



**FEMA**

September 10, 2012

Mr. Elmo E. Collins, Jr.  
Regional Administrator, U.S. NRC, Region IV  
611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 400  
Arlington, TX 76011-4005

Dear Mr. Collins:

Enclosed is a copy of the radiological emergency preparedness final report for the River Bend Station exercise evaluated on June 13, 2012. FEMA Region 6 staff evaluated the plume exposure pathway emergency planning zone (EPZ) around the River Bend Station located near St. Francisville, Louisiana. There were five Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCA) with three corrected during the exercise, and two Plan Issues identified during the exercise.

Based on the results of the exercise, the planning and preparedness for the State of Louisiana and affected local jurisdictions provide reasonable assurance that appropriate measures can be taken to protect public health and safety in the event of a radiological release. Therefore, 44 CFR Part 350 approval of the offsite radiological emergency response plans and preparedness for the State of Louisiana, specific to the River Bend Station, will remain in effect.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "George A. Robinson".

George A. Robinson  
Acting Regional Administrator

Enclosure

cc: NRC Headquarters Document Control Desk  
DHS/FEMA Headquarters - Vanessa Quinn, Renae Connell  
GOHSEP - Kevin Davis  
LDEQ - Tim Knight  
RBS - Dean Burnett



River Bend Station

# After Action Report/ Improvement Plan

Exercise Date - June 13, 2012

Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Program



**FEMA**

*Published September 06, 2012*

**Unclassified**

Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REP)

After Action Report/Improvement Plan

River Bend Station

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# River Bend Station After Action Report/Improvement Plan

*Published September 06, 2012*

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On June 13, 2012, a biennial Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Plume Exposure Pathway exercise was conducted around the River Bend Station (RBS), located near St. Francisville, Louisiana. Personnel from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security/Federal Emergency Management Agency (DHS/FEMA) Region VI, evaluated all activities. The purpose of the exercise was to assess the level of preparedness of local responders to react to a simulated radiological emergency at RBS. It was held in accordance with FEMA's policies and guidance concerning the implementation of state and local REP plans and procedures.

The previous exercise at this site was conducted on June 8, 2010. The first qualifying exercise to satisfy FEMA rule 44 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 350 requirements for Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensing to operate the facility was conducted in January 1985. Including the exercise on June 13, 2012, there have been sixteen DHS/FEMA Region VI evaluated exercises plus several drills conducted since then.

FEMA Region VI wishes to acknowledge the efforts of the many individuals in the State of Louisiana, West Feliciana, East Feliciana, Pointe Coupee, East Baton Rouge and West Baton Rouge Parishes who participated in this exercise. Protecting the public health and safety is the full-time job of some of the exercise participants and an additional assigned responsibility for others. Still others have willingly sought this responsibility by volunteering to provide vital emergency services to their communities. Cooperation and teamwork of all the participants was evident during this exercise.

This report includes the identification of any exercise issues and recommendations for corrective action where appropriate. All state and local organizations, except where noted in this report, demonstrated an adequate knowledge of the emergency response plans and procedures and properly implemented them. There were five Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCA) with three corrected during the exercise, and two Plan Issues identified during the exercise.

## **SECTION 1: EXERCISE OVERVIEW**

### **1.1 Exercise Details**

**Exercise Name**

River Bend Station

**Type of Exercise**

Plume

**Exercise Date**

June 13, 2012

**Program**

Department of Homeland Security/FEMA Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program

**Scenario Type**

Radiological Emergency

### **1.2 Exercise Planning Team Leadership**

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RAC Chair

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### **1.3 Participating Organizations**

Agencies and organizations of the following jurisdictions participated in the River Bend Station exercise:

#### State Jurisdictions

- Governor's Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness
- Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality
- Louisiana Air National Guard
- Louisiana Department of Agriculture and Forestry
- Louisiana Department of Children and Family Services
- Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries
- Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals - Office of Public Health
- Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development
- Louisiana Department of Corrections
- Louisiana State Fire Marshal
- Louisiana State Patrol Troop A
- Louisiana State University Police Department
- Louisiana State University
- Louisiana State University Agricultural Extension Service
- Department of Social Services

#### Risk Jurisdictions

East Baton Rouge Parish  
East Feliciana Parish  
Pointe Coupee Parish  
West Baton Rouge Parish  
West Feliciana Parish  
Baton Rouge Emergency Medical Services  
Baton Rouge Fire Department  
Baton Rouge Police Department  
Baton Rouge Health Services  
East Baton Rouge Coop Service  
East Baton Rouge Department of Child and Family Services  
East Baton Rouge Parish Department of Public Works  
East Baton Rouge Parish Human Resources  
East Baton Rouge Parish Mayor's Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness  
East Baton Rouge Parish Public Information Officer  
East Baton Rouge Parish Schools  
East Baton Rouge Parish Sheriff's Office  
Zachary Fire Department  
Northwestern Middle School  
East Feliciana Parish Council on Aging  
East Feliciana Parish Health Unit  
East Feliciana Parish Office of Family Support  
East Feliciana Parish Police Jury  
East Feliciana Parish School Board  
East Feliciana Parish Zoning Administration  
Jackson Volunteer Fire Department  
Pointe Coupee Parish Office of Homeland Security & Emergency Preparedness  
Pointe Coupee Parish Sheriff's Office  
Pointe Coupee School Board  
New Roads Fire Department  
First Student Bus Service  
False River Academy  
City of Port Allen

Port Allen Fire Department

Town of Brusly

West Baon Rouge Animal Control

West Baton Rouge Coroner's Office

West Baton Rouge Parks and Recreation

West Baton Rouge School Board

West Baton Rouge Sheriff's Office

Town of St. Francisville

St. Francisville Police Department.

West Feliciana Parish Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness

West Feliciana Parish Emergency Medical Services

West Feliciana Parish Fire Department

West Feliciana Parish Police Jury

West Feliciana Parish Sheriff's Office

West Feliciana Parish School Board

West Feliciana Hospital

West Feliciana Parish Citizens' Corps

West Feliciana Parish Department of Transportation

Private Organizations

American Red Cross

WJBO Radio Station

Baton Rouge River Center

River Bend Station

Federal Jurisdictions

US Department of Homeland Security - Office of Infrastructure Protection

## **SECTION 2: EXERCISE DESIGN SUMMARY**

### **2.1 Exercise Purpose and Design**

The DHS/FEMA Region VI Office evaluated the exercise on June 13, 2012 to assess the capabilities of local emergency preparedness organizations in implementing their Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Procedures to protect the public health and safety during a radiological emergency involving River Bend Station (RBS). The purpose of this report is to represent the results and findings on the performance of the offsite response organizations during a simulated radiological emergency.

