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**INTERNATIONAL LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR  
COMBATING DOMESTIC ISLAMIC TERRORISM**

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## **ABSTRACT**

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Many countries, including the United States, face social movements that promote terrorism, violence and intimidation, and do so under the cloak of religion. The terrorists' use of religion as a cover causes problems for Western countries because of strong traditions and laws pertaining to religious freedom. While domestic terrorism is not limited to followers of Islam, the use of domestic terror in the name of Islam is of immediate concern for governments around the world. The paper first briefly describes the history of Islam, the theological underpinnings of violence in Islamic tradition, and the development of Revolutionary Salafism. Next, this paper examines the strategies of several countries to monitor, control, or eliminate Salafist and religious extremist organizations and individuals that teach terrorism as an acceptable method of political and social reform. The paper concludes with recommendations for U.S. domestic policy.



## INTERNATIONAL LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR COMBATING DOMESTIC ISLAMIC TERRORISM

### Brief History of Islam

Islam began as a religion in the seventh century in what is now Saudi Arabia. Its first leader was Mohammed, who professed to have received a series of revelations from God. These revelations were later written down in a book called the Qur'an. Mohammed began preaching in the streets of Mecca, but soon relocated to Medina to escape persecution by Mecca's leaders. In Medina, he made allegiances with various tribes, some through marriage, and proceeded to enlarge the territory under his control. He entered Mecca, and his early military successes then caused tribes on the periphery of his territory to flock to his side.<sup>1</sup> Muslim forces defeated those of the weak Persian empire, and were successful at wresting control of Syria, Palestine and Egypt away from the poorly led and debt-ridden Byzantine empire. After the death of Mohammed, Islam split into Sunni and Shia branches.<sup>2</sup>

Islam continued to spread, subjugating Spain by 718, attacking into France 718-741, and expanding into Afghanistan, India and Pakistan from 711 to 1757. With the conversion of the Seljuk Turks around the year 1055, Islamic influence spread to the steppes of central Asia. The successors of the Seljuk Turks (the Ottomans) finally captured Constantinople in 1453, invaded Europe as far westward as the city of Vienna, and attacked south to capture Iraq, Egypt and Arabia. Wresting power and influence from the Arabs, the Ottoman Empire centered in Constantinople became the seat of the Caliphate, the central religious leadership of the Islamic world.

The Ottoman Empire slowly decayed, and by the nineteenth century was near collapse.<sup>3</sup> Following the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in 1918, Britain and France divided up the Middle East. The Balfour declaration established administrative territories somewhat loosely based upon Ottoman provinces, and ignored more ancient tribal boundaries. In 1923 Kemal Ataturk secularized Turkey, and in 1924 declared the Caliphate dissolved. While Islam never had a unified political government, the loss of the Caliphate was a bitter blow to the world's Muslims.<sup>4</sup> The current political structure of the Middle East is rife with tensions as dominant groups within each political boundary seek to reclaim 'ancestral' and tribal lands.

### Aspects of Islam

The practice of Islam is based mainly on two texts, although Arabic tribal custom has heavily influenced the interpretation of these texts. The first text is the Koran, which is the word of God as revealed to Mohammed. The second text is the collection of stories that record

Mohammed's life and his personal words. This collection is called the Hadith. Many compilations of the Hadith exist. Both the Koran and the Hadith contain specific, explicit messages of both intolerance and violence on one hand, and peace and tolerance on the other.<sup>5,6,7</sup> The Islamic religious texts are easily and accurately quoted by those with opposite political objectives and attitudes towards violence.

Arab tribes of the seventh century raided each other's camps and caravans, and believed that God favored those who were victorious. The tribesmen believed success was a sign of God's approval, and defeat the opposite. The culture of tribal raiding and retribution for attacks was the environment in which Mohammed existed, and forms the background for the lessons contained in the Koran and the Hadith.

The teachings of the Koran aided the spread of Islam. First, Mohammed's religious revelations motivated his soldiers to fight as part of their religious obligation, to not fear death, and guaranteed them a share of captured spoils.<sup>8,9,10,11</sup> Residents of occupied countries had to convert to Islam in order to join the Muslim armies (and share future spoils), or pay a tax (*Jizyah*) for not converting to Islam.<sup>12</sup> Over time, the imposition of paying *Jizyah*, and imposed legal restrictions on non-Muslims (*Dhimmi*) drove many in conquered lands to convert to Islam in order to maintain an acceptable life.<sup>13</sup> Islamic conquests into Palestine, India and Europe, and the counter offensives were very brutal, and drive religious hatred in those parts of the world to this day.<sup>14,15</sup>

As Islam expanded, its religious thought diversified. Within what is now the main-stream *Sunnah* faith, four schools of thought (from liberal to radical) came to be accepted as legitimate - the *Hanafi*, *Maliki*, *Shafi'i*, and *Hanbali*.<sup>16</sup>

### Development of Salafism

In the 1700s Mohammed Abd al-Wahib, of the Hanbali tradition, began teaching a return to the practice and beliefs of the time of the prophet – literally, a return to the ways of life in the 7<sup>th</sup> century A.D. He declared all knowledge not based on the Koran or the Sunnah as suspect. While all schools of Muslim thought consider the Koran to be absolutely literally correct, the Wahabi belief system emphasizes the rejection of modern, and specifically Western, ideas.<sup>17</sup>

The Salafi movement started in Egypt in the mid 1800s. Salafism called for an Islamic revival after recognizing the declining power in the Islamic world.<sup>18</sup> Similar to Wahabism, Salafism sought a return to the way of Islam as practiced by Mohammed's companions. Salafism split into two streams, one seeking peaceful reconciliation between Islam and the modern world (status quo Salafists), and the other seeking a violent Islamic revolution to bring

the modern world under the control of Islam (Revolutionary Salafists). Status Quo Salafists believe that Jihad means an internal struggle to improve one's self, but Revolutionary Salafists believe Jihad means bloody violence to extend Islam.<sup>19</sup>

In 1928, motivated by his hatred of the British protectorate over Egypt, and following the revolutionary Salafist teachings, Hasan al-Banna (1906-1949) founded the Muslim Brotherhood, al-Ikhwan al-Muslimeen.<sup>20</sup> This organization aimed to resist foreign domination, sought to stem the spread of Western culture (particularly loose morals and Christian missionary activity), and campaigned to restore the Islamic caliphate, which Ataturk had abolished in 1924. Al-Banna believed that Europeans had been able to dominate the Muslim world because Muslims had strayed from following the path of true Islam.<sup>21</sup>

Sayyid Abu'l-A'la Mawdudi, (1903-1979) was profoundly influenced by al-Banna. Mawdudi concluded that diversity of Muslim thought and practice has weakened Islam. He believed the solution was to purge Islam of all social and political ties with non Muslims, whom Mawdudi considered to be a threat to Muslims and to Islam.<sup>22</sup> Mawdudi shaped the ideas of the Sunni radicals who later assassinated Egyptian President Sadat.<sup>23</sup> Many regard him as the founder of present day Muslim political activism.

Mawdudi's writings are echoed by the Egyptian Sayyid Qutb. Qutb was a revolutionary Salafist that argued that religion forms the basis for the divisions among peoples of the world, and that killing for a religion is the only type of killing that is morally justified.<sup>24</sup> Later, Abd al-Salam Faraj wrote in Egypt in the 1980s that the Koran and the Hadith both firmly supported acts of terrorism.<sup>25</sup> The ideas of Mawdudi, Qutb and Faraj inspired Muslims around the world to look to violence as a means of changing their societies. Many consider the Muslim Brotherhood to be the ideological mother of jihadist movements.<sup>26</sup> In the 1980s, some Islamic scholars trained at Egypt's Al-Azhar school of theology taught that because Islam is the expression of God's will on earth, it is the duty of every Muslim to fight against those who reject Islam, or who mistakenly convey wrong ideas concerning Islamic theology.<sup>27</sup>

"Salafi doctrine expanded the definition of *kafir* (unbeliever, heretic, infidel) past its original definition of polytheists to now include jews, Christians, and even non-practicing or non-Wahabi Muslims."<sup>28</sup> Jihadist Salafi doctrine holds that *kafir* are legitimate targets for violence, as are is who opposes the creation of a global caliphate and the spread of Sharia law. This violence can also be against Muslims who do not express these same views.<sup>29</sup> Because the Koran and the Hadith have dual views concerning violence and acceptance of other religions, the Islamic doctrine that the Koran and the Hadith are absolutely and literally correct makes it difficult for

Muslims to reject passages calling for violence against non-Muslims, especially if their Muslim teachers promote that as the correct view in modern times.

Takfir wal-Hijra was founded in 1971 by Shukri Mustafa, an associate of Sayyid Qutb." Mustafa argued that "true Islamists have to leave their countries to gather forces and strength, before returning home and ridding their country of corrupt leaders and infidel practices, even killing Muslims who are not pure enough."<sup>30</sup> Its ideology is being embraced by a growing number of Salafi jihadists living in Europe. Takfir followers believe that it is "acceptable to deviate from Islamic practices in order to blend in to the host country while plotting attacks." The adherent of Takfir owes no allegiance to his host country, only to his violent vision of Islam. "Takfir followers form the most violent and extreme strand of the Salafist Jihadist movement."<sup>31</sup>

### Support for Radical Islam – Iran and Saudi Arabia

In 1941 Iran's new monarch, Shah Pahlavi, began a long program to westernize the Shia Muslim country. Shah Pahlavi suppressed the traditional power of the Shia clerics. His brutal actions and Western ideas enflamed the Iranian people, who revolted in 1979. Because of America's support of the Shah, the Shia Ayatollah Khomeini branded America as 'The Great Satan.' He sanctioned his followers in their take-over of the US embassy and the ensuing hostage crisis, and urged Muslims to attack Americans. This was America's first exposure to what became known as 'radical Islam.'

Wahabi adherents had supported the Saud family in the takeover of Arabia in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century. Wahabism is the official religious doctrine of Saudi Arabia, and the Saudi royal family describes themselves as Wahabi. To meet a demand for educators, Saudi Arabia brought many teachers from Egypt in the 1960s. Many of these were Salafi. As Salafi educators taught in Saudi schools, Salafism gained support among the Saudi population and gradually merged with Wahabism.<sup>32</sup> The Saudi family later supported the Salafist teachings.<sup>33</sup> As these educators then returned home to Egypt, Wahabist ideas crept into the teachings at the influential Al-Azhar University in Cairo.<sup>34</sup>

Partly as a reaction to the rise of Shia power in Iran, the Saudi family has used oil revenues to send Salafi and Wahabi teachers and diplomats to spread this brand of fundamentalist Islam around the world, including into U.S. and European mosques.<sup>35,36,37,38</sup> As noted by Jocelyn Cesari:

Saudi Arabia funds Islamic proselytizing materials and Internet sites that facilitate access to Wahabi and similar teachings and "promote Wahabism as the sole legitimate guardian of Islamic thought." The Saudi government has succeeded in transforming the term 'Salafi' from a radical idea into a (merely) "conservative approach to the Islamic tradition." "The widespread diffusion of Salafi teachings



means that even non-Salafi Muslims evaluate their Islamic practice by Wahabi standards. Even if most Muslims do not follow Wahabi dress codes, the orthodox Salafi becomes the standard image of what a good Muslim ought to be.<sup>39</sup>

Because the Saudi royal family allied itself with western (*kafir*) powers, revolutionary Salafists within Saudi Arabia began to call for the overthrow of the Saudi family. Recognizing a danger to its rule, the Saudi government stopped supporting revolutionary Salafists in the 1970s, and funded only status quo Salafists instead.<sup>40</sup>

Due to its tight control of domestic activities, the Saudi royal family is able to restrain revolutionary Salafists within the borders of Saudi Arabia. As opposed to the relatively restricted social situation in Saudi Arabia, Western countries with a greater degree of personal and religious freedom provide fertile ground for the teachings of Saudi Wahabist and Salafist scholars to grow into expressions of religious intolerance and violence. Thus, even though Saudi Arabia fights revolutionary Salafism at home, the version of Islam it exports generates religious violence in western countries, to include Pakistan.<sup>41</sup> The revolutionary Salafist teaching that 'moderate' Muslims are apostate, and therefore subject to attack, does little to empower or protect western Muslims who believe that the peaceful and tolerant passages have relevance in modern times.

