

THE NATURE OF THE BOKO HARAM SECURITY CRISIS  
IN THE LAKE CHAD BASIN

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MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE  
General Studies

by

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## ABSTRACT

THE NATURE OF THE BOKO HARAM SECURITY CRISIS IN THE LAKE CHAD BASIN, by Esaie Beng Amboh, 98 pages.

Boko Haram, a religious extremist organization opposed to western influences in the Nigerian society was created in 2002 in Bornu state by Mohammed Yusuf an extremist Muslim preacher. Due to an inappropriate management of this religious issue, the organization gained importance and rapidly came to control large territories in the North east of Nigeria, with active presence on Chadian, Cameroonian and Nigerien bordering regions. After almost a decade of fights, Boko Haram is still able to attack military bases, civilian populations and public services. The insecurity climate is real, despite important military efforts from these countries and partners. Therefore, the regional and national strategies implemented so far need to be assessed. The identification of the nature of Boko Haram in the Lake Chad region is the first step. This study has revealed Boko Haram is an insurgency in Nigeria, but is a security crisis that did not turned into an insurgency in Cameroon, Niger and Chad; This difference on the nature of threats induces a difference of approaches at the national and at the regional levels.

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## ACRONYMS

LCBC	Lake Chad Basin Commission
MNJTF	Multi National Joint Task Force (a military force under the Lake Chad Basin Commission with detachments from Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger, Chad and Benin)
ISIS	Islamic State in Syria and Iraq
ISWAP	Islamic State West African Province
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
COIN	Counterinsurgency
UNOCHA	United Nation Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

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## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION/BACKGROUND

#### Genealogy of Boko Haram and its Evolution

Boko Haram, an extremist sect opposed to visible signs of western civilization in the Nigerian Muslim society, is also known as “*jama’atu ahl assunnah li da’awati wal-jihad.*” Translated, this means “People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad” or the “Group of the People of Sunnah for Preaching and Jihad.”<sup>1</sup> This organization has two possible origins. The most scholars argue Boko Haram was founded as the result of endemic corruption in northern Nigerian states, and the belief only a society ruled by Islam’s precepts can heal the ill society and restore justice and equity. Other scholars believe Boko Haram emerged from a religious insurgent group called “Sahaba” (Allah’ apostles or companions) that was dismantled in the 1980s by Nigerian security forces.

In fact, both may be true since they are not mutually exclusive. Both agree on the emergence of Mohamed Yusuf,<sup>2</sup> as the first leader of the organization in 2002. The group’s name translated from Hausa, a common language spoken in northern Nigeria, is

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<sup>1</sup> See Charles Rivers Editors, *Boko Haram: The History of Africa’s Most Notorious Terrorist Group* (Chares Rivers Editors, 3 March 2015), 5; Mike Smith, *Boko Haram: Inside Nigeria’s Unholy War* (New York: I. B Taurus, March 2016); Solomon Hussein, *Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in Africa: Fighting Insurgency from Al Shabaab, Ansar Dine and Boko Haram* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).

<sup>2</sup> For more details on Mohammed Yusuf, see Virginia Comolli, “Boko Haram and the Islamic State,” in *Jihadism Transformed: Al Qaeda and Islamic State’s Global Battle of Ideas*, ed. Simon Staffell and Akil Awan (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2016), 130-131.

“western education is forbidden.” Yusuf was a Muslim “Maalam” (teacher or master) and extremist preacher in Maiduguri, the capital of Bornu state in northeast Nigeria. He was proficient in English and received his religious education in Chad, Niger and Egypt. In 2002, he founded his own congregation and built his own mosque dedicated to the strict adherence of Muslim traditions. He totally rejected western ways of life including education, technology and civil authority.<sup>3</sup> In an interview on BBC in 2009, Yusuf declared Darwin’s Theory and the concept of a spherical earth were both contrary to Islam and could not be accepted in a Muslim society.

In 2002, the organization was described by John Campbell, former US Ambassador to Nigeria, as a “loosely organized, grassroots insurrection against not only the Abuja government, but the traditional Muslim establishment as well.”<sup>4</sup> But Yusuf’s charisma and methods rapidly spread out and found favorable echo among the Nigerian Muslim community. By 2009, he had hundreds of thousands of followers. The movement began-with extremely violent sermons in mosques and the use of social medias to establish itself as a major critic of the government. Boko Haram advocated the replacement of federal laws in the northern part of Nigeria with Muslim laws based on sharia.<sup>5</sup> The response of federal and local police authorities was immediate, strong and

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<sup>3</sup> Alex Perry, *The Hunt for Boko Haram: Investigating the Terror Tearing Nigeria Apart* (Newsweek Insights, 19 September 2014), 52; Charles River Editors, *Boko Haram: The History of Africa’s Most Notorious Terrorist Group*, 5.

<sup>4</sup> David Cook, “Terrorism in Nigeria: The Rise of Boko Haram,” *CTC Sentinel* 4, no. 9 (September 2011), <https://ctc.usma.edu/the-rise-of-boko-haram-in-nigeria>.

<sup>5</sup> See Comolli, “Boko Haram and the Islamic State,” 130; Marc Antoine Perouse de Montclosé, “A Sectarian Jihad in Nigeria: The Case of Boko Haram,” *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 27, no. 5 (2016): 878-895.

deadly. Thousands of Yusuf's followers were arrested with 800 killed including Yusuf and some of his lieutenants. Yusuf's body was discovered handcuffed on the street. Government authorities alleged Mohammed Yusuf died while attempting to escape. The circumstances of the tragic end of Mohamed Yusuf gave rise to an extrajudicial execution, which questioned the credibility of the escape story.<sup>6</sup>

Nigerian authorities expected that by eliminating Boko Haram's leader, this would weaken and end the insurrection. However, after the death of Yusuf, Abubakar Shekau, one of his disciples, took command of Boko Haram. Shekau is described by his followers as a commander without the charisma or oratorical skills of his predecessor, but with an intense ideological commitment. He is also considered to belong to the more militant branch of the organization.<sup>7</sup> Under new leadership, Boko Haram entered into a new era of violence evolving from a Nigerian security issue to a trans-border threat jeopardizing the security of Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Niger around the Lake Chad Basin. According to Virginia Comolli, a Senior Fellow for Security and Development at The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in London, "The violence perpetrated both by Boko Haram and by the counter-insurgency campaign against it resulted in the deaths of nearly 30,000 people between 2009 and 2016, extensive physical destruction, displacement of some 2.4 million people, and a severe food crisis affecting

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<sup>6</sup> See also Cook, "Terrorism in Nigeria: The Rise of Boko Haram"; Cameron Daudu, "Mohamed Yusuf's Final Days," *The Guardian*, 6 August 2009, <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/belief/2009/aug/06/>.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

6.6 million more.”<sup>8</sup> In addition, Boko Haram has had dozens of people carry out suicide bombing attacks, and, from 2013 to 2017, controlled large areas in the northeastern regions of Nigeria, bordering Cameroon, Chad and Niger, a territory larger than Belgium.<sup>9</sup> A regional threat, Boko Haram has become the number one source of instability in a region that was already sensitive due to difficult natural conditions. To handle this, Nigeria, bordering Cameroon, Chad and Niger have organized themselves at national and regional levels, to provide a military response. From the internationalization of the organization in 2009, to 2019, Boko Haram’s influence has evolved and peaked between 2014 and 2016 when it gained control of the Nigerian states of Yobe, Bornu and Adamawa , threatening Niger Chad, and Cameroon.<sup>10</sup> Since 2016, the involvement of military by the Lake Chad Basin countries have degraded Boko Haram’s military capabilities. Boko Haram retains a substantial military presence mainly in Nigeria, and is still able to carry out limited or non-conventional attacks in neighboring countries. Before providing further analysis, it is important to put the evolution of the Boko Haram security in context.

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<sup>8</sup> United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), “Lake Chad Basin: Crisis Overview,” United Nations, 4 May 2017, [https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Lake%20Chad%20Snapshot\\_04%20May%202017.pdf](https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Lake%20Chad%20Snapshot_04%20May%202017.pdf).

<sup>9</sup> Virginia Comolli, “The Evolution and Impact of Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin” (International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, England, October 2017).

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

Presentation of the Region and Facilitating Factors  
of Boko Haram's Regionalization

The deep roots of Boko Haram are found in the history of the Lake Chad Basin region. From a strictly geographic prospective, Lake Chad Basin is a large area of river drainage spanning seven countries around Lake Chad. The drainage basin is almost 2,400,000 square kilometers with a population of more than 35 million<sup>11</sup> (2016). This study focusses on the region between Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Niger, immediately bordering the Lake Chad, and that is the area of interest of Boko Haram. At the local level, the area of interest (427,500 km<sup>2</sup>), corresponds to what was historically known as the “Kanem-Bornu,” an African trading kingdom founded by the “Seyf dynasty” existing during the 9<sup>th</sup> to 19<sup>th</sup> centuries.<sup>12</sup> The kingdom became Muslim state during the 11<sup>th</sup> century; but progressively lost its importance due to Fulani<sup>13</sup> attacks and the British colonization. The last king of the “Seyf dynasty” and the Kanem-Bornu kingdom died in 1846. Even after have collapsed, the Kanem Bornu kingdom period has remained as a base of common identity among the inhabitants of the region, and also, the vast majority of Boko Haram leadership and followers are from the Kanuri ethnic group<sup>14</sup> which is

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<sup>11</sup> World Food Programme, “Insecurity in the Lake Chad Basin – Regional Impact,” 31 May 2017, wfp.org.

<sup>12</sup> Gloria Lotha, “Kanem-Bornu,” (Washington State University, Pullman, WA, July 2010); Blackpast, “Thinly Kalsang Butha, Empire of Kanem-Bornu, July 2015,” <https://www.blackpast.org/?s=Thinly+Kalsang+Butha%2C+Empire+of+Kanem-Bornu%2C+July+2015+>.

<sup>13</sup> Also called Fulbe or Peul, Fulani are origin nomadic pastoralists who settled from Senegal to Cameroon; see Henry Lhote “L’ Extraordinaire Aventure des Peuls,” *Presence Africaine*, no. 22 (October-November 1958): 48-57.

<sup>14</sup> Kanuri is the dominant group of the population of Bornu state in northeastern Nigeria and also found in large numbers in southeastern Niger. The Kanuri language is

spread in the region of interest, and is around ten millions, (seven in Nigeria, hardly 4% of its entire population).

The lake Chad basin area is an arid savanna with one rainy season lasting no more than three months. Major activities are subsistence agriculture and fishing. Herding is the more valuable activity and is, as well as agriculture, are jeopardized by long periods of drought. Consequently, periods of famine are common. Even though the region is among the poorest, based on the GDP per capita of its inhabitants, there are regional differences. The Nigerian side of the basin which is also the most important part of the Kanuri land, benefits from Nigerian oil exports and enjoy a relative decentralization of the country. The Cameroonian part of the Lake Chad Basin is among the poorest and most populated areas of Cameroon. It has an average GDP with socially stable climate, while the Chadian and Niger portions line up on their national low GDP. As a legacy of the Kanem-Bornu empire, this area is more than 70 percent Muslim.

While the Lake Chad Basin is a geographic, social and cultural entity, it has four different organizational systems. There is no common trans-border economic or social program shared by those states. However free circulation of goods and people is assured by bilateral agreements. Diplomatic relations have deep and historic roots. However, important between 1994 and 2002, Cameroon and Nigeria have had a military conflict along their through 2000 km of border, due to territorial disputes over the Bakassi

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classified as belonging to the Saharan branch of the Nilo-Saharan family. See Encyclopedia.com, "Kanuri," accessed 29 December 2018, <https://www.encyclopedia.com/humanities/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/kanuri>.

peninsular.<sup>15</sup> Even if the case was brought before the United Nation's International Court of Justice, the conflict remains and has affected the handling of the Boko Haram crisis at the bilateral level.

Prior to the regionalization of the Boko Haram crisis, only the Lake Chad Basin Commission<sup>16</sup> (LCBC), created in 1964, connected the 4 countries of the region. This organization was later joined by other African countries interested in the Lake Chad Basin's water, namely Central African Republic in 1988 and Libya in 2002. The LCBC's original and main mission is the regulation and control of water and other resources inside the basin's area.

The Lake Chad Basin region is a very sensitive area jeopardized by droughts, famine, religious and social instability. As a result, a special attention must be paid on any factor that can set the area ablaze. The spreading of Boko Haram has threatened the surrounding countries and have captured great attention. This Crisis is multidimensional, with social, humanitarian, political and religious aspects. The spread of Boko Haram has hit the region without any consideration of the existing country borders.

The social and humanitarian consequences of Boko haram's spread have been severe. According to Dr. Abiodun Emmanuel Awosusi in his editorial of *aftermath of Boko Haram Violence in the Lake Chad Basin: a Neglected Global Health Threat*, an

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<sup>15</sup> See Cameroon v. Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea intervening, "Land and Maritime Boundary Between Cameroon, and Nigeria: Judgements," Judgement of 10 October 2002, International Court of Justice.

<sup>16</sup> For more information, see Lake Chad Basin Commission, <http://www.cbtl.org/en>.

article published by BMJ Global Health in 2016,<sup>17</sup> “Over two million people have been displaced from their homes; more than half of them are children ... one hundred and eighty-seven thousand people have fled Nigeria for Cameroon, Chad and Niger...half a million children are at risk of severe acute malnutrition in the Lake Chad Basin region; nearly 250,000 in Bornu, north east Nigeria. More than 4 million people are at risk of food insecurity.” In addition, the health system is disorganized or non-existent. More than 50% of the health facilities are closed or non-functional. Health personnel have fled, fearing for their lives. The situation for the educational institutions and educators is worse, because Boko haram considers western education to be evil. This Boko Haram security crisis on the Nigerian side, extends to some bordering regions of Cameroon, Niger and Chad. Boko Haram knows no borders.

The Lake Chad Basin region is of multiple religions. Even though the region is populated by a majority of tribes which converted to Islam during the Kanem-Bornu Empire, the religious climate is marked by tolerance toward Christian minorities. The rise of Boko Haram under the doctrine of its leaders has been and still is, a threat for Muslims not converted to the radicalism of the organization, as well as Christians inhabiting the region.<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> See UNOCHA, “Lake Chad Basin: Crisis Overview.”

