

**STRENGTH THROUGH PARTNERSHIP:  
BUILDING THE U.S.-TAIWAN RELATIONSHIP**

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**HEARING**

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EAST ASIA,  
THE PACIFIC, AND INTERNATIONAL  
CYBERSECURITY POLICY

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS  
UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

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## **STRENGTH THROUGH PARTNERSHIP: BUILDING THE U.S.-TAIWAN RELATIONSHIP**

**THURSDAY, JUNE 17, 2021**

U.S. SENATE,  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EAST ASIA, THE PACIFIC, AND  
INTERNATIONAL CYBERSECURITY POLICY,  
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,  
*Washington, DC.*

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m. in room SD-419, Hon. Edward Markey, chairman of the subcommittee, presiding.

Present: Senators Markey [presiding], Coons, Romney, and Hagerty.

### **OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD MARKEY, U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS**

Senator MARKEY. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on East Asia, the Pacific, and International Cybersecurity Policy, will come to order.

It is a pleasure to chair our second sole hearing of the East Asia Subcommittee on “Strength Through Partnership Building: The U.S.-Taiwan Relationship.”

America’s bond with Taiwan’s vibrant democracy of nearly 24 million people continues to grow. Taiwan’s democracy serves as a model in the Indo-Pacific.

As authoritarianism deepens its hold in the region, Taiwan serves as a powerful counter example proving that reports of democracy’s demise are unfounded.

That Taiwan continues to flourish just 100 miles away from Mainland China is a testament to the enduring strength of its people and the strength of the universal values that we share with the people of Taiwan.

The Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, three joint communiqués, and six assurances have underpinned this fragile peace in the Taiwan Strait, insulating Taiwan’s democracy and economic system from serious interference.

We have seen elections which have worked to prove democracy works in that country, despite widespread Chinese Government meddling and attempts to spread disinformation, and it served as a referendum on the Chinese Government’s long-standing efforts to adopt a one country/two systems model for Taiwan.

As Taiwan was preparing to vote, Beijing had begun to strip away the right to vote in Hong Kong, denying its people the high

degree of autonomy guaranteed by the 1984 Sino-British declaration and the Basic Law of Hong Kong.

In the past year, the Chinese military's incursions across the median line and into Taiwan's air defense identification zone have increased to their highest level in a generation.

Beyond the Strait, Beijing has turned to the use of force to assert territorial claims on its border with India, and it has sought to rewrite maps in the South China Sea, challenging the international rules-based system.

All of these provocative actions towards Taiwan, particularly against the backdrop of the PRC's violation of their agreements regarding Hong Kong, have contributed to great concern about the PRC's future intentions towards Taiwan.

This hearing offers a chance to discuss ways we can bolster Taiwan's defenses to avert armed conflict in the Taiwan Strait.

This hearing also allows us to examine how the United States can better support Taiwan's standing in the world and help it build relationships with the international community so it can withstand Beijing's efforts to deny it access to diplomatic and economic partners overseas.

We know how China views Taiwan. We should focus our attention on how the world views Taiwan as a reliable partner. The COVID-19 pandemic is a preview of what the world has to gain by giving Taiwan a larger place on the international stage.

Even in the face of a recent uptick in infections, the Taiwan model, characterized by early detection, contact tracing, and universal acceptance of mask wearing, spared Taiwan the worst ravages of the pandemic.

Just as Taiwan stepped up in providing PPE to our hospitals at the height of the pandemic in the United States, we must return the favor by expediting the delivery and increase in the number of vaccines to our friend and partner, Taiwan.

Senator Romney and I agree upon this issue. The World Health Organization could have been a forum for Taiwan to share its remarkable success and best practices with the global community.

Beijing has used the One China policy as a bludgeon to shut out Taipei from the World Health Assembly, and Senator Romney and I, and other members of this subcommittee, campaigned to allow for Taiwan's meaningful participation.

The Biden administration must use its vote, its voice, and influence to unlock the doors of the WHA and other international organizations to Taiwan.

In order to build upon our already strong bilateral relationship with Taiwan, we have to literally show up. Towards that end, I was proud that Senator Rubio's Taiwan Fellowship Act was recently passed by the Senate. The bill will send U.S. Government officials to Taiwan to learn, to study, and to work for up to 2 years.

The Indo-Pacific is key to the United States' alliances and relationships, home to 60 percent of the world's inhabitants, and this legislation will ensure that more of our civil servants throughout the United States continue to be able to go to that region.

So with that, I just want to welcome our witnesses. Thank you so much for your willingness to be with us today, and turn to recognize the ranking member, the senator from Utah.

**STATEMENT OF HON. MITT ROMNEY,  
U.S. SENATOR FROM UTAH**

Senator ROMNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your convening this hearing on this extraordinarily important topic.

Thank you also to our witnesses, Mr. Fritz and Ambassador Barks-Ruggles. I appreciate the commitment you have to this region, to this people, to the interests of the United States of America, and your willingness to testify here today and your ongoing work.

I am going to be very brief this morning. The United States of America believes that the people of Taiwan should be allowed to determine their own destiny. This is an inescapable aspect of having respect for the dignity of humankind.

The Chinese Communist Party, on the other hand, believes that it should be free to usurp the will of the people of Taiwan.

Taiwan is not some small outpost. It is comprised, as the chairman indicated, of almost 25 million people. It is one of the largest 20 global economies and leads the world in a number of cutting-edge technologies. It has its own government and its own military.

The Chinese Communist Party attempts to cut it off from global association and choke its economy, and it threatens invasion by military incursion and incendiary language.

The question today is how America, a nation that believes in the dignity of humanity, can aid the millions of people of Taiwan to remain free to make their own decisions, to determine their own course, and to raise their children in the way of their own choosing.

Quite simply, it is a matter of believing that the people of Taiwan should be free to make their own choice, or whether instead the Communist Chinese Party should take that choice away from them and oppress them.

So I look forward to our chance to hear from our witnesses and to be able to ask questions on these topics.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator MARKEY. Thank you so much, and let me then introduce our first witness.

Our first witness, Mr. Fritz, is the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in the East Asian and Pacific Affairs Bureau. Jonathan Fritz is a career member of the Foreign Service. He has primary responsibility at the State Department for China, Mongolia, and Taiwan.

Prior to his current post, he was the director for bilateral and regional affairs in the State Department's Office of International Communications and Information Policy.

He has previously also been posted to the U.S. Embassy in Beijing. Of note, Mr. Fritz also served as an advisor to the U.S. Trade Representative.

Welcome, Mr. Fritz. Whenever you are comfortable, please begin.

**STATEMENT OF JONATHAN FRITZ, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR CHINA, MONGOLIA, AND TAIWAN COORDINATION, BUREAU OF EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC**

Mr. FRITZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and members of the subcommittee, for the opportunity to be here today to speak to you about our partnership with Taiwan and our efforts

to coordinate with like-minded partners to promote Taiwan's international space and deter conflict in the Taiwan Strait.

Since the election of President Tsai Ing-wen in 2016, the PRC has endeavored to unilaterally alter the status quo in cross-strait relations and isolate Taiwan from the international community.

The PRC's increasingly aggressive behavior toward Taiwan endangers the very stability that has allowed this region to peacefully prosper. Despite President Tsai's determination to maintain the status quo across the strait, Beijing has been unwilling to engage with her.

Instead, the PRC has continued to apply military, diplomatic, and economic pressure. To counter Beijing's attempts to intimidate Taiwan, we will continue to make available to it the defense articles and services necessary for Taiwan self-defense.

Consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act and our One China policy, the United States has notified more than \$32 billion worth of arms to Taiwan since 2009. Arms sales alone cannot ensure Taiwan's ability to defend itself.

Our expanding security cooperation encourages Taiwan to prioritize capabilities that complicate PRC planning for an invasion, including small mobile cost-effective systems like coastal defense cruise missiles, as well as reserve force reform to strengthen Taiwan society's ability to resist in a conflict.

Beijing has also executed a campaign to entice Taiwan's few remaining diplomatic partners to discontinue official ties in favor of the PRC. It has pressured countries to deny permission for Taiwan representative offices that would conduct unofficial relations, and it has continued to pressure U.N. agencies to prevent Taiwan from meaningfully participating in their work.

Strong U.S. support for Taiwan is paramount in light of this coercive behavior. Today, Taiwan has just 15 diplomatic partners after losing seven since President Tsai's inauguration in 2016.