The United States may have encouraged and facilitated the growth of Salafist jihadi groups during the Soviet war in Afghanistan when Salafists who were opposed to a communist government merged with jihadists in the Pakistani training camps under CIA sponsorship and fed by Saudi petro-dollars.<sup>42</sup> Al-Qaeda is the prime example of a Salafist group, steeped in the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood, that jelled into an effective terror organization following the Afghan war. Revolutionary Salafism forms the second basis for what is referred to as 'radical Islam.

### The Modern Problem

In the 1900s, ideas spread through the print media, radio, and by word of mouth or loudspeaker. Later, television allowed more rapid spread of ideas, especially to those who were not literate. Radio and television could be controlled relatively easily, loudspeaker broadcasts monitored, and printed materials located and destroyed. The internet has changed the ability of governments to restrict the ideas propagated within and across borders. Multinational Salafist groups have used the internet very effectively. "Al-Qaeda and other jihadist groups reach millions of young people even without brick-and-mortar religious institutions. With internet and satellite technology, they continue to preach the killing of innocent civilians, including any Muslims who disagree with them."<sup>43</sup>

Salafism and the Iranian leaders of Shia Islam both aspire to conduct a global insurgency with the goal of first restoring the ancient caliphate, and then expanding it to impose strict Islamic law (Sharia) world-wide.<sup>44</sup> This goal requires the overthrow of current 'moderate' Islamic governments as well as any secular governments. The idea of a global caliphate is being spread by radical Islamists to Muslims over the globe. With the example of life in Afghanistan under the Taliban, most Muslims reject this vision of Sharia. There are, however, Muslims dissatisfied with their current societies. Radical Islam seeks to motivate these dissatisfied Muslims to take action to change their societies, and is promoting terrorism against non Muslims and moderate Muslims as a valid method for changing society. Terrorist actions in recent history include car bombings, airline hijack bombings, suicide backpack bombings, and destruction of vital infrastructure or national symbols.

While most Muslims disagree with these views, it only takes a few to agree with the views to create a terrorist problem. Although it is difficult to determine how many Muslims identify themselves as Salafi jihadists, one informed estimate is about one percent of the world's 1.2 billion Muslims" – about 120 million – see life divided between the land of Islam (dar al-Islam) and the land of war (dar al-harb), and also wish to extend Islam to all humankind.<sup>45</sup> Even assuming only one out of every hundred thousand Muslims accepts and acts upon Salafist jihadi doctrine, that still means 12,000 individuals willing to perform acts of terrorism, with a very conservative calculation of 250 more each year coming of age to perform acts of terror. "Salafist jihadists are now a burgeoning presence in Europe, having attempted more than 30 terrorist attacks among E.U. countries since 2001."<sup>46</sup>

Every society contains dissatisfied individuals, but Jurgensmeyer observed that most acts of terrorism are collective decisions, not merely individual decisions. Terrorism, except for the true sociopath, requires 1) a great deal of internal conviction, 2) social acknowledgement, 3) the stamp of approval from a legitimizing ideology or authority someone respects, 4) a belief that a person's community or culture is under attack, has been violated, and its people are victims, 5) ordinary methods of redress or correction will not work or 6) those responsible are truly evil and deserving of terrorism, and 7) their acts of violence are part of an already existing larger struggle that demands their contribution.<sup>47,48</sup> Salafism provides all of these elements.

Many Muslim immigrants in the West have had a hard time assimilating, either through the domestic policies of the host nation (such as in Europe), or many Muslims' own desires to only associate with other Muslims (such as in America). The lack of assimilation often results in feelings of alienation, perceptions of lost economic and social opportunity, and dissatisfaction. Many Muslim immigrants are also dissatisfied at the foreign policies of their host nations, and

seek a way to change these policies. A problem for Governments and societies world-wide is how to prevent Muslims within their borders from embracing the Salafist message of terrorist violence as a reaction to this sense of dissatisfaction, perceived injustices and a desire for change.

The question for citizens of countries with Muslim immigrants becomes: are these new citizens and residents really loyal to their current country of residence, or are they merely biding time for terrorist acts? Because many Muslims see loyalty to the Islam as a higher loyalty than that owed to their current country of residence, the answer to the question may not be good for countries with tolerant governments, especially in countries with liberal immigration or asylum policies.<sup>49</sup>

This paper will now examine how four countries attempt to control the subversion of Islam by Revolutionary Salafism within their borders. Yemen and Jordan were chosen because they are Muslim nations. Presumably, the leaders of these countries would understand in detail the effects of various strategies to combat radical Islam. France and England were chosen because they have similar situations to America, being western democracies with growing minority Muslim populations.

## Yemen

### Current Situation

Yemen's constitution declares that Islam is the state religion, and Sharia is the source of all legislation. Virtually all of its 20 million citizens are Muslims, with roughly 30% being Shia and 70% being Sunni. Yemen also has small Christian and Jewish minorities. Residents are free to worship according to their own religious beliefs.<sup>50</sup> Tensions exist between the majority Sunni and the minority Shia populations. The Government is committed to religious tolerance, and is concerned with both Iran fomenting rebellion, and revolutionary Salafi elements promoting religious violence.

Yemen recognizes the danger Salafism poses to society. "Well before 9/11, Yemen was faced with a terrorist threat on a scale matched by few other countries. It had to handle the return of thousands of militants from Afghanistan and other battlefields with impressive combat experience and deep ideological motivation."<sup>51</sup> The country has suffered from six terrorist acts between 1997 and 2002. Yemen recognizes that religiously motivated terrorists are tools of politically minded religious leaders. As stated by Yemeni Colonel Taiseer Saleh:

There is no doubt that young people who commit terrorist acts are of a critical age and do not make sound choices. Surely they are victims of powerful evil

leadership who ...issue misguided religious proclamations to push them to kill innocent people.<sup>52</sup>

Yemen treats terrorism on the same level as organized crime, but recognizes the religious aspect as a powerful motivator. Yemen created a National Security Council to 'reinforce counterterrorism activities and tackle organized crime to achieve comprehensive national security.'<sup>53</sup>

#### Yemen's National Strategy

**Diplomatic.** Yemen enforces border control with neighboring countries, and deports illegal aliens.

**Informational.** The Yemeni Ministry of Religion took control of all mosques within its borders in order to promote moderate Islam, discredit radical ideologies, and disrupt moral support in mosques for terrorists. As documented by the U.S. State Department:

In May 2006 the government conducted a six-day training course for 500 imams to promote principles of moderation and religious tolerance.<sup>54</sup> It monitors mosque sermons for individuals who incite violence. Yemen "closed more than 3000 unlicensed schools and religious centers, and then deported foreign students found studying in those unlicensed religious schools. The Minister of Religion also mandated curriculums in religious schools that promote tolerance and peace. This instruction is intended to counter radical ideologies. Both public and private schools are prohibited from teaching courses outside of the officially approved curriculum."<sup>55</sup>

Yemen also use mass media to promote influence of moderate Islamic scholars in order to orient young people toward a version of Islam based on tolerance and compassion. It implemented a major civics campaign to promote national cohesion and love of country so the Yemeni population will not participate in any criminal or terrorist acts. The goal is to mount information operations to prevent recruitment of young people by terrorist cells.<sup>56</sup>

In order to reduce local support for religiously inspired violence, Yemen also engages with and buys the loyalty of tribal leaders.

**Military / Police.** The armed branches of the Yemeni government physically attack and destroy terrorist cells within the country, and invite foreign counterterrorism forces with specific expertise to aid in attacking terrorist cells.<sup>57</sup> Most significantly, starting in 2001 Yemen rounded up Yemeni citizens it suspected of following radical Islamic beliefs. Several hundred of these were returning fighters from Afghanistan, while others were citizens who never left the country.<sup>58</sup>

**Economic.** Yemen seeks to create economic opportunities for youth, and for those who might support Salafist views.

Financial. Yemen tries to attack money laundering and achieve transparency in financial transactions in order to limit financing of terrorists.

Intelligence. As do most countries in the region, Yemen shares intelligence with the international community.

Legal. The Yemeni government has taken two broad measures. First, it disarmed the public.<sup>59</sup> Second, it arrested those suspected of being a danger to Yemen, and uses a religious ideology standard for determining if they should be released. Yemeni clerics meet individually with each detainee over a period of weeks or even months, and debate the validity of Salafism based strictly on the Koran and the Hadith. The clerics attempt to persuade them that their ideology of terrorism, disrespect of non-Muslims, and attacking foreign interests is not justified by the Koran or the Hadith, thus discrediting the teachings of Qutb, Faraj, Zawahiri, and other Salafists. Those who are genuinely persuaded not to conduct acts within Yemen are released and aided to find viable employment. Well over half have been 'reformed', but several hundred still believe that Revolutionary Salafism justifies violent acts within Yemen, and remain detained.<sup>60,61</sup>

## Analysis

Yemen's informational approach directly attacks the spread of Salafist ideology. Its method of individually debating with Salafists provides a definite means to reform and discredit the Salafist movement.

## Jordan

### Current Situation

Jordan is a kingdom ruled by a direct descendant of Mohammad. Because of this, the King has a small inherent religious legitimacy that other heads of state do not enjoy. Six million people live within Jordan's borders, one third of whom are refugees from Palestine and Iraq. Jordan's constitution guarantees religious freedom. The vast majority of the population is Muslim; one third of whom regularly attend Friday prayers in the kingdom's 3800 mosques.<sup>62</sup>

"Back in the 1970s Islamists and members of Muslim Brotherhood fought with the king of Jordan in a civil war against the PLO. As payback for supporting the king, these Salafists were given control of the ministries of education and Islamic affairs. This gave Salafists the ability to teach and preach generations of Jordanian youth in schools and mosques throughout the kingdom. Jordanian society transformed from being largely secular in the mid 1970s to now being strongly religious."<sup>63</sup>

Despite the fact that a global caliphate as promoted by Salafism would eliminate the kingdom's sovereignty, Jordan allowed radical clerics to spread jihadist Salafi ideas. Al Qaeda terrorist Zarqawi was born and educated in Jordan. Jordanian clerics taught Osama bin Laden. Sermons by Zarqawi and Al Qaeda propaganda were available in Amman mosques.<sup>64</sup> In 2004 Jordan formally recognized that Salafist teachings are a danger to its people, and that this radical ideology must not be tolerated.

