

CONFRONTING THE RISE IN ANTI-SEMITIC
DOMESTIC TERRORISM, PART II

HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE AND
COUNTERTERRORISM
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION

FEBRUARY 26, 2020

Serial No. 116-61

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security



Available via the World Wide Web: <http://www.govinfo.gov>

U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

41-451 PDF

WASHINGTON : 2020

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CONFRONTING THE RISE IN ANTI-SEMITIC DOMESTIC TERRORISM, PART II

Wednesday, February 26, 2020

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
AND COUNTERTERRORISM,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:03 p.m., in room 310, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Max Rose (Chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Rose, Slotkin, and Walker.

Also present: Representative Malinowski.

Mr. ROSE. The Subcommittee on Intelligence and Counterterrorism will come to order. The subcommittee is meeting today to receive testimony on “Confronting the Rise in Anti-Semitic Domestic Terrorism, Part II.”

Without objection, the Chair is authorized to declare the subcommittee in recess at any point.

Without objection, Members not on the subcommittee shall be permitted to sit and question the witnesses.

I now recognize myself for an opening statement.

Of course, thank you so much to our extraordinary slate of witnesses from the FBI and Department of Homeland Security for coming here today to testify on the Federal Government’s response to the rise in anti-Semitic domestic terrorism.

I am sure in the process we will also be focusing on generally the issue of domestic terrorism. This is not a question of either/or, and we are not losing sight of jihadi terrorism and the threat that it continues to pose. But there is no doubt the statistics do not lie. The rise of domestic terrorism and the anti-Semitic threads running through it are an incredibly real problem.

I have got people in my community, people in communities throughout this country, that are afraid to go outside wearing their kippah, afraid to congregate, afraid to observe the High Holy Days, and people generally are now afraid to do things that they were not afraid to do just a few years ago.

We have certainly seen the rise of a global neo-Nazi, White nationalist movement that is deserving of our attention. Many people, experts, have said that this looks like what al-Qaeda looked like in the 1980’s and the 1990’s. Let’s not find ourselves asleep at the wheel, as we did in the run-up to 9/11.

For so many people in my community, it feels like 9/11 was yesterday. These organizations, it is my opinion and I am not the only

one, need to be identified as foreign terrorist organizations, and if they are not identified as foreign terrorist organizations, you need to tell us that we are still protected.

We need to know that when people in America go to train overseas, when people in America are recruited, when people try to come to America who have trained with these organizations, that you have the same tools at your disposal that you do and have had in the fight against jihadi terrorism. That is not too much to ask on behalf of the American people.

So, with that, I will move on to your testimonies. I have no more highlighted things.

[The statement of Chairman Rose follows:]

STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN MAX ROSE

FEBRUARY 26, 2020

Anti-Semitic domestic terrorism is an issue that has deeply affected my district, my community, and the whole New York City area. As we all know, in recent months, anti-Semitic violence has terrorized Jewish communities across the country. In the past few months, Jews in New York and New Jersey have been subjected to dozens of anti-Semitic incidents and attacks.

We saw the brutal stabbing attack at a rabbi's home in Monsey, New York, on December 28, and the mass shooting in Jersey City on December 10. Just in the past few months, we've seen over 40 anti-Semitic incidents in the New York area. And it hasn't stopped. Earlier this week, bomb threats were sent to 18 Jewish community centers across New York State.

The simple truth is that we are under assault by extremists, many of whom are emboldened to act and often encouraged by content on social media platforms. The time for thoughts and prayers has passed—the time now is for action. Let me be clear: I will not lose sight or focus on this issue which has hit far too close to home.

Last month, this subcommittee heard from experts on anti-Semitic violence and homeland security. Thanks to their expert testimony, we heard a description of the problem—the violence gripping the Jewish community across the country—and we heard their recommendations for Congress and the Executive branch.

Today, we have representatives from the FBI and DHS to discuss the Federal Government's response to the rise in anti-Semitic domestic terrorism. I'm glad to see two representatives from DHS who briefed this committee earlier this month on the Department's approach to targeted violence and terrorism.

I'm also glad to have FBI at the table. Their work countering all forms of terrorism is crucial—and I am looking forward to hearing how they are approaching the issue of anti-Semitic domestic terrorism.

For the past year, Democrats on this committee have led on this issue. Last month, the President signed H.R. 2479, a bill led by Chairman Thompson that I co-sponsored, which authorizes and funds the Nonprofit Security Grant Program to help secure synagogues and other houses of worship. I fought for funding for this program to be increased to \$90 million. It was increased, thanks to strong bipartisan support.

But we also need to consider what measures lawmakers and law enforcement can implement to make sure that anti-Semites and racists can't carry out acts of violence, and that domestic terrorism is seen as the crime that it is. Government officials, at all levels, have a duty to protect Jewish individuals, communities, and institutions from anti-Semitic violence, and must put forth comprehensive strategies to address it. That includes meaningful and respectful outreach and partnerships with Jewish community institutions. In doing so, these strategies should protect and uplift the civil rights and civil liberties of all Americans.

We cannot forget that Anti-Semitic violence in the United States is often linked to transnational networks of terror and hate, including global networks of white supremacist extremists in Europe and elsewhere. The Government must prioritize understanding and combating these networks in order to prevent anti-Semitic and racist violence. When these foreign white supremacist groups meet the definition of a Foreign Terrorist Organization, they should be designated as such.

I look forward to hearing testimony from our witnesses today on the work that is being done to combat anti-Semitic domestic terrorism. More importantly, I want to hear about the work that we still need to do to address this rising threat—and

how Congress can help. We can all see that this problem isn't going away. And I will not lose focus on this issue.

Mr. ROSE. So the Chair now recognizes the Ranking Member of the subcommittee, the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Walker, for an opening statement.

Mr. WALKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your passion in this area and the fine job that you are doing in this area. I appreciate you scheduling today's hearing to follow up on the Federal efforts to address anti-Semitism and domestic terrorism.

It was just last month we had the opportunity to hear directly from faith-based organizations, think tanks, and others on the growing threat of anti-Semitic rhetoric and violence basically around the world. Witnesses testified about growing threats to their communities from a wide variety of hateful ideologies and the need for more Federal coordination and support.

I look forward to hearing from our distinguished panel about ongoing Federal efforts to combat domestic extremism and terrorism.

Earlier this month, FBI Director Wray testified that the Bureau had elevated racially-motivated violent extremism to a threat level on par, and of what Chairman Rose was talking about it, with Islamist terrorism.

In response, the FBI has established a new Fusion Cell to better coordinate the response to domestic terrorism and hate crimes, and joint terrorism task forces across the United States have been instructed to increase their focus on domestic terrorism.

I want to welcome the new FBI Assistant Director of the Counterterrorism Division Jill Sanborn, for, I believe, her first appearance before the Homeland Security Committee.

Similarly, the Department of Homeland Security has taken a number of actions to expand efforts to address domestic terrorism. In April 2019, I believe, DHS launched the new Office of Targeted Violence and Terrorism Prevention, or TVTP, to coordinate efforts across the Department and focus on building prevention capabilities. This office is also working with FEMA to administer the new TVTP grant program.

DHS also released the first Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism and Targeted Violence, which is a holistic review of DHS's counterterrorism capabilities and how they can be utilized to address targeted violence and domestic extremism.

I look forward to hearing more about the implementation plans today for all of these efforts and how DHS will expand the information-sharing and outreach efforts with, very important, faith-based communities.

I applaud the great work that is being done by this administration. It is clear that it is taking the increased domestic extremism threats seriously. I remain steadfast in my commitment to an open and bipartisan discussion about domestic terrorism and hateful ideologies in my quest or my search for meaningful recommendations for addressing these very real threats to our homeland.

We have and we must continue to work in a bipartisan fashion to help provide the necessary tools to our communities that address these complex problems.

I thank the witnesses for appearing here today.

I yield back the balance of my time, Mr. Chairman.

[The statement of Ranking Member Walker follows:]

STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER MARK WALKER

FEB. 26, 2020

I would like to thank Chairman Rose for scheduling today's hearing to follow up on Federal efforts to address anti-Semitism and domestic terrorism.

Last month, we had the opportunity to hear directly from faith-based organizations, think tanks, and others on the growing threat of anti-Semitic rhetoric and violence around the world. Witnesses testified about growing threats to their communities from a wide variety of hateful ideologies and the need for more Federal coordination and support.

I look forward to hearing from our distinguished panel about on-going Federal efforts to combat domestic extremism and terrorism. Earlier this month, FBI Director Wray testified that the Bureau had elevated racially-motivated violent extremism to a threat level on par with Islamist terrorism. In response, the FBI has established a new fusion cell to better coordinate the response to domestic terrorism and hate crimes, and Joint Terrorism Task Forces across the United States have been instructed to increase their focus on domestic terrorism. I want to welcome the new FBI assistant director of the counterterrorism division, Jill Sanborn, for her first appearance before the Homeland Security Committee.

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I applaud the great work that is being done by this administration—it is clear that it is taking the increased domestic extremism threats seriously. I remain steadfast in my commitment to an open, bipartisan discussion about domestic terrorism and hateful ideologies, and my search for meaningful recommendations for addressing these very real threats to our homeland. We have and we must continue to work in a bipartisan fashion to help provide the necessary tools to our communities that address these complex problems.

I thank the witnesses for appearing here today and I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. ROSE. Thank you, Ranking Member, and thank you for your extraordinary partnership in dealing with this issue. Other Members are reminded that statements may be submitted for the record.

[The statement of Chairman Thompson follows:]

STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN BENNIE G. THOMPSON

FEBRUARY 26, 2020

Today's hearing, the subcommittee's second hearing on the issue of anti-Semitic domestic terrorism, presents one more opportunity for all Members of Congress to come together and condemn acts of domestic terrorism and targeted violence motivated by anti-Semitism.

This issue continues to be a top priority for this committee. Since this Congress began, our oversight efforts have uncovered the dramatic and disturbing rise in acts of right-wing domestic terrorism, including anti-Semitic violence.

Sadly, recent acts of anti-Semitic violence in the New York and New Jersey areas have highlighted the urgent need to ensure the Federal Government is working with its State and local partners to combat anti-Semitic domestic terrorism. Some of these attacks targeted houses of worship and other religious institutions, a trend we have increasingly seen Nation-wide.

That is why I introduced H.R. 2476, the American Nonprofit Organizations Against Terrorism Act of 2019, which authorizes the Nonprofit Security Grant Program (NSGP) for years to come. The program provides grants to nonprofits and

faith-based organizations in both urban and rural areas to help secure their facilities against a potential terrorist attack. While I am pleased that the bill was signed into law on January 24, 2020, Congress must continue its work to make sure that all precautions are taken to protect communities targeted by hate and violence.

This includes reevaluating the Grant Program's funding levels and working with community groups and leaders to establish meaningful partnerships to tackle this issue.

On this issue, I would be remiss not to express my disappointment in the Trump administration's continued efforts to make drastic cuts to DHS preparedness grant programs. In fact, the President's proposed fiscal year 2021 budget requested nearly \$700 million in cuts to these important grant programs that are necessary to support State, local, Tribal, and territorial governments in improving their homeland security posture.

However, I am also encouraged by the DHS's first-ever Strategic Framework for Combating Terrorism and Targeted Violence. Earlier this month, the committee held a productive briefing to discuss this strategy. Two of the witnesses today, Assistant Secretary Neumann and Assistant Director Harrell, were among the briefers.

I look forward to speaking further with the Department representatives today to identify issue areas we can work together. Hearing-specific goals and time lines from the Department today will be integral to ensuring that implementation of the strategy is a priority.

Moreover, I look forward to hearing from Assistant Director Sanborn of the FBI, on how the FBI is working with DHS to combat domestic terrorism—especially anti-Semitic domestic terrorism. Additionally, Ms. Sanborn, it is my understanding that you are the first woman to hold the position of assistant director of the Counterterrorism Division at the FBI. I would like to extend my congratulations to you on this significant achievement.

It goes without saying that Congress must continue to advocate for policies that protect the Jewish community and all communities impacted by acts of domestic terror. I look forward to hearing testimony from the witnesses on how we can work together to curb domestic terrorism while respecting and protecting the civil rights and civil liberties of all Americans.

Mr. ROSE. I now welcome our panel of witnesses.

Our first witness is Ms. Jill Sanborn, assistant director of the counterterrorism division of the FBI.

Ms. Sanborn, I understand that you are the first woman to hold this position, and we congratulate you on this tremendous, tremendous achievement.

Our second witness is Ms. Elizabeth Neumann, assistant secretary for threat prevention and security policy in the Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans at DHS.

Our third and final witness is Mr. Brian Harrell, assistant director for infrastructure security at the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, or CISA, at DHS.

Without objection, the witnesses' full statements will be inserted in the record.

I now ask each witness to summarize his or her statement for 5 minutes, beginning with Assistant Director Sanborn.

STATEMENT OF JILL SANBORN, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, COUNTERTERRORISM DIVISION, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Ms. SANBORN. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and Members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today.

My name is Jill Sanborn. It is always an honor to be on the Hill, where I started my public service as a Senate page back in 1987.

As of last week, I am now the assistant director of the FBI's counterterrorism division. I spent the last couple years as the spe-

cial agent in charge of the Bureau's Minneapolis division, where I had the honor of overseeing FBI operations in Minnesota and the Dakotas.

While I was sad to leave the great folks working the upper Midwest, I am equally happy to be here focusing on the counterterrorism fight once again.

