The Global War on Terrorism: Is “where next” really the right question?

by

Eric A. Pohland
U.S. Air Force

Dr. Anthony Joes
Project Advisor

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any of its agencies.

U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013
The devastating attacks of modern terrorism have necessitated a new national and international posture: responding to terrorism as war. This is the case in the current U.S. led war in Afghanistan, and the successes there have resulted in a great deal of media coverage and speculation on where the U.S. will attack next for “phase-two” in the war on terrorism. The areas most frequently indicated for this phase-two include: Iraq, Somalia, Pakistan, Yemen, Philippines and Colombia. But a review of the proposed military actions in these countries reflect little in-depth analysis or justification to truly provide serious debate or recommendations required to win the war against terror. This is primarily due to the fact that the vast preponderance of the discussion on a next phase in the war has centered strictly on U.S. military actions, with virtually no attention to U.S. national interests or policy in a manner equating to a full strategic analysis.

Fortunately there are tools and methodologies for just such an analysis. These include criteria on which to base a “phase-two” decision, as well as a strategic framework on which to build an analysis. That framework is provided succinctly by the Army War College in its “ends, ways, and means” paradigm. Inclusive in this framework is a presentation of the elements of national power and their applicability to strategic analysis of national issues. Asking “where next” for the U.S. military may be a great media ploy, but it will be of little avail in enhancing long-range U.S. interests. It is rather in a strategic context that we need to address the war on terrorism.
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THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM: IS “WHERE NEXT” REALLY THE RIGHT QUESTION?

Terrorism – premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents usually intended to influence an audience.

—22 U.S.C. 2656(d)

Terrorist attack September 11, 2001 – four fully fueled and loaded passenger aircraft were hijacked by terrorists and corrupted into use as massively powerful guided bombs. Three of the four aircraft were flown into their targets, destroying the World Trade Center buildings in New York, and part of the Pentagon in Washington DC. On the fourth, passengers and crew bravely attempted to regain control of the aircraft, and successfully crippled the terrorist’s plans. Tragically, the terrorists were still able to crash the aircraft. In the aftermath, all four aircraft were destroyed, killing all on-board and over 3000 other innocent people. Hundreds more were injured, and property damages exceed an estimated one billion dollars. The magnitude and audacity of the attack shocked and outraged the U.S. and the world.

FIGURE 1 TERRORIST ATTACK ON NEW YORK, 11 SEPTEMBER 2001

The full impact of this tragedy is yet to be measured, but it has already proven to be the watershed event in international response to terrorism. Terrorism had now crossed the threshold to war. With substantial and credible evidence indicting Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda network, the U.S. launched a massive military campaign to destroy al-Qaeda and their state sponsors (the Taliban government) in Afghanistan. With surprising speed, the U.S. destroyed terrorist forces and base camps in Afghanistan. And, in concert with the Afghan
Northern Alliance executed a regime change that pushed the Taliban out of existence and put in place a new Afghan government. The speed and success of this effort (frequently referred to as “phase one” of the war on terrorism), along with President Bush’s mandate that the U.S. will search out terrorists and their state sponsors wherever they are, has led to significant speculation and discussion on “phase two” (or where next) for the war against terrorism.

This “where next” discussion has focused almost exclusively on the continued military application of U.S. power in specific countries or locations. The media and other sources most frequently identify Iraq, Somalia, Pakistan, Yemen, Philippines, and Colombia as the most likely locations for U.S. military intervention (where terrorist networks are known to exist or where failed states/governments make the conditions ripe for these networks to operate). However, this very narrow approach bears great caution: by primarily isolating our efforts to examining where next strictly in terms of attacking militarily at subsequent location(s) ignores the other tools of national power and cripples our ability to win the war on terrorism in the long term. This then is the crux of the issue: asking the question “where next” in isolation and in the absence of a broader policy approach makes the question itself irrelevant. Before asking “where next”, the U.S. must develop a strategic, full spectrum approach to the war on terrorism.

SCOPE AND PURPOSE

This paper began as an effort to gather together and analyze the varied and substantial speculation on the theorized “phase two” of the U.S. war on terrorism. Within just months of the 11 September terrorist attack, the U.S. military was being credited with marked success in the campaign against terrorism in Afghanistan. Skilled use of special operations forces and a highly successful bombing campaign destroyed and routed the al-Qaeda terrorists and eliminated the Taliban government. With this enormous success as a backdrop, television news, magazine and newspaper articles, and even government sources began to air and publicize stories suggesting their ideas on where the U.S. military would be used next in the war. Thus, the initial effort was to ‘dig-in’ to these varied guesses and come up with the right answer – where we should go next, and why. This paper begins in that vein, with a review of those countries most often proposed for the next phase of the war on terrorism.