Understanding that “the roots of Islamist militancy lie as much in the religious teachings of radical clerics, whose presence was tolerated in their country for decades, as it lies in broader social and political ills,” the Kingdom established a national strategy to combat the spread of jihadist Salafi ideas and capabilities.<sup>65</sup>

### Jordan's Strategy

In November 2004 King Abdullah II released his strategic vision for reclaiming Islam from those who preach a message of violence.<sup>66</sup> While the ‘Amman Message’ did not name who the King considered the enemies of Islam to be, it is clear the document refers to those who follow the Salafi and Wahabi doctrines. The message defines Islam as peaceful, tolerant, accepting of modern ways, and rejects the use of terror or the killing of innocent and defenseless people under any circumstances. It then goes on to describe the means for inculcating these ideas and preventing the spread of violent ideologies. The strategy leans heavily on the informational element of national power. The cornerstone of the strategy is to counter the militant messages of jihadist Salafism by using the Kingdom's mosques and Imams, and the clerical networks of Muslim states to discredit violent teachings.

Diplomatic. Jordan joined with “more than a dozen Arab states to exchange training and expertise in a shared campaign against radical ideologies,” and America may ask Jordan to send moderate Imams to the U.S. to counter Salafist radicalism.<sup>67</sup> Most importantly, Jordan actively seeks resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Kingdom views the continuation of the Palestinian refugee situation as the main cause for instability in the Muslim world, and believes it provides a legitimate cause for violent Islamic movements. Jordan has offered the U.S., Israel, and neighboring Arab countries a workable plan for resolving it.<sup>68</sup>

Informational. First, Jordan seeks to “rehabilitate the preachers of Islam” in order to counter Salafist ideology.<sup>69</sup> Islamic clerics receive training in how to counter arguments supporting violence and intolerance (‘knowledge of contemporary culture’), and how to identify and deal with violent elements in their congregations (‘how to deal with their communities’). “In order to preach in Jordan, an Imam must have a license from the Ministry of Religious Affairs.”<sup>70</sup>

Second, Jordan aims to “utilize the media in a sound, scientific manner, without weakness or emotional outburst.”<sup>71</sup> The Jordanian government influences how the country’s mass media portray terrorist events, encouraging a focus on the sorrow and harm caused by the attackers, without promoting an emotive response of terror in the viewers.

Third, Jordan controls the religious views expressed in print, loudspeaker, radio, and television. Only Imams who preach messages consistent with the Amman Message are allowed to broadcast sermons from within Jordan, but Jordan has been unable to prevent the viewing of radical Jordanian Imams broadcasting on foreign cable networks.<sup>72</sup> The Ministry of Religious Affairs also publishes a monthly scholarly journal that attempts to influence religious thought among Jordanian Imams.

Fourth, Jordan encourages its teachers to promote tolerance and moderation in order to “keep our youth from sliding down the paths of ignorance, corruption, close-mindedness, and subordination, into the abyss of extremism.” Teachers are also responsible for promoting “positive visions of politics, displaying exacting standards of science, and ‘bringing people together, not dividing them.’”<sup>73</sup>

Imams of the Muslim Brotherhood, such as Sheikh Ahmad Nofal, still teach the next generation of Imams in universities.<sup>74</sup> To help counter their impact, “the king has called for the closing of the religious studies programs at several universities by 2009. These will be replaced by a new training institute that aims to promote moderate Islam and stop (seminary) students from being influenced by extremist (revolutionary Salafist) teachings and thinking.”<sup>75</sup>

Military / Police. Jordan positions a large portion of its armed forces, along with units from other government agencies, along its borders as part of border security and to prevent illegal acts such as smuggling. It also cooperates heavily with Israeli security forces along their common border to prevent the movement between the two countries of anyone intending to carry out terrorist acts.<sup>76</sup> Jordan is also establishing a Regional Counterterrorism Institute to train military and interagency personnel of Jordan and other regional governments.<sup>77</sup>

Economic. Jordan encourages scientific and technological development without supporting unrestrained capitalism. The Amman Message states that the “Islamic approach provides a balance in spiritual, economic, and social life, ...provides for human rights,...guarantees basic needs, and administers society’s affairs... This approach benefits from and strengthens the mechanisms of democracy.”<sup>78</sup>

Financial. Jordan uses three approaches to this element of national power. First, it provides a monthly stipend to its licensed Imams. Second, it finances the operation of the 3800 mosques, with the intent of providing enough sources of ‘peaceful Islam’ so that citizens will

have to take effort if they desire to seek out unofficial, radical Imams.<sup>79</sup> Third, Jordan works with the U.S. and other countries to control money laundering and the flow of cash into and out of Jordan that could finance terrorist groups.

Intelligence. Jordan's internal intelligence efforts rely heavily on about 100 'First Clerics,' whose job it is to monitor what Imams preach and allow to be displayed in the nation's mosques. The First Clerics can enter a mosque at will, listen to sermons, question Imams on theology, and evict Imams that do not follow the vision specified in the Amman Message.<sup>80</sup> An area of special focus for the First Clerics is the identification and monitoring of 'unofficial mosques.' The Muslim Brotherhood still operates about 500 'Koran Study Centers' in Jordan, wherein Salafist teachers attempt to skirt the law.<sup>81</sup>

Externally, Jordan pools its intelligence information with neighboring countries such as Israel, Egypt, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia, and its allies such as the U.S. and Britain. The danger is that some regional governments, such as Syria, the Palestinian Authority, and Iran, support jihadist groups. This support for jihadist ideals limits those with whom Jordan can effectively cooperate. Even Egypt, which actively fights jihadist Salafists, probably has people within its government who secretly identify with the radicals, and could compromise the intelligence. The same danger exists with the Lebanese government, now influenced by Hezbollah.

Legal. Islamist student organizations have won landslide elections on college campuses. To counter the strong activism of Islamists on college campuses, Jordan passed a law in 2000 that made fewer than half of the student-council seats on any state university contestable by ballot. Government-appointed college deans give the majority of seats in student councils to rival liberal student organizations.

## Analysis

Since the Amman Message, however, Imams from the Muslim Brotherhood still preach in Jordanian mosques.<sup>82</sup> In 2005 a triple suicide bombing by a jihadist organization killed 60 people at a wedding in Amman. This shows the difficulty in rooting out Salafist ideology once it is entrenched. Defining an officially supported version of Islam clearly sets the Salafists as the outsiders, but this could only be done in an Islamic country. Monitoring of sermons and inspection of materials is a concrete and effective way to identify, and then neutralize, Salafist messages.



## France

### Current Situation

In 2006, out of a total population of 61 million people, there were six million Muslims living in France.<sup>83</sup> Jocelyn Cesari of the Social Science Research Council, noted that the French have “longstanding cultural values, including secularism, the status of the citizen as an individual, and the rejection of minority cultural and ethnic communities.”<sup>84</sup> While these cultural values have been largely successful in assimilating immigrants from many cultures, there is a strong perception within North African immigrants that those of French descent do not fully accept them as ‘French.’<sup>85</sup> France has never had anti-Muslim popular riots, and French political representatives widely promote rhetoric of tolerance towards Islam.<sup>86</sup>

“France imported workers in the 1950s through the 1970s to satisfy a demand for labor when unemployment was 2%. France built low rent housing projects (‘banlieues’) to house the immigrant laborers.<sup>87</sup>

By the 1980s the jobs had evaporated, but the immigrant laborers had not. French youth unemployment is among the highest in Europe, and higher the further you descend the social scale. High minimum wages, payroll taxes and labor protection laws make employers loath to hire those whom they cannot easily fire, and whom they must pay beyond their worth.<sup>88</sup>

Unemployment hit the North Africans hard: in 2005, unemployment rates among Muslims were two to five times higher than people of French origin depending on the age and education level category of comparison.<sup>89</sup>

These banlieues, technically towns on the outskirts of cities, have degenerated into ghettos that concentrate immigrants and their descendents, segregating them from the rest of French society.<sup>90</sup>

North African Muslims make up one third of the residents of the banlieues.<sup>91</sup> Islamic religious teachings and French labor and housing policies have greatly contributed to a growing identity among North African immigrants in France as being Muslims first, instead of as being ‘French.’<sup>92,93,94</sup> The French now fear a possible growth in the numbers of French Muslims who agree with Salafi / Wahabi teachings, that could then fuel violence inspired by Islamic theology.<sup>95</sup>

France experienced violence and terrorism involving Muslims throughout the last two decades. In the 1990s religious violence in Algeria spilled over into France, when some of the Algerian Islamic radicals thought they could pressure the French government to stop backing the Algerian military.<sup>96</sup> In 1994 police stormed a hijacked aircraft in Marseilles. In December

1995 the Paris metro was bombed. In 2001, police in Dubai arrested a French Algerian who admitted to being part of a Takfir terrorist cell planning a suicide attack on the U.S. embassy in Paris. His accomplice admitted to being the designated suicide bomber of a canteen on a NATO base in Belgium. The French then arrested the members of the Takfir cell on September 10, 2001.<sup>97</sup>

### National Strategy

To counter the threat of Islamic terrorism in France, the French have evolved primarily a legal and informational approach, although other elements of national power are also involved. The French strategy does not adequately address the biggest cause of Muslim dissatisfaction, which is unemployment. In November 2005 thousands of young people, mostly Muslims who were mostly frustrated by social and economic conditions, rioted over police actions.<sup>98</sup> French Islamic leaders were unable to exert control or calm down the rioters.

Diplomatic. France has steadfastly refused to grant asylum to individuals with connections to terrorist groups. France supported military operations in Afghanistan, but did not support military action in Iraq. It is unclear how domestic Islamic groups influenced either decision. France's involvement in the United Nation's Iraq 'Oil for Food' program may have played a larger role than domestic religious concerns.

Informational. In 2004, France established the French Council on Muslim Culture (CFCM). "Even though the French secular State has always reiterated its commitment to church / state separation, Islam enjoys a nearly official recognition by the Government and public authorities."<sup>99</sup> The CFCM is an attempt to mold Islam into a version compatible with French legal and social traditions. France thus supports the efforts of 'moderate' and 'liberal' Imams in an attempt to counter the message of Salafist jihad available over the internet and in private prayer halls. The success of CFCM is debatable. Conservative Islamic clerics reject the French government's attempt to change how Islam is practiced in France.

Military / Police. Other than suppressing the insurgency in Algeria, France has not used its military in the effort to identify, control and eliminate Islamic terrorists in a preemptive manner. The military and paramilitary police are used if an event is actually taking place, such as with the storming of the hijacked airliner in 1995. The police were active in quelling the riots of 2005, but generally follow two extremes. Either the police look the other way at low level civil crimes, or they are extremely heavy handed. Relations between the police and residents of the banlieues are very poor.<sup>100</sup>

Economic. In 2006, the French Government attempted to pass labor laws aimed at opening up its labor market, but mass demonstrations by employed French youths forced the Government to abandon the idea. Unemployment among Muslim youths remains among the highest in Europe.

