U.S. POLICY TOWARD
THE EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY

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The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any of its agencies.

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In December 2000 the European Union formalized a common European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) with treaty amendments and concrete measures to establish supporting political and military structures. The United States favors a greater role for the European Union (EU) in European security provided that NATO’s role in transatlantic security is not weakened and that European Union efforts result in increased and relevant military capabilities. Given the nascent nature of the ESDP, the time is now to carefully analyze the challenges and opportunities that exist for the United States to actively participate in shaping ESDP and NATO-EU relations. The United States seeks a relationship with the EU that strengthens transatlantic security and leads to an EU which is capable of being a future, viable partner for global security. How can the United States influence the process to ensure evolving EU defense structures are complementary and interoperable with NATO and capable of sharing defense responsibility with the United States in the future?
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PREFACE

Over a period of twenty years in service I have spent thirteen in Western Europe. During my time in Europe, I have served in U.S. units in Italy and Germany and as an exchange officer in the Italian Army. I have participated in NATO exercises and bilateral exchanges, completed graduate studies in France, worked as a research intern in the Assembly of the Western European Union and conducted operations with Allied militaries in the Balkans and a variety of African countries. My experience has left me with a healthy respect for the professionalism of NATO militaries and given me a “bottom-up” appreciation of the political, economic and cultural factors which influence the European defense debate.

I offer this SRP based on the unique perspective I have gained from service in Europe and from the deep friendships I have established with the citizens and soldiers who live there.

I would like to acknowledge a number of people who assisted me in developing my thoughts and provided me key resources for this SRP: COL Glenn Trimmer, COL Harry Tomlin, LTC Ray Milen, my advisor - CAPT Steven Nerheim, and my close friend - LTC (Italian Army) Roberto D’Alessandro.

Finally, to my family – all European born – Rita, my wife, and Stefania and Victoria, my children, I remain eternally grateful and indebted for their support, patience and understanding during the preparation of this paper.
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Since the end of World War II, successive administrations have held that the security and stability of Europe are of vital interest to the United States. U.S. policy and strategy to ensure European security have significantly evolved over the last fifty years, but a number of elements have remained constant. The end has remained ‘a secure and stable transatlantic community’ and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has been the primary politico-military means of ensuring that end. The ways have varied from organizing collective defense and security, stemming Communism, promoting democracy, promoting respect for human rights and the rule of law, promoting free market economies, and finally, promoting integration and cooperation among the sovereign nations of Europe. The latter, European integration through the European Union (EU), has reached a point where it now includes “the progressive framing of a common defense policy, which might lead to a common defense, should the European Council so decide.”

A central debate in U.S. policy over the last three years has been how to deal with European intent to frame a common defense policy given U.S. strategy for European security and U.S. National Security Strategy in the larger sense. After some reservation the Clinton Administration decided to support the EU’s initiatives for a European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) with certain conditions: (1) NATO must remain the core institution for European security and (2) ESDP should not decouple EU decision-making from NATO, duplicate scarce defense resources, or discriminate against other European members of NATO. The second condition, outlined in an article by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, was commonly referred to as the “Three D’s”. Rhetoric over decoupling and discrimination has receded from public debate, and the concern of duplication has been replaced by a focus on improved military capabilities as proof of both ESDP’s desirability and credibility. To date the Bush Administration has confirmed previous policy toward ESDP, embracing the same conditions for acceptance and emphasizing the importance of progress in improving military capabilities important to NATO. During a busy first year, the Bush Administration spent considerable effort in developing NATO-EU and U.S.-EU relationships. The attacks of September 11, 2001 and the ensuing war on terrorism have acted as catalysts to foster greater cooperation between the U.S. and the EU and between the U.S. and its NATO allies and partners.

The success of ESDP, however, is by no means certain. Combating terrorism may have diluted EU political effort towards ESDP and complicated the debate. EU leaders face a myriad of other pressing topics that all affect ESDP: economic slowdown, stability in the
Balkans, relations with Russia and other European neighbors, Mediterranean security, continued refinement and execution of EU policies, EU enlargement, etc. U.S. policy will also be a determining factor in the evolution of and the rate of progress of ESDP. With ESDP still in a nascent state and revision of U.S. National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy still underway, now is an appropriate time to review U.S. policy towards ESDP. The purpose of this paper is to review the opportunities and concerns ESDP presents and identify the best U.S. policy alternative to encourage and promote an ESDP that is complementary to U.S. interests.

BACKGROUND

An analysis of the key issues affecting U.S. policy towards ESDP requires a review of the origin of ESDP and what it consists of at the outset of 2002. What emerges is that the ESDP is neither a new concept nor a finished product, but rather a living, evolving set of measures with an ambiguous end state – an end state which is certain to be refined over time and which the U.S. still has the opportunity to influence.

Over the past fifty years notions of European defense have ranged from a community, to a pillar to an identity within the confines of NATO, to a distinct, but not entirely separate identity or policy within the European Union. As political integration has progressed within Western Europe from an economic community to a single market to a union, so has political and security cooperation developed into a common defense concept with ties to, but unique from NATO.

WEU, NATO AND ECSC – AT THE ORIGIN OF EUROPEAN DEFENSE COOPERATION

In the aftermath of World War II the countries of Western Europe embarked on historic ventures to formalize cooperation in the areas of defense and economics. In both areas, the U.S. acted as a key catalyst. In order to counter the spreading threats of communism and an aggressive Soviet policy, the governments of Western Europe sought U.S. military assurances for their security. The sine qua non condition to obtain U.S. support for a formal alliance was intra-European cooperation and the dedication of significant West European national resources to collective defense. The Treaty of Brussels in 1948 establishing the Western European Union (WEU) satisfied this condition. The Treaty of Washington establishing NATO was signed the following year. An attempt to create a European Defense Community outside of NATO in 1952 failed due to doubts over re-arming Germany outside of a U.S. umbrella. The importance of U.S. military power and U.S. political support made NATO the institution of choice (of all member states) for discussing and resolving Western European security issues.

Likewise, the Marshall Plan announced by the U.S. in 1947 encouraged the countries of Europe to formally coordinate their economic recovery plans in order to receive the U.S. aid so
critical to overcoming the devastation left by World War II.\textsuperscript{15} Success in economic cooperation led to a Franco-German plan to create an institution to pool and regulate the production of key national resources. Resources that had been the object of conquest in two world wars became the basis of a historical integration – the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1952.\textsuperscript{16} Building on the ECSC’s success, the six member states established the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1958 in order to expand cooperation to the free flow of goods, services, capital and people.

**ESDI AND WEU REVITALIZATION WITHIN NATO**

As defense cooperation remained deeply rooted in NATO through the 1980s, economic and political collaboration increased within the EEC. Informal policy coordination was formalized as European Political Cooperation in the 1986, then transformed into the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in 1993 via the Treaty on European Union (EU).\textsuperscript{17} Enhanced foreign and security cooperation was seen as a logical parallel to deepening economic and political integration, but EEC partners were not yet ready to tackle defense issues.

Within NATO, however, European allies were ready to support enhanced security and defense cooperation. The collapse of communism in Europe and the unification of Germany led NATO to revise its Alliance Strategic Concept in 1991. The new concept expanded NATO’s mandate beyond collective defense and deterrence to include a broader concept of security. Additionally, it formally endorsed a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) centered on the WEU, but grounded within NATO.\textsuperscript{18}

Between 1991 and 1998, the WEU’s role grew. It gradually incorporated all other European nations of EU and NATO (as members, partners and observers). It increased its ties with the EU and, most importantly, it developed operational capabilities.\textsuperscript{19} In 1992 at a WEU Foreign and Defense Ministers meeting in Petersberg (Germany), the WEU agreed upon specific tasks (see Figure 1) it could viably execute: “humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks, [and] tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.”\textsuperscript{20} The WEU agreed to designate forces answerable to WEU (FAWEU) for such tasks. Such forces were to be “separable, but not separate” when working under the aegis of WEU.\textsuperscript{21} In support of an operational role for the WEU, NATO agreed to make Alliance assets and capabilities available to European allies and approved the elaboration of multinational European command arrangements for WEU-led operations and the conduct of military planning and
exercises for potential WEU missions.\textsuperscript{22} During this period the WEU created a number of supporting structures to enhance its coordination and operational roles:

- **Institute for Security Studies** to develop a European security identity through studies, dialogue and publication (1991 in Paris)
- **Satellite Center** to provide information and intelligence (1993 in Torrejon)
- **Planning Cell** to carry out planning for WEU-led operations (1994 in Brussels)
- **Situation Center** to monitor crises and WEU-led operations (1996 in Brussels)
- **Permanent Military Delegates Committee** to support military coordination (1998 in Brussels)\textsuperscript{23}

Despite progress in developing capability for action, WEU-led operations in the 1990s were limited in scope and focused on the lower end of the “Petersberg tasks” (see Figure 2).\textsuperscript{24}
ESDP AND WEU INTEGRATION INTO THE EU

By 1997 members of the EU and the WEU had reached a consensus to institutionalize closer ties in view of possible WEU integration into the EU. The EU announced its intention to assert its security identity through CFSP and established the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit (PPEWU) from existing assets of WEU’s Planning Cell and Situation Center. The EU and the WEU also decided to synchronize their six-month presidencies to facilitate a common voice. Hence at the outset of 1998 ESDI (an emerging idea in 1991 when first sanctioned by NATO) had developed structure and experience and taken on more of an EU flavor. ESDI was thus set for the next step – transformation into a defense identity embodied in the EU.

The European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) was officially coined at the Helsinki European Council of December 10-11, 1999, but traces its genesis to the British-French Summit at St-Malò, December 3-4, 1998 (the first formal gesture of British support for the idea of a defense identity within the EU). A number of reinforcing factors led to the shift toward a
stronger European defense identity within the EU: support for greater political integration, a less threatening Russia, and a desire to balance the weight of American influence on European security issues.

As a result of the Balkan conflicts, Europeans both recognized and resented their dependence on U.S. political leadership and military power. European allies recognized that they lacked the type and scale of military capabilities necessary to resolve these conflicts on their own and noted the difficulties they experienced in securing U.S. military involvement. Once the U.S. was involved, Europeans perceived the U.S. as inflexible or overly assertive in determining and executing alliance strategy. EU leaders came to see that a more cohesive voice in matters of security, combined with a greater capability to act, would mean both greater influence within NATO and the ability to take care of crises in their own backyard. The confluence of progress in EU political integration, progress in defense cooperation through the WEU, and a desire to play a larger role in European security matters led to the creation of the ESDP.

WHAT IS ESDP TODAY?

The ESDP is best understood as a group of measures agreed upon and institutionalized by successive European Council meetings from 1998 to present. The purpose of the ESDP as defined at the 1999 Helsinki European Council is “to develop an autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises. This process will avoid unnecessary duplication and does not imply the creation of a European Army.” The scope of ESDP is limited to the “Petersberg tasks,” which exclude collective defense, but in EU parlance are interpreted as covering the “full range of conflict prevention and crisis management tasks.” Such an interpretation probably includes what the U.S. military refers to as a small-scale contingency, but not a regional war.

The EU has made considerable progress since adopting an ESDP in 1999. It has adopted permanent political and military structures, established permanent contacts with NATO, integrated WEU capabilities and functions, committed to developing rapid reaction forces, developed an exercise policy, and declared its ‘operational status.’ What the EU has not done is realize significant improvements in military capabilities or finalize essential agreements with NATO and its non-EU partners for access to key capabilities and consultation in times of crisis. Other important unfinished business on ESDP includes harmonizing internal EU procedures for policy development and execution, defining parliamentary roles, determining how to incorporate
the collective defense aspects of the Treaty of Brussels and defining what form “common defense” within the EU will eventually take.

**Permanent Structures**

At the Nice European Council (December 7-9, 2000) the Council approved permanent political and military bodies (which had been acting as interim bodies since March 2000) to provide strategic direction and support to ESDP. The new EU bodies, all located in Brussels, are principally evolutions of existing structures (see Table 2).

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>What</th>
<th>When Established</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political and Security Committee (PSC)</strong></td>
<td>January 22, 2001</td>
<td>Deals with all CFSP issues, including ESDP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The PSC is composed of senior/ ambassadorial level national representatives. The PSC subsumed the responsibilities of the existing EU Political Committee, which had previously coordinated member state input to CFSP.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EU Military Committee (EUMC)</strong></td>
<td>April 9, 2001</td>
<td>Responsible for providing the PSC with military advice and recommendations on all military matters within the EU as well as providing military direction to the EU Military Staff.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chairman of the EUMC is Swedish General Gustav Hägglund. Like NATO’s Military Committee the EUMC is composed of military Chiefs of Defense (CHOD), represented by their military delegates.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EU Military Staff (EUMS)</strong></td>
<td>June 11, 2001</td>
<td>Provides military expertise and support to the ESDP, including the conduct of EU-led military crisis management operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EUMS subsumed officers and NCOs of the WEU Military Staff. SOURCE: Göteborg (June 2001) European Council</td>
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**TABLE 1. EU STRUCTURES FOR ESDP**

**Permanent Consultation with NATO**

Consultation between NATO and the EU on “matters of security, defense and crisis management of common interest” initially began at representative and delegate level between the interim PSC and North Atlantic Council (NAC) and the respective Military Committees. Permanent consultation at ministerial and CHOD level started last year. The first meeting of EU and NATO Foreign Ministers took place on May 20, 2001, in Budapest and the first meeting of the EU and NATO Military Committees followed in Brussels on June 12, 2001. Successive meetings at CHOD and ministerial level are planned to occur at least every six months.

