

THE GROWING INFLUENCE OF RUSSIA AND CHINA AND
THE CONSEQUENCES FOR U.S. INTERESTS
AS RELATED TO BRAZIL

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
General Studies

by

FELIPE DE CARVALHO ABBUD, LIEUTENANT COLONEL, BRAZILIAN ARMY
B.S., Agulhas Negras Military Academy, Resende, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 1999

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
2019

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. United States Fair Use determination or copyright permission has been obtained for the use of pictures, maps, graphics, and any other works incorporated into the manuscript. This author may be protected by more restrictions in their home countries, in which case further publication or sale of copyrighted images is not permissible.

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			<i>Form Approved</i> <i>OMB No. 0704-0188</i>		
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.					
1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 14-06-2019		2. REPORT TYPE Master's Thesis		3. DATES COVERED (From - To) AUG 2018 – JUN 2010	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE The Growing Influence of Russia and China and the Consequences for U.S. Interests as Related to Brazil			5a. CONTRACT NUMBER		
			5b. GRANT NUMBER		
			5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER		
6. AUTHOR(S) LTC Felipe de Carvalho Abbud			5d. PROJECT NUMBER		
			5e. TASK NUMBER		
			5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER		
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army Command and General Staff College ATTN: ATZL-SWD-GD Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301			8. PERFORMING ORG REPORT NUMBER		
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)			10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)		
			11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)		
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT In recent times, Russia and China are making efforts to challenge U.S. hegemony, looking for improvement of their influence over countries that previously were under U.S. influence. One of those countries is Brazil. Historically, Brazil and the U.S. share consistent relations that are extremely significant for both countries. Nevertheless, the Russian and Chinese influence in Brazil can potentially change Brazilian priorities, affecting the status of relations with the U.S., which could affect U.S. national interests as related to Brazil. This thesis will address how and whether the growing influence of Russian and Chinese diplomatic, informational, military and economic instruments of national power in Brazil pose consequences for U.S. national interests. The conclusion pointed out that Russia is creating tension points in Latin America, and China is promoting economic competition with the U.S. in the region, in both cases with consequences for U.S. interests in Brazil.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS Russia, China, Brazil, Latin America, BRICS, U.S., U.S. national interest					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT (U)	b. ABSTRACT (U)	c. THIS PAGE (U)			19b. PHONE NUMBER (include area code)
			(U)	93	

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39.18

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of Candidate: Felipe de Carvalho Abbud

Thesis Title: The Growing Influence of Russia and China and the Consequences for
U.S. Interests as Related to Brazil

Approved by:

_____, Thesis Committee Chair
Lieutenant Colonel Jon W. Young, M.A.

_____, Member
Lieutenant Colonel Rafael E. Linera Rivera, Ph.D.

_____, Member
Alan C. Lowe, MMAS

Accepted this 14th day of June 2019 by:

_____, Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

THE GROWING INFLUENCE OF RUSSIA AND CHINA AND THE CONSEQUENCES FOR U.S. INTEREST AS RELATED TO BRAZIL, by Felipe de Carvalho Abbud, 93 pages.

In recent times, Russia and China are making efforts to challenge U.S. hegemony, looking for improvement of their influence over countries that previously were under U.S. influence. One of those countries is Brazil. Historically, Brazil and the U.S. share consistent relations that are extremely significant for both countries. Nevertheless, the Russian and Chinese influence in Brazil can potentially change Brazilian priorities, affecting the status of relations with the U.S., which could affect U.S. national interests as related to Brazil. This thesis will address how and whether the growing influence of Russian and Chinese diplomatic, informational, military and economic instruments of national power in Brazil pose consequences for U.S. national interests. The conclusion pointed out that Russia is creating tension points in Latin America, and China is promoting economic competition with the U.S. in the region, in both cases with consequences for U.S. interests in Brazil.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Initially, I would like to thank LTC Jon W. Young, my committee chair, who guided me since the beginning, motivated me, and patiently provided me with the support to carry out the work. Likewise, I thank LTC Rafael E. Linera-Rivera and Mr. Alan C. Lowe, my committee members, for their interest in my work and their valuable guidance. I will always be grateful for the time you have invested in this research, and for having believed in my project.

I would like to thank my lovely wife Aline and my daughters Manuela and Rafaela. They are my haven, once again they were by my side giving me strength. I would also like to thank the support of my parents, my in-laws and my whole family. Thank you also to all those who contributed to this research. Finally, I dedicate this thesis to my father, rest in peace. Comandos, Força, Brasil.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE THESIS APPROVAL PAGE	iii
ABSTRACT.....	iv
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	v
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	vi
ACRONYMS.....	viii
ILLUSTRATIONS	ix
TABLES	x
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION	1
Overview.....	1
Problem Statement.....	3
Primary Research Question	4
Secondary Research Questions.....	4
Definitions and Terms	5
Limitations.....	7
Scope and Delimitation.....	8
The Significance of the Study.....	9
Chapter Conclusion.....	9
CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW	11
Chapter Introduction.....	11
Russian and Chinese Diplomatic Influence in Brazil	12
Russian and Chinese Informational Influence in Brazil	14
Russian and Chinese Military Influence in Brazil	16
Russian and Chinese Economic Influence in Brazil.....	18
Chapter Conclusion.....	21
CHAPTER 3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY	23
Chapter Introduction.....	23
Research Methodology	23
Evaluation Criteria.....	24
Chapter Conclusion.....	28

CHAPTER 4 ANALYSIS	29
Chapter Introduction	29
Brazil – United States	29
U.S. Influence and the Interests Related to Brazil	29
Brazil – Russia	36
Diplomatic Influence of Russia and the Consequences for U.S. Interests as Related to Brazil.....	36
Informational Influence of Russia and the Consequences for U.S. Interests as Related to Brazil	39
Military Influence of Russia and the Consequences for U.S. Interests as Related to Brazil.....	41
Economic Influence of Russia and the Consequences for U.S. Interests as related to Brazil.....	44
Influence of Russia and the Consequences for U.S. Interests as Related to Brazil ..	46
Brazil – China	48
Diplomatic Influence of China and the Consequences for U.S. Interests as Related to Brazil.....	48
Informational Influence of China and the Consequences for U.S. Interests as Related to Brazil	51
Military Influence of China and the Consequences for U.S. Interests as Related to Brazil.....	53
Economic Influence of China and the Consequences for U.S. Interests as Related to Brazil.....	55
Influence of China and the Consequences for U.S. Interests as Related to Brazil ...	60
Chapter Conclusion.....	63
CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS	64
Conclusion	64
Recommendations.....	65
APPENDIX A BRAZILIAN MILITARY EQUIPMENT WITH U.S. ORIGIN	68
APPENDIX B PARTICIPATION OF THE U.S. IN BRAZILIAN EXPORTS AND IMPORTS	70
APPENDIX C CONFUCIUS INSTITUTE LOCATIONS IN BRAZIL.....	72
APPENDIX D PARTICIPATION OF CHINA IN BRAZILIAN EXPORTS AND IMPORTS	73
APPENDIX E CRUDE PETROLEUM TRADE ANALYSIS – BRAZIL-U.S. AND BRAZIL-CHINA	75
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	76

ACRONYMS

AEB	Brazilian Space Agency
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
CJCSM	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual
DAEBAI	Brazilian Army. Guideline for the Activities of the Brazilian Army in the International Area
DIME	Diplomatic, Informational, Military and Economic instruments of National Power
DoD	Department of Defense
DOS	Department of State
ENEM	National Examination of High School
FEB	Brazilian Expeditionary Force
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
IBGE	Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics
ICS	Integrated Country Strategy
ISS	International Space Station
IMET	International Military Education and Training
MINUSTAH	United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
NASA	National Aeronautics and Space Administration
U.S.	United States of America
VLS	Satellite Launch Vehicle

ILLUSTRATIONS

	Page
Figure 1. Risk Characterization Graph.....	27
Figure 2. Risk Analysis of Russian Influence	46
Figure 3. Risk Analysis of Chinese Influence.....	60

TABLES

	Page
Table 1. Joint Risk Analysis Methodology Steps and Research Risk Analysis Steps.....	25
Table 2. Total of Brazilian Military Equipment with U.S.-Origin	68
Table 3. Participation of the U.S. in Brazilian Exports – Top 5 Brazilian Exported Products (2017).....	70
Table 4. Participation of the U.S. in Brazilian Imports – Top 5 Brazilian Imported Products (2017).....	71
Table 5. Confucius Institute Locations in Brazil	72
Table 6. Participation of China in Brazilian Exports – Top 5 Brazilian Exported Products (2017).....	73
Table 7. Participation of China in Brazilian Imports – Top 5 Brazilian Imported Products (2017).....	74
Table 8. Crude Petroleum Trade Analysis – Brazil-U.S. and Brazil-China	75

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Overview

After World War II, the U.S. held hegemonic status as the leading influential national power worldwide, and built an “international order that suited its interests.”¹ Besides that, the world observed the growing economy of China, since 1978, which increases its relevance in one rate without precedents.² Moreover, Russia resurges as one important player on the international scene, and “is a strategic competitor actively seeking to degrade U.S. partnerships and undermine U.S. interests” in Latin America.³

In recent years, Russia and China are trying to introduce themselves as competitors for the influence over Latin America countries, each one with their respective interests. Those could be noted, in the same way, through the establishment of some initiatives taken to provide a common agenda shared by those countries, as in the case of the group made up of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS).⁴ Jim O’Neill, chief economist at Goldman Sachs conceived that acronym in 2001.

¹ Laura Neak, *Studying Foreign Policy Comparatively: Cases and Analysis*. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2018), 150.

² R. Evan Ellis, “U.S. National Security Implications of Chinese Involvement in Latin America,” Strategic Studies Institute, June 2005, accessed 20 September 2018, <https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=606> 1-2.

³ Kurt W. Tidd, *Posture Statement of Admiral Kurt W. Tidd Commander, United States Southern Command*, 15 February 2018, 6, accessed 09 September 2018, https://www.southcom.mil/Portals/7/Documents/Posture%20Statements/SOUTHCOM_2018_Posture_Statement_FINAL.PDF?ver=2018-02-15-090330-243. 6.

⁴ Neak, *Studying Foreign Policy Comparatively: Cases and Analysis*, 146.

Initially, it was just a reference “to call attention to four countries with dynamic economies worth investing in.”⁵ However, in 2008 “that group began to think of itself as a loose group,”⁶ and develop a common agenda, with regular annual meetings.

BRICS, according to Brazilian Ministry of External Relations, “has significantly expanded its activities in the fields of political coordination and economic, financial and multisectoral cooperation.”⁷

BRICS must be considered not just for the declared intent for their existence, but must also for the signaling of the intentional approach among those countries. More specifically, the transparent attempt of Russia and China is to present themselves as a potential partner for the Latin America Countries. That is an “example of what might be an effort to form a strategic balance against the United States.”⁸

Brazil is considered a “regional power and an important leader in international affairs.”⁹ The country has the 9th largest GDP (purchasing power parity – 2017 est.) in

⁵ Neak, *Studying Foreign Policy Comparatively: Cases and Analysis*, 146.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “BRICS – Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa,” accessed 27 April 2019, <http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/en/politica-externa/mecanismos-inter-regionais/7505-brics-brazil-russia-india-china-south-africa>.

⁸ Neak, *Studying Foreign Policy Comparatively: Cases and Analysis*, 146.

⁹ U.S. Embassy & Consulates in Brazil, “U.S.-Brazil Diplomatic History,” accessed 31 October 2018, <https://br.usembassy.gov/our-relationship/policy-history/io/>.

comparison to the world; the 5th largest population (July 2017 est.); the 6th largest territory and a large variety of natural resources.¹⁰

Gvosdev and Marsh present Brazil as an emerging global power and state that the Brazil – Russia relationship is undertaken at the highest level of government, due to its importance.¹¹ Ellis believes that Brazil occupies a dominant position among China’s trade in Latin America, and also notes that authors, such as Monica Hirst, consider a special recognition from China to Brazil, because of the Brazilian traditional leadership role in the region.¹²

Besides that, Hirst states that the U.S. “is no longer a central element for Brazilian international affairs.”¹³ That assertion reinforces the relevance of the present study, at the moment when analysts try to evaluate just how the relations of Russia and China with Brazil can affect the interests of the U.S.

Problem Statement

Considering aforementioned statements, there remains doubt just how the growing influence of Russia and China in Brazil could affect U.S. national interests.

¹⁰ Central Intelligence Agency, “The World Factbook: South America – Brazil,” accessed 31 October 2018, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/br.html>.

¹¹ Gvosdev and Marsh, *Russian Foreign Policy: Interests, Vectors, and Sectors*, 383.

¹² R. Evan Ellis, *China in Latin America: the Whats & Wherefores*(Boulder, CO: Lynne Publishers, 2008), 49.

¹³ Monica Hirst, *Understanding Brazil-United States Relations: Contemporary History, Current Complexities and Prospects for the 21st Century* (Brasília, DF, Brazil: Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão, 2013), 15.

Russia and China are expanding their influence over the world. These countries comprise a threat over U.S. hegemony on the international stage. As part of the process of increasing their influence, they are changing their approach with Latin American countries, including Brazil.

One of the main pillars of Brazilian diplomacy is the firm commitment to the multilateral system,¹⁴ which finds opportunities in this new relationship that Russia and China seek to create. This raises the question of how this can impact Brazil-US relations.

Primary Research Question

During the past years, there has been a significant amount of literature about the influence of Russia and China and the intention to change the international order; in other words, to challenge U.S. hegemony. Among that literature, rarely is found some conclusive research regarding the Russia – Brazil and Brazil – China relations, and the consequences for U.S. interests related to Brazil. Therefore, through the content analysis of the reviewed literature, this thesis will answer the primary research question: Given the growing influence of Russia and China in Brazil, what are the potential consequences for U.S. national interests as related to Brazil?