Financial. France regularly funds mosques and Islamic social support structures. Although the French government announced an intent to building social facilities in the utilitarian banlieues in order to improve the lives of the residents, as of yet few improvements have been made.

Intelligence. France collects intelligence on terrorist organizations and actively shares information with Western, North African, and Middle Eastern governments

Legal. In 2004, France passed a law banning the wear of conspicuous religious items in school or in civil service. This applied to items such as the Muslim girls' head coverings and veils, large Christian crucifixes, and Jewish head caps. The intent was to reduce the overt expression of religion in schools and in government offices. Students refusing to remove the articles are refused entry into school, but may attend private religious schools. Civil servants who refuse to comply are fired. The effect of this has been to satisfy the native born French that the government is 'doing something about these religious extremists,' but is also confirming the idea in the minds of Muslims that France is against their religion.

Social. In order to combat the environment of the banlieues, instead of granting permission for the residents to move into other housing, the neighborhoods will receive increased social facilities intended to reduce dissatisfaction. Residents are still unable to escape their environment.

## Analysis

France's attempt to officially influence the form of Islam practiced lacks credibility among Muslims. Islam will probably be reformed only from within. The geographic and economic isolation of Muslims contributes to Muslims' feelings of rejection, promotes identification with global Islam, and provides fertile ground for radicalization.

## Great Britain

### Current Situation

The estimates of the number of Muslims in Britain vary from a low of one million to a high of two million<sup>101</sup>. The Muslim Council of Britain says there are approximately 1.6 million Muslims in Great Britain, out of a total population of 60 million people. Great Britain does not track

census figures for religious affiliation, but does for ethnic affiliation. Approximately 46% are of Pakistani descent, 26% of Arab / African descent, 15% of Bangladeshi descent, and 13% other (Turkish, Indonesian, etc.). Over half of Muslims in Great Britain are at least second generation. There are at least 1000 mosques operating in Great Britain.<sup>102</sup> Muslims are represented by four members in Britain's parliament. The four members actively promote Muslim interests and fight to make sure their constituents are not treated unfairly under the law.

With the large Pakistani population, there is a large amount of travel back and forth to Pakistan. A fair number of British Pakistanis also participated in the Mujahadeen against the USSR in the 1980s.<sup>103</sup>

London had very liberal immigration and asylum policies for many years. "The British capitol is reputedly referred to as 'Londonistan' by Salafi jihadists because of its policy of giving asylum to anyone who was a radical proponent of Islamist jihad activities as long as they would not practice terrorism on British soil."<sup>104</sup> Radical (Salafi jihadist) mosques such as the Finsbury Park mosque operated open in London for years, and a large percentage of Muslims in Britain support radical ideology. British reporters documented that Saudi Arabian clerics and the Saudi government export Wahabi teachings, and that these extreme views are preached regularly in the nation's biggest mosques.<sup>105</sup> One of the tenets preached is that Muslims owe a higher allegiance to Islam than to their country. A survey published in August 2006 reported that 81% of British Muslims consider themselves to be Muslims first, and British second.<sup>106,107</sup>

In July of 2005 Islamists bombed London's subway and bus systems. Surveys published in 2006 show thirteen percent of British Muslims believe the persons who bombed the London subway system in July 2005 were Martyrs for Islam, and forty-nine percent believe U.S. military actions in Iraq are an attack against Islam.<sup>108,109</sup> These expressions of support for the radical Islamic agenda have caused the British to evaluate their stance on tolerating radical religious activities in their country.

As in other Western nations with large immigrant populations and depressed economic situations, recent immigrants in Britain often do not feel fully accepted by the British they are competing against for jobs. In employment, Bangladeshis and Pakistanis are two and a half times more likely than the white population to be unemployed and nearly three times more likely to be in low pay.<sup>110,111</sup>

A 'generation Gap' also exists between the older, conservative Imams and the young Muslim men who follow popular ways of behavior, speech and dress. The older moderate clerics who do not subscribe to radical beliefs have a hard time connecting and communicating with the young generation of British Muslims. The situation of feeling not fully belonging to

Britain, and also not fitting in with traditional Islam, allows Salafist clerics in Britain to seize upon the young Muslim's lack of identity and recruit these people for violent acts.<sup>112</sup>

#### National Strategy

Diplomatic. Britain used to allow almost anyone to enter as long as that person or group did not practice terrorism on British soil, but since 2001 bars those associated with terrorist activity from entering the country. Britain's foreign policy is supportive of U.S. actions, and therefore antagonizes Arabs and British Muslims.<sup>113</sup>

Informational. Prior to 2006, British law allowed full freedom of expression to radical Islamic groups. Preaching in Finsbury Park mosque in northern London prior to his arrest in 2004, Abu Hamza openly called for *jihad*, for killing "non-Muslims."<sup>114</sup> Although the Terrorism Act of 2006 made it illegal to encourage or glorify terrorism, radical clerics are distributing their message louder than that of any other religious group. Western media has often showed masked Muslims demonstrating in front of London's Westminster cathedral, calling for the establishment of Sharia in Britain, insulting other religions, and promoting the defeat of U.S. and British military efforts.<sup>115</sup> The police allow the radical Muslim groups to do so, even when other groups or individuals would be arrested for similar provocative statements. Religious instructional materials and internet video lectures from Saudi Arabia encourage Salafist and Wahabist doctrine in Britain.<sup>116</sup>

Military / Police. Britain has fully supported militarily actions against terrorist groups around the world. British anti-terror units have conducted operations inside Britain to counter kidnappings, hijackings, and bombings.

Britain has a national police force, which avoids many problems associated with the U.S. system of compartmented functional jurisdictions. British police are allowed to monitor communications and to detain suspects for up to 28 days, but more than 2 days detention requires a judge's concurrence.

Economic. Britain gives no economic preferences to any religious group, but all groups are treated equally. The depressed economic situation in Britain causes intense competition for jobs, and immigrants have some trouble breaking out of lower paying jobs.

Financial. Britain actively fights money laundering and financial support of terrorist organizations. There are at least 90 Muslim charity organizations publicly operating in Britain. It is not possible to determine what percent of these channel funds to groups that support terrorist activities.<sup>117</sup> The option of private money transfers makes tracing funds very difficult.

Intelligence. Britain collects domestic intelligence on the activities within the Muslim community. Muslims have protested this, and the Government has sought to be covert in its activities. Britain shares its intelligence with other countries in the EU, the friendly governments in the Middle East, and with the U.S.

Legal. Prior to 2000, British terrorism laws were tailored towards the situation with Northern Ireland. In response to the changing threat of international terrorism, Britain enacted a series of legislation beginning in 2000 designed to make it more difficult for terrorist organizations to function within its borders.<sup>118</sup>

The Terrorism Act 2000<sup>119</sup>:

- Outlawed certain terrorist groups from operating in the U.K.
- Gave police greater powers to stop, search and detain individuals.
- Made it illegal to incite terrorist acts, seek or provide training for terrorism anywhere in the world, and specifically to provide instruction in firearms, explosives, and chemical, biological or nuclear weapons.

The Anti-Terrorism, Crime, and Security Act of 2001 legalized measured intended to:<sup>120</sup>

- Cut off terrorist funding.
- Allow government agencies to collect and share information.
- Refuse entry to those with links to terrorist groups, and allow the deportation of foreign nationals who actively support terrorism.
- Secure nuclear and aviation industries.
- Improve security of dangerous substances.

In 2005, Britain had to revise Part 4 of the 2001 Act because the European Commission on Human Rights ruled that domestic laws cannot discriminate between citizens and foreign nationals. In response, the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 established the mechanism of 'control orders,' similar to U.S. restraining orders, that restricted the ability of certain individuals to move about within the U.K. The control orders can also restrict designated individuals from accessing certain types or means of information such as diagrams of utilities or the actual internet itself.<sup>121</sup>

The Terrorism act of 2006 made it illegal to:<sup>122</sup>

- Prepare to commit a terrorist act.
- Encourage or glorify terrorism
- Disseminate terrorist publications
- Give, receive, or be at a place that provides, terrorist training.

Social. In order to counter religious extremism among the Muslim population after the July 2005 bombings, British government and Muslim leaders set up seven 'Preventing Extremism together' workshops. The workshops made 37 specific recommendations, of which the government is considering only seven. The proposals encourage Muslims to participate constructively in British society, as opposed to staying within closed religious social circles. Key points are to:

- Improve the skill of Imams, mosque officials and teachers in religious schools to emphasize life skills and citizenship, and teach Muslims to deal with extremist tendencies.
- Increase the visibility and influence of Muslim women in order to moderate radical influences.
- Develop opportunities for young British Muslims to become civic leaders and active citizens by making places of worship become community centers.

#### Analysis

Britain is now struggling to constrain Salafist groups that it unwisely allowed to grow in years past. The use of a single national police force greatly facilitates rapid identification of threats and corrective action. Britain's policy of showing restraint when faced with offensive Muslim activism may backfire, as the exposure of radical ideas shows the power of the radical Islamist movement, portrays weakness of the Government, and may encourage more people to join. The legal measures enacted between 2000 and 2006 provide sufficient tools to deal with domestic terrorism, although the European Union's demand that British law not place extra restrictions on foreign nationals places additional importance on pre-entry screening.

Britain recognized the importance of reforming Islam within Britain, and has taken a sensible approach to do so through the recommendations of its 'Preventing Extremism' workshops. Using moderate Imams to teach religious clerics, educating British Muslims how to resist extremism, and encouraging the role of Muslim women all attack the ideals supported by Wahabist and Salafist clerics. Britain still is unable to effectively prevent the entry and influence of Wahabist teachings emanating from Saudi Arabia.<sup>123</sup>

#### United States

##### Current Situation

There are no precise figures for the number of Muslims in America. The U.S. State Department cites studies that range from two to seven million, and notes that Muslim groups

provide the higher figure.<sup>124</sup> Muslim population growth is estimated at 6% per year, higher than the national average, due to higher birth rates, immigration, and religious conversion. The number of Muslim households in America is estimated at 2.3 million.<sup>125</sup> Most large urban centers have Muslim populations. A recent study indicates that Muslims in America are better educated and more affluent than the average American citizen.<sup>126</sup>

Many Muslim social organizations exist. The most public Muslim organization, the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), was selected by the president to speak for Muslims across America in calls for peaceful relations between Muslims and non-Muslims in the United States.<sup>127</sup> Several of these organizations, however, have come under close scrutiny for alleged ties to extremist ideology or terrorist groups. Non-Muslim organizations alleged ties of CAIR executives to the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas, and state that several of its key officers have been convicted on crimes related to terrorism.<sup>128,129</sup>

The foreign policy of the United States has antagonized Arabs for many years.<sup>130,131</sup> The U.S. bias in favor of Israel in its dealings with other Arab nations, the lack of U.S. pressure on Israel to resolve the Palestinian issue, and the U.S.'s refusal to recognize the democratically elected government of the Palestinians all cause the Arabs to view the U.S. as not an honest broker, but as the supporter of an enemy of Arabs.<sup>132,133</sup> Scholars have documented the efforts of what can be referred to as the 'Israel Lobby', and its effects on U.S. foreign policy.<sup>134,135</sup> One Middle Eastern ambassador has noted that "it is easier for Arabs to talk to Israelis than it is for Arabs to talk to Israel's supporters in America."<sup>136</sup> Arab nations have been able to frame America's 'pro-Israel' bias into one of being 'anti-Muslim,' and thus generate hostility towards America from Muslims around the world. The continued confinement of Muslims at Guantanamo and photos of Iraqis abused at Abu Ghraib prison are used by radical Muslims to back claims that America preaches human rights but does not practice it towards Muslims.