As the Members of this committee are well aware, preventing acts of terrorism, domestic or international, continues to be the FBI's No. 1 priority. The FBI takes very seriously all acts of terrorism, from any place, by any actor, against any person.

Multiple fatal attacks, from a church in Charleston in 2015, to a synagogue in Poway just last year, underscore the continuing threat currently facing faith-based communities in the United States.

The threat itself is diverse. In the last 18 months, Jewish communities have been targeted and threatened by violent extremists across the terrorism spectrum.

It is widely known that there are groups that want to do harm to Americans, but the greatest threat we face today is the one posed by lone actors of any ideology, who are typically radicalized on-line and look to attack soft targets with easily accessible weapons. The solitary nature of their radicalization and mobilization makes them particularly difficult to identify and disrupt before they take their opportunity to act.

More often than not we are seeing that these people are motivated and inspired by a mix of ideological, social, political, and personal grievances against their targets.

While identifying the ideology of the person helps us understand their motivation, our ability to prevent an attack seems to rely heavily on recognizing warning signs or indicators that someone is actually mobilizing toward an act of terrorism.

In a recent FBI study of successful attackers, in each case at least one person saw a change in the attacker's behavior before the attack unfolded.

Unfortunately, people in the United States are often inspired by attacks abroad. Attacks like the one in Christchurch, New Zealand, last year could and have incited others to conduct a similar attack here in the United States. In fact, we have seen some domestic terror subjects reference foreign individuals over the course of their own radicalization process, as well as attempt to livestream their attacks, mirroring what they have seen overseas attackers do.

The internet transcends borders; so, too, do the ideas that are propagated on it. To that end, we have seen some domestic terrorism subjects travel overseas, some to conflict zones, for combat training.

It is for these reasons, and many more, that the FBI commits significant resources to the fight against terrorism both here and abroad. Regardless of where it happens, how it happens, or who does it, terrorism is terrorism.

I would like to thank all of our partners, including the Members of this committee, who work with us to keep the American people safe. We do not and cannot fight this battle alone.

Our people are collaborating and communicating at a high level in joint terrorism task forces across the country, and also within the numerous fusion centers throughout the Nation.

In my career, I have worked with many fusion centers, to include some in your districts, and the work we are doing together there is simply amazing. In fact, information provided by the fusion center in Orange County, California, led us to predicate cases that recently resulted in 7 arrests of members of The Base across 4 different States.

Collectively, we are working around the clock to push out real-time intelligence to Federal, State, local, Tribal, and territorial agencies. This collaboration will continue to be vital as we face new trends in the threat.

Our partnerships include non-law enforcement agencies, from tech companies to faith-based organizations like the Anti-Defamation League. I can tell you from my time in the upper Midwest, one of our best partners was, and still is, the Jewish Community Relations Council of Minnesota and the Dakotas.

These relationships are working. In just the first quarter of this fiscal year, these types of partnerships have assisted JTTFs across the country in disrupting and arresting 38 terrorism subjects right here in the United States.

In closing, I want to thank you for your continued support of the men and women of the FBI. I am honored to be here with you today to discuss the issues facing our communities, and I look forward to answering any questions you might have.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Sanborn follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JILL SANBORN

FEBRUARY 26, 2020

Good afternoon, Chairman Rose, Ranking Member Walker, and Members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I welcome the opportunity to discuss the FBI's efforts to combat the terrorism threat to the homeland, specifically the increasingly lethal threat posed by violent extremism to the Jewish community.

THREAT ASSESSMENT

While the threat posed by terrorism has evolved significantly since 9/11, preventing terrorist attacks from foreign and domestic actors remains the FBI's top priority. We face persistent threats to the homeland and to U.S. interests abroad from foreign terrorist organizations ("FTO"), home-grown violent extremists ("HVE"), and domestic violent extremists ("DVE"). The threat posed to the United States has expanded from sophisticated, externally-directed plots to attacks conducted by radicalized lone actors who mobilize to violence based on international and domestic violent ideologies.

In this vein, the greatest threat we face in the homeland today is that posed by lone actors radicalized on-line who look to attack soft targets with easily accessible weapons. This threat includes both HVEs and DVEs, two distinct sets of individuals who generally radicalize and mobilize to violence on their own. Many of these insular violent extremists are motivated and inspired by a mix of ideological, socio-political, and personal grievances against their targets, which recently have increasingly included large public gatherings, houses of worship, and retail locations. Lone actors, who by definition are not likely to conspire with others regarding their plans, are increasingly choosing these soft, familiar targets for their attacks, further limiting law enforcement opportunities for detection and disruption ahead of their action.

These lone actors have targeted and will likely continue to pose a threat to the Jewish community. Multiple recent attacks against the Jewish community perpetrated by Racially/Ethnically Motivated Violent Extremists highlight the diverse

nature of this threat. In just the last 18 months, anti-Semitic terrorism has devastated Jewish communities from Pueblo to Poway to Pittsburgh to Jersey City. These attacks were planned by individuals with a variety of ideological motivations that justify violence toward others, to include those who advocate for a perceived superiority of the white race, as well as individuals with an ideology that believes Western hemisphere-based minorities are the true Jewish race and are empowered to eradicate those not in their belief system. In fact, the top threat we face from DVEs stems from those we identify as Racially/Ethnically Motivated Violent Extremists. Racially/Ethnically Motivated Violent Extremists were the primary source of all ideologically-motivated lethal incidents and violence in 2018 and 2019 and have been considered the most lethal of all domestic violent extremists since 2001. We assess the threat posed by Racially/Ethnically Motivated Violent Extremists in the homeland and will remain persistent going forward.

Domestic violent extremists pose a steady and evolving threat of violence and economic harm to the United States. Trends may shift, but the underlying drivers for domestic violent extremism—which includes socio-political conditions, racism, and anti-Semitism, just to name a few—remain constant. As stated above, the FBI is most concerned about lone offender attacks; primarily shootings, as they have served as the dominant lethal mode for domestic violent extremist attacks. More deaths were caused by domestic violent extremists than international terrorists in recent years. In fact, 2019 was the deadliest year for domestic violent extremism since the Oklahoma City Bombing in 1995; a tragic note on the state of domestic terrorism as we look back and remember the victims and their families approaching the 25th anniversary of that horrific attack.

HVEs, who are global jihad-inspired; FTOs; and state sponsors of terrorism have also demonstrated and acted upon a desire to target Jewish houses of worship and the Jewish community in the United States. Groups such as the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (“ISIS”), the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (“IRGC”), and Hizballah have established anti-Semitic intent and encouraged their followers to target Jewish persons and interests both in the homeland and around the world. In April 2016, an individual in southern Florida was arrested by the FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force (“JTTF”) based on his plot to attack a Florida Jewish Center with an improvised explosive device (“IED”) in support of a FTO. In August 2018, two individuals were arrested for working on behalf of the Islamic Republic of Iran to conduct surveillance of Jewish facilities in the United States. In December 2018, a JTTF in Ohio arrested a subject who identified two different synagogues in Toledo he wanted to attack in support of ISIS. These arrests reflect just a few examples of international terrorism actors who have targeted the Jewish community.

It is important to note again that the FBI is concerned about any and all acts of terrorism. Multiple lethal attacks in the last 5 years have underscored the threat posed by violent extremist actors to all faith-based communities in the United States. From the attack on the Emanuel AME Church in Charleston in 2015 to the attack on a Hanukkah celebration in Monsey just 2 months ago, our faith-based communities have been targeted during services, in their places of worship, which have included temples, synagogues, churches, mosques, and private homes; and in their grocery stores and community centers. Each attack represents unacceptable violence against a group of Americans gathered together to exercise their Constitutional right to practice their religious beliefs freely. The FBI takes these attacks very seriously, and is committed to working with our partners to prevent these acts of terrorism.

The attacks and disrupted plots we saw in 2019 underscore the continued threat posed by violent extremists. Such crimes are not limited to the United States, however, and with the aid of the internet, like-minded violent extremists can reach across borders. Violent extremists are increasingly using social media for the distribution of propaganda, recruitment, target selection, and incitement to violence. Through the internet, violent extremists around the world have access to our local communities to target, recruit, and radicalize like-minded individuals and on a global scale. Attackers both in the United States and overseas, for example, have posted manifestos dedicated to their ideology prior to their attacks.

Last year’s attack in Poway not only highlights the enduring threat of violence posed by domestic violent extremists, but also demonstrates the danger presented by the propagation of these violent acts on the internet. The attacker in Poway referenced the mosque attacks in Christchurch, New Zealand, and we remain concerned that on-line sharing of live-streamed attack footage could amplify viewer reaction to attacks and provide ideological and tactical inspiration to other violent extremists in the homeland. Less than 2 months after the attacks in Christchurch, FBI JTTFs in multiple states disrupted plots both to replicate and to retaliate for those attacks in New Zealand. We continue to see subjects reference foreign

attackers in the course of their radicalization process. In recent years we have also increasingly seen domestic violent extremists both communicating and traveling to meet with like-minded individuals overseas. Some of these individuals have traveled to conflict zones for combat training and established contacts with foreign military and paramilitary organizations, which could increase their capacity for violence here in the homeland.

FBI AND PARTNERSHIP ACTION TO COMBAT THE THREAT

As the threat to harm the United States and U.S. interests evolves, we are adapting and confronting these challenges, relying heavily on the strength of our Federal, State, local, Tribal, and international partnerships. In that vein, it is important to highlight the men and women across this country that work to fight terrorism every day. That includes the men and women of the FBI, who have dedicated their lives to our mission to protect the American people from its enemies and to uphold the Constitution of the United States. It also includes the men and women across the United States who serve on our Joint Terrorism Task Forces and in our fusion centers, who work with the FBI to identify, assess, and disrupt terrorism threats in the homeland. These force-multipliers in the counterterrorism fight serve as the front line in the homeland and bring invaluable experience and familiarity with the local community to our investigations. Just in January 2020, JTTFs across the 50 States disrupted 22 terrorism subjects by arrest.

In this vein, I would be remiss if I did not mention the great work being done to fight the scourge of hate crimes by my colleagues in our Criminal Investigative Division. Through our Domestic Terrorism-Hate Crimes Fusion Cell we at the FBI apply the expertise, dedication, and resources of both the Counterterrorism and Criminal Investigative Divisions to these overlapping threats, working to prevent the threats on the horizon and provide justice to the victims of hate crimes. Because individual incidents may be investigated as both domestic terrorism and as a hate crime, we bring the force of the FBI to bear against any event that may fall into these categories, investigating crimes through the lenses of both Divisions unless or until one avenue is foreclosed or eliminated. This Fusion Cell helps ensure seamless information sharing across Divisions and augments investigative resources to combat the domestic terrorism threat, ensuring we are not solely focusing on the current threat or most recent attack, but also looking to the future to prevent the next one.

In the last year, the FBI investigated countless threats to religious institutions. Our most valuable tool in this counterterrorism fight exists in our relationships with local communities and the public, who are best positioned to notice a change in an individual's behavior and alert the FBI to threats that endanger members and congregants. In line with this effort, the FBI's partnerships with leaders in the faith-based communities are paramount to our success. Just a few months ago the FBI held a Roundtable with leaders from the faith-based community across the country to discuss the threats posed to their members and the importance of vigilance in their places of worship. Perhaps more importantly, our Field Offices conduct outreach with faith-based leaders in their areas of responsibility to host inter-faith working groups and training in an effort to ensure communities are kept abreast of the current threat picture and are in the best position to prevent and mitigate acts of terrorism when they arise.

It is also important to highlight our outreach to social media and technology companies. FBI interactions with social media companies center on education and capacity building, in line with our goal to assist companies in developing or enhancing their terms of service to address violent extremist exploitation of their platforms. I want to emphasize that no FBI investigation can be opened solely on the basis of First Amendment-protected activity. Thus, the FBI does not investigate mere hateful rhetoric or association with groups that are not engaged in criminal activity, or with movements without any element of violence or criminal activity. In order to predicate a domestic terrorism investigation of an individual, the FBI must have information that there is the potential for a Federal or criminal violation and that the individual is threatening or planning violent actions in furtherance of an ideology. In this vein, we remain sensitive to First Amendment-protected activities during investigative and intelligence efforts so as to ensure our investigative actions remain aligned to and do not exceed the scope of our authorities and are conducted with the appropriate protections in place for privacy and civil liberties.

In a recent FBI study of HVEs who were successful in conducting their attacks, the FBI found that in every instance, at least one person saw a change in the attacker's behavior before the individual mobilized to violence. This was not surprising given the frequency with which the FBI receives terrorism-related tips from

the community, law enforcement, or other Government agencies. In this vein, increased community awareness of concerning behaviors and encouraging reporting of those behaviors are critical in our fight against terrorism in the homeland. Friends and family are always in the best position to notice a change in the behavior of their loved ones. Their willingness to reach out to law enforcement and others in the community to get help for individuals they are concerned about make them critical to protecting others in their communities and neighborhoods. We need the public to maintain this awareness, and help us to expand the understanding that “See Something, Say Something” is not a plea for vigilance limited to unattended baggage—it also includes our responsibility to speak up when we believe an individual in our midst could be radicalizing to violence.

CONCLUSION

The FBI would not be as successful as we are in identifying and detecting violent extremists before they act if it were not for our close relationships with all of our partners across the country, including law enforcement at the Federal, State, local, Tribal, and territorial levels, as well as our partners in the faith-based communities and the private sector. In conjunction with these partners we constantly collect and analyze information concerning the on-going threats posed by violent extremists and work to share that information with these partners around the country, and with our international partners around the world. The American lives saved in communities across this country are a testament to their hard work and dedication to disrupting terrorism from any place, by any actor.