Secondary Research Questions

The thesis will analyze whether the influence of the diplomatic, informational, military and economic (DIME) instruments of national power of Russia and China in

¹⁴ Cristina Soreanu Pecequilo, *Manual do Candidato: Política Internacional* (Brasília, DF, Brazil: Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão, 2010), 295.

Brazil pose consequences or not for U.S. national interests related to Brazil. For that, the following secondary research questions were formulated:

1. Does the diplomatic influence of Russia and China pose consequences for U.S. national interests as related to Brazil?
2. Does the informational influence of Russia and China pose consequences for U.S. national interests as related to Brazil?
3. Does the military influence of Russia and China pose consequences for U.S. national interests as related to Brazil?
4. Does the economic influence of Russia and China pose consequences for U.S. national interests as related to Brazil?

Definitions and Terms

The following definitions and terms will facilitate the understanding of the thesis.

National Interest: “the interest of a nation as a whole held to be an independent entity separate from the interests of subordinate areas or groups and also of other nations or supranational groups.”¹⁵ This definition was chosen because it is considered complete in comparison with others presented by different authors. With that, it is possible to cover the peculiarities of different countries, without compromising its meaning. Another reason for its choice was the fact that this definition was presented during the Command and General Staff Course, in 2018 (Lesson C203), which reinforces its credibility.

¹⁵ Merriam-Webster, “National Interest,” accessed 25 February 2019, <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/national%20interest>.

Instruments of National Power: “All the means available to the government in its pursuit of national objectives. They are expressed as diplomatic, informational, military, and economic.”¹⁶

Diplomatic Instrument of National Power: “The essence of the diplomatic instrument is engagement - how a nation interacts with state or non-state actors, generally to secure some form of agreement that allows the conflicting parties to coexist peacefully.”¹⁷

Informational Instrument of National Power: “The informational instrument is about creating, exploiting, and disrupting knowledge. A state or non-state actor generally benefits when it enjoys an information advantage over another party. The infrastructure, capabilities, and processes by which a state or non-state gathers, analyzes, disseminates, and exploits information are crucial foundational and institutional dimensions of power.”¹⁸

Military Instrument of National Power: “The essence of the military instrument is the use of force by one party in an attempt to impose its will on another. This use can

¹⁶ Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington DC: The Joint Staff, February 2019), accessed 27 April 2019, <https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/dictionary.pdf>.

¹⁷ Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), *Joint Doctrine Note 1-18: Strategy* (Washington DC: The Joint Staff, 25 April 2018), II-5, accessed 27 April 2019. https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/jdn_jg/jdn1_18.pdf?ver=2018-04-25-150439-540.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, II-6.

entail applying force, threatening the application of force, or enabling other parties to apply force in furtherance of strategic ends.”¹⁹

Economic Instrument of National Power: “The economic instrument focuses on furthering or constraining others’ prosperity. Economic power is frequently considered the heart of national power.”²⁰

Influence: “the power or capacity of causing an effect in indirect or intangible ways.”²¹

Risk: “the probability and consequence of an event causing harm to something valued.”²²

Limitations

There are a small number of reliable resources that address exclusively Brazil – Russia, Brazil – Russia, Brazil – U.S. bilateral relations, usually the sources include Latin America as a whole. For this reason, the author will reference some relations mentioning the region as a whole to provide the context of determined subjects. The compressed time available to conduct the study will also limit the research. The delimitation will mitigate the shortage of time possible in the timeframe of the study. Another limitation will be the

¹⁹ JCS, *Joint Doctrine Note I-18: Strategy*, II-6.

²⁰ Ibid, II-7.

²¹ Merriam-Webster, “Influence,” accessed 25 February 2019, <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/influence>.

²² Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), *Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual – Joint Risk Analysis*, (Washington DC: The Joint Staff, 14 October 2016), accessed 27 April 2019, <https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Library/Manuals/CJCSM%203105.01%C2%A0.pdf?ver=2017-02-15-105309-907>.

availability of and access to information and documents. This thesis will not include any classified material. Finally, the research will not include any sources in Russian or Mandarin, but will consider sources in English, Portuguese, and Spanish. The author did the translation of those sources to the English language.

Scope and Delimitation

The thesis will be delimited in time between 2008 and 2018.

The author considers relevant delimitate in 2008 due to some significant events that configured the evident influence of Russia and China in the Latin America region. One of these events is the meeting of the leaders of BRIC (lately called BRICS, with the inclusion of South Africa in the group) countries during the 2008 G8 summit in Japan, this meeting was the first in that new format, and after that, the forum will become an annual event.²³ Another event with significance in that year was the publication of the first ever policy paper on Latin America and the Caribbean region by China.²⁴

The author selected 2018 to analyze the current events and to present the remarkable change of posture that will be adopted in Brazil after the election of the new President of Brazil Jair Messias Bolsonaro. The year 2018 will be exceptional in this transition, since the inauguration of the new President took place on January 1, 2019.

²³ University of Toronto, “BRICS Information Center – BRIC Leaders Meet.” 9 July 2008, accessed 11 December 2018, <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/080709-leaders.html>.

²⁴ Government of China, *China’s Policy Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean*, 5 November 2008, accessed 11 December 2018, http://www.gov.cn/english/official/2008-11/05/content_1140347.htm.

This timeframe will make it possible to verify the evolution of the relationship between the countries and to identify the elements necessary to answer the research questions. The exception to this timeframe will be made while describing the historical aspects of the diplomatic relations between Brazil – U.S., Brazil – Russia, and Brazil – China. This will create the necessary background for the understanding of bilateral relations between these countries, making it possible to identify the basis for the thoughtful of the current status quo of these relations.

The research will also be delimited with focus on the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments of national power.

The Significance of the Study

This study will present a personal perspective of a Brazilian Army Officer related to Brazil – Russia, Brazil – China, and Brazil –U.S. bilateral relations. It does not consist of an official position of the Brazilian Government or even the Brazilian Army, but will present the point of view and perceptions considering the author’s background. So, the results could be used to advise the determination of activities, exchanges, and priorities for the examined region. Future researches could address some issues highlighted in this thesis.

Chapter Conclusion

Russia and China are setting their priorities with particular concerns related to Latin America. That provides Brazil an alternative to developing multilateral relations. These alternatives include the development of ties involving the instruments of national power, diplomatic, informational, military, and economic. Those ties, in turn, could pose

challenges to U.S. national interests related to Brazil. Chapter 2 will provide the literature review that defines U.S. national interests related to Brazil as well as the different influence of Russia and China in Brazil, according to the instrument of national power.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Chapter Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to provide the analysis and the theoretical framework to verify the potential consequences for U.S. interests as related to Brazil posed by the growing influence of Russia and China in Brazil.

For that, I will be present relevant literature that pertains to the research topic. The chapter will give the theoretical basis that supports the explanation for the objectives of the Russian and Chinese influence in Brazil. The authors and official documents from Brazil, Russia and Chinese government and agencies consider that the Russian influence in Brazil and Latin America aims to disrupt and destabilize the region. The Chinese intent is to reduce U.S. influence in the region and force the Americans to carry out direct competition with the Chinese in a region where the U.S. previously held hegemonic influence. There is also the intention of reducing U.S. influence both in the Russian and Chinese strategic environments in eastern Europe and the South China Sea.

The chapter's organization will facilitate answers for the primary and secondary research questions that explain Russian and Chinese DIME influence. The literature review will prioritize the primary sources, when possible, to confirm or refute the analysis and conclusions of the experts who have already written about the subject. It seeks to provide a view of how a Brazilian evaluates the situation.

The conclusion will indicate which of the Russian and Chinese DIME influences in Brazil can pose consequences for U.S. national interests as related to Brazil.

Russian and Chinese Diplomatic Influence in Brazil

Historically, Brazil-Russia and Brazil-China started their bilateral relations in 1878 and 1974, respectively. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of those countries, since the beginning of 2000 the number of visits of high-level authorities increased leading to the development of relevant bilateral agreements in the following years.²⁵

Gvosdev and Marsh stated that Russia foreign policy aims to form a coalition with different countries to counterbalance the influence of the U.S., Europe, and China. The authors consider BRICS as a potential new international alignment to place Russia in an advantageous position as coordinator and mediator of a multipolar world.²⁶

Blank defined that Russia identifies Brazil's potential Latin America leadership and intends to fix their influence on the region, by deepening the ties with Brazil and to pose a competitive opposition to the U.S. Blank also mentioned that Russia uses BRICS to promote multipolarity on the world.²⁷

²⁵ Embaixada da Federação da Rússia na República Federativa do Brasil, “*História das Relações Bilaterais*,” accessed 31 October 2018, https://brazil.mid.ru/web/brasil_pt/historia-das-relacoes-bilaterais; Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Russian Federation,” accessed 31 October 2018, http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=6573&Itemid=478&cod_pais=RUS&tipo=ficha_pais&lang=en; Government of China, “Top Legislator Lauds China-Brazil Strategic Partnership,” accessed 31 October 2018, http://www.gov.cn/english/2006-09/01/content_375045.htm.

²⁶ Gvosdev and Marsh, *Russian Foreign Policy: Interests, Vectors, and Sectors*, 54, 55, 56, 386, 387, 389.

²⁷ Stephen Blank, “Russia in Latin America: Geopolitical games in the US’s neighborhood,” *Russie. Nei. Visions* 38 (2009): 1-23.

Milles considers that Russian engagement in Latin America includes trade and investment, diplomatic engagement, and arms sale. The diplomatic approach seems to be more critical than the economic or military approaches. Russian intent is to destabilize democratic institutions in Latin America and uses the region to divert attention from the critical situation in Georgia and Ukraine.²⁸

Ellis defined that China has, as a long-term strategic objective, the intent to increase its presence in Latin America which will create implications for the U.S. Chinese interest in Latin America aims to guarantee access to critical commodities, and they finance the development of the local economy. The author described that the Chinese approach to Latin America aims to balance the influence of the U.S. in Asia.²⁹

Piccone defined that China increased its diplomatic approach with Latin America, facilitated by the leftist governments which were the majority in Latin America during the last decade. The author highlighted that the government of China published in 2008 China's Policy Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean, to clarify Chinese priorities for the region.³⁰

²⁸ Richard Miles, "Virtual Russian Influence in Latin America," Center for Strategic & International Studies, 9 May 2018, accessed 13 December 2018, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/virtual-russian-influence-latin-america>.

²⁹ Ellis, "U.S. National Security Implications of Chinese Involvement in Latin America," v, 23, 24.

³⁰ Ted Piccone, "The Geopolitics of China's Rise in Latin America," Brookings, November 2016, accessed 27 April 2019, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/the-geopolitics-of-chinas-rise-in-latin-america_ted-piccone.pdf; Government of China, *China's Policy Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean*, 5 November 2008, accessed 11 December 2018, http://www.gov.cn/english/official/2008-11/05/content_1140347.htm.

Fleischman, overall, shares the same opinion with Ellis and Piccone. The author also defined that China's Policy Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean presents typical protocols on the issues from an economic perspective, but has a strategic dimension that can be understood by observing the Chinese political and military agendas.³¹

Pereira and Neves identified that the advance in Brazil-China relations coincided with the adoption of the South-South foundations for Brazilian foreign policy, adopted during President Lula's administrations (2003-2010). That had the objective of increasing Brazil's influence in international multilateral arenas, by strengthening ties with other developing nations and regional powers, such as China and BRICS.³²

Russian and Chinese Informational Influence in Brazil

Blank considers that the Russian support to Venezuela's government, both military and intelligence, could destabilize Latin America. In the past, the negligence of U.S. policy for that region allows the introduction of Russian influence.³³

Milles considers that Russia did not have significant commercial or diplomatic relations in the region, except with Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua. Besides that, their

³¹ Luis Fleischman, *Latin America in the Post-Chavez Era: The Security Threat to the United States*, Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2013.

³² Carlos Pereira and João Augusto De Castro Neves, "Brazil and China: South-South Partnership or North-South Competition?" *Brookings*, 4 April 2011, accessed 31 October 2018, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/03_brazil_china_pereira.pdf.

³³ Blank, "Russia in Latin America: Geopolitical games in the US's neighborhood."

interest in Latin America is not very well defined. However, the Russian influence done by social media platforms exercises their influence with a low-cost investment.³⁴

Fleischman stated that the objective for Russian influence in Latin America aims to show to the U.S. that Russia can intervene in the U.S. backyard just as the U.S. has intervened in Russia's backyard.³⁵

Ellis explained that the focus of Russian influence in Latin America is based on Information Operations to complicate U.S. strategic position in the region. For that, Russia is influencing the local audience mainly through social media to create a negative image of the U.S.³⁶

Related to China, Ellis stated that the core of Chinese informational influence is related to the perception that due to the Chinese economic growth and technology development the country constitutes opportunities for business. The author also highlighted that the partnership in the aerospace arena, China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite program (CBERS), supports Brazil to develop that capability but also provided "the Chinese access to Brazilian satellite tracking facilities," with consequences for the U.S. national security.³⁷

³⁴ Miles, "Virtual Russian Influence in Latin America."

³⁵ Fleischman, *Latin America in the Post-Chavez Era: The Security Threat to the United States*.

³⁶ Frank O. Mora, R. Evan Ellis, and Gary Bjorge, "Cultural and 'Soft Power' Influences of China and Russia in the Americas," (panel, organized by Cultural & Area Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 28 March 2019).

³⁷ Ellis, "U.S. National Security Implications of Chinese Involvement in Latin America," 11; R. Evan Ellis, "Chinese Soft Power in Latin America: A Case Study,"

Bjorge defined that China is projecting its influence through the Confucius Institute. The author explained that the Institute is the most important and efficient Chinese informational influence tool, and has the primary objective to create favorable public opinion regarding China and the Chinese Government. The institute can influence how China is taught and studied in several Academic Institutions around the world.³⁸

Russian and Chinese Military Influence in Brazil

Ionescu states that Russia and Brazil are not traditional partners on the military arena, but the geographical distance and the lack of direct conflict of interest between them benefit for that relationship and does allow for some exciting exchanges on both sides. The author noted that Russia has a consortium of Russian companies using the Alcântara Launch Base in Maranhão. Besides that Brazil acquired Mi-35 helicopters and Igla-S (Needle) portable air defense systems from Russia.³⁹

Dall’Agnol, Zabolotzky, and Mielniczuk described that Brazil and Russia have one Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Cooperation in the Field of Military Technologies of Mutual Interest which presents few practical results, but they consider that this MOU has the potential for future military-technical cooperation in the future.