<sup>18</sup> See The Guardian, “Boko Haram’s ‘deadliest massacre’: 2,000 feared dead in Nigeria,” 9 January 2015, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/09/boko-haram-deadliest-massacre-baga-nigeria>.

By pledging allegiance to the Islamic State in March 2015, Boko Haram became an Islamic province in west Africa,<sup>19</sup> claiming a territory, a political and military chain of command and population of followers. In doing so, it challenged the established governments in Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Niger.<sup>20</sup> This aspect of the Boko Haram crisis was the most visible and directly caused military involvements of Lake Chad Basin countries. The basis and the framework of the political and military intervention in the will be discussed later in this study.

Most of aspects of the Boko Haram crisis in the Lake Chad Basin were foreseen and anticipated. Adequate measures of surveillance and preventive actions related to a variety of domains could be taken to prevent the crisis and its effects. However, when judged upon the severity of the crisis at its peak from 2014 to 2016, serious deficiencies appear.

#### Purpose of the Study

This study identifies the specific nature of the threat represented by the Boko Haram organization in the Lake Chad Basin countries. The first step set forth conditions for reevaluating the management of the Boko Haram security crisis by Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Niger. This study will then provide important inputs for improving

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<sup>19</sup> Sarah Almuthakhar, "How Boko Haram Courted and Joined the Islamic State," *The New York Times*, 10 June 2015.

<sup>20</sup> The intention of creating a caliphate with all the elements of a state as described by Dr. S.B.M. Marume, R. R. Jubenkanda, C. W. Namusi, and N. C. Madziyire, "An analysis of essential elements of the state," *International Journal of Engineering Science Invention* 5, no. 3 (March 2016): 24-28, [www.ijesi.org](http://www.ijesi.org).

existing strategies which has not succeeded in bringing peace back to this region. The completion of this first step will allow further analysis oriented toward the assessment of the entire process of the regional crusade against Boko Haram, in order to have a clear idea of the efficiency of the existing regional mechanism of security and military cooperation if any.

### Problem Statement

The Boko Haram movement appeared in 2002 in Bornu, a Nigerian federate state<sup>21</sup>. The organization became a national threat around 2008. Despite security measures taken by the Nigerian government, the sect rapidly spread out of Nigeria. By the beginning of 2010, it was a regional threat, jeopardizing the entire Lake Chad Basin region. After years of national, regional and international military efforts, Boko Haram is still alive, controlling many cities and tackling some Nigerian military bases on the borders of Lake Chad. It has also carried out attacks on civilian populations, as well as public service offices in Chad, Cameroon and Niger. Although political and military authorities in the region claim to have defeated the organization, the region is not secure and people are still fleeing the area. In view of this, it is valuable to consider whether or not fighting Boko Haram at the regional or at the national level is effective. The implemented strategies need to be assessed.

Those who have studied the Boko Haram involvement in the Lake Chad Basin region have identified the crisis as a regional insurgency. They must likely have come to

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<sup>21</sup> Comolli, “The Evolution and Impact of Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin,” 4.

this conclusion by extending the circumstances in Nigeria to the entire region. But is this assessment accurate and helpful in resolving this prolonged crisis? To avoid further failures or risks, nothing should be retained without a critical review. Supporting this approach, Julia McQuaid and Patricio Astufa-Heim, in their report, *Rethinking the US Approach to Boko Haram; the Case for a Regional Strategy*, the first step in analyzing a security crisis situation is, “Devising a strategy that is built on an analytically derived conflict assessment...and rooted in a balanced assessment of the conflict. This will improve programs, activities, and actions that address the drivers of the conflict.”<sup>22</sup> This study conducts an objective analysis that identifies the type of threat the Lake Chad Basin countries are facing at the national level. It also looks at threat at the regional level. Whether or not, Boko Haram the objective is to identify whether Boko Haram is a national or regional insurgency or something totally different that still needs to be identified. This will help assess the most effective way for those countries to deal with Boko Haram as a significant regional security crisis.

#### Research Question

What is the real nature of Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin region?

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<sup>22</sup> For more details, see Julia McQuaid and Patricio Astufa-Heim, “Rethinking the US Approach to Boko Haram: The Case for a Regional Strategy” (CNA, Arlington, VA, February 2015), 12.

### Assumptions

In this study, it is assumed that the identification of a movement as “insurgency” or “terrorist movement” should obey to the accepted definition of the concepts according to scholars and social science.

This study considers the Lake Chad Basin Area as a continuous geographic area with international borders, different and sovereign legal and administrative systems. consequently, each of the four sovereign countries of the region should be analyzed.

It also assumes that a response to an insurgency situation is different from any other security crisis response. Therefore, a relevant identification of the type of threat is the first step to the resolution of any crisis.

### Definitions

Insurgency: A condition of revolt against a government that is less than an organized revolution and that is not recognized as belligerency. *Merriam Webster Dictionary*.

Terrorist movement: An organization implementing a systematic use of terror especially as a means of coercion. Merriam Webster

Boko Haram: An extremist sect, opposed to visible signs of western civilization in the Nigerian Muslim society and is also known as “Jama’Atu Ahl Assunnah Li Da’Awati Wal-Jihad,” translated: “People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad.”

Caliphate: A region or province ruled and organized by a caliph who is a political and administrative and religious leader.

Lake Chad Basin: Geographical region surrounding Lake Chad, covering around 420,000 km<sup>2</sup> under the sovereignty of Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroon.

#### Limitations

The current study would have been better if not limited by the following:

1. Time available to conduct the study
2. Availability and access to information/data/resources
3. Experience as researcher
4. Possible bias

#### Scope and Delimitations

The present study focusses on the nature of the Boko Haram threat inside the Lake Chad Basin geographical area, and how the organization has acted so far. Political, religious, administrative or military aspects will be analyzed. Narrative concerning the history of the organization or description of military operations, social and humanitarian considerations, are not part of this study.

#### Significance of the Study

The results of this analysis may help in early identification of security threats before their maturation and provide better and more effective approaches for addressing them.

The results of this study may be used to improve the fight against trans-border terrorism.

The results of this study may also advance scholarship in the field of military art and science.

## Summary and Conclusions

Boko Haram is a Nigerian extremist movement born in Kanem Bornu in 2002. Due to inappropriate policies of the Nigerian government to control and fight the organization, it rapidly spread out of Nigeria and around 2014, became a regional security threat impacting Cameroon, Niger and Chad, as well as Nigeria. After four years of primarily military regional efforts, the organization is still active and the region unsecured. The organization is still able to carry out military actions and win major battles. For those reasons, the current strategy adopted by Lake Chad Basin seems questionable. The literature on the topic is important and diverse and is explored in chapter 2.

## CHAPTER 2

### LITERATURE REVIEW

#### Introduction

The present study revisits how the Boko Haram international security crisis has affected the Lake Chad Basin area as an international problem and how it has been handled by the Nigeria Cameroon, Chad and Niger, all countries of the Lake Chad Basin. This chapter explores how scholars and available literature examine the Boko Haram security crisis and its most important aspects.

As a Nigerian originated issue from the beginning, a great deal of interest will be placed on the Nigerian centered Boko Haram literature. This will provide a better understanding of the question from its start. Also, particular points of interest will focus on the literature that deals with the issue since its spread out of Nigeria as well. Another portion of the literature reviewed will relate to the broad aspects of insurgency, terrorism and the best ways to overcome these threats. The findings of these readings are intended to provide an efficient framework for an objective assessment of how efficiently the Lake Chad Basin countries are organizing their efforts to resolve the Boko Haram crisis. The results of the regional handling of this crisis could serve as a framework for resolving similar situations.

#### Organization of Chapter 2

This study is intended to address the research question identified in chapter 1. The first group of documents utilized for this research work is addressing the general questions of counterinsurgency, terrorist movements and is focusing on what classifies

Boko Haram as one of these organizations. The second group of documents discusses ways and means to combat insurgency and terrorism generally speaking, and how Lake Chad Basin countries organize to tackle the common threat. The documents provided help understand the Boko Haram from within Nigeria and its actions in the Lake Chad Basin. The last group discusses ways of fighting Boko Haram.

### What Has Been Written on Terrorism and Insurgency

The literature on Boko Haram is significant. However, for the purpose of the present study, it is important to explore the theory on insurgency and counterinsurgency in order to determine with precision, the type of organization Boko Haram is. An objective classification of the studied organization is necessary; to determine whether Lake Chad Basin countries are facing a terrorist group, a criminal organization, an insurgency, or something totally different. This will make it easier to assess if they are they are responding appropriately.

David Kilcullen, in his book *Counterinsurgency*, Oxford University Press 2010, provides a focus on the practical aspects of combatting terrorism and insurgency, He proposes an interesting definition of the two concepts, and discusses, According to Kilcullen, an insurgency is “An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict”<sup>23</sup> he also, on the same page, provides another definition, “An organized protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an established government,

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<sup>23</sup> See David Kilcullen, *Counterinsurgency* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2010), 1.

occupying power or other political entity, while increasing the insurgent's control.”<sup>24</sup>

This second definition taken from the US military doctrine is broad with emphasis on the political contest and the military contest to control populations and lands. Some may think there is only a single type of insurgency, which is why Kilcullen stresses on the fact that there are dozens of types of insurgencies. Therefore, there is no single solution.

Supporting this, Paul B. Rich in *Jihadist insurgent movements*,<sup>25</sup> presents many types of insurgencies. The most notable being jihadism, ethnic and colonial conflicts. He also describes the Jihadist as a “heavily contested one”. Therefore, dealing with a specific type of insurgency requires specific measures. However, three key factors are to consider with all: “The nature of the insurgency, the nature of the government ... and the environment.”<sup>26</sup> This is important when defining best practices in the counterinsurgency

Both authors agree on the importance of identifying the type of insurgency before establishing the way to fight it. Therefore, if Boko Haram is to be identified as an insurgency in each of the lake Chad Basin, the measures to combat it would depend on the type on insurgency it is identified to be. For this purpose, it would be interesting to analyze its ability to use political and military ways of exercising control over population and land inside the four states of the Lake Chad Basin countries. Also, the reaction of the

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<sup>24</sup> See U.S. Government, U.S. Army, Field Manual 3-24/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5, *Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, May 2014).

<sup>25</sup> Paul B. Rich, and Richard Burchill, eds., *Jihadist Insurgent Movements* (New York: Routledge, 2016), 7.

<sup>26</sup> Kilcullen, *Counterinsurgency*, 1.

political powers can be analyzed in consideration of the type of threat they are facing, if assumed that the response to give to a particular threat depends on its real nature.

At this stage, it is important to discuss the size of the counterinsurgency. Since 09/11, the Jihadist insurgency is a global threat of which many consider Boko Haram to be a part; Or it is may be more relevant to consider the size of insurgency in every country as separated, and therefore, apply a more classical counterinsurgency theory that fit more to local threats.<sup>27</sup> There is no certainty as to whether Boko Haram has the same nature in all the 4 countries of the Lake Chad Basin. The crisis may be extended to the four countries but the intentions and the ways the organization behaves in each of those may be totally different. As a result, the same crisis may need different measures in two neighboring countries. For this reason, it will be interesting to know if the concept of global insurgency as presented by Kilcullen can be applied here. This will command how to deal with it because “Global insurgency renders the traditional counterinsurgency paradigm irrelevant, and that it has strained the classical counterinsurgency paradigm, which is ill suited to countering a globalized insurgency.”<sup>28</sup> On the other hand, terrorism, is defined by the US security doctrine as "premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents." It is also, “ The use of violence or threat of violence in the pursuit of political, religious, ideological or social objectives.”<sup>29</sup> These two definitions differentiate between acts of war and terrorism, whose goal is to inflict indiscriminate casualties on populations and

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<sup>27</sup> Kilcullen, *Counterinsurgency*, 166.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, 192.

<sup>29</sup> See U.S. Code § 2656f, Chapter 38, Title 22, Definition of Terrorism.

use terror and fear as a means of expression. These actions are condemned by the international law and are crimes, which makes them illegal by each countries' internal legislation. This is important for this study because if Boko Haram is identified a terrorist movement and not considered an insurgency movement, its actions could fall under the internal criminal laws. This will make the approach different from dealing with an insurgency.

### Origin, the Evolution of the Boko Haram Organization

After understanding the concepts on terrorism, insurgency, counterinsurgency and related concepts, it is necessary to focus on Boko Haram and study its historical, geographical, social and political tenets. At this stage, it is also important to have an idea of the sociology of the Lake Chad Basin area.

### Boko Haram, a Nigerian and Lake Chad Basin Crisis

The available literature largely considers Boko Haram primarily as Nigerian problem that has spread. The assumption is it spread out of Nigeria is a consequence of both bad handling of the crisis by the Nigerian government and involvement of the Lake Chad Basin countries (Chad, Niger and Cameroon) in the military fight alongside the Nigerian army starting in early 2014. Concerning the genesis of the Boko Haram organization, Raymond A. Forbes<sup>30</sup> assumes in his MMAS research work, "*Boko Haram, a systemic and strategic analysis*," states that the Boko Haram insurgency has deep root

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<sup>30</sup> Raymond A. Forbes, "Boko Haram: A Systemic and Strategic Analysis" (Master's Thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, August 2016).

causes in the Nigerian history and society. For him, “When viewed through these lenses, Boko Haram is a modern manifestation of old problems, wrapped in the guise of fundamentalist Islam. Many of the same problems that drove the system state throughout the history of the Nigerian region resulted in the emergence of Boko Haram. Problems that may seem new are, in fact, old problems.”<sup>31</sup> These causes are endogenous with the ongoing schism among the practitioners of some forms of local Muslim ideology and view of the society, mixed with some latent ethnic conflicts among historical rival groups in the northern Nigeria. At the national level, he also stresses the incapability of the federal government to build a national identity. Developing the same point of view, Paul B. Rich and Richard Burchill published a series of eleven articles on the topic of terrorism entitled “*Jihadist Insurgent Movements*.”<sup>32</sup> The seventh focused on Boko Haram with the title “*A sectarian jihad in Nigeria: the case of Boko Haram*,” by Marc Antoine Perouse de Montclos, a French teacher in Nigeria and specialist of armed conflicts in Africa. He describes Boko Haram as, “An Islamic sect turned terrorist group that has an ethnic leaning, but that is not a liberation front...It is a jihadist movement because it fights for the full implementation of sharia law, which will require the change of the political regime and the establishment of an Islamic state...in the region of great Bornu which encompasses parts of Nigeria, Chad, Niger and Cameroon.”<sup>33</sup> There is a slight difference between the two approaches presented above; While Antoine de

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<sup>31</sup> Forbes, “Boko Haram: A Systemic and Strategic Analysis,” 87.