Chairman Rose, Ranking Member Walker, and Members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify concerning the evolving terrorism threat to the homeland. As I hope I will make clear to you today, the FBI takes very seriously the threat of terrorism in any place, by any actor, against any individual or group. Regardless of a case classification or indictment category, we work daily to carry out the FBI mission to protect the American people and uphold the Constitution of the United States. We are grateful for the support that you and this subcommittee have provided to the FBI, and we look forward to answering any questions you might have.

Mr. ROSE. Thank you for your testimony.

I now recognize Assistant Secretary Neumann to summarize her statement for 5 minutes.

STATEMENT OF ELIZABETH NEUMANN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, THREAT PREVENTION AND SECURITY POLICY, OFFICE OF STRATEGY, POLICY, AND PLANS, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Ms. NEUMANN. Chairman Rose, Ranking Member Walker, Congresswoman Slotkin, and Congressman Malinowski, I have appreciated each of your attention, your leadership, to this issue, and I appreciate you holding this hearing today.

Last summer, I toured Auschwitz-Birkenau death camps. To prepare I read multiple survivors’ memoirs, but really nothing can prepare you for the size and the scale of those camps.

The more harrowing thing I found was that there was a methodical approach to annihilating groups of people that were deemed “less than.” I was struggling with how do people devolve into such depravity, how quickly pride, which is that part of ourselves that says, “I am better than,” which we all struggle with, it is the original sin, but how quickly pride leads to anger, then hate, and then to violence, if properly stoked and unchecked.

How quickly a small group of empowered people, take just the prison guards at one camp, they had to buy into the justification, a sick rationale, to bring themselves to kill millions of people in a systematic fashion.

You see, they didn’t see fellow men and women. They didn’t see the children reminding them of their own sons and daughters and

nieces and nephews. Those coming off sealed cattle car trains were “the other,” a manifestation of a profound breakdown of societal bonds into two camps—us and them.

While many scholars and philosophers have expanded on this idea far better than I can, experiencing Auschwitz left me with renewed purpose to root out such division within our country.

Anti-Semitism and similar ideologies of hatred and the violence perpetrated in their name have a chilling effect on Americans’ ability and willingness to openly exercise their Constitution’s guaranteed rights. These individuals support ideologies that seek to create “the other” here in the United States, and we cannot let that happen.

Last June, I had the privilege of testifying before another subcommittee, and I made a commitment that DHS would develop a strategy to counter the threat of domestic terrorism. In September, DHS released that strategy, the Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism and Targeted Violence, which describes the threat from domestic terrorism, particularly racially- or ethnically-motivated violent extremism as growing, and needing to be addressed in the same way we have addressed the foreign terrorist challenge.

It calls for us to update the tools and expertise that have protected and strengthened our country the past 17 years from foreign terrorists, to address the threat from domestic terrorism and targeted violence.

As testified in one of your earlier panels, increasingly this threat is transnational. Thus, we are exploring how to leverage our existing CT authorities to combat terrorist travel against any foreign threat actor seeking to conduct violence.

At DHS we work closely with the State Department, who has the statutory authority for designating groups as foreign terrorist organizations. For any groups that are designated, DHS then implements relevant screening and vetting measures.

While designations of certain overseas groups may help us address some of these challenges, the lack of a designation does not prevent the Department from applying its authorities under the INA to disrupt travel of violent extremists. We have several examples of skilled CBP officers preventing foreign nationals with ties to neo-Nazi groups overseas from entering the country due to being deemed inadmissible under the INA.

Finally, we are seeing foreign-based groups attempting to influence and motivate U.S.-based individuals through a variety of extremist ideologies in an effort to sow discord in the United States as well as incite violence. It is critical that we educate the American public and build resilience to these malign influence campaigns.

We are still early in this process, and it is a process which needs to be done carefully to ensure we operate within the bounds of existing authorities. But please know that our operators are actively working to prevent individuals seeking to harm our citizens from entering the country.

The Strategic Framework also called for DHS to create new tools, new capabilities to address the threat of terrorism and targeted violence. It redefines what we mean by prevention and calls for scaling the prevention mission across the United States.

Prevention efforts, in short, are locally-based solutions, centered on accepted threat assessment and management approaches. We are assisting law enforcement and communities to offer voluntary counsel and help to susceptible individuals before they commit a crime or violent act.

The strategy also highlights that we need to do a better job countering the on-line influence of violent extremists, as witnesses on previous panels discussed in depth. Thanks to funding provided by you in fiscal year 2020, we are already beginning to scale the prevention mission this year. That effort is under way and described in more detail in our written statement for the record. Further, the President's budget for fiscal year 2021 requests additional increases for prevention.

We are headed in the right direction, and I am hopeful that these efforts in time will lead to a reduction in violence in our communities.

But let me end with this. While I am passionate about DHS's approach to preventing violence, I am also realistic about how much Government can do. At its core, hate is a heart problem, and Government can only do so much about heart problems. We need engaged citizens, communities of faith, and leaders in communities, nonprofits, corporations, academia, technology, and Government to stand up against this evil.

In his Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech in 1986, Eli Wiesel, a survivor of Auschwitz-Birkenau's death camps, said: We must always take sides. Neutrality helps the oppressor, never the victim. Sometimes we must interfere. When human lives are endangered, when human dignity is in jeopardy, national borders and sensitivities become irrelevant.

Thank you for holding this hearing, and I look forward to your questions.

[The joint prepared statement of Ms. Neumann and Mr. Harrell follows:]

JOINT PREPARED STATEMENT OF ELIZABETH NEUMANN AND BRIAN HARRELL

FEBRUARY 26, 2020

INTRODUCTION

Chairman Rose, Ranking Member Walker, and distinguished Members of the subcommittee, thank you for holding today's hearing on domestic terrorism and, in particular, the rise in anti-Semitic domestic terrorism.

Terrorists and perpetrators of targeted violence aim to weaken the very fabric of our democracy. The Constitution's guaranteed rights and privileges, including free exercise of religion, are integral to the American way of life. Anti-Semitism and similar ideologies of hatred for religious groups, and the violence perpetrated in its name, have a chilling effect on Americans' ability and willingness to openly exercise their most fundamental rights.

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is committed to preventing and mitigating the impact of all forms of terrorism and targeted violence. DHS addresses the threat of domestic terrorism with the same gravity and seriousness that it gives to foreign terrorist organizations. To be clear, whether its origins are anti-Semitism, white supremacy, or something else, domestic terrorism of any form cannot and will not be tolerated in the homeland. The Department stands committed to working with faith-based organizations (FBO) and other stakeholders to enhance our collective ability to prevent, protect against, and respond to attacks in our communities.

Over the past decade, DHS, the Department of Justice, and our State, local, Tribal, and territorial (SLTT) law enforcement partners have tried a variety of approaches to tackle the problem of targeted violence and terrorism originating from

within the homeland. We have learned that traditional law enforcement tools—such as investigations and prosecutions—are critical, but they alone cannot solve the problem.

We need to make it harder to carry out an attack and reduce the potential loss of life, as well as prevent individuals from mobilizing to violence in the first place. Achieving those objectives is beyond the Federal Government’s capability and role alone; we need a whole-of-society approach. DHS’s role in this effort is to inform, equip, and empower the homeland security enterprise to enhance its capabilities. This means building meaningful partnerships and trust among many different actors in our local communities, including houses of worship, civic organizations, Government agencies, law enforcement, and others, and providing resources, training, and other assistance that bolsters their ability to protect themselves and prevent these attacks before they happen.

A NEW APPROACH

Since its creation in 2003, DHS has initiated numerous programs and activities to provide support to our SLTT and private-sector partners across the National Preparedness System. The National Preparedness Goal is comprised of 5 Mission Areas: Prevention, Protection, Mitigation, Response, and Recovery. Across 4 of these missions, DHS has supported our partners in steadily building core capabilities for decades. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)—as the primary lead for the mitigation, response, and recovery missions—has worked to hone the doctrine, policy, concept of operations, and training since the 1980’s, while the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), which leads the protection mission, has been at it for 15 years. DHS is now bringing to scale the fifth mission—the prevention mission—to ensure that there is both a well-regarded set of baseline capabilities and the capacity to help State and local partners build these programs.

In September of last year, DHS released its *Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism and Targeted Violence* (referred to here as the “Strategic Framework”), which seeks to use all the Department’s resources to address these threats holistically. It also makes clear that the threat landscape is no longer dominated solely by foreign terrorist organizations; significant attention and effort are required to address domestic terrorism and the mass attacks associated with targeted violence.

The Strategic Framework contains 4 goals to counter terrorism and targeted violence:

1. *Goal 1.*—Understand the evolving terrorism and targeted violence threat environment, and support partners in the homeland security enterprise through this specialized knowledge.

2. *Goal 2.*—Prevent terrorists and other hostile actors from entering the United States and deny them the opportunity to exploit the Nation’s trade, immigration, and domestic and international travel systems.

3. *Goal 3.*—Prevent terrorism and targeted violence.

4. *Goal 4.*—Enhance U.S. infrastructure protections and community preparedness.

While these goals focus on some very traditional roles for the Department—information sharing, border security, and infrastructure protection—the Strategic Framework is novel in several respects.

First, it addresses not only international and domestic terrorism, but also targeted violence—explicitly stating for the first time in National-level strategy that these threats overlap and intersect, necessitating a shared set of solutions.

Second, the Strategic Framework lays a significant marker for DHS to step up its activities in the prevention space. The Department views prevention as key to addressing terrorism and targeted violence in the United States. Consequently, the Strategic Framework’s third goal—simply titled “Prevent terrorism and targeted violence”—calls for DHS to further the development of societal resistance to radicalization and ensure broad awareness of the threat of mobilization to violence. It also emphasizes locally-based solutions. DHS will continue to support local efforts to develop and sustain prevention frameworks that ensure threat assessment and management approaches that assist law enforcement and the communities they serve to “off-ramp” susceptible individuals before they commit a crime or violent act.

Third, the Strategic Framework highlights the need to counter terrorists’ and violent extremists’ influence on-line. Witnesses on previous hearing panels discussed the role of on-line platforms in addressing the spread of violent extremist and other hate-filled content. The Department will continue to engage with our partners in the private sector, including internet service providers and social media platforms, both directly and through broader initiatives such as the Global Internet Forum for Counterterrorism and the evolving framework found in the Christchurch Call to Action. We will also continue to support efforts by individual technology companies,

non-governmental organizations, and civic partners through mechanisms like the digital forum for terrorism prevention and by supporting digital challenges that turn the tools terrorists and others use for malicious intent back on them.

IMPLEMENTING THE FRAMEWORK FOR COUNTERING TERRORISM AND TARGETED VIOLENCE

The Department is working aggressively to meet the goals it has set for itself, including working diligently to finalize an implementation plan for the Strategic Framework. The implementation plan will outline DHS's role in this space, which again is to ensure that our SLTT partners have the knowledge, tools, and resources required to address all of the missions contained in the Strategic Framework. Nowhere is this more critical than the need to bolster the protection and prevention missions within the United States to reduce the harms associated with terrorism and targeted violence fueled by anti-Semitism.

Protection

The Department's protection mission is integral to the Nation's counterterrorism efforts. The protection of infrastructure and people are therefore a vital component of the Department's Strategic Framework.

CISA is at the forefront of this work and is continuing long-standing efforts to partner with communities to enhance their safety and security. For example, CISA's Hometown Security Initiative provides direct, tangible support to harden public gathering locations. Leveraging its field personnel and program offices, CISA also shares threat information, including prominent and emerging tactics; conducts security and vulnerability assessments; and provides a wide range of training and exercises. In the last 3 fiscal years, CISA conducted 1,534 engagements with FBOs, primarily through its Protective Security Advisors (PSA). In fiscal year 2019 alone, CISA conducted 800 engagements with places of worship, progressively increasing its outreach annually since fiscal year 2017.

CISA also provides a suite of resources that helps inform local decision making. For example, CISA shares information aimed at reducing the impacts of an active-shooter incident. This information focuses on suspicious behavioral indicators, potential attack methods, how to develop an emergency action plan, actions that may be taken during an incident to reduce its impact, and how to quickly and effectively recover from an incident. Since 2011, CISA has conducted more than 300 in-person Active Shooter Preparedness Workshops with 41,000 participants, nearly 975,000 people successfully completed the on-line training course, the publicly-available website has been viewed almost 4.5 million times, and PSAs conducted more than 5,000 active-shooter activities (e.g., briefings, presentations, security walk throughs, and emergency planning sessions) directly with facilities. Many of these resources have been provided to FBOs. Following the tragic attack at the Tree of Life synagogue in Pittsburgh, members of the synagogue credited the training coordinated by CISA's PSA with saving lives.

CISA also maintains an exercise program that provides effective and practical mechanisms to identify areas for improvement, implement, and evaluate corrective actions, and share best practices through discussion- and operations-based exercises. Scenarios are driven by the public and private sectors, and often focus on active shooters. As just one example, in April 2019, CISA partnered with the Secure Community Network to conduct a tabletop exercise with Jewish Community leaders from across the United States, law enforcement personnel, and interagency officials to work through how the community will share information and what actions they would take in the event of a threat.

Additionally, FEMA manages the Nonprofit Security Grant Program, which provides more than \$70 million in grants annually to non-profit and faith-based institutions to protect infrastructure and houses of worship.

