



THE 2011 Research and Innovation Conference






TABLE OF CONTENTS

Executive Summary

Introduction and Overview of the TOPOFF Planning Process

Planning Conference Agenda

Functional Group Discussions

Functional Group Proposed Objectives

Multidisciplinary Group Discussions

Multidisciplinary Group Proposed Objectives

Consensus Objectives/Summary of Guidance

Participants List

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY/APPROACH/FINDINGS



TOPOFF Exercise

The United States Congress, believing “that few of the *top officials* of agencies have ever fully participated” in domestic preparedness exercises has directed the Department of Justice to conduct an exercise “with the participation of all key personnel who would participate in the consequence management of [an actual chemical, biological, or cyber] terrorist event.” [Senate Report 105-233]

TOPOFF Exercise Planning Conference


The **TOPOFF Exercise Planning Conference** brought together over 100 state and local emergency response planners and practitioners from across the nation, to identify objectives to be used in designing the Top Official’s (TOPOFF) Exercise. Hosted by the Department of Justice and the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Conference was held May 20-21, 1999 in Chantilly, VA.

Over the day and a half of the Conference, fire/HAZMAT, law enforcement, medical/EMS, and emergency management professionals identified and prioritized consensus objectives reflecting each discipline and jurisdiction, large and small. As a result, the TOPOFF Exercise will directly address the concerns and issues of Stakeholders nationwide.

The Process

On the morning of the first day of the conference, participants were assigned to functional / professional working groups (law enforcement, fire / HazMat, medical/EMS, local emergency management, and state emergency management). These workgroups were asked to identify and prioritize critical exercise objectives for a national exercise.

In the afternoon session, these exercise objectives were considered by five multidisciplinary groups, tasked with recommending consensus objectives for use by the TOPOFF exercise planners. Their prioritized objectives reflect the cross-cutting nature of the groups’ makeup and provide the basis for the Conference’s recommendations.



TOPOFF Conference Recommendations

The following categories highlight the final objectives that were produced by the TOPOFF Conference participants.



Command and Control

- Exercise an integrated Emergency Management Structure (Incident Command System, Unified Command System, etc.).
- Exercise Interagency and Intra-agency coordination.
- Demonstrate Federal, State, and local integration and cooperation.
- Show the integration of the medical community into the overall emergency response.
- Exercise the interaction between crisis to consequence management: FBI and FEMA roles.
- Exercise crime scene evidence preservation, criminal investigation, and chain of custody issues.
- Exercise communications degradation.
- Review and exercise procedures and mechanisms for reimbursement to local and State agencies for expenses and losses incurred due to a WMD incident.

Incident Timing/Scope

- A no notice event
- Stage multiple events at multiple locations or jurisdictions on a local, State, and Federal level. Utilize contrasting cities (i.e. Nunn-Lugar-Domenici and non-Nunn-Lugar-Domenici cities) and involve rural participants.
- Exercise over multiple days.
- Conduct the event with “real time” deployment of assets and real resource limitations in handling mass fatalities and mass casualties.
- Address both crisis and consequence management issues simultaneously.
- Demonstrate the distinction between chemical and biological incidents, including an overt release, covert release, and hoax. Recognize, identify and predict consequences stemming from a chemical or biological event. Have a combined event, (i.e. explosive and a biological agent).

Public Information

- Exercise and evaluate public affairs plans and procedures for establishing and maintaining responsive and thoroughly coordinated public information programs at the local, State, and Federal levels.
- Prepare to handle disinformation and misinformation from overnight experts, media designated Subject Matter Experts, media use by the adversary, as well as public expectations and misunderstandings.

Medical/Public Health

- Exercise the medical and public health infrastructure, response and resources, provision of health resources (prophylaxis), and mutual aid/support to handle mass casualties and mass fatalities on an immediate level. Assess the ability to provide extended care and extended resources. Examine the effectiveness and timeliness of the Federal government response to provide long-term support to jurisdictions.
- Demonstrate the ability to protect lives.
- Prevent injury at all levels through an assessment of the capability to deliver, distribute and administer medical supplies (antibiotics, antidotes, and vaccinations, ventilators, ICU capabilities) and personnel in a timely manner, and manage disposition of mass fatalities (the management of contaminated remains).
- Exercise surveillance, diagnosis, and identification capabilities.
- Show the ability to effectively integrate supplemental support.
- Determine the capabilities and resources to provide mental health care for victims, first responders, and the community at large.

Infrastructure

- Test the ability to protect and/or respond to disruptions of critical infrastructure resulting from a catastrophic WMD attack.
- Test different types of infrastructure, public works, (water and wastewater), utilities, and transportation.
- Test quarantine challenges (transportation of victims and facilities to house them).
- Test technical capabilities of federal resources, including software and hardware.



Resource Management

- Promote and broaden understanding of the assets available at all levels, how to call up these assets, and stress the most effective integration of federal assets in local, county, and State operations.
- Analyze the adequacy of current federal response systems and programs at meeting local, State, and regional needs.
- Identify, manage, and move Federal, State, and local resources and mutual aid pacts, including local accommodation/reception support to augment federal assets.
- Demonstrate the prioritization of limited specialized Federal response assets to separate and simultaneous WMD incidents.
- Utilize a broad resource pool: contractors, the private sector, volunteers and Non-Governmental Organizations.
- Integrate the activation/call up of personnel, including Reserves and the National Guard.