### **2.2 Exercise Objectives, Capabilities and Activities**

Exercise objectives and identified Capabilities/REP Criteria selected to be exercised are discussed in the Exercise Plan (EXPLAN), Appendix E.

### **2.3 Scenario Summary**

The exercise scenario was developed to evaluate the response of exercise participants to an incident requiring evacuation of the public from the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone surrounding the River Bend Station (RBS). The exercise scenario provided for the evaluation of the State of Louisiana, Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality, East and West Baton Rouge, East and West Feliciana, and Pointe Coupee Parishes to conduct evacuations of the public.

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## **SECTION 3: ANALYSIS OF CAPABILITIES**

### **3.1 Exercise Evaluation and Results**

Contained in this section are the results and findings of the evaluation of all jurisdictions and functional entities that participated in the June 13, 2012 exercise to test the offsite emergency response capabilities of state and local governments in the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone surrounding the River Bend Station.

Each jurisdiction and functional entity was evaluated on the basis of its demonstration of criteria delineated in the exercise evaluation areas as outlined in the April 25, 2012, Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program Manual. Detailed information on the exercise evaluation area criteria and the extent of play agreement used in this exercise are found in Appendix E of this report.

### **3.2 Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation**

The matrix presented in Table 3.1, on the following page, presents the status of all exercise evaluation area criteria that were scheduled for demonstration during this exercise by all participating jurisdictions and functional entities. Exercise criteria are listed by number and the demonstration status is indicated by the use of the following letters:

M - Met (No Deficiency or ARCAs assessed and no unresolved ARCAs from prior exercises)

D - Deficiency assessed

A - ARCA(s) assessed or unresolved ARCA(s) from prior exercise(s)

P - Plan Issue

N - Not Demonstrated

Table 3.1 - Summary of Exercise Evaluation (2 pages)

DATE: 2012-06-13 SITE: River Bend Station, LA  M: Met, A: ARCA, D: Deficiency, P: Plan Issue, N: Not Demonstrated													
			GOHSEP EOC	LDEQ HQ	LDEQ EOF	LDEQ FMT 1	LDEQ FMT 2	RB Alt. JIC	E. Baton Rouge Parish	LSU RC	E. Feliciana Parish	Jackson FD M&D	
<b>Emergency Operations Management</b>													
Mobilization	1a1	M	M	M				M	M			M	
Facilities	1b1												
Direction and Control	1c1	M	M	M					M			M	
Communications Equipment	1d1	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M			M	
Equipment and Supplies	1e1	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
<b>Protective Action Decision Making</b>													
EW Exp. Control Decisions	2a1	M		M					M			M	
PARs	2b1	M		M									
PADs	2b2	M							M			M	
PADs for Disabled/Functional Needs	2c1								M			M	
Ingestion PADs	2d1												
RRR Decisions	2e1												
<b>Protective Action Implementation</b>													
EW Exp. Control Implementation	3a1			M	M	M			M	M	M	M	M
KI Public/Institutionalized	3b1								M			M	
PAD Imp. Disabled/Functional Needs	3c1												
PAD Imp. Schools	3c2												
TACP Establishment	3d1								M			M	
Impediments to Evacuation	3d2								M			M	
Implementation of Ingestion PADs	3e1												
Ingestion Strategies and Information	3e2												
Imp. of RRR Decisions	3f1												
<b>Field Measurement and Analysis</b>													
RESERVED	4a1												
Field Team Management	4a2			M									
Field Team Operations	4a3				M	M							
Field Team Sampling	4b1												
Laboratory Operations	4c1												
<b>Emergency Notification and Public Info</b>													
Initial Alert & Notification	5a1	P							M			M	
Backup Alert & Notification	5a3												
Exception Area Alerting	5a4								M				
Subsequent Public Information	5b1	M						A	M			M	
<b>Support Operations/Facilities</b>													
Reception Center Operations	6a1									M			
EW Monitoring & Decon	6b1												P
Congregate Care	6c1									M			
Contaminated Injured Transport & Care	6d1												

Table 3.1 - Summary of Exercise Evaluation (Continued. page 2/2)

		Pointe Coupee Parish	PCPSD	W. Baton Rouge Parish	W. Feliciana Parish	WFPSD	EAS Station WJBO
DATE: 2012-06-13 SITE: River Bend Station, LA  M: Met, A: ARCA, D: Deficiency, P: Plan Issue, N: Not Demonstrated							
<b>Emergency Operations Management</b>							
Mobilization	1a1	M		M	M		
Facilities	1b1						
Direction and Control	1c1	M		M	M		
Communications Equipment	1d1	M		M	M		
Equipment and Supplies	1e1	M		M	M		
<b>Protective Action Decision Making</b>							
EW Exp. Control Decisions	2a1	M		M	M		
PARs	2b1						
PADs	2b2	M		M	M		
PADs for Disabled/Functional Needs	2c1	M		M	M		
Ingestion PADs	2d1						
RRR Decisions	2e1						
<b>Protective Action Implementation</b>							
EW Exp. Control Implementation	3a1	M	M	M	M	M	
KI Public/Institutionalized	3b1	M		M	M		
PAD Imp. Disabled/Functional Needs	3c1						
PAD Imp. Schools	3c2		M			M	
TACP Establishment	3d1	M		M	M		
Impediments to Evacuation	3d2	M		M	M		
Implementation of Ingestion PADs	3e1						
Ingestion Strategies and Information	3e2						
Imp. of RRR Decisions	3f1						
<b>Field Measurement and Analysis</b>							
RESERVED	4a1						
Field Team Management	4a2						
Field Team Operations	4a3						
Field Team Sampling	4b1						
Laboratory Operations	4c1						
<b>Emergency Notification and Public Info</b>							
Initial Alert & Notification	5a1	M		M	M		M
Backup Alert & Notification	5a3						
Exception Area Alerting	5a4						
Subsequent Public Information	5b1	M		M	A		
<b>Support Operations/Facilities</b>							
Reception Center Operations	6a1						
EW Monitoring & Decon	6b1						
Congregate Care	6c1						
Contaminated Injured Transport & Care	6d1						

## 3.3 Criteria Evaluation Summaries

### 3.3.1 Louisiana Jurisdictions

#### 3.3.1.1 Louisiana Emergency Operations Center

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.a.1, 2.b.1, 2.b.2, 5.b.1.
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: 5.a.1.

ISSUE NO.: 53-12-5a1-P-01

**CRITERION:** Activities associated with primary alerting and notification of the public are completed in a timely manner following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. The initial instructional message to the public must include as a minimum the elements required by current REP guidance.