Because of a dependency on Middle Eastern oil, America has involved itself several times in the region. American supported the brutal Shah of Iran and invaded Iraq on what proved to be a very weak justification. The U.S. does support the Arab governments of Egypt and Saudi Arabia, but many citizens of these countries see the U.S. as supporting corrupt and repressive regimes.<sup>137</sup>

American popular culture offends traditional Muslim sensibilities. U.S. media shows images of America to the world, but American television and cinema often distort reality in an attempt to increase 'entertainment value'. The export of programming that celebrates and promotes what Muslims consider to be morally depraved behavior is seen by Radical Muslims as an attack on traditional Islamic values, and thereby subject to defensive jihad.



In the 1980s and 90s, the US allowed the immigration of Muslims of with little regard to their political and civic orientation. Saudi religious materials and financial support of Wahabist clerics and Mosques promoted the belief among many U.S. Muslims as owing greater allegiance to Islam than to their country of residence. The influence of Wahabi and Salafist teachings in American mosques has two effects. Wahabism encourages Muslims to stand apart from the U.S. political system. This voluntary exclusion removes voting as a means of changing U.S. policies. Salafism encourages Muslims to take violent action in order to 'fight for Islam' against U.S. policies and popular culture. Some Muslims in the U.S. became attracted to the teachings of radical clerics in the US, sought combat in Afghanistan, and returned to America.<sup>138</sup>

American media generates maximum exposure for terrorist acts. Media images enhance the ability of terrorist groups to effect societies by 'magnifying its horror far beyond the number of people immediately affected by the blast.'<sup>139</sup> The Government has avoided the difficult issue of the press emphasizing the damage done by terrorist acts on U.S. soil. The major media networks compete with each other for the most dramatic headlines, such as the caption 'Terror in the Heartland' when covering the Oklahoma City bombing.

#### Current National Strategy

In order to defend itself against the activities of domestic terrorists, the U.S. is using many elements of national power. Legal powers are directed against the acts themselves, but little is being done against the ideology that spawns the acts.

Diplomatic. The U.S. government has not given very much weight in its foreign policy decisions to the attitudes and reactions of Muslims at home or abroad. Support for Israel often over-rides other considerations.

The United States Government pressured the government of Saudi Arabia to stop using its diplomats to import Salafist literature and distribute it in U.S. mosques. The U.S. has not been successful, however, at getting the Saudi Government to stop the Saudi educational system from spreading Salafist and Wababi teachings and materials inside the U.S.<sup>140</sup>

Internationally, the U.S. has encouraged legal immigration from all Muslim countries except Pakistan. In 2007, 18,848 immigration visas were awarded to residents of Muslim countries, including 8,590 from Egypt and Iran.<sup>141</sup> The U.S. tightened its immigration screening process after the September 11 attacks, but has not established effective border control. Entering the U.S. illegally from Mexico is still almost effortless, as evidenced by the ease at which violent criminal gangs move back and forth.<sup>142</sup>

Informational. The Government declared a War on Terror, but never defined who the enemy was. Despite appeals not to characterize all Muslims as terrorists, Americans have not been provided with an accurate statement of who the enemy actually is. Because the Government never specified Revolutionary Salafism as the source of terrorist ideology, and Salafists as the enemy, most Americans continue to see 'Islam' as the enemy. This generates distrust of all Muslims, and hostility from Muslims in return.

There is no viable national program to combat the Salafist / Wahabi teachings of Muslim separatism. The constitutional prohibition against making laws pertaining to the establishment of a religion presents a formidable legal barrier to declaring an ideology illegal, or even just supporting a moderate or peaceful Islamic ideology.

The U.S. government and educational systems have pursued a policy of encouraging residents of America to recognize and accept each other's differences – the 'Diversity' and 'Multicultural' movements – instead of stressing the things that bind us together as a society and as a nation. As a result, all philosophies and schools of thought are given equal validity. The encouragement and celebration of 'Diversity' and 'Multiculturalism' continues to prevent positive steps towards assimilating recent immigrants. Civics classes have fallen out of favor with curriculum designers who view the topic as being culturally biased. The U.S. faces a danger of accepting destructive or non-compatible cultural differences in behavior among immigrants, such as honor killings and wife-beating, as has occurred in Germany.<sup>143,144</sup>

Military / Police. Federal law enforcement is fractured into over 40 functional jurisdictions. Members of each jurisdiction are legally prevented from enforcing federal law coming under the jurisdiction of other agencies. Because of the Posse Comitatus Act, the federal military has not been involved in domestic activities except in guarding key infrastructure as part of Operation NOBLE EAGLE.

Economic. Although the economic opportunities of America have benefited Muslims as a group, there are no specific programs or social trends that facilitate this.

Financial. The Patriot Act of 2001 increased tools for preventing money laundering and identifying those who donate funds to known terrorist organizations.<sup>145</sup>

Intelligence. The Patriot Act of 2001 expanded the ability of domestic law enforcement and intelligence agencies to conduct surveillance on domestic activities. It also directed the sharing of intelligence across functional and geographic jurisdictions.

Legal. While criminal acts are certainly prosecutable, the promotion of violence through promulgating revolutionary Salafist teachings presents a special case due to first amendment rights. Encouraging violence against American society or against individuals falls under federal

terrorism statutes as either terrorism or hate crimes. Citizens convicted are subject to fines and imprisonment, while aliens can also be deported. Naturalized citizens may also have their naturalization certificates revoked if their crimes are serious enough.<sup>146</sup> The Patriot Act allows the deportation of any alien whom the attorney general certifies is a threat to national security.<sup>147</sup>

To clarify the powers granted by the Patriot Act, the U.S. Attorney General issued guidelines pertaining to the investigation of terrorism enterprises.<sup>148</sup> This document did several things. First, it defined terrorist acts inside America. Terrorism is defined as “two or more persons engaged for furthering political or social goals through activities that involve force or violence and a federal crime,” or those actions which meet the previously existing definitions of terrorism as stated in 18 U.S.C. 2331 (1) or (5) and 2332b(g)(5)(B).<sup>149</sup>

Second, the Attorney General stated that authorized methods may include informants attending public gatherings such as prayer calls. Third, however, “law enforcement agencies may not maintain files on individuals solely for the purpose of monitoring activities protected by the First Amendment.” The prohibition against monitoring individuals solely because they are of a certain religion makes a reason for investigating or surveillance necessary. The document does state that “the reasonable indication for undertaking such an investigation is substantially lower than probable cause.” Verbally promoting violent jihad, such as described per revolutionary Salafist doctrine, meets the Attorney General’s definition of terrorism, and a verbal report of such words could be used to initiate an undercover operation of prayer calls and meetings. Muslim organizations such as the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) are concerned about FBI surveillance, and have worked extensively to keep the FBI out of U.S. mosques.<sup>150</sup>

A hate crime is not a distinct federal offense. However, the federal government can and does investigate and prosecute crimes of bias as civil rights violations, which do fall under its jurisdiction.<sup>151</sup> It is against Federal law for two or more persons to conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any person in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured by the laws of the United States.<sup>152</sup> Wahabist teachings against women’s rights, and Salafist calls to eliminate certain civil rights, constitute under U.S. law conspiracy to violate civil rights.

## Analysis

U.S. foreign policy is very painful to Muslims. The U.S. Government has ignored the relationship between its foreign policy and the attitude and reaction of Muslims. The U.S.

support of Israel at the expense of the Palestinians plays into the hands of Islamic leaders trying to generate violence against the United States.

By never defining the population the Global War on terrorism is against, there is a tension domestically between non-Muslims and Muslims that generates fear and hostility. Our inability to divide Islam between moderate schools of thought and radical political movements prevents us from identifying Salafism as a hostile political movement, as opposed to being a religious philosophy. We thus misapply the First Amendment and prohibit ourselves from taking measures aimed at discrediting this corrosive social and political ideology.

Through actively seeking immigration from Muslim countries, America is increasing its exposure to individuals who may be swayed by Salafist ideology. It is unknown whether the screening process individuals undergo is adequate to identify those who may later support radical ideologies. The presence of Wahabist instructional materials from Saudi Arabia in U.S. mosques does not help the matter.

The elevation and celebration of foreign cultures and practices in America through 'Diversity' and multicultural programs necessarily means a lessening of the esteem of traditional American values, institutions, and practices. This lowered esteem gives weight to Salafist arguments that U.S. culture is deficient, and that Salafist Islam is a better social system.

The guidelines issued by the U.S. Attorney general lay out a very effective way to implement the Patriot Act. Provisions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, however, prevent much of our considerable intelligence capabilities from being used within the borders of America.

### Recommendations for U.S. Strategy

Diplomatic / foreign policy.

1. Change those elements of U.S. Foreign policy that show the U.S. to be biased or that antagonize dangerous non-state groups that we cannot defend against. This means treating Arab countries in the Middle East the same as we treat Israel, exerting visible pressure publicly on Israel to establish borders for the 'Palestinians,' and recognizing all democratically elected governments as being representatives of their constituents, regardless of their terrorist ties.
2. Pressure the Saudi Government to discourage exporting Wahabist materials to the U.S. and restrict the ability of Wahabist clerics from teaching in U.S. mosques via the internet.

3. Deny entrance visas to clergy from Wahabist and Salafist universities, such as those supported by the Saudi government.

Information operations / public affairs.

1. Recognize, as Jordan and Yemen have, that revolutionary Salafism is a danger to society and to the existing form of government, and that the Government has an obligation to combat such an ideology.
2. Acknowledge publicly that Revolutionary Salafism is not merely a religious doctrine, but is a political doctrine that seeks to replace the U.S. Constitution. This avoids the restrictions imposed by the First Amendment.
3. Declare that Revolutionary Salafism is the enemy in the Global War on Terrorism, not just generic terrorism or something vague such as 'Islamofascism.' This would prevent Muslims worldwide from claiming that the U.S. is fighting Islam as a whole, and reduces the moral pressure on American Muslims to 'join in the fight for Islam.' Treat terrorism sponsored by Iran as a separate case, because Iran's leadership is not Salafi.
4. The U.S. should not follow the French idea of trying to recognize an officially acceptable version of Islam. Seek advice and help from Jordan, Yemen and Turkey in countering the spread of Salafist and Wahabi ideology in U.S. mosques. Invite selected Imams to teach in U.S. mosques in order to counter the Salafist message, and to identify those who encourage violence.
5. Actively suppress Salafist messages and ideology before the situation in the U.S. reaches the level it has in Britain. Shut down computer servers that host revolutionary Salafist messages, especially those operating in the U.S. Use existing hate crime statutes to investigate and prosecute fully individuals who spread Salafist materials.
6. Be selective about what Muslim organizations the U.S. Government partners with in its efforts to prevent recriminations against Muslims and repress Salafist ideology. Do not repeat the error of supporting a domestic Islamic organization that has ties to terrorist groups. The government should research the background of Islamic organizations before the government chooses what organizations it will partner with to stop the spread of extremism.
7. To better instill the idea of the obligations of citizenship, follow Jordan's and Yemen's examples and promote a national civic identity. Restore the requirement of public

and private schools to teach civics and the responsibilities of an individual in a democracy.