These partners are important for Taiwan in a variety of manners, not least of which is they advocate for Taiwan's participation in international organizations.

Through our diplomatic and commercial engagements, we seek to highlight to these countries the benefits of having a reliable partner like Taiwan. To support Taiwan's unofficial bilateral relationships, U.S. missions throughout the world engage with Taiwan's local representatives.

U.S. leadership and expanding our own engagement with Taiwan encourages other governments to do the same. Our newly liberalized guidelines for engagement with Taiwan representatives were warmly welcomed by Taiwan, probably for this very reason.

Another way we support Taiwan's international space is through the Global Cooperation and Training Framework, or GCTF. The GCTF, facilitated by the American Institute in Taiwan and co-sponsored by allied partners like Japan and Australia, provides training and technical assistance to third-country participants, demonstrating the value of Taiwan's expertise and participation on the global stage.

Since its inception in 2015, the GCTF has featured dozens of workshops that have provided training to over a thousand participants. The specifically appropriated \$3 million in funding to sup-

port GCTF for the first time this year will significantly expand that program's reach.

To build Taiwan's resiliency against PRC economic coercion, we are deepening trade investment and other economic ties. In November of last year, we established the economic prosperity partnership dialogue with Taiwan to discuss key economic issues such as supply chain security, investment screening, and science and technology collaboration.

Such efforts advance U.S. interests and help diversify Taiwan's economy away from over reliance on the PRC. High-level visits that advance our substantive interests are another important way to show our support.

In April, President Biden sent an unofficial delegation, led by former Senator Chris Dodd, to mark the 42nd anniversary of the signing of the Taiwan Relations Act and sent a clear signal about the ongoing U.S. commitment to Taiwan and its democracy.

Last week, the Biden/Harris administration announced a plan for international vaccine donations, including to Taiwan. We were grateful for Senators Duckworth, Sullivan, and Coons visiting Taiwan to announce that donation and underscore our deep appreciation for Taiwan's assistance to the United States in the dark days of the early period of the pandemic. Moving forward, we will seek and consider opportunities for more such visits.

Congressional support for Taiwan has been paramount in the successful and consistent application and articulation of our long-standing One China policy. Moving forward, we will continue to rely on your support to achieve shared objectives, including through appropriations related to implementing the CHIPS Act to secure U.S. supply chains in advanced semiconductors.

Now, I would like to give the floor to my colleague, Ambassador Barks-Ruggles, who will further discuss our efforts to support Taiwan's meaningful participation in international organizations.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Fritz follows:]

**Prepared Statement of Mr. Jonathan Fritz**

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, Members of the Subcommittee: Thank you for the opportunity to be here today. It is my honor to speak with you about our partnership with Taiwan and our efforts to coordinate with like-minded partners to promote Taiwan's international space and deter conflict in the Taiwan Strait.

Since the election of President Tsai Ing-wen in 2016, the People's Republic of China (PRC) has endeavored to unilaterally alter the status quo in cross-Strait relations and isolate Taiwan from the international community. The PRC's increasing pressure and aggressive behavior toward Taiwan endanger the very stability that has allowed the region to peacefully prosper.

Despite President Tsai's determination to maintain the status quo across the Taiwan Strait, Beijing has been unwilling to engage with her. The PRC has continued to apply military, diplomatic, and economic pressure on Taiwan, a democratic partner with whom we share common values and a common vision for a prosperous and secure Indo-Pacific region.

To counter Beijing's attempt to intimidate Taiwan and alter the status quo, we will continue to make available to Taiwan the defense articles and services necessary for Taiwan's self-defense capability, consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act and our "One China" policy. The United States notified more than \$32 billion worth of arms to Taiwan since 2009, but arms sale alone cannot ensure Taiwan's ability to defend itself. Our expanding security cooperation seeks to encourage Taiwan to prioritize capabilities that complicate PRC planning for an invasion, including small, mobile, cost-effective systems like coastal defense cruise missiles and reserve force reform to strengthen Taiwan society's ability to resist in a conflict.

Beijing has also executed a concerted campaign to entice Taiwan's few remaining diplomatic partners to discontinue official ties in favor of the PRC, has pressured countries to deny permission for new Taiwan representative offices that would conduct unofficial relations, and has continued to pressure U.N. agencies to prevent Taiwan from meaningfully participating in these agencies' work.

Strong U.S. support for Taiwan's international space is paramount in light of this coercive behavior. Today, Taiwan has just 15 diplomatic partners after losing seven since President Tsai's inauguration in 2016. These partners are a crucial source of support for Taiwan, and they advocate publicly and privately for Taiwan's membership or meaningful participation in international organizations.

To support Taiwan's unofficial relationships, U.S. missions throughout the world engage with Taiwan's local representative offices. U.S. leadership in expanding our engagement with Taiwan representatives encourages other governments to do the same despite PRC objections. Our newly liberalized guidelines for engagement with Taiwan representatives were warmly welcomed by our Taiwan counterparts, including Representative Bi-khim Hsiao of the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States.

Facilitated by the American Institute in Taiwan, the United States supports Taiwan's international space through the Global Cooperation and Training Framework. The GCTF provides training and technical assistance to third-country participants, building support for Taiwan around the world and demonstrating the value of Taiwan's participation on the global stage. Since its inception in 2015, the GCTF has featured dozens of workshops that have provided training to over a thousand participants. The specifically appropriated \$3 million in funding to support GCTF for the first time this year will significantly expand the program's reach.

Additionally, the State Department's Office of Global Partnerships (GP), in coordination with AIT and TECRO, held three virtual Partnership Opportunity Delegations to facilitate exchange between the public and private sectors of the United States and Taiwan in Paraguay, Eswatini, and St. Lucia.

To build resiliency in Taiwan against economic coercion from Beijing, we are committed to deepening trade, investment, and other economic ties with Taiwan. In November 2020, we established the Economic Prosperity Partnership Dialogue with Taiwan to discuss key economic issues, such as supply chain security, investment screening, and science & technology. Such efforts advance U.S. interests and help diversify Taiwan's economy away from being overly reliant on the PRC. We will continue to strengthen U.S. economic ties with Taiwan as an important priority.

While challenges remain, we will continue deepening our ties with Taiwan in the face of PRC efforts to apply pressure on Taiwan and its partners. In April, President Biden continued those efforts by sending an unofficial delegation of retired U.S. officials to Taiwan, led by former Senator Chris Dodd. The delegation marked the 42nd anniversary of the signing of the Taiwan Relations Act and sent an important signal about the lasting U.S. commitment to Taiwan and its democracy. Last week the Biden-Harris administration announced a plan for sharing vaccine donations internationally, including with Taiwan. We were grateful for Senators Duckworth, Sullivan, and Coons' visit to Taiwan to announce our vaccine donation and underscore our appreciation for Taiwan's assistance to the United States in the earliest days of the pandemic.

Moving forward, we will seek and consider opportunities for visits to Washington and Taipei that advance our unofficial relationship and enable substantive exchanges on issues of mutual concern.

Bipartisan Congressional support for our unofficial relationship with Taiwan has been paramount in the successful and consistent articulation of our longstanding "One China" policy. Moving forward, we will rely on Congressional support to facilitate shared objectives, including through appropriations related to implementing the CHIPS Act, which could help to secure American supply chains in advanced semiconductors and diversify Taiwan's production base.

Now, I would like to give the floor to my colleague, Ambassador Barks-Ruggles, who will further explain our efforts to support Taiwan's meaningful participation in international organizations.

Thank you.

Senator MARKEY. Thank you so much, and let me give you a more formal introduction, Ambassador.

Ambassador Erica Barks-Ruggles was appointed in January this year as Senior Bureau Official for the Bureau of International Organization Affairs.

Prior to her current post, Ambassador Barks-Ruggles was a senior diplomatic scholar at the Woodrow Wilson Center and was the acting Chancellor of the College of International Strategic Affairs at the National Defense University. She also has served as the Ambassador from the United States to the Republic of Rwanda.

So we welcome you, Ambassador. Whenever you are ready, please begin.

**STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ERICA BARKS-RUGGLES,  
SENIOR BUREAU OFFICIAL, BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL  
ORGANIZATION AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,  
WASHINGTON, DC**

Ambassador BARKS-RUGGLES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, thank you, Ranking Member Romney, and all distinguished members of the subcommittee. It is an honor to be here today.

I am appearing before you as the Senior Bureau Official for the Bureau of International Organization Affairs. I am pleased that Ambassador Michele Sison, who has been nominated to lead the bureau, had her hearing before this committee last month.

