

CHAPTER 1

Asymmetrical Rivals: The Enemy Next Time

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Isaiah Berlin, in a famous essay, once wrote that thinkers could be classified either as foxes or hedgehogs. He wrote, “the fox knows many things, but the hedgehog knows one big thing.”¹ After watching the U.S. military demolish the Iraqi armed forces in the 1991 Gulf War over the occupation of Kuwait, one such hedgehog, the Chief of Staff of India’s Air Force, concluded that the lesson of Operation Desert Storm for future U.S. opponents was “do not fight the United States without nuclear weapons.” His conclusion was that no state, particularly no Third World state, could hope to defeat the U.S. military in a straight force-on-force conventional war.

Perhaps the Indian general was too specific in his advice since a more general formulation would gain a greater consensus from other strategists, namely, “don’t fight the United States by conventional means; use an asymmetrical strategy and unconventional weapons to offset U.S. conventional military superiority.”

In the twelve years between Operation Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom, little has changed to cause a strategist to alter this advice. Challengers are well advised not to take the U.S. armed forces on in conventional battle. One reason this is so is the massive investment that America puts into organizing, training and equipping its armed forces. The United States has fewer than five percent of the world’s population but consumes and produces twenty-five percent of the world’s GNP. With such riches, the U.S. Government is able to outspend all rivals in the area of military capabilities.

For example, the administration of President George W. Bush in February 2003 “requested \$399.1 billion for the U.S. military in Fiscal Year 2004, \$379.9 billion for the Defense Department and \$19.3 billion for the nuclear weapons functions of the Department of Energy.”² This

figure does not count the additional \$37 billion for the Homeland Security Department or the tens of billions in supplemental funding for Operation Iraqi Freedom. Put another way, the United States defense budget expenditures in 2001 were more than the combined expenditures of the next 12 states in the worldwide defense spending pecking order. Note the comparisons in 2001 in Table 1 below:³

Table 1
Military Expenditures in 2001 (in U.S. dollars)

Russia -----	63.7 B
China -----	46.0 B
Japan -----	39.5 B
United Kingdom -----	35.7 B
France -----	32.9 B
Germany -----	26.9 B
Italy -----	20.9 B
India -----	14.1 B
S. Korea -----	11.2 B
Brazil -----	10.5 B
Taiwan -----	10.4 B
Israel -----	10.4 B
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	Total \$322.2 B
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United States	\$322.4 B

The U.S. military budget increased to \$379 billion in FY2003 before the multi-billion dollar supplement was voted for Operation Iraqi Freedom. The \$48 billion increase, in the regular U.S. military expenditures between FY2002 and FY2003, was larger than the total annual military expenditures of any other state except Russia. Such disparities in resources mean that the outcome of Operation Iraqi Freedom was never in doubt from the outset.

The United States has become the world's military superpower, and its decisive victories against Iraq in 1991 and 2003, Serbia in 1999, and the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2002 all serve notice to its opponents that to

take the United States head on in a conventional war is regime suicide. Enemies of the United States thus are driven to seek asymmetric means of preparing to fight or in attempting to deter United States use of force against them in the future.

For this reason, the enemy in the war next time likely will employ unconventional warfare strategies rather than suffer the same fate as the regimes of Saddam Hussein, Slobodan Milosevic and Mullah Omar.

A number of asymmetrical strategies are likely to be employed by the next enemy to emerge. Hit-and-run terrorist tactics will likely be emphasized even more by those who oppose and are determined to inflict damage on the United States. Cells of Al-Qaeda terrorists will continue to attack Americans, and U.S. and allied targets of opportunity until the U.S.-led Global War on Terrorism destroys their leadership, along with the state sponsors of such terrorists.

Dealing effectively with such shadowy adversaries could be the work of many years as the sources of their discontent cannot be fully addressed short of decades of re-education, economic development, settlement of outstanding international issues such as the Arab-Israeli conflict, and a persistent and global counter-terror campaign involving most of the countries of the world.