**Integration of WEU**

In 1999, Dr. Javier Solana, the previous NATO Secretary-General (1995-1999), was aptly designated the first High Representative (HR) for the CFSP of the European Council and the
Secretary-General (SG) of the Council of the EU. HR/SG Solana has been extremely active since his arrival in coordinating EU’s burgeoning ESDP with NATO allies, partners, and other nations important to EU interests. The dual-hatting of HR/SG Solana is one example of the EU decision to integrate WEU functions. As of 1 January 2002, the EU had subsumed all WEU bodies (see Table 1) with the exception of the Assembly of WEU (made up of Members of Parliament from WEU nations as well as from associate and observer nations). The ISS, Satellite Center, Policy and Planning Unit (previously the PPEWU), and the Situation Center all report to the HR/SG (the Situation Center is manned by the EUMS). In addition to handing over its crisis management responsibilities and its academic and intelligence activities, the WEU transferred its police mission in Albania to the EU, completed its de-mining assistance mission in Croatia, suspended its formal consultations with other organizations and forwarded its work on common strategies (with Russia, Ukraine and Mediterranean partners) to the PSC.

Rapid Reaction Forces – Headline Goal

The Washington NATO Summit of 24 April 1999 was a major milestone for European defense. In addition to commemorating the 50th anniversary of the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty, the summit again revised the Alliance Strategic Concept (first update since 1991), reaffirmed NATO’s competence in the areas of security and consultation (in addition to deterrence and defense), reinforced support for ESDI and WEU-led operations, included provisions for support of EU-led operations, and launched the Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI). The DCI was launched “to improve defense capabilities of the Alliance to ensure the effectiveness of future multinational operations across the full spectrum of Alliance missions in the present and foreseeable security environment with a special focus on improving interoperability among Alliance forces (and where applicable also between Alliance and Partner forces). The DCI initiative focuses on five functional areas: deployability and mobility, sustainability and logistics, survivability, engagement capability and command and control and information systems. The last sentence of the Final Communiqué read “Improvements in interoperability and critical capabilities should also strengthen the European pillar in NATO.”

A few key member states of the EU took the idea and ran with it, albeit in a slightly different direction. After three bilateral summits in July and November 1999 (British-Italian, British-French, and Franco-German) and a WEU Audit of Assets and Capabilities for European Crisis Operations, the European Council agreed on a series of five measures, the first of which has been commonly referred to as the Headline Goal. The Helsinki European Council introduced the goal of deploying by 2003, a force of up to corps level (up to 15 brigades or
50,000-60,000 persons), capable of the full range of “Petersberg tasks,” within 60 days for a period of 1 year.\textsuperscript{48} The Helsinki Presidency Conclusions included language addressing stated U.S. concerns. It declared the required EU capabilities as mutually reinforcing of NATO’s DCI (which closely, but not entirely matched), limited deployment of the force to situations in which NATO as a whole was not engaged, and specified that the process would avoid unnecessary duplication and did not imply the creation of a European Army.\textsuperscript{49}

Meetings of the General Affairs Council (EU Ministers of Foreign Affairs, at times joined by Defense Ministers) and the European Council have elaborated the Headline Goal to include air and sea assets, police forces and civilian crisis management capabilities (see Table 2). The latter two are capabilities that NATO does not deploy. Three conferences at ministerial level in 2000 and 2001 have refined a catalog of forces eligible for EU-led operations.\textsuperscript{50}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>EU Capability</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>Ability to deploy 60,000 men in less than 60 days and to sustain them for at least one year. Member states have committed to a pool of more than 100,000 men, around 400 combat aircraft and 100 ships.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>Ability to provide 5000 police officers and deploy up to 1000 police officers within 30 days. Member states have committed to a pool of 1400 police officers to deploy within the 30 day time frame. Additionally, a Police Unit has been created within the CFSP Secretariat to help plan and conduct EU police operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian</td>
<td>Ability to deploy a pool of experts “to take on assignments within civilian administration in the context of crisis management operations,” i.e. general administrative functions, social functions, infrastructure support functions.</td>
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Source: Göteborg (June 2001) and Laeken (December 2001) European Council documents.

**TABLE 2. HEADLINE GOAL - EU CRISIS MANAGEMENT CAPABILITIES**

**EU Operational?**

At Laeken (December 14-15, 2001), the European Council declared “the Union now capable of conducting some crisis-management operations.”\textsuperscript{51} A fairly qualified and ambiguous statement, but facts show that it is still ambitious. Retired General Klaus Naumann, former Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, estimated it would take at least ten years before the European reaction forces would be ready to deploy as politicians have imagined.\textsuperscript{52} Despite the goal set at the Nice European Council (December 7-9, 2000) to seek an operational capability by the end of 2001,\textsuperscript{53} much remains to be done to meet the EU’s own detailed plans of action.

The Police Action Plan developed under the Swedish EU Presidency and announced at the Göteborg European Council (June 15-16, 2001) is making progress toward the police aspects of the Headline Goal, but is far from complete.\textsuperscript{54} A detailed EU Exercise Policy was also announced at Göteborg. Despite a solid concept to test crisis management capabilities at
the strategic and operational level, exercises have yet to be announced and financial aspects remain to be defined.\textsuperscript{55}

The European Capability Action Plan (ECAP) released at Laeken reveals the real gap between the EU’s current ‘operational status’ and its desired end state.\textsuperscript{56} The ECAP identifies the significant shortfalls that exist in a variety of required military capabilities and specifies a tracking mechanism (Capability Development Mechanism – CDM) to monitor and evaluate EU members’ progress.\textsuperscript{57} The ECAP identifies efforts to be made in general terms and more specifically with respect to forces and strategic capabilities.\textsuperscript{58} In general terms, the ECAP notes capability shortfalls in carrying out the most complex operations of the “Petersberg tasks” at an appropriate level of risk for the desired period of deployment. In terms of forces, shortfalls are noted in total commitment (in order to ensure rotation of units once deployed), force protection, logistics, degree of availability of ground troops (based on restrictions by member states pertaining to actual availability in time of a crisis), operational mobility, naval aviation, maritime medical evacuation, combat search and rescue and precision guided weapons for air elements. Finally, strategic capability shortfalls are listed in air and sea lift (main shortcomings) and reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition.\textsuperscript{59}

The ECAP identifies four key principles to follow in order to rectify the remaining deficiencies: (1) “enhanced effectiveness and efficiency of European military capability efforts” (i.e. improve military cooperation between member states), (2) “a ‘bottom-up’ approach to European defense cooperation” (i.e. carry through on planned national and multinational projects and develop new initiatives to address remaining deficiencies), (3) “coordination between EU Member States and cooperation with NATO” (i.e. target specific shortcomings, avoid duplication and ensure transparency and consistency), and (4) “broad public support” (i.e. communicate EU vision and shore up public and political support in EU member states).\textsuperscript{60}

Reviews by both European and U.S. defense analysts indicate that European armies have a long way to go to make required force structure changes, to finance and develop the needed military capabilities for DCI and the Headline Goal, and to improve the training quality and readiness of the envisioned rapid reaction forces.\textsuperscript{61} Changes from in-place defense forces to deployable forces, and from conscript armies to volunteer forces with viable reserves, are ongoing, but will not be completed for years to come.\textsuperscript{62} Additionally, acquisition and development of much of the new equipment and platforms needed for a modernized, projection-oriented force will take years to finance and field. EU may be operational, but for just what security tasks at what level of risk is unclear.
Other Unfinished Business

The lack of progress in developing required military capabilities is arguably the main focus of EU efforts in realizing its goal of an autonomous capacity to conduct EU-led operations. It is also the area most relevant to gaining and maintaining U.S. support for ESDP. However, there are other shortcomings, inefficiencies and issues the EU must confront.

The EU must address a number of internal political questions: remaining aspects of the WEU, parliamentary roles in ESDP, and overlapping competencies between the European Commission’s External Relations Directorate and the CFSP Secretariat. The EU must decide whether or not and how to incorporate the Treaty of Brussels, which provides for the collective defense of the ten members of the WEU. The question of parliamentary roles remains. EU decisions have endorsed a role for the Assembly of WEU, but have not yet addressed the role of the European Parliament. The European Parliament has a Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights and Security and Defense Policy, but it exerts little or no influence on CFSP or ESDP. The Assembly of WEU advocates its primacy over the European Parliament in ESDP oversight based on its unique and historical focus on defense issues and national make up. The European Parliament views WEU as “gradually disappearing” and advocates a greater role for itself. Not the least of EU’s structural problems is how to ensure synergy and eliminate duplication of effort between the two entities responsible for CFSP. The European Commission’s Directorate-General for External Relations, led by Commissioner Chris Patten, was responsible for CFSP (in conjunction with the President of the Commission and European Council) until Dr. Javier Solana assumed his duties as HR/SG in 1999. Dividing lines have appeared between the civilian and military aspects of CFSP, but “cross-organizational coherence” is still an issue awaiting resolution.

The question of a common EU security strategy has not been adequately addressed. Successive European Council documents since Vienna (December 1998) have refined and expanded the scope of ESDP and resulted in detailed plans to meet the goals intended to give the EU an autonomous capacity for action. However, an overarching strategic concept for ESDP and common vision of the end state – ‘common defense’ – is missing. No single document addresses an EU assessment of its security environment, its vision for political and military capability, integration and purpose, or how it plans to achieve such a vision. Such a strategic vision is likely to be some time in coming.

With respect to NATO, the EU must finalize agreements on the key questions of access and consultation. The Feira European Council (June 19-20, 2000) approved the creation of ad hoc groups to work with NATO in four areas: security issues (intelligence access and sharing),
elaboration of capability goals, EU access to NATO assets (based on existing agreements for
WEU access), and definition of permanent arrangements between EU and NATO in times of
crisis and non-crisis. EU has had success in the first two tasks, but as of December 2001 the
latter two still await resolution.

The long list of unfinished business and work in progress under ESDP leads one to doubt
the EU’s ability to undertake and lead a military operation under current circumstances. In the
Summer of 2001, conflict in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) was initially
touted as a potential test case where EU could take the lead diplomatically and militarily. In
the end, European leaders chose to conduct operations through NATO vice the EU. Although
military effort was largely European with only minimal U.S. presence, it appears that European
allies and perhaps FYROM leaders preferred a NATO umbrella for the operation (Essential
Harvest, later replaced by Amber Fox). With the mandate of Amber Fox set to expire in March
2002, NATO and the EU may revisit the decision and consider a hand off to EU command and
control. Considering previous WEU-led operations and an Italian-led, non-NATO,
multinational operation conducted in Albania in 1997 (Operation Alba), the potential for EU-led
operations exists. Arguably small scale “Petersberg tasks,” nonetheless these operations
provide examples of military action led by EU member states without the support of significant
NATO assets or United States support. The bottom line on progress in improving EU
capabilities is grim, but political consensus can be a powerful catalyst. As NATO Secretary-
General Lord Robertson said in March 2001, “we have achieved more in the last 12 months on
the mechanisms for building European defense than we achieved in the preceding 12 years.”

ANALYSIS

With the foregoing as a foundation, it is possible to review current U.S. policy and the key
factors that will shape NATO-EU and U.S.-EU relations in the years to come. The key factors
are: the future evolution of Europe, the future threats to European security, U.S. and EU
strategic perspectives, and challenges to completing the EU’s ‘unfinished business’ of ESDP.
After reviewing these factors, we will look at key milestones planned over the next two years,
which will have a significant impact on the progress of ESDP.

CURRENT US POLICY

The Bush Administration’s policy toward ESDP could best be described as a “yes, if”
approach. Yes to ESDP, as long as it progresses along certain lines – cooperative and
compatible with NATO, transparent in its deliberations, open to participation by non-EU
members (to influence decisions on use of NATO assets) and resulting in improved capabilities relevant to European security. In a broader perspective, the Bush Administration has made it clear that it views its European allies as desirable partners in global security, sharing the burdens and risks of sustaining peace in Eurasia. In a 1999 speech at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library in California, then presidential candidate Bush declared:

“We have partners, not satellites. Our goal is a fellowship of strong, not weak nations. And this requires both more American consultation and more American leadership. The United States needs its European allies, as well as friends in other regions, to help with security challenges as they arise. For our allies, sharing the enormous opportunities of Eurasia also means sharing the burdens and risks of sustaining the peace. The support of friends allows America to reserve its power and will for the vital interests we share.”

This vision for Europe is consistent with the National Security Strategy (NSS) and the Department of Defense’s transatlantic security strategy (Strengthening Transatlantic Security: U.S. Strategy for the 21st Century) published in December 2000 in the waning days of President Clinton’s mandate. The Bush Administration has yet to revise either of these documents. However, based on policy statements issued to date, the Bush Administration is unlikely to drastically change the concept of transatlantic security.