I want to echo my colleague, Jonathan Fritz's, words about the importance we place on Taiwan's meaningful participation in the U.N. and its related bodies, and share some details about my bureau's work on this important issue.

Taiwan's transparent and democratic management of the COVID-19 pandemic is a model for the region and for the world. As you know, this virus knows no politics and knows no boundary, and we need to ensure that we are hearing from everyone with a role to play in the fight against COVID-19, especially those that have been, largely, successful in protecting their populations from the worst ravages of this pandemic.

At the U.N. Security Council on May 7th, Secretary Blinken called for modernization of the coalitions we include in diplomacy and development efforts, including forging nontraditional partnerships with civil society and the private sector.

It is no coincidence that on the very same day he also called on the World Health Organization to allow Taiwan to participate as an observer in the World Health Assembly.

Taiwan's public health experts, who have worked to protect the 24-plus million people on the island, are a prime example of the key actors with important information to share.

They deserve a voice in the room in institutions like the World Health Organization. Shutting them out of last month's World Health Assembly under pressure from the People's Republic of China weakened us all.

I am proud of the work my team did to advocate for Taiwan's participation and equally proud of our efforts to work closely with partners to address and broaden the coalition of countries that share the objective of having Taiwan's voice heard.

There is, clearly, much more work to be done. In that vein, for more than a decade the Bureau of International Organization Affairs has convened biannual talks to address these concerns.

Over time, we have continued to expand the scope and breadth of these discussions with Taiwan. I had the honor of convening our twice yearly talks with Taiwan virtually on March 30 of this year.

Key U.S. Government officials and subject matter experts from the Department of State, the Department of Health and Human Services, and the American Institute of Taiwan engaged with their Taiwan counterparts to build support among like-minded countries and incorporate more stakeholders in this effort.

It is important to note that these talks included a robust discussion of Taiwan's meaningful participation in U.N. agencies as well as other international organizations and multi-stakeholder initiatives.

Moving forward, the United States intends to focus on several priority areas to demonstrate the added value that Taiwan brings to the international system in tackling regional and global challenges.

First, working with like-minded nations to advocate for Taiwan's role in global health efforts, such as COVID relief, as well as cancer research and other research efforts in the WHO and its subsidiary organizations, including the International Agency for Research on Cancer, known as IARC in diplo-speak.

Second, advocating for opportunities for Taiwan to attend the International Civil Aviation Organization, ICAO, and Interpol meetings, and exchange key aviation safety and law enforcement data to promote safer air travel and combat transnational crime.

Third, including Taiwan in the Biden administration's renewed efforts to tackle global climate change, partnering with Taiwan under the auspices of AIT and TECRO to address critical needs and critical technology related to climate change.

From halting the spread of deadly disease to ensuring safe and secure aviation to stopping global criminal networks, the 24 million people of Taiwan can make an important and constructive contribution in the international system.

In the face of unprecedented global challenges, we will continue to work assiduously to secure Taiwan's vital voice in the room.

I thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today, and I welcome your questions.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Barks-Ruggles follows:]

**Prepared Statement of Ambassador Erica J. Barks-Ruggles**

Thank you, Subcommittee Chairman Markey, Ranking Member Romney, and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee.

I am honored to appear before you as the Senior Bureau Official for the Bureau of International Organization Affairs. Ambassador Michele Sison, who has been nominated to lead the bureau, had her hearing with the Committee last month.

I want to echo my colleague Jonathan Fritz's words about the importance we place on Taiwan's meaningful participation in the U.N. and its related bodies, and share some details about my Bureau's work on this important issue.

Taiwan's transparent and democratic management of the COVID-19 pandemic is a model for the region and the world. This virus knows no politics and no borders, and we need to ensure we are hearing from everyone with a role to play in the fight against COVID-19.

At the U.N. Security Council on May 7, Secretary Blinken called for the modernization of the coalitions we include in diplomacy and development efforts, including forging non-traditional partnerships with civil society and private sector actors.

It is no coincidence that on the same day, he also called on the World Health Organization to allow Taiwan to participate as an observer in the World Health Assembly. Taiwan's public health experts, who have worked to protect the 24 million people on the island, are a prime example of key actors with important information to share. They deserve a voice in the room in institutions like the World Health Organization.

Shutting them out of last month's World Health Assembly under pressure from the People's Republic of China weakened us all. I am proud of the work my team did to advocate for Taiwan's participation, and equally proud of our efforts to work closely with partners to broaden the coalition of countries that share such objectives. But there is clearly much more work to be done.

In that vein, for more than a decade the Bureau of International Organization Affairs has convened biannual talks to address these concerns. Over time, we continue to expand the scope and breadth of our discussions. I had the honor of convening our twice-yearly talks with Taiwan virtually on March 30.

Key U.S. Government officials and subject matter experts from the Department of State, the Department of Health and Human Services, and the American Institute in Taiwan engaged with their Taiwanese counterparts to build support among like-minded countries and incorporate more stakeholders.

It is important to note that these talks included a robust discussion on Taiwan's meaningful participation in U.N. agencies as well as other international organizations and multi-stakeholder initiatives.

Moving forward, the United States intends to focus on several priority areas to demonstrate the added value that Taiwan brings in the international system to tackling regional and global challenges:

- First, working with like-minded nations to advocate for Taiwan's role in global health efforts, such as COVID-19 relief and cancer research with the WHO and International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC);
- Second, advocating for opportunities for Taiwan to attend International Civil Aviation Organization and INTERPOL meetings, and exchange key aviation safety and law enforcement data to promote safer air travel and combat transnational crime; and
- Third, including Taiwan in the Biden administration's renewed efforts to tackle the global climate crisis, partnering with Taiwan under the auspices of AIT and TECRO to address critical needs related to climate change.

From halting the spread of deadly disease, to ensuring safe and secure aviation, to stopping global crime networks, the 24 million people of Taiwan can make important and constructive contributions in the international system.

In the face of unprecedented global challenges, we will continue to work assiduously to secure Taiwan's vital voice in the room.

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you, and I welcome your questions.

Senator MARKEY. Thank you, Ambassador, so much. Thanks to the both of you. So we will begin questions from the subcommittee.

Let me ask you this. Looking back at the Taiwan Relations Act, the three communiqués, and the six assurances which have guided our very delicate relationship with Taiwan, are there any plans to alter that framework at all that those foundational documents have established?

Mr. FRITZ. Thank you very much for the question, Mr. Chairman.

The United States believes that we have been very effective in stewarding the unofficial relationship between ourselves and Taiwan since the enactment of the Taiwan Relations Act, and we have a commitment to maintaining a consistent approach to our One China policy based on that legislation, and the three joint communiqués as well as the six assurances.

Senator MARKEY. So nothing is going to change it?

Mr. FRITZ. Mr. Chairman, I would say that we are committed to being consistent in terms of our One China policy.

Within the bounds of that One China policy, certainly, we are always seeking to strengthen our unofficial ties with Taiwan, not only because Taiwan on its own merits is becoming a better partner in many different aspects, but because of the increasing threat from the other side of the Strait.

Again, I would reiterate that that would take place within the context of the long-standing U.S. One China policy.

Senator MARKEY. All right. Let me ask about the vaccines. What is the schedule for those 750,000 vaccines—the doses to get to the people of Taiwan?

Mr. FRITZ. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for that question.

First of all, I would like to reiterate our thanks to your colleagues for their trip to Taiwan to announce that donation. I think it is fair to say the reaction on the island was nothing short of ecstatic.

With regards to actually getting those on airplanes and flying them, I do not have a set date that I can provide, Mr. Chairman.

What I can tell you is that Taiwan regulators are working super intensively with their USG counterparts to make sure that we have met all of the requirements of the Taiwan regulatory system.

In very short order, we do expect to have those vaccines on their way to Taiwan and, hopefully, into people's arms shortly thereafter.

Senator MARKEY. You are saying within weeks they will be there. Is that what you are saying?

Mr. FRITZ. I would hope, perhaps, even sooner than that, sir. I am not able to give a detailed time line for exactly when. We do have a few more hoops we have to get through to make sure that we have met all of the regulatory requirements of our Taiwan friends.

Senator MARKEY. Okay. Are there plans to partner with Taiwan to manufacture and distribute vaccines?

Mr. FRITZ. Thank you, Chairman.