Joint Forces Quarterly, 60, 8, (January 2011), accessed 31 March 2019, <https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a536568.pdf>.

³⁸ Mora, Ellis, and Bjorge, “Cultural and ‘Soft Power’ Influences of China and Russia in the Americas.”

³⁹ Imanuela Ionescu, “Brazil_Russia Military-Technical Cooperation A fruit of the Post-Cold War World Order,” *Military Review* (November-December 2018): 66-79.

The authors also believe that “the nonconventional character of the Brazilian-Russian military cooperation summarizes the limited scope of Russian ambitions in the region.”⁴⁰

Wegrzynowski stated that Brazil and Russia signed a defense technology cooperation agreement establishing a partnership that may lead Brazil to the top of defense technology. That agreement includes Aerospace cooperation programs, the stimulation of reciprocal investments of cooperation in the field of high technology, among other mutual support.⁴¹

Milles, in turn, stated that with the replacement of left-wing governments in Latin America by the center-right that took place in Brazil, Argentina, and Chile, Russian arms deals have reduced with Venezuela only remaining.⁴²

Ellis highlighted that Chinese military relationships with Brazil includes “the participation of the Chinese military in MINUSTAH for more than six years.” The author defined that the Chinese participation in the mission was an opportunity for valuable

⁴⁰ Augusto César Dall’Agnol, Boris Perius Zabolotsky, and Fabiano Mielniczuk, “The Return of the Bear? Russian Military Engagement in Latin America: The Case of Brazil,” *Military Review Online Exclusive* (July 2018): 1-11, accessed 31 March 2019, <https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/Online-Exclusive/2018-OLE/Jul/Russia-Brazil/>.

⁴¹ Ricardo Wegrzynowski, “União de dois gigantes – Nova parceria com a Federação da Rússia pode levar o Brasil ao topo da tecnologia de defesa,” *Desafios do Desenvolvimento – Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada* 5, no. 43 (May 2008), accessed 17 January 2019, http://www.ipea.gov.br/desafios/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1511:catid=28&Itemid=23.

⁴² Miles, “Virtual Russian Influence in Latin America.”

military exchange for both countries, favoring the development of mutual understanding and creating links and opportunities for the future.⁴³

Besides that, the Brazilian Defense White Paper presents professional military course participation for both Brazilian and Chinese military personnel, principally involving Field Grade Officers of these countries. In 2011 Brazil sent three (03) Brazilian Army Colonels to participate in Chinese courses, and in 2019 that number will increase significantly to thirteen (13) officers to the Chinese International College of Defense Studies.⁴⁴

Russian and Chinese Economic Influence in Brazil

Gvosdev and Marsh consider that “as an economic bloc, the BRICS is in its infancy,” and consists “in diversification of Russia’s foreign economic policy.” Besides that, Russian experts consider that by 2030, intra-BRICS trade could reach US\$ 1 trillion in value.⁴⁵

⁴³ R. Evan Ellis, “China-Latin America Military Engagement: Good Will, Good Business, and Strategic Position,” Strategic Studies Institute, August 2011, accessed 1 April 2019, <https://publications.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/2150.pdf>.

⁴⁴ Brazilian Ministry of Defense, *Defense White Paper*, Brasília, DF, 2012, accessed 12 December 2018, https://www.defesa.gov.br/arquivos/estado_e_defesa/livro_branco/lbndn_2013_ing_net.pdf; Brazilian Army, *Informex no. 14*, Brasília, DF, 30 June 2011, accessed 12 December 2018, <http://www.eb.mil.br/documents/16768/396506/INFORMEX+014.pdf/5c339e10-4364-4a46-bc2e-84e5c4ed2ef2?version=1.0>; Brazilian Army, *Informex no. 24*, Brasília, DF, 25 June 2018, accessed 12 December 2018, <http://www.eb.mil.br/documents/16768/8526667/INFORMEX%20N%C2%BA%20024>.

⁴⁵ Gvosdev and Marsh, *Russian Foreign Policy: Interests, Vectors, and Sectors*, 388.

In that sense, Blank defined that Brazil is the Russian “economic beachhead” in South America.⁴⁶ But Miles highlighted that, even as the main trade partner in the region, Brazil-Russia trade represents less than 2 percent of the Russian world’s trade.⁴⁷

The Brazilian Ministry of Foreign affairs stated that China is Brazil’s largest trading partner and has been establishing itself as a major source of investment in the country. “In 2009, China became not only the largest buyer of Brazilian exports but also the main trade partner of Brazil, according to the criterion of trade flow. In 2012, China also became the leading supplier of products imported by Brazil.”⁴⁸

According to the Brazilian Central Bank, the Chinese investment in Brazil is hardly tracked because of the Chinese direct investment in Brazil are channeled through intermediary countries. The sectors of the Brazilian economy that received Chinese investment includes electricity, financial services, chemical products, and oil and gas.⁴⁹

Ellis explained that the Chinese investment pattern in Brazil indicates that they are pursuing the assurance of access to commodities by integrating supply networks. The

⁴⁶ Blank, “Russia in Latin America: Geopolitical games in the US’s neighborhood,” 15.

⁴⁷ Miles, “Virtual Russian Influence in Latin America.”

⁴⁸ Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “People’s Republic of China,” accessed 1 April 2019, http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=5988&Itemid=478&cod_pais=CHN&tipo=ficha_pais&lang=en.

⁴⁹ Brazilian Central Bank, *Direct Investment Report 2018*, Brasília, DF, 2018, accessed 26 March 2019, https://www.bcb.gov.br/Pom/Spb/Ing/Direct_Investment_Report_2018.pdf.

author detailed that the Chinese investment and loans in Brazil were focused on one steel plant, and Brazilian power and oil companies.⁵⁰

In the same context, Escher, Wilkinson, and Pereira analyzed the characteristics of Chinese investment in the agribusiness sector. The authors noted that China is investing in the Brazilian soybean production chain in a way that is ensuring the food security of its country. That is because Chinese companies are seeking participation in all phases of production, including logistics infrastructure, transportation, and warehousing.⁵¹

Kaplan considers that China's actual approach to Latin America is based on the development of multilateralism, free trade, and globalization.⁵² Moreover, Dollar stated that Latin America is a vital source of energy supply, metals, and foodstuffs. In 2018, Chinese demands for imports of those items promoted price increases, which affected not just China and Latin America, but the entire world, due to the relevant Chinese

⁵⁰ Ellis, "U.S. National Security Implications of Chinese Involvement in Latin America," 11; Ellis, "Chinese Soft Power in Latin America: A Case Study."

⁵¹ Fabiano Escher, John Wilkinson, and Paulo Rodrigues Fernandes Pereira. "Causas e Implicações dos Investimentos Chineses no Agornegócio Brasileiro," *ApexBrasil 2018 China Direções Globais de Investimentos*, 18 October 2018, accessed 1 April 2019, <http://cebc.org.br/2018/10/18/china-direcoes-globais-de-investimentos-2018/>.

⁵² Stephen Kaplan, "China is investing seriously in Latin America. Should you worry?" *The Washington Post*, 24 January 2018, accessed 1 April 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/01/24/china-is-investing-seriously-in-latin-america-should-you-worry/?utm_term=.9219c6265155.

economy.⁵³ Both authors remarks reinforce the Chinese economic profile described by Ellis.⁵⁴

Chapter Conclusion

The Chapter provided the literature review including books, articles, official documents, websites and other sources of information relevant to creating the theoretical framework for the understanding of the DIME influence of Russia and China in Brazil.

The literature review sought to emphasize the sources describing the Russian and Chinese standards for the application of national power instruments, preferably including the purpose and assessment of the effectiveness of the initiatives. It was also pursued to include the most recent studies, seeking to verify the adequacy in the application of an individual instrument of national power, in the face of recent changes in Brazil and Latin America. After that, the principal results identified during the literature review were presented. In this context, the subsequent analysis, in Chapter 4, will indicate the indicators of the influence of DIME to confirm or refute the thesis presented by the authors.

In summary, the Russia DIME influence in Brazil indicates that Russia is more dedicated to the creation of instability in Brazil than to constitute an alternative to counteract the U.S. influence. The Chinese DIME influence, in turn, indicates the

⁵³ David Dollar, “Chinese investment in Latin America continues to expand,” Brookings, 20 March 2018, accessed 10 December 2018, <https://www.brookings.edu/research/despite-slowdown-chinese-investment-in-latin-america-continues-to-expand/>.

⁵⁴ Ellis, “U.S. National Security Implications of Chinese Involvement in Latin America,” v.

existence of potential threats to the U.S. interests, offering alternatives that oppose U.S. hegemony, most notably, but not excluding the others, in the diplomatic and economic fields.

Chapter 3, will provide the Methodology used to evaluate the identified potential threats, those will be analyzed in Chapter 4 to answer the primary and secondary research questions.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Chapter Introduction

The research methodology used in this thesis is a content analysis based on a literature review to answer the primary question.

The literature review will inform the analysis and creation of the theoretical framework to answer the primary question. Due to the complexity of the subject, secondary questions were formulated, based on the instruments of national power (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic). Those will be answered before the primary question. The thesis conclusion includes some considerations, highlighting some issues that could be considered to mitigate identified risks.

Research Methodology

The sequence to answer the primary question is described as follows:

Phase 1: This step aimed to present the theoretical framework and create the background, based on the non-classified sources available. First, the U.S. DIME influence and the U.S. interest in Brazil were identified. Second, the Russian and Chinese DIME influences were presented. That verified the validity of the assumption of the existence of the growing influence of Russia and China in Brazil, as well as created the theoretical framework for further analysis.

Phase 2: Analysis of the evaluation criteria was presented in the second phase, which answered the secondary questions. The instruments of national power, DIME, are the evaluation criteria used for analysis. All the indicators and relevant issues identified

in the literature review informed the analysis for each instrument of national power. The conclusion determined whether or not one specific instrument of national power of Russia and China pose consequences for the U.S. national interests in Brazil.

Phase 3: The primary research question was answered based on the results of phases 1 and 2.

Phase 4: In conclusion, the research results were presented accompanied by some recommendations to mitigate potential risks, besides recommendations for future research.

Evaluation Criteria

The instruments of national power are the evaluation criteria. The DIME of Russia and China were categorized according to the risk analysis classification.

That classification of risk followed the Joint Risk Analysis Methodology, established on the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff Manual – Joint Risk Analysis⁵⁵ with some adaptations to achieve the purpose of this research.

For that, the research considered the definition for risk as “the probability and consequence of an event causing harm to something valued”⁵⁶. Said that each secondary question was answered with their correspondent risk classification.

The Manual – Joint Risk Analysis (2016) states that risk analysis is composed of three major components. The three major components are Risk Appraisal, Risk Management, and Risk Communication. The present research does not intend to present

⁵⁵ JCS, *Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual – Joint Risk Analysis*.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, B-1.

decisions and actions inherent to the process of risk analysis; however, the methodology is adequate to adapt the research to the subject vocabulary and also the desired consistency for this type of analysis.⁵⁷

The Joint Risk Analysis methodology considers four steps.⁵⁸ Regarding that, the research adopts those steps according to the following:

Joint Risk Analysis methodology steps ⁵⁹		Research Risk Analysis
1) Problem Framing	“risk to what?”	The answer for this question pointed out which of the U.S. interest could be affected by that determined instrument of national power.
2) Risk Assessment	“risk from what?”	The “from what” was each one of the instruments of national power (DIME).
3) Risk Judgment	“how much risk?”	The classification of risk followed the risk judgment described below.
	“how much risk is ok?”	The answer for this question was not part of the analysis.
4) Risk Management	“what should be done about the risk.”	The risk management presented some recommendations to mitigate the risk.

Source: Created by author.

⁵⁷ JCS, *Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual –Joint Risk Analysis*, B-1.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

Regarding the third phase, Risk Judgment – “how much risk?”, the risks were classified, considering their probability and consequences.

The probability was classified subjectively, according to the following:

1. Highly Unlikely – not observed during the research time delimitation;
2. Improbable – rarely observed during the research time delimitation;
3. Probable – usually observed during the research time delimitation;
4. Very Likely – continuously observed during the research time delimitation.

The consequences were also classified on the same scale defined on CJCSM 3105.01 (October 10, 2016), according to the following:

1. Minor harm⁶⁰ to something of value;
2. Moderate harm to something of value;
3. Major harm to something of value;
4. Extreme harm to something of value.

After that, it was done the risk characterization, which consisted of the establishment of a risk level for each potential threat. “The risk level is a function of the previously assessed probability (P) and consequence (C) (Risk = $f(P,C)$).”⁶¹

For the risk characterization, each evaluation criteria were classified, determining the level as low, moderate, significant or high according to the Figure 1 - Risk

⁶⁰ Harm is generally estimated considering vulnerability, the scale of damage, and the speed of recovery/resiliency (permanence). JCS, *Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual – Joint Risk Analysis*.

⁶¹ JCS, *Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual – Joint Risk Analysis*.

Characterization Graph, and described the potential consequences for the U.S. national interests related to Brazil.

Consequences	Extreme	Significant Risk	Significant Risk	High Risk	High Risk
	Major	Moderate Risk	Significant Risk	Significant Risk	High Risk
	Moderate	Moderate Risk	Moderate Risk	Significant Risk	Significant Risk
	Minor	Low Risk	Moderate Risk	Moderate Risk	Significant Risk
		Highly Unlikely	Improbable	Probable	Very Likely
		Probability			

Figure 1. Risk Characterization Graph

Source: Developed by author. The risk characterization scale used for this research is based on the Generic Risk Contour Graph presented on Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual –Joint Risk Analysis* (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, 14 October 2016), accessed 27 April 2019, <https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Library/Manuals/CJCSM%203105.01%C2%A0.pdf?ver=2017-02-15-105309-907>.