Information Sharing

- Demonstrate the value of information sharing between Federal, State, and local entities in preventing and/or mitigating the consequences of WMD.
- Exercise information sharing horizontally, vertically, up, down and across all levels.
- Reassess classification issues, who should be cleared?
- Conduct threat assessments and pre-event intelligence for jurisdictions.

Interoperable Communications

- Expose suspected gaps in physical communications interoperability between functional and jurisdictional levels of government during a WMD incident.

Lessons Learned

- Utilize a neutral party or observers to assist in the peer evaluation and capture of lessons learned.
- Disseminate After Action Reports on a timely and widespread basis.
- Ensure widespread dissemination and discussion of lessons learned.
- Maintain a comprehensive recording of incident play.
- Identify and evaluate the efficacy of deployed Federal and State assets and standing response plans utilized during the incident response.

TOPOFF EXERCISE PLANNING CONFERENCE AGENDA

May 20, 1999

- 8:30a.m. Welcome – Stan McKinney, Director, South Carolina
Emergency Preparedness Division
- 8:45a.m. Laurie Robinson, Assistant Attorney General
- 9:00a.m. Mike Walker, Deputy Director, FEMA
- 9:15a.m. Tom Kuker, Director, NDPO
- 9:30a.m. Overview of Process – Stan McKinney
- 9:45a.m. Break Into Functional Workgroups
- 12:00p.m. Working Lunch
- 1:00p.m. Recess
- 2:00p.m. Convene Cross-Functional Workgroups
- 4:30p.m. Conference Recesses
- 5:00p.m. Attorney General Janet Reno

May 21, 1999

- 8:30a.m. Re-Convene Conference
Review Proposed Consensus Objectives
- 9:30a.m. Discuss Additions/Deletions and Approve Final Report
- 10:00a.m. NDPO Presentation
- 11:00a.m. Recess
- 11:30a.m. Re-Convene, Report Recommendations to Senior
Official Panel
- 1:00p.m. Adjourn

INTRODUCTION


The threat of terrorism involving the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) has increasingly attracted the attention of planners and emergency managers in this nation and around the world. The tragic litany – World Trade Center, Tokyo Subway, Oklahoma City – is far too familiar, and the potential consequences far too grave, not to command the most urgent efforts of government at all levels. While tremendous progress has been made through initiatives such as the Domestic Preparedness Program, the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s WMD Coordinators, and the Public Health Service Metropolitan Medical Response System, more remains to be done.

In early 1999, the United States Congress ordered the Department of Justice to conduct an exercise “with the participation of all key personnel who would participate in the consequence management of [an actual chemical, biological, or cyber] terrorist event.”¹ The exercise, to be called TOPOFF (for “Top Officials”) is intended to realistically test the Federal, State and local response and management systems. To achieve that end, the Attorney General directed the Office of Justice Programs, Office for State and Local Domestic Preparedness Support (OSLDPS) to convene a meeting of emergency response planners and practitioners from across the nation to develop objectives for use in designing such an exercise. The participants in the meeting, held May 20-21, 1999 in Chantilly, Virginia, were invited from jurisdictions large and small representing a broad range of responder disciplines.

THE PROCESS

On the morning of the first day of the conference, participants were assigned to functional / professional working groups (law enforcement, fire / HazMat, medical/EMS, local emergency management, and state emergency management). These workgroups were asked to identify and prioritize critical exercise objectives for a national exercise.

In the afternoon session, members of the morning’s functional groups were reassigned to multidisciplinary groups. These groups considered the exercise objectives developed during the morning session, with the purpose of identifying those of the greatest importance. The resulting priority objectives were then blended to create a consensus list for use by the TOPOFF exercise planners.



THIS REPORT

¹ U.S. Senate, Report 105-233.

One of the promises made to the participants was that all proposed objectives would be captured. The following pages attempt to do that, while at the same time providing a more complete understanding of how the Conference's recommendations were achieved. The men and women that took part in the TOPOFF Planning Conference were among the finest professionals this nation has to offer. These consensus objectives reflect the diverse and expert makeup of the participants and represent action-oriented recommendations for use in the design of this most important exercise.

FUNCTIONAL GROUPS

The May 20, 1999 morning session began with the participants divided into five functional area groups organized by functional specialty: Local Emergency Management, State Emergency Management, Emergency Medical Services, Fire and HazMat, and Law Enforcement. The Functional Groups process was the first stage in the procedure of establishing the scope of the TOPOFF exercise and specifying the needs for the drill to demonstrate, through prioritizing were tasked with identifying potential objectives for use in designing the TOPOFF exercise. These objectives were then to be prioritized as response objectives on a high, medium, and low basis. The Multi-Functional groups would then further synthesize these objectives. The aim of this process ultimately provides top level officials with a primary knowledge of how the Federal response and the frontline response on the local and State side can most effectively integrate.

LOCAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

The Local Emergency Management Group discussed a series of issues and possible objectives during the morning session, ranging from the type of scenario that should be constructed to the issues that the exercise needs to test to the number and nature of the cities to be involved in the exercise. The group discussed In discussing whether a chemical, biological, or cyber attack should be utilized, – The general feeling was that a cyber attack would be difficult to test. – and that a preferred approach was a combined attack using a (conventional explosive and a biological agent), – in multiple jurisdictions – over a several day period; such a scenario would provide a more rigorous test for the first responder community as a whole well as top Federal officials. According to the group, The group felt it was important that the exercise needs to be driven from the bottom up, from the local to the State to the Federal level, just as it would occur be during a real incident.

Areas that should be tested by the exercise included Among the issues that were deemed necessary for the exercise to test were the Federal, State, and local level Command and Control structure on a Federal, State, and local level and the critical infrastructure capabilities capacities, as well as communications and system-wide technological capabilities. The need to treat evaluate treatment of the incident site as a crime scene and to preserve evidence for the prosecution was brought up, as was the need for to assess the organization of a joint criminal and epidemiological investigation. Testing the medical and public health sector infrastructure, including medical response, provision of resources, and the availability of medical mutual aid and support was also a need identified by the group. Coordination between and among agencies on all three levels needs to be tested is a high priority for testing, as is, as does the distribution of information and intelligence from the Federal level on down to the local level, as well as information sharing between among cities. The role of informal relationships that exist outside the official channels as an unofficial means to distribute information should receive examination as well. (It was noted that t Threat assessments should be conducted to improve the development of a jurisdiction's preparedness levels.)

The group stressed that the exercise needs to test the distribution of information to the public and the media, ensuring that there is conformity of the consistency and clarity in the information given out, in order to minimize the level of confusion and panic. Conflicting or alarmist information given out by media-appointed experts and the potential use of the media by the

terrorists has the potential to create further panic. ~~Panic and disinformation from the M~~media ~~disinformation will can~~ make or break what is done at the local level; ~~and the~~ management of the media can become a huge issue ~~confounded compounded~~ by bureaucratic politics. The group addressed the conflicting demand for federal assets that will be experienced during an event as an issue to be exercised. All jurisdictions, regardless of size, will have to rely on federal assets, so they need to ~~know be able to show that they can identify~~ what ~~help~~ is required. ~~This then needs to be matched up with and~~ what is available, in what quantity, how it will be managed, and ~~how it will be~~ mobilized to reach the area during the ~~available limited~~ window of opportunity ~~during which its arrival can~~ positively ~~aeffect~~ the incident outcome. The group also recommended that the exercise test the availability ~~and accessibility~~ of resources from alternative sources such as mutual aid agreements ~~that provide local and State assets to augment Federal assets and assets from~~, volunteer organizations, and the private sector.

STATE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

The State Emergency Management ~~G~~group explored ~~the issues objectives~~ that would make TOPOFF a meaningful no-notice exercise at the Federal, State, and local levels. The type of attack for the scenario was discussed and a biological incident was seen as an Achilles heel that should be exercised. ~~This and~~ would allow extensive testing of the medical and public health community, which has not always been extensively involved in the preparedness process. Chemical incidents were seen as having been extensively tested and primarily providing the opportunity for exercise at a local level. However, some group members pointed out that for jurisdictions not fully participating in the ~~D~~domestic ~~P~~preparedness ~~P~~programs thus far, even a chemical exercise would be a challenge. The impact of a cyber attack on the Federal, State, and local levels was seen by some as a component that could be added to the exercise as an additional challenge. The group felt that testing the execution, deployment, and integration of all three levels of response is critical in order for the lessons learned from TOPOFF to be relevant for all, instead of only the jurisdictions in which the events occur.

In order to maximize integration testing, multiple sites should be used, preferably in multiple states. This stresses the idea that the Federal government may have to deal with more than one incident at a time and ~~that~~ resource allocation must ~~be planned plan~~ accordingly. The group felt this would be reinforced if the exercise operated ~~ds~~ in real time over a multiple day period. The allocation of scarce operational resources at all levels was identified as a need to be tested by the exercise. This ~~would~~ includes investigating the availability of assets in other jurisdictions through interstate and intrastate mutual aid agreements that are available for mobilization faster than Federal assets. The exercise should also test the ~~U~~nified ~~C~~ommand ~~S~~ystem, ~~according to the State Managers~~, as well as the medical and public health community's response operations, the mortuary community, and the decision-making process of sheltering in place and evacuation.