<sup>32</sup> See Rich and Burchill, *Jihadist Insurgent Movements*.

<sup>33</sup> de Montclos, “A Sectarian Jihad in Nigeria: The Case of Boko Haram,” 150.

Montclos presents Boko Haram as a “terrorist” (person or organization who uses of terror as a mean of coercion, *Merriam Webster*) movement with jihadist inspiration, Forbes presents it as an ethnic and religion based “insurgency” (person or organization who revolts against established leadership, *Merriam Webster*). The difference between those two terms is important since it implies different approaches due to differences in their contents, and the difference between counter-terrorism and counterinsurgency. For further understanding of Boko Haram, Marc Antoine de Montclos, in his article “*A sectarian jihad in Nigeria: The Case of Boko Haram*” identifies two versions of Boko Haram; one running from The early 2002 to the death of Abubakar Yusuf in 2009, in which the sect was an exclusive Nigerian security issue with only local actions and interests; and the second period beginning with the death of Yusuf and lasting up to now. That period still on its way is marked by the internationalization of the movement through its allegiance to ISIS, the cooperation with some other African Islamic movements and attacks on Lake Chad Basin countries. In his analysis, Marc, Antoine de Montclos stresses on how Nigerian government forces and police dealt with the issue when it was still a minor and a local issue. He also assesses how Cameroonian, Chadian and Nigerian security forces handled the case when it began its internationalization. According to this thesis, the brutality and the heavy hand of the security forces of the Lake Chad Basin countries did not create the crisis, but it exacerbated it and allowed the sect to gain followers due to the inappropriate strategy. This approach not only assesses the military and police forces, but also judiciary aspects of the crisis, as resulting from security forces actions, and the different criminal courts of the four countries of the Lake Chad Basin. The study points out various negative aspects such as extra judiciary

executions by Nigerian and Cameroonian police forces<sup>34</sup> and weak numbers of trials before specialized courts. All these factors are considered to have participated in the building of the Boko Haram crisis, and therefore should help in understanding it.

Other authors such as Claire Felter, who wrote “*Nigeria’s Battle With Boko Haram*,” published by the Council of Foreign Relations in August 2018 advocate for a very endogenous definition of Boko Haram taken from Chris Ngwodo.<sup>35</sup> He sees the group arising from decades of failed governmental policies, years of political instability, three years of civil war and a dozen of coups. The consequence of this Nigerian centered approach is that the other Lake Chad Basin countries are viewed simply as collateral damage, due to their support to Nigerian forces in their fight against Boko Haram. For Felter, “Cameroon, Chad, and Niger have deployed thousands of troops as parts of the multinational forces authorized by the African Union. The coalition has been credited with helping the Nigerian Army retake much of the territories claimed by Boko Haram and reduce violence linked to the group to levels prior to 2014.”<sup>36</sup> Even if this approach is still Nigeria centered it alludes to the international context of the crisis and steers the problem at the regional level.

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<sup>34</sup> de Montclos, “A Sectarian Jihad in Nigeria: The Case of Boko Haram,” 155, 157.

<sup>35</sup> Uthman Dan Fodio, “Understanding Boko Haram: A Theology of Chaos,” *Revolution by Other Means* (blog) Chris Ngwodo, August 2010, accessed 3 April 2019, <http://chrisngwodo.blogspot.com/2010/10/understanding-boko-haram-theology-of.html>.

<sup>36</sup> Claire Felter, “Nigeria’s Battle with Boko Haram,” Council on Foreign Relations, last updated 18 August 2018, accessed 4 April 2019, <https://www.cfr.org/background/nigerias-battle-boko-haram>.

At the Lake Chad Basin level, many studies have been done, but the vast majority start with Nigeria at the epicenter of the crisis and the other countries of the Lake Chad Basin as the surrounding area. In his MMAS entitled “*The effects of Boko Haram in West and Central Africa*,”<sup>37</sup> Andrew Nicholson, a Marine officer conducts an evaluation study of the Boko Haram crisis through as it impacted the social, economic and military aspects of the governance of the four Lake Chad Basin countries. In his analysis, the author uses a rating table to provide an assessment of the situation and its evolution since the inception of the Boko Haram crisis in the region. Through this process, the author surprisingly concludes that Lake Chad Basin countries suffered marginally from Boko Haram’s exactions in the region. The reason this conclusion sounds so different is that elements of the analysis, such as economic and social data are presented at the national level while the crisis does not affect any of the concerned countries in its entire territory. While the data may be correct, the conclusion is not accurate, because of being diluted in broad economic, social and economic environments.

Considering the regional aspects of the crisis, Foster states the region is a highly sensitive area and all the states of the Lake Chad Basin are aware of this sensitivity. Therefore, they are supposed to provide adequate security measures to handle the threat represented by the Boko Haram security crisis. Forbes also uses the systemic approach to assess the involvement of the Nigerian government, as well as the countries of the Lake Chad Basin in the fight against Boko Haram. He uses the same approach to assess the US

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<sup>37</sup> Andrew D. Nicholson, “The Effects of the Boko Haram Insurgency Group in West and Central Africa” (Master’s Thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, Ft. Leavenworth, KS), 68, 69, 70.

government's official posture which for him, is not committed enough alongside Nigeria and the sub region countries. The result of the insufficient commitment of Lake Chad Basin countries and the US has been the rapid spread of Boko Haram out Nigeria. Therefore, Forbes who analyses the case from the American prospective, recommends more involvement from the US government and actions tackling the root causes of the security crisis, even if these actions involve cultural changes.

Commenting also on the regional aspects of Boko Haram, Montclos deduces that all the inadequate defense and security forces behaviors of the Lake Chad Basin countries drastically hindered the fight against Boko Haram. He questions the internationalization of the response against Boko Haram. He believes it could be seen as a cause or a response to the spreading of the sect in the Lake Chad Basin, and evokes the question of fighting Boko Haram as part of the global jihadist network or simply as a localized movement.

### Ways of Fighting Boko Haram

The Boko Haram security crisis began in 2002. Seventeen years later, it is still a major security issue in Africa and remains the biggest threat faced by the Lake Chad Basin countries. From a marginal movement with hundreds of followers, it has grown to become a serious military threat, controlling of pieces of land and people. Those facts are a proof of the failure of established states to end the insurgency either politically, ideologically or militarily. The reasons why Boko Haram is so difficult to combat are diverse. According to Sadau Zubairu Azama, a Nigerian officer who analyzed the Boko Haram insurgency under the prism of the Mao's theory of revolutionary war, the main reason is the use of the Mao's revolutionary war theories. In this study indeed, Boko

Haram's struggle is compared to Mao's revolutionary process which is characterized by the staging of the actions into three phases.

The first phase is, "Organization, consolidation and preservation of regional bases areas". It matches with what Boko Haram is doing in the Northeast Nigeria, with extensions into neighboring countries. The terrain is isolate from those four states' administrative centers and difficult to access. The second phase is "progressive expansion" through direct violent actions and military struggle against established governments. The objective is to challenge these governments and create a climate of panic and fear among their members and forces. The third phase is the confrontation of military forces and use of deceptive negotiations. A comparison of these stages with the Boko Haram process shows the organization is somewhere between the first and the second phases applying the entire panoply of Mao's insurgency tactics. Therefore, only the adapted counter insurgency at an international level can overcome the crisis. To do this, he recommends four major sets of measures:<sup>38</sup>

1. Stress on the social aspects of the crisis;
2. Increase their intelligence work;
3. Equip and train Nigerian armed forces;
4. Enhance border security with neighboring countries.

Another approach for addressing the Boko Haram insurgency is presented in *Rethinking the US Approach to Boko Haram; the Case for a Regional Strategy*", by Julia

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<sup>38</sup> Sadau Zubairu Azama, "A Critical Analysis on Boko Haram Insurgency" (Master's Thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, August 2015), 98-100.

McQuaid and Patricio Astufa-Heim with the objective of enhancing the US political efficiency in the region. These authors identify the Boko Haram crisis as an insurgency and present a model with eight steps for assessing any counterinsurgency. Those criteria are taken from the root causes of the crisis and are related to social, political and economic grievances, sustained by a fundamentalist and rejectionist ideology.<sup>39</sup>

Accordingly, the 8 points model, is broad and able to fit any type of counterinsurgency. This model has been used by the authors to assess the Nigerian and US governments' actions. As a result, the study determines efficient or inefficient actions taken have been.

Concerning the government of Nigeria, the conclusion of the analysis is rude as the authors clearly state, "The Government of Nigeria has not pursued an approach that supports the eight best practices of the COIN. Rather, it has pursued primarily a counterterrorism approach, focusing on trying to defeat the group through military, security, and law enforcement means. The approach so far has been ineffective and counter-productive, with the conflict intensifying and the group growing stronger over time. The government of Nigeria has also pursued efforts to negotiate a deal that would incentivize the group to shut down its operations, but has not done so successfully."<sup>40</sup>

As stated above, this may be one reason why the Boko Haram crisis is now a regional security issue involving the entire Lake Chad Basin. In this paper, the "eight point" methodology will be retained as the method of analysis, but the analysis will focus

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<sup>39</sup> McQuaid and Astufa-Heim, "Rethinking the US Approach to Boko Haram: The Case for a Regional Strategy," 7.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid., 35.

on the four Lake Chad Basin countries, assuming the Boko Haram crisis is no longer a Nigerian issue alone, but also a Lake Chad Basin security issue.

### Conclusion

This study is intended to set conditions for the assessment of the global management of the Boko Haram crisis inside the Lake Chad Basin. For that purpose, it will identify the true nature of Boko Haram in the region. The above literature review provides a broad view of the topic and information about how the related topics have been studied. Concerning the topics of insurgency, terrorism and ways to combat them, the literature is available and Boko Haram is broadly considered as an insurgency in the region, which uses terrorist strategies and tactics. The available literature largely categorizes Boko Haram as primarily a Nigerian problem that has spread out of Nigeria as a consequence of both bad handling of the crisis by the Nigerian government and the involvement of the Lake Chad Basin countries (Chad, Niger and Cameroon) in the military fight alongside the Nigerian army from early 2014.

## CHAPTER 3

### RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

#### Introduction

The present study attempts to understand and assess the management of the Boko Haram international security crisis in the Lake Chad Basin using case study methodology. For this purpose, it is important to collect and analyze all data and information related to the subject to help to identify possible mismanagement and improve current strategies, so far implemented by Cameroon, Niger, Chad and Nigeria. The current study also wants to identify new strategies that would cope more efficiently with similar situations in the future. The methodology for this research paper will be the case study methodology. This methodology is defined by John Guerring in his article “What is a Case Study and What is it Good for?”<sup>41</sup> as, “An intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of understanding a larger class of (similar) units.” This definition matches with the objectives of first understanding the situation in the Lake Chad Basin and then applying the results of the experience to future situations in other parts of the world.

#### Organization of Chapter 3

This chapter describes the methodology and objectivity used to assess the way the four Lake Chad Basin countries are dealing with the Boko Haram crisis since its regionalization. It is organized using the available literature concerning the description of

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<sup>41</sup> See John Gerring, “What Is a Case Study and What Is It Good For?” *The American Political Science Review* 98, no. 2 (May 2004): 341.

models and criteria that can be used to assess actions carried out by Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Niger in their management of the Boko Haram crisis.

#### Steps Taken to Address the Primary and Secondary Questions

This study's primary research question is the determination of the true nature of Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin region. The goal is to improve the overall response to the ongoing security crisis by Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Niger. To address this question, the chosen methodology is qualitative research, which explores and provides a better understanding of existing situations. In fact, according to Saul McLeod in his article, *What's the Difference Between Qualitative and Quantitative Research?*<sup>42</sup>, this methodology is, "used to gain an understanding of underlying reasons, opinions and motivations. It provides insights into problems or helps to develop ideas or hypothesis. It is also used to uncover trends in thought and opinions, and dive deeper into the problem."<sup>43</sup> This qualitative methodology will be implemented through a case study design focused on Boko Haram security crisis in the Lake Chad region. The case study explores the situation by gathering and applying data from various sources, analyzing relationship and interactions. The case study methodology is defined by Leonard Barton as, "A case history of past or current phenomenon, drawn from multiple sources of evidences. It can include data from direct observation and systematic interviews as well from public and private archives. In fact, any information relevant to the stream of events

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<sup>42</sup> See Saul McLeod, "What's the Difference Between Qualitative and Quantitative Research?" Simply Psychology, last updated 2017, <https://www.simplypsychology.org/qualitative-quantitative.html>.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid.

describing the phenomenon is a potential datum in a case study, since context is important.”<sup>44</sup> This describes the Boko Haram crisis in the Lake Chad Basin. This technique of analysis seems to be the more adapted to social sciences inquiries. The first step of this rigorous analysis will be the identification of criteria.

#### Criteria to Identify Boko Haram as an Insurgency Organization or Not

Boko Haram is broadly presented by authors such as Virginia Carmolli<sup>45</sup>, Marc Antoine Perouse de Montclos<sup>46</sup> and others as an insurgency in Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger and Chad. Before analyzing the counterinsurgency reactions from those states, it is important to verify they actually are facing an insurgency movement in their respective territories. From a military prospective, an insurgency can be defined as the rise of a smaller force, against a more larger and conventional force, utilizing a mix of conventional and non-conventional tactics.<sup>47</sup> This definition is more adapted to the tactical approach of the understanding of the concept and is not enough explicit as far as the analysis is not based on military standards. Another definition, also from a military origin, and provided by the American military doctrine in FM 3-24 version of December

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<sup>44</sup> See Chris Voss, Nikos Tsiriktsis and Mark Frihlich, “Case Research in Operations Management,” *Qualitative Report* 13, no. 4 (December 2008): 544-559, accessed 3 May 2019, <http://www.nova.edu/ssss/QR/QR13-4/baxter.pdf>.