In doing so however, it became increasingly apparent that limiting the context of the discussion of U.S. counter-terrorist efforts to where our military forces should go next was parallel to “exploring the symptoms, rather than the disease.” If we truly want to analyze this issue (ultimately leading to a strategy that would win the war on terrorism), we need to ask not
only where to attack, but, why, in what ways, and to what ends? That is the ultimate purpose of this paper.

CURRENT WAR ON TERRORISM – AFGHANISTAN

Military actions (Operation Enduring Freedom began October 7, 2001) throughout phase one of the war on terrorism have been highly successful. The al-Qaeda terrorist network has been virtually routed within Afghanistan and the supporting Taliban government as well. Ongoing U.S. military actions to seek out remaining terrorists are proceeding, and humanitarian efforts and the introduction of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) are on track. The hunt for Osama bin Laden and senior al-Qaeda leaders remains, as does the potential elimination of remaining al-Qaeda pockets of resistance, and the processing and disposition of terrorist POWs. The White House lists these specific successes so far:¹

- In just weeks, the military essentially destroyed al-Qaeda’s grip on Afghanistan by driving the Taliban from power.
- Taliban leaders have surrendered major cities to opposition forces, including Kandahar, Kabul, Kunduz, and Mazar-e-Sharif.
- The military has destroyed at least 11 terrorist training camps and 39 Taliban command and control sites. The Wall Street Journal reported on December 13 that as many as 50,000 terrorists from more than 50 countries may have received training in al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan in recent years.
- About 2.5 million humanitarian rations have been dropped to aid the people of Afghanistan.
- Senior al-Qaeda and Taliban officials have been either captured or killed.
- The U.S. military rescued two American Christian aid workers who were being held as prisoners by the Taliban.

Known as the “Graveyard of Empires”, Afghanistan presented daunting challenges. In fact many analysts predicted that al-Qaeda would be extremely difficult to defeat in Afghanistan due to their vastly dispersed structure, the virtual impregnability and secrecy of their cave network, and the support of the Taliban government. But, this simply was not the case. It was an overwhelming military victory that clearly exceeded expectations. The net effect was resounding support of the U.S. populace for the war, and a clear signal to the Bush administration to continue the war on terrorism. A recent Harris Poll, 7 Feb 2002, states that 93% of those surveyed support “the U.S. continuing to fight…the war on terrorism in order to kill or capture those who planned or supported the attacks on 9/11.”²
WHERE NEXT, AND WHY

As shown above, our military success in the war on terrorism in Afghanistan remains a powerful enticement to continue in similar fashion in other potential or known terrorist hotbeds. This is certainly true if we look at the way the media has grabbed on to this issue. The major television networks have all aired varying stories on where U.S forces might go next. Major and local newspapers have run articles and editorials, as have most of the major weekly magazines. Even the foreign media has offered a deluge of speculation. The media is not alone in this however. Government officials have expressed opinions on “phase two”, as well as research agencies (AFI Research), military and private organizations (Retired Officers Association, The Heritage Foundation), and many others.

If this media blitz was simply viewed as ‘spreading the word’ on newsworthy information, or as media or personal opinions, then the media impact might end there – with little significance. This however is not the case in the U.S. or arguably any western country anymore. The media have influence on public opinion, especially when an issue is exploited repeatedly as it is with the war on terrorism, and more so when other ‘officials’ and ‘experts’ join the discussion. Otherwise stated, the vast coverage and information put out by these numerous ‘opinion makers’ does ultimately have an impact on the actions of the U.S. government. Recognizing this makes it pertinent to understand the options being presented.