EMERGENCY MEDICAL SERVICES

The Emergency Medical Services ~~G~~group focused on ~~TOPOFF objectives issues~~ that ~~the TOPOFF exercise should would~~ test ~~in~~ both the medical and public health communities and ~~in~~ the larger Federal, State, and local ~~community communities~~ as ~~a whole well~~. The ~~EMS G~~group ~~discussed the problem noted~~ that although biological and chemical agents are often treated as the

same under the heading of weapons of mass destruction, they actually require different response actions from the medical community. There needs to be a greater understanding of the differences between chemical and biological attacks in terms of identification of the agent, response, and casualty numbers, as well as a knowledge of the difference between an overt and a covert release, a hoax, and an actual event. There was a feeling of frustration that the issues are often misrepresented and that the medical, public health, and laboratory communities are often underrepresented in preparedness meetings. Another ~~often overlooked issue brought up~~ concern voiced by the ~~Emergency Medical Services group~~ EMS Group is the fact that the dead and those who handle them are not often dealt with in Ddomestic Ppreparedness exercises. The EMS Ggroup stressed that management of the disposition of potentially contaminated mass fatalities ~~that may be contaminated~~ needs exercise testing. A biological agent incident was seen as more of a challenge than a chemical event, as it is a scenario that would more fully test the system and allow the health care community to be fully exercised. However, the Emergency Management Medical Services Ggroup felt that the scenario needs to incorporate a chemical agent incident as well, in order to exercise the other members of the first responder community who have more of an active role in chemical response. The exercise should also be on a multi-state level to allow testing of a wide range of issues and should be designed to address current response shortcomings.

The EMS Ggroup touched on the issue of training, pointing out that guidance for responders entering a chemical or biological situation must be incorporated into the daily aspects of operations. Tas the ~~death toll~~ death toll of among responders who do not take proper precautions are is an indicator of the severity of the situation. First responders should ~~receive training to be trained to conduct~~ a preliminary analysis for the presence of a chemical or biological agent on the scene.

The ability of the health system to recognize and predict the consequences of a chemical or biological attack should also be examined tested. The exercise needs to assess the level of resources that are available for distribution during an incident and the ability to coordinate, deliver, distribute, and administer these resources, personnel, and supplies. The ability to acquire emergency resources and the mobilization time should also be tested, as the availability of Federal assets cannot always be assumed. Protection of, and response to, disruptions in critical infrastructure elements caused by a catastrophic nuclear, biological, chemical, radiological, or cyber event also needs testing. The ~~group stated that the~~ exercise should test Command, Control, and Coordination between agencies and at the Federal, State, and local levels as well as the integration with the medical community through this process. The TOPOFF exercise also provides an opportunity for ~~analyzing the ability of~~ analysis of the current Ffederal response systems' and programs' ability to meet local, State, and rRegional preparedness needs.

FIRE AND HAZMAT

The Fire and HazMat Ggroup discussed incident management needs ~~from the Fire and HazMat perspective~~ and examined ~~the issues~~ objectives that, once tested, will help that will enable top Ffederal officials ~~to decide how~~ acquire the experience to handle a WMD terrorism incident. ~~an incident of terrorism with a weapon of mass destruction.~~ The group consensus was that the exercise should be constructed to analyze the response system as it operates on a day-to-day

basis from the bottom up with a true unannounced drill, ~~because as~~ rehearsed drills do not provide a true test of the system. However, unannounced exercises are difficult to stage, ~~as the resources deployed may be needed to respond to and coordinate, and may be disrupted by responses to real-world an actual~~ events. The FHM Group also pointed out that chemical, biological, and cyber attacks are three very distinct events, requiring different types of responses. Command and Control was identified by the group as a priority need to be exercised, particularly in relation to managing and integrating ~~all three levels~~ local, State, and Federal resources, ~~and examining~~ Testing C&C will allow for an examination of the capability of existing protocols and procedures to ~~accomplish the transitioning of response to~~ manage the deployment and integration of State and Federal resources as they arrive on the scene. It was suggested that the exercise could evaluate the effectiveness of the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Domestic Preparedness Training Program by conducting the exercise in a city that has completed the training.

The Fire and HazMat Group also recommended other needs that the exercise should test. The ability to respond to the mass decontamination of victims, both real and psychosomatic and provide the full range of victim care in a situation that exceeds normal capabilities should be tested on all three levels. Incident recognition on a local level and the ability to test detection and monitoring capabilities at the local, State, and Federal levels needs to be evaluated by the exercise. Another ~~issue to consider~~ objective of the exercise should be to assess ~~is~~ the ability of responders to use personal protective equipment and protocols that will safeguard them during an incident and knowledge of the procedures of acquisition, deployment, and maintenance of the equipment. Interoperability of communications between and among all three levels and among all disciplines and the availability and existence of equipment and protocols to govern effective communications should be tested ~~by the exercise~~.

TOPOFF needs to examine the issue of finances and how funds are given to jurisdictions and what mechanisms are in place to manage the distribution and the amount delivered. The Fire and HazMat Group ~~stated that TOPOFF should also provide~~ ~~also felt that an objective of TOPOFF should be then~~ evaluation ~~to measure of what~~ the appropriate level of response ~~should be in varying situations~~ and determine ~~if whether~~ all those ~~who respond~~ responding assets are required. A “pull” versus “push” system needs to be ~~established whereby~~ honored, ~~where~~ the local level ~~commanders are~~ determining the level of response, ~~not rather than~~ the Federal level ~~managers~~, which could result in response overkill.