National Security Strategy and Transatlantic Security Strategy

The 2000 NSS underlines U.S. interest in Europe (“European stability is vital to our own security”) and lists three strategic goals with respect to Europe: “integration of the region, a cooperative transatlantic relationship with Europe on global issues, and fostering opportunities while minimizing proliferation risks posed by collapse of the Soviet Union.” The 2000 NSS lays out a positive, reinforcing policy towards ESDP in contrast to the negative edge of the “Three D’s” article written by Secretary Albright two years earlier. On the role of NATO and U.S. policy toward ESDP, the NSS states:

“NATO remains the anchor of U.S. engagement in European security matters, the foundation for assuring collective defense of Alliance members, and the linchpin of transatlantic security…the United States actively supports the efforts of our European partners to develop their own European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). We further support European efforts to increase and improve capabilities for collective defense and crisis response operations, including the capability to act militarily under the EU when NATO, as a whole, is not engaged.”

The Defense Department’s Strengthening Transatlantic Security provides five overarching principles to guide U.S. relations with European allies and partners (author’s comments in parentheses).
- Transatlantic security is indivisible (it is based on mutually recognized vital interests in security; U.S. presence in Europe and U.S. nuclear deterrent are critical elements of security);
- The transatlantic community should include all of Europe and multiple institutions are necessary to unite it (NATO and the EU are the leading pillars; continued enlargement is important; engagement with non-NATO and non-EU nations is key, i.e. Russia, Ukraine, etc.)
- The U.S. welcomes European efforts to increase their capabilities of collective defense and security and an ability to act militarily under EU where NATO as a whole is not engaged (U.S. is prepared to adapt to work with stronger, more united European partners);
- For future transatlantic security, the U.S. and its allies must improve defense capabilities relevant to modern warfare (the U.S. is moving in this direction and expects NATO partners to do their share);
- In this era of globalization, the U.S. and Europe have common interests in dealing with security challenges on the periphery of Europe and beyond (terrorism, hostile states, NBC weapons and humanitarian disasters impact on transatlantic interests and require joint responses).  

Defense Strategy

Although the Bush Administration has not completed its own NSS, the Department of Defense did complete a Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) in September 2001. The 2001 QDR includes the framework of a defense strategy, which provides insight on how the forthcoming NSS might address the question of ESDP. In terms of enduring national interests relating to Europe, the QDR includes the “security and well-being of allies and friends,” and “precluding hostile domination of critical areas, particularly Europe, Northeast Asia, the East Asian littoral, and the Middle East and Southwest Asia.” The defense strategy emphasizes two points relevant to ESDP: (1) U.S. desires strong, capable allies and friends to ensure European security as well as to act in concert as potential partners to deter/defeat aggression in other “critical areas.” (2) U.S. forward presence in Europe has a dual role: respond to European security threats and project power rapidly elsewhere, if needed. The first point emphasizes what is arguably not a primary objective of ESDP, i.e. to develop a capability to act outside of Europe as a coalition partner of the U.S. Although ESDP may result in more modern military capabilities (including power projection), its focus is clearly on a limited range of threats and a limited area within the periphery of Europe. The second point reflects the U.S. view of a pertinent, modern military – responsive (more proactive than reactive), rapidly deployable, interoperable, capable of dealing with a broad array of threats. These are the measures by
which the U.S. assesses its allies’ capabilities (i.e. DCI), thus the capabilities of ESDP’s reaction forces. The EU’s measures success on a much less ambitious scale.

Recent Policy Statements

Recent administration policy statements on ESDP are consistent with existing U.S. security strategy and focus on three points. Firstly, NATO remains central to U.S. strategy. Secondly, improved capabilities are what matters most to the U.S. Capabilities are important to deter and defeat potential threats to regional stability and to close a widening technology gap between the U.S. and its allies. Thirdly, the EU is encouraged to act where NATO as a whole is not engaged provided it respects the watchwords of coordination, compatibility, transparency, and participation. Otherwise, the core value of NATO as the anchor, foundation, linchpin of transatlantic security may be weakened. Between February and June 2001, President Bush issued four joint statements concerning ESDP with NATO heads of state (Polish President Aleksander Kwasniewski, Spanish President Jose Aznar, German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, and British Prime Minister Tony Blair). All four statements were consistent, if not identical in language, and state that:

“We affirm that NATO will remain the essential foundation of Transatlantic security...We support efforts of NATO's European Members and other European nations to assume greater responsibility for crisis management in Europe by committing new resources to strengthen their and NATO’s capabilities and developing the ability to manage efforts where NATO as a whole chooses not to engage. The United States welcomes the European Union's European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), intended to make Europe a stronger, more capable partner in deterring and managing crises affecting the security of the Transatlantic community. We believe it is essential that the EU develop capabilities that enable it to act when NATO as a whole is not engaged, in a manner that is fully coordinated, compatible and transparent with NATO, and to provide for the fullest possible participation of non-EU European Allies. We also agree that the Alliance will be able to meet the 21st century's new challenges most effectively by strengthening cooperation in Transatlantic defense trade and the removal of unnecessary governmental barriers and impediments to such trade.” (Emphasis added.)

Statements by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Ambassadors Alexander Vershbow and Nicholas Burns (successive U.S. Ambassadors to NATO) have echoed the key policy points above. With respect to capabilities, Ambassador Vershbow delivered hard-hitting speeches in March and May 2001. He provided specific examples of desired improvements in allied capabilities: precision-guided munitions, electronic warfare, unmanned reconnaissance vehicles, air-to-air refueling, and air transport. Ambassador Vershbow identified two allied multilateral programs which the U.S. would use as indicators of serious progress: Alliance
Ground Surveillance System (AGSS – an aircraft radar system for deep battlefield surveillance), and the Airbus A400M large transport aircraft. The capabilities specified by Ambassador Vershbow were later included as “critical and long-standing deficiencies” in a NATO Statement on DCI issued at the NAC Defense Ministerial on June 7, 2001. On June 19, 2001, a number of European nations signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Airbus to acquire the A400M. Eight nations (Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom) placed large orders. Other evidence that EU leaders are listening to U.S. concerns is found in statements by HR/SG Solana issued just prior to EU’s Capabilities Improvement Conference in November 2001. HR/SG Solana reiterated improvement of capabilities as being of utmost importance in order to demonstrate real progress and listed priority areas, which included the U.S. examples. Only moderate progress, however, was made at the EU’s November 2001 conference.

The U.S. has also taken an active role to ensure NATO-EU relationships and respective decision-making processes reflect the desired watchwords of coordination, compatibility, transparency, and participation. In his March speech Ambassador Vershbow outlined the purpose of institutionalizing political and military links. “We need to embed the habits of collegial consultation and collaboration so deeply in our separate systems in routine times that they become automatic in times of crisis.” He also reiterated the need to complete tasks outlined previously by Secretary Albright relative to ESDP. On December 14, 2000, in a speech to the North Atlantic Council Secretary Albright outlined the tasks for NATO and the EU with respect to ESDP: (1) develop “a coherent and collaborative approach to force planning;” (2) assure “EU access to NATO operational planning;” (3) establish “reliable arrangements for regular consultations” between NATO and the EU; (4) ensure “all allies are given adequate means to participate and contribute to EU defense activities.” Ambassador Vershbow concisely framed the issue of the last task as “ensuring the regular involvement [of non-EU members of NATO] in shaping the strategy and in doing the military planning for EU-led operations and exercises affecting their security.” As mentioned previously tasks (2) and (4) are closely tied and incomplete. Task (1) has fallen from public discussion and task (3) has been successfully concluded. In June 2001, the European Council at Göteberg declared progress in establishing regular consultations between NATO and the EU. In fact, both the EU and NATO military committees and ministers had formally met by early June 2001. While the Presidency Conclusions of Göteberg referenced work to be done on arrangements for EU
After 11 September – Evidence of Policy Success

Ambassador Vershbow’s words about cooperation in times of crisis proved prophetic. The day after the 11 September attacks NATO invoked Article 5 of the Washington Treaty for the first time in its history. Individually and collectively EU leaders condemned the attack and pledged support. Within ten days, key EU leaders (representing the Presidency, the Council and the Commission) had visited Washington, D.C., issued a joint U.S.-EU statement on combating terrorism and reunited in an Extraordinary European Council to approve and publish a comprehensive European action plan to combat terrorism (see Table 3). The latter preceded the first instance of U.S. legislation by weeks. Within twenty-five days, NATO approved eight measures to support the U.S. campaign against terrorism ranging from intelligence sharing to providing capabilities, assistance and forces. To say the least, European allies and friends responded quickly and decisively on the side of the U.S. NATO continues to play a key role in coordinating European support for the U.S. global campaign against terrorism and the EU has actively supported the campaign internationally and domestically.

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<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Support to U.S. in War on Terrorism</th>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>• Increased intelligence and information sharing</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Provided assistance to allies as needed as a result of their support for the campaign</td>
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<td>• Provided access to ports and airfields for U.S. and other allies</td>
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<td>• Increased security of U.S. facilities</td>
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<td>• Backfilled selected Allied assets needed out of area</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Provided blanket overflight clearances for U.S. and other allied aircraft</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Deployed NATO airborne early warning forces to patrol U.S. airspace (currently 7 AWACS)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Deployed Standing Naval forces to the eastern Mediterranean</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Initiated review of policies, structures, capabilities and defense concept to combat terrorism</td>
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<tr>
<td>European Union</td>
<td>• Developed a broad plan of action to combat terrorism in Europe and support U.S. efforts</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Exchanged information between Europol, Eurojust, intelligence services, police forces and the U.S. Department of Justice</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Enhanced cooperation on criminal justice, matters of extradition, and visa/passport controls</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Identified and froze assets of terrorist groups and associated bodies; adopted measures on money laundering and suppression of terrorist financing</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Enhanced joint efforts on non-proliferation and export controls of arms and NBC substances</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Enforced U.N. resolutions against terrorism</td>
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<td>• Enhanced aviation security regulations</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Supported Bonn Conference (Dec 01) on Afghanistan reconstruction and member-states’ participation in International Security Assistance Force</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Provided humanitarian aid to Afghanistan and neighboring countries and pledged future aid at Tokyo Donors Conference (Jan 02)</td>
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TABLE 3. NATO AND EU SUPPORT TO U.S. IN WAR ON TERRORISM
After 11 September – Evidence of Policy Failure (or Lack of Progress).

Notwithstanding NATO and EU solidarity, U.S. policy toward ESDP has not met its goals. The lack of progress in improving European military capabilities is already noted. Work also remains on EU access to NATO assets and on consultation between EU and non-EU partners. The concern over collaborative NATO-EU force planning appears to have receded.\textsuperscript{103} EU statements to date concentrate on ensuring access to NATO operational planning capabilities. It is probable that NATO and EU leaders are comfortable with NATO’s lead in force planning based on the fact that 11 of 15 EU members already participate and that the long term focus of force planning allows for sufficient coordination between NATO and the EU. It is also likely that the EU is comfortable with the limited force planning capability of its Policy Planning Unit.

A real stumbling block appears to be the consent of Turkey in the proposed arrangements for partner consultation. Turkey demands a role in the initial decision-making process for any EU-led operation, beyond being “involved” in the operational planning. The EU proposal provides for non-EU allies to consult during the decision-making process, but does not afford a veto on how NATO resources might be used. Given the likelihood of potential crises in the vicinity of Turkey, i.e. the Balkans, the Middle East or Southwest Asia, and the logical importance of Turkish military support, Turkish leaders are concerned about relegation to a second-class partner status.\textsuperscript{104} Complicating the issue is progress on Turkey’s candidature for the EU. Although declared a suitable candidate at the Helsinki European Council in December 1999, economic and democratic reforms have not yet met EU accession requirements. Recent progress in settling the issue of Cyprus is offset by lack of progress in settling the question of the Kurds.\textsuperscript{105} While the U.S. promotes Turkey’s membership in the EU,\textsuperscript{106} the Laeken European Council did not significantly advance Turkey’s eventual accession to the EU.\textsuperscript{107}

As of the December 2001 North Atlantic Council meetings neither access nor consultation had been resolved. The final communiqués of both the Defense Minister and Foreign Minister sessions noted “work to be done on the arrangements for NATO support to EU-led operations” and “the need to find solutions satisfactory to all Allies on the issue of participation by non-EU European Allies.”\textsuperscript{108}

FUTURE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

To determine what U.S. policy is right for ESDP, it is necessary to look to the future context of European security. ESDP’s evolution over the next 10-15 years depends on both the progress of European political integration and the likely threats to European security. Two
questions emerge. What is the future of the European Union? What future threats to European security should the ESDP address?