**CONDITION:** Scripted Emergency Alert System (EAS) messages supplied by River Bend Station do not fully meet the requirements for an EAS Message.

**POSSIBLE CAUSE:** Several required and key elements were omitted in the EAS message design, such as area codes for phone numbers (for transient populations) and the final statement asking them to stay tuned for more information and future developments.

**REFERENCE:** NUREG Criterion E.7

**EFFECT:** The current omissions could cause confusion and result in people not being aware of the right phone numbers for getting information and help, and that more information for their safety could be forthcoming that they should stay tuned for.

**RECOMMENDATION:** All of the pre-scripted EAS messages assigned to the



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published scenarios supplied by River Bend Station should be reviewed and amended to insure full compliance with the required elements for an EAS message.

- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

### **3.3.1.2 Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality Headquarters**

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1.
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

### **3.3.1.3 Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality EOF**

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.a.1, 2.b.1, 3.a.1, 4.a.2.
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

### **3.3.1.4 Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality Field Monitoring Team One**

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 4.a.3.
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None

- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

### **3.3.1.5 Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality Field Monitoring Team Two**

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 4.a.3.
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

### **3.3.1.6 River Bend Alternate Joint Information Center**

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1.
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: 5.b.1.

ISSUE NO.: 53-12-5b1-A-07

CRITERION: OROs provide accurate emergency information and instructions to the public and news media in a timely manner.

CONDITION: The West Feliciana Parish Spokesperson published a protective action decision to evacuate Protective Action Sections (PAS) 1, 7, and 8 in a press release at the Site Area Emergency (SAE). During the second news conference, the West Feliciana spokesperson briefed the media that PAS 1 and 7 were to evacuate. The Protective Action Decision from the All Call with the utility, State and Parishes was to evacuate West Feliciana PAS 1, 3, and 4 and shelter-in-place PAS 7. During the third news conference, the spokesperson briefed the media that members of the public in PAS 1, 3, and 7 should evacuate. In the final news conference, all evacuation and shelter-in-place protective action sections were correctly clarified.

**POSSIBLE CAUSE:** The dissemination of incorrect evacuation and shelter-in-place subareas was primarily due to the lack of written procedures directing the Public Information Officers (PIOs) to verify the information with their respective Emergency Operation Centers (EOCs). In addition, there was minimal or no collaboration among the Offsite Response Organization (ORO) PIOs on information going out to the public. Nor was a log of all incoming and outgoing messages kept among the ORO PIOs.

**REFERENCE:** NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, E.5, 7; G.3.a, G.4.a, c

**EFFECT:** Conflicting information or inadequate information released to the public would cause confusion on whether to evacuate or shelter-in-place leading to a potential risk to their health and safety. In addition, members of the public could have overwhelmed the public inquiry and 911 telephone lines.

**RECOMMENDATION:** It is recommended that detailed procedures be developed for the ORO PIOs. The following processes should be outlined in such procedures:

- How to develop press releases including an approval process. This will ensure that the correct protective action information is released.
- How press releases and other ORO news will be shared with the entire AJIC, whether it be formal JIC/AJIC briefings or a common log of message traffic from all the OROs. This will help all OROs see the entire response as well as monitor any information distributed to the public.

- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

### 3.3.1.7 Louisiana State University Field House Reception Center

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 6.a.1, 6.c.1.
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: 1.e.1, 6.a.1.

ISSUE NO.: 53-12-1e1-A-02

CRITERION: Equipment, maps, displays, dosimetry, KI, and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations.

CONDITION: Emergency Workers did not successfully demonstrate an operations check on the survey meter.

POSSIBLE CAUSE: Procedures were not followed.

REFERENCE: NUREG-0654,H.7,10; J.10.a, b, e, J.11; K.3.a

EFFECT: The survey meter was not validated to be operating correctly and could have resulted in false or inaccurate readings while performing monitoring.

CORRECTIVE ACTION DEMONSTRATED: Training was provided by the controller and successful re-demonstration of the operations check against the range of readings sticker with the Cesium source was performed.

ISSUE NO.: 53-12-6a1-A-03

CRITERION: The reception center facility has appropriate space, adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide monitoring, decontamination, and registration of evacuees.

CONDITION: The evacuee had contamination on his hands when he arrived at the Monitoring and Decontamination Station. The Emergency Workers (EW) briefed him on the process and asked him to wash his hands with soap and water. The EW

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monitored his hands and (by inject) he still had contamination on his right hand. The evacuee was instructed to wash his hands a second time. The EW only monitored his right hand and it was found to be free of contamination. The evacuee was instructed to proceed to the registration area, without having his left hand monitored even though he rubbed both hands together when washing.

POSSIBLE CAUSE: Lack of training.

REFERENCE: NUREG-0654, J.12

EFFECT: The evacuee could have potentially spread contamination to the staff and other evacuees in the registration area.

CORRECTIVE ACTION DEMONSTRATED: Play was stopped and emergency workers (EWs) received some training on thorough monitoring procedures. The EWs re-monitored the evacuee's hands, confirming that they were both free of contamination. EWs were able to successfully demonstrate the importance of a thorough monitoring practice.

- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

### **3.3.2 Risk Jurisdictions**

#### **3.3.2.1 East Baton Rouge Parish Emergency Operations Center and Traffic/Access Control Point**

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.a.1, 2.b.2, 2.c.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 5.a.1, 5.a.4, 5.b.1.
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None

- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

### **3.3.2.2 East Feliciana Parish Emergency Operations Center and Traffic/Access Control Point**

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.a.1, 2.b.2, 2.c.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 5.a.1, 5.b.1.
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

### **3.3.2.3 Pointe Coupee Parish Emergency Operations Center and Traffic/Access Control Point**

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.a.1, 2.b.2, 2.c.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 5.a.1, 5.b.1.
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

### **3.3.2.4 Point Coupee Parish School District**

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 3.a.1, 3.c.2.
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None

- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

### **3.3.2.5 West Baton Rouge Parish Emergency Operations Center and Traffic/Access Control Point**

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.a.1, 2.b.2, 2.c.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 5.a.1, 5.b.1.
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

### **3.3.2.6 West Feliciana Parish Emergency Operations Center and Traffic/Access Control Point**

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, 1.e.1, 2.a.1, 2.b.2, 2.c.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.d.1, 3.d.2, 5.a.1.
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: 5.b.1.

ISSUE NO.: 53-12-5b1-A-06

CRITERION: OROs provide accurate emergency information and instructions to the public and news media in a timely manner.