Prevention

The paths of terrorists and other violent actors are not linear. As witnesses on previous hearing panels have attested, anti-Semitic attacks in the United States demonstrate a variety of ideological drivers. As such, there is not a one-size-fits-all solution to these attacks on FBOs. However, the factors that drive these individuals to violence are almost consistently observed by those who know them best. Families, friends, bystanders, and others who are concerned for the well-being of these individuals are critical to prevention, as they are often the ones who will recognize behavioral changes over time that may be indicative of radicalization and mobilization to violence.

Building local prevention frameworks that these bystanders can consult when they have concerns—especially before an individual has committed a criminal act—

is the lynchpin of our prevention efforts. DHS is focused on ensuring that SLTT partners, social services, civil society groups, the private sector, and other elements of the local homeland security enterprise are aware, informed, and capable of creating and maintaining local prevention frameworks. Baseline capabilities published by DHS will help States and municipalities understand what ingredients are needed in a framework and may help them identify existing resources that can be leveraged for prevention of terrorism and targeted violence. For instance, a suicide hotline, a case management system for school resource officers or existing protocols for community engagement on other issues can be a good start for a prevention framework and baseline capabilities will determine whether and how they fit. When consulted, these local prevention frameworks can work with individuals of concern and their support network of family and friends to prevent further progression toward violence and improve the odds of a more positive outcome for all involved.

The Department is already actively engaged in prevention activities. DHS currently provides information products to State and local partners that provide the latest understanding of the threat and how to prevent it. For 20 years, the United States Secret Service National Threat Assessment Center (NTAC) has been conducting research and training on the prevention of various forms of targeted violence. NTAC has traveled to all 50 States, the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and 16 countries providing 1,188 training/briefings to approximately 160,000 members of Federal, State, and local law enforcement, mental health professionals, teachers and school administrators, private industry, and other community stakeholders. NTAC's most recent publications included an operational guide for preventing targeted school violence, *Mass Attacks in Public Spaces—2018*, which was released in July 2019, and the most comprehensive behavioral analysis of incidents of targeted violence at K–12 schools released in November 2019. Since 2011, NTAC has also provided 100 case or program consultations for community partners. The goal of NTAC's work is to help standardize the principles of threat assessment so our communities are better equipped to identify persons of concern, assess their potential for carrying out an act of targeted violence, and intervene before an act of violence takes place.

In recent years, DHS has also worked diligently to identify what works best to prevent terrorism and targeted violence. We have administered a grant program since 2016 to identify innovative programs and promising practices, delivered awareness trainings to audiences seeking knowledge of the threat, engendered effective partnerships with the whole of society, and assisted practitioners across the country in building meaningful and effective prevention programs.

All of this preparatory work culminated in the April 2019 creation of the Office of Targeted Violence and Terrorism Prevention (TVTP), the primary entity responsible for driving the prevention mission within DHS. From that starting point, we worked with Congress to share the Department's vision for prevention. Over the course of many hours of briefings across the Hill, we had several productive conversations on the best approach to this problem. We also pledged to develop a prevention strategy. In September 2019, we delivered on that promise with the publication of DHS's Strategic Framework, wherein Goal 3 outlines the DHS approach to prevention.

In December 2019, Congress provided funds to implement that mission through TVTP. We thank you for that investment. Because of this additional funding, DHS is well-positioned to begin achieving the goals laid out in the Strategic Framework. For example, with \$10 million in fiscal year 2020 grant funding dedicated to the creation and expansion of local prevention programs, DHS will build on the promising practices and lessons learned from DHS's past and on-going activities, with an emphasis on projects that will help our partners to build local capacity to prevent targeted violence and all forms of terrorism.

The Department is also expanding its ability to coordinate and deliver technical assistance. For example, TVTP's awareness briefing team is coordinating, updating, and expanding DHS's training offerings—including the Community Awareness Briefing, Community Resilience Exercise, and Law Enforcement Awareness Briefing (in partnership with the DHS Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties and the Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers)—to meet the needs of our State and local partners, as well as the technology sector. A strategic engagement team is working with key stakeholders, including houses of worship; civic organizations; behavioral practitioners; law enforcement and other Government officials; and others, to ensure the proper operation of prevention frameworks at the local level. Broader engagement seeks to amplify and support local prevention efforts.

Over the next year, the Department's top priority will be working with our State and local partners to issue baseline capabilities and build locally-based prevention capabilities. To do that, we will leverage both the Targeted Violence and Terrorism

Prevention Grant Program and a soon-to-be-launched Nation-wide field staff presence to provide technical assistance to those partners who have volunteered to work with us to develop these capabilities. With fiscal year 2020 appropriations, DHS's field staff program can now expand over the next year to 12 regions across the country with the ability to deliver awareness briefings, convene key stakeholders required to collaborate on prevention frameworks, and identify existing resources that can bolster prevention efforts.

The Homeland Security Advisory Council Subcommittee Report on Preventing Targeted Violence Against Faith-Based Communities

Recognizing the impact that the threat of targeted violence and terrorism has on FBOs, at the suggestion of Chairman Thompson and Ranking Member Rogers, then-Acting Secretary McAleenan directed the Homeland Security Advisory Council (HSAC) to stand up a subcommittee that would focus on how the Department can support FBOs to keep them safe, secure, and resilient. The HSAC subcommittee transmitted its findings and recommendations on preventing targeted violence against FBOs to Acting Secretary Wolf on December 17, 2019. We are grateful for the leadership of the subcommittee co-chairs, General John R. Allen, USMC (Ret.), and Paul Goldenberg, and for the valuable recommendations they provided. DHS leadership acted quickly to assess the Report's findings and identify areas where we could take action.

The encouraging news is that many of the subcommittee's recommendations will be addressed in the implementation plan for the Strategic Framework, which is now being finalized. The Implementation Plan is one of the Department's top priorities.

The Department continues to explore options to implement several of the top-tier recommendations in the Report. We concur with the Report's findings on the importance of having a designated lead within DHS who is responsible for coordinating security-related information, training, and engagement with FBOs. The Department is in the process of identifying the appropriate office and resources to support this requirement. The Department also concurs with the recommendation to establish a standing inter-faith advisory council to support the work of this newly-established director for FBOs. Such a council would enhance the Department's understanding of FBO security needs, streamline and increase our engagement with FBOs, and inform our responsiveness to threats of targeted violence. We look forward to sharing more details about the new director for FBOs and inter-faith advisory council as they are formalized.

Last, we should note that several of the Report's findings focus on enhancing outreach efforts by State and local fusion centers, and on increasing awareness, training, and information sharing at the local level. In order to best address these recommendations, DHS must employ a multi-pronged approach that includes all State, local, Federal, and non-Federal partners, including State Homeland Security Advisors and State and local law enforcement. This approach should build upon DHS's mission to facilitate and enhance information sharing and analysis across the DHS intelligence enterprise, and with our SLTT homeland security partners. Furthermore, our approach should leverage DHS's field-deployed experts, such as the CISA's PSAs, TVTP's Prevention Coordinators, and DHS Intelligence and Analysis Field Intelligence Officers who engage with communities and provide vetted information, security assessments, and links to key resources and training. We look forward to engaging with Members of Congress to outline opportunities where we believe additional resources could help advance this important goal.

CONCLUSION

The Department recognizes there is a lot of work to do, and that the threat continues. It is unacceptable that anyone in the United States be made to feel afraid because of religion, race, or ethnicity, nor should anyone be fearful of attending a house of worship or school, or of visiting a public space. We are working expeditiously to ensure that DHS is postured to better prevent and protect against all forms of targeted violence regardless of the ideological motivation.

The Department is also seeking to build our prevention and protection programs to scale in the coming years. The President's fiscal year 2021 budget request reflects this requirement, adding \$80 million to the prevention and protection missions. In addition to allowing expansion of hard infrastructure assessments and cybersecurity engagements, among others, this budget will permit CISA to expand its field forces to significantly improve its ability to meet regional stakeholders' service demands, such as vulnerability assessments and recommendations for action; guidance and best practices for security and resilience; situational awareness products and briefings; active shooter and counter-IED products, training and tools; and workshops, exercises, and consultancy to affect a comprehensive approach to address the threat

of targeted violence and terrorism. With the additional funds provided in the President's budget, TVTP will enhance coordination of the overall prevention approach for the Department and expand provision of technical and financial assistance to SLTT partners establishing and expanding local prevention frameworks. Specifically, the President's budget will expand TVTP's regional coordinator program, enhance our efforts to engage with the technology sector to combat terrorist use of the internet, and double the size of the Targeted Violence and Terrorism Prevention Grant Program.

Again, thank you for the opportunity to appear before the subcommittee to discuss the Department's efforts to combat domestic terrorism, in particular, by maturing the prevention and protection work of DHS. We look forward to answering your questions.

Mr. ROSE. Thank you for your testimony.

I now recognize Assistant Director Harrell to summarize his statement for 5 minutes.

STATEMENT OF BRIAN HARRELL, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY, CYBERSECURITY AND INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY AGENCY, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Mr. HARRELL. Chairman Rose, Ranking Member Walker, and Members of the subcommittee, thank you very much for having me today.

The cornerstone of America's democracy is a free and open society where people can live without fear of harm. Americans expect to be safe and secure as they conduct their daily lives. Most importantly, there are certain foundational rights within the Constitution that must be protected.

These freedoms, including the right to practice a religion of choice, are integral to the American way of life.

Unfortunately, the persistent pressures from domestic and international terrorists and other violent extremist actors aim to threaten the fabric of America's democracy.

Differences in ideology materialize in targeted violent attacks, as demonstrated by recent events against faith-based communities. Throughout the past few years, we have seen significant security incidents involving houses of worship, schools, and other soft targets and crowded places.

We have seen the face of evil, but we have also seen the face of courage. Courage has materialized in the response of our law enforcement, our community business partners, our fellow worshippers, and our faith leaders.

The Department is committed to mitigating the risk of attacks on our homeland, and our mission is critical to the Nation's counterterrorism efforts. The protection of our people and our infrastructure is a vital component of the Department's Strategic Framework.

Through the resources provided by CISA, DHS continues our long-standing efforts with communities to share threat information, harden public gathering locations, train law enforcement and first responders, and conduct a wide range of training and exercises.

We do not magically get better in a time of crisis. We always default to the things that we know, to training, to the lessons learned from exercises. These are proven initiatives that have enhanced the safety and security of the American people. Through the Strategic

Framework, DHS is augmenting its capabilities to address this increased targeted violence against our communities.

To ensure the safety and security of our worshippers, we must be innovative, provide timely and useful resources, and increase information sharing. CISA is at the forefront of this work. Our Hometown Security Initiative provides direct, tangible support to harden public gathering locations. Leveraging its field personnel and program offices, CISA shares information on the evolving threat, including prominent and emerging tactics, we conduct security and threat vulnerability assessments, and we offer resources to how to mitigate and drive down the risk of violent attacks.

In the last 3 fiscal years, CISA has conducted 1,534 engagements with faith-based organizations, primarily through its Protective Security Advisor Program. In 2019 alone, CISA conducted over 800 engagements with houses of worship, progressively increasing our outreach since 2017.

Just last week, DHS, in partnership with DOJ, HHS, and the Department of Education, released to the public the *SchoolSafety.gov* website, further demonstrating the Department's commitment to giving the appropriate security resources to those that can have an impact.

CISA's resources help inform local decision making. The Agency shares information aimed at reducing the impacts of an active-shooter incident. This information focuses on suspicious behavioral indicators, potential attack methods, how to develop an emergency action plan, actions that may be taken during an incident, and how to quickly and effectively recover from an incident.

Since 2011, CISA has conducted more than 300 in-person active-shooter workshops throughout this country, teaching over 41,000 participants. Nearly 975,000 people have successfully completed our on-line active-shooter training, and our active-shooter website on *DHS.gov* has been seen and viewed over 4.5 million times. Our PSA has conducted more than 5,000 active-shooter activities throughout this country, and many of them revolve around the faith-based organizations.

Following the strategic attack at the Tree of Life Synagogue in Pittsburgh, members of the synagogue credited the training provided by our PSAs with saving lives.

CISA maintains an exercise program that provides effective and practical mechanisms to identify areas for improvement, evaluate and implement corrective actions, and share best practices through discussion-based and full-scale exercises. These scenarios are driven by the public and private sector and often focus on active shooter, vehicle ramming, chemical security, and bombing prevention.

In view of the attacks against faith-based communities in April 2019, CISA partnered with the Secure Community Network, SCN, to conduct a tabletop exercise with the Jewish community leaders from across the United States, law enforcement personnel, and interagency officials to work through how a community will share information and what actions they should take during a security event.

Throughout the history of our Nation, the United States has epitomized the truest definition of a great democracy and has dem-

onstrated to the world the value of freedom, and this is clearly seen in the right to practice a religion of choice.

However, those freedoms that have made this country a shining city upon a hill do not come without a price. As I wrote to the faith-based community a little over a year ago, in this dynamic threat environment we face the reality that differences in ideology can result in attacks even in the most holy of places.

While this unfortunate truth may be a reality, it does not have to be inevitable. The threat is not going away, but neither is our determination to reduce the probability of a successful attack.

The Department is committed to maintaining a strong relationship with the faith-based community to reduce risk where we can, mitigate impacts where we must, and always defend today to secure tomorrow.

Thank you, and I welcome your questions.

Mr. ROSE. I thank all the witnesses for their testimony.

