31 Mar, 2005
Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction: Report to the President of the United States
United States. Government Printing Office
"Our unanimous report is based on a lengthy investigation, during which we interviewed hundreds of experts from inside and outside the Intelligence Community and reviewed thousands of documents. Our report offers 74 recommendations for improving the U.S. Intelligence Community (all but a handful of which we believe can be implemented without statutory change). But among these recommendations a few points merit special emphasis. We conclude that the Intelligence Community was dead wrong in almost all of its pre-war judgments about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. This was a major intelligence failure. Its principal causes were the Intelligence Community's inability to collect good information about Iraq's WMD [weapons of mass destruction] programs, serious errors in analyzing what information it could gather, and a failure to make clear just how much of its analysis was based on assumptions, rather than good evidence. On a matter of this importance, we simply cannot afford failures of this magnitude."
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Author
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Publisher
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Date31 Mar, 2005
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CopyrightPublic Domain
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Retrieved FromCommission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction: www.wmd.gov/about.html
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Formatpdf
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Media Typeapplication/pdf
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