LAW ENFORCEMENT

The Law Enforcement Group ~~examined issues~~ ~~considered objectives centering on~~ ~~crucial to~~ the interaction between public safety and an understanding of the aspects of response that top level officials need to raise their incident awareness level. There was ~~discussion~~ ~~a sense~~ among LE Group members that the exercise should take place in multiple jurisdictions, combining both a chemical incident that would train the police and fire community and a biological event that would train the medical community. There was also consensus to incorporate a cyber component to initiate the exercise that would have an impact on communication capabilities. The process should be tested from the bottom up, with a review of the transitions and timelines that occur.

A series of ~~issues-questions~~ that the exercise needs to test were pinpointed. Communication was identified as one of the most important ~~issues~~areas for testing, not only from ~~a-the~~ standpoint of interoperability and common terminology and protocols, but also the problem of knowing knowledge of who to contact ~~on-aat the~~ local, State, and Federal levels. Intelligence sharing and uniformity in the distribution and type of information ~~distributed-provided~~ to the public ~~needs-to be accomplished-between-by~~ and among all three levels needs to be tested. Supply and resupply of materials, ammunition, and personnel, and equipment and inventory delivery systems should be ~~tested~~evaluated. An understanding of what assets are available, when the assets need to be called up, what the priority is for asset distribution, and how these assets will be integrated also ~~becomes-an-issue~~deserves examination. The exercise provides an opportunity to ~~examine-review~~ how jurisdictions will receive additional funding, how the incident costs will be absorbed, and how agency reserve monies will be accessed. The need for some level of self-sufficiency is a factor to consider, as Federal assets will not arrive immediately. Prior training and education for first responders, giving them the mindset needed to handle an incident should be tested.

The LE G group also recommended that the exercise ~~must-also~~ explore chain of command issues and the role of the WMD coordinator as the conduit between the local and State and the Federal levels. The relationship between the police, ~~and~~ the FBI, and who will arbitrate if there is a conflict between the two, is an important alliance-to-analyzearea for consideration. The interaction ~~between-among~~ Federal officials in Washington, the Federal officials on the ~~local~~ levelsscene, and the local incident command system, and the effect - for good or ill -- this has on the response effort needs to be illuminated by the exercise, in order to better facilitate emergency response in the event of an actual emergency.

FUNCTIONAL GROUP PROPOSED OBJECTIVES

LOCAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

All objectives listed as high priority

- **Event Profile**
 - Combined event (explosive and biological agent)
 - Multiple events
 - Multiple location/city campaign
 - Duration of multiple days
 - Contagion versus non-contagion (not important)

- **Testing the Infrastructure**
 - Public works: water and wastewater
 - Utilities
 - Transportation: inter-city & local (site access); quarantine challenges (transport, facilities)
 - Test technical capability of federal resources, including software and hardware

- **Medical & Public Health Infrastructure**
 - Response and resources
 - Provision of health resources (prophylaxis)
 - Mutual aid/support

- **Command & Control**
 - Inter-agency and intra-agency
 - Federal, State, and local integration/cooperation
 - Crisis - consequence management hand-off
 - Unified command structure
 - Crime scene evidence preservation/criminal investigation/chain of custody
 - Communications degradation

- **Public Information/Media Affairs**
 - Test dialogue with public
 - Information flow and management
 - Disinformation and misinformation: overnight experts, media-designated subject matter experts
 - Media use by adversary

- **Asset Management**
 - Federal, State, and local resources identification, managing, and moving
 - Mutual aid: including local support to augment federal assets
 - Challenge resource pool

Contractor and private sector
Volunteers and Non-Governmental Organizations
Timeliness of decision making; timeliness of movement

- **Information Sharing**
Horizontal and vertical: up and down and across
Classification issues
Threat assessments
- **Widespread Dissemination of Lessons Learned**
Timely, widespread dissemination of after action reports
Comprehensive recording of unfolding event

STATE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

High Priority

- Execution and integration of all levels of response design-making to include interstate and intrastate mutual aid
- Exercise allocation of scarce operational resources at all levels
- Exercise unified command system
- Exercise public health/medical community

Medium Priority

- Exercise shelter-in-place and evacuation
- Exercise the mortuary community

EMERGENCY MEDICAL SERVICES

High Plus Priority

- Demonstrate distinction between chemical and biological incident, including a focal chemical, a focal biological, covert release, and a hoax.
- Assess capability to deliver, distribute, and administer medical supplies (antibiotics, antidotes, vaccinations, ventilators, ICU capabilities) and personnel in a timely manner.

- Assess command, control, and coordination at the local, state, regional, and federal levels and integration with the medical community

High Priority

- Measure health system's (including labs and public health) ability to recognize and identify and predict consequences stemming from a chemical or biological event.
- Manage disposition of mass fatalities (the management of contaminated remains).
- Analyze the adequacy of current federal response systems and programs (the federal portfolio) at meeting local, state, and regional needs.