IRAQ

A media and government favorite for “phase two”, much of the discussion on Iraq is anchored in the belief that the U.S. ‘failed to finish the job’ in the Gulf War and that the war on terrorism is precisely the opportunity to do so. The case being made for Iraq follows these broad guidelines; Iraq continues to impede and disregard UN resolutions (specifically UN Resolution 1284) calling for inspections of Iraqi WMD programs. There is some (though not necessarily clear) evidence that ties Saddam Hussein to a planned attempt to assassinate President George H. W. Bush in 1991, and Hussein’s regime is known for terrorist association and continuing efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction. Thus, taking the war on terrorism to Iraq would equate to ‘killing two birds with one stone’ – getting rid of the Hussein government in Iraq, and fighting global terrorism. This is precisely the effort advocated by Senator John McCain and nine other members of Congress in their letter to President Bush which in part stated: “As we work to clean up Afghanistan and destroy al Qaeda, it is imperative that we plan to eliminate the threat from Iraq.”
Directly attacking Iraq however is fraught with dangerous consequences. Most prominently, to do so could easily “shatter the international coalition (against terrorism) on which the United States was absolutely dependent.” Russian President Putin warned the U.S. against military actions in Iraq and Germany’s foreign minister Joschka Fischer said succinctly “All European nations would view a broadening to include Iraq highly skeptically….” Secondly, in light of the lack of a direct link between al-Qaeda and Iraq, a U.S. attack on Iraq would likely be viewed by many (and most especially Arab nations) as a war against Islam rather than a war against terrorism or the Hussein regime. Lastly, from a military standpoint a war against Iraq would require a massive build-up of U.S. forces in the region far beyond our efforts in Afghanistan, and potentially equal to or exceeding those necessary during the Gulf War of 1991.

SOMALIA

The primary case for taking the war to Somalia (typically portrayed as a classic failed state) is the very real possibility that al-Qaeda will use Somalia as a safe sanctuary. Muslim warlords there are known affiliates with al-Qaeda and thus the country presents an alluring next haven should the terrorist network be able to regroup in sufficient size. Additionally, though a direct link has not been established with the September 11th attack, the terrorist group al-Itihaad al-Islamiya operating in Somalia is suspected to be closely tied to al-Qaeda. A second reason for U.S. military action in Somalia is that a successful anti-terrorist campaign there would bolster U.S. clout and resolve – making up for the embarrassing withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Somalia resulting from the downing of two blackhawk helicopters and the killing of 19 American soldiers there in 1993. Lastly the nature of conflict in Somalia presents a situation similar to Afghanistan wherein regional factions in Somalia would be used to provide the primary fighting forces rather than commit significant numbers of U.S. ground troops.

The noted downside to military action in Somalia is the likelihood of high costs with very little payoff mainly because there is no significant enemy. Unlike Afghanistan, there is no ‘government’ (like the Taliban) to overthrow, and U.S. reconnaissance indicates that former terrorist camps there are abandoned. Defense Secretary Rumsfeld made that point stating “We know there have been (terrorist) training camps there…and that they, like most of them, go inactive when people get attentive to them.” In fact the reportedly predominant sentiment from the people of Somalia is that they seem to prefer U.S. military intervention in the hope of gaining greater security and stability, and U.S economic aid.
PAKISTAN

There is much speculation that Pakistan’s current cooperation with the U.S. in the war on terrorism is either a ruse or at least that significant factions within the Pakistani government and populace are undermining U.S. efforts. The Pakistan Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) service is closely tied to the Taliban and al-Qaeda, and much of the Pakistan populace openly support both. Several media sources report that up to several thousand al-Qaeda fighters (and senior al-Qaeda leaders) escaped to Pakistan and are being hidden there. Thus as Stratfor.com strongly advocates; “The next country the United States has to deal with if it wants to break al Qaeda is not Iraq or Somalia. It is Pakistan. The United States cannot begin the process of shutting down al Qaeda globally until their organization inside Pakistan is broken.”

This is in effect the heart of the argument: Pakistan continues to be the prime sanctuary for al-Qaeda terrorists, and that very sanctuary affords them the freedom of movement and action essential to their existence and operations.

The extreme difficulty in taking any action against Pakistan is that “officially” Pakistan has been our ally in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). President Bush made this point very clear in his 29 January, 2002 State of the Union Address saying: “My hope is that all nations will heed our call, and eliminate the terrorist parasites who threaten their countries and our own. Many nations are acting forcefully. Pakistan is now cracking down on terror, and I admire the strong leadership of President Musharraf.”

