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## Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV)

### Background

According to the Army, the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) Family of Vehicles (FoV) is an Army-led, joint-service program designed to replace a portion of each service's light tactical wheeled vehicle fleets. The JLTV FoV consists of two variants: the four-seat Combat Tactical Vehicle (CTV) (**Figure 1**) and the two-seat Combat Support Vehicle (CSV) (**Figure 2**). The CTV is to support the General Purpose, Heavy Gun Carrier, and Close Combat Weapon Carrier missions. The CSV is to support the Utility/Shelter Carrier mission. The JLTV is transportable by a range of lift assets, including rotary-wing aircraft. Its maneuverability enables activities across the spectrum of terrain, including urban areas, while providing inherent and supplemental armor against direct fire and improvised explosive device threats.

### Current Program Status

The JLTV is currently being produced by Oshkosh Defense, headquartered in Oshkosh, WI. In August 2015, the Army awarded Oshkosh a \$6.7 billion low-rate initial production (LRIP) contract to procure the initial 16,901 vehicles for the Army and Marines. In June 2019, the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisitions, Logistics, and Technology) approved Army JLTV full-rate production (FRP). The Army plans for a follow-on full-rate production contract to be awarded to a single vendor in the fourth quarter of FY2022. It is planned to be a competitive five-year contract with five one-year options, with an expected value of \$12.3 billion, for about 30,000 JLTVs and 10,000 JLTV trailers. The Army began fielding LRIP JLTVs to units in April 2019, and Marine Corps units received their first LRIP JLTVs in February 2019.

**Low-Rate Initial Production (LRIP)** is a programmatic decision made when manufacturing development is completed and there is an ability to produce a small-quantity set of articles. It also establishes an initial production base and sets the stage for a gradual increase in production rate to allow for Full-Rate Production (FRP) upon completion of Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E).

**Full-Rate Production (FRP)** is a decision made that allows for government contracting for economic production quantities following stabilization of the system design and validation of the production process.

### JLTV CTV

**Figure 1. JLTV Combat Tactical Vehicle Variant (CTV)**



**Source:** <https://asc.army.mil/web/portfolio-item/cs-css-joint-light-tactical-vehicle/>, accessed December 30, 2020.

### JLTV CSV

**Figure 2. JLTV Combat Support Vehicle Variant (CSV)**



**Source:** <https://asc.army.mil/web/portfolio-item/cs-css-joint-light-tactical-vehicle/>, accessed December 30, 2020.

## Budgetary Information

**Table 1. FY2022 DOD JLTV Budget Request**

<b>Funding Category</b>	<b>Total Request (\$M)</b>	<b>Total Request (Qty)</b>
<b>RDT&amp;E USA</b>	2.6	—
<b>RDT&amp;E USMC</b>	2.0	—
<b>Procurement USA</b>	603.9	2,744
<b>Procurement USAF</b>	97.4	158
<b>Procurement USN</b>	27.4	14
<b>Procurement USMC</b>	322.0	883

**Source:** Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, Program Acquisition Cost by Weapon System: United States Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2022 Budget Request, May 2021, p. 3-2.

**Notes:** RDT&E = Research, Development, Test & Evaluation; \$M = U.S. Dollars in Millions; Qty = FY2022 Procurement Quantities.

### Army FY2022 Unfunded Priorities List

The Army's FY2022 Unfunded Priorities List to Congress reportedly includes a request for an additional \$120 million in JLTV funding to procure 340 additional vehicles, noting the following:

The unfunded request of \$120 million reduces JLTV fielding. Due to Army topline [budget] reductions, our plan to field approximately 3 to 5 Brigade Combat Team's worth of JLTVs each year to FY2041 to reach the authorized procurement objective of 49,099 is in jeopardy. The \$122 million reduction per year will delay the fielding of one Armored Brigade Combat Team (approximately 340 vehicles) per year extending the authorized procurement objective fulfillment to approximately FY2045. From FY2019 to the current proposed funding level, JLTV has seen a 54% reduction in funding at a time when JLTV claimants (e.g., military police, artillery, mission command systems) continues to grow. Other impacts include a price increase for each vehicle as well as jeopardizing the Army's strategy of re-competing the JLTV contract, as continued reductions will dissuade potential manufacturers from submitting proposals ... Lack of funding puts future production/fielding of JLTV at risk for sustained and unplanned contingency high-operational tempo (OPTEMPO) units.

### Foreign Military Sales

The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notes approved JLTV sales to the United Kingdom (\$1.035 billion for 2,747 JLTVs) and Lithuania (\$170.8 million for 500 JLTVs).

## Potential Issues for Congress

### Has the JLTV Become a Major Bill Payer for Army Modernization?

Based on the aforementioned Army FY2022 JLTV Unfunded Priorities List narrative justification, it can be argued that the JLTV has become a major bill payer for other Army modernization efforts. This has resulted in extending fielding timelines and could also cause a vehicle price increase and an overall program cost increase if the Army is unable to re-compete the JLTV contract as currently planned. In addition, there is an associated operational risk, particularly for Army contingency units. As it stands, there appears to be a degree of programmatic uncertainty and risk associated with the Army's decision to use JLTV as a bill payer for other Army modernization priorities.

Some defense experts have speculated that the Marine Corps might also cut its JLTV buy, as the JLTV might prove to be too heavy for the Marines' planned pivot to a more expeditionary form of warfare. If this becomes the case, and the Army reduces or further delays its JLTV procurement to fund modernization, there could be appreciable joint programmatic impacts of interest to policymakers.

### What Is the Future of JLTV Procurement?

The Army's current modernization strategy is primarily focused on six modernization priorities that do not include the JLTV. With the Marine Corps downsizing per its March 2020 Force Design Initiative and adoption of a more expeditionary posture (possibly requiring fewer JLTVs), original JLTV procurement plans for the two major service customers might no longer be relevant. Despite the Army's intent to lower costs by competing a follow-on contract with another vendor by FY2022, slowing production rates and extended procurement timelines can act to increase costs. In addition, different versions of the JLTV produced by another vendor could result in additional operations and maintenance costs that can result from a mixed fleet of vehicles. Taken collectively, these issues might merit DOD and policymakers examining the future of JLTV procurement to help determine the current requirement for JLTVs, as well as whether decisions to extend procurement and re-compete future production will result in increased programmatic costs.

For a more detailed historical discussion of the JLTV Program, see CRS Report RS22942, *Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV): Background and Issues for Congress*, by Andrew Feickert.

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