From the Conclusion, "In Syria, our current benefactor-proxy relationship seems plagued by divergent objectives and interests while the U.S. operational approach is characterized by seemingly disjointed, poorly coordinated, and competitive efforts. At the very least, in other words, our Syria Train and Equip intervention appears to violate at least two principles of joint operations (objective and unity of command/unity of effort). The full-spectrum approach to unconventional warfare described in this paper could have resulted in a quite different outcome for Syria. Early U.S. UW [unconventional warfare] engagement, effective influence and coercion actions, and a more disciplined approach to nonviolent civil resistance could have resulted in early regime change favorable to U.S. interests. This could have been followed immediately by a host nation-initiated U.S. foreign internal defense (FID) engagement to begin the process of retraining the Syrian military and forestalling any counter-revolution or countercoup activity. Russian intervention, the enormous refugee crisis that continues to plague Europe and Turkey, and the lingering potential for increased U.S. force commitment might all have been averted. Furthermore, and most important, such a FID engagement with a newly legitimized Syrian military and police force, coupled with coordinated defense efforts with neighboring Turkey and Jordan, could have gone far in preventing encroachment on sovereign Syrian territory by the so-called Islamic State."