This represents a real quagmire for any potential U.S. military action against Pakistan. The U.S. has no intentions to overthrow or even undermine Musharraf’s regime. On the contrary, they are very much trying to support it. The U.S. fully recognizes that because of the differing factions within Pakistan (to include support for al-Qaeda), the Musharraf government is not secure enough to fully attack the terrorist network, even within its own borders. Thus the current U.S. approach there is one of great caution. If the U.S. presses Pakistan for action, or were to take unilateral U.S. military action, the result could be the fall of the government, replaced by a regime that would likely be anti-U.S. Additionally, even putting this element aside, the U.S. does not want to find itself in a position to take sides vis-a-vis the delicate balance of power and longstanding struggle between Pakistan and India.

YEMEN

The ancestral home of Osama bin Laden, Yemen is suspected of harboring a large network of al-Qaeda terrorists. In fact one U.S. government official cited Yemen as having “the second largest al-Qaeda network outside of Afghanistan.” Most notably, Yemen is directly
linked to the attack on the USS Cole resulting in the killing of 17 Navy seamen. With this backdrop, the U.S. seemingly has just cause to strike against Yemen, and tactically, (like Afghanistan) Yemen offers the U.S. the advantage of working with local military forces, rather than commit a significant U.S. ground force.

The argument against Yemen as a next target is similar to that for Somalia. There is little real government there, though those who provisionally govern Yemen have indicated support for the U.S. Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh declared: “We are dealing with the United States to confront and fight terrorism. Yemen is chasing down so-called Qaeda members and any extremist elements that cause security problems for us or for anyplace in the world.” At this point those indication seem genuine with reports that his military has already attacked suspected al-Qaeda forces there. Another factor against attacking Yemen is that following the bombing of the USS Cole, U.S. intelligence agencies turned their collective resources and focus directly on Yemen. Accordingly, it is very difficult for al-Qaeda to hide or seek sanctuary in Yemen as George Friedman, founder and chairman of STRATFOR, points out: “It is more difficult to go underground in Yemen, and U.S intelligence dollars have undoubtedly purchased the services of numerous important players in the last year. Al Qaeda won’t be able to be sure who is or is not on the CIA payroll. From an intelligence standpoint, Yemen is a very noisy place….”

PHILIPPINES

One might argue that the U.S. has already taken the GWOT to the Philippines. After all, President Bush said himself: “While the most visible military action is in Afghanistan, America is acting elsewhere. We now have troops in the Philippines helping to train that country’s armed forces….” And, as many recent media pieces portray, the U.S. is continuing to deploy additional Special Operations Forces to the Philippines. However, as compared with the magnitude of U.S. military operations in Afghanistan, it would be an exaggeration to state that our current efforts in the Philippines equate to a similar high-end war on terrorism.

The impetus behind our engagement there nevertheless merits some comparisons. Notably, the Abu Sayyaf terrorist group (ASG) is strongly suspected to be linked with al-Qaeda, and is known as the most radical of the Islamic separatists groups in the Philippines. ASG members have studied in the Middle East and have fought and trained in Afghanistan. And, while it is unlikely that key members or large numbers of al Qaeda will seek immediate sanctuary in the Philippines, the ASG will likely to continue to both support, and receive support from al-Qaeda. Other speculation about expanding the war on terrorism to the Philippines
includes that the U.S’s longstanding there offer a better potential for U.S intervention there than other candidate countries. Additionally, the U.S would be able to work with the local military, rather than commit large ground elements of U.S. forces, again consistent with our force posture in Afghanistan. Consequently, this is precisely the argument for not prosecuting a U.S military-led war on terrorism there: the U.S. would much prefer to provide financial aid, advisors, and a low level of special operations support, and rely on the Philippine government and military to prosecute the war.\textsuperscript{16}

COLOMBIA

Bringing Colombia to the fore as a next target in the war on terrorism is a planned “tougher approach” to the longstanding instability and narcotics problems in Colombia. U.S. News and World Report outlined the Bush administration proposals to do so and stated that Defense Secretary Rumsfeld “directed Pentagon planners to draft a stiffer version” calling for much greater support by U.S. forces.\textsuperscript{17} Recently, two high profile kidnappings by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) served to highlight the failed policies and peace process toward terrorist groups there. These kidnappings (in Feb 2002) essentially broke the FARC’s peace agreement with the Colombian government and as a result President of Colombia, Andres Pastrana, ordered the Colombian military to retake lands (sanctuary) previously ceded to the FARC in an effort to curtail the increasing terrorist violence. The impetus thus exists that the U.S. should best seek to support the stern reaction (to the kidnappings) by President Pastrana by stepping up our counter-narcotics campaign there to a more aggressive approach of combined counter-narcotics and direct counter-terrorism support. The FARC, National Liberation Army (ELN), and the United Self-Defense Group of Colombia (AUC) are all categorized officially by the U.S. State Department as terrorist groups (not insurgents), and U.S. assistance there would be viewed as helping eliminate a much nearer threat to America than other locations.