I will remind the subcommittee that we will each have 5 minutes to question the panel.

I will now recognize the Ranking Member of the subcommittee, the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Walker.

Mr. WALKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Assistant Secretary Elizabeth Neumann, I would like to start with you.

Anti-Semitism is rising around the world. I think you even addressed that a little bit. We need to figure out how to stop this hateful trend. I asked our last panel of witnesses that are referred to a little earlier in my statement about a month ago this question, and I am interested to see your assessment.

What are you seeing in Europe and elsewhere in terms of anti-Semitic rhetoric and violence, and how has this contributed to the rise of anti-Semitism here in the United States?

Ms. NEUMANN. Sir, I will invite also AD Sanborn to join me in this because the FBI does a lot more of the intelligence investigations than I do in my role. But I can tell you from the work that my team does and talking to our partners overseas that our European allies are very concerned about what they are seeing. There are a number of summits that are planned for next month to discuss how to wrestle with the same issues that we are wrestling with here.

It is transnational, it is rising in Europe, and increasingly everybody is talking to one another and sharing ideas, and how to get around our law enforcement and terrorism tools.

Mr. WALKER. I was going to the assistant director.

Would you mind answering the same question?

Ms. SANBORN. Just to add to what Ms. Neumann said, the Jewish community across the world is definitely vulnerable, not just in regard, though, I would highlight, to domestic terrorism, but also international terrorism.

If you remember back—and I think I mentioned this in my statement for the record—in 2016, we actually arrested, JTTF did, an individual who was planning to attack a Jewish center in Florida on behalf of ISIS.

In 2018, we had two individuals who were surveilling Jewish facilities to do attacks potentially on behalf of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Then later on in December 2018, the JTTF in Ohio arrested an individual for identifying two different synagogues that he wanted to attack.

So the vulnerability, obviously, of the Jewish community is concerning, and it is across both spectrums of—

Mr. WALKER. Well, let's stay there, let's unpack that a little bit then. Anti-Semitic attacks and incidents in New York and New Jersey, we have seen them increase, but we have also seen that it comes from a wide variety of ideologies. Is that fair to say?

Ms. SANBORN. Totally fair to say. I think—

Mr. WALKER. Well, what do you—let me ask the question here. This is what I would like you to address. What do you attribute the spread of anti-Semitism from so many of these ideological drivers?

Ms. SANBORN. That is a great question, and I think you heard from the earlier panel, in Session I. What is behind each individual's ideology and motivation and eventual decision to attack is complex, and incredibly complex. We are seeing a mixture of ideologies. So peeling back exactly what that is and what drove them to that is incredibly difficult.

I think both Ms. Neumann and I commented in our opening statements about the behavior and focusing on the indicators and warning signs that somebody might mobilize is where we see our most productive, successful effort.

Mr. WALKER. OK. Earlier this month, as I mentioned, FBI Director Wray testified that the Bureau has elevated racially-motivated violent extremism to an equal priority with home-grown violent extremism and Islamist terrorism.

Assistant director, have new directives been issued to the JTTFs and the FBI field offices? What type of resources are dedicated to all these new priorities?

Ms. SANBORN. Another great question.

So every year we go through a threat prioritization process at headquarters and out in the field, and by the director doing that, that sets the stage for how the field should respond to that.

So that definitely is something that every field office reacts to. I can tell you in Minnesota, I mimicked exactly what you heard the director say. I have a hate crimes DT Fusion Cell in Minnesota. I created that to mimic that.

I think to highlight the resources, I would like to bring up a significant arrest that we had today.

Mr. WALKER. Sure.

Ms. SANBORN. Sort-of mention to you, this is how we respond to those things.

So today we arrested 5 members of the Atomwaffen Division across 4 different States. Why I bring that up is I think it is important for you to understand every single person in the FBI is going to work a threat when we have a threat.

We had individuals who were involved in an intimidation campaign to put personalized messages on journalists and members of our Jewish community to intimidate them and potentially act out in violence. When that happens, in those 4 States every single per-

son in these field office is working that arrest today. Whether they are a fugitive agent or a counterterrorism agent, they are working that arrest today.

Mr. WALKER. Just a quick yes or no as my time expires here. Thank you for that information. I can even see your passion behind this a little bit. It sparks up a little bit there. Just a quick yes-or-no question. Do you feel like the directives that are getting are more than just what is on white paper, but these are actually being implemented along the way?

Ms. SANBORN. Yes.

Mr. WALKER. OK.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

Mr. ROSE. Thank you, Mr. Ranking Member.

We will now move on to the esteemed gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Malinowski.

Mr. MALINOWSKI. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for allowing me to take part in this hearing.

Ms. Neumann, it has been a pleasure to work with you over the last several months. I want to thank you again personally for coming to my district and helping us spread the word among our faith community about the resources that are available to them.

I want to start with you because, as you know, one success that we have had recently is that we have worked together here to restore a significant amount of funding that was previously cut from a variety of DHS Office of Targeted Violence and Terrorism Prevention programs.

I wanted you to tell us in as concrete and straightforward terms as possible what you are now able to do, now that you have this new funding, that you were not able to do before, how that will help, and what lessons has DHS learned from previous iterations of this program to make sure that we are effectively honing our efforts on where the threat is coming from right now, in accordance with the strategy you all put out.

Ms. NEUMANN. Thank you, Congressman. I, too, have enjoyed the partnership and everyone on this committee's support for our efforts.

I am going to start with your last question because I think it helps frame where we are today, the lessons learned.

A couple of years ago, as you alluded to, the funding for this effort was reduced, in large part because we were going through administration transitions, and the work that had been initiated was toward the end of an administration and not properly codified in a variety of mechanisms, getting things into budgets and making sure that there was appropriate policy documentation to say what we were trying to achieve, the expected outcomes, et cetera.

One of the things that we looked to do when we were studying where does the prevention mission need to go, we first started with RAND, our FFRDC, and asked them to go look at the problem set because there were criticisms from multiple angles: "You are targeting communities," to, "This is pseudo-science, it doesn't actually work."

RAND went out and studied. They came back, they said prevention does work, it is underfunded, here is where you need more money, and it needs to be locally-based, you need to focus your ef-

forts on equipping, empowering, informing the local communities, the local government, to be able to conduct prevention efforts.

So that gave us a framing, and from that we started talking to you all, and we started articulating a vision for where we wanted to go with prevention, acknowledging the mistakes of the past few years and looking forward to trying to build a better path forward.

I am very pleased that because of those conversations with you, with your staff, that what is represented in this document here, Goal 3, that it is all about prevention. It redefines what prevention means. As many of you know, post-9/11 prevention was the imminent threat—stop the bomb from going off.

Now prevention is much farther left of boom, working with individuals well before they contemplate an act of violence, trying to build resilience into society, and then, as somebody is on that pathway to violence, trying to intervene before they have crossed that criminal threshold.

Because of the funding that you have given us, the concrete answers, we are able to put 12 field staff in the field this year. We are going to be developing baseline capabilities for how you do prevention correctly, to make sure we have proper protections in place for civil liberties, as well as privacy, and as well as having the right handshake with law enforcement, with the FBI, so that if somebody does not successfully work through an intervention and an off-ramp, that law enforcement is called in appropriately to disrupt.

We are going to be able to engage with more stakeholders, especially the technology community. I think this is a space, as your earlier panels alluded to, that we need to have more conversations and see if we can be doing more to combat terrorist use of the internet.

So that is just a snapshot of what we are currently working on, but there is much more to be done.

Mr. MALINOWSKI. Thank you.

Very, very quickly, I don't have much time left. Ms. Sanborn, you mentioned the arrest of the Atomwaffen Division members. What are they being charged with, if it is a campaign of intimidation? Because we are thinking about legal authorities and whether you have sufficient authorities.

Ms. SANBORN. Absolutely. I don't have the specific charges in front of me. I do remember that some of them involve the transmission of threats across interstate lines, wire communication, and whatnot, so typical tools we use in our toolbox.

Mr. MALINOWSKI. Right. But we still can't charge someone with material support—

Ms. SANBORN. Correct.

Mr. MALINOWSKI [continuing]. For the Atomwaffen Division. Right, got it.

Thank you and I yield back.

Mr. ROSE. Thank you.

We will move on to someone who has spent her entire career fighting this fight, Ms. Slotkin, from the great State of Michigan.

Ms. SLOTKIN. He is just trying to make up for the fact that he let Mr. Malinowski go first.

Thank you for being here.

The context for my questions is that I am from Michigan, and in my district specifically we have seen in the very recent past a real uptick in anti-Semitic incidents. We have had our Michigan State University Hillel defaced this fall. We had a swastika painted in front of a fraternity house in the past month. We had a mezuzah pulled off one of our dorm—or one of our student's locations.

Then in one of my counties, across basically an entire town, we woke up one morning and had anti-Semitic graffiti in front of multiple businesses saying, Jews are responsible for 9/11.

So in response to this uptick, not just in my district but across the State, we have had synagogues defaced, including in Hancock, Michigan, where a man from New Jersey put out a call and said, you know, kind-of, you should move against synagogues. In Michigan and in Wisconsin, people responded and defaced synagogues.

I held a meeting this past Sunday on anti-Semitism in my community, in East Lansing, Michigan. My attorney general was there. We spent a lot of time answering questions, concerns, from community members on what to do about this.

So my experience in my life is in countering foreign terrorism and the foreign threats. I know that after 9/11, especially in the FBI, it took a minute to adjust to these different threats. I remember when we turned a lot of support staff at the FBI into analysts on terrorism overnight. I remember how we weren't resourced because the threat had fundamentally changed.

So if I can just ask, Ms. Sanborn, can you tell me in specific terms what you have changed on number of analysts, number of dollars, number of agents, number of task force? Like, I get that you guys are focused on it and I am thrilled, but I know after 15 years in the Government, it is dollars and people. Convince me, as Mr. Rose said, that we are taking the threat seriously.

Ms. SANBORN. What I can tell you is the number of resources that we throw at that is commensurate with what we are seeing with the problem. So, for example, one-fifth of my CT cases are either racially or ethnically motivated. So one-fifth of my resources are applied to that. So it is commensurate with what we are seeing as far as the cases and the threat and the amount of resources that we put forth to it.

I believe that the creation of things like the Hate Crimes Fusion Center, the other thing that we have done is we have cross-pollinated some of those people that you reflect in your career, the long-time, good, international terrorism analysts and/or agents are cross-pollinating into the domestic terrorism space to sort-of make sure we are passing on best practices and lessons learned.

Interestingly enough, the JTTF, which is one of our best tools in our toolbox, was actually created in 1980 in response to domestic terrorism in New York with the increase of attacks there.

Ms. SLOTKIN. So what I would ask, because I think there are a lot of folks who might be interested in this, is that you take that question for the record, and provide kind-of in concrete dollars and bodies what we are talking about. It is great that one area is commensurate with the threat, but I think a lot of us would be able to speak to our constituents with real authority if we said, look, here is what the FBI had their resources—here is how they had

them allocated in 2016, and here is what they are today. A comparative to show us the delta would be great.

If I can just move on to Assistant Secretary Neumann.

So I guess the question I have is, in your experience, once we identify that these networks are out there, that there are communities, particularly on-line, that may be mobilizing or dealing in conspiracy theories, recruiting, those kinds of things, tell me about rehabilitation. Tell me about how you deal with this.

I understand prevention, and obviously that is the goal. But just like with foreign terrorists, right, with people who have been radicalized, what is the rehab process once we identify a community? What can you recommend to people who are concerned about the growing spike in anti-Semitic attacks?

Ms. NEUMANN. I will start with the honest answer, which is I think we are still learning. From your experience overseas, you know that there are a number of other governments that have been struggling with this for a long time. They don't have some of the restrictions we do, they try a variety of things, and the jury is still out whether it really works.

It is very hard to say that once somebody is fully radicalized, mobilized to violence, committed that act, that you are going to have much success off-ramping them, if you will. So the recidivism problem is one that we are really concerned about.

I don't think that means we are without hope, and I am sure AD Sanborn has some interesting experience on this, too. But I do think we need more research, and we need to study.

So one of the things that we are doing with the grant funds that you all have provided us is we are ensuring that there is room for innovation, for NGO's, nonprofits, things that maybe Government is not best equipped to do, to try new things, try something new in this space, since we are all still kind-of learning what works and what doesn't.

We are also bringing our Science and Technology Directorate alongside those grantees to study the effectiveness, the outcome. I am OK if we give money to a grantee, they try something, and it fails. I just want to know that it failed, so we don't re-fund it or other people don't try to pass on that practice.

So I think we need more research in that space. I think we need to invite more of the technology sector and academia to the table. Things that we thought were working, for example, in counter-messaging, we are now seeing some evidence that maybe it doesn't work as well as we thought a couple of years ago.

So data here is really important to make sure that as we are trying new things, that we genuinely understand if it is having that long-term impact.

I feel much more confident in what the science is telling us or the research is telling us on that far left of boom, being able to intervene before somebody really has idealized and come up with a plan.

Once somebody has carried out an attack, that space—and DOJ does a lot of studies in this space, more so than DHS—but that space we know is a tougher—to crack.

It is in our strategy. It is one, as we are building our implementation plan, I see us taking on in probably another fiscal year or

two because we want to build the local prevention framework capability first, so that as somebody is coming out of prison they might be able to leverage that capability more effectively, and recognizing DOJ also has strong responsibilities in this space.

Ms. SLOTKIN. Thank you. I think my time has expired.

Mr. ROSE. We will do another round of questions after this.