<sup>45</sup> See Comolli, “Boko Haram and the Islamic State.”

<sup>46</sup> See de Montclos, “A Sectarian Jihad in Nigeria: The Case of Boko Haram,” 151, 152.

<sup>47</sup> Kelly Nicholson Jackson, “Essential Elements Required by an Insurgency Force” (Master’s Thesis, Defence and Strategic Studies, Massey University, Manawatu, New-Zealand, 2011).

2013, defines it as “An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict.”<sup>48</sup>

Integrating an interesting difference between Insurgency and terrorist groups, the 2012 Guide of the Analysis of Insurgency published by the US government also defines insurgency as, “A protracted political-military struggle directed toward subverting or displacing the legitimacy of a constituted government or occupying power and completely or partially controlling the resources of a territory through the use of irregular military forces and illegal political organizations” It adds, “The common denominator for most insurgent groups is their objective of gaining control of a population or a particular territory, including its resources. This objective differentiates insurgent groups from purely terrorist organizations”<sup>49</sup>

For Bard O’Neill, insurgency is, “ A general overarching concept that refers to a conflict between a government and an out group or opponent in which the latter uses both political resources and violence to change, reformulate, or uphold the legitimacy of one or more of four key aspects of politics...(1) the integrity of borders and the composition of the nation-state, (2) the political system, (3) the authorities in power, and (4) the policies that determines who gets what in the society.”<sup>50</sup> This definition is broad, complete and similar to, David Kilcullen’s, proposed in his book entitled

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<sup>48</sup> See FM 3-24 version of December 2013, “Definitions.”

<sup>49</sup> See U.S. Government, *Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency 2012*, Homeland Security Digital Library, accessed 20 April 2019, <http://www.hsdl.org>.

<sup>50</sup> Bard O’Neill, *Insurgency & Terrorism Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare* (Dulles, VA: Brassey’s, 2005).

“Counterinsurgency,”<sup>51</sup> which states that an insurgency is, “An organized protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an established government, occupying power or other political authority while increasing insurgent control.”<sup>52</sup> Those two definitions depict military, social, and political aspects supporting an insurgency. For the purpose of this study, the identification criteria of the Boko Haram movement as an insurgency, a terrorist movement or something else, will be built upon the review Boko Haram in the four countries of the Lake Chad Basin, using the above four main points listed in Bard O’Neill’s definition. The identified main aspects of the definition, appears to be the contest on (1) the integrity of borders and the composition of the nation-state, (2) the political system (3) the authorities in power, and (4) the policies that determines who gets what in the society. These four characteristics will be applied as the main criteria for identifying whether or not Boko Haram is an insurgency. The analysis will be done for each of the four state of the Lake Chad Basin.

The first criteria is whether or not the integrity of borders and the composition of the nation-state are being contested. This criteria focusses on contesting of borders through the retention of cities and villages, the utilization of the armed struggle with unconventional tactics to contest the borders and the attempt to recruit followers to constitute a population. The main indicators are the number of attacks on a country’s borders and the number of villages and cities claimed by Boko Haram. The second criteria

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<sup>51</sup> David Kilcullen is described by the critics, among them *The Washington Post* as one of the world’s most influential experts on counterinsurgency and modern warfare. He is the author of *Counterinsurgency* published by Oxford University Press, 2010.

<sup>52</sup> Idem

is whether or not the political system is being contested by Boko Haram. The measurement will be the creation of a new political entity different from the existing one the creation of a new caliphate or the extending of the auto-proclaimed one on the area of interest will be the main indicator of an existing contest on the political system. The third criteria is whether or not the authorities in power are being contested by Boo Haram. This includes political and administrative leadership as well as the contesting of religious authorities. The fourth criteria which is whether or not policies determining who gets what in the society are being contested through the imposition of sharia as legal base of the society and the attempts to control the economic activities

In the framework of the current analysis, it will be assumed that, to be a regional or/and national insurgency, the Boko Haram organization should at least encompass the above four criteria identified by Bard O'Neal's definition. For the purpose of this study, all the criteria will be rated equally, even if it can be assumed that some may be more influential than others. Meeting the above criteria will open the way to define Boko Haram as an insurgency, while the lack of meeting these criteria means Boko Haram is closer to a terrorist or criminal organization acting at the regional level. The goal of this process is to clearly identify and categorize the movement, then construct an adequate and relevant strategy to the fight against Boko Haram, at national or/and regional levels.

#### Evaluation of Criteria

For a better understanding of the criteria, illustrative tables will be utilized with chosen symbols. Those symbols will illustrate the occurrence of the criteria as follows:

Concerning criteria 1, “2” will correspond to attacks with effective retention of territories for more than two days; “1” will correspond to attacks with no more than two days of occupation; “0” will be absence of contestation on national borders.

For criteria 2, “2” will correspond to a partial or total success in the establishment of the auto proclaimed caliphate by Boko Haram; “1” will correspond to attempts without success and “0” will correspond to cases where no attempts to extend the caliphate have been reported.

Criteria 3 will be rated with “2” if the Boko Haram organization has taken over the country political, administrative or religious authorities. “1” will be attributed. To the situation where existing authorities have only been prevented from exercising their functions, and “0” will be the sign that no political, administrative or religious leader have been contested by Boko Haram.

Regarding criteria 4, “2” will correspond to the case where Boko Haram has officially proclaimed and effectively implemented sharia laws; “1” will refer to attempts to implement and “0” will be applied to situations where there has been no attempt to the establishment of sharia.

For the overall assessment of the nature of Boko Haram in every country, all the received grades, “2”, “1” and “0” will be compiled and a total of 50 % over 8 (4) will be considered as an insurgency and a total of less than 4 will be considered a security threat that is not an insurgency.

Table 1. Evaluation of Criteria

Criteria	Description of the indicator of measurement	Occurrence ( to be filled in chapter 4)	Corresponding grade
The contest of the integrity of borders and the composition of the nation-state	Retention of cities and villages after military attacks		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• “2” for attacks with retention of territories &gt; 2 days.</li> <li>• “1” for attacks with less than 2 days retention</li> <li>• “0” for no contest on borders and no threat on national territory.</li> </ul>
The contest on the political system	Integration of national territory to the auto proclaimed caliphate		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• “2” for successful integration to the auto proclaimed caliphate</li> <li>• “1” for a failure attempt to integrate some territories in the caliphate</li> <li>• “0” for no attempt</li> </ul>
The contest of the authorities in power	Existence of administrative, political and religious leaders empowered by Boko Haram		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 2” for more than 5 leaders empowered leaders</li> <li>• “1” for between 1 and 5 leaders empowered leaders</li> <li>• “0” for no attempt to empower a leader</li> </ul>
The contest on policies that determines who gets what in the society	Sharia proclaimed or implemented by Boko Haram in the country.		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 2” for sharia proclaimed and implemented</li> <li>• “1” for attempt to impose sharia as legal basis of the society</li> <li>• “0” for no attempt to impose sharia.</li> </ul>

Source: Created by author.

## Summary and Conclusion

The current study intends to analyze the management of the Boko Haram security crisis in the Lake Chad Basin through the qualitative research methodology implemented in this case study. The chosen methodology is expected to be the most adapted, due to its ability to give good results when it comes to understand the “why” or “how” of topics that are related to social sciences. As indicated in chapter 2, the first step of this analysis work is the collection of information and data from available literature. The analysis of the collected data based on the established criteria in the current chapter will be done in chapter 4.

## CHAPTER 4

### ANALYSIS

#### Introduction

Nations face various types of conflicts and crisis. Each corresponds to a specific type of response. A security threat should be appropriately identified. In practice, there is a specific way of dealing with an insurgency which is different from how you can deal with a terrorist movement or tribal conflict. Since the regionalization of the crisis, the security crisis has been considered by most of the scholar community as an insurgency in Nigeria, as well as in the entire Lake Chad Basin. As a consequence, critics and scholars expect the management of the crisis by the lake Chad Basin countries to be aligned with the best practices for dealing with a counterinsurgency. Governments of lake Chad Basin countries are urged by their international partners, as well as their own populations, to update their strategies accordingly. On the terrain however, the strategy implemented by Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Niger is primarily based on a military response. So far, the Boko Haram threat has noticeably decreased inside Cameroonian, Chadian and Nigerien territories, but is still highly present in Nigeria. Applying the same strategy to the same threat in the continuous geographic area has produced different results. The persistence of Boko Haram in Nigeria gives the organization the capability to keep pressure on the entire region. A global and definitive solution needs to be found. A reassessment of the conflict in the entire Lake Chad Basin area is the first step to take. This chapter applies the criteria defined in chapter 3 to confirm whether or not Boko Haram is a regional insurgency.

## Organization of Chapter 4

This chapter is divided into four parts. It deals with identifying the true nature of Boko Haram in Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger and Chad. This analysis will be conducted in applying the criteria defined in chapter 3. Existing literature clearly qualifies the Boko Haram movement in Nigeria as an insurgency. Consequently, this study will not focus on Nigeria. Only few developments will summarize the situation in that country. Instead, the current study will be on the three other countries where the situation seems to be different.

### Boko Haram in Nigeria

Boko Haram is not the first extremist movement to have risen in Nigeria. Actually, the Izala movement<sup>53</sup> was. This Salafist organization was created in the 1960s by Sheikh Ismaila Idriss in Jos city in central Nigeria. It was fighting for the return of Nigerian Muslim traditions and the removal of state institutions in Muslim areas. Its objectives were very similar to today's Boko Haram. The Izala organization was crushed in 1980 by Nigerian security forces. Some other organizations such as the Islamic movement in Nigeria, a Shia sect created by Malam Ibrahim al Zakzaky and close to Iran,<sup>54</sup> or the Movement for the Islamic Revival, founded by Abubakar Mujahid the (or

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<sup>53</sup> See Jonathan N.C. Hill, "Sufism in Northern Nigeria: Force for Counter-Radicalization?" (Report, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, May 2010), accessed 13 March 2019, <https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pdffiles/PUB989.pdf>.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid.

Ahl al-Sunnah wal-Jama'ah, Ja'amutu Tajidmul Islami.<sup>55</sup>) in the late 1990s in Kano are other important extremist movements that pre-existed Boko Haram in Nigeria. However, without any possible contest, Boko Haram has been the most successful. Since 2002, the organization has progressively established itself as a major stakeholder in Nigeria. It has become the number one security threat and has jeopardized the existence of the Federation of Nigeria by attempting to control the northern Muslim states of the federation. To understand this crisis that has already spread out of Nigeria, many authors and scholars have studied Boko Haram and have tried to identify its true nature, according to international and historic standards. Almost all of them have qualified the organization as an insurgency movement in Nigeria, and have extended this definition to all the countries of the Lake Chad Basin where Boko Haram is active.

Notable authors such as Andrew D. Nicholson in *“The Effects of the Boko Haram insurgency group in West and Central Africa”*, Sadau Zubairu Azama in *“Boko Haram: A critical analysis on Boko Haram insurgency”*, and Marc, Antoine de Montclos, in *“A sectarian jihad in Nigeria: The Case of Boko Haram”*, as well as the United States, the United Nations and other major international stakeholders have qualified the movement as an insurgency. It is important to recall that, as defined by Bard O'Neill in 2005, an insurgency is “A general overarching concept that refers to a conflict between a government and an out group or opponent in which the latter uses both political resources and violence to change, reformulate, or uphold the legitimacy of one or more of four key aspects of politics...(1) the integrity of borders and the composition of the nation-state,

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<sup>55</sup> Hill, “Sufism in Northern Nigeria: Force for Counter-Radicalization?”

(2) the political system (3) the authorities in power, and (4) the policies that determine who gets what in the society.”<sup>56</sup> In Nigeria, according to almost all scholars interested in this topic such as John Campbell and Asch Harwood in their article “*Boko Haram Deadliest Impact*,”<sup>57</sup> the organization fulfills all four criteria. Under Abubakar Shekau’s leadership, the organization has openly claimed its intention to overthrow the political system of the “Nigerian corrupted state” out of its area of interest. The organization has conducted between 2021 and 3346 attacks, depending on sources and killed more than 30,000 people during the period between 2011 and 2018 (territory, borders contest). It has tried to implement the replacement of the existing state by a Muslim “caliphate” (political system) with sharia rules and has effectively implemented those rules in the controlled areas, especially at its peak in 2014-2015 (determines who gets what) using religious based rules and leadership (authority in power). It appears that Boko Haram has tried to organize and rule the controlled areas, according to the ISIS model, with religious authorities in charge of the Jihad and public affairs. The organization has received relative support (population) at its peak in the northeastern part of Nigeria. Bornu, Adamawa and Yobe states, and the “caliphate” almost existed during a limited period of time, due to the organization exercising a military control on that part of the country.

For this research work, there will be no additional research and analysis on Nigeria, due to the extent of existing studies. Therefore, it will be assumed that Boko

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<sup>56</sup> O’Neill, *Insurgency & Terrorism Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare*.

<sup>57</sup> John Campbell and Arsch Harwood, “Boko Haram’s Deadly Impact,” Council on Foreign Relations, 20 August 2018, accessed 24 April 2019, <https://www.cfr.org/article/boko-harams-deadly-impact>.

Haram in Nigeria is the standard of insurgency for the Lake Chad Basin and the situation in the three other countries will be compared to the so-called Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria through the analysis process described in Chapter 3.

Table 2. Nature of the Boko Haram Security Crisis in Nigeria

Criteria	Description of the indicator of measurement	Occurrence	Corresponding grade
The contest of the integrity of borders and the composition of the nation-state	Retention of cities and villages after military attacks	More than 2000	2
The contest on the political system	Integration of national territory to the auto proclaimed caliphate	Permanent In Yobe, Adamawa and Bornu states	2
The contest of the authorities in power	Existence of administrative, political and religious leaders empowered by Boko Haram	Permanent In Yobe, Adamawa and Bornu states	2
The contest on policies that determines who gets what in the society	Sharia proclaimed or implemented by Boko Haram in the country.	Permanent In Yobe, Adamawa and Bornu states	2

*Source:* Created by author.