Future of European Union

What kind of global peer is the EU destined to be in the 21st Century? To what degree will the EU share resources and responsibilities with the U.S. in promoting development, democracy and stability? The United States Commission on National Security/21st Century (USCNC) proposes a range of scenarios for Greater Europe during the first quarter of the 21st Century. In their 1999 report, the USCNC considered possibilities ranging from a federalized Europe, to a failed EU and the resurrection of an imperial Russia. The report concludes that “the EU will neither collapse nor achieve a fully unified foreign and security policy” and “Russia will muddle through” without disintegrating or becoming a credible threat. The USCNC report predicts increased political and economic integration in Europe and a greater desire to bear security responsibilities, but without a corresponding, unified effort to buy the military assets required. Tensions over differing perspectives are probable between the EU and the U.S., but a “rebalanced NATO is likely to remain the premier institution of Atlantic relations and the main instrument of U.S. power in Europe.” The report also concludes that U.S. political, economic and cultural engagement will be important for stability and progress in Russia and the central and eastern European countries remaining external to the EU.

In his 2000 book entitled Uniting Europe: European Integration and the Post-Cold War World, John Van Oudenaren examines the trends of European economic, social and political integration and reaches a similar conclusion. Mr. Oudenaren states that a United States of Europe will not be achieved “not least because the citizens of Europe have shown that they are not prepared to abandon national and regional identities and loyalties.” He goes on to say that because European citizens realize the benefits integration has brought, integration “is likely to continue, unevenly and imperfectly, but with enduring effects for Europe, its neighbors, and the international system as a whole.” Mr. Oudenaren is pessimistic about defense integration for a variety of reasons. Diverging national views on defense and the absence of a major threat make higher military expenditure politically difficult and thus unlikely to reach the scale needed to increase capabilities and support defense industry collaboration and consolidation. As a result, he predicts “the EU is likely to develop as a regional power… concentrating the bulk of its resources on the stabilization of its immediate periphery.”

What does the EU say of its future? The recent Laeken Declaration on the Future of the European Union boldly states that “the Union is at a crossroads, a defining moment in its
existence; the unification of Europe is near.” The Laeken Declaration doesn’t offer a vision, but does offer a consensus on how the EU views its new role in the world. An excerpt reads:

“No that the Cold War is over and we are living in a globalized, yet also highly fragmented world, Europe needs to shoulder its responsibilities in the governance of globalization. The role it has to play is that of a power resolutely doing battle against all violence, all terror and all fanaticism, but which also does not turn a blind eye to the world’s heartrending injustices. In short, a power wanting to change the course of world affairs in such a way as to benefit not just the rich countries but also the poorest. A power seeking to set globalization within a moral framework, in other words to anchor it in solidarity and sustainable development.”

Such a role is rather ambitious to say the least, given the significant lack of military capabilities noted in the Laeken Presidency Conclusions. Regardless, the European Council declares “the image of democratic and globally engaged Europe admirably matches citizens’ wishes...they also want to see Europe more involved in foreign affairs, security and defense.” Such language corresponds nicely with U.S. desires for a capable global partner to share security risks and burdens. However, whether such verbiage will be matched by adequate European military capability remains to be seen. In all likelihood, the EU’s vision of an active, global role will remain more in the realm of diplomatic and economic engagement. The options of military force to ‘do battle against violence, terror and fanaticism’ will remain limited and more characterized by ambition and rhetoric, than reality.

**Future Threats to European Security**

Consensus generally exists between the U.S. and NATO on future threats to European security. The 1999 Alliance Strategic Concept described security challenges and risks as various, military and non-military, multi-directional and hard to predict. The Alliance Strategic Concept noted sources of potential local and regional instability as “ethnic and religious rivalries, territorial disputes, inadequate or failed efforts at reform, the abuse of human rights and the dissolution of states.” Other risks to European security included nuclear forces outside the Alliance, the proliferation of advanced weaponry and weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, organized crime, and the disruption of the flow of vital resources.

In Secretary Rumsfeld’s July 2001 address to his fellow NATO defense ministers, he noted that it was difficult to predict who might threaten Europe and when or where such threats might occur. However, he stated that how those threats would occur as “less difficult to anticipate.” As such, he outlined the principal future threats to NATO (out to 2015) as terrorism, cyber-attack, advanced technological weapons, ballistic and cruise missiles and other
weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In testimony to Congress in June 2001, Secretary of State Colin Powell described other European security concerns such as Balkan stability (and democratic and economic reform) and continual democratic and economic progress in Russia, Ukraine, and other Central and Eastern European countries. Terrorism has taken precedence over other threats since 11 September for both the U.S. and NATO. In December 2001, NATO issued a communiqué on combating terrorism that identified a number of NATO efforts underway. Those efforts included an updated threat assessment and a review of relevant capabilities and measures to develop or improve.

EU documents are less specific about threats to European security. As previously defined, ESDP’s scope includes the capacity to “launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises.” The sources of international crises are not listed in EU discussions of ESDP, but the areas of most concern are the Balkans, the Middle East, and North Africa. The Laeken Declaration on the Future of EU defines potential threats. “The opposing forces have not gone away: religious fanaticism, ethnic nationalism, racism and terrorism are on the increase, and regional conflicts, poverty and underdevelopment still provide a constant seedbed for them.” It is reasonable to assume that EU members agree to the threats addressed in NATO documents and by NATO’s Defense Planning Process.

CHALLENGES TO ESDP

Both internal and external challenges affect the ability of ESDP to achieve its goals and overcome its shortcomings. External challenges originate primarily from the NATO-EU power relationship and the different U.S. and EU perspectives of appropriate global strategies, legitimacy for action, and the sharing of burden, risk and power. Internal challenges include resistance to increased defense spending, obstacles to increased defense industry collaboration, a still immature strategic defense culture, and differing views on the purpose of reaction forces.

Differing US-EU perspectives

The U.S. is a global power of nearly unmatched economic, diplomatic and military capabilities. The EU is a recognized global economic power, but only the United Kingdom and France are arguably global players with global military reach. Through the combined resources of its member states, the EU represents a significant diplomatic presence throughout the world, but it does not yet exert the coherent influence on foreign affairs its citizens may desire or its Common Foreign and Security Policy might suggest. The relative strengths of
the EU have conditioned it to favor diplomatic-economic solutions over diplomatic-military solutions to security problems. The U.S. praises and welcomes EU efforts to reinforce free market economies and democratization in Russia and former states of the Soviet Union, but has not used the regular U.S.-EU meetings to discuss traditional security issues. Collaboration and concerted action between the U.S. and the EU to combat terrorism has been an exception to the U.S. policy of using NATO as the sole forum for issues of transatlantic security. U.S. policy also places greater emphasis on military power and is "both more assertive and coercive than European policy." Although, the EU will continue to exert itself in global affairs, security efforts through ESDP will probably remain regional in scope. "The realistic geographical limit is unlikely to extend beyond the EU's 'near abroad': the Caucasus, the Transcaucasus, the Middle East, [and] Africa." 

The U.S. and the EU differ on their perspective of legitimacy for military action. While the U.S. prefers to act in concert with allies to counter aggression, it systematically affirms the right to "act unilaterally when compelling national interests so demand." Military intervention by the EU, which requires unanimous decision of its members, would almost certainly require a specific United Nations (UN) Security Council mandate. Language adopted in the Treaty on European Union does not make a UN mandate a condition, but it implies such.

The U.S. and its European allies differ on their perspectives of burden- and risk-sharing. The burden-sharing debate in the U.S. is generally defined by NATO's annually published statistics on defense spending (see Table 5). While the U.S. spent an estimated average 2.9-3.0 percent of GDP between 1999-2001, European NATO allies averaged 2.0-2.1 percent and EU countries just 1.9 percent. However, if burden is measured in terms of troops deployed in NATO operations in the Balkans or economic assistance to non-NATO European countries, a different view emerges. In Bosnia and Kosovo, the U.S. currently contributes 13 percent to EU's 63 percent of the total troop force and $900 Million to EU's $2.98 Billion in non-military aid. Operation Amber Fox in FYROM is entirely European. Burden-sharing can also be defined in terms of hosting foreign forces permanently on national soil (and during frequent port calls) and living with a relatively higher density of land and air training activity. U.S. leaders and the U.S. public are less sensitive to the latter. In terms of risk-sharing, Europeans demonstrated greater resolve to deploy ground troops to hostile situations in the Balkans. Europeans provided the vast bulk of forces to UNPROFOR in Bosnia. During Operation Allied Force, the U.S. provided only 2,100 of the 23,000 ground troops poised to enter Kosovo.
TABLE 4. NATO DEFENSE EXPENDITURES\textsuperscript{144}

One result of these differing perspectives is friction within transatlantic relations. The ultimate test for U.S.-EU and NATO-EU relations is how the U.S. shares decision-making and influence with its allies and partners. The U.S. wants its European partners to do more, but many in the U.S. also expect the U.S. to retain a leadership role in NATO.\textsuperscript{145} Paradoxically, if Europeans do create the desired military capabilities, the resulting balance in military power would logically imply a greater European role – read more influence and control in NATO and a greater role for EU in European security. The Department of Defense’s Strengthening Transatlantic Security welcomes just such a rebalance of power within NATO and between the U.S. and the EU.\textsuperscript{146} The document lays out a set of guidelines for the exercise of U.S. leadership vis-à-vis its transatlantic partners. The type of U.S. leadership envisioned is one of preponderance vice dominance, cooperation vice competition and one in which the U.S. is prepared to share responsibility and leadership.\textsuperscript{147}

These points clearly break with the “Three D’s” policy. However, unilateral action (e.g., missile defense and withdrawal from treaty negotiations – Kyoto, ABM) by the U.S. over the last few years continues to be a source of great tension with European allies. Some Europeans have questioned the credibility and desirability of U.S. leadership in NATO.\textsuperscript{148} Nonetheless, the collaboration between NATO and the EU and between the U.S. and the EU since 11 September demonstrates the importance the U.S. places on its European allies’ views and support.
Challenges internal to EU

The internal challenges to ESDP are the most formidable, yet are critical for progress. These challenges include increases in defense spending, rationalization, and cooperation necessary for achieving the Headline Goal (and DCI) and reaching consensus on a common European strategy for ESDP and the use of reaction forces.

In the first instance, achieving desired military capabilities requires greater domestic efforts from EU member states and greater intra-European cooperation (see previous discussion of the ECAP). Necessary internal efforts include increased defense budgets to support modernization programs, to fund research and development, and to fund higher quality training and readiness. Moreover, internal efforts must include transformation of forces from heavy, main defense forces to more offensive, more versatile, more deployable forces. Transformation or modernization implies closure and consolidation of structures, retirement of obsolete equipment, all-volunteer/more-volunteer forces, revised employment doctrine and training strategies, and revised military education. Competition for use of discretionary public monies is logically fierce. Increases in defense spending mean diverting funds from domestic programs, social benefits, and economic stimulus plans. The latest NATO data on defense spending is not promising. Although nine of seventeen European NATO countries spent more in 2001 than in 1999 (when DCI was initiated), the total budget increase among European NATO allies was less than a half percent. NATO communiqués which reference the need for improved capabilities speak of restructuring, using defense resources more effectively and greater cooperation, but only half-heartedly endorse greater spending. The NATO ministers declared in December 2001, “we also acknowledge that in some cases, more resources will be needed.” This is hardly a strong plea for public support. NATO and EU leaders and European defense analysts emphatically agree on the need for more spending, but there is little evidence of growth in expenditures.

In terms of intra-European defense cooperation, the European defense industry has experienced significant rationalization at national level, but only moderate transnational defense consolidation. Only two European conglomerates (BAE Systems and EADS) are in the same league as the leading U.S. defense giants (Lockheed-Martin, Boeing, Raytheon, General Dynamics). Europeans (like Americans) favor neither dependence upon extra-national sources for defense equipment nor sending public monies (and jobs) abroad. Armament cooperation within NATO and the WEU has had some success in defining interoperability standards and leading to multilateral efforts, but has failed to harmonize existing or future military requirements. Initiatives by groups of EU nations (i.e. the Organization for Joint
Armaments Cooperation established in 1996 and the six-nation 1998 Letter of Intent to restructure European defense industry) have established principles for defense complementarity, common procurement and integration, but have not led to appreciable results.\textsuperscript{154} Budget constraints will continue to force governments to seek the best value for their defense funds, but that will not necessarily lead to the standardization and interoperability required for success of ESDP.