FIRE AND HAZMAT GROUP

High Priority

- Exercise the ability of local, State, and Federal assets, across the functional spectrum, to integrate into an ongoing response to a weapon of mass destruction incident utilizing the Incident Command System & Incident Management System.
- Exercise the ability of local, State, and Federal responders to react to a truly no notice WMD incident.
- Show the ability and time necessary to fully deploy of specialized Federal and State assets in support of the local incident commander.
- Examine victim care (e.g., triage, treatment, transport, National Disaster Medical System (NDMS), mortuary affairs, integration into local response, hospital capability).
- Examine the ability of local and State personnel protective equipment, and other self protection resources, for response to a WMD terrorist incident (with considerations of appropriateness, effectiveness, & availability).
- Exercise communications interoperability between functional, jurisdictional, and levels of government during a WMD response.
- Exercise mass decontamination requirements that exceed local capability and resources.
- Examine the ability of local responders, 911 dispatchers, and public health personnel to recognize the indicators of a WMD incident.

- Examine the efficacy of the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Domestic Preparedness Program to prepare a community to respond to a WMD terrorist incident by contrasting a response to a non-programmatic jurisdiction.

Medium Priority

- Examine the adequacy of detection and monitoring capabilities to accurately and expediently identify a chemical or biological agent.
- Evaluate State and Federal methodologies for the deployment of supplemental assets to determine whether a request based or anticipatory approach is being utilized (pull vs. push).
- Exercise the effectiveness of mutual aid agreements to effectively supplement a response to a WMD incident.
- Exercise local, State, and Federal capabilities to track personnel accountability associated with a WMD response.
- Exercise and evaluate public affairs plans and public diplomacy policies and procedures for accomplishing an effective, responsive, and coordinated public affairs effort at the local, State, and national levels.
- Review and exercise procedures for reimbursement to local and State agencies for expenses and losses incurred due to a WMD incident.
- Examine the ability to provide and sustain resources during the entire cycle of a WMD response.
- Examine intelligence sharing as it pertains to WMD preparedness.

Low Priority

- Know the system and actions required to request supplemental assistance.

LAW ENFORCEMENT

High Priority

- Exercise multiple jurisdiction/multiple locations
Consequence management versus crisis management
- Intelligence/information sharing

Clearance management

- Federal integration process of Federal, county, local, and State levels.
Knowledge of Federal assets and coordination of activities at all levels.
Joint Operations Command/Joint Information Command/Incident Command System
- Communication
- Activation (call up)
- Public Affairs Officer – managing the public and operational information
- Crime scene investigation
- New unit integration

Medium Priority

- Resource development
- Planning (pre)/training
- Equipment/inventory management
- Manpower
- Funding
- Predeployment
- Supply/resupply (logistics)

MULTI-DISCIPLINARY GROUPS

During the May 20, 1999 afternoon session of the TOPOFF Exercise Planning Conference, five multi-disciplinary groups were convened, each made up of members of the Local Emergency Management, State Emergency Management, Emergency Medical Services, Fire and HazMat, and Law Enforcement Groups. These multi-disciplinary groups reviewed and recommended objectives prepared by the Functional (single discipline) Groups during the morning session. Following their review, the Multi-Disciplinary Groups were tasked with achieving consensus objectives for use in designing the TOPOFF Exercise.

EVENT PROFILE

Each of the Multi-Disciplinary Groups discussed, refined, and prioritized those exercise objectives created during the Functional Group morning sessions. This review allowed an opportunity for participants to champion objectives that were of great interest to them and their respective discipline, as well as to permit reexamination of objectives that may have been neglected earlier in the day. The process thus achieved the Attorney General’s goal of capturing all relevant perspectives.

The end-state of the afternoon sessions was the preparation of at least six consensus objectives from each of the Multi-Disciplinary Groups. The resulting thirty or more objectives were prioritized by the groups, sorted by conference staff, and presented on May 21, 1999 in a plenary session for approval.

During the sorting process on the evening of May 20, conference staff members took the “raw material” from each session (morning and afternoon) and attempted to determine and clarify the themes and trends present. Categories were identified and then used to create a matrix of prioritized consensus objectives for review by the Conference participants. Nine overarching objective categories were identified for the TOPOFF Exercise (**Figure 1**).

	Group 1	Group 2	Group 3	Group 4	Group 5
Command and Control	◆	◆	◆	◆	◆
Multiple Events	◆	◆	◆	◆	◆
Public Information	◆	◆			◆
Medical	◆	◆	◆	◆	
Infrastructure	◆		◆	◆	
Resource Management	◆	◆	◆		◆
Information Sharing	◆	◆		◆	◆
Interoperable Communications					◆
Lessons Learned	◆	◆		◆	

Figure 1: Matrix of recommended objectives from the Multi-Disciplinary Groups. Objectives were placed within nine objective areas of operation.

The resulting prioritized recommendations were presented to a plenary session of the Conference on the morning of May 21. The recommended objectives reflected a broad consensus on a number of critical points, discussed in the next section of this report. Presented on the following pages is a detailed listing of the Multi-Disciplinary Groups prioritized recommendations, sorted by the nine objective categories.