Most of the media speculation regarding Colombia, however, indicates that direct U.S. counter-terrorist involvement there will not materialize at least in the near term. Colombian terrorist groups have not been noted to target Americans, and there is not a known link to al-Qaeda. Also, there is much political reluctance to expand U.S counter-drug efforts to include counter-terrorism out of fears of finding ourselves in a counter-insurgency likened to Vietnam.’

TOWARD A BROADER ANALYSIS OF U.S. INTERVENTION

Amidst the shifting proposals and constant media speculation on phase two in the GWOT, the next step would logically seem to be to assess the options -- to evaluate the various
countries where the U.S. might next attack, weigh the pro and cons, and pick one. While the media so often paints it that way, the simple truth is it’s just not that easy. Expanding the war on terrorism is vastly more complex and demanding. Examining that complexity across a consideration of options that include not only military action, but also the other instruments of national power, policy and strategy is what we actually need to do. This is thus the genesis of a deeper, more thorough analysis and an appropriate starting point is U.S. precedent regarding military actions in response to terrorism.

CHOOSING THE APPLICATION OF MILITARY FORCE – BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS

Terrorism is by no means a new phenomenon, nor necessarily are violent terrorist tactics. However, there has been a marked emergence of significant trends with regard to modern terrorism. These include an increasingly international nature of terrorism, an adaptation of tactics that gains the world stage, and a rise in violence equating to mass murder (Figure 2). Additional trends are the use of weapons of mass destruction, a shift toward a basis of religious radicalism concurrent with a shift toward direct targeting of U.S. citizens and territory, and finally a resultant shift in U.S. national response toward a more prevalent use of military force.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Incident</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iran Hostage Crisis</td>
<td>4 Nov '79</td>
<td>Terrorists seize U.S Embassy. 53 hostages held until 20 Jan '81.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bombing of U.S. Embassy in Beirut</td>
<td>18 Apr '83</td>
<td>63 killed, 120 injured.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bombing of Marine Barracks in Beirut</td>
<td>23 Oct '83</td>
<td>300 killed (242 U.S. Marines).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air India bombing</td>
<td>23 Jun '85</td>
<td>Bomb destroyed Boeing 747 in flight, 329 killed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Achille Lauro Hijacking</td>
<td>7 Oct '85</td>
<td>Italian cruise liner seized, 700 hostages.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pan Am 103 bombing</td>
<td>21 Dec '88</td>
<td>Bomb destroyed aircraft in flight, 259 killed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bombing of Israeli Embassy in Argentina</td>
<td>7 Mar '92</td>
<td>29 killed, 242 wounded.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Trade Center bombing</td>
<td>26 Feb '93</td>
<td>Car bomb in underground garage intended to topple the building. 6 killed, 1,000 injured.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tokyo Subway attack</td>
<td>20 Mar '95</td>
<td>Sarin nerve gas attack at subway station. 12 killed, 5,700 injured.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khobar Towers bombing</td>
<td>25 Jun '96</td>
<td>Truck bomb at U.S. military housing. 19 killed, 515 injured.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bombings of U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania</td>
<td>7 Aug '98</td>
<td>Near simultaneous bombings of two embassies in Africa. 54 killed, 5,000 injured.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attack on USS Cole</td>
<td>12 Oct '00</td>
<td>Explosive laden dingy kills 17, 39 injured.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks</td>
<td>11 Sep '01</td>
<td>3,000 killed.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

FIGURE 2 SELECTED SIGNIFICANT TERRORIST INCIDENTS 1979–2001
The confluence of these trends has brought us to where we are today – combating militarily a terrorist network (al-Qaeda) with international connections and operations, based on a radical theology, wholly opposed to the U.S. and western culture, and demonstrably capable of mass killing and destruction.