When rooting out the terrorist cells and groups allied with Al-Qaeda, the United States and its allies must pursue a careful strategy that preserves and expands its allies in the Muslim world and one that is careful not to galvanize a worldwide anti-U.S. reaction in the 45 countries that contain Muslim majorities or large pluralities. One-sixth of the world's population follow Islam as their religion and care must be made to separate the few jihadists from the vast majority of peaceful Muslims when combating terrorists. Otherwise, in the worst case, the U.S.-led war against terrorism could polarize into a war pitting the United States against a large fraction of the billion plus people who make up the Islamic world, a Herculean task that could have no good ending.⁴

It may have been the underlying strategy of Osama bin Laden and his Al-Qaeda followers when they planned the airline hijackings and lethal attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon on September 11, 2001, to do more than inflict pain on the United States. They may also have been trying to persuade it to withdraw from Muslim lands and claimed territory. Further they may have sought to spark a worldwide holy war

that would mobilize Islamic fighters throughout the Muslim lands, influenced either by the 9/11 assault or, perhaps, by the anticipated draconian U.S. reactions or over-reactions.

Osama bin Laden's fatwa urging a jihad against Americans was published in *Al Quds al-Arabia* on 23 February 1998 and characterizes the conflict as one of Islam versus the Crusader-Zionist alliance. In it he clearly tries to rally Muslims worldwide by his inflammatory rhetoric. He asserts as "facts" that "the United States has been occupying the lands of Islam in the holiest places, the Arabian Peninsula, plundering its riches, dictating to its rulers, humiliating its people, terrorizing its neighbors, and turning its bases in the Peninsula into a spearhead through which to fight the neighboring Muslim peoples."⁵

The Al-Qaeda leader then attempted to mobilize the Muslim community by declaring that:

"We with God's help call on every Muslim who believes in God and wishes to be rewarded to comply with God's order to kill the Americans and plunder their money wherever and whenever they find it. We also call on Muslim ulema, leaders, youths, and soldiers to launch the raid on Satan's U.S. troops and the devil's supporters allying with them, and to displace those who are behind them so that they may learn a lesson."⁶

Thus, the war next time might well be another clash with elements of bin Laden's radical Islamic groups, the state sponsors of such groups or other rogue states.

Out of the 192 countries that populate the international system at present there are less than 10 that stand out as actual or potential adversaries of The United States. These states have a combination of traits that mark them for special attention. First, their leaders have overtly identified the United States as their adversary. Second, they have been state sponsors of international terrorism, offering arms, financial support, and encouragement, training and/or safe haven. Third, they have a record of hostile and violent actions taken against Americans, U.S. allies, and U.S. interests. Fourth, and this makes them especially dangerous, they have either already acquired some types of mass casualty weapons or they seek such weapons. Fifth, they have record of collusion with similar states

and groups of concern to augment each other's military capabilities, and plan actions against the United States and its allies. Finally, they are prone to violent solutions to disputes and endanger the peace and security of their regions and that of the United States.⁷

Such states as Iran, North Korea, Syria, Libya, Cuba, and Sudan fit this overall pattern, some more than others. Afghanistan under the Taliban and Iraq under Saddam Hussein, until their demise, also fit this mold. In addition to these rogue regimes, there are thirty-six international terrorist groups that top the U.S. watch list.⁸ Al-Qaeda, an umbrella organization that connects many of them in the Islamic world, is the number one concern at present and has been seen to be behind such violent events as:

- The 1993 attack of the World Trade Center.
- The 2001 September 11th attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon.
- The 1998 bombing of the U.S. Embassies in Tanzania and Kenya.
- The 1996 bombing of the U.S. troop barracks at Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia.
- The 2000 attack on the USS Cole when anchored at port in Yemen.
- Financing and planning numerous other terrorist events such as the blowing up of airliners, attempted assassinations of heads of state, and kidnappings.

These international terrorists of Islamic persuasion are imbedded in groups and cells of groups scattered throughout over 60 countries in the world, especially drawn from the disaffected in the 22 Arab states and other 29 non-Arab states with large Muslim populations.⁹

Indeed, elements within official U.S. allies, such as Saudi Arabia, are often the chief financial and ideological contributors to such radical terrorist groups. Note that 15 of the 19 participants in the September 11th hijackings, and subsequent attacks, were citizens of Saudi Arabia, as was Osama bin Laden, leader of Al-Qaeda.

