From the thesis: "This thesis applies strategic forecasting to the field of cyberbiosecurity, a rapidly evolving discipline at the intersection of genomic science, artificial intelligence, and cybersecurity. Through four original scenarios, it examines threats emerging from planetary research, geopolitical genomic espionage, domestic infrastructure sabotage, and individual-targeted medical device manipulation. Each narrative covers different dimensions of vulnerability and institutional failure, reinforcing the need for proactive, systems-based policy frameworks. Drawing lessons from the history of CBRN [Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear] governance, the thesis proposes a multidimensional doctrine for cyberbiosecurity resilience that is grounded in adaptive policy, integrated agency coordination, and a redefinition of the bioeconomy as national security infrastructure. Ultimately, the work provides a strategic path for anticipating and mitigating cyberbio threats before they become irreversible crises."