CONDITION: The Public Information criterion was not satisfactorily demonstrated at the West Feliciana Parish Emergency Operations Center. Errors in information flow led to the erroneous announcement of an evacuation recommendation to members of the public in a protective action section (#7) that did not need to evacuate.

POSSIBLE CAUSE: Several possible causes:

Procedural inadequacy - the Public Information Officer procedure does not require written preparation of items for news releases nor does it require written approval by the Parish Police Jury President, the Mayor or the Emergency Director. All information to the Parish Spokesperson for entry into News Releases is transmitted orally over the telephone.

Inadequate Training - The Parish Public Information Officer indicated that she was unfamiliar with her responsibilities and that she had not participated in this position prior to the exercise.

Inadequate Management Oversight - The Parish response leadership did not review the final version of the news release as faxed back to the Parish Emergency Operations Center. Consequently, they did not correct the protective action error for two hours (1140 to 1350).

REFERENCE: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1 Planning Standard E.7.

EFFECT: Erroneous information could lead to confusion and distrust among the general public. Members of the public following the information in the news release (#2) would lead to the unnecessary evacuation of the members of the public in PAS #7 and would have placed them at greater risk than following the information in the Emergency Alert System (EAS), which instructed members of the public in PAS #7 to shelter in place. Also, the extended time (over two hours later) needed to correct the erroneous information could have compounded the confusion.

RECOMMENDATION: Several Recommended Actions:

Revise the Public Information Officer procedure by requiring the written preparation of items for Parish news releases and the written approval of the final versions of news releases by Parish response leadership prior to their release.

Provide additional training of Parish Public Information Officers and Parish Spokespersons to stress the need for the release of accurate and approved information.



Provide additional training of Parish response leadership positions to stress the need for careful review and approval of draft news releases prior to their release.

- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

### **3.3.2.7 West Feliciana Parish School District**

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 3.a.1, 3.c.2.
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

### **3.3.3 Support Jurisdictions**

#### **3.3.3.1 Jackson Fire Department Monitoring and Decontamination**

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 1.e.1, 3.a.1.
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: 1.e.1.

ISSUE NO.: 53-12-1e1-A-04

CRITERION: Equipment, maps, displays, dosimetry, KI, and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations.

CONDITION: Personnel were unfamiliar with the proper method for conducting a response source check to verify the correct range of readings when checking the

survey meters with the provided source.

POSSIBLE CAUSE: Lack of experience/training with the survey meters.

REFERENCE: NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1 H.10

EFFECT: The inability to complete a proper source/response check could result in the use of a survey meter that was not working correctly.

CORRECTIVE ACTION DEMONSTRATED: The controller stopped the drill, conducted training on how to conduct a response/source check and each of the monitoring locations re-demonstrated the proper method for completing the response/source check prior to resuming the drill.

- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: 6.b.1.

ISSUE NO.: 53-12-6b1-P-05

CRITERION: The facility/ORO has adequate procedures and resources to accomplish monitoring and decontamination of emergency workers and their equipment and vehicles.

CONDITION: A simulated contaminated Emergency Worker (EW) was placed in plastic shoe covers prior to exiting the EW vehicle. The EW was then escorted to the initial monitoring location where a whole body survey was completed, however, the worker's shoes were surveyed through the plastic shoe covers. The worker then proceeded to the decontamination area and exited the decontamination area, removing the shoe covers in the process of exiting. The only survey completed on the shoes was through the plastic shoe cover.

POSSIBLE CAUSE: The procedure in use requires the worker to be placed in plastic shoe covers as they exit the vehicle. There was no point in the process where the EW was required to remove the covers to complete a survey of their shoes.

REFERENCE: NUREG-0654/FEMA -REP-1 K.5.a, b.

EFFECT: Low levels of contamination could be shielded by the plastic shoe covers and contamination on the worker's shoes may have gone undetected in the process.

RECOMMENDATION: Revise the procedure to require a survey of the worker's shoes prior to exiting the vehicle, place the worker in shoe covers only when contamination was detected during this survey. Any worker that then enters the decontamination center with shoe covers on should be considered to have contamination on their shoes and they should be processed accordingly.

- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

### **3.3.4 Private Organizations**

#### **3.3.4.1 EAS Radio Station WJBO**

In summary, the status of DHS/FEMA criteria for this location is as follows:

- a. MET: 5.a.1.
- b. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: None
- c. DEFICIENCY: None
- d. PLAN ISSUES: None
- e. NOT DEMONSTRATED: None
- f. PRIOR ISSUES - RESOLVED: None
- g. PRIOR ISSUES - UNRESOLVED: None

## **SECTION 4: CONCLUSION**

Based on the results of the exercise, the offsite radiological emergency response plans and preparedness for the State of Louisiana and the affected local jurisdiction are deemed adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate measures can be taken to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency. Therefore, 44 CFR Part 350 approval of the offsite radiological emergency response plans and preparedness for the State of Louisiana site-specific to River Bend Station will remain in effect.

## APPENDIX A: IMPROVEMENT PLAN

<b>Issue Number: 53-12-6b1-P-05</b>		<b>Criterion: 6b1</b>	
<p><b>ISSUE:</b> A simulated contaminated Emergency Worker (EW) was placed in plastic shoe covers prior to exiting the EW vehicle. The EW was then escorted to the initial monitoring location where a whole body survey was completed, however, the worker's shoes were surveyed through the plastic shoe covers. The worker then proceeded to the decontamination area and exited the decontamination area, removing the shoe covers in the process of exiting. The only survey completed on the shoes was through the plastic shoe cover.</p>			
<p><b>RECOMMENDATION:</b> Revise the procedure to require a survey of the worker's shoes prior to exiting the vehicle, place the worker in shoe covers only when contamination was detected during this survey. Any worker that then enters the decontamination center with shoe covers on should be considered to have contamination on their shoes and they should be processed accordingly.</p>			
<p><b>CORRECTIVE ACTION DESCRIPTION:</b></p>			
<b>CAPABILITY:</b>		<b>PRIMARY RESPONSIBLE AGENCY:</b>	
<b>CAPABILITY ELEMENT:</b>		<b>START DATE:</b>	
<b>AGENCY POC:</b>		<b>ESTIMATED COMPLETION DATE:</b>	