Added to this mix of potential adversaries are the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Russian Republic. At present, these states appear to be partners of the United States in some projects, trade rivals in others, and possible future peer competitors in other situations. China is ruled by a Communist Party that still identifies the United States as its most likely military opponent in its military literature and war games. Also, the U.S. protection and friendly association with Taiwan points toward a possible future crisis with the People's Republic of China, should Taiwan too openly declare its independence or should the PRC act too boldly to force its subjection. Clearly, there remain many hostile elements within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the Chinese government and Chinese military that predispose China to regard the United States as a future military opponent despite an enormous trade volume that has developed between the two states.

Chinese military writers have paid close attention to U.S. military victories in Iraq, Serbia, Kuwait, and Afghanistan and have emphasized the need both to embrace the new tools in the latest revolution in military affairs and the utility of adapting unconventional and asymmetrical methods of waging war to offset U.S. conventional capabilities.

Indeed, it would be surprising if future opponents such as these in a future military conflict did not seriously pursue asymmetrical capabilities to level the playing field against the U.S. giant. As the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in *Joint Vision 2020* has stated:

“In the face of such strong (U.S.) capabilities, the appeal of asymmetric approaches and the focus on the development of which capabilities will increase. By developing and using approaches that avoid U.S. strengths and exploit potential vulnerabilities using significantly different methods of operation, adversaries will attempt to create conditions that effectively delay, deter, or counter the application of U.S. military capabilities.”¹⁰

In defeating Saddam Hussein's Iraq in the Spring of 2003, the United States National Security team planned against a number of possible Iraqi unconventional war scenarios. There was the worry about the possible use of Iraqi chemical and biological weapons. There were a number of

possible times in the conflict that Iraqi forces might have plausibly used chemical and or biological weapons to disrupt the allied attack.

First, Iraq might have used such weapons on coalition forces as they massed in neighboring countries such as Kuwait or as the U.S.-U.K. forces poured personnel, equipment and supplies through regional seaports of debarkation. While this was a possibility, Saddam Hussein was unlikely to use his WMD in this preemptory fashion since his best hope of survival was to prevent the war from happening and such an attack would bring on the conflict. Using chemical and biological weapons, which he had denied having, would have lost him the last international support he had. International pressure against the war, in turn, was his last best hope of preventing the U.S.-U.K. invasion in a war he probably realized he could not win once it began.

A second place and time when some feared an Iraqi use of chemical and biological weapons was when the allied army approached and massed before the bridges crossing the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers on the march to Baghdad. Indeed, a number of Iraqi Republican Guard units blocking the way had, at the ready, their individual protective equipment including protective overgarments, gloves, boots, and masks, as if they anticipated such a chemical barrage even though none materialized.

A third scenario envisioned by some was the possible Iraqi use of chemical and biological weapons in the defense of Baghdad as U.S. forces approached the outskirts of the Iraqi capital. Again, this did not happen for reasons yet to be explained. Indeed, two key divisions of the Iraqi Republican Guards (IRG) were sent South of the city to intercept and turn back the allied Army approaching rapidly. Once in the open, and without an Iraqi aircraft in the sky, these IRG divisions were destroyed by lethal precision air and ground strikes. It appears that they were sent naked into battle as a delaying tactic, a sacrifice to allow the regime leaders to escape the trap that Baghdad was becoming.

Finally, some feared possible Iraqi revenge strikes where Iraqi forces would be ordered to launch missiles with chemical and biological warheads at surrounding countries that had cooperated with U.S.-U.K. invasion forces, cities in places like Kuwait and Qatar, for example. Indeed, it might have been just such a specter that Turkish politicians feared when they voted against allowing U.S. forces to go through Turkey to attack Iraq on a second front North of Baghdad as well as from the

South through Kuwait. Fortunately, Saddam Hussein, his sons, and the other remnants of his leadership either rejected or could not execute this Samson option in the end game of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

So, the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein was inept in its military tactics, strategy, and operations. They chose to hide, export, or eliminate their chemical and biological weapons rather than use them. They did not use WMD to disrupt the U.S.-U.K. attacks, nor did they deter such an attack. Further, they did not use WMD in the defense of Baghdad, choosing instead to melt away and to fight a rearguard, and not very effective, hit-and-run guerrilla war that still persists at the time of this writing (in the fall of 2003).