THE CHOICE FOR MILITARY INTERVENTION

The current war in Afghanistan is the calculated U.S. led military response to the singular attack of September 11, and is a marked success across military, diplomatic, and international lines. In fact the current campaign is so successful that it really forces an examination of why the U.S. has not used the military more often against terrorists. A broad review shows that “from 1983-1998, more than 2,400 incidents of international terrorism were directed against the citizens, facilities, and interests of the United States throughout the world. Over 600 US citizens lost their lives and nearly 1,900 others sustained injuries in these attacks.”

In spite of this tremendous killing and destruction, the U.S. responded with military force only three times in that same period:

- 1986; military air strikes against Libya following the bombing of a discotheque in Germany (killing 2 U.S. soldiers).
- 1993; military strike against Iraq following an Iraqi plot to assassinate President George H. W. Bush.
- 1998; military strikes against Sudan following al-Qaeda bombings of two U.S embassies.

In her article, “Explaining the United States’ Decision to Strike Back at Terrorists”, Michele Malvesti puts forth an excellent analysis of factors leading to a U.S. military response. She outlines common factors inherent in the three cases of U.S military response and posits several explanatory factors for deciding on military action. These arguably were evident in the U.S. decision to act against al Qaeda in Afghanistan and remain relevant still. They include:

- Substantial and credible evidence existed allowing for quick and positive identification of the perpetrators (terrorists group)
- The specific terrorist group has made repetitive attacks
- The attack consisted of direct targeting of U.S. citizens
- The terrorist incident was a fait accompli: a completed event (bombing, armed attack, killing) and not a prolonged crisis (hostage taking or hijacking)
- The terrorist group has demonstrated consistent and/or flagrant anti-U.S. behavior
- The terrorist group is vulnerable (politically and/or militarily)
The first and last of the above bear great significance both in evaluating U.S. response. The first factor gives legitimacy to the U.S. military response, while the last balances U.S. reply against the potential political, international and military consequences. With regard to the question of where next in the GWOT, it becomes important to examine all six of the present factors outlined by Malvesti. If the U.S. were to launch a military campaign against any of the countries touted in the media, would doing so meet the criteria? For instance, at present there clearly is no “smoking gun” that would give the U.S. just cause to take military action against any of the discussed nations. By similar analysis neither the Abu Sayyaf group in the Philippines nor any of the three terrorist groups in Colombia have demonstrated “flagrant anti-U.S. behavior”, and terrorist attacks there have not consisted of direct targeting of U.S. citizens or interests. Likewise, the factor of political and military vulnerability of the terrorists groups is not necessarily manifest in either Pakistan or Iraq. In fact the contrary case is probably more evident. The answer then to the question is that currently an overt U.S. military action directed against any of the six (Iraq, Somalia, Pakistan, Yemen, Philippines, and Colombia) phase-two candidate nations would not be consistent with the above criteria or factors that typically characterize such a response.

What all of this ultimately portends for broadening U.S. military activity in the GWOT is an evaluation of U.S action across three criteria; precedent of action, consistency of action, and legitimacy of action (particularly with regard to international scrutiny). The U.S war on terrorism in Afghanistan meets these criteria, but expanding the war to other countries will face the same scrutiny. If we begin by asking the kinds of questions that measure proposed U.S actions on a phase-two country against these criteria, we can far better predict or even ask “where next.”

A FULL “STRATEGIC” ANALYSIS

The above review of why the U.S. chooses to apply military power in response to terrorist actions really begins an essential process of framing the issue in a broader context. While Malvesti’s article suggests some common factors inherent in why the U.S. responds militarily, it more importantly leads to other essential questions. For instance; what it is that the U.S truly wants to accomplish in the war on terrorism, how does the U.S. plan to do so, and what level of effort and expenditure is necessary or appropriate? In this broader context, what begins to then emerge is the need for a broader strategic analysis of U.S counter-terrorism and the GWOT. That’s a far more appropriate baseline to truly explore “where next” in the war on terrorism.
AWC STRATEGIC MODEL

The Army War College (AWC) provides an excellent tool and framework for exactly such a strategic analysis. Dr Robert Dorff, Chairman of the Department of National Security and Strategy, sets the basis for this strategic review in his overview “A Primer in Strategy Development.” He opens this process by providing the following definition of strategy as: “the relationship among ends, ways, and means. \textit{Ends} are the objectives or goals sought. \textit{Means} are the resources available to pursue the objectives. And \textit{Ways} or methods are how one organizes and applies the resources.”\textsuperscript{21} To further establish a common reference and understanding of this “ends, ways, and means” strategy framework, Dr Dorff offers the following example from sports (paraphrased below):