### Analysis of the Results

The score completed by Nigeria after the analysis of all the criteria is 8 out of 8. All the criteria have scored 2 out of 2, which is the highest possible for each criteria. The percentage of fulfilled criteria is 100%, which is higher than 50% necessary for a security crisis to be called an insurgency. Therefore, the Boko Haram security crisis in Nigeria is an insurgency.

## Boko Haram in Niger

The criteria that can help establish the type of threat the Boko Haram represents in Niger are stated in chapter 3. Accordingly, the situation in this country that is located to the northeastern part of the Lake Chad Basin will be reviewed and compared using the four criteria. The compilation of the whole analysis will indicate the true nature of Boko Haram in this country and help to identify an effective strategy for fighting against Boko Haram in Niger.

### Criteria 1: The Contest of the Integrity of Borders and the Composition of the Nation-state

This criterion measures how much Boko Haram has contested the borders of the state of Niger. Has Boko Haram tried to include some parts or all of Niger and how have they tried to achieve this end. It will also be useful to identify the military techniques used, knowing that an insurgency is inclined to use of asymmetric warfare.

The claiming of villages or important terrain in the Nigerien territory would show Boko Haram's interest to settle in the area its intention to claim the area as its own, and incorporate it into its caliphate. This type of control is typically seizure and settlement in a city. According to reports and witnesses, in February and March 2015, Boko Haram attacked and took control of Bosso, a Nigerien city in the Diffa region for hours<sup>58</sup>. The organization has also controlled some remote areas around Lake Chad during limited

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<sup>58</sup> International Crisis Group (ICG), "Niger and Boko Haram: Beyond Counter-insurgency," (Africa Report No. 245, ICG, Brussels, Belgium, 27 February 2017). The primary source is interviews of officials in the Diffa region and members of the Buduma community in Diffa, May 2016.

periods before being pushed out by the Nigerien army.<sup>59</sup> So far, only two attempts have been registered; this gives some important clues to the intention of the organization, but cannot be compared with activity of Boko Haram on the other side of the border where three regions and important cities and have been seized by the group, no official declaration by Boko Haram reported, that would indicate an attempt by the organization to claim a change to the Nigerien border. The exact number of attacks in Niger have not been reported officially. However the compilation of all available sources indicates a total of less than fifty attacks from 2015 to 2018.<sup>60</sup> So, it can be said that Boko Haram shows only limited interest in controlling parts of the Nigerian territory.

It is also important to know if these armed attacks were helping sustain a political program that could establish a true insurgency in Niger. On the Nigerian side of the border, Boko Haram has made many official announcements and declarations, claiming to be, "The Islamic State in Western Africa Province (ISWAP), a caliphate (state) ruled by a single political and religious leader according to Islamic law, or Sharia".<sup>61</sup> Therefore, it can be assumed that the ongoing military fights in this part of the Lake Chad Basin area are intended to support the political contest. In Niger on the other side of the Border, the situation seems to be different. The only official reason advocated by

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<sup>59</sup> See ICG, "Niger and Boko Haram: Beyond Counter-insurgency," 6.

<sup>60</sup> See CNN Library, "Boko Haram Fact Facts," *CNN*, updated 8 September 2019, accessed 25 April 2019 <https://www.cnn.com/2014/06/09/world/boko-haram-fast-facts/index.html>.

<sup>61</sup> See BBC News, "Nigeri's Boko Haram pledges allegiance to Islamic State," *BBC*, 7 March 2015, accessed 4 March 2019, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-31784538>.

Abubakar Shekau to justify targeting the country in his military operations is reprisal due to the country's involvement in the military coalition against the organization. According to many information networks cited by the International Crisis Group's report on Niger and Boko Haram, "Shekau threatened the presidents of Chad, Cameroon and Niger and criticized the latter for offering support to the French president after radical Islamists attacked the satirical periodical Charlie Hebdo in Paris"<sup>62</sup>and immediately carried out Boko Haram's most deadliest attacks in those countries in March 2015.

In order to mitigate established states superiority while challenging them, insurgencies often use a mix of conventional and unconventional means or hybrid warfare. This combat style requires important knowledge of terrain and local support to the insurgents. If identified in Niger, this could provide important clues as to the nature of Boko Haram in that Niger. From the beginning of 2015 to 2016, Niger at least 3 major conventional attacks from Boko Haram,<sup>63</sup> in Bosso, (March 2015), Karama and Niger's lake Chad Island (June 2015). The organization has also conducted dozens of minor attacks in the Diffa region area. In addition to these conventional actions, Boko Haram has used unconventional tactics such as Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) to hit military convoys and bombing populations in markets and mosques. According to Triton report,<sup>64</sup> between 01 January 2015 and 03 March 2017, five IED attacks have occurred

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<sup>62</sup> See ICG, "Niger and Boko Haram: Beyond Counter-insurgency," 15.

<sup>63</sup> Ibid., 17.

<sup>64</sup> The Triton Report is compiled monthly by highly specialized data collators and former British Military Ammunition Technical Officers using state of the art data-mining technology. We work with global partners to gather, analyze and evaluate, comprehensively, all recorded IED events worldwide.

in the Diffa region. This proves the organization has used a mix of conventional and unconventional tactics, just like other group conducting insurgency fighting.

An insurgency's ultimate goal is to control the land and the population. This control can be used to help the change of the constitution of a nation state. In the Nigerien case, Boko Haram conducted some successful attacks, principally in Bosso and in some Nigerien island in Lake Chad. They also reportedly have had success in minor attacks along the Nigerian border. However, they have never held these territories more than a few hours, withdrawing willingly or under the Nigerien army and allied pressure. Such a posture clearly shows little interest in holding portions of Nigerien territory or exercising a strong control on parts of its population, even if the opportunity arises. In contrast, in 2014 and 2015, Boko Haram claimed a territory larger than Belgium in the northeast of Nigeria. At this point, it can be assumed that Boko Haram did not have interest in consolidating its military successes in Nigerien territory.

It appears Niger has effectively faced armed attacks from Boko Haram's forces. These attacks have been of a hybrid nature such as what was witnessed in other insurgencies. However, the link between these armed activities and a political program of the organization in Niger is not evident. That is the reason why only the retention of two cities has been reported for only a few hours. These actions seem to have been preemptive, against a country perceived as Nigeria's ally against Boko Haram.

#### Criteria 2: The Contest on the Political System

This criterion should be understood as a vision, an effort from the Boko Haram organization to change the form of the state in the contested area. This effort need to be implemented though the creation of a new political system intended to replace the

existing one. In Nigeria, the auto proclaimed caliphate or ISWAP is built on the model of ISIS with a central government and an entire political system and leadership. the whole organization was not intended to coexist with Nigerian authorities, but to supplant them. If there were an extension of this model into Niger, it would be a clear indicator of the existence of an ongoing insurgency in this country.

No report has mentioned attempts by Boko Haram to create or extend the auto proclaimed caliphate in northeastern Nigeria into the neighboring regions of Niger. Although the Diffa region, zone of interest to Boko Haram is historically and economically more related to the northeastern Nigerian region than it is with the rest of Niger, Boko Haram has not tried to settle in the area. Since the beginning of the insurgency in Nigeria and its spread to Niger, Boko Haram's activities in the region have maintained their roots in Nigeria.

### Criteria 3: The Contest of Authorities in Power

The contest of the state authority on two major aspects have been identified to objectively illustrate the nature of Boko Haram in any Lake Chad Basin country. Those aspects are the strict political and administrative leadership and the religious leadership in the Nigerien side of the Lake Chad Basin area going to be analyzed to understand the exact situation in that country.

In a study conducted by the International Crisis Group, "Niger and Boko Haram: beyond counter-insurgency",<sup>65</sup> the situation of the southeastern part of Niger is clearly depicted as fertile soil for Boko Haram due to its proximity to the Nigerian city of

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<sup>65</sup> ICG, "Niger and Boko Haram: Beyond Counter-insurgency."

Maiduguri (around 400 miles), the capital city of the Bornu State; the distance of the Nigerien capital city Niamey (more than 1000 miles away; the predominance of the Kanuri tribal group in the Diffa region on the Nigerian border; the spread of Islam from northern Nigeria and the influence of the same religious movements such as Izala.<sup>66</sup> The same report also presents the political situation as sensitive due to the poor representation at the national level of some tribal groups of the southeastern Niger. It appears that the Kanuri are well represented in the political and military elite in Niamey, the capital of Niger, including the former president Mamadou Tandja and important members of the current government.<sup>67</sup> In addition, the same report points out the central state does not show particular interest in this distant region, and also does not enjoy a particular legitimacy. Local chiefs exist in those tribal areas and share their regulating authority with locally elected authorities. All those with authority have not been challenged since the escalation of the Boko Haram crisis in the southern Nigerien region. They have not been contested by local followers of Boko Haram or its Nigerian leaders. At this stage, that the contesting of the Nigerien political authorities by the Boko Haram organization is low, and nothing reported so far can be compared to the situation in Nigeria.

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<sup>66</sup> The Izala religious movement is the one where Mohammed Yusuf received his education before turning away from it and fighting it, is very influential in Niger, especially around Diffa. It controls two of the towns' six main mosques. See also Zakari Maïkoréma, *L'islam dans l'espace nigérien. De 1960 aux années 2000, Tome 2* (Paris: L'harmattan, 2009).

<sup>67</sup> See ICG, "Niger and Boko Haram: Beyond Counter-insurgency," 4. It is stated that Among the most prominent figures are the education minister and former vice president of the National Assembly, the general secretary at the defense ministry and President Tandja's former private chief of staff.

It has also been established that in the beginning of the 2000s, Yusuf's preaches already had echo in the Diffa region due to the tied cultural and religious relations between Maiduguri and the south east of Niger. Also, Abubakar Shekau reportedly preached in Diffa before 2009.<sup>68</sup> In addition to this, many leaders of the organization found refuge in the region after the violent repression they suffered from of the Nigerian authorities in 2008. As a result, Boko Haram had religious influence in many mosques in the Diffa region, especially among traders. The movement was successful in developing recruitment networks, urging young people to join them. For that purpose, they created an organization named *The Yusufiyya*.<sup>69</sup> and built a powerful network with the objective of collecting financial support through the religious network with strong representatives such as a young Fulani preacher named Sayedi and El Hadj Kakabuno, a prosperous young Kanuri trader whose business network extended to Maiduguri and Kano.

It appears the Boko Haram organization had and probably still has an important influence in the southeastern region of Niger. However, it cannot be assumed the organization had at that time or still exercises strong control of mosques and preachers of the region. Therefore, it is assumed the influence of Boko Haram in Nigerian mosques was marginal.

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<sup>68</sup> See ICG, "Niger and Boko Haram: Beyond Counter-insurgency," 5.

<sup>69</sup> Yusuf' followers in Arabic.

#### Criteria 4: The Contest on Policies that Determines Who Gets What in the Society

Another way to exercise the power of deciding who gets what in a society can be done through economic control. The southeast of Niger has cultural, social and economic ties with the Boko Haram's primary zone of influence in Nigeria. However, to understand the degree power the organization has in this Nigerien region, there is a need to consider the Boko Haram economic interests. The assumption is that, an attempt by Boko Haram to control or increase its role in the region's economy would give important clues to the importance of the region in the organization's ability to decide who gets what.

Understanding this will also help to understand what kind of threat Boko Haram is to Niger. According the International Crisis Group's report, "The Diffa region became a place to raise funds and stock up on petrol, weapons and food supplies. Boko Haram sold some of its looted goods."<sup>70</sup> Clearly, there was an attempt to play a major role in controlling the region's economy through the creation of a network of activities and people, with the intention of controlling various aspects of economic activity. The report also states that, the assassination of the president of Diffa's chamber of commerce in May 2015 was presumed to be by Boko Haram members<sup>71</sup> supporting the organization's intent to control major businessmen in the region. In addition, Boko Haram has created an economic model in Nigeria based on looting activities and reward of its combatants, providing them with relative wealth in a generally poor society. This model has spread

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<sup>70</sup> See ICG, "Niger and Boko Haram: Beyond Counter-insurgency," 5.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid.

into Niger, especially aimed at young people looking for social consideration and ascension<sup>72</sup>.

In any given country, the laws define who gets what and how. To be able to change this, an insurgent movement should be able to change the laws. The other way of being deciding of the share of resources is the economic control. This criterion will investigate how those two aspects have been managing in Niger during the ongoing Boko Haram security crisis. In the neighboring Nigeria, the Boko Haram organization has officially announced its intention to replace existing laws by sharia. As previously identified, the Nigerian situation is a clear insurgency. To create the same situation in Niger, same measures are expected to be taken. However, no document, report or statement has been found, mentioning the intention of the Boko Haram organization to extend the sharia to the Nigerian territory.

At this stage, it clearly appears through credible sources that the Boko Haram organization has effectively exercised, at least from 2009 to 2015, economic influence in Niger through the building of a trade network, but also by attracting young people by rewarding them on traffics and looting activities. However, it is important to stress on the fact that, they just built a parallel networks and did not tried to replace the State of Niger in activities such as tax collection or economic regulation, which would be a higher level of attempt to exercise a more important control over the region. The Boko Haram organization did not challenged Niger in deciding who gets what through the control of the economy and its regulation.

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<sup>72</sup> See ICG, “Niger and Boko Haram: Beyond Counter-insurgency,” 7.

This analysis shows the Boko Haram has not fulfilled the necessary criteria to be called an insurgency. In fact, the movement is closer to being a terrorist movement which uses criminal and terrorist methods to create and maintain an insecure climate that will set better conditions for the insurgency in Nigeria, exploit economic opportunities in Niger and deter the Nigerien government from staying involved in the fights against the organization. This analysis has established that:

1. Boko Haram has violated the Nigerien borders several times but did contest their legal existence at the local or international level.
2. Boko Haram did not clearly try to change the political system in the Southeast part of Niger. There was no political agenda comparable to what had been done on the Nigerian side of the common border.
3. No local political power has been established by Boko Haram in Niger in order to try to exercise power throughout Niger.
4. There has been no attempt from the Boko Haram organization to change the established rules of the Nigerien society or of replace the existing body of rules by sharia as it has been clearly attempted in Nigeria.