Chapter Conclusion

This chapter described the research methodology applied to answer the primary question “Given the growing influence of Russia and China what are the potential consequences for U.S. national interests related to Brazil?”

The methodology consisted of content analysis, and the instruments of national power were defined as the evaluation criteria. For each evaluation criteria were determined the risk evaluation and the potential consequences for the U.S. interests related to Brazil. With that methodology, the secondary questions were answered, and that informed the answer for the primary research question. The analysis and the answer for the secondary and primary research questions will be presented in the following chapter.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Chapter Introduction

This Chapter will provide the analysis of each instrument of national power (DIME) of Russia and China in Brazil, applying the evaluation criteria described in Chapter 3, and identifying the consequences for the U.S. interests related to Brazil. First, the U.S. influence and the interest related to Brazil will be analyzed, followed by Russian DIME analysis, and by Chinese DIME influence analysis. That analysis will answer the primary and secondary research questions. The chapter conclusion will summarize those analysis and evaluation.

Brazil – United States

U.S. Influence and the Interests Related to Brazil

The influence of the US in Brazil is greatly favored by historical ties⁶² and the similarity of ideas between the current governments of President Bolsonaro in Brazil and President Trump in the U.S.⁶³

Regarding the diplomatic influence, Monica Hirst defined that the historical ties of the Brazil-U.S. make evident moments of greater and lesser proximity; however, not

⁶² U.S. Embassy & Consulates in Brazil, “U.S.-Brazil Diplomatic History,” accessed 31 October 2018, <https://br.usembassy.gov/our-relationship/policy-history/io/>.

⁶³ The White House, “Remarks by National Security Advisor Ambassador John R. Bolton on the Administration’s Policies in Latin America,” 2 November 2018, accessed 11 December 2018, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-national-security-advisor-ambassador-john-r-bolton-administrations-policies-latin-america/>.

going through any moment of tension between countries. Hirst also pointed out that between 1942 and 1977 the diplomatic relationship between countries made possible the use of the U.S. military based on the Brazilian Northeast coast to support American operations in the North of Africa. It was also in this period that Brazil integrated the Alliance to fight during World War II, organizing the Brazilian Expeditionary Force (FEB) that departed to Europe to join the 5th Division of the United States Army. It is remarkable that the US foreign priority as of 9/11 impacted on Brazil-U.S. relations.⁶⁴ That period coincided with the leadership of parties of left-wing ideology in Brazil, in which the country prioritized the defense of multilateralism, generating a rapprochement with other countries, such as South Africa, India, China, and Russia.

Currently, President Bolsonaro's government has shown clear signs of a new direction of Brazilian foreign policy with better alignment with the U.S.⁶⁵ At the same time, the U.S. government also pays attention to Brazil and Latin America,⁶⁶ seeking to minimize the negative effect on its hegemony that occurred when the U.S. prioritized exclusively other regions.

In this sense, it can be understood that the maintenance or increasing of the American influence in Brazil, as well as in Latin America, depends on the U.S.

⁶⁴ Hirst, *Understanding Brazil-United States Relations: Contemporary History, Current Complexities and Prospects for the 21st Century*.

⁶⁵ YouTube, "Brazil will no longer be a socialist country: Eduardo Bolsonaro," 30 November 2018, accessed 11 December 2018. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OXpbGl3x7MM>.

⁶⁶ The White House, "Remarks by National Security Advisor Ambassador John R. Bolton on the Administration's Policies in Latin America."

dedicating priority to the region. It is considered that the affinity of purposes of the present governments of Brazil and the U.S. favors for the increase of the diplomatic influence of the U.S.

The informational influence presents important indicators in favor to the U.S. One is regarding the significant number of Brazilian migrants that go to the U.S., which shows the identification of the Brazilian with the American way of life.⁶⁷ Another important indicator is found in existing initiatives in the basic and university education sector in Brazil.

In basic education, it is possible to identify the importance that the Brazilian government dedicates to teaching the English language.⁶⁸ This condition favors the assimilation of U.S. values and customs by Brazilian society, which increases the effectiveness of the US informational influence in the country. In university education, in turn, the incentive to exchange with American universities is observed, through the Program Science without Borders.⁶⁹ This initiative increases American influence, both in social and scientific terms. The coexistence among the students will create identification bonds that possibly, in the future, will facilitate the development of new bilateral innovativeness. And yet, the academic formation of the Brazilian professional remains

⁶⁷ Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics, *Censo Demográfico 2010*. Brasília, DF, 2010. 55-61, accessed 26 March 2018, https://biblioteca.ibge.gov.br/visualizacao/periodicos/93/cd_2010_caracteristicas_populacao_domicilios.pdf.

⁶⁸ Instituto Nacional de Estudos e Pesquisas Educacionais Anísio Teixeira, “Exame Nacional do Ensino Médio,” 2019, accessed 26 March 2019, <https://enem.inep.gov.br/antes#leia-o-edital>.

⁶⁹ Ciência sem fronteiras, “O que é?” 2019, accessed 26 March 2019, <http://www.cienciasemfronteiras.gov.br/web/csf/o-programa>.

with high identification and similarity with the North American, because when returning to Brazil this professional transmits the acquired knowledge to different branches of the Brazilian society.

The potential of this multiplier effect can be verified with the presence of professionals graduated in North American Universities at the highest levels of the Brazilian government. Worthy of mention is the Minister of Economy and other important personalities in leading the institutions of the Brazilian economic sector, who intend to implement a liberal economy style in Brazil with the knowledge and influence acquired at the University of Chicago.⁷⁰

Another highlight is for the Minister of Science and Technology, a former Brazilian astronaut with training at NASA,⁷¹ who is seeking to effect the use of the Brazilian Rocket Launch Base by the U.S.⁷² In both cases, it is evident that the presence of leaders with formation and knowledge received in the U.S. favor positively to the increase of the influence of the U.S. in Brazil. In this way, it is verified that the American influence in Brazil is favorable to the development of a greater cultural and scientific identification between the two countries.

⁷⁰ Andres Schipani, “Jair Bolsonaro’s inner circle: who’s who,” *Financial Times*, 22 November 2018, accessed 12 December 2018, <https://www.ft.com/content/cc6331fc-ecde-11e8-8180-9cf212677a57>.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*

⁷² Camila Turtelli, “Marcos Pontes Defende Uso Comercial da Base de Alcântara, no Maranhão,” *Estadão*, 01 November 2018, accessed 13 December 2018, <https://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,marcos-pontes-defende-uso-comercial-da-base-de-alcantara-no-maranhao,70002580189>.

Related to military influence, it is worth noting the significance of Brazil's participation in World War II. "Brazil was the only Latin America country to dispatch troops to the war in Europe."⁷³ That has brought direct consequences in the post-war period that endure to this day. These consequences can be observed in several aspects, but especially the American influence in the creation of Brazilian War College, in the design of the Brazilian Army Staff College, as well as in the structuring of the Brazilian Special Forces.⁷⁴ So, there is a direct American influence on the conception of Brazilian military doctrine, structure, and even on the principles of national security.

The bonds of mutual trust developed in the European War theater certainly helped to facilitate the development of various agreements and exchanges in the defense sector. In this context, the considerable number of Brazilian military students in different military courses regularly including noncommissioned officers, lieutenants, captains, and field-grade officers provides an opportunity for U.S. positive influence, achieving the IMET objectives of developing increased understanding and defense cooperation between the U.S. and Brazil.⁷⁵

Also worthy of note is the privileged situation where the U.S. is positioned at Brazilian Army. Guideline for the Activities of the Brazilian Army in the International

⁷³ Hirst, *Understanding Brazil-United States Relations: Contemporary History, Current Complexities and Prospects for the 21st Century*, 40.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 34-54; Brazilian Special Operations Command, *As Operações Especiais do Exército Brasileiro* (Goiânia, GO: EGGCF, 2016), 37, 99.

⁷⁵ Department of State, *Military Assistance* (Washington, DC: Department of State, 2002), accessed 26 March 2019, <https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/17783.pdf>.

Area (DAEBAI). Thus, that regulation facilitates the development of military cooperation and the consequent military influence of the U.S. besides that demonstrates another common interest shared between the U.S. and Brazil.⁷⁶

The military equipment listed in the Brazilian Defense White Paper is another indicator of U.S. military influence in Brazil. The significant number of U.S.-originated equipment, as detailed in Appendix A, is highly favorable for the relationship between the two countries.⁷⁷ It facilitates doctrinal influence, using equipment with similar technical capabilities, and facilitates interoperability for future operations.⁷⁸ Also noteworthy is the technical, logistical and even operational assistance that accompanies the purchase and sale of this equipment, which only contributes to increasing the influence of the U.S. in Brazil. It is also worth noting that, in the future, there is a tendency for the country to try to modernize the equipment next to the same country of origin of the replaced material. That reduces the need for doctrinal and structural adequacy than when there is a transition to equipment of different origin.

The military influence of the US in Brazil is significantly superior to that of any other country, since it reached several sectors, beginning with the historic alliance in World War II, passing through the intellectual, technical formation of its members and including the influence in the structure of military education, doctrine, and concepts of

⁷⁶ Brazilian Army, *Boletim do Exército no. 9-16*, Brasilia, DF: SGEX, 4 March 2016, accessed 26 March 2019, <http://www.sgex.eb.mil.br/sistemas/be/boletins.php>.

⁷⁷ Brazilian Ministry of Defense, *Defense White Paper*.

⁷⁸ Department of State, *Integrated Country Strategy –Brazil* (Brasilia, DF: Department of State, 31 July 2018), accessed 29 March 2019, <https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/284657.pdf>.

National Defense. Thus, the breadth and depth of U.S. military influence in Brazil favor the protection of US interests as related to Brazil.

The economic influence of the U.S. can be considered very relevant for Brazil. The U.S. is Brazil's second largest trading partner and participates heavily in the negotiation of the leading products marketed by Brazilians, most notably Brazil's export of Crude petroleum to the U.S. and the import of refined petroleum from the U.S.,⁷⁹ as displayed in Appendix B. Thus, a possible reduction or interruption in the Brazil-U.S. commercial relationship will have disastrous consequences for the Brazilian economy.

Also remarkable is the significant contribution of U.S. resources in the form of investments in the agriculture and mining, manufacturing, and services sectors of the Brazilian economy.⁸⁰ That reinforces the relevance of the commercial relationship Brazil-U.S. for Brazil and indicates the great potential that this instrument of national power has to favor the defense of U.S. interests as related to Brazil.

With that said is remarkable the excellent projection that all the U.S. instruments of national power, which favors the defense of the interests of the country as related to Brazil. In that context, it should be noted that the DOS and DOD are aligned and synergistically seeking to consolidate the American influence in Brazil to defend the

⁷⁹ Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "United States of America," accessed 31 October 2018, http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=6072&Itemid=478&cod_pais=USA&tipo=ficha_pais&lang=en; The Observatory of Economic Complexity, "Where Does Brazil Export to? (2017)," accessed 26 March 2019, https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/export/bra/show/all/2017/; The Observatory of Economic Complexity, "Where Does Brazil Import from? (2017)," accessed 26 March 2019, https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/import/bra/show/all/2017/.

⁸⁰ Brazilian Central Bank, *Direct Investment Report 2018*.

interests of the US territory, the US citizen security, the preservation of peace, the promotion of American prosperity, and the interest in advance of American Influence.⁸¹

The following is an analysis of the Russian DIME influence and, subsequently, of the Chinese DIME influence. In this way, the primary and secondary questions will be answered, guiding for the conclusion of this thesis.

Brazil – Russia

Diplomatic Influence of Russia and the Consequences for U.S. Interests as Related to Brazil

The following analysis will answer the secondary research question “Does the diplomatic influence of Russia pose consequences for U.S. national interests as related to Brazil?”

Historically the Russia-Brazil diplomatic relationship was directly affected by the period of the Cold War. It was only in 1991, after the end of the Soviet Union, it had begun a more effective relationship. This relationship acquired a more positive dynamic in 2002 when it received the status of Strategic and Technological Alliance Partner. Since then, a flow of visits of high authorities was observed.⁸²

⁸¹ Donald J Trump, *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: The White House, December 2017), accessed 26 March 2019, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf>; Tidd, *Posture Statement of Admiral Kurt W. Tidd Commander, United States Southern Command*; Department of State, *Integrated Country Strategy – Brazil*.

⁸² Embaixada da Federação da Rússia na República Federativa do Brasil, “*História das Relações Bilaterais*, ”; Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Russian Federation.”

In that context, two reasons constitute obstacles to the intensification of Brazil-Russia diplomatic relations. The first of these is the fact that Brazil is located, within the divisions of Russian foreign policy, in the less developed sector, this situation is the result of the lack of historical connections. The second fact was the decline in diplomatic relations between 1991 and 2002 due to lack of economic resources and the political instability of Russia after the end of the Soviet Union.⁸³

Since 2003 the attempt to re-approximation was observed. Russia has come to identify Brazil as a regional leader and has distinct interest in the region to maintain opposition to the U.S. This rapprochement has resulted in the creation of the BRICS. Thus, the group constitutes a crucial diplomatic tool to strengthen a possible strategic disadvantage against the US.⁸⁴ It should be noted that the five countries that make up the group have a common interest in seeking a new dimension for the international decision-making process to reform key international organizations, such as the G-20 and the United Nations.