In a basketball game, most teams begin with a straightforward objective of winning (the ends). Both teams have resources that consist first and foremost of the players on the respective teams (the means). A team wins by outscoring the opponent, and can accomplish this with a strategy that employs both offensive (how your team will score) and defensive (how you prevent the other team from scoring) methods (the ways). Successful “strategic” coaches figure out ways to employ their means more effectively than their opposing coaches.\textsuperscript{22}

Similarly, this AWC strategic model provides us a guide in evaluating the war on terrorism and the options for “where next.” Framing the discussion in terms of ends, ways, and means helps to answer many of the questions posed throughout this paper and those essential to determining the U.S.’s courses of action in the GWOT: Where should the U.S. go next? Why? What goals are to be obtained? The list of questions easily goes on, but the key is that we gain tremendous advantage by pursuing the questions in this framework: it leads to the development of specific goals, guided by the application of thought-out, consistent policy, balanced against available and affordable resources.

Determining and evaluating ends, ways, and means (the AWC model) forms the core for the analysis. However, equally important to this effort (and essentially embedded within the AWC model) is an understanding national strategy (its basis on the elements of national power, and how those elements relate to each other and to strategy development). As defined by the U.S. Department of Defense, National Strategy is “the art and science of developing and using all the elements of national power (economic, psychological or informational, political, and military) during peace and war to secure national interests.”\textsuperscript{23} National Strategy is built on and around all four of these elements of national power (Figure 3), and the “focus on these elements of national power as a means to national strategic ends also serves as an organizational link to the overall strategic formulation process.”\textsuperscript{24}
The important link between this understanding of national strategy and the issue of where next in the GWOT is this: while true national strategy involves all the elements of national power, the discussion on the GWOT has centered almost solely on the use of U.S. military power. Put very simply, this current approach does not address the war on terrorism in a strategic context.

STRATEGIC ANALYSIS APPLIED TO THE GWOT

As outlined above, the structure of the AWC model provides two guiding principles necessary to evaluate the GWOT on a strategic basis. These are: determining and analyzing the various ends, ways, and means, and developing U.S. response such that the use of all the elements of national power are applied appropriately (or at least considered). Thus far, most of the public and media discussion on the GWOT has missed on both principles. The varied media speculation on where next in the war on terrorism has not included, nor led to, serious comment on what to achieve in a given country (ends), how to do it (ways), or what to do it with (means). Similarly, the economic, political, and psychological/informational tools of national power get rarely mentioned, if at all.

Nevertheless, the beginnings of the required strategic analysis are starting to emerge in publication. In particular, the U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) published in January 2002, a collection of essays (Defeating Terrorism: Strategic Issue Analysis) specifically “designed to provide senior Army leadership with context, information, and policy options as they made strategic decisions in the earliest days of the war (on terrorism).” The authors of these essays provide both opinion and analysis of proposed ends, ways, and means for U.S. engagement in the war on terrorism. In contrast to the lack of sufficient (or any) strategic
analysis in the media, these essays serve to provide just such an effort for the ongoing war on terrorism.

Several essays in particular highlight the distinctions between the absence of analysis and in-depth review of the war on terror in the current media and public discussion and a broader strategic approach. One of the most apparent differences is in the stated ends or goals. In this regard, the most frequently portrayed U.S. goal (in the media) is the destruction of the al-Qaeda terrorist group. But, would destroying al-Qaeda really signify or be a true end to the war on terrorism? Dr. Biddle, in his essay “War Aims and War Termination” argues for a very different goal, stating:

“…al-Qaeda itself could be destroyed without eliminating the (terrorist) threat if the ideology it represents survives it. It is al-Qaeda’s ideology—and the malign intent this creates and embodies—that pose the real threat…. Our real opponent is thus the ideology that underpins al-Qaeda’s terrorist program—it is not terrorism per se, nor even al-Qaeda itself. And this implies that our war aims must include not only eliminating al-Qaeda’s current operatives, but preventing their ideology from spreading beyond their current membership.”

Likewise, several of the authors contributing to this SSI publication outline the common theme that the U.S. led war on terrorism must not become perceived as a war on Islam. Both Dr. Crane and Dr. Hajjar stress the point that potential future U.S. military actions against Muslim countries would run a high risk of just such a perception. Additionally, Dr. Hajjar offers that the “Use of the other instruments of U.S. national power—diplomatic, economic, and informational—would not engender holy war (by Muslims against the U.S.).” Thus, the “way” in which the U.S. responds next, as well as where, could have a major impact on this potential perception of the U.S. led GWOT as a war on Islam. Again, this presents a far deeper and more thorough approach in understanding and solving the problem of terrorism than the common solution given by the media of simply picking where to go next and attacking.