As you know, President Biden has made it clear that America wants to work together with its friends and partners to become an arsenal of vaccines.

Taiwan does have capacity in this regard, and there are talks underway to see how we can cooperate with Taiwan, amongst many others, to get the entire world vaccinated to end this pandemic.

As both you and the ranking member mentioned in your remarks, Taiwan was incredibly generous and showed great flexibility in upping its production of personal protective equipment in the early days of the crisis.

They ramped up their production many, many multiples of tenfold and, of course, the United States was one of the great beneficiaries of their generosity. We will look to do the same with them on vaccines.

Senator MARKEY. No, I think it makes a lot of sense, and it would only deepen our relationship with them.

The United States has supplied 550,000 COVID-19 vaccines to South Korean armed forces who serve alongside U.S. forces. Given the consequences of a COVID-19 outbreak to the operational readiness of Taiwan's armed forces, would the Administration consider providing vaccines as an extension of our commitment to Taiwan's self-defense?

Mr. FRITZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

As you know, this first tranche we have set aside 750,000 doses of vaccine for the island, and this is, of course, only the first of what we hope will be many tranches of donations.

I cannot speak to specific allocations that will happen in the second and then, hopefully, third, and then future tranches.

We will continue to take into consideration the needs of our very close friends in Taiwan, keeping in mind not only their security needs but also the fact that a number of very critical industries, like semiconductors, for example, could potentially be affected by an unchecked outbreak of COVID there.

Senator MARKEY. Yes, and I recognize that our armed forces do not serve alongside of the Taiwan armed forces the way our forces do with the South Korean military.

I do believe that these vaccines can be as valuable if they go directly to those troops as any weapons system, which we sell to Taiwan. So I would recommend to the Administration that they look at that.

So let me turn and recognize the ranking member, the gentleman from Utah.

Senator ROMNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I think it may well be confusing to our public, generally, and perhaps to people on the Hill to consider two things.

One is the term that says that we believe in the One China policy and then at the same time to say that we believe the people of Taiwan ought to be able to choose their own destiny.

Can you describe what the One China policy means and how you square that with the principle that the people of Taiwan should be able to choose their own course?

Mr. FRITZ. Thank you very much, Ranking Member Romney. That is a great question and, certainly, one that could use some further public elucidation.

The One China policy refers to the fact that we have diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China and, of course, that has implications for who is seated in various international organizations.

My colleague, Ambassador Ruggles, can speak to that. Under our One China policy, even though our relationship with Taiwan is now on an unofficial basis, we nonetheless have made clear in both public statements with private démarches and otherwise that we will continue to maintain and, in fact, even grow a very, very close relationship with Taiwan in the security, in the economic, in the cultural and many other spheres.

As you point out, Taiwan is a fellow democracy. It is important to peace and stability in the Western Pacific and it is absolutely in the U.S. interest to make sure that the 24 million people of Taiwan are able to make choices about their own future free from coercion from across the Strait.

So we will continue to do everything we can to show that rock-solid American support for Taiwan's democracy and for its ability to choose its own future.

Senator ROMNEY. My perception of how we are doing really falls into sort of two buckets. One is associated with the people of Taiwan.

My reading suggests that what the Communist Chinese Party has done in Hong Kong has solidified in the mind of the Taiwanese people that the idea of one country/two systems is not real, and the most recent actions even today, where the Chinese Communist Party has raided a newspaper and incarcerated leaders of an independent newspaper in Hong Kong, this has got to underscore in the

minds of the people of Taiwan that China has a very different intent than allowing them to operate on their own if they were somehow combined with China.

On the other hand, my perception is that the nations of the world, the geopolitical dynamics, have not been working in favor of a strong and free to make its own choice Taiwan, that instead the geopolitical dominoes have been falling in the other direction in terms of them being excluded from more and more international bodies, having recognition being shut off by nations in the region. I wonder why it is.

If I am correct that China is, if you will, being more effective in closing off Taiwan from international support, why they are being successful at that and why we are being unsuccessful at that, while they are winning and we are losing.

Mr. FRITZ. Thank you, Ranking Member Romney.

We are of one mind on your observations regarding Hong Kong and how that applies to Taiwan. I, obviously, do not want to be in the position of speaking for folks on Taiwan.

Clearly, PRC promises of high degree of autonomy for Hong Kong and maintenance of Hong Kong civil liberties have been completely and thoroughly discredited over the last year, particularly since the unilateral enactment of the National Security Law.

So it is no surprise that folks in Taiwan who might at one point in the past have contemplated some consideration of a one country/two systems formula would now find that to be an altogether unappetizing prospect.

With regard to the geopolitical dynamics, certainly, there are challenges. As you point out, the People's Republic of China is extremely aggressive in pushing to constrain Taiwan's political space.

I would point, however, to successes we have had both on the multilateral front, and I will let Ambassador Barks-Ruggles talk about that.

Even bilaterally, the Biden/Harris administration has been quite successful in getting many of our closest friends and partners and allies to publicly declare their support for peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and for Taiwan's democracy.

The joint statement that resulted from the visit of the Japanese Prime Minister, the joint statement that resulted from the visit of the South Korean President, the G-7 ministerial communiqué, the G-7 summit communiqué, the U.S.-EU summit document—I cannot remember if it was a communiqué or joint statement—in all of these, we have seen unprecedented public statements in support of Taiwan and peace and stability across the Strait.

So, again, Ranking Member Romney, I will not deny that the PRC is applying a lot of pressure on folks around the world to isolate Taiwan. There are, in fact, some antibodies at work, and we are doing everything we can to strengthen those antibodies.

Senator ROMNEY. Thank you.

Senator MARKEY. The chair recognizes the Senator from Delaware.

Senator COONS. Thank you.

Chairman Markey, Ranking Member Romney, thank you for holding a hearing on this vitally important topic, and let me thank both of our witnesses today. It is great to see you again.

Ambassador Barks-Ruggles, I must say, as I look back over a decade, our meeting in Rwanda is truly one of the most memorable exchanges I have had, and I do not need to go into details but it will long live in my memory as one of the most challenging and difficult diplomatic moments we may have both had together in our brief service to the people of the United States.

I was so grateful for the opportunity, facilitated by the Administration, to visit Taiwan with Senators Duckworth and Sullivan to announce the delivery of vaccines to Taiwan.

We were also in South Korea and had an opportunity to be there as a million doses were delivered to South Korea as well.

I thought it was an important opportunity for us to make real our response to Taiwan's kindness to us in the early days of the pandemic, as the United States was truly struggling with the provision of PPE.

Taiwan sent 10 million masks to the people of the United States. In fact, Senator Sullivan brought one of those masks with him and was wearing it during our press conference when we landed in Taipei.

So I think it was only fitting and appropriate that the Administration come to Taiwan's aid with a safe and effective vaccine, as they have experienced a modest increase in COVID-19 cases but still profoundly concerning to the people of Taiwan.

I think we are all watching conditions in the Taiwan Strait closely, and this week's entry of 28 Chinese military aircraft into Taiwan's air defense identification zone.

I would be interested in both of you speaking, if you could, to the question do you agree that escalating provocations by the PRC toward Taiwan are failing to create the appropriate incentives for Taiwan to work towards peaceful unification?

Mr. FRITZ. Thank you very much, Senator Coons.

Let me start off by reiterating my gratitude to you and your colleagues for making the trip to Taiwan. As you know full well, at that time the Taiwan authorities were under a fairly extensive disinformation campaign trying to draw divisions not only on the island but also between Taiwan and the United States.

I know it had a very galvanizing effect on the morale of the entire island. I have a picture from TECRO representative of the lit-up Grand Hotel with the giant U.S.A. emblazoned on it.

I think you struck a great blow for Taiwan's democracy and against attempts by the PRC to undermine that democracy and sow discord. So thank you again for that.

With regards to your question about recent PLA incursions, whether its naval forces or its air forces, into the airspace and waters around Taiwan, you are absolutely right. This is, unfortunately, part of an ongoing pattern of increasing military pressure that the PRC is bringing to bear on Taiwan.

The Administration has been very clear in calling this out, condemning China's attempts to intimidate its neighbors in the region to include Taiwan, of course, and instead urging that Beijing engage in dialogue with the Taiwan authorities.