Thus, in the last engagement fought, the United States and allied forces encountered limited effective asymmetrical resistance, mostly after main enemy forces were defeated. However, the United States would be wise to continue to prepare fully against future foes who may be far more astute strategists and practitioners of the military art¹¹ who may employ mass casualty weapons, utilize effective urban and guerrilla warfare tactics, utilize underground hardened shelters, launch ballistic and cruise missiles from hidden and mobile launchers, and attack our command, control and communications and ISR assets either with special operations forces, air strikes, ground strikes or cyber attacks.

For example, no such easy victory, as was achieved twice versus Iraqi forces in 1991 and 2003, is likely to be duplicated were the United States to go to war in the future with a rival as formidable as North Korea.

Indeed, a war in Korea might see multiple uses of unconventional tactics and weapons. It is possible that a conflict with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) would involve clashes of million-man armies on each side and hundreds of thousands of artillery rounds fired across the DMZ in the first hours of combat, many into heavily populated cities like Seoul. Also, North Korea is reputed to have over 90,000 special forces that might be directed to infiltrate the ROK and operate behind allied lines in a lethal guerrilla campaign.¹²

North Korean forces might attempt to cross the DMZ through tunnels, perhaps after attempting to soften up U.S. and Republic of Korea (ROK) forces through a combination of biological and chemical attacks. For example, such a rogue state armed with both might lead with non-lethal but incapacitating biological weapons such as Staphylococcal Enterotoxin B (SEB) and follow with non-persistent nerve

gas strikes using an agent such as Sarin to create weak points in the U.S. and allied defenses that their conventional combat divisions could then pour through.

North Korean nuclear weapons might be kept in reserve as a deterrent to U.S. nuclear use, or might be utilized in high altitude nuclear bursts to create electromagnetic pulse (EMP) effects to blind U.S. satellites and destroy their downlinks, thereby robbing the U.S./ROK of much of its command, control, communications and intelligence (C³I) connectivity advantages. It could also possibly disable U.S. satellite guidance of U.S. warplanes and precision guided munitions.

North Korean chemical, biological, and radiological weapons carried by Special Operations Forces (SOF), cruise missiles, and No Dong missiles could also contaminate ports in the Republic of Korea and Japan, interfering with U.S. re-supply and reinforcement efforts by disrupting work at the airfields and ports, possibly creating panic that, in turn, could cause Japanese politicians to close Japan's seaports and airfields to U.S. ships and aircraft.

Thus, if the next conflict were to take place on the Korean Peninsula, the U.S.-ROK casualty rate likely would be very high, and the degree of difficulty in confronting a formidable asymmetric adversary like North Korea would be daunting, even for the world's only military superpower. This is especially true for a state like the United States that is also saddled with the occupation and reconstitution of Iraq as well as a worldwide campaign against Al-Qaeda and other terrorist threats, while simultaneously shouldering a host of other security responsibilities.

In addition to security challenges on the rimlands of Eurasia, the continental United States could be a battlefield in the next conflict. Indeed, the global war on terrorism presently is being fought in the 50 states as well as outside U.S. borders. If any ruler of a radical regime wishes to defeat the United States in an escalating conflict on its home turf it probably should look at what caused the U.S. retreats from Vietnam, Lebanon, and Somalia. The best means of defeating the United States is not on the military battlefield against U.S. forces, but rather by somehow affecting the U.S. political will at home. Attacks on U.S. forces abroad or on targets in the United States might, over time, raise the threshold of pain high enough so that the U.S. leadership would decide to end the conflict by bringing American forces home.

Saddam Hussein once declared that the United States was so casualty adverse that it would not pay the price of more than 5,000 combat deaths in a regional conflict before it would withdraw.¹³ He based this on his perceptions of the U.S. withdrawals from Vietnam and Lebanon, and the decline of U.S. political support for those military force deployments after U.S. forces got sufficiently bloodied. Saddam never got to test his 5,000 threshold theory in either Desert Storm or Operation Iraqi Freedom because he miscalculated the capabilities of his large, but ineffective, Iraqi Revolutionary Guard divisions. U.S. casualties in both wars combined, at this writing, are less than 500 total killed in action.

Striking the U.S. homeland is likely to be a losing strategy for a rival. It is far more likely to stir up a hornet's nest, rather than to coerce a U.S. peace initiative. Adversaries who attack the United States on its own territory in an attempt to destroy U.S. popular support for the war next time, however, will be playing with fire and are more likely to be burned badly by their own actions. While desiring the Mogadishu effect, they may be unleashing, instead, the Pearl Harbor or Post-9/11 effect of galvanizing fierce U.S. popular support for military retaliation. Rather than tie the U.S. President's hands, they may loose a tsunami of support for all-out war against the attacker.