It is also important to note that the period of re-approximation coincided with the period in which left-wing ideological orientations governed Brazil. These governments, especially the two periods of the Lula Administration (2003-2010) and the first term of former President Dilma Rousseff (2010-2014), both of the Workers' Party, maintained an external policy with emphasis on the South-South Relationship, which privileged Russia,

⁸³ Gvosdev and Marsh, *Russian Foreign Policy: Interests, Vectors, and Sectors*, 54, 55, 56, 365, 376, 377.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 386, 387.

as well as China, the African countries, and the neighbors of Latin America, mainly Venezuela and Cuba.⁸⁵

The recent change in government, with the inauguration of the Right-Wing-oriented Bolsonaro Government in 2019, created a new dynamic in these relations.⁸⁶ From the period of the election campaign there was already an indication that there would be a gradual rapprochement with the U.S. The first months of the Government confirmed this situation.

Add to this the impasse with the political situation in Venezuela. The divergent positions between Brazil and Russia, in recognition of President Guaidó created a point of tension with consequences still unpredictable in the Brazil-Russia relationship.⁸⁷ Thus, the risk posed by the diplomatic influence of Russia is classified, as probable, and consequences as minor.

The probable classification was selected considering that, even if there is a divergence of political opinions among the current governments, it is known that Russia maintains its diplomatic interest in seeking an approximation with the countries of Latin America. That approximation aims to create a focus of opposition to the USA in the

⁸⁵ Pereira and Neves, “Brazil and China: South-South Partnership or North-South Competition?”

⁸⁶ YouTube, “Brazil will no longer be a socialist country: Eduardo Bolsonaro.”

⁸⁷ Rick Noak, “The divide on Venezuela: Who’s supporting Maduro, and who’s following the U.S. lead in recognizing Guaidó,” *The Washington Post*, 28 January 2019, accessed 1 April 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2019/01/28/divide-venezuela-whos-supporting-maduro-whos-following-us-lead-recognizing-guaid/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.74490314604f.

region, so if there is a chance, Russia will keep up its efforts to strengthen the relationship.

The classification of consequences as Minor was selected because it is considered that, even with the development of closer diplomatic relations among the countries, it will be necessary the extension of this relationship for a considerable period until the development of mutual trust. In this way, the consequences will be of lesser effect, mainly because of the history of relations between U.S. and Brazil that even during the left-orientation governments did not present tensions that compromised the solidity of the relationship.

It is concluded that the diplomatic influence of Russia poses a moderate risk to the U.S. interest in advance of American influence in Brazil.

Informational Influence of Russia and the Consequences for U.S. Interests as Related to Brazil

The following analysis will answer the secondary research question “Does the informational influence of Russia pose consequences for U.S. national interests as related to Brazil?”

The main informational influence of Russia, which most affects Brazil and the interest of the US, is concerning the support to the Maduro’s regime in Venezuela. This support not only interferes in the information field, with the help of Russian intelligence to Maduro, but also has a potential consequence in the diplomatic and military area.⁸⁸

⁸⁸ Blank, “Russia in Latin America: Geopolitical games in the US’s neighborhood,” 18; Fleischman, *Latin America in the Post-Chavez Era: The Security Threat to the United States*; Miles, “Virtual Russian Influence in Latin America.”

Besides, as identified in the U.S. National Security Strategy, Russia develops informational operations to destabilize democracies in Latin America and influence the international public opinion. Besides that, Russia projects its capabilities in a region of evident influence of the U.S.⁸⁹

This type of influence was observed in other countries of Latin America, as well as in Brazil in the electoral period in 2018,⁹⁰ which demonstrates the Russian intention to apply this tool in the country, and that will be done in any window of opportunity that appears. Also, this threat is enhanced by the ability of Russia's cyber warfare using social media, which makes it difficult to neutralize the threat.

It is also worth noting that informational influence is a preferential option for Russia, because of the low cost and significant results.⁹¹ It may be considered that there is a consensus among the authors, such as Ellis, Fleischman, and Blank, that the primary objective of this action is to present a threat to the strategic position of the U.S. in the region.⁹²

In this way, the risk presented by the informational influence of Russia is classified as very likely, and consequences as moderate.

⁸⁹ Trump, *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, 14, 26, 35.

⁹⁰ Miles, "Virtual Russian Influence in Latin America."

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² Mora, Ellis, and Bjorge, "Cultural and 'Soft Power' Influences of China and Russia in the Americas,"; Fleischman, *Latin America in the Post-Chavez Era: The Security Threat to the United States*; Blank, "Russia in Latin America: Geopolitical games in the US's neighborhood," 22, 23.

The very likely classification was selected considering that Russia took every opportunity to use its tools of information influence to destabilize the region. It is noteworthy that this instability in the area also destabilizes and promotes consequences in Brazil, as currently observed with the situation in Venezuela.

The classification of consequences as moderate was selected by considering that, the effects of informational influence will potentially bring implications for other fields, such as the diplomatic, political and even the military. In this way, there is a potential destabilization of Brazil that threatens the interests of the U.S. in the country, which nowadays scale their efforts by considering the region as stable.

It is concluded that the informational influence of Russia poses a significant risk to the U.S. interests in the preservation of peace.

Military Influence of Russia and the Consequences for U.S. Interests as Related to Brazil

The following analysis will answer the secondary research question “Does the military influence of Russia pose consequences for U.S. national interests as related to Brazil?”

According to Ionescu, Russia and Brazil do not have a traditional military partnership, but the geographic distance and lack of conflict of interest would be beneficial for that relationship and would create an opportunity for the development of exchanges.⁹³

⁹³ Ionescu, “Brazil_Russia Military-Technical Cooperation A fruit of the Post-Cold War World Order.”

This assertion was confirmed when considering the period between 2002 and the middle of 2016. In 2002, the Presidents of the two countries signed a memorandum of military technology cooperation. There was little practical application of this memorandum, but it may be considered that he favored the collaboration of the investigation of the causes of the accident in the Alcântara Launch Base, in Brazil. It is also worth noting that from 2003 Russian companies started using this base for their activities.⁹⁴

Subsequently, in 2006, the space mission of the only Brazilian astronaut, Marcos Pontes, took place with Russian support. It should be noted that all preparation and initial agreement for the mission was conducted between AEB and NASA.⁹⁵ Because of political issues and problems of the Brazilian administration of the agreement, the mission was only possible with the Russian aid.⁹⁶ It is worth noting that Russia does not miss the opportunity to carry out military cooperation with Brazil, as has already been observed in diplomatic and informational matters.

Besides that, the most relevant military cooperation between both countries was the purchase of twelve MI-35 helicopters. That is the only Russian-origin equipment in the Brazilian Defense White Paper list. In addition to this equipment, there is only the

⁹⁴ Dall’Agnol, Zabolotsky, and Mielniczuk, “The Return of the Bear? Russian Military Engagement in Latin America: The Case of Brazil.”

⁹⁵ Ionescu, “Brazil_Russia Military-Technical Cooperation A fruit of the Post-Cold War World Order.”

⁹⁶ Marcos Pontes Astronauta do Brasil, “Vida e Realizações,” December 2013, accessed 28 March 2019, [http://www.marcospontes.com/\\$SETOR/MCP/VIDA/biografia.html](http://www.marcospontes.com/$SETOR/MCP/VIDA/biografia.html).

presence of the Igla-S portable air defense system.⁹⁷ Again, it is observed that there is a little Russian influence in the military sector.

In this context, it is understood that the Russian military influence exerted by the sale of arms tends to decrease further during the period of right-wing government in Brazil.⁹⁸ This reduction was still due to the positioning on different sides of the situation in Venezuela.

The Russian diplomatic and military support to the Maduro's regime, in Venezuela, is a point of tension existing in the Russian-Brazilian relationship, with consequences for the U.S. interest. Russia provided the main military equipment of Venezuela and showed evident attention to destabilize the region. The enhancement of military exercises is another worrying factor, since it makes possible the positioning of Russian strategic armaments, such as the TU-60 bombers, in the proximity of Brazilian borders and the U.S. backyards.⁹⁹ Thus, the risk presented by the military influence of Russia is classified as very likely, and consequences as major.

The very likely classification was selected because it was considered that in the same way that is done in regards to other instruments of national power, Russia took every opportunity to use its tools of military influence to destabilize the region. It was observed with Brazil and is ongoing with Venezuela.

⁹⁷ Ionescu, "Brazil Russia Military-Technical Cooperation A fruit of the Post-Cold War World Order,"; Brazilian Ministry of Defense, *Defense White Paper*.

⁹⁸ Miles, "Virtual Russian Influence in Latin America."

⁹⁹ BBC News Brasil, "ONU diz que Crise Migratória na Venezuela já Está Quase no Nível de Fluxo de Refugiados no Mediterrâneo," 25 August 2018, accessed 13 December 2018, <https://www.bbc.com/portuguese/internacional-45307311>.

The classification of consequences as major was selected because the military support to Venezuela is one of the main obstacles for the problem solution. That military support can evolve into the occurrence of an armed conflict in the region, with unforeseen and catastrophic consequences.

It is concluded that the military influence of Russia poses a high risk to the U.S. interests in the protection of the U.S. territory, the U.S. citizen security, and preservation of peace.

Economic Influence of Russia and the Consequences for U.S. Interests as related to Brazil

The following analysis will answer the secondary research question “Does the economic influence of Russia pose consequences for U.S. national interests as related to Brazil?”

Russia’s economic relationship with Brazil is not very well developed. While considering the entire trade between both countries, it represents just two percent of Russia’s total and 1.3 percent of Brazil’s total.¹⁰⁰ That profile also confirmed that BRICS, as an economic bloc has not significant result, at least from Russia’s perspective, even after ten years of existence.

The main product that Russia imports from Brazil is frozen bovine meat. Russia is the leading Brazilian partner for that, but, even with that, the total trade between the

¹⁰⁰ Miles, “Virtual Russian Influence in Latin America,” The Observatory of Economic Complexity, “What does Brazil import from Russia? (2016),” accessed 13 December 2018, https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/import/bra/rus/show/2016/; The Observatory of Economic Complexity, “What does Brazil export to Russia? (2016),” accessed 13 December 2018, https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/export/bra/rus/show/2016/.

countries has low significance.¹⁰¹ The Russian weak participation on the top five products exported from Brazil reinforces that low profile of Russia-Brazil trade.¹⁰² The same consideration can be done regarding the Russian investment in Brazil, it is less than one percent of Russian global investment, and from the Brazilian perspective, even Russia is not mentioned on the official report related to foreign investment.¹⁰³ Therefore, the risk presented by the economic influence of Russia is classified as highly unlikely, and consequences as minor.

The highly unlikely classification was selected due to its small participation in Brazil's trade. That is known that Brazil is Russia's primary partner in Latin America, but it does not mean that this trade is relevant for Brazilians economy. The economic relationship between the countries does not include any contribution pertinent to both economies.

The classification of consequences as minor is directly related to the low relevance of the total trade. Add to this the fact that Russia does not establish any competition with the products that Brazil negotiates with the U.S. Therefore, Russian economic interference in Brazil does not present any potential threat to US interests.

¹⁰¹ Ionescu, "Brazil_Russia Military-Technical Cooperation A fruit of the Post-Cold War World Order,"; The Observatory of Economic Complexity, "What does Russia Import from Brazil? (2008)," accessed 15 January 2019, https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/import/rus/bra/show/2008/.

¹⁰² The Observatory of Economic Complexity, "Where does Brazil export to? (2017)," accessed 26 March 2019, https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/export/bra/show/all/2017/; The Observatory of Economic Complexity, "Where does Brazil import from? (2017)," accessed 26 March 2019, https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/import/bra/show/all/2017/.

¹⁰³ Brazilian Central Bank, *Direct Investment Report 2018*.

With that, it is concluded that the economic influence of Russia poses a low risk to the U.S. interests of the promotion of American prosperity.

Influence of Russia and the Consequences for U.S. Interests as Related to Brazil

Considering the literature review and the answers to the secondary questions, represented in figure 2 below, it becomes possible to present the following analysis that will answer the primary research question “Given the growing influence of Russia in Brazil, what are the potential consequences for U.S. national interests as related to Brazil?”

Instrument of National Power	Probability	Consequences	Risk Analysis
Diplomatic	Probable	Minor	Moderate Risk
Informational	Very Likely	Moderate	Significant Risk
Military	Very Likely	Major	High Risk
Economic	Highly Unlikely	Minor	Low Risk

Figure 2. Risk Analysis of Russian Influence

Source: Developed by author.

The influence of Russia in Brazil shows, nowadays, a greater tendency to create tension points than to present itself as a competitor with the North American influence in the country. Brazil-Russia diplomatic relations are well established, and there is scope for potential bilateral agreements. The participation of the countries in the BRICS is an

opportunity to develop a common agenda. In the last years, when parties of ideological orientation of left-wing governed Brazil, there was an intensification in the relations, confining this potential. However, with the inauguration of the Bolsonaro government, this positive scenario for Russia has changed, the new President of Brazil has already expressed his intention to prioritize the relationship with the U.S. in detriment of the then-existing South-South policy. Add to this the existing problem concerning the situation in Venezuela. Brazil and Russia have adopted completely opposing positions; thus, in the face of gravity and Venezuelan instability, this issue may, soon, reduce the rapprochement between Russia and Brazil.

The Russian informational influence in Brazil did not show any indication that it had the objective of bringing the two countries together. On the contrary, the application of cybernetic tools and Russian information operations are precisely aimed at discrediting the democracies of Latin America. In this way, it is again clear that Russia's primary objective is to destabilize Latin America, thereby affecting U.S. interests in Brazil and the region.

The Russian military influence in Brazil is another component that currently favors the Brazil – U.S. approach. However, Russian influence affects the interests of both Brazilians and North Americans. This assertion is supported by the fact that the most evident influence is related to Russia's support for the Maduro regime in Venezuela. The provision of equipment and the conduct of military exercises in Venezuela promotes the imbalance of power and destabilizes the region. Notably, this is the Russian intention. Apart from this, the approximation between Russia and Brazil, in the military field, is very small. Thus, Russian military influence is another factor that facilitates the

proximity of the United States and Brazil, but it affects the North American interests related to the country, given the potential threat that Venezuela imposes on the regional instability of Latin America.