In addition to that, Senator, of course, we are also taking steps to make sure that Taiwan is able to defend itself. That is not just a reference to our ongoing arms sales to the island, but also to our

ever-strengthening security cooperation which is aimed at getting Taiwan's defense approach, if you will, to more approximate that of a porcupine, so that they will more faithfully and expeditiously implement their overall defense concept, moving towards a more dispersed, mobile, and cost-efficient platforms, training their reserves for a sort of defense in depth sort of approach—anything that would, basically, complicate the efforts of the PLA to plan for any potential invasion of the island.

Senator COONS. I have two more questions, if I might. I will ask them both and then let you both decide which is the more appropriate to answer.

Last year in the State and Foreign Operations Appropriations Subcommittee, I worked to include more robust funding for the Global Cooperation Training Framework.

This is a way to allow the world to learn more about the capabilities of the people of Taiwan and for them to be able to participate in international issues of development, cybersecurity, engagement, and I think it has been a useful tool for helping preserve Taiwan's international space.

I would be interested in hearing more about what the Administration has planned for the GCTF for this year and future years.

I noted that USTR Ambassador Tai recently had a conversation with her counterpart, and I would be interested in what either of you could say about our plans moving forward in terms of trade talks.

Thank you.

Mr. FRITZ. Thank you, Senator. I will take a swing at both of those.

With regards to the Global Cooperation and Training Framework, thank you and thank your colleagues for the appropriation of \$3 million. That is going to really allow us to expand that program.

I agree 100 percent, Senator, that has been a very effective platform for, basically, advertising the Taiwan brand, if you will.

I think we have something like more than a thousand folks from around the world who have participated in the various seminars the GCTF has helped put together.

Another thing that we are doing, the State Department now has sort of China experts deployed not just in the People's Republic of China and Taiwan and Hong Kong, but also in regional hubs around the world, and we are giving those regional China officers some authorship and some ownership of the GCTF.

So in the future, it will not just be headquarters folks plotting and planning those GCTF programs and seminars. We will have folks actually in, you know, Francophone Africa, for example, or the Caribbean, who will be able to tailor these to specific audiences in the parts of the world they are responsible for.

So I could not agree with you more on the effectiveness of that, and again, thanks for the appropriation that will really help us expand that.

With regards to the meeting that Ambassador Tai had with her counterpart, Minister Deng, obviously, I would defer to USTR on the details. I will point out that Ambassador Tai and Minister

Deng did commit to restarting our Trade and Investment Framework Agreement talks.

We have not had a round of TIFA council meetings, I think, for something like 4 or 5 years now. I do believe the USTR is planning to hold one of those in the very near future.

There is, obviously, a broad range of issues to go into great detail with Taiwan, given they are our ninth largest trading partner and home to many industries of very strategic importance, whether that is in the health sector or semiconductors.

I think it is probably safest for me to defer to my colleagues on 17th Street there, Senator. Thank you.

Senator MARKEY. As much of cross-strait relations are mired in strategic ambiguity on both sides, it may become more difficult to distinguish between actions that fall below the threshold of conflict with those that risk leading to an escalation.

We know from the U.S.-China summit in Anchorage, Alaska, that China's leaders are not shy about referring to Taiwan as a redline issue or part of its core interests, the implication being that it is willing to go to war over Taiwan.

I believe that we need to have ongoing dialogues to ensure that a military exercise or an incident at sea does not become a prelude to a conflict. As the Singaporean Prime Minister recently said of the stakes of a U.S.-China war, everything is to be lost.

Mr. Fritz, do you agree that it is in the interest of all sides to avoid a war over Taiwan, which would lead to catastrophic consequences for all parties involved?

Mr. FRITZ. Mr. Chairman, I absolutely agree with that, and I would like to point out that along the lines of what you just mentioned, in Anchorage and elsewhere our top leadership, including Secretary Blinken, have made it extremely clear to our PRC counterparts that it would be a very serious mistake for them to resort to anything other than peaceful means to resolve cross-strait differences.

I think in both word and deed we have made it crystal clear to our friends in Taiwan, to the leaders in Beijing, and to folks around the world how important peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait is.

Senator MARKEY. Now, some observers say that China is unlikely to move to forcefully attempt to unify Taiwan barring a push for independence by Taiwan. Others note that their calculus is driven by the moment when it believes it is most militarily advantageous for them to do so.

Regardless of what motivates Beijing, our policy approach should be the same. Do you agree that it is important to signal that any disruption to the status quo, be it through forcible unification or independence, is unacceptable?

Mr. FRITZ. Mr. Chairman, I agree with that statement.

Senator MARKEY. So I do not believe that we are entering a new cold war with China, but we can draw upon lessons from U.S.-Soviet and U.S.-Russia transparency and confidence-building steps and formal agreements that help prevent the cold war from going hot.

I am concerned that we do not have an active crisis hotline between our militaries and I am also concerned that Secretary of

State Blinken indicated following the Anchorage summit that we would not be seeking a follow-on strategic dialogue with China.

It is in our interest to ensure that a conflict of the strait or the South China Sea does not escalate between the United States and China, both of whom are nuclear armed.

It is still the position of the State Department that it does not seek an additional strategic stability dialogue with Beijing to negotiate measures that reduce the risk of hostilities?

Mr. FRITZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You raise a very, very important series of issues there.

I would point out that this Administration, while it is not interested in dialogue for dialogue's sake, is still very much committed to maintaining open lines of communication with Beijing so that sensitive issues like Taiwan, amongst many others, are not able to cause misunderstandings that could lead to some unfortunate consequences.

As you pointed out, and, obviously, it is quite in the public eye, we have already had the Secretary and National Security Advisor Sullivan meeting with their counterparts in Anchorage.

I can assure you that the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary of State have had additional interactions with their counterparts since then. We expect those to continue, going forward.

The issue of communications in a crisis is, indeed, a very important one. That is something that is very high on our agenda. We have no desire for misunderstandings that could potentially lead to unfortunate consequences.

So that will, indeed, be something that will factor very high on the agenda both at the State Department and other agencies around the executive branch as well.

Senator MARKEY. Okay. Well, the Chinese military's incursions into Taiwan's air defense identification zone and amphibious assault exercises have increased to their highest levels in 25 years.

These actions have raised concerns about a looming conflict over Taiwan.

However, we also know that a protracted conflict over Taiwan is not likely in China's interest, that their military does not seem to have the appropriate military capabilities for such a confrontation and that Beijing has responded in a similar provocative way to U.S. arms sales to Taiwan in the past and in response to shifts in Taiwanese politics.

Mr. Fritz, to what do you assign recent provocative moves by Beijing in the Taiwan Strait?

Mr. FRITZ. Thank you for that question, Mr. Chairman.

There is some debate about that. Beijing's leadership is notoriously opaque, and so it would be somewhat difficult for me to opine with any sort of authoritativeness on what is motivating the PRC to take an ever more aggressive approach to intimidating Taiwan.

Certainly, much of it has to do, I believe, with the fact that the PRC is very upset with the results of the two most recent presidential elections on the island. That, obviously, has factored into their calculations quite severely.

The U.S. Government's view is that as Beijing seeks to disrupt the status quo by upping the pressure, it is incumbent upon us to further reinforce our support for Taiwan.

In addition to the United States doing that, Mr. Chairman, I would also point out that another very important factor, we think, in deterring Beijing aggression is to make this more of a multilateral issue, and that is why we have worked so hard with our friends and allies—the Japanese, the South Koreans, our Five Eyes partners, the G-7, the Europeans—to get them to come out in public and also voice their support for Taiwan’s democracy and for peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.

Senator MARKEY. Well, let me just finish up by saying that Taiwan has taken important steps to increase its defense budget.

However, it has averaged 1.8 to 2.1 percent of GDP over the last 5 years, short of the 3 percent target that U.S. and Taiwan policymakers have made.

My hope is that the Biden administration supports the effort to get Taiwan to move closer to that 3 percent target. It is a wealthy country. Is that the goal of the Biden administration?

Mr. FRITZ. Yes, that is, Mr. Chairman.

Senator MARKEY. Okay. Thank you.

Let me turn, recognize the Senator from Utah, Mr. Romney.

Senator ROMNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We are going to give Mr. Hagerty a chance to speak in just a minute but he said let me go first, so I will do that.

There are many fronts on which we would like China to take a different course. This is, obviously, one of them. Their ambition to dominate the people of Taiwan, but their treatment of the Uighurs and minorities, of religions, their predatory actions in the world economic marketplace, there are so many dimensions where we would like China to change course.

That raises the question about what we can do and what the Administration’s strategy is with regards to convincing the Chinese Communist Party to allow Taiwan to determine its own destiny and not to invade or dominate the people of Taiwan.