Lastly, as introduced earlier, it is important in a strategic evaluation of the war on terrorism to return to a review of the elements of national power. Notably, media coverage and related “expert” commentary have almost exclusively highlighted various U.S. military actions and options to fight the war on terrorism, while typically ignoring the other elements of national power. Yet this is not nearly the case behind the scenes. For instance, the U.S. Department of State lists the following specific accomplishments regarding diplomatic, economic, and informational efforts to date in the war on terrorism:

- President Bush met with leaders from 51 different countries to build support for the war against terrorism
• With U.S. leadership and with international support, Afghanistan formed a new interim government
• The U.S. and several other allies have reopened embassies in Kabul, Afghanistan
• The U.N. General Assembly and Security Council condemned the September 11th terrorist attacks
• U.S. increased aid to the Afghan people by providing $187 million in aid since October 2001
• President Bush signed an Executive Order freezing U.S.-based assets of individuals and organizations involved with terrorism
• Since September 11th, the U.S. has blocked more than $33 million in assets of terrorist organizations
• 142 countries have issued orders freezing the assets of suspected terrorists and terrorist organizations
• The U.S. government has offered a reward of up to $25 million for information leading directly to the apprehension or conviction of Osama bin Laden

The importance and relevance of the above information is that an analysis of the GWOT inclusive of a review of the application of all the elements of national power adds greatly to the ability to make knowledgeable, informed decisions as to where next in the war on terrorism. Unfortunately, information about the economic, political and informational efforts in the war on terrorism is little known and scantily portrayed in the media.

CONCLUSIONS
The devastating attacks of modern terrorism have necessitated a new national and international posture: responding to terrorism as war. This is the case in the ongoing U.S. led war in Afghanistan. Current U.S. military successes there have resulted in a great deal of media coverage and speculation on where the U.S. will attack next for “phase-two” in the war on terrorism. The areas most frequently cited for further U.S military actions include: Iraq, Somalia, Pakistan, Yemen, Philippines and Colombia. However, a review of proposed military actions in these countries reflect little in-depth analysis of why the U.S. should attack one or more of those particular countries. Nor does such a review provide sufficient justification to truly generate serious debate or recommendations required to win the war against terror. Further U.S military action may not be appropriate at all, especially as we examine the possible long-term consequences of doing so. Rather, we must examine the war on terrorism with keen regard to what the U.S. desires to accomplish, offset against impacts and consequences. More
succinctly, the U.S. can only win the Global War on Terrorism through serious strategic analysis of the problem, and in a manner that utilizes all the instruments of national

Fortunately there are tools and methodologies for just such an analysis. These include criteria on which to base a “phase-two”, or “where next” decision, as well as a strategic framework on which to build an analysis. That framework is provided succinctly by the Army War College in its “ends, ways, and means” paradigm, and it affords the basis to ask the right strategic questions. Finally, military action has been the cornerstone to the U.S. response to the al-Qaeda terrorist actions of 11 September. Nevertheless, the U.S. is engaged diplomatically, economically and through the use of military assistance and aid to several of the nations identified previously as potential candidates for “phase-two” U.S. military intervention. These actions are working to improve the stability of the local governments, as well as improving their governments’ ability to engage within their own countries against the war on terrorism. It is precisely this full range of actions, based on a full strategic analysis, that will secure the victory in the war against terror.

WORD COUNT = 6154
ENDNOTES


18 Andrew J. Smith introduces and develops several trends in terrorism in his article “Combating Terrorism,” Military Review, Jan-Feb 2002, 11-12.

19 Michele L. Malvesti, “Explaining the United States’ Decision to Strike Back at Terrorists,” Terrorism and Political Violence, 13 (Summer 2001), 85.


22 Ibid, 11.


27 Sami G. Hajjar, “Avoiding Holy War: Ensuring That the War on Terrorism is Not Perceived as a War on Islam,” in Defeating Terrorism: Strategic Issue Analysis, ed. John R. Martin, (Carlisle Barracks; Strategic Studies Institute, January 2002), 18.

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