<b>Issue Number: 53-12-5a1-P-01</b>		<b>Criterion: 5a1</b>	
<p><b>ISSUE:</b> Scripted Emergency Alert System (EAS) messages supplied by River Bend Station do not fully meet the requirements for an EAS Message.</p>			
<p><b>RECOMMENDATION:</b> All of the pre-scripted EAS messages assigned to the published scenarios supplied by River Bend Station should be reviewed and amended to insure full compliance with the required elements for an EAS message.</p>			
<p><b>CORRECTIVE ACTION DESCRIPTION:</b></p>			
<b>CAPABILITY:</b>		<b>PRIMARY RESPONSIBLE AGENCY:</b>	
<b>CAPABILITY ELEMENT:</b>		<b>START DATE:</b>	
<b>AGENCY POC:</b>		<b>ESTIMATED COMPLETION DATE:</b>	

**Issue Number: 53-12-5b1-A-07** **Criterion: 5b1**

**ISSUE:** The West Feliciana Parish Spokesperson published a protective action decision to evacuate Protective Action Sections (PAS) 1, 7, and 8 in a press release at the Site Area Emergency (SAE). During the second news conference, the West Feliciana spokesperson briefed the media that PAS 1 and 7 were to evacuate. The Protective Action Decision from the All Call with the utility, State and Parishes was to evacuate West Feliciana PAS 1, 3, and 4 and shelter-in-place PAS 7. During the third news conference, the spokesperson briefed the media that members of the public in PAS 1, 3, and 7 should evacuate. In the final news conference, all evacuation and shelter-in-place protective action sections were correctly clarified.

**RECOMMENDATION:** It is recommended that detailed procedures be developed for the ORO PIOs. The following processes should be outlined in such procedures:

- How to develop press releases including an approval process. This will ensure that the correct protective action information is released.
- How press releases and other ORO news will be shared with the entire AJIC, whether it be formal JIC/AJIC briefings or a common log of message traffic from all the OROs. This will help all OROs see the entire response as well as monitor any information distributed to the public.

**CORRECTIVE ACTION DESCRIPTION:**

<b>CAPABILITY:</b>	<b>PRIMARY RESPONSIBLE AGENCY:</b>
<b>CAPABILITY ELEMENT:</b>	<b>START DATE:</b>
<b>AGENCY POC:</b>	<b>ESTIMATED COMPLETION DATE:</b>

**Issue Number: 53-12-5b1-A-06** **Criterion: 5b1**

**ISSUE:** The Public Information criterion was not satisfactorily demonstrated at the West Feliciana Parish Emergency Operations Center. Errors in information flow led to the erroneous announcement of an evacuation recommendation to members of the public in a protective action section (#7) that did not need to evacuate.

**RECOMMENDATION:** Several Recommended Actions:

Revise the Public Information Officer procedure by requiring the written preparation of items for Parish news releases and the written approval of the final versions of news releases by Parish response leadership prior to their release.

Provide additional training of Parish Public Information Officers and Parish Spokespersons to stress the need for the release of accurate and approved information.

Provide additional training of Parish response leadership positions to stress the need for careful review and approval of draft news releases prior to their release.

**CORRECTIVE ACTION DESCRIPTION:**

<b>CAPABILITY:</b>	<b>PRIMARY RESPONSIBLE AGENCY:</b>
<b>CAPABILITY ELEMENT:</b>	<b>START DATE:</b>
<b>AGENCY POC:</b>	<b>ESTIMATED COMPLETION DATE:</b>

## APPENDIX B: EXERCISE TIMELINE

Table 1 presents the times at which key events and activities occurred during the River Bend Station (RBS) exercise on June 13, 2012.

Table 1 - Exercise Timeline  
DATE: 2012-06-13, SITE: River Bend Station, LA

Emergency Classification Level or Event	Time Utility Declared	GOHSEP EOC	LDEQ HQ	LDEQ EOF	RB Alt. JIC	E. Baton Rouge Parish	E. Feliciana Parish
Unusual Event	0825	0838	0840	0837		0838	0837
Alert	0913	0925	0925	0925		0924	0924
Site Area Emergency	1054	1103		1055	1056	1101	1100
General Emergency	1149	1159		1149	1149	1156	1156
Simulated Rad. Release Started	1045			1059	1149	1101	1100
Simulated Rad. Release Terminated							
Facility Declared Operational		0934		1047	0956	0903	0845
Declaration of State of Emergency		1115				1233	1100
Exercise Terminated		1529		1525	1445	1530	1340
Early Precautionary Actions:							
1st Protective Action Decision:						1208	1205
1st Siren Activation		1220					
1st EAS or EBS Message		1224					
2nd Protective Action Decision:							
2nd Siren Activation							
2nd EAS or EBS Message							
3rd Protective Action Decision:							
3rd Siren Activation							
3rd EAS or EBS Message							
4th Protective Action Decision:							
4th Siren Activation							
4th EAS or EBS Message							
5th Protective Action Decision:							
5th Siren Activation							
5th EAS or EBS Message							
6th Protective Action Decision:							
6th Siren Activation							
6th EAS or EBS Message							
KI Administration Decision:							

**Table 1 - Exercise Timeline**  
**DATE: 2012-06-13, SITE: River Bend Station, LA**

Emergency Classification Level or Event	Time Utility Declared	Pointe Coupee Parish	W. Baton Rouge Parish	W. Feliciana Parish
Unusual Event	0825	0844	0838	0837
Alert	0913	0925	0924	0924
Site Area Emergency	1054	1102	1100	1100
General Emergency	1149	1157	1156	1157
Simulated Rad. Release Started	1045	1054	1100	1100
Simulated Rad. Release Terminated			1527	
Facility Declared Operational		0924	1038	1006
Declaration of State of Emergency		1102	1130	1025
Exercise Terminated		1526		1526
Early Precautionary Actions:				1029
1st Protective Action Decision:		1220	1220	1205
1st Siren Activation				
1st EAS or EBS Message				
2nd Protective Action Decision:				
2nd Siren Activation				
2nd EAS or EBS Message				
3rd Protective Action Decision:				
3rd Siren Activation				
3rd EAS or EBS Message				
4th Protective Action Decision:				
4th Siren Activation				
4th EAS or EBS Message				
5th Protective Action Decision:				
5th Siren Activation				
5th EAS or EBS Message				
6th Protective Action Decision:				
6th Siren Activation				
6th EAS or EBS Message				
KI Administration Decision:				