One European defense study highlights the reality of declining EU military capability in terms of rising defense costs.\textsuperscript{155} The study concludes that only a concerted ‘pooling and integration’ effort will achieve greater capability within current budgets.\textsuperscript{156} The study explains that equipment costs rise faster than inflation, personnel costs rise at a rate slightly faster than inflation and fixed operating costs rise in line with inflation. The combined impact of level defense spending is a decrease in defense capability in real terms.\textsuperscript{157} Level or even moderate increases in spending will inevitably lead to a critical point “beyond which our forces will become unemployable in any remotely challenging environment.”\textsuperscript{158} As a solution, the study’s authors strongly encourage EU nations to agree on common requirements and platforms and on pooling of resources to procure and organize high demand, high cost capabilities such as air transport, air refueling, fighter aircraft, naval auxiliary, ground support, and reconnaissance platforms. The NATO AWACS Airborne Early Warning force and the Nordic Logistic Battalion are successful, but perhaps the only examples of this concept.\textsuperscript{159} The authors also highlight the necessity of greater defense integration (i.e. industry cooperation, intergovernmental arrangements, common strategic view of requirements and standardization among defense ministries) to reap the benefits of economy of scale and reduce production unit costs.\textsuperscript{160} However, national sensitivities and the diverse nature of national policies, equipment inventories and force structures all impede or limit the building of consensus within the EU. The end result is that ‘pooling and integration’ initiatives will most likely be gradual at best and real progress in defense capabilities is probably ten to fifteen years away.\textsuperscript{161}

The progress of the Euro purports further problems for European defense spending. Since its introduction as a reserve currency in 1999 (and as a hard currency in 2002), the Euro has not served as the promised catalyst of a re-energized EU economy. Introduced at $1.17, the Euro was valued at just $.90 on 1 January 2002 and continues to slide.\textsuperscript{162} Initially touted to be a competitor to the dollar as a world currency reserve, it commands approximately one-fifth the dollar’s share.\textsuperscript{163} The reasons for the Euro’s lackluster performance to date are self-inflicted. Industries continue to be protected, product and labor markets are highly regulated
and the European Central Bank is slow to change interest rates to stimulate growth. As the Euro continues to lose ground against the dollar, so does European purchasing power. While the latter may inspire greater efforts to “buy European” and, more importantly, spur greater defense integration, it also means that the Euro will buy less and less of the research and development needed for defense modernization. European members of NATO already spend less on procurement and only a third of what the U.S. does in research and development.

EU members differ significantly in their strategic perspectives of common defense policy and on the use of reaction forces. These differences are based on diverse historical experiences with respect to the use of force, different national force structures, and different security priorities based on geographic location. National views vary widely on the out-of-area use of force. The United Kingdom and France have historically maintained deployable forces and regularly employ the use of force abroad, unilaterally if required, to protect their national interests. Italy has recently developed into a proactive military power, participating in nearly every NATO and UN operation since the Persian Gulf War and leading both unilateral and multinational operations in Albania. Germany has only recently begun to deploy troops abroad. Other EU countries participate at moderate to minimal levels in NATO and UN operations. The security priorities of EU countries vary on widely. Northern EU countries are most sensitive to issues involving Russia. Southern EU countries are concerned with the Balkans and North Africa. Germany and Austria are more sensitive to Central European countries, as Greece is to South Eastern Europe and its NATO ally, Turkey. Eleven EU nations are members of NATO; the other four are NATO partners and declared neutrals. With respect to the use of EU reaction forces, France favors keeping potential scenarios inclusive of the most demanding of “Petersberg tasks.” The United Kingdom favors use for the more limited end, relying on NATO intervention for high intensity conflict. Denmark has accepted the consensus of the rest of its partners to develop EU reaction forces, but abstains from participation in EU-led operations to avoid doing anything that might weaken NATO’s role in European security. The four neutrals historically participate only in peacekeeping operations. The rest of the EU nations falls somewhere between the extremes. The end result is the absence of a common assessment on threats and priorities, a common end state, and an overarching common European vision or strategy to guide ESDP and the use of European reaction forces.
KEY MILESTONES AHEAD

Several key milestones loom over the EU and NATO. They will have a significant impact on just how capable, effective and autonomous the ESDP might become. Key EU milestones concern enlargement, achievement of the Headline Goal and the next Intergovernmental Conference (IGC). NATO’s key milestones include enlargement, completion of the Force Structure Review and follow through on ongoing initiatives, i.e. the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept, DCI, and Immediate Ready Task Force (IRTF) study. The combined impact will affect the geometry of relationships (see Figure 3) within and between NATO and the EU, each organization’s sphere of security concerns, and their response capabilities.

EU MILESTONES.

Key milestones relating to EU enlargement include conclusion of the next round of accession negotiations in 2002, ratification of a Treaty of Accession in 2003 and the next round of European Parliament elections in June 2004. The EU has opened negotiations with twelve candidates and confirmed Turkey as a thirteenth candidate. Three EU candidates are already members of NATO. Five more are candidates for NATO accession. Only Cyprus and Malta are neither. Accession of a number of these candidates will alter the security and defense debate by moving EU borders closer to the Balkans, to Belarus, Ukraine and Russia or even
towards North Africa and the Middle East. The potential for instability (ethnic tensions, terrorism, economic strife, internal political conflict, etc.) in each of these areas is great. While consensus on ESDP may become more difficult based on more members and more diverse security concerns, in the long term, accession to the EU will enhance the economic well-being (i.e. more funds available for modernization and interoperability) and defense cooperation of new EU members.

The future of ESDP (if not the EU) will be decisively affected by the outcome of the next IGC scheduled for 2004. The key questions to be addressed at the next IGC will affect how decisions are made with regard to ESDP, the relative impact national and supranational structures have on ESDP, and the effectiveness of crisis response mechanisms available to the EU. As discussed previously under “unfinished business,” the EU must still address simplification of its political structures to enhance coherence between foreign and defense policy, the role of parliaments (national, WEU, and European) and the collective defense provisions of the Treaty of Brussels. A significant change to decision-making could be expansion of the concept of “enhanced cooperation” (flexible groups of states willing to enhance progress on specific issues within the EU structure) to areas such as armament cooperation, force structures and command arrangements. However favorable such an expansion would be to accelerate progress in ESDP, it is highly unlikely given the current exclusion of enhanced cooperation in matters of CFSP.

NATO Milestones

The next round of NATO enlargement is scheduled for the Prague Summit of 2002 and will consider which of nine candidates (Albania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, FYROM, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia) are invited to join the Alliance. While discussion on the advantages and disadvantages of NATO enlargement is not the purpose of this paper, the rationale is pertinent to ESDP. Enlargement of NATO to include Central, Eastern and Southern European nations is based on the belief that integration of these nations into Western Europe will improve their democratization and “provide the best means to ensure peaceful relations in Europe for the long-term.” NATO has agreed that some number between one and nine will be invited to join in 2002. Of the nine NATO candidates, all but Albania and FYROM are candidates for EU accession. The overall affect of NATO and EU enlargement on NATO-EU relations is difficult to predict. Because the four non-NATO EU nations are currently not NATO candidates, the difference in memberships between the two organizations is likely to increase. Variable geometries may complicate NATO-EU decision processes, but they may also increase
opportunities for non-members of one organization to eventually gain acceptance to the other. NATO enlargement may also be a catalyst for increased efforts in ESDP, by focusing EU attention on and facilitating EU consensus on a variety of security issues.

The Defense Capabilities Initiative launched in 1999 is a moving milestone. The Washington Summit did not include an end date for achievement of desired capabilities.\textsuperscript{185} A High Level Steering Group continues to track implementation and harmonize Allied efforts as well as work with the EU on coordinating DCI with the Headline Goal.\textsuperscript{186} There is significant synchronized effort between NATO and the EU, but differences remain based on the fact DCI is meant to enhance both Article 5 collective defense and non-Article 5 crisis response operations. The Headline Goal focuses mostly on the latter. NATO efforts to update the threat assessment and capabilities required to counter terrorism and WMD will revise DCI and likely affect the Headline Goal.\textsuperscript{187} DCI appears, however, to have lost impetus over the last two years as European leaders have paid more attention to developing and tracking the Headline Goal. A tracking mechanism like the EU’s Capability Development Mechanism would be worthwhile for NATO. A specific inventory of progress or failure in DCI functional areas is needed on a regular basis to maintain the attention of government leaders, parliaments and publics.

A number of NATO efforts to improve the readiness, effectiveness and responsiveness of headquarters and forces, would provide attractive command options for EU-led operations. The 1999 Washington Summit launched the Force Structure Review to restructure existing multinational land headquarters and affiliated (assigned or ear-marked) forces and to revise guidance and practices in order to better align NATO force structure with NATO strategy (i.e. in order to have forces adequately trained and ready for crisis response operations).\textsuperscript{188} Most important for EU purposes will be the designation of High Readiness Forces (HRF) corps-level headquarters, the designation and array of affiliated units (combat to combat service support), and the assigned categories of readiness (eleven levels ranging from 2 days to over 365). An appropriate number of HRF headquarters (six corps-level headquarters currently exist)\textsuperscript{189} with a complete array of affiliated units and peacetime training relationships would greatly enhance both NATO’s and the EU’s ability to conduct operations.

Other initiatives that could affect command and force options for NATO supported, EU-led operations are the full implementation of the CJTF concept and the IRTF study. The CJTF concept initiated in 1994 was intended to provide NATO (and the WEU) with options for command and deployment of large forces (corps and above). The CJTF concept now applies to EU-led operations as well, but work to transform the two land-based regional command headquarters (AFNORTH, AFSOUTH) into fully deployable (including component commands)
and sufficiently robust organizations is still underway. Finally, a multi-year study is ongoing to test the feasibility of transforming the Allied Command Europe Mobile Force (Land) – AMF(L) – into a division-size IRTF(L), not unlike the rapidly-deployable divisions of the U.S. XVIII Airborne Corps. Full implementation of NATO’s CJTF concept could theoretically provide the EU a sufficiently sized headquarters to control an operation up to the high end of its Headline Goal. Approval of an IRTF(L) could likewise provide a larger, more capable, initial response force for a NATO-supported, EU-led operation.

SUMMARY

ESDP does not threaten NATO now, nor will it in the foreseeable future. ESDP has not resulted in decoupling, discrimination, or unnecessary duplication, nor is it likely to do so. The EU has favorably addressed each of the “Three D’s” in its declarations, decisions and efforts to date. EU words and deeds recognize NATO as essential to European security and demonstrate a strong desire for continued U.S. presence in Europe. EU reaction forces to be created under ESDP are designed for security tasks less than collective defense and are still a long way from reaching the established Headline Goal and being ready for employment. Additionally, ESDP has multiple internal challenges to overcome before it can fully mature – no common vision and strategy, problems with structural coherence, flat national defense expenditures, and limited support for defense cooperation and integration. EU’s current status of integration and rate of progress indicate that EU consensus on developing a “common defense” is a long way off.

The chances of a hostile or resistant EU caucus forming against the U.S. and other non-EU NATO allies are extremely low given the historical tendency of many EU countries to support the U.S. or at least not support initiatives that go against U.S. positions. Often cited as a source of U.S. concerns, France has historically promoted a distinct European political identity and greater European autonomy in decision-making. France resisted a NATO role in the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, but she contributed her troops and political support to U.S. efforts early in the current war on terrorism. Philosophical differences will continue between France and the U.S., but we can expect those differences to be tempered by France’s European partners and France’s own desires to demonstrate herself a capable ally (e.g., Persian Gulf, Bosnia, Kosovo) and a supporter of continued U.S. presence in Europe.

ESDP has the potential to significantly enhance transatlantic security. NATO-EU relations have been mutually supportive in the Balkans and the ongoing war on terrorism. By serving as an additional catalyst and mechanism to improve European military capabilities, ESDP will strengthen NATO’s capabilities. By constituting a viable capability to act where NATO as a
whole is not engaged, EU reaction forces could address crises in conjunction with U.S. forces (acting as a global partner), in lieu of U.S. forces (lifting some of the burden U.S. would otherwise have carried), or in situations where U.S. forces would not be committed (because U.S. interests are not threatened above a threshold to warrant military deployment). In spite of the self-declaration of the EU’s operational status, ESDP currently represents a very limited autonomous capability. Arrangements with NATO are incomplete and significant military capabilities still need to be addressed.

ESDP needs NATO and U.S. support to progress. In the long term, success of ESDP will depend on the EU realizing improved European military capabilities and obtaining NATO support for access to existing assets and capabilities. Without improved European military capabilities, the credibility of ESDP within the EU and with NATO partners will suffer. ESDP will not result in the EU’s stated intent to develop a more balanced partnership with NATO and the U.S. Minimal progress in European military capabilities would only reinforce the current dilemma of the EU being capable of carrying out low end “Petersberg tasks” and the U.S. (with NATO support) executing high intensity conflict. It is not in U.S. interest to allow such a division of labor to persist. Furthermore, EU access to NATO’s operational planning capabilities, support structures for power projection, and a portion of common assets (i.e. HRF headquarters and forces), is critical for EU-led operations to be viable. Finalization of arrangements for EU access to NATO resources is likely to depend on the success of arrangements for participation of non-EU partners in consultation and decision-shaping for EU-led operations.

OPTIONS

U.S. policy can influence ESDP to ensure evolving EU structures and forces are complementary, integrated, and interoperable with NATO and capable of sharing defense responsibility with the U.S. What policy options are available to the Bush Administration to shape ESDP so that EU eventually develops into a viable, global security partner?