I am not talking about military action. Clearly, there is a military component that figures very significantly into any effort to dissuade China from invasion or the like.

Putting aside military deterrent, what things can we do that would have the potential of convincing China, let us not focus on making Taiwan a vassal state? If we look back, we walked away from the TPP.

Many people thought that the agreement that we might have in the region economically would be able to strengthen our hand relative to China and create a stronger neighborhood.

The Quad, obviously, has potential with regards to that effort. I am interested in your view and the Administration’s view about what actions we can take. Oftentimes, when people do bad things we place sanctions on them.

The challenge with sanctions, of course, is what we do after they have done the bad thing and we would like to prevent the bad thing from happening.

What is our strategy with regards to convincing the Chinese not to play a heavy hand with regards to Taiwan?

Mr. FRITZ. Thank you, Ranking Member Romney. That is a fabulous question.

First, we point out to our PRC counterparts often that few countries have benefited from peace and stability in that part of the world as much as the People's Republic of China has.

Second, we make it clear that this is not just a bilateral concern. As I pointed out, we have been hard at work making sure that major partners of ours around the world are speaking up and demonstrating their support for Taiwan, and again, not necessarily in a military fashion. Diplomatically, economically, parliamentary exchanges—there are a number of ways for that to be manifested.

Third, we have also been very, very clear, as I mentioned earlier, with the PRC in terms of—I guess I would be best suited to just quote Secretary Blinken.

He said it would be a very serious mistake for anyone to resort to anything other than peaceful means to resolve cross-strait differences, and I am very confident that the PRC leaders in Beijing are crystal clear that if they were to decide to use some coercive manner to unify Taiwan, they would face grave consequences.

As you pointed out, Ranking Member Romney, those would not necessarily be confined to the military arena either. Reputational, economic—there be any number of areas in which, I think, they would have to think very, very long and hard about making a momentous choice like that.

Senator ROMNEY. I would just note my own personal view that the more specific we might be in advance with not only our own communications but also with communications of our friends and allies around the world about the economic consequence of China using coercive means to impose its will on Taiwan would, potentially, be helpful in dissuading them from using such means, and that it would be helpful for us to be extraordinarily explicit and for our friends and allies around the world to combine and speak about this specifically so that China would have a good sense of what we are talking about.

Because, frankly, China and Russia, for that matter, have done a lot of bad things over the past couple of decades, and we have told them of the terrible consequences that would be rained upon them for the things they did.

Somehow they are getting along just fine, and the consequence was not as great as they might have once feared.

I think we need to be more specific as we deal with China and its potential aggressiveness with regards to Taiwan.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator MARKEY. Great.

Senator HAGERTY.

Senator HAGERTY. Thank you, Chairman Markey, Ranking Member Romney. Thank you very much for the time here today for having this hearing. To our witnesses, thank you.

Ambassador, I would like to start with you, if I might. It is a point that has been a concern of mine for some time regarding international organizations and that is the fact that American funding of these organizations is far disproportionate to the American employees that are present at those organizations.

We are far underrepresented, in my perspective, and I look at how other countries accomplish disproportionate overrepresentation. They take advantage of a series of programs: the U.N. Junior

Professional Officer program, the World Bank donor-funded staffing program, and the U.N. Special Assistant to the Regional Coordinating program.

In particular, China has done a big job at doing this and in doing so achieving a disproportionate representation, disproportionately high representation in these organizations.

It also is evident to me that the United States takes very little advantage of these organizations, and it puts us at a numeric disadvantage when you look at how we project our influence in these organizations, how we make American thought and American perspective heard, particularly in light of the fact that these other countries that do not pay as much on a percentage basis are over represented.

So I would like to know how many of these positions, these three programs that I just mentioned, does the department currently fund, and do we intend to continue funding those?

I would like to get an accounting of that.

Ambassador BARKS-RUGGLES. Thank you, Senator, for your question, and I appreciate your interest in this important issue.

We have been examining this as part of our efforts supported very generously by the Senate and we appreciate your support for that, as we have set up our new Office of Multilateral Strategy and Personnel, which we are now in the process of getting authorization for and hope to be staffing in the next several weeks here.

Because this is an important issue, how do we take best advantage of those programs throughout the U.N. system and throughout the other international organization systems to make sure that we are placing the next generation of American professionals in those organizations to ensure their integrity, their strength, their efficacy, and also their accountability, because we do provide a lot of funding for those organizations.

I do not have the exact figures of the number of JPOs that we pay for in the system. That number, I know, is increasing, again, in part due to the support we have received from this committee and from the Senate.

We appreciate very much that effort and we are in the process of preparing our regular reports on these programs, where we will have the numbers and we are happy to share those with you.

We are looking at how do we increase, not only in the JPO programs but also in the mid ranks and in the senior ranks, and making sure that we have, if not Americans, like-minded partners and allies that share our values who are in those positions, because it is important not only in the senior leadership positions but all the way down that you have people who are going to be independent minded, that are going to reinforce the values and the foundational strengths of the international system so that we can fight back against this bullying that has been happening.

Senator HAGERTY. Well, I would look forward to hearing from your organization. If you could provide a timeline of how these numbers have moved over time.

I am encouraged to hear that they are increasing. At least, that is your sense of it. I would also like to understand what measures you are taking, particularly at the financial organizations and the standard setting organizations, how you are strategizing a way to

move forward in this, and in particular, the HR policies that may be discriminatory toward Americans.

My understanding is that if a person has dual citizenship that they are counted as an American rather than whatever the other citizenship might be, again, making the numbers harder for us to accomplish.

I am particularly concerned with respect to World Bank IMF roles there in terms of us being underrepresented, and it has become even more obvious to me in recent years that standard-setting bodies, particularly with respect to 5G, are an area where we need to be deeply concerned and deeply focused on being properly represented there.

So I appreciate a report back at your earliest convenience on that.

Mr. Fritz, if I could turn to you, please. I appreciate the fact that in April, the department has issued new guidelines for how we interact as the United States Government with Taiwanese counterparts.

I certainly support the fact that we are going to be more focused on and taking a greater perspective on having our United States diplomats engage with Taiwanese counterparts in that regard.

I want to particularly commend my former DCM, Joe Young, who is now the chargé or was most recently the chargé d'affaires in Japan for hosting his counterparts at the Taiwan Economic and Cultural Office there in Japan at the U.S. Ambassador's residence. I think that sends a very strong message.

Deputy Assistant Secretary Fritz, I wanted you to provide any further updates that you might have on these guidelines, how we are making progress on this and how you see it unfolding.

Mr. FRITZ. Thank you very much for that question, Senator.

I can tell you that these new guidelines are, indeed, the most liberal that we have had since, basically, 1980 when we first started issuing these at the State Department.

There are a number of restrictions that were part of earlier versions that have been lifted, allowing for more easy contacts, meetings in U.S. office buildings, at the offices of the Taipei Economic Cultural Representative Office, without going into specifics of any of these specific meetings, I can tell you we are taking full advantage of these, and our Taiwan friends are noting this and are quite appreciative.

I would point out that the new contact guidelines have had been welcomed in public from President Tsai's office down through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to TECRO here in Washington, DC, and you really can see the uptick in interactions between U.S. Government officials and their Taiwan counterparts.

Senator HAGERTY. Well, I would just note this, and I appreciate the time, but the meeting between Chargé d'Affaires Young and his counterpart at the Ambassador's residence in Japan got press all over the Japanese media and all over Asia.

So this can make a real mark. It could send a real message. So I appreciate you are expanding this policy as much as possible.

Thank you.

Senator MARKEY. Senator Coons, do you have any additional questions? No.

Back to you, Senator Romney.

Senator ROMNEY. Just a couple of questions and comments.

My understanding is that China has used its vaccines as a key part of diplomacy at the same time it has used this opportunity to suggest that America is not a very helpful ally of the people of Taiwan.

Taiwan's Ambassador indicated that she had actually received indication of texts coming from the Chinese Communist Party saying that Americans have so much vaccine that we are vaccinating our pets, and that we think more of our dogs than we think of the people of Taiwan.

This kind of misinformation spreads throughout Taiwan, and, therefore, I want to underscore something that others have raised, which is the urgency for getting vaccines to the people of Taiwan.

There is a need for about 2 million vaccinations. We have agreed to 750,000. I would strongly encourage us to move as soon as we can to the higher number and that we get these to the people of Taiwan as urgently as we possibly can.