As we consider what adversaries we might confront in future conflicts, additional care needs to be taken in planning war termination end games in order to prepare better to win the peace after winning the main military phase of the war. Critics of both Operation Iraqi Freedom in the Spring of 2003 and Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan in 2002 argue that the primary military engagement phase of operations was better planned and executed than the subsequent phase of mopping up resistance, establishing a new regime and getting the Iraqi society back up and running again.

The parties to a war may choose to terminate a conflict for a number of reasons. One analyst of conflict end games identifies four theories of war termination:¹⁴

- **Winners and Losers Theory:** This "theory of termination would predict that when a state's forces were decisively defeated and the state's leaders realized that they lost the war, they would be compelled to seek an end to the war."¹⁵

- **Cost Benefit Theory:** This is “the idea that the decision to terminate a war is a rational cost benefit calculation.”¹⁶ Here the explanation is that decision-makers are predicted to only pursue their war aims through military engagement until the “marginal costs of continuing the war are not worth the objective, then the State’s leaders will decide to terminate the war.”¹⁷
- **Political Leadership Shift Theory:** Another explanation of why some wars are terminated is that, while leaders who plunge their states into war may be too committed to change their direction, they may be replaced in mid-course by others who are less invested in their course, who will seek peace if the war costs mount and victory seems elusive.¹⁸
- **Second Order Change Theory:** A fourth partial theory of how wars may be terminated is that, in some cases, the war begins to threaten higher values than those for which the war was launched, perhaps even the existence of the state itself. Thus, the war itself, once seen as the solution to problems, becomes the major problem itself, and must be terminated.¹⁹

In both Afghanistan and Iraq, guerrilla and other low intensity warfare continues at the time of this writing, even though both the Taliban rulers and Saddam Hussein’s Ba’athist regime have been toppled and are unlikely ever to be reconstituted. In Iraq, the United States has suffered more combat deaths in this “post war” guerrilla stage than in the “wartime” large unit engagement stage of the conflict.

Endings of wars against determined opponents may require prolonged and bloody pacification campaigns. Few wars end like athletic conflicts where at a certain moment the game is over, a winner and loser are certified, and the record book is closed. Rather, wars end when the losing side is either terminated or has been so decisively beaten it has completely lost the will to fight on further. It helps greatly if a respected adversary leader formally capitulates and orders his or her own partisans to lay down their arms and cease hostilities, such as was the case when Emperor Hirohito ordered the Japanese to surrender in August 1945, ending the Pacific phase of World War II. Few major wars end so cleanly and some drag on for years after the decisive battles have been fought.

Clearly, if the United States and its allies fight future wars such as Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom, they should have their planners relate the military campaign plans to the post-war rebuilding plans so that success in the first does not make success extraordinarily difficult in the latter. For example, it might be wise to develop the Air Tasking Order by keeping in mind the post-war nation-building requirements to come. Effects based targeting ought to consider the immediate military effects of taking down the assets of the adversary regime as well as simultaneously considering the long-term effects of rebuilding what is being taken down.

In the realm of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) asset targeting, the United States was careful in the 2003 Iraq campaign to attack only possible WMD delivery vehicles rather than biology laboratories, pharmaceutical plants, and possible WMD storage sites, because the latter types of targets, if hit, might cause considerable downwind and site contamination of the Iraqi civilian population, and the United States and its allies might then have been accused of using such weapons themselves as the disease agents or chemical contamination spread.

In future conflicts the United States is well advised if it were to develop a sufficient WMD elimination plan complete with:

- Sufficient numbers of trained inspectors.
- Chemical and biological sensors.
- A mobile on-site laboratory for early identification of biological and chemical agents found.
- Adequate decontamination equipment and supplies.
- Sufficient transportation for inspectors, decontamination teams, laboratory technicians, and guards.
- U.S. and allied interrogators with sufficient language skills necessary to question and understand indigenous scientists who previously worked on adversary WMD projects.
- Human intelligence that could pinpoint the locations of adversary WMD laboratories, research institutes, production facilities, storage sites, and deployed or hidden weapons.

- A system of rewards for cooperative adversary state scientists who substantially cooperate with U.S. officials in locating WMD infrastructure, materials, delivery systems and weapons.