A review of the current debate on ESDP provides three alternatives: (1) a “yes, if” policy (current U.S. policy) which supports ESDP with adequate constraints on European autonomy while promoting real capability improvement; (2) a “okay, whatever” policy which acknowledges the U.S.’s limited ability to affect internal EU policy, and would concentrate more on global policy, adopting a tougher, less ideological approach vis-à-vis the EU; or (3) a “yes, yes” policy which promotes a more assertive European role and greater responsibility sharing as a way to achieve real capability improvement within the EU.
“Yes, if.” Current Bush Administration policy. In his recent book Does America Need a Foreign Policy?, Henry Kissinger presents an argument which strongly supports current U.S. policy. Dr. Kissinger argues that EU countries need to increase defense spending to make a European force viable and relevant. He points out that independent employment of a European force is most likely only in minor actions in which no major power is involved or outside the area of NATO responsibilities. In the latter, an employment is only conceivable with significant U.S. support or goodwill. On the other hand, he argues that close coordination is necessary to prevent development of an EU force outside of NATO and to prevent EU-bloc decisions against U.S. interests. Likewise, Stanley Sloan in a study of U.S. European defense policy published in April 2000, argued for a similar policy as the best way to balance support for European efforts with U.S. interests. Mr. Sloan argued keeping focus on EU producing “more substantive and visible contributions to international security requirements” while at the same time strengthening “transatlantic and trans-European bonds politically, economically and militarily.” Mr. Sloan proposed a number of other guidelines as well, some of which put restraints and requirements on the U.S.: discourage EU members from making strong distinctions between EU and NATO positions in dealing with potential new members; avoid forcing Germany to choose between U.S. and French positions; emphasize transparency between the U.S., EU and NATO; continue preference for a more coherent European role within the Alliance; continue handing over Balkan operations to European members of NATO; refrain from over-regulation of transatlantic defense cooperation and competition; ensure U.S. military compatibility with NATO allies. Mr. Sloan’s points on transparency, compatibility and Alliance preference are present in Strengthening Transatlantic Security published by Secretary Cohen in December 2000.

“Okay, whatever.” Limit U.S. activism in Europe in favor of global interests. John Van Oudenaren of Johns Hopkins argues that “hyperactive U.S. policy” in Europe to reform NATO and improve EU military capabilities rests on the false premise that U.S. influence is based on the strength of NATO. He argues that “U.S. has influence in Europe because it is a global power” and can offer Europe what itself can not provide. In his book, Uniting Europe: European Integration and the Post-Cold War World, Mr. Van Oudenaren states the EU will remain principally a regional power for years to come due to the likelihood it will not commit the resources it needs to develop its military instruments of power. A U.S. stance vis-à-vis Europe that is both tougher and at the same time less ideological will result in greater influence both within Europe and international forums important for other global interests. Dr. Ted Carpenter of the Cato Institute similarly argues for moving away from a NATO-centered
policy. Dr. Carpenter argues that although Europe's security and stability are important to the U.S., there is no dominant power rising in the wings (i.e. a resurgent Russia) to threaten Europe and the combined efforts of our allies would be more than sufficient to deal with it. More importantly, a NATO-centric policy suppresses the growth of “alternative European security institutions” and draws the U.S. into “irrelevant disputes and problems.” There is “little, if any evidence of effective U.S. leverage” derived from NATO policy and U.S. presence in Europe. Posture statements by presidential candidate Bush and key campaign advisors (e.g., Condoleezza Rice, Robert B. Zoellick) emphasized the importance of power relationships and the primacy of U.S. interests in determining U.S. policy. Despite some similarities in theme with Mr. Oudenaren's and Dr. Carpenter's arguments, the pre-Administration statements and current policy disagree completely on the importance of NATO and U.S. influence in Europe. “Yes, yes.” Promote European leadership and responsibility in regional and global issues. Kori Schake and Jeffery Simon of the Institute for National Security Studies argue the U.S. should recognize that it is not challenged by a more capable, assertive Europe and that the U.S. should strongly encourage European efforts to improve forces and decision-making processes. They argue that by “setting our European allies up to lead and succeed with initiatives we develop together,” the U.S. will develop a stronger partner who is both willing and able to defend common interests. Mr. Schake and Mr. Simon’s policy recommendations include: giving greater credit to what EU members do for collective security, holding EU responsible for member links to NATO, ignoring French rhetoric where it does not reflect EU consensus, advocating new EU force structures that give incentives to key capability improvements, setting a positive agenda in NATO of issues central to U.S. security, and maintaining NATO as the forum where EU must go to discuss security with the U.S. and non-EU members. Mr. Schake and Mr. Simon's policy option is quite similar to the 'yes, if' in many aspects, but with a decidedly positive twist towards encouragement, active promotion, and success-sharing.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To date the “yes, if” policy of the Bush Administration has enjoyed moderate success in shaping NATO-EU relations. The emphasis on transparency and consultation with allies has attenuated some of the European concern over key U.S. policy issues affecting European security, e.g., Balkan commitment, Missile Defense. Support for ESDP and NATO-EU relations has resulted in significant good will and concrete cooperation in the war on terrorism. The “yes, if” approach has not, however, succeeded in promoting greater European military capabilities or
in resolving the issues of EU access to NATO and consultation arrangements between EU and its non-EU partners.

The “okay, whatever” approach is not an acceptable alternative for the current Administration. The approach runs counter to a few basic premises of the current Administration’s defense strategy – U.S. needs strong, capable allies to deal with global security issues; U.S. assures its friends and allies by honoring its commitments and by stationing or deploying U.S. forces overseas. The “okay, whatever” approach’s relative indifference to NATO’s role and the importance of U.S. presence in Europe is not compatible with current policy.

Bold action in times of uncertainty and crisis offers opportunities for great success. Without an appropriate capacity to offset unforeseen events (a reserve in the military sense), such bold action can also lead to disaster. A “yes, yes” approach – yes to a more balanced NATO-EU relationship and yes to a more capable ESDP – is the bold approach that the current state of U.S.-NATO-EU relations calls for. A “yes, yes” approach offers the best opportunity for achieving the U.S. strategic objective of a “coherent and mutually reinforcing” relationship between NATO and the EU in support of the end of U.S. transatlantic security strategy – preservation of the security and stability of the transatlantic community. The “reserve” to such an approach exists in that the “yes, if” option remains feasible, “if” ESDP or other EU action evolves in a divergent path from the objective of a ‘coherent and mutually reinforcing’ NATO-EU relationship.

The U.S. policy toward NATO and the ESDP should be adjusted along two lines. First, continue the five-point policy proposed in Strengthening Transatlantic Security (see page 14), but with greater emphasis on promoting shared European responsibility and leadership in transatlantic relations. Second, actively promote strengthening ESDP as an integral part of the European security calculus and the foundation for an EU role in global security.

With respect to the elements of national power, recommend U.S. policy as follows:

**Diplomatic.** Continue to promote NATO and the EU as the principal pillars of European stability and security writ-large, with NATO as the pillar for collective defense and the linchpin of transatlantic security. Actively promote strengthening ESDP with less emphasis on differentiating between an ESDI within NATO and an ESDP external to NATO.

Continue to favor NATO forums for discussion of European security issues, but identify areas of common interest for concerted action between NATO and the EU. Promote greater NATO-EU cooperation in security issues through creation of permanent liaison offices between the NAC and PSC, through ensuring substantive agenda for regular NAC-PSC contact and
semi-annual NATO-EU Ministerial and Military Committee meetings, and through the work of U.S. missions to NATO and the EU to promote active NATO-EU coordination.

Mediate or facilitate a common position between Turkey (and other non-EU partners) and the EU on consultation and decision-shaping for EU-led operations. Mediate or facilitate agreement on arrangements for EU access to NATO operational planning, pre-identified assets and suitable command options.

Reinforce positive trends in non-NATO EU countries and encourage closer NATO ties.

Promote common policy positions between the U.S. and the EU’s CFSP external to the NATO area of interest.

Military. Study proposals for greater European leadership within NATO (e.g., rotational command at the Regional Command Headquarters level). Continue to hand over tasks in the Balkans to European headquarters and forces.

Support NATO-EU exercises (as NATO-WEU have been supported) to ensure interoperability between permanent structures, ensure feasibility of arrangements for access and consultation and improve EU capabilities. Offer U.S. expertise in “joint combined headquarters training” to support and evaluate NATO-EU exercises.

Support creation of a NATO capabilities tracking mechanism (along the lines of the EU’s CDM) to support NATO’s High Level Steering Group’s efforts in the DCI and assist reporting progress to NATO leaders. Synchronize tracking reports on DCI with the EU’s CDM in terms of format and timing to ensure collaboration and combined effort on functional areas. Ensure compatibility and interoperability with NATO and the EU are considerations in developing joint requirements. Seek greater opportunities to exploit NATO’s Conference of National Armament Directors (CNAD) to encourage collaboration in research and development and defense cooperation. Regularly publicize progress (or lack thereof) of European and U.S. military capabilities under the DCI functional areas and the EU’s Headline Goal.

Encourage NATO and U.S. participation in EU efforts to develop a common EU security strategy or vision for ESDP or “common defense.” The George Marshall European Center for Security Studies is conveniently located to attend or contribute to EU sponsored conferences and studies in European security. The NATO Defense College could also play a role in contributing thought to EU security strategy development.

Build functional relationships between the U.S. Department of Defense and Joint Staff and their EU counterparts (e.g., along the lines of bilateral staff talks with various EU nations). Consider exchanges of officers between the Joint Staff and the EUMS.
Reinforce military participation of the four non-NATO EU nations in the Balkans and NATO-EU initiatives. Encourage integration of European forces outside of NATO (EUROCORPS, EUROFOR, EUROMARFOR) into NATO in order to benefit from NATO’s standardization, interoperability and training benefits. Seek French military participation in NATO and NATO-EU initiatives with a view towards encouraging France’s eventual integration into the International Military Staff under its own accord.

**Economic.** Break down barriers to transatlantic defense cooperation and consolidation. Support and expand the Defense Trade Security Initiative launched in 2000 to facilitate export controls with NATO allies and EU partners and encourage natural market competition and consolidation. Encourage Congressional support for as much de-regulation between transatlantic partners as possible.

Identify and promote U.S. defense items and supplies that address European military capability shortfalls (e.g., precision guided munitions, select avionic upgrade packages). Likewise, promote best market value over national origin in selection of U.S. defense equipment. Specifically, ensure European defense joint ventures are considered as suppliers for new programs.

Support NATO-EU initiatives and programs with the Departments of Defense and State (i.e. funding and manpower for exchanges, NATO-EU exercises, security conferences).

**Informational.** Promote strategic objectives to Congress, the public and European audiences. Ensure inter-agency effort and vertical effort down to missions, country teams and unified commands.

Identify and promote progress (e.g., in ECAP, DCI, NATO-EU collaboration, etc.) as it occurs. Share success with NATO allies and partners and specifically advertise successes to the national audiences of allies and partners.

Avoid forcing allies and partners to choose publicly between U.S. positions and others. Refrain from publicly accentuating differences between internal NATO or EU positions that provoke national sensitivities (e.g., France’s lack of military integration in NATO or Denmark’s refusal to contribute troops for ESDP).

Continue consultation with allies and partners and ensure transparency of U.S. policy development on issues that affects European security. Avoid gratuitous characterizations of the U.S. that invoke negative reactions from European allies and partners (e.g., “the indispensable nation,” “the only remaining superpower”). Promoting the U.S.’s “inherent right of unilateral action” is also better left for written statements, than pronouncement in speeches or publication.
CONCLUSION

ESDP is but two years old. It is far from developing the synergy and capabilities it must achieve to provide the EU with an autonomous capacity to act where NATO as a whole is not engaged. Whenever it is accomplished, the eventual framing of a common European defense will not evolve in a direction antagonistic to the U.S., unless the U.S. does something extraordinary to provoke such an evolution. Shared historical, cultural, and political values will continue to bring Europeans and Americans together in common causes to advance common interests.

U.S. policy currently supports ESDP, but a more active promotion of ESDP and a strengthening of NATO-EU relations provide a better chance of realizing the U.S. objective for ESDP. That objective is a security and defense policy mutually beneficial to the EU and to NATO, representing improved military capabilities (for security and defense), and constituting an EU capability to act where NATO as a whole is not engaged. ESDP has the potential to significantly enhance both the EU and NATO by ensuring continued support for defense spending and modernization efforts. U.S. support of ESDP will encourage Europeans to remain focused on resolving European security issues and will sponsor greater intra-European cooperation and integration. The EU is an important regional security partner. An EU with a weak ESDP will certainly not become the strong, viable global partner the U.S. seeks. An EU with a strong ESDP will provide the military capability and political confidence to become such a partner.

As the twenty-first century approaches, vast global forces are at work that, over the course of time, will render the United States less exceptional.

America will be the greatest and most powerful nation, but a nation with peers; the primus inter pares but nonetheless a nation like others.

The rise of other power centers – in Western Europe, Japan, and China – should not alarm Americans. After all, sharing the world’s resources and the development of other societies and economies has been a peculiarly American objective ever since the Marshall Plan.

—Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy, 1994

WORD COUNT = 14,986
ENDNOTES

1 Historians generally see the end of World War II as a turning point in American foreign policy. It marks the end of an avoidance of 'entangling alliances' as cautioned by George Washington and the entrance of America as a proactive, superpower onto the world stage. See Karl L. Schonberg, "The Evolution of American Attitudes Toward the Atlantic Alliance: Continuity and Change from the Washington Treaty to NATO Enlargement", European Security 9 (Winter 2000): 2. Karl Schonberg writes “the adoption of the North Atlantic Treaty by the United States Senate in 1949 symbolizes unmistakably the death of isolationism as a cornerstone of American foreign policy.”