## APPENDIX C: EXERCISE EVALUATORS AND TEAM LEADERS

DATE: 2012-06-13, SITE: River Bend Station, LA

LOCATION	EVALUATOR	AGENCY
Louisiana Emergency Operations Center	David Jeremy *Bill Webb	FEMA HQ FEMA RX
Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality Headquarters	David Jeremy	FEMA HQ
Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality EOF	*Nan Calhoun Marcy Campbell	FEMA RVI ICFI
Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality Field Monitoring Team One	*Scott Flowerday	FEMA RVI
Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality Field Monitoring Team Two	Dennis Wilford	ICFI
River Bend Alternate Joint Information Center	*Bill Bischof Cara Christianson-Riley Meg Swearingen	FEMA RVI FEMA RVII ICFI
Louisiana State University Field House Reception Center	Brad DeKorte *Elsa Lopez Meg Swearingen Dennis Wilford	FEMA RVI FEMA RVI ICFI ICFI
East Baton Rouge Parish Emergency Operations Center and Traffic/Access Control Point	*Brad DeKorte Rebecca Fontenot Thomas Hegele Cheryl Weaver	FEMA RVI FEMA HQ ICFI ICF
East Feliciana Parish Emergency Operations Center and Traffic/Access Control Point	*Paul Anderson James Greer	FEMA RIX ICFI
Pointe Coupee Parish Emergency Operations Center and Traffic/Access Control Point	*Linda Gee Alberto Sifuentes David White	FEMA RVI FEMA RIX ICFI
Point Coupee Parish School District	David White	ICFI
West Baton Rouge Parish Emergency Operations Center and Traffic/Access Control Point	*Elsa Lopez Paul Ringheiser	FEMA RVI ICFI
West Feliciana Parish Emergency Operations Center and Traffic/Access Control Point	Thomas Hegele Elena Joyner *William Maier	ICFI FEMA RIX NRC
West Feliciana Parish School District	Elena Joyner	FEMA RIX
Jackson Fire Department Monitoring and Decontamination	Nan Calhoun *Scott Flowerday Linda Gee	FEMA RVI FEMA RVI FEMA RVI
EAS Radio Station WJBO	*Timothy Pflieger	FEMA RVI
* Team Leader		

## APPENDIX D: ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

Acronym	Meaning
AAC	Accident Assessment Coordinator
AJIC	Alternate Joint Information Center
ARC	American Red Cross
ARCA	Areas Requiring Corrective Action
CDE	Committed Dose Equivalent
CO	Communications Officer
DAC	Dose Assessment Coordinator
DC	Detention Center
DRD	Direct Reading Dosimeter
EAS	Emergency Alert System
EBRP	East Baton Rouge Parish
ECL	Emergency Classification Level
ED	Emergency Director
EFP	East Feliciana Parish
EID	EOC Information Database
EOC	Emergency Operations Center
EOF	Emergency Operations Facility
EPA	Environmental Protection Agency
EPZ	Emergency Planning Zone
ESD	Emergency Services Director
EW	Emergency Worker
FTC	Field Team Coordinator
GE	General Emergency
GOHSEP	Governor's Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness
GPS	Global Positioning System
HOO	Headquarter Operations Officer
HQ	Headquarters
JIC	Joint Information Center
KI	Potassium Iodide
LDEQ	Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality
LPRRP	Louisiana Peacetime Radiological Response Plan
LSEOC	Louisiana State Emergency Operations Center
LSU	Louisiana State University
NRC	Nuclear Regulatory Commission

OSL	Optically Stimulated Luminescent
PAD	Protective Action Decision
PAG	Protective Action Guide
PAR	Protective Action Recommendation
PAS	Protective Action Section
PCP	Pointe Coupee Parish
PIO	Public Information Officer
PJP	Police Jury President
RADEF	Radiological Defense
RBS	River Bend Station
REDAM	Radiological Emergency Dose Assessment Model
REP	Radiological Emergency Preparedness
SAE	Site Area Emergency
SAV	Staff Assistance Visit
SEOC	State Emergency Operations Center
SPOC	Single Point of Contact
T/ACP	Traffic and Access Control Points
TEDE	Total Effective Dose Equivalent
TLD	Thermoluminescent Dosimeter
UE	Unusual Event
US	United States
VHF	Very High Frequency
WBRP	West Baton Rouge Parish
WFP	West Feliciana Parish

## **APPENDIX E: EXERCISE PLAN**

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**STATE OF LOUISIANA**  
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**SCENARIO NARRATIVE**

**The scenario has been prepared to test the effectiveness of the emergency response organization (ERO) and functions of the RBS Emergency Plan, implementing procedures, facilities, and equipment. Some events that occur during this drill are unrealistic and may not be strictly in accordance with the design basis of the Facility.**

**Summary**

The scenario starts at 0800 in a Division III work week. At approximately 0802, the crew will receive a call that power has been lost to the Training Center. The Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) wing of the Training Center is currently on backup power. Transmission and distribution personnel will be requested to investigate and make repairs. It will be determined that a tree has fallen on the transmission lines from Grant Substation.

A report will be received from the field (RP) that the Vertical Cask Transporter (crawler) is on its side in the drainage ditch north of the Security Owner Controlled Area (SOCA). The road shoulder gave way under the crawler's weight. The Operations Support Manager (OSM) will consult the Emergency Action Levels (EAL) and the crew will dispatch an Senior Nuclear Equipment Operator (SNEO) to the area to investigate. Initial reports are that no one was injured in the incident. The crawler and its fuel cask are on its side in the ditch. Dose rates are slightly elevated; however a complete radiological survey is not possible as the crawler and cask are partially submerged in mud and water. The Shift Manager will review the status of the MPC confinement boundary and declare a Notice of Unusual Event (NOUE) on E-HU1-1. Offsite notifications will be made and the Emergency Response Organization (ERO) will be notified on the event. Assistance will be requested by the Duty Manager.

At 0850, a rise in level indication will be received for the Low Pressure Coolant System (LPCS) pump room floor sump. The crew will dispatch an operator to the area to investigate. The operator will report a LPCS suction line break inside the pump room between the wall and the LPCS pump / Line Fill Pump (LFP) suction line. Several inches (2-3) of water are on the floor and water is spraying on the LFP motor. The Div I line fill pump will trip and header low pressure alarms will be received. The operator will report that the isolation valve can not be closed manually. At 0859, the Shift Manager (Emergency Director) will review the status of the LPCS and Residual Heat Removal (RHR) A to determine that the uncontrolled flooding has resulted in a degraded LPCS safety system. Conditions for an ALERT, HA6-5 exist. Offsite notifications will be made and the ERO will be activated. The crew will dispatch an operator to rack out the LPCS and RHR A pump breakers. The LPCS suction valve will be closed and the leak will be secured.