The economic influence, at its end, is the one that has less capacity to influence U.S. interests. Even with Brazil being the main Russian trading partner in Latin America, marketed values, as well as major products, do not affect U.S. trading relationships in the region.

Thus, the main consequence of the Russian influence in Brazil on U.S. interests is to demand a greater involvement of the country on issues related to the stability of the region, especially the situation in Venezuela, to defend democracies and maintain an environment conducive to the development of Brazil and the region.

Brazil – China

Diplomatic Influence of China and the Consequences for U.S. Interests as Related to Brazil

The following analysis will answer the secondary research question “Does the diplomatic influence of China pose consequences for U.S. national interests as related to Brazil?”

The Chinese diplomatic influence in Brazil demonstrates efficient coordination of instruments of national power to increase the relevance of the Brazilian-Chinese relationship.

China’s government urged an effort to deepen diplomatic relations with Brazil from the beginning of the 2000s. This effort involved an increase in the number of high-

level visits and even the publication of a critical document to signaling the importance of the region for China, China's Policy Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean.¹⁰⁴

This document can be considered relevant at the moment in which it explicitly states the intentions of the country. China also noted its central positions on controversial matters, with emphasis on the Taiwan issue. At this point, there is a clear message that relations with China would be conditioned to the non-diplomatic recognition of that region. This constraint is an argument that puts pressure on developing or underdeveloped countries to maintain their position in favor of China, as a means of guaranteeing access to the market and investments of that country, of great relevance in the international scenario.¹⁰⁵

It can also be mentioned that the intensification of the Brazilian-Chinese diplomatic relationship coincided with the period in which the Brazilian government prioritized the South-South relationship in foreign policy.¹⁰⁶ In this context, China has presented itself as an essential partner, allowing to increase Brazil's influence in international multilateral arenas. This relationship served to attract investments to Brazil and increased Chinese participation in the Brazilian economy, at the same time as it

¹⁰⁴ Piccone, "The Geopolitics of China's Rise in Latin America," and Government of China, *China's Policy Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean*.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ Pereira and Neves, "Brazil and China: South-South Partnership or North-South Competition?"

gained Chinese access to commodities and energy resources, which, in summary, represent the Chinese win-win approach.¹⁰⁷

The beginning of the Bolsonaro government in Brazil, in 2019, created a new dynamic in this relationship, and it is not yet possible to define the real consequences for the diplomatic relations between the countries.¹⁰⁸ It is certain that China is prioritizing the intensification of the diplomatic influence and associates this focus with the economic component of that country, which makes China a desirable alternative. In this way, China has been efficient in entering the region, in clear opposition to the influence and interest of the U.S.

In this context, the risk presented by the diplomatic influence of China is classified as probable, and consequences as major.

The probable classification was selected because it is observed a constant effort to strengthen the diplomatic relationship. It is also evident that the association of that diplomatic effort has the support of the Chinese economic power so that it allows a significant influence on some questions, such as the recognition of Taiwan, that guarantee potential advantage in favor of China. Besides that, the Chinese influence in Brazil, and other countries of Latin America creates competition with the U.S. influence.

¹⁰⁷ Government of China, *China's Policy Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean*.

¹⁰⁸ Luciano Costa, "Bolsonaro Deixa Empresários Chineses em Compasso de Espera com Declarações," *Exame*, 5 November 2018, accessed 6 December 2018, <https://exame.abril.com.br/economia/bolsonaro-deixa-empresarios-chineses-em-compasso-de-espera-com-declaracoes/>; Extra, "Bolsonaro Diz que Comércio com China Poderá ser Ampliado em seu Governo," 5 November 2018, accessed 6 December 2018, <https://extra.globo.com/noticias/brasil/bolsonaro-diz-que-comercio-com-china-podera-ser-ampliado-em-seu-governo-23212557.html>.

The classification of consequences as major considers that the diplomatic influence is allowing a greater penetrability of the other instruments of national power. And that effort will reduce the U.S. influence in Brazil, as well as in the America Latina as a whole.

Thus, it is concluded that the diplomatic influence of China poses a significant risk to the U.S. interests in advance of American influence, also affecting the interest of the promotion of American prosperity.

Informational Influence of China and the Consequences for U.S. Interests as Related to Brazil

The following analysis will answer the secondary research question “Does the informational influence of China pose consequences for U.S. national interests as related to Brazil?”

China is very effective in its informational influence over western countries. The central idea of that influence is related to the perception that China constitutes opportunities for business. Because of these opportunities, several people around the world are looking for the study of the Chinese language and culture, to understand better how they can present themselves as an exciting competitor or those business chances.¹⁰⁹

In that context, China uses the Confucius Institute as the most essential and efficient Chinese informational influence tool. The Confucius Institute contribute for the creation of a positive perception of China, as well as carry out propaganda to promote come Chinese government agenda, such as Taiwan’s situation. Institute activities also

¹⁰⁹ Ellis, “Chinese Soft Power in Latin America: A Case Study.”

support the Chinese ideology and threaten the American values and the American way of life.¹¹⁰

In Brazil, it is observed the presence of the Confucius Institute in eleven educational institutions, in nine different states,¹¹¹ as presented in Appendix C. Those are the main Brazilian Universities. Apart from that, the Chinese language is taught in some public high schools in the State of São Paulo, the most economically developed in Brazil.¹¹² That indicates the success of the Chinese influence.

Another Chinese informational influence in Brazil is observed in the CBERS program. That Satellite program helped Brazil to develop this capacity in the country, and also guaranteed China access to Brazilian tracking facilities that cover the western hemisphere.¹¹³ So, the risk presented by the informational influence of China is classified as probable, and consequences as major.

¹¹⁰ Mora, Ellis, and Bjorge, “Cultural and ‘Soft Power’ Influences of China and Russia in the Americas,”; Universidade de Pernambuco, “Instituto Confucio,” 2018, accessed 31 March 2019, <http://www.upe.br/instituto-confucio>.

¹¹¹ China Vistos, “Instituto Confucio: o Caminho Para o Melhor Intercambio,” 2019, accessed 31 March 2019, <https://chinavistos.com.br/instituto-confucio/>.

¹¹² Ministério da Educação, “Japonês e mandarim estão entre as opções para alunos paulistas,” 23 June 2015, accessed 31 March 2019, <http://portal.mec.gov.br/busca-geral/222-noticias/537011943/21416-japones-e-mandarim-estao-entre-as-opcoes-para-alunos-paulistas>.

¹¹³ José Romildo and Ana Cristina Campos, “Brazil, China celebrate 30-year-old satellite cooperation,” Empresa Brasil de Comunicação, 29 August 2018, accessed 12 December 2018, <http://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/en/internacional/noticia/2018-08/brazil-china-celebrate-30-year-old-satellite-cooperation>; Brazilian Ministry of Defense, *Defense White Paper*; Ellis, “U.S. National Security Implications of Chinese Involvement in Latin America,” 11.

The probable classification was selected because, besides the constant presence and influence over the populace, it remains restricted with the focus in business opportunities. That shows that the public that suffers this influence is not so broad as to change the behavior of the population as a whole in a meaningful way. However, it should be noted that, when evaluated for the long-term, the initiatives tend to increase with the initial success of the first ventures. A similar assessment can be made with the influence on technological development. China presented itself as an interesting alternative, and that helped positively in the solution of one knowledge gap, the satellite development, favoring that the model is repeated in other areas.

The classification of consequences as major is justified by the ability to influence a portion of relevance in the Brazilian society, which includes politicians, entrepreneurs, and university students. Notably, this portion will occupy positions of leadership in society, which may influence the development of policies, enterprises, and even scientific works of relevance in the national and international scenario, favoring the enhancement of China and reducing the U.S. influence.

Therefore, it is concluded that the informational influence of China poses a significant risk to the U.S. interests in advance of American influence.

Military Influence of China and the Consequences for U.S. Interests as Related to Brazil

The following analysis will answer the secondary research question “Does the military influence of China pose consequences for U.S. national interests as related to Brazil?”

China's military influence in Brazil is not very evident as observed in the other instruments of national power.

The Brazil-China military exchange is summarized in the participation in courses and internships.¹¹⁴ The growing participation in these activities, observed in recent years, may increase the Chinese influence in the Brazilian doctrine, it is emphasized that, in opposition, the exchanges of this nature with the U.S. are much more significant and consolidated.

The Chinese participation in MINUSTAH for six years was an excellent opportunity to develop bonds of trust, although the partnership only occurred because it was a United Nations mission, not a bilateral understanding.¹¹⁵

Another Chinese influence is observed in the partnership between Brazil and China in the manufacture of aircraft.¹¹⁶ Although of relevance, this partnership tends to

¹¹⁴ Brazilian Ministry of Defense, *Defense White Paper*, Brazilian Army, *Informex no. 14*; Brazilian Army, *Informex no. 24*.

¹¹⁵ Ellis, "China-Latin America Military Engagement: Good Will, Good Business, and Strategic Position," Instituto Igarapé, and Centro Conjunto de Operações de Paz do Brasil, *A Participação do Brasil na MINUSTAH (2004-2017): Percepções, Lições e Práticas Relevantes para Futuras Missões* (Rio de Janeiro, RJ: Instituto Igarapé, 2018), accessed 1 April 2019, <https://igarape.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/2018-03-06-AE-MINUSTAH-PT.pdf>.

¹¹⁶ Ellis, "China-Latin America Military Engagement: Good Will, Good Business, and Strategic Position,"; Kyunghee Park and Fabiola Moura, "Embraer cogita abrir fábrica de aviões comerciais na China," *Bloomerg*, 11 September 2017, accessed 1 April 2019, <https://www.bloomberg.com.br/blog/embraer-cogita-abrir-fabrica-de-avioes-comerciais-na-china/>.

have its influence reduced, at the moment in which the partnership EMBRAER - BOEING is in the phase of consolidation.¹¹⁷

In this context, the risk presented by the military influence of China is classified improbable, and consequences as minor.

The improbable classification was selected because China has not significant options and opportunities to exercise its influence. It is restricted to participation in military courses and not observed in military equipment. That is important to find that the military educational influence can achieve some goals in the future, but it does not consist of a relevant issue so far.

The classification of consequences as minor took into consideration the fact that, due to the lack of opportunities for influence in the military area, the possible implications for the U.S. interests are controllable. The reason for that is the great exchange between Brazil and the U.S., but it is remarkable that China will present the country as an alternative like it has been done in other areas.

With that said, it is concluded that the military influence of China poses a moderate risk to the U.S. interests in advance of American influence, also considering that although the military influence is very sensitive and sometimes not very easily identifiable, the well-developed bonds between Brazil and the U.S. mitigate the Chinese influence.

Economic Influence of China and the Consequences for

¹¹⁷ Ghim-Lay Yeo, "Embraer Partnership," Flight Global, 10 January 2019, accessed 15 March 2019, <https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/brazil-approves-boeing-and-embraer-partnership-454944/>.

U.S. Interests as Related to Brazil

The following analysis will answer the secondary research question “Does the economic influence of China pose consequences for U.S. national interests as related to Brazil?”

China is the largest Brazilian trading partner.¹¹⁸ The relevance of China to the Brazilian economy is undeniable.

The great prominence of Chinese influence on the Brazilian economy is broader than the actual numbers themselves. Some of the factors that stand out are related to how China purchases and its investments in the sector, and by adopting this profile, the Chinese facilitate the performance of the other instruments of national power.

Analyzing the agribusiness sector is possible to verify an example of how the dynamics of investments facilitate the Chinese influence in the country.¹¹⁹ It is noteworthy that soybeans are Brazil’s main export product, accounting for 12 percent of the country’s total exports, of which 79 percent are destined for China. The participation of China in Brazilian imports and exports is detailed in Appendix D. When the Chinese market is evaluated, Brazil is the largest supplier, accounting for 56 percent of the imports made by China, with the U.S. as the second largest supplier, with a total share of

¹¹⁸ Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “People’s Republic of China.”

¹¹⁹ Escher, Wilkinson, and Pereira, “Causas e Implicações dos Investimentos Chineses no Agonegocio Brasileiro.”

34 percent.¹²⁰ Thus, in addition to increasing its permeability in America, China promotes a direct competition between Brazil and the U.S. in the sector.

Chinese investment in agribusiness in Brazil aims to ensure the country's food security, and for this, promotes investments that cover the entire production chain, with emphasis on infrastructure gaps. It is initially observed that China makes use of the concept of win-win, this assertion is valid when considered that these investments facilitate the flow of the product, reduce costs and increase the competitiveness of Brazil as a producer country. However, evaluating the long term, this investment profile creates a Brazilian dependence of the Chinese companies.¹²¹ It should also be noted that the benefits of this investment have a great return to China when the cost reduction increases the Chinese profit margin and also provides greater control of the production chain by its companies.

One point that draws attention to and hampers the actual assessment of how the influence affects the Brazilian economy refers to the fact that Chinese investments are not fully identified. That is because investments are being made by intermediary countries, as defined by the Brazilian Central Bank. In this way, Chinese participation may be even higher than it is already proven.¹²²

¹²⁰ The Observatory of Economic Complexity, "Where does China Import Soybeans from? (2017)," accessed 26 March 2019, https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/import/chn/show/1201/2017/.

¹²¹ Escher, Wilkinson, and Pereira, "Causas e Implicações dos Investimentos Chineses no Agornegócio Brasileiro."

¹²² Brazilian Central Bank, *Direct Investment Report 2018*.

As discussed initially, economic influence facilitates the permeability of other instruments of national power. Considering that the economic return of Chinese investment is beneficial to the country, the willingness for those economic benefits will drive the political leaders to develop diplomatic and military ties, looking for mutual trust. Entrepreneurs, on the other hand, channel their production into serving the Chinese market, which, with the country's backing being the world's largest economy, becomes attractive and relatively safe. The combination of diplomatic agreements and economic chances motivate the students and the general population to seek opportunities; that system provokes a positive cycle of growth of relations, which configures the positive effect of informational influence. In this system, therefore, there is an opportunity for economic influence, at first, followed by the diplomatic, informational, and even military. It is also worth noting that, with this, China controls the sector, which may cause dependence on Brazil in relation to the Chinese companies, in addition to the fact that the commercialization of the product *in natura*, with low added value, hinders the development of the sector and increases the profit in favor of the Chinese. This same dynamic can also be observed in the energy sector.