MULTI GRP 1

MULTI GRP 2

MULTI GRP 3

MULTI GRP 4

MULTI

COMMAND AND CONTROL

Interagency/Intra-agency, FSL integration/cooperation crisis-consequence management handoff Unified Command Structure Crime Scene Evidence preservation/criminal investigation/chain of custody Communications degradation FBI and FEMA roles Finances

Exercise and Integrated Emergency Management Structure (IMS, ICS, UCS, etc...)

Assess Command, Control, and Communication and Coordination at the local, State, Regional and federal levels and integration with the medical community

Interagency/Intra-agency, FSL integration/cooperation crisis-consequence management handoff Unified Command Structure Crime Scene Evidence preservation/criminal investigation/chain of custody Communications degradation Public information/media affairs Asset management

Exercise should stress the ability of local, State, and Federal assets across the functional spectrum to integrate into the response to a WMD incident, using the incident command system, incident management system, and unified command concepts.

MULTIPLE EVENTS

Stage Setting: event profile, combined event, (explosive and bio agent), multiple events, multiple location/city campaign, duration of multiple days, contagion vs non-contagion (not important), "real time", deployment of assets, mass fatalities/mass casualties, contrast, NLD and non-NLD cities

Design exercise with the following features: multiple events, multiple location/cities, duration of multiple days, real time deployment, real resources limitations, note: principle event generated by chemicals

Demonstrate distinction between chem and bio incidents, including focal chemical, focal biological, covert release and hoax. Recognize, identify and predict consequences stemming from a chem or bio event

Event profile, combine event, multiple events, multiple locations/city campaign (one site should be a city which has concluded the NLD/DPP cycle, duration of multiple days, real time, involve rural participants

Exercise should involve multiple jurisdictions, local, state, and federal, at multiple locations responding to multiple agents, (or initiators) for 2-3 days and should simultaneously address both crisis and consequence management issues

PUBLIC INFORMATION

Public Information/Media affairs, test dialogue with public, information flow and management, room for disinformation and misinformation: overnight experts, media designated SMEs, media used by adversary, public

Exercise public info/media affairs

Exercise and evaluate public affairs plans and procedures for establishing and maintaining responsive and thoroughly coordinated public info prog at the l, s, f, levels

MULTI GRP 1

MULTI GRP 2

MULTI GRP 3

MULTI GRP 4

MULTI

**GRP 5
MEDICAL/PUBLIC HEALTH**

Medical and Public Health infrastructure, response and resources, provision of health resources (prophylaxis) mutual aid/support, mass casualties/mass fatalities

Exercise the medical/public health infrastructure

Demonstrate ability to protect lives and property: prevent injury at all levels through assessment of the capability to delivery, distribute and administer medical supplies (antibiotics, antidotes, and vaccinations, ventilators, ICU capabilities) and personnel in a timely manner, manage disposition of mass fatalities (the management of contaminated remains)

Medical and public health infrastructure, victim care, resource management, surveillance, diagnosis, identification, mortuary services, integration of additional support,

INFRASTRUCTURE

Testing the infrastructure, public works: water and waste water, utilities, transportation: inter-city and local (site access): quarantine challenges, (transport, facilities), test technical capabilities of federal resources, including software and hardware

Test ability to protect and/or respond to disruptions of critical infrastructure resulting from a catastrophic WMD attack

Testing the infrastructure, public works: water and waste water, utilities, transportation: inter-city and local (site access): quarantine challenges, (transport, facilities), test technical capabilities of federal resources, including software and hardware

RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

FSL resources, identification, managing, and moving, mutual aid, including local accommodation/reception support to augment federal assets, challenge resource pool, activation/call up, contractor and private sector, volunteers and NGOs, timeliness of decision making: timeliness of movement, mobilization match the need, adequacy of federal response

Exercise resource/asset management

Analyze the adequacy of current federal response systems and programs (the federal portfolio: for example, NLD/DPP) at meeting local, state and regional needs

Force the prioritization of those limited specialized federal response capabilities to separate the simultaneous WMD incidents, exercise should promote and broaden understanding of assets available at all levels, stress the most effective

MULTI GRP 1

MULTI GRP 2

MULTI GRP 3

MULTI GRP 4

MULTI

GRP 5

INFORMATION SHARING

Horizontally vertical, up and down and across, classification issues, threat assessments, pre-event intelligence

Exercise "information sharing"

Measure health surveillance system's ability to recognize, identify, and predict consequences from a CB incident.

Horizontal, vertical, up and down, across classification issues, threat assessments

Demonstrate the value of info sharing between FSL entities, in preventing and/or mitigating the consequences of WMD

INTEROPERABLE COMMUNICATIONS

Expose suspected gaps in physical communications interoperability between functional and jurisdictional levels of government during a WMD incident

LESSONS LEARNED

Timely widespread dissemination of AARs, comprehensive recording of unfolding event, identify those federal and state assets that were actually used, pre-planning was exploited

Discussion of lessons learned

Widespread dissemination of lessons learned, Timely widespread dissemination of AARs, comprehensive recording of unfolding event

CONSENSUS OBJECTIVES/GUIDANCE

In plenary session on the morning of May 21, the Planning Conference participants received, discussed, and adopted the following consensus objectives for the TOPOFF Exercise:

1. Command and Control

- 1.1. Exercise an integrated Emergency Management Structure (Incident Command System, Unified Command System, etc.).
- 1.2. Exercise Interagency and Intra-agency coordination.
- 1.3. Demonstrate Federal, State, and local integration and cooperation.
- 1.4. Show the integration of the medical community into the overall emergency response.
- 1.5. Exercise the interaction between crisis to consequence management: FBI and FEMA roles.
- 1.6. Exercise crime scene evidence preservation, criminal investigation, and chain of custody issues.
- 1.7. Exercise communications degradation.
- 1.8. Review and exercise procedures and mechanisms for reimbursement to local and State agencies for expenses and losses incurred due to a WMD incident.