In addition to WMD inspectors and elimination teams, post-war planning will require a comprehensive blueprint of how to turn essential services back on after the society's critical infrastructure has taken a pounding during the war. For example, teams of experts will be needed to restart the electrical power grid and get the telecommunications network (telephones, internet, radio, television, etc.) back into working order.

Police Forces will have to be brought in to augment and retrain the newly constituted local police to prevent looting, lawless behavior, and thievery that could otherwise flower in the chaotic aftermath of a military occupation.

Other U.S. and allied experts should be at the ready to reconstitute the banking and financial institutions, and health experts should be primed to oversee the maintenance of health service delivery. Water supplies must be protected and transportation (road mobile, railroad, air travel, and sea travel) routes must be protected, maintained, and kept open. Food supply and distribution systems have to be reconstituted and clean water supplies provided to the population of a defeated state. Public health facilities need to be maintained, supplied, and augmented. Roads, bridges, and tunnels will need to be repaired and reopened. Emergency services need to be reconnected to prevent chaos. Mail and shipping systems would need to be put back into operation, as would the major industrial plants, farms, ranches, and retail markets. Finally, the occupying power would need to provide the whole spectrum of government services formerly provided by the defeated regime, including a new set of laws and ordinances to keep order, provide services, and reassure the population about its future. Meanwhile, during this reconstitution of the society phase, U.S. and allied forces would have to gain full military and police control within the borders of the defeated country to combat the remnants of the defeated regime still offering resistance. To get an entire country back on its feet after a wartime collapse is an immense task and would potentially require tens of thousands of specialists to restore the infrastructure and restore vital services.

In conclusion, it appears that the United States is going to win most or all of its wars in the near term. The adversary must fight asymmetrically

if he is to have much of a chance at a stalemate or victory. It is likely that one of those asymmetrical strategies will involve chemical and biological warfare attacks and the use of terrorist surrogates.²⁰ The United States must anticipate these asymmetrical strategies and organize, train and equip to fight and win such conflicts as well as the conventional fights it is so proficient in conducting. But winning the immediate war is just part of the planning that must take place. Winning the peace after major hostilities have ended is just as important, for that is why the war would be fought in the first place. Thus, the U.S. and its allies must plan end-to-end strategies of war, war termination, and peace construction, and these strategies must be dovetailed to accomplish our ends against asymmetrical adversaries in the war next time.

Notes

1. Isaiah Berlin, *The Hedgehog and the Fox* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1953). He wrote that this was a fragment from something written by the Greek poet Archilochus “which says: ‘the fox knows many things, but the hedgehog knows one big thing.’ Scholars have differed about the correct interpretation of these dark words, which may mean no more than that the fox, for all his cunning, is defeated by the hedgehog’s one defense. But taken figuratively, the words can be made to yield a sense in which they mark one of the deepest differences which divide writers and thinkers, and, it may be, human beings in general. For there exists a great chasm between those, on one side, who relate everything to a single central vision, one system less or more coherent or articulate, in terms of which they understand, think and feel – a single, universal, organizing principle in terms of which alone all that they are and say has significance – and, on the other side, those who pursue many ends, often unrelated and even contradictory, connected, if at all, only in some de facto way, for some psychological or physiological cause, related by no moral or aesthetic principle.”...The first kind of intellectual and artistic personality belongs to the hedgehogs, the second to the foxes; and without insisting on a rigid classification, we may, without too much fear of contradiction, say that , in this sense, Dante belongs in the first category, Shakespeare to the second; Plato, Lucretius, Pascal, Hegel, Dostovevsky, Nietzsche, Ibsen, Proust are, in varying degrees, hedgehogs; Herodotus, Aristotle, Montaigne, Erasmus, Moliere, Goethe, Pushkin, Balzac Joyce are foxes.” See on the Internet the excerpt from Berlin’s work, http://www.cc.gatech.edu/people/home/idris/Essays/Hedge_n_Fox.htm.

2. Center for Defense Information (CDI), “Fiscal Year 2004 Budget.” See <http://www.cdi.org/budget/2004/highlights.cfin>.

3. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 2002-2003 (London: Oxford University Press, 2003), 332-336.