Ms. Sanborn, I want to lean in on this arrest that was made earlier today. Based off your understanding, specifically looking at R.A.M., Atomwaffen, and The Base, 3 leading domestic neo-Nazi organizations, what are their global connections? Who are they going to work with, communicating with, exchanging money with? Paint the picture of this global movement, please.

Ms. SANBORN. I can't get into the specifics on this specific case because the investigation is obviously on-going, but I will tell you that that is one of the things that we are doing all the time. For example, you probably saw the attacks in Germany this week. So we are trying to take those attacks overseas, or disruptions here, and build out global networks, working with our foreign partners.

Mr. ROSE. OK. So you look at Atomwaffen, for instance. Sonnenkrieg in Britain is technically an offshoot of Atomwaffen. Sonnenkrieg, just several weeks ago, was labeled a terrorist organization by the United Kingdom, so this is something that is clear. It is almost obvious at this point.

If Atomwaffen were ISIS or al-Qaeda and those 4 individuals had sent these menacing messages, anti-Semitic in nature and otherwise, what would you be charging them with?

Ms. SANBORN. Not speaking for the United States Attorney, but if they were supporting a foreign terrorist organization, and they were designated, we would have the potential for the 2339, the foreign—material support to a foreign—

Mr. ROSE. Providing them material support. What additional powers would you have in terms of surveillance and generally in terms of your law enforcement capabilities, again if Atomwaffen were ISIS or al-Qaeda and they had chapters here in America?

Ms. SANBORN. That is a complicated, I think, two-part process, right? So the charge is separate from our authorities, and what we would need to predicate a case.

So while the charge is definitely a great tool in the toolbox to add charges on, we, according to our policies and procedures, to predicate a case in the domestic terrorism space you would still need those things that we have right now, which is somebody who is looking to commit a criminal act, conduct violence in furtherance of their ideology to coerce.

So it wouldn't help us predicate a case just because we had a statute.

Mr. ROSE. Sure. But again, with that providing material support, based off your experience, looking at the charges that these 4 Atomwaffen members will likely face, versus providing material support, in terms of the severity, how different are they, in terms of the average amount of time that they will spend behind prison, behind bars, so on and so forth?

Ms. SANBORN. Material support exposure is definitely greater than what these 3—

Mr. ROSE. How—and I understand you are speaking in generalities—but how much greater?

Ms. SANBORN. I don't remember specifically what the exposure is on 2339, but I, in the press conference with the United States Attorney and the SAC out in Seattle, these guys are looking at about 5 years.

Mr. ROSE. Atomwaffen?

Ms. SANBORN. The ones we disrupted today, correct.

Mr. ROSE. They are looking at about 5 years. Now, if they were ISIS, al-Qaeda providing material support to a foreign terrorist organization, correct me if I am wrong, they are looking at closer to life?

Ms. SANBORN. Correct. You would have an extra charge.

I will say that one of the things that they are doing in this case, and you will find this in many cases, is they start off with a one charge, and then as the case progresses they will add further charges on. So I would not be surprised if in the coming days you don't see the Western District of Washington add charges on to these individuals, so their exposure could get—

Mr. ROSE. Sure. But the charge that is not available to them right now is exactly the one you just laid out, providing material support to a foreign terrorist organization, because our State Department has been unwilling to label global neo-Nazi organizations as foreign terrorist organizations, despite the fact that countries like Canada and the United Kingdom have already done so, despite the fact that if you look at the conflict in Crimea, 20,000 foreign fighters have gone to already fight in that conflict in just the last 5 years, double the number that went to go fight in Afghanistan during the entirety of that conflict in the 1980's.

Ms. Neumann, you mentioned tracking foreign fighters, both foreign fighters coming into America, as well as American citizens or legal residents going to fight and then coming back. Are you telling us here that you have enough powers, that the Federal Government has enough power right now and authority to identify every legal resident, American citizen, as well as person attempting to come into America who has participated in the conflict in Crimea or been a part of a global neo-Nazi organization?

Ms. NEUMANN. What I can say is that we are working on it. But, no, I don't have confidence that we would be able to track everyone.

Mr. ROSE. Do you have confidence that we are able to track those participating with jihadist organizations?

Ms. NEUMANN. I have better confidence, yes.

Mr. ROSE. Why do you have better confidence?

Ms. NEUMANN. We have been working on it longer. As Congresswoman Slotkin pointed out, it does take a while for us to figure, when we are doing something new and the authorities are different, what we are allowed to do, what are the parameters—

Mr. ROSE. Why are the authorities different?

Ms. NEUMANN. When you have a designated terrorist organization, like ISIS, we are able to do certain things with our screening and vetting tools that in a context of not having a designated organization we have to be careful to make sure that when we are tracking somebody or denying somebody admissibility that it adheres to the law.

If you are a member of a foreign terrorist organization, period, hard stop, you don't get to come in.

If you are not, but you are associated with a violent extremist group but they are not designated, we have to do more work to justify that inadmissibility.

Mr. ROSE. So what I am hearing from you is because, again, we are unwilling to label these organizations as FTOs, we do not—we cannot say with certainty, the same level of certainty that we can say for jihadist organizations, that we can track those coming in, as well as legal residents and American citizens who go and then come back. Is that correct?

Ms. NEUMANN. Yes.

Mr. ROSE. OK.

I want to look at social media. How has your partnership been with social media companies thus far in addressing the issue of counterterrorism? Well, let's actually do all three, because I think all three of you are affected by this.

Ms. SANBORN. Want to go first?

Mr. HARRELL. Yes, sure. Mr. Chairman, I don't mind going first.

You know, CISA works with our social media companies quite often. Mostly it is centered around disinformation and foreign influence.

But as the Strategic Framework, I started to point out, we are starting to gravitate resources and ask the right questions of our social media companies now as it relates to really the connection between foreign influence and the radicalization that is highlighted in the DHS framework.

I think from a resource perspective I would like to circle back on Congresswoman Slotkin's question from earlier.

The resources are really driven from the demand signal from industry. So right now faith-based organizations, particularly the Jewish organizations that reside throughout this country, are asking these very key questions of, DHS, you have done these really great things over the last 15 years, they are very high-level, they are at 45,000 feet, we need some very specific things surrounding what to do when an intruder comes into our church, synagogue, mosque, temple. Can you get more specific?

So what we have done over the last number of years is to try and drill down to what does "run, hide, fight" really mean, what are some of the basic protective measures that a church or synagogue should actually implement that are low cost or no cost that people can do today.

So a lot of our products and services that we are pushing out today have a lot of that flavor. I think today we are in a better position to provide subject-matter expertise in the field where the constituents reside to make them a more secure campus, or in this case a more secure church, synagogue, mosque, or temple.

We do this through the PSA Program. I mentioned that earlier in my opening statement. We have 119 PSAs, and quite frankly, we probably need 119 more. The demand signal again is just off the charts. These are GS-14s and 15s that are out in the field, kind-of the tip of the spear, that are able to walk the property, understand what that enemy avenue of approach is, understand what

the gaps in security might be, and where to make those investments.

So this is really from an investment and resource perspective where I think DHS and CISA are trying to gravitate toward now.

Ms. NEUMANN. On social media, we, as I mentioned in my testimony, we do work with the big companies primarily through the Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism.

Mr. ROSE. Who do you work with at the Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism?

Ms. NEUMANN. So the founding partners were Facebook, Twitter, Google, and Microsoft.

Mr. ROSE. Who is your point of contact?

Ms. NEUMANN. So GIFCT as an entity is in the process of turning itself into a nonprofit.

Mr. ROSE. Right.

Ms. NEUMANN. So as they are standing that up——

Mr. ROSE. Because we yelled at them, because it was a shell of an organization with no points of contact.

Ms. NEUMANN. It was a rotating chair.

Mr. ROSE. They had no points of contact, they had no budget, they had no SOP, they had nothing.

So my question is, is that when you work with social media companies to address the issue of counterterrorism, who do you call?

Ms. NEUMANN. All right. So if it is law enforcement, that would be in the Bureau's lane, so I will let AD Sanborn describe that.

On the nature of how do you take down terrorist content, voluntary approach that the U.S. Government uses, best practices for countermessaging, we are using the points of contact at the GIFCT. I personally don't know the names of those, but my staff——

Mr. ROSE. So you send an email to 5 people?

Ms. NEUMANN. No. They are in the process of hiring an executive director, is my understanding.

Mr. ROSE. Yes, I know.

Ms. NEUMANN. I am happy to take that as a get-back with the precise "here is how often that we are talking to them." But I know that we are——

Mr. ROSE. Yes. We are very interested to know how this actually happens.

Ms. NEUMANN. Sure.

Mr. ROSE. Because I have been hearing people brag about the GIFCT now for more than a year, and right now the thing does not exist. It is not real. All it is, is a share drive of hashtags. That is all it is. It doesn't exist. So we really want to understand how this works.

Ms. NEUMANN. Sure.

Mr. ROSE. We have yet to get a real answer.

Terrorism is terrorism. Take it all down. But this is big business here.

GIFCT does not exist yet. So that is not a suitable answer yet as to what your operational procedures are to address social media companies.

Ms. Sanborn.

Ms. SANBORN. We spend a good chunk of our energy and resources in my division and across the Bureau, I have a Strategic

Partnership Engagement Section that tries to focus on strategic partners in general, which include social media and education and capacity building, trying to really make them aware of what the threat is so that they can be very mindful when they develop and enforce their terms of use, for example. Also very encouraged by their response when we serve them lawful process.

So both in an education and capacity-building, the better aware they are of the threat, the more—

Mr. ROSE. You are confident that they treat neo-Nazi organizations in the same manner that they treat jihadist terrorist organizations?

Ms. SANBORN. I am encouraged by their interest to learn that from us.

Mr. ROSE. OK. All right. For our next round, we will move back to the Ranking Member.

Mr. WALKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Neumann, the Homeland Security Advisory Council Subcommittee on Faith-Based Security released a report in mid-December with a number of recommendations. One that stood out to me was that there is an information gap between faith-based groups and State and locally-owned fusion centers.

The reason why, I was a pastor for 16 years, during the time that we began to build our own security teams, trying to even go as far as process information to see if there were any potential threats out there.

My question is: Does DHS have any initiatives to expand information sharing and as well training available to fusion centers and DHS personnel deployed around the United States to fill this gap?

Ms. NEUMANN. Thank you for the question, Chairman. I am actually going to answer part of this and pass it over to Mr. Harrell.

We are in the process of finalizing our implementing recommendations coming out of that HSAC report. We took their commentary about fusion centers and connecting with churches, we kind-of examined that and had some conversations with the HSAC chairs, Mr. Goldenberg, Mr. Allen, and we are trying to understand the problem that they were describing.

I think one of the challenges is that fusion centers are different in each State. Their original purpose was information sharing between and among local government and up to the Federal Government. They were not necessarily designed to be outreach mechanisms to their community.

Now, some fusion centers have taken on that mandate, and that is great—New Jersey is a great example of this—where they physically go out and do trainings and conduct exercises and educate their communities about the threat. I think that is wonderful.

But I don't think all fusion centers are designed that way. They really are about intelligence analysis and information sharing.

So this leads me to, as we were assessing, there is a problem here—we like to call it the last-mile problem—the Federal Government's apparatuses are not designed to get to all, you know, tens of thousands of houses of worship in this country—

Mr. WALKER. Let me—and pause for just a second.

Ms. NEUMANN. Sure.

Mr. WALKER. I appreciate the eloquent response there. But if there is a concern, even remotely, for a synagogue or a church in a specific area, does not these fusion centers of the Federal Government have some responsibility to bring these folks in to say, "Hey, it is just small on the radar, I just wanted you to know," as opposed to putting the burden on the church or synagogue, the rabbi, the pastor, the clerk, whatever it might be, to pursue this information?

Ms. NEUMANN. Yes. What I was trying to get to is that we haven't had to do that before. So we are trying to figure out the best way to do it.

Mr. WALKER. OK.

Ms. NEUMANN. So I think there is a role for fusion centers. There is a huge role for State and local law enforcement. Our Protective Security Advisors are in some ways much better-equipped than perhaps a fusion center might be to make sure that they are getting that information out.

But it is tens of thousands of houses of worship that need to be trained and educated, that there is not enough manpower in a fusion center or a PSA apparatus to do that. So we are going to have to come up with a slightly different model than what we have used heretofore.

Mr. WALKER. Mr. Harrell, do you want to add something to that?

Mr. HARRELL. Please, and thank you, sir.

You know, with the 80-plus fusion centers that we have in this country, that is one bellybutton. The additional bellybutton would be the information sharing and analysis center, or the ISACs, and these are the major channels of communication back and forth between the Federal Government, State and local partners, and then ultimately industry, churches, synagogues, mosques, et cetera.

But you don't know what you don't know, and I think at some point there needs to be a better information-sharing campaign to say these resources exist, this information is being shared on a daily, weekly, monthly basis in terms of threats, in near-real time.

It is difficult, as Assistant Secretary Neumann just mentioned, it is difficult to get to every church. But we need to ensure that through this mechanism people are landing on distribution lists across this country to get this information into the hands to people that can actually do something about it.

I think through the PSA program, we have tried to bridge some of those gaps, but it is difficult to get to some of the rural communities. It is difficult to get to some of the lesser-served populations. But that is our goal. That is what we are trying to do. That is what we are gravitating toward.

Mr. WALKER. Let me switch gears just for a second and stay with you, Mr. Harrell.