The table below provides an assessment of the Boko Haram situation in Niger

Table 3. Nature of the Boko Haram Security Crisis in Niger

Criteria	Description of the indicator of measurement	Occurrence	Corresponding grade
The contest of the integrity of borders and the composition of the nation-state	Retention of cities and villages after military attacks	Around 20 attacks; 2 retentions of cities for hours	.1
The contest on the political system	Integration of national territory to the auto proclaimed caliphate	NONE	0
The contest of the authorities in power	Existence of administrative, political and religious leaders empowered by Boko Haram	Influence in some mosque	1
The contest of policies that determine who gets what in the society	Sharia proclaimed or implemented by Boko Haram in the country.	NONE	0

Source: Created by author.

### Analysis of the Results

The score completed by Niger after the analysis of all the criteria is 2 out of 8. Only criteria 1 and 3 have scored 1 each. The percentage of fulfilled criteria is 25%, which is lower than 50% necessary for a security crisis to be called an insurgency. Therefore, the Boko Haram security crisis in Niger is not an insurgency.

## Boko Haram in Chad

Chad is the Lake Chad Basin country that has suffered the least from Boko Haram' attacks. Although the country controls almost half of the entire Lake Chad Basin, only a few shores in the Lake, has been targeted.<sup>73</sup> This fact alone however cannot explain the organization's strategy in the country and every aspect of the strategy needs to be analyzed carefully. To find out whether there has been or still is a political contest strategy being carried out by Boko Haram, it is necessary to look for any sign of the Boko Haram contesting established political and administrative leadership as well as the military and the religious leaderships.

Unlike the three other countries involved in the Lake Chad Basin crisis, this area of interest is not considered as remote or of less economic importance for Chad. The area, which is only less than one hundred miles from the capital city Ndjamen, produces agricultural goods and fish. It is also one of the most fertile area of the country and trade from the area is important with Nigeria and Cameroon.<sup>74</sup> From a historic prospective, it is important to note only some shores of the lake were parts of the Kanem-Bornu Kingdom, the historic kingdom of the Kanuri. In addition, predominant local tribal groups such as the Baduma and Sao were joined in the area by Hausa and other origin settlers during the seventies. This was due to the growing importance of agricultural,

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<sup>73</sup> International Crisis Group (ICG), "Fighting Boko Haram in Chad: Beyond Military Measures" (Africa Report No. 246, ICG, Brussels, Belgium, 8 March 2017), 7.

<sup>74</sup> Ibid., 17-21.

fishing and pastoral activities, changing the structure of the population<sup>75</sup> into a more diverse society organized into local collectivities with loose links to the central power of Ndjamenana and commercial links with Maiduguri, the big city of the Nigerian Bornu state.<sup>76</sup> Despite those improvements, the region has always been politically neglected and has received only one visit from a Chadian head of state, in October 2015, by the current president Idris Deby Itno. Ndjamenana seems indeed, to be the most dependable capital to the Lake Chad Basin area, and therefore, the most directly exposed to the effects of the crisis, and possibly, the most exposed to the organization's attacks or retaliation measures and reason why the real threat faced by Chad should be analyzed carefully in accordance with the criteria discussed in chapter 3.

#### Criteria 1: The Contest of the Integrity of Borders and the Composition of the Nation-State

This criterion is intended to measure how much Boko Haram has contested the borders of the state of Chad. Has Boko Haram attempted to include part or all of the Chadian territory in its caliphate, and have armed actions been used to achieve this goal. It will also be helpful to know the type of military techniques used, knowing that an insurgency is inclined to the use asymmetric warfare.

The Boko Haram has shown clear interest in the Chadian shores on the Lake Chad Basin. However, for the organization to be considered an insurgency in the Chadian

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<sup>75</sup> See United Nations Population Fund for West and Central African Regional Office (UNFPA/WCARO), "Demographic Dynamic and the Crisis of Countries Around Lake Chad" (UNFPA/WCARO, Dakar, Senegal, July 2017).

<sup>76</sup> Ibid.

territory, it need to show it has contested existing Chadian borders or tried to integrate some parts of Chad into its caliphate. However, exercising loose control of the area without showing any interest in claiming these lands would be perceived as limited interest by the Boko Haram in the Chadian territory.

So far, 2015 is considered to be the peak of Boko Haram activity in Chad. According to the International Crisis Group Report, “The group staged repeated raids in lakeshore villages, carried out suicide attacks twice in Ndjamena and in Baga Sola; several hundreds of islanders were killed or abducted. Around 100 soldiers were killed in ambushes and in fighting against Boko Haram in the Lake region.”<sup>77</sup> After 2015, security condition improved significantly with positive impact on the population. During that difficult period, no reports or claims have been found regarding the seizure of a Chadian village or shore by Boko Haram. It appears the organization did not succeed in controlling any part of the Chadian territory and did not claim a military victory that would have led to such a situation. Concerning Chad, even in the Boko Haram named zone of interest, there has always been a clear boundary between the controlled territories of the organization in Nigeria and the territory under Chadian sovereignty. For this reason, it can be assumed the Boko Haram either has only limited interest on controlling parts of the Chadian territory or did not succeed in its attempts to exercise such a control.

However, the Chadian army has been effectively challenged by Boko Haram inside the Chadian territory. In fact, the army suffered heavy casualties from 2015 to 2017. In fact, according to official sources cited by the international Crisis Group

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<sup>77</sup> See ICG, “Fighting Boko Haram in Chad: Beyond Military Measures,” 12.

“Around 100 soldiers were killed in ambushes and in fighting against Boko Haram in the Lake region.”<sup>78</sup> However, all the attacks perpetrated in the Chadian territory were bombing attacks. The attacks took place in the capital city of Ndjamena twice in June and July 2015 and in Baga Sola in August 2015.<sup>79</sup> This data proves Boko Haram was involved in military operations in Chad. However, these operations didn’t result into major victories or control of lands in the Chadian territory. They were also of less intensity if compared to what was observed in neighboring countries. At this point, it seems difficult to establish a clear correlation between the level Boko Haram’s military involvement in Chad and the level of military activities in a classic insurgency struggle.

Insurgency movements can be easily identified in the military domain, due to their use of hybrid strategies and tactics. The goal is always the same and is about mitigating the superior power of established states. In the case of Boko Haram activities in Chad, the organization carried out two types of operations; classic combat actions on the shores alternating between direct confrontations and ambushes; and two bombing attacks in Ndjamena with one in Baga Sola in 2015. With the combination of these two types of operations, the use of hybrid tactics can no longer be denied. However, additional criteria are necessary before describing this conflict as a classical insurgency.

Boko Haram reportedly inflicted some important casualties on the Chadian army during combat, but did not have any military success in Chad. This could be due to the lack of interest on the Chadian soil or also as an inability to gain any success in combat

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<sup>78</sup> See ICG, “Fighting Boko Haram in Chad: Beyond Military Measures,” 15.

<sup>79</sup> Ibid.

against the Chadian army which is famous in the sub-region for its combative spirit. It is interesting to note the high interest of Boko Haram when it comes to control territories on the Nigerian side of the lake, and how the same organization shows little interest on controlling the same type of area when those villages are located on the Chadian side of the lake. At this point, Boko Haram did not enjoy military success in Chadian territory and did not have any success in consolidating. They did not control any part of the Chadian territory.

#### Criteria 2: The Contest on the Political System

This criterion assessed whether or not, an effort from the Boko Haram organization can change the form of the state in the contested area. This would be implemented through the creation of a new political system intended to replace the existing one. In Nigeria, the auto proclaimed caliphate or ISWAP was built on the model of ISIS with a central government and an entire political system with leadership. The organization never intended to coexist with Nigerian authorities, but to supplant them. The extension of this model to Niger would be a clear clue of the existence of an ongoing insurgency in this country.

No report has mentioned attempts by the Boko Haram to create or extend the auto proclaimed caliphate in northeastern Nigeria to the neighboring regions of Chad.

Although the Lake Chad Chadian shores are isolated from the rest of the country, Boko Haram has not tried to settle in the area. Since the beginning of the insurgency in Nigeria and its regionalization, Boko Haram's activities in Chad have remained at a low level compared to the Cameroonian or the Nigerian situations.

### Criteria 3: The Contest of the Authorities in Power

The control of the state authority on two major aspects have been identified to objectively illustrate the nature of Boko Haram in any Lake Chad Basin country. These aspects which are the contest on political and administrative leadership and the religious leadership in the Nigerian side of the Lake Chad Basin. The political issue can be analyzed by looking at whether or not Boko Haram tried to exercise a control on political and administrative leadership, as well as on the religious leadership, due to the religious nature of Boko Haram.

The Chadian shores of Lake Chad are directly ruled from the capital city of Ndjamena. The country is a centralized republic of 23 regions with very low political autonomy at the local level. Major cities are Bol, Tipsi, Kalia, Baga Sola and Kaouda. These cities are led by appointed authorities by the Chadian president. Except for Baga Sola being attacked in October 2015 by a suicide bomber,<sup>80</sup> only a few villages on the shores have been targeted. At this stage, administrative network on the area has not been threatened by Boko Haram. Hospitals and schools have not closed in the area due to Boko Haram activities. The effects of the organization of the functioning of the administration or the contest on politic authorities seems to be marginal, due to very few reports or complains have been recorded.<sup>81</sup>

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<sup>80</sup> See ICG, "Fighting Boko Haram in Chad: Beyond Military Measures," 25.

<sup>81</sup> No important interruption in public service due to Boko Haram activities in Chad has been recorded in the International Crisis Group report of March 2017, between 2015 and 2017.

From a religious perspective, the cooperation between the Lake region of Chad and the Bornu state in Nigeria has always been important. Many young Chadian have studied in Maiduguri since the 1960s. These studies include religion, particularly in communities settled on the shore and islands along the lake. Some of these “alumni” of Nigerian religious schools have reportedly helped spread Boko Haram’s doctrine in their communities, but did not have enough impact on the youth as in Niger or Nigeria.<sup>82</sup> No major mosque or famous preacher has openly favored Boko Haram’s ideology, and the organization has not enjoy popular support from the population due to religious convergence.

#### Criteria 4: The Contest on Policies that Determines Who Gets What in the Society

In any given country, the laws define who gets what and how. To be able to change this, an insurgent movement needs to change the laws. The only way of being deciding how resources are shared is through the economic control. This criterion will investigate how these two aspects have been managing in Niger during the ongoing Boko Haram security crisis.

As explained in the Nigerien case, the situation should be compared with what Boko Haram has done in Nigeria. As a remind, in the neighboring actually, Boko Haram officially announced its intention to replace existing laws by those from the sharia, behaving as observed in many cases of insurgency where the organization trying to overthrow the pre-existing one has a complete plan of organizing the society in a

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<sup>82</sup> See ICG, “Fighting Boko Haram in Chad: Beyond Military Measures,” 10.

different way. For the current case, there have been no report mentioning any attempt of imposing sharia in Chadian territory.

Historically, the Lake Chad Basin is an economic hub for Chadian local populations inhabiting the lake region. Trade is flourishing between Chad and its two neighbors, Cameroon and Nigeria. In addition to the historical link between the local majoritarian Buduma tribal group and the Kanuri of the Nigerian Bornu<sup>83</sup> (both groups have been part of successive empires of the region), the control of the economic network which is heavily oriented toward Maiduguri<sup>84</sup> the epicenter of Boko Haram, may reason for Boko Haram's interest in the area. In addition to this, the Nigerian currency, Naira is used around the Lake as well as the franc CFA of Chad and Cameroon; movements across the borders are free and economic opportunities exist between Nigeria and Chad, Nigerian is more attractive for trade due to higher prices. Seen this way, it appears that the Boko Haram organization would logically want to control the area's economy because of its importance and also for the diversification of supply routes. During the evolution of the conflict however, it appears that the organization has shown interest on controlling the Nigerian side of the lake, in controlling its most important lake ports such as Baga Waga, Malam Fatori or Woulgo and carrying out violent attacks causing the death of more than 2000 people and displacing thousands.<sup>85</sup> However, did not show the

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<sup>83</sup> See Géraud Magrin, Jacques Lemoalle, and Roland Pourtier, "Atlas du lac Tchad," *Passages* (Special Edition: June 2015): 183.

<sup>84</sup> Ibid.

<sup>85</sup> See ICG, "Fighting Boko Haram in Chad: Beyond Military Measures," 9.

same interest on the Chadian side. At this point, it appears the organization did not show interest in controlling economic activities in the Chadian side of the lake.

So, Chad has effectively faced armed attacks from Boko Haram's forces.

However, the link between these armed activities and an insurgency program in Chad has not been established. After analysis, it appears:

1. Boko Haram has violated the Chadian borders several times but did not really contested their legal existence at the local or international level. It also did not clearly show interest in incorporating these territories into its "caliphate"
2. Boko Haram has not clearly expressed interest in changing the political system in southwest of Chad. There has been no political agenda revealed that can be compared to what has been established in Nigeria.
3. No local political power has been empowered by Boko Haram in Chad in order to exercise in its name any type of power.
4. There has been no attempt from the Boko Haram organization to change the established rules of the Chadian society, or replacing the existing body of rules with sharia as it has been attempted in Nigeria.

The table below illustrates all the findings concerning the Boko Haram situation in Chad.

Table 4. Nature of the Boko Haram Security Crisis in Chad

Criteria	Description of the indicator of measurement	Occurrence	Corresponding grade
The contest of the integrity of borders and the composition of the nation-state	Retention of cities and villages after military attacks	No retention of territories	0
The contest on the political system	Integration of national territory to the auto proclaimed caliphate	NONE	0
The contest of the authorities in power	Existence of administrative, political and religious leaders empowered by Boko Haram	Influence in some mosques	1
The contest on policies that determines who gets what in the society	Sharia proclaimed or implemented by Boko Haram in the country.	NONE	0

*Source:* Created by author.

### Analysis of Results

The score completed by Chad after the analysis of all the criteria is 1 out of 8. Only criteria 3 has scored 1. The percentage of fulfilled criteria is 12.5%, which is lower than 50% necessary for a security crisis to be called an insurgency. Therefore, the Boko Haram security crisis in Chad is not an insurgency.