4. See Samuel P. Huntington, the Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996). Huntington argues that the world is divided into seven very different “civilizations” the Western, Islamic, Hindu, Sinic, African, Latin American, Orthodox, Buddhist, and Japanese. He suggests that the bases of future wars, at their root, will be in the clash of those holding these very different competing worldviews. See his section on “Islam and the West,” 209-216.

5. See Simon Reeve, The New Jackals: Ramzi Yousef, Osama Bin Laden, and The Future of Terrorism (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1999), 268.

6. *Ibid.*, 270.

7. As stated in the U.S. National Security Strategy issued by the Administration of President George W. Bush, a small number of rogue states share a number of attributes, including the fact that these regimes: “brutalize their own people and squander their national resources for the personal gain of leaders; display no regard for international law, threaten their neighbors, and callously violate international treaties to which they are party; are determined to acquire weapons of mass destruction, along with other advanced military technology, to be used as threats or offensively to achieve the aggressive designs of their regimes; sponsor terrorism around the world; reject human values and hate the United States and everything for which it stands.”

8. These Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations can be found in the U.S. State Department’s annual report *Patterns of Global Terrorism*, issued each April. In 2003, they include the following: Abu Nidal Organization, Abu Sayyaf Group, Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, Armed Islamic Group, Asbat al-Ansar, Aum Shinrikyo or Aleph, Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA), Communist Party of the Philippines/New People’s Army, Al-Gama’a al-Islammiyya, HAMAS, Harakat ul-Mujahidin, Hizballah (party of God), Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Jaish-e Mohammed, Jamaah Islamiya, Al-Jihad (Egyptian Islamic Jihad), Kahane Chai (Kach), Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK), Lashkar-e Tayyiba, Lashkar I Jhanvi, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Ewelam, Mujahedin e-Khalq Organization (MEK), National Liberation Army (ELN) of Columbia, Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ), Palestine Liberation Front (PLF), Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), Al-Qaeda, Real IRA, Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC), Revolutionary Nuclei, Revolutionary Organization 17 November, Sendero Luminosos (Shining Path or SL), and the United Self Defense Forces/Group of Columbia.

9. The 22 Arab states with large Muslim majorities are Algeria, Bahrain, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates and

Yemen. None are yet democracies. The 29 other states with Muslim majorities or large pluralities are as follows: Indonesia, Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Turkey, Iran, Nigeria, China, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, Tanzania, Russia, Malaysia, Mali, Senegal, Niger, Azerbaijan, Somalia, Kazakstan, Guinea, Burkina Faso, United States, Tajikistan, Congo Democratic Republic, Turkmenistan, C'ote D'Ivoire, Chad, and Cameroon.

10. General Henry W. Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 2000), 6.

11. Saddam Hussein's application to a military academy in Iraq was rejected when he was still a teenager. His lack of military training and experience handicapped him severely in his many military adventures. Perhaps the officials at the Baghdad military academy were correct about his military potential. Indeed, General Charles Horner, the U.S. Joint Air Force Commander in Desert Storm, maintains that the coalition in the 1991 Gulf War was fortunate that it missed killing Saddam since, "as General Schwarzkopf pointed out after the war, Saddam Hussein was a lousy strategist, and thus a good man to have in charge of Iraqi armed forces, under the circumstances." See Tom Clancy and Charles A. Horner, Every Man A Tiger (New York: J.P. Putnam, 1999), 515.

12. Kim Il Sung, the first President of the DPRK, was a Special Forces officer operating on the side of the Russian and Communist Chinese armed forces in Manchuria during WWII. His orientation toward Special Operations Forces (SOF) has had a lasting impact on the major SOF emphasis in the North Korea military forces from 1945 to the present.

13. See Avigdor Haselkorn, The Continuing Storm: Iraq, Poisonous Weapons, and Deterrence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999), 53.

14. Joseph A. Englebrecht, "War Termination: Why Does A State Decide to Stop Fighting," PhD. Dissertation, Columbia University, New York, 1992, 24-25.

15. *Ibid.*, 29.

16. *Ibid.*, 31.

17. *Ibid.*

18. *Ibid.*, 34-36.

19. *Ibid.*, 36-45.

20. See Jim A. Davis and Barry R. Schneider, Editors, The Gathering Biological Warfare Storm (Maxwell AFB, AL: USAF Counterproliferation Center, 2002) in paperback. Also, this is forthcoming in hardback, published by Praeger in 2004