Another example of how the growing Chinese economic influence in Brazil affects the U.S. is verified in the crude petroleum trade. Those crude petroleum data must be considered in its percentage of the total participation of each country in the total exported by Brazil. From that analysis it is clear that the Chinese obtained success when introduced themselves as an important commercial partner and effectively became the main destiny for the crude petroleum exported from Brazil, replacing the U.S. from that position. Once again, the economic approach described by Ellis in 2004 has been

proven.¹²³ In eight years (2008 – 2016), China became the primary destination for that product, establishing a direct dispute with the U.S. and achieving more than 40 percent in the participation of the Brazilian crude petroleum trade, as observed in Appendix E.

However, it can be considered that the economic influence is not yet resulting in geopolitical influence, as explained by Horta:

While China has gained an impressive economic presence in Brazil—and in the region—economic influence does not always translate into political and strategic dominance. The economic power of the United States remains the dominant force, and its century-old relationship with Brazil continues to have a strong appeal among the Brazilians. Arguably, China’s growing influence in the Americas, to an extent, is a result of previous U.S. administrations’ neglect of the region’s needs and it remains to be seen what effect would a more attentive U.S. administration will have in facing China’s growing influence in Latin America.¹²⁴

Therefore, the risk presented by the economic influence of the U.S. is classified as very likely, and consequences as major.

The very likely classification was selected due to its continued participation in Brazil’s trade. China is Brazil’s primary trading partner, the profile of this trade includes the main products exported by Brazil, with emphasis on soybeans and crude petroleum. Besides, the pattern of investment adopted by the Chinese indicates that there is a tendency for the growth of this relationship.

The classification of consequences as major is directly related to the fact that the increase of Chinese participation in the Brazilian economy is associated with direct

¹²³ Ellis, “U.S. National Security Implications of Chinese Involvement in Latin America,” 10, 11.

¹²⁴ Loro Horta, “Brazil-China Relation,” S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies working paper no. 287, 10 March 2015, accessed 05 April 2019, <https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/WP287.pdf>.

competition with the North American trade. That can be noticed in the case of soybeans and crude petroleum with more clarity. Also, economic influence favors a higher permeability of the influence of the national instruments of power, which also establishes a competition with the influence of the U.S.

With that, it is concluded that the economic influence of China poses a high risk to the U.S. interests of the promotion of American prosperity and in advance of American influence.

Influence of China and the Consequences for U.S. Interests as Related to Brazil

Making an allowance for the literature review and the answers to the secondary questions, represented in figure 3 below, the following analysis will answer the primary research question “Given the growing influence of China in Brazil, what are the potential consequences for U.S. national interests as related to Brazil?”

Instrument of National Power	Probability	Consequences	Risk Analysis
Diplomatic	Probable	Major	Significant Risk
Informational	Probable	Major	Significant Risk
Military	Improbable	Minor	Moderate Risk
Economic	Very Likely	Major	High Risk

Figure 3. Risk Analysis of Chinese Influence

Source: Developed by author.

The consequences of China's influence are more complex than the consequences posed by Russia. China has efficiently coordinated the instruments of national power to increase its influence in the region, establishing direct competition with the U.S. in some susceptible areas.

Economic influence is the primary vector of this network of influence. China has established a very consistent trade relationship with Brazil. This relationship, as explained in the course of the work, has created a cycle of opportunities that facilitate the permeability of the other instruments of national power. The economic issue, in itself, established a direct competition with the U.S. for the purchase of Brazil's crude petroleum, with advantage for the Chinese. Regarding the soybean market, Chinese investments in Brazil's production chain may affect the sale of this product from the U.S. to China. That may be because Chinese companies are controlling several sectors of the production chain, mainly the infrastructure network, with the possibility of increasing profit margins, which would reduce the purchase of North American production, which could negatively impact the sector in the U.S.

The growing economic influence still favors diplomatic rapprochement. Political leadership identifies the possibility of Chinese investment and thereby facilitates and encourages bilateral agreements. Even on the diplomatic influence, it is essential to emphasize the meaning of the Policy paper for the Caribbean. This document formalizes Chinese interest in the region, which is often left in the background in international relations. Thus, the combination of economic influence and diplomatic effort directly affects U.S. interests because it reduces U.S. participation and importance in a region where there has always been under American hegemonic influence.

Add to this the Chinese informational influence. The primary tool that exerts this influence is the Confucius Institutes, scattered throughout Brazil. Although with little expressive results, some indicators point to the success of this initiative. The first of these is the national reach of these institutes, that is, China facilitates access to Chinese language teaching, and the indirect contact with Chinese culture in the main Brazilian states. Knowledge of the language provides access to the labor market, which has the growing participation of Chinese companies, and thus, the cycle results in an increasing trend of this influence. Another indicator is the inclusion of Chinese language teaching in high schools in the state of São Paulo. The dynamics are the same as previously described. However, the target audience is different, which diversifies the performance and increases the possibility of success of the initiative. Thus, there is another point in which direct competition is established with the North American influence, again emphasizing that still with little expressiveness, but with great potential to affect U.S. interests in the future.

The Chinese military influence, however, still does not count with great articulacy. However, the growing participation of Brazilian military personnel in courses in China also makes it possible to see in the future some modifications, mainly in doctrinal aspects, that reduce the influence of the U.S. in this sector.

Therefore, the consequences of the growing Chinese influence in Brazil presents major challenges to the U.S. to contain and reverse the reduction of its influence in Brazil. Unlike Russia, China presents itself as a competitor in the Brazil-U.S. relationship, and the Chinese are making significant progress and with great potential for growth in the future.

Chapter Conclusion

This chapter presented the U.S. DIME influence and interests related to Brazil, and described the analysis of each instrument of national power (DIME) of Russia and China and its consequences for the U.S. interests related to Brazil.

After applying the evaluation described in Chapter 2, the influence of the Russian DIME was classified as offering a moderate, significant, high and low risk, respectively, for the interests of the U.S. related to Brazil. The Chinese DIME, in turn, was classified as a significant risk, for diplomatic and informational influence; moderate risk for military influence, and high risk for economic influence.

With that, it can be recalled that Russia presents itself as a source of tension in the region, with possible consequences for the interests of the U.S. that, therefore, may have to dedicate efforts to maintain the stability. As for China, it was possible to identify that the country represents a potential adversary of the U.S. in the region, trying to reduce the North American influence, using mainly its economic power.

The following chapter will conclude the thesis summarizing the role of each national power instrument in Brazil-US relations, and proposing some recommendations for future researches.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusion

Besides the analysis provided, the strength of U.S. influence in Brazil cannot be disregarded. As detailed in Chapter 4, Brazil and the U.S. share a very well-established relationship, that occurs with all instruments of national power.

In the diplomatic field, the history of bilateral relations has always pointed to positive results. Even in the most troubled periods of Brazilian domestic politics, there was no compromise of this relationship. There were periods of lesser or greater withdrawal; however, the historical ties of friendship and cooperation between countries were always present.

In the information field, it is still possible to note the preponderance of the North American influence on Brazil. That is observed both in language teaching at all levels of education in the country, and in the similarity of cultural values. It can be said that the societies of both countries have the same ideals of freedom and democracy, and there is a significant similarity between the Brazilian and the American way of life, which significantly facilitates the relationship between countries.

In the military field, similarly, historical ties between countries provided a great permeability of U.S. doctrinal precepts in Brazilian doctrine. The same success is observed in the number of equipment of North American origin in the Brazilian Armed Forces. Of equal importance, it is necessary to emphasize the enormous scope of the IMET in the educational formation of the Brazilian military. The significant participation of Brazilian military personnel in the courses and activities with the U.S. Armed Forces

will facilitate the development of interoperability between the two countries. That outstanding relationship since World War II has excellent potential to keep up with the current exceptional standards, or even to intensify. Concerning the Russian influence in Venezuela, currently with a diplomatic approach but with possible progress in the military field, it is emphasized that the political environment in Latin America favors the development of an effort, bringing together mainly Brazil, U.S., and Colombia, to solve the crisis with the least side effects to regional stability.

In the economic field, however, the most significant challenges for maintaining success in defense of U.S. interests are present. The participation of the Chinese economy constitutes a major adversary for the interests of the U.S. in Brazil. Even with the success story, the North American influence is in a downward trend, and the Chinese the opposite. However, the Brazilian search for diversification in trade relations can be an exciting opportunity for the U.S. to reverse this trend.

In general, historical ties, cultural similarities and the sharing of similar values are the basis for the maintenance of Brazil-U.S. relations, with opportunities to serve the interests of both countries, favoring the maintenance of peace and democracy in the American continent.

Recommendations

At this moment, after analyzing the data presented in this thesis, it should be pointed out that the reduction of U.S. influence in Brazil and Latin America was intensified during periods when the U.S. priority was focused mainly on the Middle East, Europe, and Asia. In these opportunities, Russia and China have positioned themselves as

an option for western countries, with some achievements in American backyard that may in the future make it difficult to serve U.S. interests.

The study also pointed to some issues that will be presented as suggestions for future research; they are:

1. What is the possibility that the profile of Chinese investment in the agricultural sector replicates in other sectors of the economy? What are the impacts of this in the commercial relations Brazil-U.S.?

2. What is the future of BRICS with the current tension in Venezuela and the distinct positioning between Brazil and Russia?

3. What impact will the agreement on the use of the Alcântara Launch Base by the U.S. have in the development of partnerships in the aerospace sector?

4. What are the consequences of an internal conflict in Venezuela for Latin America and the U.S.?

5. What are the implications of international military intervention in Venezuela for Latin America and the U.S.?

6. What are the alternatives for reducing the Chinese information influence (Soft Power) in Brazil?

7. The return of left-wing ideologically oriented governments in Latin America can affect the influence of the U.S. in the region?

Thus, the present thesis sought to identify the consequences of the growing influence of Russia and China in Brazil on the interests of the U.S. related to the country.

The work carried out a literature review, identifying the influence of U.S. DIME and U.S. interests related to Brazil. Later the influence of Russian and Chinese DIME

was presented. Then, in the analysis, the secondary questions were answered and defined the degree of risk that each one of these instruments of national power present to the U.S. interests. Following that, the primary question was answered, and later suggestions were presented for future research.

In conclusion, one can affirm that the influence of Russia and China in Brazil present entirely different profiles. Russia exerts an influence that aims at destabilizing the region to demand a U.S. effort to stabilize the area that was previously under its hegemonic influence. China, in turn, exerts its influence to increase its permeability in Brazil and is, therefore, a direct competitor to U.S. interests. In both cases, it is clear that to mitigate risks and avoid adverse consequences to their interests, the U.S. should establish the priority it deems sufficient to maintain its influence in both Brazil and Latin America. In their favor, the U.S. can count on the mutual trust between Brazil and the U.S., developed in the long years of our history, and with the certainty that our peoples share the same ideal of freedom and democracy, seeking to defend a prosperous environment, as well as maintain and defend World peace.

APPENDIX A

BRAZILIAN MILITARY EQUIPMENT WITH U.S. ORIGIN

Table 2. Total of Brazilian Military Equipment with U.S.-Origin				
		Type	Number of equipment with U.S. origin	Total number of different equipment
Navy	Fleet naval resources	Landing Ship G-28 Mattoso Maia	01	16
	Fleet's Naval Aviation resources	Fight Aircraft AF-1/AF-1A Skyhawk	04	08
		Anti-submarine helicopter SH-3A/B Sea King		
		Training Helicopter IH-6B Bell Jet Ranger		
		General Purpose Helicopter MH-16 Sea Hawk		
	District's Naval resources	Patrol Boat Class Piratini	01	25
	Marine Corps' Resources	Armored Personnel Carrier M-113	04	12
		Assault Amphibious Vehicle AAV-7A1/LVTP-7		
		Artillery M-114 (155 mm)		
		Mortar 81mm		
Army	Armored Vehicle M60 Patton A3 TTS	08	22	
	Armored Vehicle M-41B/C			
	Armored Personnel Carrier M-113			
	Artillery M 108 105mm			
	Artillery M 109 155mm			
	Artillery M 114 155mm			

		Artillery M 101 105mm		
		Helicopter Black-Hawk		
Air Force		Air transport, in-flight refueling and search & rescue aircraft C-130 Hercules	08	29
		Transport aircraft C-98/A Caravan		
		Multirole fighter aircraft F-5 EM/FM Tiger II		
		Transport and search & rescue helicopter H-1H		
		Transport and search & rescue helicopter H-60 Black Hawk		
		Transport and in-flight refueling aircraft KC-137 Boeing 707		
		Maritime patrol aircraft P-3 AM		
		Transport and reconnaissance aircraft VU/R-35 Learjet 35		
		Presidential airplane VC-1 Airbus A 320		
	Total	Navy		
Army		--	08 (36%)	22
Air Force		--	08 (27%)	29
Armed Forces		--	26 (23%)	112

Source: Created by author using data from Brazilian Ministry of Defense, *Defense White Paper*, Brasília, DF, 2012, accessed 12 December 2018, https://www.defesa.gov.br/arquivos/estado_e_defesa/livro_branco/lbdn_2013_ing_net.pdf.

APPENDIX B

PARTICIPATION OF THE U.S. IN BRAZILIAN EXPORTS AND IMPORTS

Table 3. Participation of the U.S. in Brazilian Exports – Top 5 Brazilian Exported Products (2017)		
Product ¹²⁵	Participation of the product in the total exported ¹²⁶	Participation of the U.S. as the destiny of the product exported
Soybeans	12 %	0 % ¹²⁷
Iron Ore	9.2 %	1.5 % ¹²⁸
Crude Petroleum	7.9 %	17 % ¹²⁹
Raw sugar	5.2 %	1.5% ¹³⁰
Cars	3.1 %	2.4% ¹³¹

Source: Created by author.