4 Madeleine K. Albright, “The Right Balance Will Secure NATO’s Future,” Financial Times, 7 December 1998, p. 22. In her article, published one week before the European Council of Vienna, Secretary Albright outlined what the Clinton administration did not want EU defense initiatives to do. These conditions were listed in the article as ‘the Three Ds’ and specified as follows: avoid decoupling European decision-making from broader Alliance decision-making, avoid duplication of defense resources for force planning and command structures, and avoid discrimination against non-EU NATO members.

5 Ibid.

6 Rutten, 8-9. The Joint Declaration issued at the conclusion of the British-French Summit of St-Malò, 3-4 December 1998 is recognized as the “start of the European defense project.” The Joint Declaration already addressed most of Secretary Albright’s points by emphasizing NATO as the foundation of collective defense, respect for the various positions of European states and the importance of avoiding unnecessary duplication. Rutten, 22-23. The Final Communiqué issued at the North Atlantic Summit in Washington, 24 April 1999, thoroughly addressed processes between the EU and NATO to avoid the Three D’s and simultaneously launched the Defense Capabilities Initiative to improve defense capabilities of the Alliance. U.S. policy statements since 2000 as well as statements by NATO Secretary-General Robertson and EU High Representative/Secretary-General Solana systematically focus on the importance of progress in defense capabilities in building a credible European defense.


8 Within a month of their confirmations, both Secretary Rumsfeld and Secretary Powell had visited their counterparts in Europe and outlined the new Administration’s support for NATO and EU initiatives. Secretary Rumsfeld met European Defense Ministers and spoke at the Munich Conference on European Security on 3 February 2001, and Secretary Powell met with NATO Foreign Ministers and EU Commissioner for External Relations on 27 February 2001. President Bush visited Spain, Belgium, Germany, Poland and Sweden in June 2001 speaking at the NATO Summit and with the heads of state that represented current and future EU presidencies (which rotates among EU member-states every six months). During his June 2001 visit to Europe, President Bush spoke on NATO-EU relations, ESDP and NATO enlargement.


12 Don Cook, *Forging the Alliance: NATO 1945 to 1950* (London: Seeker & Warburg, 1989), 117-118. Although several important factors played in forming the U.S. political consensus to support the North Atlantic Treaty (i.e. the fear of Soviet aggression, the importance of preventing resurgence of hostile West Germany, etc.), early talks between U.S. and potential European allies focused on demonstrated intent on the part of West Europeans to work together for their own defense. Undersecretary of State Robert A. Lovett wrote on 7 February 1948 “When there is evidence of unity with a firm determination to effect an arrangement under which the various European countries are prepared to act in concert to defend themselves, the U.S. will carefully consider the part it might appropriately play in support of such a Western Union.” Don Cook, 284 (U.S. Senate Resolution 239 – The Vandenberg Resolution). The Vandenberg Resolution of 1949 specified congressional support for President Truman to enter into a collective defense treaty with European allies, provided the treaty was based on concepts of “self-help and mutual aid.”

13 André de Staerke et al, 172. Signed in March 1948, the Treaty of Brussels’ original signatories were Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. These five were subsequently joined by five other permanent members: the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain. All ten are members of the EU.


Van Oudenaren, 3-4. The Organization of European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) was established prior to the ECSC in 1948 in order to manage U.S. aid under the Marshall Plan. Sixteen European nations initially formed the OEEC (later becoming the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development – OECD). The ECSC initially included six nations: France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxembourg.


Nanette Gantz and John Roper, ed., *Towards a New Partnership: US-European relations in the post-Cold War era* (Paris: Institute for Security Studies of Western European Union, 1993), 60-61, 205. The first official support for a European defense identity after the 1954 failure of the EDC is found in the Platform on European Security Interests released at The Hague on 27 October 1987 by Western European Union foreign and defense ministers. The first NATO reference to a European defense identity can be found in the Alliance’s New Strategic Concept, NATO Press Communiqué, 7 November 1991, as support for the “development of a European security and defense role, reflected in the strengthening of the European pillar within the Alliance”.


NATO, 98. This formula was approved and announced at the 1996 NATO Berlin Summit.

NATO, 99-100, 253-254.

NATO, 361, 365.

NATO, 367-368.

NATO, 362. All ten nations of the WEU belong to the EU. The other five EU nations (Austria, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Sweden) all are represented within the WEU as observers. European Union, *The Amsterdam Treaty: a Comprehensive Guide*; available from [http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/a19000.htm](http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/a19000.htm); Internet; accessed 10 December 2001. The Treaty of Amsterdam of 1997 declared EU intention to “assert its identity through the implementation of a common foreign and security policy including the eventual framing of a common defense policy.”

European Union, *The Amsterdam Treaty*. The PPEWU was later redesigned the Policy Planning Unit by the Treaty of Nice (2000).

Rutten, 8-9.


European Union, *Common Foreign and Security Policy-European Security and Defence Policy*. The EU’s CFSP website offers a summary of the essential ESDP measures agreed upon to date. Elements of decisions taken at the Laeken European Council had not been incorporated into the summary as of 30 December 2001.

Rutten, 82.

Brussels: NATO Press Releases, 7 December 2001. The latest joint NATO-EU indicates no intent on the part of the EU to extend ESDP beyond the ‘Petersberg tasks’.

35 Rutten, 94-107.


39 Rutten, 13. The decision to combine the two offices was made at the Vienna European Council, 11-12 December 1998. Dr. Javier Solana took office on 8 November 1999.

40 For a list of activities and speeches of HR/SG Solana see the EU’s website dedicated to CFSP: http://ue.eu.int/pesc/home.asp?lang=en.


42 The Emergence of a Europe of Security and Defence, Strasbourg: Group of the European People’s Party (Christian Democrats) and European Democrats, September 2000, 5-8.


Rutten, 23.

Rutten, 46-47, 73-85.

Rutten, 83.

Rutten, 82, 86. EU leaders have taken caution to not refer to these capabilities in the popular vernacular of European Rapid Reaction Forces, likely to add credence to their claim that these capabilities are not intended to build a European army outside of NATO.

The three conferences held by the EU to date were: the Capabilities Commitment Conference (November 2000), the Capabilities Improvement Conference (November 2001) and the Police Capabilities Commitment Conference (November 2001).


McGinn and Liston, 84. GEN Naumann made his remarks at a European security symposium in Brussels in March 2000.

Rutten, 168.


Ibid., 17-22.

Ibid., 17-18.

Ibid., 17-19.

Ibid., 20.


reorganization and transition to an all-volunteer force by 2015. German forces will complete current reorganization by 2006, but will retain a ten month mandatory service. Italian forces will end conscription in 2006, but do not expect to complete reorganization until 2020.

63 European Council, Presidency Report on European security and defence policy, Brussels, 11 December 2001, 3, 14, 17-22. Improving military capabilities is the area most emphasized in the Laeken report on ESDP (e.g., first area addressed, first annex is devoted to the ECAP, first task of the mandate for the Spanish Presidency).

64 Assembly of WEU, The follow-up to the Nice decisions on the ESDP and the completion of the project for European defence, Paris: Assembly of WEU, 18 June 2001, 15. The Assembly of WEU has designated itself as “the interim European Security and Defence Assembly.” Solana, 5-6. Assembly of WEU Members of Parliament (MP) expressed their continued belief in the importance of the Assembly’s role in European defense matters to HR/SG during his address in Paris in December 2001. All members of NATO and the EU send MPs as national representatives or observers (as do most of the NATO/EU aspirants). Over the years the debates and committee reports of the Assembly of WEU have helped build consensus, promote cooperation, and ensured transparency between the national parliaments and key WEU/NATO leaders.


68 Rutten, 132.

69 European Council, Presidency Conclusions: European Council Meeting in Laeken 14 and 15 December 2001, Annex II, 11-12. The Presidency Conclusions with respect to arrangements with NATO and partners read: “the Union intends to finalize the security arrangements with NATO and conclude the agreements on guaranteed access to the Alliance’s operational planning, presumption of availability of pre-identified assets and capabilities of NATO and identification of a series of command options made available to the Union…The full and complete implementation of the Nice arrangements with the 15 [6 non-EU European members of NATO + 9 EU candidates for accession] and the 6 [non-EU European members of NATO], their additional contribution to the civilian and military capabilities and their participation in a crisis-management operation in accordance with those arrangements (in particular by setting up a Committee of Contributors in the event of an operation) will appreciably strengthen crisis-management operations carried out by the European Union.”


74 Lord Robertson, Speech by NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson at the Conference on Security Policy, Munich: NATO, 3 February 2001.


77 Albright. See endnote 4.

78 Clinton, 40.


81 DoD, QDR, 11-13, 15. The QDR lists four defense policy goals, all of which specifically relate to European allies (author’s comments in parentheses): (1) assuring allies and friends (i.e. honoring commitments and helping allies and friends create favorable balances of military power to deter regional aggression or coercion); (2) dissuading future military competition (including maintaining favorable regional balances which would make hostile acts too costly for potential adversaries); (3) deterring threats and coercion against U.S. interests (including peacetime forward deployed and stationed forces in order to deter with only modest reinforcement from outside the theater); and (4) if deterrence fails, decisively defeat any adversary (i.e. impose the will of the U.S. and its coalition partners on any adversaries).


Vershbow, Improving Alliance Military Capabilities: The Track Record Two Years After the Washington Summit.


Ibid. Solana’s identified the following as priority areas for improvement: “sealift, strategic airlift, air-to-air refueling, aerial surveillance, command and control assets, precision munitions – essential to minimize collateral damage – and means to suppress enemy air defense.”

European Council, Presidency Conclusions: European Council Meeting in Laeken 14 and 15 December 2001. NATO, Meeting of the North Atlantic Council: Final Communiqué, Press Release (2001) 171, Brussels: NATO Press Releases, 18 December 2001, 1. Paragraph 3 of the Final Communiqué reads, “while there has been some progress as a result of DCI, the full potential of the initiative has not been realized and we are accordingly determined to continue to give it our close personal attention.”
In effect, these watchwords are positive spins on Madame Albright’s Three D’s –
decoupling, duplication, discrimination.

Vershbow, The Transatlantic Relationship at the Crossroads? Meeting NATO’s Five
Challenges, 7.

Madeleine K. Albright, Intervention by Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright to North

Vershbow, 7.

European Council, Presidency Report to the European Council on European Security
and Defence Policy, Göteborg, 11.

NATO, Statement by the North Atlantic Council, Press Release (2001) 124, Brussels:

Colin L. Powell and Louis Michel, Joint Press Availability with his Excellency Vice Prime
Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Belgium (in capacity of EU Presidency) and Secretary
European Council Meeting on 21 September 2001, Tampere, Belgium, 21 September 2001

Ralph Dannheisser, “Senate and House Approve Similar Anti-Terrorism Bills”, The
Washington File, 12 October 2001. George W. Bush, Remarks by the President at the Signing
Press Secretary, 25 May 2001. The U.S. Senate and House passed legislation on anti-
terrorism, money laundering, and aviation security measures on 11, 12 and 16 October 2001.
The President signed the Patriot Act, which combined the various legislation, on 26 October

Lord Robertson, Statement to the Press by NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson,
on the North Atlantic Decision on Implementation of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty
Following the 11 September Attacks Against the United States, Brussels: NATO, 4 October

According to an interview with a senior officer on the Joint Staff on 12 December 2001,
16 of 18 NATO allies have offered forces in support of U.S. Operation Enduring Freedom.
British and French militaries are part of the U.S.-led coalition operating in Afghanistan.
Germany, France, Italy and Spain (members of both NATO and the EU) have contributed forces
to the United Kingdom-led International Security Assistance Force approved by United Nations

NATO, NATO’s Response to Terrorism, Press Release M-NAC-2 (2001) 159, Brussels:
NATO Press Releases, 6 December 2001, 1-3. NATO, Statement on combating terrorism:
Releases, 18 December 2001, 1-3. European Council, Follow-up to the September 11 Attacks
and the Fight Against Terrorism, Declaration by the Heads of the States or Government of the
European Union and the President of the Commission, Ghent, 19 October 2001, 1-3. European
Council, Presidency Conclusions: European Council Meeting in Laeken 14 and 15 December 2001, 4-5.

NATO’s force planning (known as the Defense Planning Process) is the biannual process of determining requirements for forces, force capabilities and structures to respond to assessed threats (approved by the NATO Military Committee’s General Intelligence Estimate). Rumsfeld, The Purpose of NATO. The last reference to the importance of collaborative defense planning was noted in Secretary Rumsfeld’s speech on 1 July 2001. Ambassador Burns (who replaced Ambassador Vershbow in June 2001) has not repeated the issue in speeches on NATO and ESDP.


Ibid., 68-69.

Ibid., 69.

Ibid., 70.

Van Oudenaren, 356.

Ibid.
115 Ibid., 283-295.
116 Ibid., 310.
118 Ibid., 3.
119 Ibid., 3-4.
121 Ibid., 50-51.
122 Rumsfeld, The Purpose of NATO, 3.
123 Ibid.
125 NATO, Statement on combating terrorism: Adapting the Alliance’s Defence Capabilities.
126 Rutten, 82, 168.
129 An external challenge already discussed is that of Turkey, a key non-EU ally, over the appropriate level of influence it should have on EU decision-making. See endnote 104.
131 Missiroli, Occasional Papers 27 Coherence for European Security Policy: Debates – Cases – Assessments, 42-64.