The CISA Protective Security Advisor program has been getting a lot of attention recently and additional responsibilities related to community outreach. How many PSAs are there, and what are their primary responsibilities? What new responsibilities will they have under the new TVTP initiative? I will throw this in there since I have just got a few seconds. Touch on it what you can. Does this strain your resources for other missions under CISA?

Mr. HARRELL. We have 119 PSAs, Congressman, and as I mentioned earlier, we need a whole lot more. This is one of the things that we have asked for in future budgets, and I am confident that is where we will end up going as an organization.

The demand signal ultimately comes through these PSAs. They are the field resources. They are the ones that eat, breathe, sleep, and reside in these communities. They have the relationships with the local community, the churches, the schools, the big communities that are out there, critical infrastructure owners and operators.

Their whole goal really, at the end of the day, is capacity building and bringing relationships to bear, having the right people sit at the table to understand what the risk is, how to drive down risk, and ultimately what resources does the Federal Government have that we could put into the community today to drive down risk and make people a harder target.

Many of these resources are low-cost, no-cost. I would say the majority of them are absolutely free. But, again, people don't know what they don't know, and so it is our opportunity, it is our challenge to get this information out.

I can point to a website all day, but at the end of the day we need to help people along to get them the right information.

Mr. WALKER. It is your challenge, your opportunity, and I would even add, hopefully, responsibility as well.

Mr. HARRELL. Thanks.

Mr. ROSE. Thank you.

Mr. Malinowski.

Mr. MALINOWSKI. Thank you.

I want to start with a social media question, and I want you all to imagine the following hypothetical scenario.

An American company reaches out to leaders of The Base or the Atomwaffen Division or another terrorist group and says, "Have we got a great service for you. We will scour the entire internet looking, using big data, for anybody in the world who might be susceptible to your message. So long as you don't post things that are overtly threatening violence, we are willing to deliver your message directly into the social media of those people wherever they may be to help you recruit more members and to spread your message more effectively."

Would you be concerned about that?

Ms. NEUMANN. Very.

Mr. MALINOWSKI. Isn't that exactly what Facebook and Twitter and YouTube and the big social media companies, in fact, do via their social media algorithms?

Now, they may not physically pick up the phone and call the Atomwaffen Division and say, you know, "This is a great service for you." But isn't that effectively what the social media algorithms do? They scour the internet for anybody who, based on their previous internet usage, seems like the sort of person who would like to buy a pair of shoes, watch a cute kitten video, or perhaps be interested in anti-Semitic or neo-Nazi content, and make that connection?

Ms. NEUMANN. Yes. I am not going to sit here and defend companies. That is not my job. Your point, Mr. Chairman, was well-taken.

That said, I do think that the briefings I have received, they are trying. Are they trying hard enough? I think that is for you all to examine.

Mr. MALINOWSKI. Have you ever in your engagement with them, though, directly addressed this issue of how their algorithms help to spread this kind of content?

Ms. NEUMANN. Yes. I can tell you that there are any number of former counterterrorism professionals that work for these companies that are actively trying to figure out how to stop this.

If they are moving fast enough, if there is enough money toward that, that is a separate question. I have not examined that. But I do know that the people that I have met with that brief me on their innovative tools to try to promote civil discourse, to try to appropriately remove content that violates their terms of service, that tries to identify that content, which is spreading hate, they are looking for ways to do that within the context of their—

Mr. MALINOWSKI. So clearly, if they see something bad they take it down, but the engine that causes that stuff to spread is something I think they are more reluctant to acknowledge and address.

Different question for you, Ms. Sanborn. We were talking about various legal authorities. We had a case in New Jersey recently, a man in Camden County, New Jersey, who had a long history of posting anti-Semitic rants on the internet, including celebrating acts of violence against Jews.

Allegedly, he was in personal contact with the shooter in the Tree of Life Synagogue. Because we have in New Jersey recently passed a so-called red flag law, law enforcement in New Jersey was able to confiscate this individual's firearms, of which he had quite a few.

In your experience as a law enforcement officer, do you think this is an authority that is useful in these circumstances, where somebody has not yet committed an act of violence but there is this body of evidence that they may be celebrating, contemplating engaging with people who have committed such acts? Is that a useful tool for law enforcement to have in your view?

Ms. SANBORN. I think what would concern me about sort-of thinking that solves the problem is, in my experience as a law enforcement officer, if an individual is intent on doing some harm, they are going to find a weapon. Unfortunately, all of our terrorism, international and domestic, is encouraging individuals to make a weapon.

I mean, the threat we have seen in Europe of vehicular attacks is equally as scary as the threat that we can imagine when you talk about firearms. They are telling them, go get a knife, go get a vehicle. So I am not sure that that necessarily—it could falsely give us the sense of security—

Mr. MALINOWSKI. But can it help? I am not suggesting it solves the problem.

Ms. SANBORN. Any time a bad guy doesn't have a weapon in their hands it is a positive sign.

Mr. MALINOWSKI. Good. Thank you.

I yield back.

Mr. ROSE. So I want to close out just by again looking at this issue of social media.

Ms. Sanborn, would you agree that one of the most significant threats we face today when it comes to terrorism is that of a self-radicalized lone gunman, lone gunwoman, or lone perpetrator, who hasn't traveled to a terrorist camp, hasn't necessarily even moved overseas?

Ms. SANBORN. Correct, the lone offender is our greatest threat.

Mr. ROSE. They are often radicalized on-line, correct?

Ms. SANBORN. Correct.

Mr. ROSE. So we have that—we all agree that that is a threat.

Now, Ms. Neumann, you just said something that I found interesting. We don't yet know, correct, whether social media companies are fulfilling their responsibilities to adhere fully to their own codes of conduct. Right now it doesn't seem like we have a metric or a system in place to say they have done it 90 percent of the time or 95 percent of the time. Is that correct?

Ms. NEUMANN. I think so. I will also take that as a get-back to confirm that we don't have metrics in place. I have been in conversations where they have been discussing how to measure. They measure right now in terms of the amount of content taken down.

Mr. ROSE. Sure.

Ms. NEUMANN. How quickly they intervene in content before it even uploads. But I think you are getting into a slightly different type of metric, and I would like to look at that.

Mr. ROSE. Yes. What I am trying to get at is that we don't have—the public sector right now, we have no system in place to measure how well they are doing something which we all collectively agree is one of, if not our greatest or most likely, terrorist threats. We are in essence relying on them to take—we have to take them at their word.

Now, we don't do that for airbag deployability. We don't do that for all of these other public health, public safety concerns that we as society have agreed upon. Do you agree with that?

Ms. NEUMANN. Yes.

Mr. ROSE. So what I would urge you all, and we are going to have continued discussions about this, we are proposing something called Raise the Bar Act, which would be an innovative public-private partnership between DHS and the social media companies, particularly those engaged in GIFCT when they stand it up and make it a real organization, to on a quarterly basis issue a report, engage in a partnership with a university and trusted flaggers, to see how well they do at taking terrorist content off of their platforms.

But the last point here is we have to get them to agree that Atomwaffen and The Base and Sonnenkrieg and Blood & Honour and National Action and so many others are actually terrorists. In order to do that we need you all to call them that. We need the State Department to label at least some of them FTOs.

So I will leave it to you, if you all have any reaction to what I just said, and then we can close it out.

We will start with you, Ms. Sanborn.

Ms. SANBORN. I think we would welcome the participation about the conversation with the State Department. We would be happy to feed our intelligence into them and allow them to evaluate what we have to see if it helps them make a decision.

Mr. ROSE. Thank you.

Ms. NEUMANN. I have really struggled with this, several of the questions you have been raising, Mr. Chairman, especially since we talked a couple weeks ago. I have, in truth, been struggling with this for the 2 years that I have been in my position.

I think that what you are raising deserves robust debate, and I think it deserves probably more due diligence than somebody in my role with multiple responsibilities in, quite frankly, one hearing can do.

I think there are two particular issues you have drawn out. The first is the way in which on-line platforms catalyze hate. I think Mr. Goldenberg, in his past panel with you, gave you a great example of situations that are just absolutely abhorrent of a rabbi whose children were targeted on-line. I am very encouraged by AD Sanborn to see that they are looking to try to use all the tools that they currently have to try to go after such horrible, horrible things.

But the fact is that our law enforcement community feels hamstrung in how do you go after and balance First Amendment rights to free speech, while at the same time how do you not acknowledge that innocent children being projected with images on-line that will forever be on-line, what about their rights? So there is that tension there.

Then we also know that we have these organizations or movements or individuals, that some of them are very sophisticated. They know exactly how far they can go. They are training their people to say you can go this far but not any farther. They are being sophisticated in both their communications and in their messaging.

So they are playing a game, and we are not equipped to go after that game effectively because of the rules that we are using that were, quite frankly, designed 50 years ago.

So I think it is probably time to take a fresh look. We do regulate other parts of speech over airwaves. It is hard for me to understand why on the on-line side we are not willing to look at that.

Then the second thing you raised, about some domestic terrorist groups and movements being designated, I think it is definitely worth looking at whether we need a new DTO designation or movement designation or maybe just relook at the whole, entire framework.

The National security apparatus is designed for a threat from 20, 30 years ago, and the world is changing. Every counterterrorism professional I speak to in the Federal Government and overseas feels like we are at the doorstep of another 9/11, maybe not something that catastrophic in terms of the visual or the numbers, but that we can see it building and we don't quite know how to stop it.

So this feels like one of those moments where having smart people, academics, lawyers, people that can appreciate that we, as a country, have abused authority in the past, McCarthyism, internment of Japanese during World War II, we don't have a great track record here. We need to do this wisely. It probably is not in our normal course of business. It feels like this is a time for some sort of bipartisan commission to go off and study this problem and come back with a holistic view of this.

So I applaud your championing. Happy to work with you on your legislation, because I will take whatever we can get to go after this problem. But I also think we need a bigger conversation on this.

Mr. HARRELL. Mr. Chairman, thank you again for having us.

You know, based off of current events and the frequency of events, I am convinced that this country is becoming more and more violent every single day.

I am unique up here in that I sit in a position where we are focused within CISA on preparedness and protection. I live my life as if the worst day is right around the corner. I think I mentioned this to you in the past.

So we need to ensure that we have the resources in our fingertips. They can't reside in our fingertips. They have to go out into the field where they can be used to reduce risk and ultimately save lives.

So in terms of marshalling resources, budgets, the things that we have within the Department, we need to ensure that they are well-known, there is an education campaign that DHS has these things, and I think we are moving in this direction now.

Mr. ROSE. Thank you all so much again, and thank you for all your service to this country. I know you live with an incredible amount of stress and pressure, and people are often only focusing on you when something doesn't go well. So thank you for everything that you are doing for this great country.

I would also ask unanimous consent for a statement from the Jewish Federations of North America to be entered into the record. Without objection, so ordered.

[The information follows:]

LETTER FROM THE JEWISH FEDERATIONS OF AMERICA

February 26, 2020.

The Honorable MAX ROSE,
Chairman, Intelligence and Counterterrorism Subcommittee, Homeland Security Committee, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, DC 20515.

The Honorable MARK WALKER,
Ranking Member, Intelligence and Counterterrorism Subcommittee, Homeland Security Committee, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, DC 20515.

DEAR CHAIRMAN ROSE AND RANKING MEMBER WALKER: The Jewish Federations of North America (JFNA) applauds your continued focus on confronting the rise of anti-Semitic domestic terrorism. The existential threats to the Jewish community have been growing and becoming more complex over the past two decades and Federal resources to counter these threats are in increasing demand.

Three months after the horrific September 11 attacks on our country, the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee held a hearing on confronting international terrorism. At that the hearing, JFNA (then United Jewish Communities) submitted the lone statement expressing the needs and concerns of the nonprofit sector, as follows in pertinent part:

"The events of September 11th have also affected our institutions in a profound and unanticipated way. Our Federations, day schools and seminaries, synagogues, community centers, seniors programs, and agencies serving the public became aware that our own institutions and the people they serve could be the targets of future terrorist attacks. There is no secret that both the rhetoric of those responsible for September's attacks and past experiences support this view.

"While State and local law enforcement and other emergency response agencies play a necessary and indispensable role in protecting our communities, it is not their responsibility to secure our daily operations or infrastructure.

"Creating and employing a mitigation plan; maintaining and coordinating full-time security staff; installing bulletproof glass, gates and fencing, outdoor cameras, reinforced doors and locks, intercoms and panic buttons; redesigning the ingress and

egress of facilities and retraining staff are examples of the types of enhanced human and hardware assets our communities will require to meet their security needs.

“[S]ecurity enhancements across the Jewish Federated system will cost hundreds of millions of dollars. Our greatest concern is that without some modest government assistance, our costs for providing security will come at the expense of program dollars and upon our ability to provide for the health and social wellbeing of the millions of people living in the hundreds of communities we serve.”

This statement was the precursor to JFNA’s efforts with Congress to establish the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) Nonprofit Security Grant Program (NSGP) in 2004. The concerns we relayed then are equally germane today, and the escalating threats against Jewish and other faith-based and nonprofit communal organizations posed by Domestic Violent Extremists (DVEs) and Racially/Ethnically Motivated Violent Extremists (RMVEs), further crystalize the importance of the NSGP as the central Federal program to counter these threats.