8. Stop supporting the destructive themes of 'Diversity' and 'Multiculturalism' as ends in themselves. Instead, promote the concept of 'civic loyalty makes other differences irrelevant.' These measures will assist in assimilation of immigrants from cultures intolerant of the values that make a democracy function.
9. Pressure domestic media to eliminate sensationalism and expanded coverage of domestic terror attacks. This will help remove terrorism as a useful tool for those seeking to influence domestic policy.

#### Military / police action

Secure the U.S. borders in order to control access to U.S. territory.

#### Financial

Investigate the private donations of Mosques. Identify the sources of funding pertaining to construction, publications, and guest lecturers. Intervene if those sources of funding originate from Wahabist or Salafist groups.

#### Intelligence

Have the DoD intelligence community share its capabilities with the Department of Homeland Security. This will require changes to U.S. law.

#### Legal

Fully prosecute those Islamic practices that are incompatible with U.S. law and moral custom. Demonstrate America does not accept practices which harm human rights. Revise the FISA law to allow domestic surveillance of foreign groups. Consolidate the more than 40 federal functional law enforcement jurisdictions to allow greater efficiency in law enforcement.

#### Social

Discourage concentrations of Muslims in segregated neighborhoods in order to avoid the situation experienced by France. Increase the exposure of American Muslims to mainstream U.S. society.

## Conclusions

Most countries with large or growing Muslim populations recognize the threat to order that Salafism poses. The U.S. has been relatively lucky in avoiding domestic based Islamic terrorism, but great dangers exist. For the U.S. to reduce risk in the future we must:

- Learn from the successes and mistakes of other countries.
- Declare Revolutionary Salafism as the enemy in the Global War on Terror.
- Reduce the abilities of Salafists to spread their message in America.
- Increase recognition among American Muslims that violent Salafist ideology is inherently socially destructive and therefore undesirable.
- Support the idea among American Muslims that they are Americans who just happen to be Muslim instead of Muslims who just happen to reside in America. Loyalty to America must take priority over loyalty to their previous countries or to groups that threaten Constitutional freedoms.
- Stop promoting 'Diversity' and 'Multiculturalism' as greater civic virtues than assimilation into a democratic American society.

## Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> George F. Nafziger and Mark W. Walton, *Islam at War* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003), 1-14.

<sup>2</sup> S.A. Nigosian, *Islam* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2004), 19-23.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, 23-38.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, 39-40.

<sup>5</sup> "The Glorious Qur'an," trans. Muhammad Marmaduke Pickthall (New York: Muslim World League, 1977). The Qur'an, also spelled Koran in English, is divided into chapters called Surah, each with subordinate verses. For Koranic verses on peace, see Surah VI:151, CX:4-6, II:190, and V:32.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.* For verses on war, see Surah II:191-193, II:216, III:19, IV:74, IV:104, VIII:12, XLVII:4, IX:5, IX:29, IX:73, IX:123.

<sup>7</sup> A very accessible English translation of the Hadiths compiled by Bukhara are available through the University of Southern California. See the *USC-MSA Compendium of Muslim texts*, available at <http://www.usc.edu/dept/MSA/fundamentals/hadithsunnah/bukhari/>; Internet; accessed 9 March 2007/. Section 52 deals with Jihad, and section 84 deals with treatment of apostates.

<sup>8</sup> “The Glorious Qur’an,” Surah II:216. This Surah states that fighting is an obligation to God.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid. Surahs VIII:14-17 direct Muslims not to run away in battle except as a deception, and state that Allah is actually the one who kills, not the Muslims who merely carry out his will.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid. Surah IV:74 states “ Let those fight in the way of Allah who sell the life of this world for the other. Whoso fighteth in the way of Allah, be he slain or be he victorious, on him We shall bestow a great reward. Surah IX:111 states “...the garden will be theirs: they shall fight in the way of Allah and shall slay and be slain.” For descriptions of the garden of Paradise, see also Surahs XIII:35, XLIV:51-57, LV:46-77, and LVI:15-37.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid. Surah VIII:41 directs that one fifth of the captured spoils go to Mohammed on behalf of the orphans and the poor; the rest were to be kept by the soldiers themselves.

<sup>12</sup> Nafgizer and Walton, 33.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., 225-231.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid., 91-108.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid., 221-231.

<sup>16</sup> Alex Conte and Boaz Ganor, *Legal and Policy Issues in Establishing an International Framework for Human Rights Compliance When Countering Terrorism* (Herzliya, Israel: International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism, 2005), 18. “Even though the greater majority of Muslims advocate and practice the more moderate (and even liberal) interpretations of the Sunnah which advocate tolerance of others’ religious choices and customs, the radical and conservative school of Hanbali did not.”

<sup>17</sup> Milton Viorst, *In the Shadow of the Prophet: The Struggle for the Soul of Islam* (New York: Anchor Books/Doubleday, 1998), 214-215.

<sup>18</sup> Trevor Stanley, “Understanding the Origins of Wahabism and Salafism,” *Terrorism Monitor* 3 (15 July 2005): 8-10.

<sup>19</sup> Dr. Mamoun Fandy, “Transcript from Interview for PBS Frontline,” 18 October 2004; available from <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/front/interviews/fandy.html>; Internet; accessed 9 January 2006.

<sup>20</sup> Saad Eddin Ibrahim, “Islamic Militancy as a Social Movement: The Case of Two Groups in Egypt,” in *Islamic Resurgence in the Arab World*, ed. Ali E. Hillal Dessouki (New York: Praeger, 1982), 118.

<sup>21</sup> Ted Thornton, “History of the Middle East Database: Hasan al-Banah,” 21 October 2006; available from [http://www.nmhschool.org/tthornton/hasan\\_al.php](http://www.nmhschool.org/tthornton/hasan_al.php); Internet; accessed 9 January 2006.



<sup>22</sup> Ted Thornton, "History of the Middle East Database: Mawdudi," 21 September 2006; available from [http://www.nmhschool.org/tthornton/sayyid\\_abu.htm](http://www.nmhschool.org/tthornton/sayyid_abu.htm); Internet; accessed 9 January 2006.

<sup>23</sup> Ibrahim, 126.

<sup>24</sup> Sayyid Qutb, *This Religion of Islam (Hadha 'd-Din)* (Palo Alto, CA: Al-Manar Press, 1967), 87.

<sup>25</sup> Muhammad Abd al-Salam Faraj "Al-Faridah al-Gha'ibah" (translated as *The Neglected Duty*), Cairo Al-Ahrrar, 14 December 1981, trans. in Johannes J. G. Jansen, *The Neglected Duty: The Creed of Sadat's Assassins and Islamic Resurgence in the Middle East* (New York: Macmillan, 1986), 191-199.

<sup>26</sup> Bruce Livesey, *Al-Qaeda's New Front: the Salafist Movement*, PBS Frontline special report (Boston: WGBH Boston, 25 January 2005), 2; available from <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/front/special/sala.html>; Internet; accessed 11 January 2007. Bruce Livesey is an investigative journalist, and was an associate producer on *Al-Qaeda's New Front*.

<sup>27</sup> Viorst, 40-43, 47.

<sup>28</sup> Jocelyn Cesari, *Ethnicity, Islam, and les Banlieues: Confusing the Issues* (Paris, France: Social Science Research Council, 30 November 2005), 6; available from <http://riotsfrance.ssrc.org/Cesari/printable.html>; Internet; accessed 11 January 2007. Jocelyn Cesari is principal research fellow at the National center for Scientific research (CNRS) in Paris, and associate professor at Harvard University.

<sup>29</sup> Faraj, 191-199.

<sup>30</sup> Fandy.

<sup>31</sup> Livesey, 3.

<sup>32</sup> Stanley.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid.

<sup>34</sup> Viorst, 43.

<sup>35</sup> Freedom House, *Saudi Publications on Hate Ideology Fill American Mosques* (Washington, DC, Center for Religious Freedom, 2005), 1. "Saudi Arabian publications, which espouse an ideology of hate and purport to be the authoritative interpretation of Islam, continue to be in plentiful supply at some of our nation's main mosques and continue to be used as principal educational resources on Islam for Muslims in America."

<sup>36</sup> Stanley.

<sup>37</sup> *Dispatches – Undercover Mosque*, televised report article from British Channel 4 (15 January 2007). Also on the Internet from [www.channel4.com](http://www.channel4.com), available from <http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=2668560761490749816>; Internet; accessed 21

January 2007. The rebuttal is available from <http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=-8048345222093348483&q=Dispatches>, dated 16 January 2007.

<sup>38</sup> Gilles Kepel, *Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002), 61, 69-73.

<sup>39</sup> Cesari, 6, 8.

<sup>40</sup> Stanley.

<sup>41</sup> Dispatches.

<sup>42</sup> Viorst, 24.

<sup>43</sup> Joseph Braude, "Islam in the Crucible," *Playboy*, November 2006, 70.

<sup>44</sup> COL Gary Cheek, Deputy Director for the War on Terrorism, Strategic Plans and Policy J5, Joint Staff, "The Global War On Terrorism: Strategy for the Long War," briefing slides, Pentagon, 28 March 2007.

<sup>45</sup> Livesey, 2.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*, 1.

<sup>47</sup> Mark Jurgensmeyer, *Terror in the Mind of God*, (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2000), 11-12, 74.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, 184-186, 211. "Globalization's corruption, economic despair, attacks against traditional values, and dehumanization of societies give evidence that the world has gone wrong. The perception can be so strong that the person believes that either normal political processes will not fix it, or the governments that cause these conditions must be inherently evil. Terrorist acts are therefore justified. Terrorist acts may also serve the purpose of advertising a struggle and encourage others to join."

<sup>49</sup> Sarah Lyall et al., "Threats and Responses: Tensions; Many Muslims In Britain Tell of Feeling Torn Between Competing Identities." *New York Times* (Foreign Desk), 13 August 2006, Late Edition - Final, sec. 1, p. 6.

<sup>50</sup> U.S. State Department, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, "Yemen," linked from *International Religious Freedom Report 2006* (Washington DC: U.S. State Department, 15 December 2006), available from <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2006/71436.htm>; Internet; accessed 2 February 2007.