## Boko Haram in Cameroon

Excepted for Nigeria which is considered to be the home to Boko Haram, Cameroon is the country that has been the most targeted the most by the organization's activities. This is apparent through the analysis of data compiled between 2014 and 2016 by the International Crisis Group stating that "Since March 2014, the conflict has left at least 125 dead and more than 200 wounded among the security forces and led to at least 1,400 civilian deaths. In the course of more than 100 attacks, Boko Haram is believed to have abducted more than 1,000 people, mainly women and girls: some have been used to stage suicide attacks, while others have been forcibly married to members of the group. The defense forces claim to have killed about 2,000 presumed members of the group and arrested at least 970.<sup>86</sup>" In addition, many Boko Haram leaders have indicated Cameroon is one of the organization's priorities. At this point, it is important to understand what the goal has been in Cameroon. This helps to establish whether or not the organization really wants to exercise control on Cameroonian territories and insert them into its auto-proclaimed caliphate, extending the insurgency movement to Cameroon, or if the organization simply wants to exercise a more effective control on the far northern part of the country due to its importance to the organization's general strategy. Cameroon would

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<sup>86</sup> According to International Crisis Group (ICG), "Cameroon: Confronting Boko Haram" (Africa Report No. 241, ICG, Brussels, Belgium, 16 November 2016), in Mayo Moskota district alone, more than 200 people were killed (and 39 schools shut down); in Kolofata district, more than 350 were killed and in Fotokol district, more than 550; Crisis Group estimates based on open sources and interviews. See also Crisis Group interview, defence ministry spokesperson, Yaoundé, June 2016. Based on open sources and government statements, Crisis Group estimates that the Cameroonian army has killed around 2,300 members of Boko Haram. Crisis Group interviews, security forces and prison staff, Yaoundé and Far North, 2016.

be the strategic backyard, providing supplies, tactical and strategic depth, important economic possibilities and allowing the control of routes to Sudan, Chad and Libya.

The Nigerian state of Bornu, considered the epicenter of the Boko Haram movement, is closely linked to the far north region of Cameroon. The two areas share the same Islamic culture, ethnic groups, history, commercial networks and vernacular languages. Often, villages and families extend across both sides of the border. On the Cameroonian side, the area of interest for this study is referred to as the Far North Administrative Region. This is the poorest of the country with 74.3% of the population living below the poverty line while the national rate is 37.5%. poverty is even worse in districts directly bordering Nigeria and can reach 80 % in Fotokol, Mayo Moskota and Kolofata districts.<sup>87</sup> Also a factor is the low rate in enrollment at school, which has reached 81% at the national level, but that is around 46% in this region.<sup>88</sup> Some inter-community rivalries exist in the area regarding access to resource. In fact, despite being the poorest region of the country, it is also the most populated with the highest density. This has caused numerous inter-community conflicts between the main tribal and cultural groups of the region (Kanuri, Choa arabs, Kirdi, Moundang, Mousgoum). In addition, this region, which is actually a thin band of terrain between Chad, Nigeria and Central African Republic, has, since the 1980s suffered from banditry fueled by instability in

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<sup>87</sup> All the data used in this paragraph is from National Institute of Statistics (NIS), Cameroon, *Quatrième Enquête Camerounaise Auprès des Ménages (ECAM 4): Tendances, Profil et Déterminants de la Pauvreté au Cameroun Entre 2001 et 2014* (Yaounde, Cameroon : NIS, December 2015), 43.

<sup>88</sup> Ibid.

Chad and Central African Republic. The region is also a hub for smuggling extending into neighboring countries.

The situation described, existed before Boko Haram extended its activities into Cameroon. Many analysts agree the organization began moving into the region around 2009.<sup>89</sup> Ten years after the recording of its first activities, it is still difficult to specify what kind of threat the organization has represented or is still representing in the country. For a better understanding of Boko Haram in Cameroon and consequent assessment of how the country dealt and is still dealing with the crisis, the criteria discussed in Chapter 3 will be applied.

#### Criteria 1: The Contest of the Integrity of Borders and the Composition of the Nation-State

This criteria measures the extent to which Boko Haram has contested the borders of Cameroon. It provides evidences for whether or not Boko Haram has tried to annex parts or all of Cameroon in its auto proclaimed caliphate, and if armed operations and attacks have been used to contest Cameroonian borders or authority. It also examines the type of military techniques that have been implemented, keeping in mind insurgencies tend to use asymmetric warfare.

Military clashes between Cameroon and Boko Haram have been violent. Between 2014 and 2016, the organization put a great deal of effort into defeating the Cameroonian army, using diverse tactics. This included attacks on broad fronts or use of

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<sup>89</sup> See ICG, “Cameroon: Confronting Boko Haram,” summary of Group interviews, intelligence officers, Yaoundé, April 2016, and statements from Mohammed Yusuf under interrogation in 2009.

overwhelmingly favorable force ratio (1000 to 10), planting improvised explosive devices, and often staging simultaneous attacks. As a result, confirmed both by witnesses and Cameroonian officials, in 2014, the organization flew its flag on three Cameroonian villages (Kerawa, Ashigashia and Balochi), and controlled each for less than a day<sup>90</sup>. Other less successful attempts with have been carried out in villages, towns or military bases located on the Cameroonian side of the border between the Boko Haram controlled area and Cameroon. Boko Haram tried to control numerous villages towns and military bases inside the Cameroonian territory, but did not succeed. These attempts are a sign the organization wanted to extend its territory beyond the Cameroonian border.

An insurgency movement typically mixes socio-political unrest with a military struggle against an established government's military forces. Since 2014, countless military clashes have occurred between Boko Haram and Cameroon. It is important to understand the link between those military operations and the overall Boko Haram's strategy in Cameroon. Are these fighting baking a true insurgency movement in Cameroon, or are they simply intended to allow the organization to exercise control of its supply network and the region's economy. Not every act of armed violence perpetrated by a social or cultural group is part of an insurgency. Sometimes, they are simply criminal acts. For this study, it is assumed an insurgency would tend to conduct military operations in support of a political program, promote use of unconventional tactics and strategies and consolidate military success to get the support of local populations by recruiting them into combat forces.

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<sup>90</sup> See ICG, "Cameroon: Confronting Boko Haram," 9.

Boko Haram's presence in Cameroon has been documented since 2009,<sup>91</sup>. It has also been established that Cameroonian authorities have tolerated Boko Haram's activities in the Far north region, most likely due to conflictual relationship with Nigeria and the fear of importing the conflict to Cameroon, in case of military involvement. From its early presence to 2014, the organization was satisfied with its situation in Cameroon, especially with its secure supply network, and its control over the region's underground economy. The International Crisis Group which has been following the situation thinks "Under pressure from Nigeria and facing incursions along the frontier, Cameroon began to dismantle Boko Haram's arms caches. This led the jihadist movement which probably had no political agenda or territorial expansion project in Cameroon at first, to harden its position. Boko Haram then multiplied attacks on border communities."<sup>92</sup> These military activities then became more serious. The same source states that "In 2014, Boko Haram was clearly seeking to take control of towns to add them to the caliphate it had proclaimed in Nigeria, and it even raised its flag above Kerawa, Ashigashia and Balochi." These are 3 Cameroonian villages on the border with Nigeria. In addition, the number of military confrontations between Boko Haram and the Cameroonian army in the area of interest, increased to more than 71 times out of 464 attacks.<sup>93</sup> This shows the organization initially had no military or political plan in Cameroon, but military activities were clearly intended to hit the Cameroonian army in the region in order to defeat it and

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<sup>91</sup> See ICG, "Cameroon: Confronting Boko Haram," 6.

<sup>92</sup> Ibid.

<sup>93</sup> See L'œil du Sahel "Cameroun: Boko Haram: 1 200 Morts Depuis 2013," 15 January 2016.

take control of the area. However, there is no evidence the organization wanted to extend the insurgency into Cameroon. If this would have been the plan, the organization would have been more aggressive in recruiting followers and turning populations against the government of Cameroon. At its peak in 2016, Boko Haram enjoyed a support of three to four thousand people. Even if this portion of the population were significant, this cannot be considered as particularly representative of a region that host more than four million. At this point, the important fights that took place in 2014, 2015 and 2016 between Boko Haram and the Cameroonian armed forces were more related to the aim of controlling the area for economic and military reasons than extending the caliphate in Cameroon.

Did Boko Haram tried to mitigate the Cameroonian armed forces superiority by using hybrid tactics and strategies on the terrain? The organization carried out many types of operations. 725 Boko Haram incursions have been reported into Cameroon; the army has been targeted on 71 occasions (43 conventional attacks). Boko Haram has placed 108 IED, 129 suicide attacks have been registered, the majority targeting civilian communities, markets and mosques<sup>94</sup>. The organization used conventional attacks, mostly at the beginning of the conflict, when it still had substantial military capabilities, and then turned to less conventional processes with IEDs and bombing attacks. At this stage, the entire panoply of hybrid tactics is considered to have been used in Boko Haram's military operations in Cameroon. The full spectrum of unconventional tactics has been used by Boko Haram in Cameroon.

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<sup>94</sup> This data was obtained by compiling two ICG reports from different periods. International Crisis Group (ICG), "Cameroon's Far North: A New Chapter in the Fight Against Boko Haram" (Africa Report No. 263, ICG, Brussels, Belgium, 14 August 2018) and ICG, "Cameroon: Confronting Boko Haram."

Boko Haram reportedly has inflicted significant casualties on the Cameroonian army during combat, allowing the organization to control some areas for hours. In a classical insurgency, military victories are capitalized by politics or used for further military operations. The only incident that can be considered as Boko Haram's military victory in Cameroon, was when they raised their flag on Kerawa, Ashigashia and Balochi for one day. The organization however did not succeed in keeping these areas under its control and could not capitalize on these situations. The Cameroonian army expelled them from these areas, preventing the building of a positive momentum. The only instance in which the organization capitalized on is the series abductions for which they were reportedly paid at least eleven million US dollars for the freeing of hostages in Cameroon. This does not mean the organization fits the insurgency model. Instead, its action is to be aligned to simple criminal organizations acting for the quest of profit.

#### Criteria 2: The Contest on the Political System

This criterion assesses whether the Boko Haram organization is attempting to change the political system into the contested area and replace it with the caliphate. This effort should be implemented through the creation of a new political system intended to replace the existing one. In Nigeria, the auto proclaimed caliphate or ISWAP was built on the model of ISIS encompassing a central government, a military and areligious leadership exercised by the same group of people. In Nigeria, the supposed caliphate was not intended to coexist with Nigerian authorities, but supplant them. The extension of this model to Cameroon would be a clear clue of the existence of an ongoing insurgency in this country.

No report has actually mentioned attempts from Boko Haram to create or to extend the auto proclaimed caliphate in northeastern Nigeria to the neighboring regions of Cameroon. However, with the attacks on Ashigashia<sup>95</sup> after which the organization placed its flag on two Cameroonian villages, it can be assumed that the intentions of the organization on the area were more than hostile and that the annexation of that part of Cameroon to the auto proclaimed caliphate was envisioned by the Boko Haram's leadership. However, in comparison to the situation in the neighboring Nigeria, this cannot establish an attempt to change the political situation in Cameroon.

### Criteria 3: The Contest of the Authorities in Power

In Cameroon, Boko Haram has conducted direct attacks on political leadership in the Far north region as well as against the central leadership of the country. At the national level, the abduction of the vice- prime minister's wife in her husband's compound in Kolofata<sup>96</sup>, was a direct attack on Cameroonian political leadership, as was the threatening statement of Shekau against president Paul Biya of Cameroon and the presidents of Niger and Chad.<sup>97</sup>

Threats against Cameroonian leadership in some towns bordering the Boko Haram controlled area in Nigeria have occurred at the peak of its activities in Cameroon. The seriousness of the situation was described in the International Crisis Group's report

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<sup>95</sup> See details on page 67.

<sup>96</sup> In July 2014, the wife of the vice prime minister and sixteen members of his inner circle – all Cameroonian – were kidnapped in Kolofata (Mayo Sava)

<sup>97</sup> Shekau threatens the three countries of reprisals in a statement realized in January, 15<sup>th</sup> 2015, in reaction to their decision to ally with Nigeria against Boko Haram.

which states “In 2014, Boko Haram was clearly seeking to take control of towns to add them to the caliphate it had proclaimed in Nigeria, and even raised its flags above Kerawa, Ashigashia, Balochi, although there for barely a day.”<sup>98</sup> By taking control of those towns and expelling Cameroonian leadership plus removing the Cameroonian flag and replacing it with the Boko Haram’s flag showed its intent to exercise political power Cameroon. This can be considered as clues that the Boko Haram had strong ambitions on the exercise or replacement of political authorities as holders of the political power in for north of Cameroon, but also wanted to influence central political authorities in sensitive ways.

Islamic culture is a common trait in the Nigerian and Cameroonian northern parts of each country. They belonged to same kingdoms and empires under Muslim influences, including the last one, The Adamawa kingdom under Usman Dan Fodio coming from western Nigeria in the 18<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>99</sup> This Muslim influence cannot be attributed to Boko Haram. For this to be recognized, it is important to search for other types of influences by preachers delivered by some imams, or any type of control of some mosques as it has been clearly established in Niger.

The International Crisis Group, which conducted investigations in the area, noted “The first sermon linked to Boko Haram in a mosque in the Cameroonian far north took place in 2010” the same report also declares that in 2011. Mahamat Abakar Saley, a

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<sup>98</sup> Shekau threatens the three countries of reprisals in a statement realized in January, 15<sup>th</sup> 2015, in reaction to their decision to ally with Nigeria against Boko Haram.

<sup>99</sup> See Elridge Mohammadou, *Le Royaume du Wandala ou Mandara au XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle* (Tokyo: Institute for the Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa, 1982).

preacher in the mosque of Goulfey district got radicalized and was proclaimed “emir” of Afadé. In the same area, there are evidences of distribution of Yusuf’s sermons via local imams. It is also important to mention here is the important role played by Cameroonians who studied in Nigerian koranic schools.<sup>100</sup> in convincing their families and friends to reject the Western ideology. These Cameroonians were helped by Nigerians infiltrated in Cameroon through the flow of refugees or through visits and preaches in Cameroonian mosques in bordering areas.