Last month, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) issued a joint intelligence bulletin, which assessed the threat from DVEs and RMVEs as follows:

“They will continue to pose a lethal threat to faith-based communities, particularly the Jewish community, in the homeland and remain concerned about the difficulty of detecting lone offenders due to the individualized nature of the radicalization process. At least four incidents since October 2018 against Jewish communities underscore the increasingly lethal threat RMVEs and perpetrators of hate crimes pose to faith-based communities in the United States, particularly against soft targets such as religious and cultural facilities. In addition to violent attacks and plots, the FBI and law enforcement partners have investigated and arrested individuals who have vandalized or committed arson on property associated with Jewish institutions. In addition to the previous attacks, the FBI has arrested several individuals at various stages of plotting future attacks on Jewish communities. These events underscore the persistent threat of lethal violence and hate crimes against the Jewish community in the United States.”¹

This assessment was based on multiple lethal incidents, violent attacks, and disrupted plots, including the mass casualty attacks against Jewish institutions in Pittsburgh (October 2018), Poway (April 2019), Jersey City (December 2019), and Monsey (December 2019).

The FBI, DHS and NCTC issued a second bulletin last month that underscored that international terrorists also continue to pose a threat to the Jewish community, as follows:

“If the Government of Iran were to perceive actions of the U.S. Government as acts of war or existential threats to the Iranian regime, Iran could act directly or enlist the cooperation of proxies and partners, such as Lebanese Hezbollah. Based on previously observed covert surveillance and possible pre-operational activity, Iran or its violent extremist supporters could commit attacks in retribution, with little to no warning, against U.S.-based Jewish individuals and interests among likely targets.”²

According to this assessment, in recent years, agents of Iran or Lebanese Hezbollah have been prosecuted for conducting surveillance indicative of contingency planning for lethal attacks in the United States. This included the convictions of a dual U.S.-Iranian citizen and a U.S.-based Iranian citizen convicted in November and October 2019, respectively, for working on behalf of Iran to collect information on and identify multiple Jewish institutions, including a Hillel Center and the Rohr Chabad Center in Chicago.

Encapsulating these concerns, FBI Director Christopher Wray testified before the House Judiciary Committee on February 5, 2020, that threats from ISIS, Al Qaeda, Iran and its proxy Hezbollah are of top concern and that violent extremists motivated by race were now considered a “national threat priority” equivalent to foreign terrorist organizations. Director Wray also testified before the Senate Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee on November 5, 2019, that the underlying drivers for domestic violent extremism, including racism, anti-Semitism, Islamophobia, remain constant. What we know is that both domestic and international terrorists are targeting the faith-based and communal organizations and

¹JIB: Continued Interest in Targeting Jewish Communities in the Homeland by Domestic Violent Extremists, 3 January 2020 (IA-41058-20).

²JIB: Escalating Tensions Between the United States and Iran Pose Potential Threats to the Homeland, 8 January 2020 (IA-41117-20).

that a common thread between them is anti-Semitism and violence directed at the Jewish community, in particular.

Every week, there are multiple incidents reported. This week, more than 50 Jewish community centers in 23 States received emailed bomb threats. In this environment of perpetual threats, demand for NSGP resources is growing. As you know, the program supports the acquisition and installation of physical target hardening measures (i.e., access controls, barriers, blast-proofing, monitoring and surveillance capability, and cybersecurity enhancements), activities to advance preparedness and prevention planning, training, exercises, and contracted security personnel, and collaboration and engagement with Federal, State and local law enforcement agencies.

Since its inception, the program has maintained bi-partisan support in both the House and Senate and is thought of as an efficient and effective means to accomplish a great deal of security enhancement and preparedness through modest resources. As such, we are tremendously pleased that Representatives Bill Pascrell, Jr. (D–NJ) and Peter King (R–NY) are spearheading a House funding request letter this week to increase the fiscal year 2021 appropriations for NSGP to \$360 million. This request, if funded, will significantly close the gap in unmet need. Between fiscal year 2005 and fiscal year 2019, there were more than 11 thousand NSGP funding requests, nationally, seeking approximately \$900 million in security investments, but less than 4 thousand awards were funded in support of just over \$300 million in security investments.

In this environment, we are grateful for the bipartisan leadership of the House Homeland Security Committee, and the subcommittees on Emergency Preparedness, Response and Recovery, and Intelligence and Counterterrorism, for holding hearings and advancing legislation to counter the complex threats against the Jewish community and other faith-based and communal organizations. In continuing to elevate these concerns and prioritizing limited resources to counter these threats, we urge you to maintain strong support for FEMA's Nonprofit Security Grant Program.

Sincerely,

ROBERT B. GOLDBERG,
Senior Director, Legislative Affairs.

Mr. ROSE. Thank you for their extraordinary, extraordinary contribution.

With that, I thank the witnesses for their valuable testimony and the Members for their questions.

The Members of the committee may have additional questions for the witnesses, and we ask that you respond expeditiously in writing to those questions.

Pursuant to committee rule VII(D), the hearing record will be held open for 10 days.

Without objection, the subcommittee stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4:15 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

APPENDIX

QUESTIONS FROM CHAIRMAN MAX ROSE FOR JILL SANBORN

Question 1. In your testimony, you stated, “FBI interactions with social media companies center on education and capacity building, in line with our goal to assist companies in developing or enhancing their terms of service to address violent extremist exploitation of their platforms.” Specifically, how does the FBI help “in developing or enhancing their terms of service to address violent extremist exploitation of their platforms”? What criteria does the FBI use to determine these best practices?

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.

Question 2. In general terms, please describe the collaboration and coordination of DHS and FBI with the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) with regard to domestic terrorism issues.

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.

Question 3. To what extent do DHS and FBI place emphasis on open-source intelligence when dealing with domestic terrorism? How can focusing on these unclassified sources help to improve information sharing with State and local law enforcement partners?

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.

QUESTION FROM CHAIRMAN BENNIE G. THOMPSON FOR JILL SANBORN

Question. We recently heard from DHS in a briefing about the challenges they face in distributing information to law enforcement partners in rural communities. Please describe how the FBI is approaching this challenge, alone and in coordination with other Federal entities.

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.

QUESTIONS FROM HONORABLE ELISSA SLOTKIN FOR JILL SANBORN

Question 1. The number of domestic terrorist attacks in the United States has been trending upward for several years now. In my experience, the best way to tell whether or not Government agencies are adapting to a changing environment is to look at the specifics of resource allocation, and especially dollars and people. With that context in mind, please provide annual figures for 2016–present, and estimated for fiscal year 2021 based on the President’s budget request for the following items:

- The number of employees dedicated to the problem of domestic terrorism and white supremacist extremism compared to international terrorism.
- The number of analysts dedicated to identifying and monitoring the on-line activities of domestic terrorists and white supremacist extremists compared to international terrorists.
- The budget as proposed, appropriated, and expended for the Domestic Terrorism-Hate Crimes Fusion Cell and other FBI programs designed to identify and combat domestic terrorism and white supremacist extremism compared to programs designed to identify and combat international terrorism.
- How much agent and staff time the FBI spent on domestic terrorism and white supremacist extremism across both the Counterterrorism and Criminal Investigative Divisions compared to foreign terrorism.

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.

Question 2. The FBI has previously identified community relationships as the most important factor in preventing domestic terrorism.

- Please provide annual figures for 2016–present for the number of communities the FBI has contacted regarding domestic terrorism and white supremacist extremism.

- Please provide annual figures for 2016–present for the number of communities that have reached out to the FBI regarding domestic terrorism and white supremacist extremism.

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.

QUESTIONS FROM RANKING MEMBER MARK WALKER FOR JILL SANBORN

Question 1. Understanding that case data is fluid, please clarify the current breakdown of resources within the Counterterrorism Division focused on international terrorism and domestic terrorism to include the total number of cases in each category and a breakdown within each category to the extent possible.

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.

Question 2. There is an urgent need for reliable, public data from the FBI and DOJ on hate crimes and terrorism arrests so that we can better understand the threats across the U.S. homeland. What is the status of FBI efforts to improve reporting to the Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program related to hate crime data collection? What other efforts are under way to improve and encourage participating law enforcement agency's public reporting of domestic and international terrorism arrests and prosecutions?

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.

Question 3. Outside advocacy groups and experts have stressed the need for more training for law enforcement and prosecutors at all levels regarding the successful investigation and subsequent prosecution of those who commit anti-Semitic and other domestic extremist attacks. What efforts are under way within the FBI to ensure that those on the front lines are provided with comprehensive training to identify and investigate these crimes?

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.

QUESTIONS FROM CHAIRMAN MAX ROSE FOR ELIZABETH NEUMANN

Question 1. In general terms, please describe the collaboration and coordination of DHS and FBI with the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) with regard to domestic terrorism issues.

Answer. Response is For Official Use Only.

Question 2. To what extent do DHS and FBI place emphasis on open-source intelligence when dealing with domestic terrorism? How can focusing on these unclassified sources help to improve information sharing with State and local law enforcement partners?

Answer. Response is For Official Use Only.

Question 3. What lessons has DHS gleaned from tracking ISIS-related foreign fighters that it can apply to the international travel of foreign citizen white supremacist extremists?

Answer. Response is For Official Use Only.

Question 4. Is DHS's international engagement and component international footprint appropriately calibrated and resourced to react to the changing nature of the threat posed by transnational white supremacist groups?

Answer. Response is For Official Use Only.

QUESTION FROM CHAIRMAN BENNIE G. THOMPSON FOR ELIZABETH NEUMANN

Question. What criteria will OTVTP use to determine which entities will receive grant funding from the newly set-aside \$10 million for targeted violence and terrorism prevention?

What efforts are being made to include more non-governmental organizations and academic entities, as compared to the Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) grants awarded in fiscal year 2016?

Answer. The Targeted Violence and Terrorism Prevention (TVTP) grant program Notice of Funding Opportunity (NOFO) was posted on March 30 and can be found at <https://www.grants.gov/web/grants/view-opportunity.html?oppId=325876>. We were pleased members of your committee staff were able to join us for a teleconference briefing on the NOFO. Relevant to the topic of this hearing, we want to note that 1 of the 3 priorities for this year's grant are projects which address domestic terrorism.

Speaking generally, the solicitation sets up a process to fund applicants with strong program design based on a rigorous analysis of local resources and plans for permanently sustaining capabilities. Specifically, U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) seeks to use the grants to fill significant prevention gaps at the local level. Such efforts can take multiple forms. An applicant might establish a comprehensive approach to prevention. Applicants could also use the funds to stand up

specific prevention programs to close a gap that hinders prevention of terrorism and targeted violence. Or applicants can seek to prevent forms of terrorism and targeted violence, such as the Racially and Ethnically Motivated Violent Extremism (REMVEs) we discussed in the hearing.

QUESTIONS FROM RANKING MEMBER MARK WALKER FOR ELIZABETH NEUMANN

Question 1. DHS has a significant number of employees deployed across the United States, including Protective Security Advisors, intelligence analysts at fusion centers, and brand new TVTP employees. How will all of these individuals be coordinated when it comes to TVTP outreach and training?

Answer. PLCY is working in coordination with the TVTP Executive Steering Committee (ESC) to develop a DHS Prevention Field Concept of Operations (CONOPS) for supporting locally-based prevention frameworks. PLCY leads the ESC to coordinate the efforts of 21 DHS offices and components that have a role in the implementation of Goal 3 of the Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism and Targeted Violence. The CONOPS will:

- Finalize roles and responsibilities of the OTVTP Regional Prevention Coordinators vis-à-vis other DHS field personnel (e.g., Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) Protective Service Advisors) in carrying out prevention activities with State, local, Tribal, and territorial (SLTT) partners.
- Coordinate with other Federal partners with field presence that DHS can leverage to assist in prevention; and
- Ensure mechanisms are in place to harmonize and deconflict the delivery of trainings, briefings, and information being shared with local stakeholders.

The TVTP ESC members will encourage appropriate field personnel to meet with Regional Prevention Coordinators to discuss implementation of the CONOPS.

Question 2. DHS is reinvigorating the community grant program for countering violent extremism as the Targeted Violence and Terrorism Prevention grant program. How will this program be different and when do you expect to release the Notice of Proposed Funding Opportunity? Given that programs focused on prevention are relatively new, how will DHS build in evaluation metrics into the proposals?

Answer. DHS released the NOFO on March 30, 2020. The NOFO outlines the new program elements, which are in part an evolution and in part a new direction for grants supporting targeted violence and terrorism prevention at the local level. The program is an evolution from the fiscal year 2016 Countering Violent Extremism Grant Program in that it makes modifications and improvements based on the promising practices and lessons learned that OTVTP documented in its quarterly and other reports (see <https://www.dhs.gov/cvegrants> for these reports). The grant program is a new direction in that it expands covered activities to include projects that mitigate the threat of targeted violence, therefore aligning the grant program to the objectives in Goal 3 of the *Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism and Targeted Violence*.

The TVTP Grant Program is designed around a dozen project types, each of which has required performance metrics that grantees will collect and report as a term of their award. In designing these required metrics, OTVTP drew upon lessons learned from the fiscal year 2016 grant program and engaged experts in the field of evaluation science, an example of which is found in the *RAND Program Evaluation Toolkit for Countering Violent Extremism* (see <https://www.rand.org/pubs/tools/TL243.html>). Currently, OTVTP is working with the DHS Office of Science and Technology and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to produce a robust evaluation plan that will include independent evaluations of a cross-section of the grantees. These steps ensure that the fiscal year 2020 grant program will be able to provide evidence-based answers to questions that the fiscal year 2016 program received (and continues to receive) from OMB, Government Accountability Office, U.S. Congress, the media, and SLTT partners about what works in prevention.