This is a nation, obviously, seeing a significant uptick in infections, given the Delta variant, and it has humanitarian implications, but also strategic implications that are very important, given the disinformation campaign that the Chinese are carrying out.

Is what I am saying consistent with your own understanding of what is happening with regards to Chinese misinformation and is that happening on various fronts around the world?

Mr. FRITZ. Ranking Member Romney, you are absolutely right. I think Taiwan is probably receiving, you know, the brunt of PRC disinformation.

On the other hand, we have also seen Taiwan develop quite a bit of resilience to this sort of thing. They are getting very good at identifying and pushing back with media literacy, social media literacy programs, transparency, basically, and we have actually quite a lot to learn from them in terms of combating disinformation.

Back to the Global Cooperation and Training Framework, a platform that Senator Coons mentioned, we have been able to use that platform to take some of Taiwan's expertise and share it with others around the world who are also subjected to PRC disinformation but also disinformation from other bad actors, whether that be the Russians or others.

Senator ROMNEY. One more question, and that is I would hate for us, in our concern about China's interference in the region with the people of Taiwan, to do something or say something as a body or as individuals that would precipitate or give an excuse to China to take action they might not otherwise take.

Do you have any warning or guidelines or suggestions to us? Because a number of us feel like, you know, we want to make it very clear that we stand with the free people of Taiwan, that we abhor what the Communist Chinese Party has communicated in its intent with regards to Taiwan.

Are there boundaries we should not cross for fear of precipitating some type of a coercive action?

Mr. FRITZ. That is a great question, Ranking Member Romney. Thank you for that.

Of course, that is the entire premise of our One China policy, to make sure that we abide by our diplomatic ties with Beijing while at the same time within the parameters of our unofficial relationship with Taiwan doing everything we can to support them.

That includes stronger security cooperation, commercial ties across the board, vaccine donations, visits from VIPs, et cetera.

We also, as you point out, want to be very careful not to engage in any symbolic sorts of provocations that will do nothing other than merely raise the risk for Taiwan and, perhaps, precipitate the very thing that we are trying to avoid and deter, which is the PRC feeling compelled to take some sort of coercive action against the island.

Senator ROMNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator MARKEY. Thank you, Senator Romney.

Again, we have been in a situation over the last several months in our country where, on a bipartisan basis, Democrats and Republicans are coming together to pass comprehensive legislation in order to deal with the economic threat, the strategic threat that China poses to our country, and part of that is a bill that is going to be very large, a couple of \$100 billion, looking at this issue and trying to unleash the innovation inside of our country.

When you really peel it all back, we are looking at the fact that semiconductors are now not made in the United States in any substantial measure, and as a result, we are vulnerable because our country runs on semiconductors.

We are a chip-driven country. That is who we are. We are only 5 percent of the world's population but we are not an honorary 5 percent and that is because we are an advanced technological country.

Of course, underlying this is a realization that 50 percent of all the chips in the world are made in Taiwan, and so it only further reemphasizes how important Taiwan is to us, which, I would say, brings us back again to vaccines, to look at the \$200 billion piece of legislation we are going to move to deal with it.

Yet, over here we have an additional capacity to help, and I would urge that we do that because I think it actually is part of a larger story right now and we want to cement that relationship and the great work of Senator Coons and other members of the Senate, and visiting Taiwan is, obviously, very important.

At the same time, the more we do is the less costly it could be to us in the long term by welding the Taiwanese people to the interests of the United States.

Let me ask you, Ambassador Barks-Ruggles. The United States meets quarterly with Japan, Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom, and the EU to discuss ways to expand Taiwan's participation in international organizations.

What does the world have to gain from a Taiwan that has an elevated global profile?

Ambassador BARKS-RUGGLES. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your question on that.

The Taiwanese people, as you have pointed out, have advanced industry and an advanced economy that has much to offer on a number of fronts, including on the technological front for combating climate change.

It also has a lot to offer, as you have noted repeatedly, on health issues, spanning from COVID and their response to COVID, to cancer research, where they have done some very advanced research that we have worked with them on and our research institutes have worked with them on.

We believe that they have a voice, they have expertise, and they have experience that is valuable to the entire world in combating these global issues.

They also have a lot to bring to the table in areas from civil aviation safety, where they have an enormous experience dealing with a very tough geography for their airport, and they can bring that to the table at the Civil Aviation Organization, and in law enforcement and combating international global criminal networks, where we think that they can bring a lot more to bear at Interpol and related agencies.

So 24 million people with an advanced economy should have a voice at the table on all of these fronts, and we are committed to trying to work with them to do so.

Senator MARKEY. Yeah, I agree with you when you talk about civil aviation. It does not make any sense. China cannot, obviously, want there to be mid-air aviation collisions. So excluding Taiwan from the Civil Air Organization makes absolutely no sense whatsoever.

Again, I just think it is important for us to press as hard as we can for entrance.

Let me turn again to you, Senator Hagerty.

Senator HAGERTY. Thank you, Chairman Markey.

I just want to follow on this point that you raised. I would like to turn to Mr. Fritz, though.

This is something that, again, is of great concern and very related to the last line of questions. It has to do with Taiwan's diplomatic posture and the fact that since President Tsai was inaugurated in 2016, Taiwan has lost seven. They are down to 15 diplomatic partners right now.

I would like to get your read on the trend here, Mr. Fritz, and what you think the United States might be able to do to help Taiwan maintain its diplomatic presence. The Communist Chinese Party pressure on this is enormous, as you know, and they have been fairly effective since President Tsai took office.

So I look forward to your thoughts on this trend. Thank you.

Mr. FRITZ. Thank you, Senator Hagerty.

Yes, you are absolutely right. The trend has been quite bad. As you pointed out, seven of Taiwan's diplomatic partners have been poached since Tsai Ing-wen won election in 2016.

As several of your colleagues have pointed out, the PRC has been very aggressively using vaccine donations as a lever to induce more of Taiwan's diplomatic partners to switch recognition.

We do engage very intensively with Taiwan's remaining diplomatic partners and point out to them the many benefits of having a reliable partner that, in fact, does not use, whether it is vaccines or investments or any other lever, as sort of a tool of political coercion, if you will.

Also working with our Taiwan friends to help promote investments and trade with those remaining diplomatic partners. I would

point out that in addition to those remaining diplomatic partners, so those 15, we are also working very hard on the rest of the world, all of those countries that do not have diplomatic relations with Taiwan anymore, but can and should have even stronger unofficial ties.

We are trying to set a good example of that ourselves with recent actions, and we believe that whether that is folks in Europe or Asia or elsewhere, are engaging within the bounds of their own diplomatic versions of our One China policy.

Culturally, parliamentary exchanges, closer commercial ties—all of that is to the good and I think over time is a quite important strategic deterrent to the PRC when it sits down and thinks about even the possibility of a non-peaceful strategy for unifying the island.

Senator HAGERTY. Thank you.

Senator MARKEY. I thank the senator.

We thank the witnesses for your great testimony today. I do not see any other members who are seeking recognition at this time.

So I want to thank all of you for your participation, and I applaud the Biden administration for its work to strengthen our partnership with Taiwan. The recent statements from U.S.-Japan, U.S.-South Korea, and the G-7 summits in support of Taiwan are just one indication of this Administration building back a better foreign policy.

For the information of the members, the record will remain open until the close of business on Monday, June 21st, for any other members seeking to in writing submit questions to the Administration.

So with that, this hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:11 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]

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#### ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

##### RESPONSES OF MR. JONATHAN FRITZ TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR EDWARD J. MARKEY

*Question.* Taiwan recently applied to be a manufacturer of Moderna vaccines which could enable it, as a leader in mRNA technology, to meet domestic demand for vaccines and help it become an exporter of life saving shots to the region and the world. What are the U.S. plans to partner with Taiwan to manufacture and distribute vaccines?

*Answer.* We have had a close partnership with Taiwan on global health issues and have been working together throughout the pandemic. Taiwan was there to help the United States in the earliest days of the pandemic, providing PPE and other life-saving materials. We remain grateful for that generosity, and are proud that we are able to support Taiwan in its moment of need with 2.5 million vaccine doses. You can expect our strong partnership on COVID-19 and global health to continue.

*Question.* Would the Departments of State and Defense consider inviting Taiwan, provided Japan concurs, to participate in the U.S.-Japan Extended Deterrence Dialogue (EDD) as an observer?