2. Incident Timing/Scope

- 2.1. A no notice event
- 2.2. Stage multiple events at multiple locations or jurisdictions on a local, State, and Federal level. Utilize contrasting cities (i.e. Nunn-Lugar-Domenici and non-Nunn-Lugar-Domenici cities) and involve rural participants.
- 2.3. Exercise over multiple days.
- 2.4. Conduct the event with “real time” deployment of assets and real resource limitations in handling mass fatalities and mass casualties.
- 2.5. Address both crisis and consequence management issues simultaneously.
- 2.6. Demonstrate the distinction between chemical and biological incidents, including an overt release, covert release, and hoax. Recognize, identify and predict consequences stemming from a chemical or biological event. Have a combined event, (i.e. explosive and a biological agent).

3. Public Information

- 3.1. Exercise and evaluate public affairs plans and procedures for establishing and maintaining responsive and thoroughly coordinated public information programs at the local, State, and Federal levels.
- 3.2. Prepare to handle disinformation and misinformation from overnight experts, media designated Subject Matter Experts, media use by the adversary, as well as public expectations and misunderstandings.

4. Medical/Public Health

- 4.1. Exercise the medical and public health infrastructure, response and resources, provision of health resources (prophylaxis), and mutual aid/support to handle mass casualties and mass fatalities on an immediate level. Assess the ability to provide extended care and extended resources. Examine the effectiveness and timeliness of the Federal government response to provide long-term support to jurisdictions.
- 4.2. Demonstrate the ability to protect lives.
- 4.3. Prevent injury at all levels through an assessment of the capability to deliver, distribute and administer medical supplies (antibiotics, antidotes, and vaccinations, ventilators, ICU capabilities) and personnel in a timely manner, and manage disposition of mass fatalities (the management of contaminated remains).
- 4.4. Exercise surveillance, diagnosis, and identification capabilities.
- 4.5. Show the ability to effectively integrate supplemental support.
- 4.6. Determine the capabilities and resources to provide mental health care for victims, first responders, and the community at large.

5. Infrastructure

- 5.1. Test the ability to protect and/or respond to disruptions of critical infrastructure resulting from a catastrophic WMD attack.
- 5.2. Test different types of infrastructure, public works, (water and wastewater), utilities, and transportation.
- 5.3. Test quarantine challenges (transportation of victims and facilities to house them).
- 5.4. Test technical capabilities of federal resources, including software and hardware.

6. Resource Management

- 6.1. Promote and broaden understanding of the assets available at all levels, how to call up these assets, and stress the most effective integration of federal assets in local, county, and State operations.
- 6.2. Analyze the adequacy of current federal response systems and programs at meeting local, State, and regional needs.
- 6.3. Identify, manage, and move Federal, State, and local resources and mutual aid pacts, including local accommodation/reception support to augment federal assets.
- 6.4. Demonstrate the prioritization of limited specialized Federal response assets to separate and simultaneous WMD incidents.
- 6.5. Utilize a broad resource pool: contractors, the private sector, volunteers and Non-Governmental Organizations.
- 6.6. Integrate the activation/call up of personnel, including Reserves and the National Guard.

7. Information Sharing

- 7.1. Demonstrate the value of information sharing between Federal, State, and local entities in preventing and/or mitigating the consequences of WMD.
- 7.2. Exercise information sharing horizontally, vertically, up, down and across all levels.
- 7.3. Reassess classification issues, who should be cleared?
- 7.4. Conduct threat assessments and pre-event intelligence for jurisdictions.

8. Interoperable Communications

- 8.1. Expose suspected gaps in physical communications interoperability between functional and jurisdictional levels of government during a WMD incident.

9. Lessons Learned

- 9.1. Utilize a neutral party or observers to assist in the peer evaluation and capture of lessons learned.
- 9.2. Disseminate After Action Reports on a timely and widespread basis.
- 9.3. Ensure widespread dissemination and discussion of lessons learned.
- 9.4. Maintain a comprehensive recording of incident play.
- 9.5. Identify and evaluate the efficacy of deployed Federal and State assets and standing response plans utilized during the incident response.

These objectives are intended for use by the designers of the exercise in developing the scenario and specific elements for TOPOFF. The Planning Conference participants recognized that it may not be possible to incorporate every objective into the exercise design. It was their consensus, however, that by addressing as many of the recommended items as possible, TOPOFF can provide maximum and substantial value to WMD terrorism responders at all levels of government.