133 Julian Lindley-French, Occasional Papers 20 Leading Alone or Acting Together? The transatlantic security agenda for the next US presidency, Paris: WEU ISS, September 2000, 7-10. Some Europeans question what they view as ‘defense overkill’ in the U.S. fueled by exaggerated threat estimates from the military and defense industry. “America’s Military”, New York Times, op. ed. reproduced in the International Herald Tribune, 23 August 2000, p. 8. As the New York Times noted “the United States has by far the world’s most powerful military and invests more to maintain them and their weapons than the next 10 countries combined spend on their military.”

134 Jolyon Howorth, 77.


137 Congressional Budget Office (CBO), NATO Burdensharing after Enlargement, Washington, D.C.: Congress, August 2001. Chapter 1 of the CBO paper outlines the differences between U.S. and European perspectives (and metrics) of determining burden-sharing within NATO.


139 CBO, 10. The CBO Paper lists four European responses to U.S. criticisms of European burden-sharing. (1) Europe does not have the same global commitments as the United States. European nations should not be expected to devote the same percentage of their gross GDP to defense because European interests and military budgets are geared to regional contingencies. The United States has a much broader set of global security interests, so its overall defense expenditures should naturally be larger. (2) Europe provides direct and indirect support to U.S. forces. Many U.S. operations in the Persian Gulf and other regions are conducted from bases in Europe. Those bases are provided and their costs subsidized by the host country. In addition, NATO’s common budget pays for many improvements to those bases. (3) By measures more appropriate to the post-Cold War environment, the European allies are contributing a fair share to the common defense. Europe contributes proportionate numbers of troops to the Bosnia peacekeeping mission and NATO’s rapid reaction forces. (4) The European allies devote more of their GDP to providing economic assistance to the former Eastern Bloc countries. Economic and political stabilization of the region is important to prevent the social tensions that could lead to civil unrest or open conflict.

141 For more information on NATO Operation Amber Fox see the AFSOUTH website: http://www.afsouth.nato.int/operations/skopje2/FOX.htm#composition.

142 McGinn and Liston, 77.

143 Lindley-French, Occasional Papers 20, 27.


147 Ibid., 62-63. The document lays out five guiding principles. (1) U.S. must set example, by word (political will) and deed (resources and action). (2) U.S. must use the watchwords of “inclusion” and “cooperation”, not “competition” and “confrontation.” (3) U.S. must anticipate complex, slower decision-making within NATO and EU as the organizations enlarge and increase contact with allies and partners as well as ensure access to information between U.S., NATO and the EU. (4) U.S. must straightforwardly state it reserves the right – like every other country – to act alone or within a coalition of willing when its vital interests are at stake. (5) U.S. must be prepared to share responsibility and leadership while recognizing America’s unique political, economical and military strengths will continue to ensure it a preponderant role within the transatlantic community.


149 NATO, Financial and Economic Data Relating to NATO Defence, Table 3. Calculations are based on constant 1995 dollars. The estimated 2001 total budget of European NATO countries is 0.375% higher than 1999 figures.


151 Hayward, 117. All generate over $6 Billion in revenue.

152 Hayward, 127. Zakheim, 14-17.

Ibid., 77-82, 146-150. The Organization for Joint Armaments Cooperation is more commonly known by its French acronym OCCAR (Organization de Coopération Conjointe d’Armaments et Resources).


Ibid., 520-521, 528-529.

Ibid., 515-520.

Ibid., 520.

Ibid., 522.


Alexander and Garden, 528-529. Yost, 120-129.


Yost, 100-3.

Heisbourg, Chaillot Papers #42, 21-25. Howorth, 44-56.

Heisbourg, Chaillot Papers #42, 21.

Ibid., 15-18.


All four EU neutrals are also observers to the WEU.

173 Heisbourg, Chaillot Papers #42, 21-22. However, all four neutrals contribute forces to the NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR).

174 Ibid., 24. “Current EU language (e.g., Petersberg) does not provide even the roughest guidance as to our vision of the world in which we need to be able to operate militarily.” See also Assembly of WEU, Implementation of the Nice Summit decisions in the operational area of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), Paris: Assembly of WEU, 19 June 2001.


176 Ibid., 10. European Council, Presidency Conclusions: European Council Meeting in Laeken 14 and 15 December 2001, 3. Not all candidates are equal. In the Laeken Presidency Conclusions the European Council stated “Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Slovenia could be ready” to conclude accession negotiations by the end of 2002. Bulgaria and Romania were encouraged to continue progress in their member action plans and Turkey was told its political progress to date had opened the prospects for accession negotiations.

177 Heisbourg, Chaillot Papers #42, 13-19.

178 Ibid., 18-20. EU history proves that enlargement is good for old and new EU members alike (e.g., increased markets, improved GDPs, greater growth in weaker countries, job creation everywhere).

179 European Council, Presidency Conclusions: European Council Meeting in Laeken 14 and 15 December 2001, Annex I, 4-7. The Laeken Declaration on the Future of the European Union establishes a convention of prominent European leaders to address the questions of division and definition of competence in the EU, simplification of the EU’s instruments (treaties, directives, framework of rules), democratic legitimacy (election of the Commission and President of the Commission, role of national parliaments), expansion of qualified majority voting (essential for a potential union of 28 states) and a European constitution.

180 Heisbourg, Chaillot Papers #42, 31-32.

181 Ibid., 32. Howorth, 86. Not all agree on the potential benefits of enhanced cooperation. It currently does not apply to cooperation in the field of CFSP.


183 Ibid., 32.

184 NATO, Reader’s Guide, 15. As the EU did recently with its aspirants, NATO has recognized different levels of progress made towards accession by the nine candidates. In the April 1999 Washington Summit final communiqué, NATO ‘thanked’ Albania and FYROM for
their cooperation, ‘welcomed the positive developments’ in Bulgaria and Slovakia, but
‘recognized and welcomed the efforts’ of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Slovenia.

185 Ibid., 61-2. Rutten, 23. One exception is the explicit suspense “to develop the C3
system architecture by 2002 to form a basis for an integrated Alliance core capability allowing
interoperability with national systems.”

186 European Council, Presidency Report to the European Council on European Security
and Defence Policy, Göteborg, 6. “The support of NATO experts on development of the
Headline Goal and EU Exercise Programme has been valuable.”

187 NATO, Statement on combating terrorism: Adapting the Alliance’s Defence Capabilities.


189 Thomas-Durell Young, Multinational Land Forces and the NATO Force Structure

190 NATO Combined Joint Planning Staffs (CJPS), “Brief Paper on CJTF Concept,”

191 Allied Command Europe (ACE) Mobile Force (Land), “AMF(L) Interim Report On The

192 Adrian Treacher, “Europe as a Power Multiplier for French Security Policy: Strategic
Consistency, Tactical Adaptation,” European Security 10 (Spring 2001): 22-44. Henry
internal relationships within the North Atlantic Alliance has been dominated by the perennial tug-
of-war between American and French views of Atlantic relationships. America has dominated
NATO under the banner of integration. France, extolling European independence, has shaped
the European Union. The result of their disagreement is that America’s role is too dominant in
the military field to promote a European political identity, while France’s role is too insistent on
European political autonomy to promote the cohesion of NATO.”

193 Based on a discussion between the author and a senior defense official on December
Ministre des Affaires étrangères au Conseil Ministeriel del’OTAN, Brussels: NATO, 6 December
2001, 2-3. Védrine infers that NATO’s role is closer to home and that the UN and the EU are
more appropriate institutions for guiding European efforts in the reconstruction of Afghanistan.


195 Sloan, 52. Sloan coins the term ‘Yes, if’ in his study’s conclusions as a “somewhat less
skeptical” version of the ‘Yes, but’ policy of the Clinton administration. He does not, however,
offer specific differences that would characterize a ‘Yes, if’ policy.

196 Henry Kissinger, Does America Need a Foreign Policy?: Towards a Diplomacy for the
21st Century, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001), 58-63. Dr. Kissinger also promotes one
twist – NATO should affirm that the territory integrity of the European Union is a vital NATO
interest. Given current non-NATO members of NATO (Finland, Ireland, Sweden) and the likelihood that future EU members will be NATO members or compatible to NATO, he argues that it will be impossible to ignore security concerns of EU nations regardless whether they are formal members of the Alliance. Despite the fact it is tough to imagine a potential member of EU which would be incompatible as a NATO member, it is safe to assume that other non-EU members of NATO are not ready to expand the NATO security umbrella without a specific EU request and significant political debate, if not quid pro quo.

197 Ibid., 59.

198 Ibid., 60.

199 Sloan, 1-54. Sloan provides an extensive review of the various sides of the U.S. debate on European security policy and strategy.


201 John Van Oudenaren, “E Pluribus Confusio: Living with the EU’s Structural Incoherence”, The National Interest no.65 (Fall 2001): 35.

202 Van Oudenaren, Uniting Europe, 219, 310.

203 Van Oudenaren, “E Pluribus Confusio: Living with the EU’s Structural Incoherence”, 35.


205 Ibid., 46-47, 49.


208 Ibid., 13.

209 Ibid., 13-14.
# GLOSSARY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABM</td>
<td>Anti-Ballistic Missile</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACE</td>
<td>Allied Command Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFNORTH</td>
<td>Allied Forces North</td>
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<td>AF SOUTH</td>
<td>Allied Forces South</td>
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<tr>
<td>AGSS</td>
<td>Alliance Ground Surveillance System</td>
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<td>AMF(L)</td>
<td>ACE Mobile Force (Land)</td>
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<tr>
<td>AWACS</td>
<td>Airborne Warning and Control System</td>
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<tr>
<td>BAE Systems</td>
<td>Result of 1999 merger of British Aerospace and Marconi Electronic Systems</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBO</td>
<td>Congressional Budget Office</td>
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<td>CDM</td>
<td>Capability Development Mechanism</td>
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<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
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<td>CHOD</td>
<td>Chief of Defense Staff</td>
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<td>CJPS</td>
<td>Combined Joint Planning Staffs</td>
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<td>CJTF</td>
<td>Combined Joint Task Force</td>
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<td>CNAD</td>
<td>Conference of National Armament Directors</td>
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<td>DCI</td>
<td>Defense Capabilities Initiative</td>
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<td>DoD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<td>DoS</td>
<td>Department of State</td>
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<td>DRR</td>
<td>Defense Requirements Review</td>
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<tr>
<td>EADS</td>
<td>European Aeronautic Defense and Space company</td>
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<td>ECAP</td>
<td>European Capability Action Plan</td>
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<td>ECSC</td>
<td>European Coal and Steel Community</td>
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<td>EDC</td>
<td>European Defense Community</td>
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<td>EEC</td>
<td>European Economic Community</td>
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<td>ESDI</td>
<td>European Security and Defense Identity</td>
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<td>ESDP</td>
<td>European Security and Defense Policy</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>EUMC</td>
<td>European Union Military Committee</td>
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<td>EUMS</td>
<td>European Union Military Staff</td>
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<td>EUROCORPS</td>
<td>European Corps</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUROFOR</td>
<td>European (Rapid Deployment) Force</td>
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<td>EUROMARFOR</td>
<td>European Maritime Force</td>
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FAWEU: Forces Answerable to Western European Union
FYROM: Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
GDP: Gross Domestic Product
HR: High Representative
HRF: High Readiness Forces
IGC: Intergovernmental Conference
IMS: International Military Staff
IRF: Immediate Reaction Forces
IRTF: Immediate Reaction Task Force
ISS: Institute for Security Studies
KFOR: Kosovo Force
MAPE: Multinational Advisory Police Element
MP: Member of Parliament
NAC: North Atlantic Council
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NEO: Noncombatant Evacuation Operation
NSS: National Security Strategy
OCCAR: Organization de Coopération Conjointe d'Armaments et Resources (French acronym) or Organization for Joint Armaments Cooperation
OECD: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OECE: Organization for European Economic Cooperation
PARP: Planning and Review Process
PPEWU: Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit
PSC: Political and Security Committee
QDR: Quadrennial Defense Review
SG: Secretary-General
SHAPE: Supreme Headquarters Allied Power Europe
UN: United Nations
UNPROFOR: UN Protection Force
U.S.: United States
USCNC: United States Commission on National Security/21st Century
WEU: Western European Union
WEUDAM: Western European Union De-mining Assistance Mission
WMD: Weapons of Mass Destruction


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Headquarters, Department of the Army. Transformation Campaign Plan, 10 April 2001.


________. Remarks by US Secretary of State, Colin Powell, following the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council at the level of Foreign Ministers. Brussels: NATO, 6 December 2001.


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________. Address by Mr. Javier Solana, WEU Secretary-General and High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the Council of the European Union. Paris: Assembly of WEU, 5 December 2001


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“Turkey and EU May Reach a Compromise in Near Future on ESDP.” Turkish Probe, 19 August 2001, p. 1.


