From the thesis abstract: "There is a common view within the United States Army that Information Operations is a military doctrine designed to win a 'battle of ideas' within human populations. This monograph refutes this understanding of Information Operations by tracing the doctrine's underlying design throughout its historical evolution, from its Soviet origins until present. In the late Cold War, increased reliance on both radio-electronic communications and computer automation introduced a new vulnerability: the military command and control function was itself subject to attack through the electromagnetic spectrum. The Soviet military was the first to identify the potential advantage associated with attacking an enemy's command and control function by disrupting its radio-electronic 'nervous system.' By 1974, the Soviets embraced a doctrine known as Radio-electronic Combat (REC) to realize this advantage. REC integrated a combination of disruptive and destructive means, to include signal jamming and the physical destruction of critical nodes. The ensuing disruption of radio-electronic information flows was expected to paralyze or misguide adversary military action. In 1979 the American military responded to REC with a doctrine of its own, known as Command Control Communication Countermeasures (C3CM.) Comprised of physical destruction, jamming, operations security, and deception, C3CM shared the Soviet doctrine's essentials, to include its principle elements, its emphasis on operational integration, and its intended effects on enemy command and control. In 1993, the Department of Defense recast C3CM as Command and Control Warfare (C2W), adding psychological operations (PSYOP), an additional capability that proved useful in breaking enemy information flows during the preceding Gulf War. The information revolution and consequent Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) debate of the 1990s led to further rebranding of the C2W doctrine. In 1996, the US Army published FM 100-6 Information Operations. At the core of this new doctrine was an old concept - the integration of military capabilities to disrupt or degrade an adversary's command and control. However, during the Bosnia and Kosovo peacekeeping operations, and in the counterinsurgencies of Iraq and Afghanistan, Army forces would look to Information Operations as a means to influence the ideas, sentiments, and attitudes of civilian populations. This monograph argues that a discrepancy now exists between Information Operations, as designed and Information Operations as practiced."