<sup>51</sup> Michael Tarnaby, "Yemen's Committee for Dialogue: Can Jihadists Return to Society?" *Terrorism Monitor* 3 (15 July 2005): 6-8.

<sup>52</sup> Colonel Taiseer Saleh, *Yemen National Strategy to Combat Global Terrorism*, Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 15 March 2006), 2.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>54</sup> U.S. State Department, Yemen.

<sup>55</sup> Ibid.

<sup>56</sup> Saleh, 5-6.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid., 2-6

<sup>58</sup> U.S. State Department, Yemen.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid.

<sup>60</sup> Tarnaby.

<sup>61</sup> U.S. State Department, Yemen.

<sup>62</sup> Braude, 69.

<sup>63</sup> Ibid., 78.

<sup>64</sup> Ibid., 69.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid.

<sup>66</sup> His Majesty King Abdulla II, "Amman Message," (Amman, Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, November 2004). The main points of the Amman Message are as follows: Muslims must shun violence and cruelty, Islam urges tolerance and forgiveness, Islam condemns treachery and treason, Islam rejects killing innocent or defenseless individuals, extremism is a deviation from the true faith, the foundation of relations between Islam and others is peace, terrorism includes destruction of buildings and ransacking cities, the international community should not permit any double standard with regard to how nations support Israel or Palestinians, and Muslims should not reject modern society.

<sup>67</sup> Braude, 164-166.

<sup>68</sup> His Royal Highness Crown Prince Zeid Ra'ad Zeid Al-Hussein, Ambassador of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to the United Nations, group interview by U.S. Army War College Seminar 20, 18 November 2006, New York.

<sup>69</sup> Amman Message.

<sup>70</sup> Braude, 155.

<sup>71</sup> Amman Message.

<sup>72</sup> Braude, 154-155. Jordan has attempted to restrict the ability of radical Jordanian clerics to preach hateful messages on television, but has not been completely successful. The radical cleric and Muslim Brotherhood member Sheikh Ahmad Nofal records the sermons he gives in a mosque in Amman. These sermons are then sent to and broadcast out of cable networks in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia back into Jordan and around the world.

<sup>73</sup> Amman Message.

<sup>74</sup> Braude, 78.

<sup>75</sup> Ibid., 164.

<sup>76</sup> Colonel Mohammad Jaradat, U.S. Army War College Student, seminar presentation on Jordan, 16 September 2006.

<sup>77</sup> Ibid.

<sup>78</sup> Amman Message.

<sup>79</sup> Braude, 156-157.

<sup>80</sup> Ibid.

<sup>81</sup> Ibid., 162.

<sup>82</sup> Ibid., 158.

<sup>83</sup> U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, *CIA Factbook: France* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, July 2006), available from <https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/print/fr.html>; Internet; accessed 16 January 2007.

<sup>84</sup> Cesari, 7.

<sup>85</sup> Theodore Dalrymple, "The Barbarians at the Gates of Paris," *City Journal* 14 (Autumn 2002): 7.

<sup>86</sup> Vincent Geisser, *Intellectual and Ideological Debates on Islamophobia: A 'French Specificity' in Europe?*, Research paper (Paris, France: National Center for Scientific Research, n.d.), 5-6. Professor Geisser is a researcher in the French Institute of Researches and Studies on the Arabic and Muslim World, and a Professor in the Institute of Political Studies of Aix-en-Provence.

<sup>87</sup> Dalrymple, 4.

<sup>88</sup> Ibid., 7.

<sup>89</sup> British Broadcasting Corporation news report, *French Muslims Face Job Discrimination*, 2 November 2005, available from <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4399748.stm>; Internet; accessed 11 January 2007.

<sup>90</sup> Cesari, 2-5.

<sup>91</sup> Dalrymple, 9.

<sup>92</sup> Cesari, 7.

<sup>93</sup> Dalrymple, 7. "It requires very little imagination to see how the burden of unemployment should fall disproportionately on immigrants and their children: and why, already culturally distinct from the bulk of the population, they should feel themselves vilely discriminated against. Having been enclosed in a physical ghetto, they respond by building a cultural and physiological ghetto for themselves. They are of France, but not French"

<sup>94</sup> Gilles Kepel, Interview, Al-Qaeda's New Front, by PBS Frontline, 26 September 2004. Internet article posted 25 Jan 2005, available from <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/front/interviews/kepel.html>, accessed 11 January 2007, 2. Gilles Kepel is a professor and chair of Middle East Studies at the Institute of Political Studies in Paris, and the author of *The War for Muslim Minds: Islam and the West*, and *Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam*. In this interview, he explains how Europe has evolved from a sanctuary for radical Islamists to a target. Kepel says that second and third-generation Muslims in Europe have felt discriminated against and that the message of the jihadists has stepped in to fill an identity vacuum.

<sup>95</sup> Ibid., 5-6.

<sup>96</sup> Ibid., 2.

<sup>97</sup> Livesey, 4.

<sup>98</sup> Cesari, 5.

<sup>99</sup> Geisser, 6.

<sup>100</sup> Dalrymple, 4-5.

<sup>101</sup> The Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) compiles the Muslim demographic estimates of various organizations. The estimates can be viewed at the Internet site <http://www.mcb.org.uk/library/statistics.php#4>.

<sup>102</sup> *Sala@m Website*, available from <http://www.salaam.co.uk/mosques/searchmosques.php>; Internet; accessed 3 February 2007. The Sala@m website is an Internet resource for Muslims in Britain.

<sup>103</sup> Elaine Sciolino and Stephen Grey, "British Terror Trial Traces a path to Militant Islam," *New York Times* Foreign Desk, Late Edition - Final, 26 November 2006, sec. 1, p. 1.

<sup>104</sup> Kepel Interview, 2.

<sup>105</sup> Dispatches.

<sup>106</sup> Lyall et al.

<sup>107</sup> Alan Cowell, "London Court Orders 5 Held in Plot to Kill British Soldier," *New York Times* Foreign Desk, Late Edition - Final, 10 February 2007, sec. A, p. 7. A recent example of this was the arrest of five British-born Muslims who allegedly planned to kidnap, torture and behead a British Muslim soldier because that individual had fought for Britain in Afghanistan.

<sup>108</sup> "Britain: Dark Days, Difficult Times; Terrorism," *The Economist*, 18 November 2006, 29.

<sup>109</sup> Christiane Amanpour, "The War Within," CNN Special Investigative Report television broadcast, 20 January 2007. This program focused on Muslim extremism in the United Kingdom. Transcript available from <http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0701/20/siu.02.html>; Internet: accessed 25 March 2007.

<sup>110</sup> British Government, "National Statistics, Labour Force Survey, Spring 2000," as reported by the Muslim Council of Britain, available from <http://www.mcb.org.uk/library/statistics.php#4>; Internet; accessed 19 January 2007.

<sup>111</sup> David Walker, "Study Reveals Jobs Plight of Muslims," *The Guardian*, 20 February 2002. "Muslim men of Pakistani and Bangladeshi origin are disproportionately unemployed compared to other Asians. Even after allowances for education and residential area, Pakistani Muslims are three times more likely to be jobless than Hindus are. Indian Muslims are twice as likely to be unemployed than Indian Hindus are." Article available from <http://www.guardian.co.uk/race/story/0,,657811,00.html>; Internet; accessed 19 January 2007.

<sup>112</sup> CNN Special Investigative Report: *The War Within*.

<sup>113</sup> "Britain: Dark Days, Difficult Times; Terrorism."

<sup>114</sup> During his trial, prosecutors handed to the jury more than 700 tapes with recordings of Abu Hamza's speeches, along with a 10-volume *Encyclopedia of Afghan Jihad* penned by the cleric. All the documents contained direct calls for the killing of non-Muslims.

<sup>115</sup> CNN Special Investigative Report: *The War Within*.

<sup>116</sup> Dispatches.

<sup>117</sup> *Sala @m Website*, available from <http://www.salaam.co.uk/charities/list.php>; Internet; accessed 3 February 2007.

<sup>118</sup> British Government Home Office, "Terrorism and the Law," available from <http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/security/terrorism-and-the-law/>; Internet; accessed 4 February 2007.

<sup>119</sup> British Government Home Office, "The Terrorism Act 2000," available from <http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/security/terrorism-and-the-law/terrorism-act/>.

<sup>120</sup> British Government Home Office, "The Anti-Terrorism, Crime, and Security Act of 2001," available from <http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/security/terrorism-and-the-law/anti-terrorism-crime-security-ac/>; Internet; accessed 4 February 2007.

<sup>121</sup> British Government Home Office, "The Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005," available from <http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/security/terrorism-and-the-law/prevention-of-terrorism/>; Internet; accessed 4 February 2007.

<sup>122</sup> British Government Home Office, "Terrorism Act 2006," available from <http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/security/terrorism-and-the-law/terrorism-act-2006/>; Internet; accessed 4 February 2007.

<sup>123</sup> Dispatches.

<sup>124</sup> U.S. State Department, Office of International Information Programs, "Muslim Life in America," available from <http://usinfo.state.gov/products/pubs/muslimlife/immigrat.htm>; Internet; accessed 24 January 2007. According to a report published by the Council on American-Islamic Relations, there appear to be approximately six million Muslims in the United States with about two million of these being attending services regular at more than 1,209 mosques (*masjids*) in the United States. See also Ishan Bagby, Paul M. Perl, and Bryan T. Froehle, *The Mosque in America: A National Portrait. A Report from the Mosque Study Project*, published by the Council on American-Islamic Relations, Washington D.C., 26 April, 2001.

<sup>125</sup> Al-Jazeera, "Snapshot of Muslims in America," available from <http://www.aljazeera.info/Special%20Reports/Different%20special%20reports/Snapshot%20of%20Moslims%20in%20America.htm>; Internet; accessed 24 January 2007. Al-Jazeera cites an unspecified 2002 study by Cornell University, Zogby polls, and U.S. census data from 2000.

<sup>126</sup> Ibid., "Snapshot of Muslims in America." According to data attributed to an unspecified 2001 study by Cornell University, 67% of Muslims have a bachelor's degree or higher, compared to 44% average. For advanced degrees, 37% Muslims have advanced degrees, compared to 9% U.S. average. One in ten Muslim households has a physician / medical doctor. According to the 2000 Census, the average U.S. income is \$42,158. Al-Jazeera again cites an unspecified 2002 Cornell study that found that 66% of Muslim households earn at least \$50,000, and 26% earn over \$100,000.

<sup>127</sup> The Council on American Islamic Relations (CAIR) is a Muslim civil liberties and advocacy group. According to CAIR's website, CAIR's stated goals are "enhancing understanding of Islam, promoting justice, and empowering American Muslims. CAIR took out a paid advertisement in the Washington Post condemning 9-11 and terrorism in all its forms. CAIR coordinated the release of a *fatwa* (religious pronouncement) that stated in part, "Islam strictly condemns religious extremism and the use of violence against innocent lives. There is no justification in Islam for extremism or terrorism. Targeting civilians' life and property through suicide bombings or any other method of attack is *haram* or forbidden - and those who commit these barbaric acts are criminals, not martyrs." Available from <http://www.cair.com/factsaboutcair.asp>; Internet; accessed 25 March 2007.