The Technical Support Center (TSC) and Operations Support Center (OSC) will man with minimum staffing and operability will be established within 45 minutes of the Alert declaration time. EOF personnel will find that the Training Center has lost power and the EOF is being powered by an alternate power source. The EOF will become operational and the Emergency Director will assume command and control functions. The Joint Information Center (JIC) will locate to its alternate location in Baton Rouge. 34

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At 1035, the reactor will scram. However, all rods will not be inserted either automatically or through manual methods. Reactor power will be below 5%. This low power transient will cause increased damage to the fuel. The main steam line isolation valves (MSIVs) will close and reactor pressure control will be through the use of safety relief valves (SRVs). The feedwater system and reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) will be available as makeup sources for the vessel. A steam leak will develop in the drywell downstream of SRV B21-F051D. Drywell pressure, temperature, and radiation levels will rise indicating a leak. The SRV will remain partially open and initial closure attempts will be unsuccessful. Eventually, a drywell differential pressure of 1.68 psid will be reached. Drywell to containment bypass leakage will occur resulting in an increase in containment pressure and radiation levels. A plant announcement will be made to evacuate containment.

The TSC will receive a report that a security officer failed to properly secure the outer airlock door while exiting containment through the Auxiliary Building 171' airlock. The seals of the inner door will fail before the OSC is able to dispatch a team to secure the outer door and a release will occur into the Auxiliary Building. The Emergency Director will declare a Site Area Emergency (SAE) based on FS1-1, Loss or potential loss of any two barriers (Reactor Coolant System loss – either RC1 or RC4 and Primary Containment loss – PC1). Offsite notifications will be made and a protected area evacuation will be performed. The release will be filtered by the standby gas treatment system (SBGT).

Initial attempts by OSC repair teams to close the outer airlock door are hampered by increased radiation and airborne radioactivity levels in the Auxiliary Building. Workers will find the card reader and thumb latch on the security gate of the enclosure around the airlock door are not functioning properly. The radiological assessment team in the EOF and the field monitoring teams will monitor and assess the offsite release. Offsite dose projections will indicate a projected dose of greater than 1000mR TEDE at the site boundary and a General Emergency (GE) declaration is required. The Emergency Director will declare a General Emergency on AG1-2. Offsite notifications will be performed and protective action recommendation (PAR) scenario #4 will be provided to offsite authorities. The EOF will facilitate a conference call with the state and local parishes for their decision on PAR actions and siren sounding time. The siren sounding time will be coordinated by the state.

An OSC repair team will be able to access and secure the outer airlock door, thus stopping the radioactive release. Radiological release rates will fall to near background levels. At approximately 1400, the simulator will be placed in FREEZE and the players will begin a self-critique.

### **0800 Initial Conditions**

Plant is operating at 100% power. On-line for 180 days.

High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) pump and HPCS injection valve tagged out (Part 21 inspections)

Indications have been received of fuel leakers. Reactor Engineering is working on a suppression plan.

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B21-N675D, MSIV Isolation Vacuum D Channel failed 30 hours ago. T.S. 3.3.6.1 action A completed last shift. Work is complete on the vacuum transmitter. Calibration of the trip unit is to occur later during the shift.

Spent Fuel Cask DFS-HS16 is being moved to the Independent Spent Fuel Storage location.

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**ATTACHMENT A**

**OFFSITE OBJECTIVES**



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**STATE OF LOUISIANA  
RIVER BEND STATION  
6/13/2012**

**I. EVALUATION AREA 1: EMERGENCY OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT**

**A. Sub-element 1.a – Mobilization**

**Criterion 1.a.1: OROs use effective procedures to alert, notify, and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, A.1.a, e; A.3, 4; C.1, 4, 6; D.4; E.1, 2; H.3, 4)**

Locations

State Emergency Operations Center (State EOC), Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality Headquarters (LDEQ HQ), LDEQ Emergency Operations Facility (LDEQ EOF), Alternate Joint Information Center (AJIC), East Baton Rouge Parish Emergency Operations Center (EBR EOC), West Baton Rouge Parish EOC (WBR EOC), East Feliciana Parish EOC (EFP EOC), West Feliciana Parish EOC (WFP EOC), Pointe Coupee Parish EOC (PCP EOC)

**B. Sub-element 1.c - Direction and Control**

**Criterion 1.c.1: Key personnel with leadership roles for the ORO provide direction and control to that part of the overall response effort for which they are responsible. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, A.1.d; A.2.a, b; A.3; C.4, 6)**

Locations

State EOC, LDEQ HQ, LDEQ EOF, EBR EOC, WBR EOC, EFP EOC, WFP EOC, PCP EOC

**C. Sub-element 1.d – Communications Equipment**

**Criterion 1.d.1: At least two communication systems are available, at least one operates properly, and communication links are established and maintained with appropriate locations. Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, F.1, 2)**

Locations

State EOC, LDEQ HQ, LDEQ EOF, LDEQ Field Monitoring Team 1 (FMT 1), LDEQ FMT 2, AJIC, EBR EOC, WBR EOC, EFP EOC, WFP EOC, PCP EOC

**D. Sub-element 1.e – Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations**

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**Criterion 1.e.1: Equipment, maps, displays, dosimetry, KI, and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, H.7, 10; I.7, 8, 9; J.10.a, b, e; J.11, 12; K.3.a; K.5.b)**

Locations

State EOC, LDEQ HQ, LDEQ EOF, LDEQ FMT 1, LDEQ FMT 2, AJIC, EBR EOC, WBR EOC, EFP EOC, WFP EOC, PCP EOC, Jackson Fire Department Emergency Worker Monitoring and Decontamination Center, LSU Field House Reception Center

**II. EVALUATION AREA 2: PROTECTIVE ACTION DECISION-MAKING**

**A. Sub-element 2.a – Emergency Worker Exposure Control**

**Criterion 2.a.1: OROs use a decision-making process, considering relevant factors and appropriate coordination, to ensure that an exposure control system, including the use of KI, is in place for emergency workers, including provisions to authorize radiation exposure in excess of administrative limits or PAGs. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, C.6; J.10.e, f; K.4)**

Locations

State EOC, LDEQ EOF, EBR EOC, WBR EOC, EFP EOC, WFP EOC, PCP EOC, LSU Field House Reception Center, Jackson Fire Department Emergency Worker Monitoring and Decontamination Center

**B. Sub-element 2.b. - Radiological Assessment and Protective Action Recommendations and Decisions for the Plume Phase of the Emergency**

**Criterion 2.b.1: Appropriate PARs are based on available information on plant condition, field monitoring data, and licensee and ORO dose projections, as well as knowledge of onsite and offsite environmental conditions. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, I.10; Supp. 3)**