*Answer.* We welcome the recent joint statement from President Biden and Prime Minister Suga in support of Taiwan. We will continue to work with allies and partners to highlight the positive role Taiwan plays in addressing global challenges and encourage them to stand with Taiwan in defending against threats to its democratic values.

U.S. policy has been to preserve cross-Strait stability and maintain peace in the Indo-Pacific region; within this context, we will continue our robust security co-

operation with Taiwan in a manner consistent with our “One China” policy guided by the Taiwan Relations Act, the three Joint Communiqués, and the Six Assurances.

*Question.* The Taiwan Fellowship Act is included in the Innovation and Competition Act, which passed the Senate, as well as the EAGLE Act which is still under committee consideration in the House. Specifically: What actions has the Department of State and/or the American Institute in Taiwan taken to negotiate or pre-negotiate a memorandum of understanding with Taiwan authorities that will permit the earliest possible placement of Taiwan fellows? If those have not occurred, when can we expect those formal discussions to begin?

*Answer.* We recognize Congressional support to facilitate shared objectives, including through potential legislation like the Taiwan Fellowship Act.

Congressional support for our unofficial relationship with Taiwan has been paramount in ensuring that U.S. support for Taiwan will remain strong, principled, and bipartisan, in line with longstanding American commitments to the Taiwan Relations Act, the three Joint Communiqués, and the Six Assurances.

*Question.* Are Taiwan Authorities broadly supportive of an exchange program that will send fellows, from the U.S. executive branch and select legislative branch agencies, to Taiwan for intensive language training and assignment to a government ministry?

*Answer.* Yes.

*Question.* How will the Taiwan Fellowship Program support the State Department’s revised contact guidelines that expand unofficial interactions with Taiwan authorities?

*Answer.* The new guidance encourages U.S. Government officials’ interactions with their Taiwan counterparts in a manner consistent with our unofficial relationship with Taiwan.

Fellowship programs could similarly contribute to deepening our ties with Taiwan—a leading democracy and a critical economic and security partner—and we look forward to continuing to work with Congress as it considers legislation for such a program.

*Question.* What are the benefits of Track 1.5 and Track 2 dialogues in building a sense of awareness around how other interested nations think about cross-Strait security issues?

*Answer.* Such dialogues advance our unofficial relationship with Taiwan and, by multilateralizing support for Taiwan, contribute to peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. America’s commitment to Taiwan will remain rock-solid. We will continue to work with allies and partners to highlight the positive role Taiwan plays in addressing global challenges and encourage them to stand with Taiwan in defending against threats to its democratic values.

*Question.* What more could the Global Cooperation and Training Framework (GCTF) workshops accomplish if the United States were to increase its financial support of such workshops? For instance, if additional workshops were held, could the number of issues explored be increased, and/or would additional like-minded countries be able to participate?

*Answer.* The GCTF is an essential tool for building support for Taiwan around the world and demonstrating the value of Taiwan’s participation on the global stage. Since its inception in 2015, the GCTF has featured dozens of workshops that have provided training to over 2,000 participants, mostly either virtually or in Taipei. Funding from the new \$3 million directive will be essential to the success of this initiative going forward. Additional funding would allow the Department to use this structure to expand the program further, reaching yet more audiences with positive messages on Taiwan’s constructive role on the world stage.

*Question.* How does the Department of State currently engage with counterparts in the People’s Republic of China on preventing misunderstandings and miscalculations regarding regional security interests, including around the Taiwan Strait?

*Answer.* We have sought to minimize miscalculations on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, maximize our ability to broaden and deepen the unofficial U.S.-Taiwan relationship, and ensure the future of Taiwan is determined peacefully and free of PRC coercion.

The PRC has engaged in an ongoing pattern of attempts to intimidate the region, including Taiwan. Beijing continues to exert military, diplomatic, and economic pressure against Taiwan, instead of engaging in meaningful cross-Strait dialogue.

We will continue to support a peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues, consistent with the wishes and best interests of the people on Taiwan.

*Question.* To what degree does the Department of State, through the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs or any other office, consult with Taiwan authorities regarding which defense articles to purchase?

*Answer.* In response to the growing PRC threat, we will continue deepening our unofficial security relationship with Taiwan to ensure it has sufficient capabilities to defend itself.

The United States has notified more than \$32 billion worth of arms to Taiwan since 2009, but arms sales alone cannot ensure Taiwan's ability to defend itself. Our expanding security cooperation encourages Taiwan to prioritize expenditures on relatively inexpensive, mobile, survivable, defense weapons and reserve force reform. Often referred to as an "asymmetric" defense posture, this shift in focus strengthens deterrence, and with it, cross-Strait stability.

U.S. security cooperation with Taiwan is calibrated to meet the threat from the PRC and is consistent with the U.S. "One China" policy, which is guided by the Taiwan Relations Act, the Three Communiqués, and the Six Assurances. As part of that cooperation, we encourage Taiwan to spend on defense an amount commensurate with the growing threat it faces.

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RESPONSES OF MR. JONATHAN FRITZ TO QUESTIONS  
SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JEFF MERKLEY

*Question.* Your testimony rightly noted that Taiwan faces intense economic coercion from the Chinese Government. This is not just an issue for Taiwan but for any government around the world that deviates from the Chinese Government's party line regarding Taiwan, or even for companies with individual employees that do so. What specifically are we doing to help our partners diversify economically and boost supply chain resilience so they're less vulnerable to this coercion?

*Answer.* We are committed to deepening trade, investment, and other economic ties with Taiwan, a vibrant economy that is our ninth largest trading partner. Trade with Taiwan advances U.S. interests and helps create economic opportunity and prosperity in the United States.

As a close friend and important trading partner for a number of critical products, we will continue to work with Taiwan to strengthen supply chain resilience and diversification by addressing choke points, particularly in the healthcare and semiconductor sectors.

*Question.* Last year, as mainland China became increasingly inhospitable for journalists, more than 20 journalists moved to Taiwan at the invitation of the Taiwanese Government. Many of them had published articles highlighting the Chinese Government's horrific abuses against Uyghurs or its handling of the coronavirus outbreak. What is the State Department doing to support the freedom of expression and defend Taiwan against any retaliation from the Chinese Government for hosting these journalists?

*Answer.* The PRC has displayed an ongoing pattern of attempts to intimidate the region, including through the suppression of free speech. Additionally, Beijing continues to exert military, diplomatic, and economic pressure against Taiwan instead of engaging in meaningful dialogue with Taiwan.

Taiwan is a leading democracy, a vibrant economic partner, a technology powerhouse, and a strong example of how an open society can contain COVID-19 and contribute to global health. Taiwan has also become a global leader in combating disinformation.

U.S. support for Taiwan is rock-solid, and we will continue to work with allies and partners to highlight the positive role that Taiwan plays in addressing global challenges and encourage them to stand with Taiwan in defending against threats to its democratic values, including freedom of the press.

*Question.* International NGOs that have long aimed to do work in mainland China or Hong Kong are seeing the space for civil society rapidly constrict and we're increasingly seeing Taiwan be a safer space for these NGOs to operate. What is the State Department doing to support NGOs operating in Taiwan or elsewhere in the Indo-Pacific region that work to support human rights and other important programming in mainland China and Hong Kong?

*Answer.* Taiwan is a leading democracy, a vibrant economic partner, a technology powerhouse, and a strong example of how an open society can contain COVID-19 and contribute to global health.

We will continue to work with allies and partners to highlight the positive role Taiwan plays in addressing global challenges and encourage them to stand with Taiwan in defending against threats to its democratic values.

Despite the challenging operating environment for NGOs in China, DRL programs conserve and expand space for an independent local civil society to petition the Government on behalf of citizens' demands, including through online initiatives. The Department will continue to explore ways to support human rights programming in Hong Kong through Taiwan-based partners.

*Question.* Taiwan citizen Lee Ming-cheh disappeared after traveling in China in 2017 and is serving 5 years in a mainland Chinese prison for alleged "subversion of state power," apparently a reference to his work volunteering for an NGO in Taiwan. Has the State Department pushed for his release?

*Answer.* We are aware of Lee Ming-cheh's imprisonment in the PRC since 2017. Lee's case has been included in the State Department's PRC Country Report on Human Rights Practices, including the 2020 report. The Biden-Harris administration has placed human rights at the center of its China policy and has repeatedly called on Beijing to release all those who have been jailed for exercising fundamental freedoms, such as freedom of expression and of association.