<sup>128</sup> According to Andrew Whitehead, founder of Anti-CAIR, many of CAIR's leaders have ties to terrorist organizations. His web site, which survived a legal challenge by CAIR, provides the following information. "Senior CAIR employee Randall Todd Royer, a/k/a "Ismail" Royer, pled guilty and was sentenced to twenty years in prison for participating in a network of militant jihadists centered in Northern Virginia. CAIR's Director of Community Relations, Bassem Khafagi, was arrested by the United States due to his ties with a terror-financing front group. Khafagi pled guilty to charges of visa and bank fraud, and agreed to be deported to Egypt. Rabih Haddad served as a CAIR Fundraiser. Haddad was co-founder of the Global Relief Foundation ("GRF"). GRF was designated by the US Treasury Department for financing the Al Qaida and other terrorist organizations and its assets were frozen by the US Government on December 14, 2001." This information is available from <http://www.anti-cair-net.org/>; Internet, accessed 24 January 2007.

<sup>129</sup> Evan McCormick, "A Bad Day for CAIR," *Frontpagemagazine.com*, 24 September 2003, available from <http://www.frontpagemag.com/Articles/Printable.asp?ID=9981>; Internet; accessed 15 January 2007. U.S. Senators Richard Durbin and Charles Schumer, during the September 2003 hearing of the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology and

Homeland Security, stated for the record that CAIR is “unusual in its extreme rhetoric, and its associations with extreme groups are suspect.” Further, “we know CAIR has ties to terrorism”, and “intimate links with Hamas.” “The hearing, titled “Two Years After 9/11: Connecting the Dots,” was focused on the prevalence of the radical Wahhabi Islamic sect among Muslim political groups in the U.S. In his opening statement, Chairman Jon Kyl said, “a small group of organizations based in the U.S. with Saudi backing and support, is well advanced in its four-decade effort to control Islam in America -from mosques, universities and community centers to our prisons and even within our military. Moderate Muslims who love America and want to be part of our great country are being forced out of those institutions.”

<sup>130</sup> Stephen Zunes, “U.S. Policy toward Political Islam,” *Foreign Policy in Focus* 6 (June 2001): 2, also available from <http://www.fpif.org/pdf/vol6/24politicalislam.pdf>; Internet; accessed 15 March 2007. “These.... extremist and violent movements are often rooted in legitimate grievances voiced by underrepresented and oppressed segments of the population, particularly the poor. The U.S. is increasingly identified with the political, social, and economic forces that are responsible for their misery. Many Muslims in the Middle East and elsewhere are exposed not to the positive aspects of U.S. society—such as individual liberty, the rule of law, and economic prosperity— but to the worst traits of American culture, including materialism, militarism, and racism.

<sup>131</sup> Paul Pillar, “Superpower Foreign Policies: A Source for Global Resentment,” in *The Making of a Terrorist: Volume III: Recruitment, Training, and Root Causes*, ed. James Forest (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2005), available from <http://psi.praeger.com/doc.aspx?d=/books/greenwood/C8546/C8546-13.xml>; Internet; accessed 26 March 2007.

<sup>132</sup> Jordan's Ambassador to the United Nations, His Royal Highness Crown Prince Zeid Ra'ad Zeid Al-Hussein, during an audience at the Jordanian embassy on 18 November 2006.

<sup>133</sup> Kepel Interview, 9.

<sup>134</sup> John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, “The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy,” *Middle East Policy* 13 (Fall 2006): 29-87. The authors are respected scholars from Harvard and Chicago University, and cite facts acknowledged openly in Israel, Arab countries, and the United States. The authors are “convinced that the United States will not be able to deal with the vexing problems in the Middle East if it cannot have a serious and candid discussion of the role of the Israel lobby.”

<sup>135</sup> Ruth Margolies Beitler, “The Complex Relationship between Global Terrorism and U.S. Support for Israel,” in Forest, available from <http://psi.praeger.com/doc.aspx?d=/books/greenwood/C8546/C8546-373.xml>; Internet; accessed 26 March 2007.

<sup>136</sup> His Royal Highness Crown Prince Zeid Ra'ad Zeid Al-Hussein.

<sup>137</sup> Zunes, 2. “Perhaps the most serious problem with U.S. policy has been Washington's support for repressive allied governments that suppress even moderate Islamic opposition groups. This often leads to a backlash against any U.S. presence by Islamists reacting to American support of what they perceive as an illegitimate government. The U.S. has rationalized its support for several regimes engaging in patterns of gross and systematic human rights violations as a regrettable but necessary means of suppressing an Islamic opposition that Washington fears would be even worse if it came to power.”



<sup>138</sup> Jurgensmeyer, 60-69.

<sup>139</sup> Ibid., 139-142. From the author's experience, U.S. Soldiers in Iraq in 2003 and 2004 knew to look for Al-Jazeera camera crews, who were often invited by insurgents to film bombings as they occurred and then broadcast images to the Muslim and Western world.

<sup>140</sup> Center for Religious Freedom, 1.

<sup>141</sup> In 1965 President Lyndon Johnson sponsored an immigration bill that made it possible for the first time since the early part of the 20th century for someone to enter the country regardless of his or her national origin. After 1965, immigration from Western Europe began to decline significantly, with a corresponding growth in the numbers of persons arriving from the Middle East and Asia. In this era more than half of the immigrants to America from these regions have been Muslim. Section 131 of the Immigration Act of 1990 (Pub. L. 101-649) grants 50,000 'Diversity Visas' a year. Of these for 2007, 18,848 were awarded to residents of 20 Muslim countries including Egypt, Iran, Syria, Sudan, and Algeria. "The visas have been apportioned among six geographic regions with a maximum of seven percent available to persons born in any single country. During the visa interview, principal applicants must provide proof of a high school education or its equivalent, or show two years of work experience in an occupation that requires at least two years of training or experience within the past five years." Available from [http://travel.state.gov/visa/immigrants/types/types\\_1317.html](http://travel.state.gov/visa/immigrants/types/types_1317.html); Internet; accessed 9 January 2007.

<sup>142</sup> Steven Boraz and Thomas Bruneau, "Are the Maras Overwhelming Governments in Central America?" *Military Review* 86 (November-December 2006): 40. End note 17 states "According to the Salvadoran Police, more than 2,500 MS-13 members from six Central American countries were arrested in and deported from the United States in 2005."

<sup>143</sup> Tony Paterson, "How Many More Women Have to Die Before this Society Wakes Up?" *London Daily Telegraph*, 27 February 2005, available from <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2005/02/27/wturk27.xml>; Internet; accessed 7 February 2007. Germany's acceptance of the Diversity philosophy led their government and police to turn a blind eye for many years to murders of Muslim women by their relatives. The Islamic custom of 'honor killings' finally received such public outcry in Germany that the police have finally begun to intrude into previously ignored behavior.

<sup>144</sup> Kate Connolly, "German Judge Invokes Qur'an to Deny Abused Wife a Divorce," *Guardian Unlimited*, 23 March 2007 [newspaper on-line]; available from <http://www.guardian.co.uk/germany/article/0,,2040982,00.html>; Internet; accessed 24 March 2007. In March 2007 a German judge cited the Qur'an and ruled against an abused Muslim woman filing for divorce. The judge, Christa Datz-Winter, said the German woman of Moroccan descent would not be granted a divorce because she and her husband came from a "Moroccan cultural environment in which it is not uncommon for a man to exert a right of corporal punishment over his wife," according to a statement she wrote that was issued by a Frankfurt court. "That's what the claimant had to reckon with when she married the defendant." The 26-year-old mother of two had been repeatedly beaten and threatened with death by her husband. The judge cited ruled that because the Koran allows husbands to beat their wives, the Muslim petitioner could not use beatings as grounds for a divorce.

<sup>145</sup> *USA Patriot Act of 2001 (Public Law 107-56)*, Library of Congress, available from <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d107:HR03162:@@D&summ2=m&>; Internet; accessed 24 January 2007.

<sup>146</sup> Briefing by Department of Homeland Security, New York Office, Immigration and Customs Enforcement agent, New York City, 18 November 2006.

<sup>147</sup> Patriot Act, Subtitle B. This also includes an alien who “represents groups that endorse terrorist acts, uses a position of prominence to persuade others to support an activity that undermines antiterrorist efforts, or has been associated with terrorist organizations and intends to engage in threatening activities while in the United States.”

<sup>148</sup> United States Attorney General, “The Attorney General’s Guidelines On General Crimes, Racketeering Enterprise And Terrorism Enterprise Investigations (Modified June 16, 2005),” available from <http://www.usdoj.gov/olp/generalcrimes2.pdf>; Internet; accessed 2 November 2006.

<sup>149</sup> As of 7 July 2006, 18 United States Code 2331 (5) defines domestic terrorism as activities that **(A)** involve acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State; **(B)** appear to be intended **(i)** to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; **(ii)** to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or **(iii)** to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and **(C)** occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. See [http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/18/usc\\_sec\\_18\\_00002331----000-.html](http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/18/usc_sec_18_00002331----000-.html) for an up-to-date reference on the U.S.C. Also, 18 U.S.C 2332b(g)(5)(B) specifies which acts that transcend international boundaries that the U.S. will prosecute. See [http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/18/usc\\_sec\\_18\\_00002332---b000-.html](http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/18/usc_sec_18_00002332---b000-.html).

<sup>150</sup> Cindy Carcamo and Vik Jolly, “FBI Says Muslims at UCI Aren’t Monitored,” *Orange County Register*, 6 June 2006, available from [http://www.ocregister.com/ocregister/news/homepage/article\\_1171489.php](http://www.ocregister.com/ocregister/news/homepage/article_1171489.php); Internet; accessed 25 March 2007. “Sabiha Khan, spokeswoman for the Council on American Islamic Relations in Anaheim, said ‘Thankfully with improved training of the FBI we hear less and less of the questions about what mosque (Muslims) went to or what imam they liked to listen to’.” Note that while the Attorney General’s Guidelines On General Crimes, Racketeering Enterprise And Terrorism Enterprise Investigations (Modified June 16, 2005) allows agents to monitor mosques or religious discussions in the course of a terrorism investigation, CAIR has provided ‘sensitivity training’ sessions, such as those referred to by Ms Sabiha Khan, for law enforcement officers that seeks to restrain use of the authorization. These training events have occurred in six states and at the FBI headquarters. See the CAIR website for a listing and description of CAIR’s work with the law enforcement community, available from <http://www.cair.com/default.asp?Page=CAIRsWork>; Internet; accessed 25 March 2007.

<sup>151</sup> According to the FBI, hate crimes directed at the U.S. government or the American population may be investigated by the FBI as acts of domestic terrorism. Incidents involving hate groups are also investigated as domestic terrorism. The FBI’s Civil Rights Program cannot investigate groups, only individuals. See <http://www.fbi.gov/hq/cid/civilrights/overview.htm>; Internet; accessed 9 January 2007.

<sup>152</sup> *Conspiracy Against Rights*. U.S. Code, vol. 18, sec 241 (1996), available from <http://miami.fbi.gov/hate.htm>; Internet; accessed 9 January 2007.