It appears the Boko Haram organization has exerted a great deal of effort to gain a direct control on populations on the Cameroonian side of the border through religious influence in order to facilitate the adherence of the followers.

#### Criteria 4: The Contest on Policies that Determines Who Gets What in the Society

For this criteria, focuses in identifying whether Boko Haram has tried to influence or control the rules defining who gets what. In the neighboring Nigeria, Boko Haram have tried to rule the society by sharia and controlled the economy in order to be able to create a system of retribution and rewarding.

So far, there have never been attempts to establish a sharia ruled society in the northern part of Cameroon by Boko Haram. The organization has carried out some attacks on Christians in Cameroon, but have killed more Muslims. The religious tolerance toward Christians who are the minority in the region is not particularly threatened and no

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<sup>100</sup> ICG, “Cameroon: Confronting Boko Haram”; ICG interviews, residents and traders; ICG, “Cameroon’s Far North: A New Chapter in the Fight Against Boko Haram.”

complaints have been reported concerning religious discriminations by Boko Haram members during their operations in Cameroon. Also, there is no official communication from Boko Haram attesting the choice of such a policy.

Before Boko Haram entered the area, the far north of Cameroon had been home to economic traffics between Chad, Nigeria, Central African Republic and Cameroon. In addition, lucrative highway banditry had developed, fueled by veterans of Chadian and Central African civil wars. All this includes trade of cattle, smuggling of every type and transportation of goods to different ports located in the South of Cameroon and Nigeria. In Cameroon, this economic activity was relatively important and worth up to 7.5% of the national budget before the crisis.<sup>101</sup>

Boko Haram has attempted to control the economy in the far northern Cameroon mainly by controlling trade, smuggling and cattle theft. According to the International Crisis Group, between 2014 and 2016, the organization stole approximately twelve thousand head of cattle and sold them in Nigeria or in local markets in Cameroon.<sup>102</sup> They also controlled the smugglers and their activity on both sides of the border. They have also tried to control the logistic chain. According to many witnesses and prisoners who have worked for the organization, it has invested a lot in controlling the logistic chain, recruiting, often under threat, transporters of the area. This potentially put Boko Haram in a position to exercise a lucrative control of the economic network. Some traders have been threatened and killed for have refused to finance the jihad. Kousseri, a

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<sup>101</sup> Official data provided by The Ministry of Economy, Planning and Regional Development, 2016, <https://minepatgov.org/>.

<sup>102</sup> ICG, “Cameroon: Confronting Boko Haram,” 10.

Cameroonian town bordering the Chadian capital Ndjamena, was established as Boko Haram's logistic hub and transporters who did not want to collaborate suffered reprisals.<sup>103</sup> This situation was possible due to a tolerant policy of Cameroonian authorities prior to 2014 at the beginning of abductions. It became a major economic component of Boko Haram's strategy in Cameroon. The organization earned around 11 million dollars in ransom payments, presumably from the government of Cameroon for the liberation of hostages.<sup>104</sup> Boko Haram has had important economic interests in Cameroon and at its peak, managed to control them. However, due to the weakening of the organization, it no longer enjoys those advantages. These are some important clues Cameroon was and still is, of high value as part of the organization's strategy

Based on this analysis, and after have reviewing the situation of Boko Haram in Cameroon based on criteria of analysis established in chapter 3, it appears that:

1. Boko Haram has clearly violated Cameroonian territory and its borders. These violations appear to be attempts to control different networks and economic interests rather than attempts to incorporate parts of Cameroon into the "caliphate."
2. Boko Haram has not clearly expressed an interest in changing the political system in the far northern Cameroon. There is no evidence of a political agenda comparable to that exhibited in Nigeria.

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<sup>103</sup> ICG, "Cameroon: Confronting Boko Haram," 10.

<sup>104</sup> ICG, "Cameroon: Confronting Boko Haram," 17. International Crisis Group's estimates based on open sources and several interviews with sources, including negotiators, Crisis Group interviews conducted at Yaoundé and Far North, January-May 2016.

3. Only one priest in a minor small village has officially claimed to be “emir”<sup>105</sup> of the Boko Haram organization in Cameroon. Compared to what happened in Nigeria, this is not an attempt to exercise religious power in Cameroon, and cannot be assimilated to a serious attempt of exercising political power.
4. There has been no attempt by the Boko Haram organization or replace the established rules of the Cameroonian society, or of replacing the existing body of rules with sharia as has been attempted in Nigeria.

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<sup>105</sup> Arabic term for Governor of a region with important political powers

Table 5. Nature of the Boko Haram Security Crisis in Cameroon

Criteria	Description of the indicator of measurement	Occurrence	Corresponding grade
The contest of the integrity of borders and the composition of the nation-state	Retention of cities and villages after military attacks	Retention of 2 villages for hours	1
The contest on the political system	Integration of national territory to the auto proclaimed caliphate	NONE	0
The contest of the authorities in power	Existence of administrative, political and religious leaders empowered by Boko Haram	Influence in some mosque	1
The contest on policies that determine who gets what in the society	Sharia proclaimed or implemented by Boko Haram in the country.	NONE	0

*Source:* Created by author.

### Analysis of Results

The score completed by Cameroon after the analysis of all the criteria is 2 out of 8. Only criteria 1 and 3 have scored 1. The percentage of fulfilled criteria is 25%, which is lower than 50% necessary for a security crisis to be called an insurgency. Therefore, the Boko Haram security crisis in Cameroon is not an insurgency.

## Conclusion

According to this analysis, Boko Haram is an insurgency in Nigeria, but is not an insurgency in Cameroon, Chad and Niger. The security crisis in these three countries is a situation in which, the Boko Haram organization is purposely creating, fueling and maintaining an insecure zone inside these neighboring countries to support the success of its insurgency in Nigeria. The buffer zone the organization has established is also established for the control of resources, economic networks and populations. Therefore, rather than an insurgency, the context in Cameroon, Niger and Chad, is more of international banditry, in which a criminal organization is using international terrorism tactics and techniques.

Cameroon, Chad and Niger are facing an aggression by a non- state and non-international actor. Boko Haram's members are not combatants according to international laws. They are violating national criminal laws in these countries and using terrorism to destabilize create and maintain a climate of insecurity that will set better conditions for the ongoing insurgency in Nigeria. At the regional level, this analysis shows Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin region is a Nigerian insurgency that has spread out of its zone of interest and is acting in the neighboring countries as a criminal and terrorist organization. This must be assessed and addressed accordingly by each individual country.

## CHAPTER 5

### CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This chapter is intended to close the study. It reviews earlier findings and provides recommendations to develop to develop better approaches to Boko Haram and similar security crisis. This chapter will also highlight some areas that can be covered by further studies.

#### Conclusions

This study provides a description of the Boko Haram crisis situation in the Lake Chad Basin area and explains some factors that would allow a better understanding of the crisis and its developments. The Boko Haram crisis is indeed, a Nigerian deep cultural, religious, social and economic issue that has not properly been managed by military and security authorities. Due to this mismanagement and the tolerant policy of bordering Chad, Cameroon and Niger the crisis rapidly spread from Nigeria to become a regional security issue.

A broad review of the available literature on the topic revealed the issue is considered to be an insurgency using hybrid tactics including terrorist methods. A particular emphasis was put on the definition of terrorism, insurgency and literature related to the best ways to address those security threats. Particular attention has been paid to Non-Government Organizations, the United Nations system's specialized organizations reports following the evolution of the Boko Harm security crisis.

The research methodology used in this study is a case study methodology based on a documentation review and analysis of facts. The first step was the collection of data,

followed by its analysis and interpretation. This methodology has been chosen because it is the more adapted for social sciences and produces better results when it comes to answer to the questions “why” or “how”. This analysis has tried to find out “how” are the Lake Chad Basin countries currently assessing the nature of the Boko Haram security.

The analysis has evaluated whether or not Boko Haram is an insurgency in Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Niger, or if it is something different in one or more of these countries. This study shows that, since the beginning of the Boko Haram crisis and its spread beyond the Nigerian borders, politicians and scholars have always considered this security crisis to be a regional insurgency. As a consequence, Cameroonian, Chadian and Nigerian governments have been encouraged manage the crisis to using the recognized counterinsurgency best practices. Instead, all the four countries of the Lake Chad Basin have relied on military and security measures. This posture has been condemned unanimously. However, implementing the same strategy on the same threat in the same continuous geographical are, the common threat has decreased in Cameroon, Chad and Niger, but Boko Haram remains rooted in Nigeria. It still uses this stronghold to destabilize the entire region. The area’s populations do not feel secure or safe, in spite of efforts taken. If the current strategy is not updated, there is a clear risk of a security stalemate. A new approach to the situation must be the foundation for an updated vision of this security crisis. This analyze has demonstrated the Boko Haram is an insurgency in Nigeria and something between international banditry and international aggression from a non-state actor in Niger, Cameroon and Chad. The identification of the exact nature of the threat in these countries requires more studies.

At the international level, Chad, Cameroon and Niger cannot defeat Boko Haram because the issue is primarily a Nigerian problem. Nigeria is a sovereign state in which neighboring states have no leverages. The situation in Nigeria will remain a permanent threat that is out of their reach. In the case of an insurgency, the causes and the solutions can be identified only in the country where the insurgency is originated. Nigeria is already struggling to cope with Boko Haram at the national level and obviously cannot deal alone with a regional Boko Haram. Therefore, only a true regional cooperation encompassing military, security, social, legal and economic efforts to cope efficiently with this security crisis.

The goal of this study. Is to identify a way to resolve the security crisis caused by the Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin area, using an objective reassessment of strategies. Rethinking the regional strategy used against Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin area should improve the populations perception of security in the area and return a long lasting peace. This will allow a return to a normal life for populations in this area.

### Recommendations

This study has established that the Boko Haram security crisis is a two pronged threat in the Lake Chad Basin area. Consequently, recommendations will be made for Nigeria and others for Chad, Niger and Cameroon. In addition, the regional aspects of the crisis will be addressed.

To align its general strategy concerning Boko Haram with the standards developed for counterinsurgency best practices,<sup>106</sup> the Nigerian government should:

Reassess its response to the crisis and redefine an appropriate strategy that will addresses all the root causes of the crisis and not just the military consequences of turmoil in the region. This move will shift the current strategy from a strict anti-terrorist heavy handed military strategy to a posture adapted to a counterinsurgency model encompassing social, cultural, economic aspects.

This starts by rebuilding the lost trust between security forces and the population of the northeastern regions of Nigeria. This includes a better training of soldiers and security forces in counterinsurgency tactics and techniques that respect human rights. The state also must agree on a legal framing of the military and police involvements in the area of operation and the prosecution of every violation of the established rules.

Nigeria must pursue all opportunities to reach a peace agreement with Boko Haram. Each government is responsible for the welfare of its populations. Stopping an internal war means preservation of lives and reinforcement of the authority of the state as its people's protector. Therefore, all the measures, including military kinetic actions should be intended to set up conditions for negotiating peace agreements. The government of Nigeria should manage to reach a peace agreement with Boko Haram using all the available resources. Additional measures, such as reintegration and reinsertion programs would also instill confidence and trust with civilians and facilitate a cease fire and permanent end to the conflict.

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<sup>106</sup> McQuaid and Asfura-Heim, "Rethinking the US Approach to Boko Haram: The Case for a Regional Strategy," 11.

For their parts, the governments of Cameroon, Chad and Niger, which are facing an aggression from a terrorist and criminal organization, must align their strategies with a more counter-terrorist and anti-criminal model. This means:

They must be more aggressive against Boko Haram through a resolute and offensive posture seeking to engage Boko Haram's combatants in their strongholds, instead of waiting to respond until being attacked. For this purpose, they need to be better trained on anti-terrorism and counterterrorism tactics and strategies.

The development of effective intelligence networks able to monitor and infiltrate the organization in order to better understand their modus operandi and anticipate their actions on populations or on defense forces.

The reduction of unnecessary violence affecting civilian populations could be accomplished by targeting only confirmed members of Boko Haram in military and security operations.

Niger need to improve and update its judiciary and legal system by adopting laws dedicated to the repression of terrorism, in order to cope more efficiently with Boko Haram

At the regional level, all the four countries need to:

Increase the financial tracking of potential funds from Boko Haram into the region. They can do that by creating a new organization or integrate the existing GABAG program, a central African states organization in charge of controlling funding movements at the international level. This financial instrument will improve the ability to monitor and apprehend potential Boko Haram.

Improve their economic, social and cultural cooperation around the Lake Chad Basin Areas. This will reinforce the state presence in these sensitive areas and the attractiveness of Boko Haram or any other criminal organization in the Lake Chad Basin area.

Adjust their policies concerning religious movements in this sensitive areas. Organizations in charge of regulating religious issues need to be created and harmonized by all the four countries Those governments should however, carefully avoid a risk of religious stigmatization that can potentially give the way to another Boko Haram.

#### Recommendations for Future Studies in the Domain

The most important finding of this study is identifying that nature of Boko Haram in Nigeria is different than in the other countries of the Lake Chad Basin region. In order to define a more relevant and effective approach to Boko Haram, the topic requires more exploration. It will be helpful to refine the nature of Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad and Niger, and come out with a clearer identification of the type of threat. Also, it is important to assess the best ways to manage the crisis in order to objectively identify what need to be changed and why It will also be challenging for future studies to discover why the insurgency movement failed to propagate and root itself in Niger Cameroon and Chad as it did in Nigeria. Another topic for study, is related to one of the main weaknesses of the region that has appeared to be the lack of an institutional organization among the Lake Chad Basin countries, an organization that would be able to deal with security issues as well as social and economic integration.

Boko Haram is present in Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Niger, but do not act in the four countries the same ways. This difference on postures has generated a difference

in the nature of threats. While Nigeria is facing an insurgency, Cameroon, Chad and Niger are facing the consequences of the porosity of their borders and their tolerant policies against Boko Haram. Those three countries, no matter the implemented strategies, will never end the Boko Haram security crisis because an insurgency should be addressed in its natural environment which for Boko Haram is Nigeria. Therefore, all the measures to only a regional coordination of efforts can cope efficiently against Boko Haram and return peace in the Lake Chad Basin region.

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