Locations

State EOC, LDEQ EOF

**Criterion 2.b.2: A decision-making process involving consideration of appropriate factors and necessary coordination is used to make PADs for the general public (including the recommendation of KI, if ORO policy). (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, A.3; C.4, 6; D.4; J.9; J.10.f, m)**

Locations

State EOC, EBR EOC, WBR EOC, EFP EOC, WFP EOC, PCP EOC

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**C. Sub-element 2.c - PAD Consideration for the Protection of Persons with Disabilities and Access/Functional Needs**

**Criterion 2.c.1: Protective action decisions are made, as appropriate, for groups of persons with disabilities and access/functional needs. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, D.4; J.9; J.10.d, e)**

Locations

EBR EOC, WBR EOC, EFP EOC, WFP EOC, PCP EOC

**III. EVALUATION AREA 3: PROTECTIVE ACTION IMPLEMENTATION**

**A. Sub-element 3.a – Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control**

**Criterion 3.a.1: The OROs issue appropriate dosimetry, KI, and procedures, and manage radiological exposure to emergency workers in accordance with the plans/procedures. Emergency workers periodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart. OROs maintain appropriate record-keeping of the administration of KI emergency workers. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, J.10.e; K.3.a; K.4)**

Locations

LDEQ EOF, LDEQ FMT 1, LDEQ FMT 2, EBR EOC, WBR EOC, EFP EOC, WFP EOC, PCP EOC, Jackson Fire Department Emergency Worker Monitoring and Decontamination Center, LSU Field House Reception Center, Pointe Coupee Parish School District, West Feliciana Parish School District

**B. Sub-element 3.b. – Implementation of KI Decision for Institutionalized Individuals and the General Public**

**Criterion 3.b.1 – KI and appropriate instructions are available if a decision to recommend use of KI is made. Appropriate record-keeping of the administration of KI for institutionalized individuals and the general public is maintained. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, J.10.e, f)**

Locations

EBR EOC, WBR EOC, EFP EOC, WFP EOC, PCP EOC

**C. Sub-element 3.c. – Implementation of Protective Actions for Persons with Disabilities and Access/Functional Needs**

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**STATE OF LOUISIANA**  
**River Bend Station**  
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**Criterion 3.c.2 – OROs/School officials implement protective actions for schools. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, J.10.c, d, e, g)**

Locations

Pointe Coupee Parish School District, West Feliciana Parish School District

**D. Sub-element 3.d. – Implementation of Traffic and Access Control**

**Criterion 3.d.1: Appropriate traffic and access control is established. Accurate instructions are provided to traffic and access control personnel. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, A.3; C.1, 4; J.10.g, j)**

Locations

EBR EOC/T/ACP, WBR EOC/T/ACP, EFP/T/ACP, WFP EOC/T/ACP, PCP EOC/T/ACP

**Criterion 3.d.2: Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved. (NUREG-0654, J.10.k)**

Locations

EBR EOC/T/ACP, WBR EOC/T/ACP, EFP EOC/T/ACP, WFP/T/ACP, PCP/T/ACP

**IV. EVALUATION AREA 4: FIELD MEASUREMENT AND ANALYSIS**

**A. Sub-element 4.a – Plume Phase Field Measurement and Analysis**

**Criterion 4.a.2: Field teams (2 or more) are managed to obtain sufficient information to help characterize the release and to control radiation exposure. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, C.1; H.12; I.7, 8, 11; J.10.a)**

Locations

LDEQ EOF

**Criterion 4.a.3: Ambient radiation measurements are made and recorded at appropriate locations, and radioiodine and particulate samples are collected. Teams will move to an appropriate low background location to determine whether any significant (as specified in the plan and/or procedures) amount of radioactivity has been collected on the sampling media. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, C.1; H.12; I.8, 9; J.10.a)**

Locations

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**STATE OF LOUISIANA**  
**River Bend Station**  
**6/13/2012**

LDEQ FMT 1, LDEQ FMT 2

**V. EVALUATION AREA 5: EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION & PUBLIC INFORMATION**

**A. Sub-element 5.a – Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System**

**Criterion 5.a.1: Activities associated with primary alerting and notification of the public are completed in a timely manner following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. The initial instructional message to the public must include as a minimum the elements required by current REP guidance. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, E.5, 6, 7)**

Locations

State EOC, EBR EOC, WBR EOC, EFP EOC, WFP EOC, PCP EOC, WJBO

**Criterion 5.a.4: Activities associated with FEMA-approved exception areas (where applicable) are completed in a timely manner following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, E.6; Appendix 3.B.2.c)**

Locations

EBR EOC

**B. Sub-element 5.b – Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and the Media**

**Criterion 5.b.1: OROs provide accurate subsequent emergency information and instructions to the public and the news media in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, E.5, 7; G.3.a; G.4.a, c)**

Locations

State EOC, AJIC, EBR EOC, WBR EOC, EFP EOC, WFP EOC, PCP EOC

**VI. EVALUATION AREA 6: SUPPORT OPERATION/FACILITIES**

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**STATE OF LOUISIANA**  
**River Bend Station**  
**6/13/2012**

**A. Sub-element 6.a – Monitoring, Decontamination, and Registration of Evacuees**

**Criterion 6.a.1: The reception center facility has appropriate space, adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide monitoring, decontamination, and registration of evacuees. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, A.3; C.4; J.10.h; J.12)**

Locations

LSU Field House Reception Center

**B. Sub-element 6.b – Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Workers and their Equipment and Vehicles**

**Criterion 6.b.1: The facility/ORO has adequate procedures and resources to accomplish monitoring and decontamination of emergency workers and their equipment and vehicles. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, K.5.a, b)**

Locations

Jackson Fire Department Monitoring and Decontamination Center

**C. Sub-element 6.c – Temporary Care of Evacuees**

**Criterion 6.c.1: Managers of congregate care facilities demonstrate that the care centers have resources to provide services and accommodations consistent with American Red Cross planning guidelines. Managers demonstrate the procedures to assure that evacuees have been monitored for contamination and have been decontaminated as appropriate prior to entering congregate care facilities. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, J.10.h, J.12)**

Locations

Northwestern Middle School

**STATE OF LOUISIANA**  
**River Bend Station**  
**6/13/2012**

**ATTACHMENT B**

**EXERCISE TIMELINE**

**STATE OF LOUISIANA  
RIVER BEND STATION  
6/13/2012**

Exercise Timeline

Note: all times are approximate

0800 Exercise begin

0810 Notice of Unusual Event declared

0900 Alert declared

1035 Reactor trip with stuck open safety relief valve

1105 Release begins

1105 Site Area Emergency declared – primary containment failure with release

1222 General Emergency declared

1430 Exercise termination



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