¹²⁵ The Observatory of Economic Complexity, “What does Brazil Export? (2017),” accessed 26 March 2018, https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/export/bra/all/show/2017/.

¹²⁶ Ibid.

¹²⁷ The Observatory of Economic Complexity, “Where does Brazil Export Soybeans to? (2017),” accessed 26 March 2018, https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/export/bra/show/1201/%202017/.

¹²⁸ The Observatory of Economic Complexity, “Where does Brazil Export Iron Ore to? (2017),” accessed 26 March 2018, https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/export/bra/show/2601/2017/.

¹²⁹ The Observatory of Economic Complexity, “Where does Brazil Export Crude Petroleum to? (2017),” accessed 26 March 2018, https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/export/bra/show/2709/2017/.

¹³⁰ The Observatory of Economic Complexity, “Where does Brazil Export Raw Sugar to? (2017),” accessed 26 March 2018, https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/export/bra/show/1701/2017/.

¹³¹ The Observatory of Economic Complexity, “Where does Brazil Export Cars to? (2017),” accessed 26 March 2018, https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/export/bra/show/8703/2017/.

Table 4. Participation of the U.S. in Brazilian Imports – Top 5 Brazilian Imported Products (2017)		
Product ¹³²	Participation of the product in the total exported ¹³³	Participation of the U.S. as the origin of the product imported
Refined Petroleum	8.1 %	51 % ¹³⁴
Vehicle Parts	3.6 %	0 % ¹³⁵
Packaged Medicaments	2.2 %	23 % ¹³⁶
Integrated circuits	2.2 %	0 % ¹³⁷
Cars	2.1 %	1.9 % ¹³⁸

Source: Created by author.

¹³² The Observatory of Economic Complexity, “What does Brazil Import? (2017),” accessed 26 March 2018, https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/import/bra/all/show/2017/.

¹³³ Ibid.

¹³⁴ The Observatory of Economic Complexity, “Where does Brazil Import Refined Petroleum from? (2017),” accessed 26 March 2018, https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/import/bra/show/2710/2017/.

¹³⁵ The Observatory of Economic Complexity, “Where does Brazil Import Vehicle Parts from? (2017),” accessed 26 March 2018, https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/import/bra/show/8708/2017/.

¹³⁶ The Observatory of Economic Complexity, “Where does Brazil Import Package Medicaments from? (2017),” accessed 26 March 2018, https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/import/bra/show/3004/2017/.

¹³⁷ The Observatory of Economic Complexity, “Where does Brazil Import Integrated Circuits from? (2017),” accessed 26 March 2018, https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/import/bra/show/8542/2017/.

¹³⁸ The Observatory of Economic Complexity, “Where does Brazil Import Cars from? (2017),” accessed 26 March 2018, https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/import/bra/show/8703/2017/.

APPENDIX C

CONFUCIUS INSTITUTE LOCATIONS IN BRAZIL

Table 5. Confucius Institute Locations in Brazil	
State	Educational Institution
Ceará	Federal University of Ceara
Distrito Federal	University of Brasilia
Maranhão	Federal University of Maranhão
Minas Gerais	Federal University of Minas Gerais
Pará	University of the State of Pará
Pernambuco	University of Pernambuco
Rio Grande do Sul	Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul
Rio de Janeiro	Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro
São Paulo	Paulista State University Campinas State University Armando Alvares Penteado Foundation

Source: Created by author using data from China Vistos, “Instituto Confucio: o Caminho Para o Melhor Intercambio,” 2019, accessed 31 March 2019m <https://chinavistos.com.br/instituto-confucio>

APPENDIX D

PARTICIPATION OF CHINA IN BRAZILIAN EXPORTS AND IMPORTS

Table 6. Participation of China in Brazilian Exports – Top 5 Brazilian Exported Products (2017)		
Product ¹³⁹	Participation of the product in the total exported ¹⁴⁰	Participation of China as the destiny of the product exported
Soybeans	12 %	79 % ¹⁴¹
Iron Ore	9.2 %	53 % ¹⁴²
Crude Petroleum	7.9 %	43 % ¹⁴³
Raw sugar	5.2 %	1.3 % ¹⁴⁴
Cars	3.1 %	0 % ¹⁴⁵

Source: Created by author.

¹³⁹ The Observatory of Economic Complexity, “What does Brazil Export? (2017).”

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.

¹⁴¹ The Observatory of Economic Complexity, “Where does Brazil Export Soybeans to? (2017).”

¹⁴² The Observatory of Economic Complexity, “Where does Brazil Export Iron Ore to? (2017).”

¹⁴³ The Observatory of Economic Complexity, “Where does Brazil Export Crude Petroleum to? (2017).”

¹⁴⁴ The Observatory of Economic Complexity, “Where does Brazil Export Raw Sugar to? (2017).”

¹⁴⁵ The Observatory of Economic Complexity, “Where does Brazil Export Cars to? (2017).”

Table 7. Participation of China in Brazilian Imports – Top 5 Brazilian Imported Products (2017)		
Product ¹⁴⁶	Participation of the product in the total exported ¹⁴⁷	Participation of China as the origin of the product imported
Refined Petroleum	8.1 %	0.12 % ¹⁴⁸
Vehicle Parts	3.6 %	11 % ¹⁴⁹
Packaged Medicaments	2.2 %	0.2 % ¹⁵⁰
Integrated circuits	2.2 %	25 % ¹⁵¹
Cars	2.1 %	0.84 % ¹⁵²

Source: Created by author.

¹⁴⁶ The Observatory of Economic Complexity, “What does Brazil Import? (2017).”

¹⁴⁷ Ibid.

¹⁴⁸ The Observatory of Economic Complexity, “Where does Brazil Import Refined Petroleum from? (2017).”

¹⁴⁹ The Observatory of Economic Complexity, “Where does Brazil Import Vehicle Parts from? (2017).”

¹⁵⁰ The Observatory of Economic Complexity, “Where does Brazil Import Package Medicaments from? (2017).”

¹⁵¹ The Observatory of Economic Complexity, “Where does Brazil Import Integrated Circuits from? (2017).”

¹⁵² The Observatory of Economic Complexity, “Where does Brazil Import Cars from? (2017).”

APPENDIX E

CRUDE PETROLEUM TRADE ANALYSIS – BRAZIL-U.S. AND BRAZIL-CHINA

Table 8. Crude Petroleum Trade Analysis – Brazil-U.S. and Brazil-China				
	Brazil - exports	China - Imports	U.S. - Imports	Others
2008	US\$ 15 B ¹⁵³ 100 %	US\$ 1,7 B ¹⁵⁴ 11,33 %	US\$ 5,44 B ¹⁵⁵ 36,27 %	US\$ 7,86 B 52,40 %
2016	US\$ 9,55 B ¹⁵⁶ 100 %	US\$ 3,99 B ¹⁵⁷ 41,78 %	US\$ 1,48 B ¹⁵⁸ 15,50 %	US\$ 4,08 B 42,72 %

Source: Created by author.

¹⁵³ The Observatory of Economic Complexity, “What does Brazil Export? (2008),” accessed 15 January 2019, https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/export/bra/all/show/2008/.

¹⁵⁴ The Observatory of Economic Complexity, “What does China Import from Brazil? (2008),” accessed 15 January 2019, https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/import/chn/bra/show/2008/.

¹⁵⁵ The Observatory of Economic Complexity, “What does the United States Import from Brazil? (2008),” accessed 15 January 2019, https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/import/usa/bra/show/2008/.

¹⁵⁶ The Observatory of Economic Complexity, “What does Brazil Export? (2016),” accessed 15 January 2019, https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/export/bra/all/show/2016/.

¹⁵⁷ The Observatory of Economic Complexity, “What does China Import from Brazil? (2016),” accessed 15 January 2019, https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/import/chn/bra/show/2016/.

¹⁵⁸ The Observatory of Economic Complexity, “What does the United States Import from Brazil? (2016),” accessed 15 January 2019, https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/import/usa/bra/show/2016/.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- BBC News Brasil. “ONU diz que Crise Migratória na Venezuela já Está Quase no Nível de Fluxo de Refugiados no Mediterrâneo.” 25 August 2018. Accessed 13 December 2018. <https://www.bbc.com/portuguese/internacional-45307311>.
- Blank, Stephen. “Russia in Latin America: Geopolitical games in the US’s neighborhood.” *Russie. Nei. Visions* 38 (2009): 1-23.
- Brazilian Army. *Boletim do Exército no. 9-16*. Brasília, DF: SGEX, 4 March 2016. Accessed 26 March 2019. <http://www.sgex.eb.mil.br/sistemas/be/boletins.php>.
- . *Informex no. 14*. Brasília, DF, 30 June 2011. Accessed 12 December 2018, <http://www.eb.mil.br/documents/16768/396506/INFORMEx+014.pdf/5c339e10-4364-4a46-bc2e-84e5c4ed2ef2?version=1.0>.
- . *Informex no. 24*. Brasília, DF, 25 June 2018. Accessed 12 December 2018, <http://www.eb.mil.br/documents/16768/8526667/INFORMEX%20N%C2%BA%20024>.
- Brazilian Central Bank. *Direct Investment Report 2018*. Brasília, DF, 2018. Accessed 26 March 2019. https://www.bcb.gov.br/Pom/Spb/Ing/Direct_Investment_Report_2018.pdf.
- Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics. *Censo Demográfico 2010*. Brasília, DF, 2010. 55 – 61. Accessed 26 March 2018. https://biblioteca.ibge.gov.br/visualizacao/periodicos/93/cd_2010_caracteristicas_populacao_domicilios.pdf.
- Brazilian Ministry of Defense. *Defense White Paper*. Brasília, DF, 2012. Accessed 12 December 2018, https://www.defesa.gov.br/arquivos/estado_e_defesa/livro_branco/lbdn_2013_ing_net.pdf.
- Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “BRICS – Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa.” Accessed 27 April 2019. <http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/en/politica-externa/mecanismos-inter-regionais/7505-brics-brazil-russia-india-china-south-africa>.
- . “People’s Republic of China.” Accessed 1 April 2019. http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=5988&Itemid=478&cod_pais=CHN&tipo=ficha_pais&lang=en.
- . “Russian Federation.” Accessed 31 October 2018. http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=6573&Itemid=478&cod_pais=RUS&tipo=ficha_pais&lang=en.

- . “United States of America.” Accessed 31 October 2018.
http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=6072&Itemid=478&cod_pais=USA&tipo=ficha_pais&lang=en.
- Brazilian Special Operations Command. *As Operações Especiais do Exército Brasileiro*. Goiânia, GO: EGGCF, 2016.
- Central Intelligence Agency. “The World Factbook: South America – Brazil.” Accessed 31 October 2018. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/br.html>.
- CGSC Learning Resource Center. Combined Arms Research Library. E-mail submission. April 18, 2019. Reviewed for grammar, punctuation, and clarity of expression.
- China Vistos. “Instituto Confucio: o Caminho Para o Melhor Intercambio.” 2019. Accessed 31 March 2019. <https://chinavistos.com.br/instituto-confucio/>.
- Ciência sem Fronteiras. “O que é?” 2019. Accessed 26 March 2019. <http://www.cienciasemfronteiras.gov.br/web/csf/o-programa>.
- Costa, Luciano. “Bolsonaro Deixa Empresários Chineses em Compasso de Espera com Declarações.” *Exame*, 5 November 2018. Accessed 6 December 2018. <https://exame.abril.com.br/economia/bolsonaro-deixa-empresarios-chineses-em-compasso-de-espera-com-declaracoes/>.
- Dall’Agnol, Augusto César, Boris Perius Zabolotsky, and Fabiano Mielniczuk. “The Return of the Bear? Russian Military Engagement in Latin America: The Case of Brazil.” *Military Review Online Exclusive* (July 2018): 1-11. Accessed 31 March 2019. <https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/Online-Exclusive/2018-OLE/Jul/Russia-Brazil/>.
- Department of State. *Integrated Country Strategy –Brazil*. Brasilia, DF: Department of State, 31 July 2018. Accessed 29 March 2019. <https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/284657.pdf>.
- . *Military Assistance*. Washington, DC: Department of State, 2002. Accessed 26 March 2019. <https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/17783.pdf>.
- Dollar, David. “Chinese investment in Latin America continues to expand.” Brookings, 20 March 2018. Accessed 10 December 2018. <https://www.brookings.edu/research/despite-slowdown-chinese-investment-in-latin-america-continues-to-expand/>.
- Ellis, R. Evan. “China-Latin America Military Engagement: Good Will, Good Business, and Strategic Position.” Strategic Studies Institute, August 2011. Accessed 1 April 2019. <https://publications.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/2150.pdf>.

- . “U.S. National Security Implications of Chinese Involvement in Latin America.” Strategic Studies Institute, June 2005. Accessed 20 September 2018, <https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=606>.
- . *China in Latin America: the Whats & Wherefores*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Publishers, 2008.
- . “Chinese Soft Power in Latin America: A Case Study.” *Joint Forces Quarterly* 60, no. 8 (January 2011). Accessed 31 March 2019. <https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a536568.pdf>.
- Embaixada da Federação da Rússia na República Federativa do Brasil. “História das Relações Bilaterais.” Accessed 31 October 2018. https://brazil.mid.ru/web/brasil_pt/historia-das-relacoes-bilaterais.
- Escher, Fabiano, John Wilkinson, and Paulo Rodrigues Fernandes Pereira. “Causas e Implicações dos Investimentos Chineses no Agonegocio Brasileiro.” *ApexBrasil 2018 China Direções Globais de Investimentos*, 18 October 2018. Accessed 1 April 2019. <http://cebc.org.br/2018/10/18/china-direcoes-globais-de-investimentos-2018/>.
- Extra. “Bolsonaro Diz que Comércio com China Poderá ser Ampliado em seu Governo.” 5 November 2018. Accessed 6 December 2018. <https://extra.globo.com/noticias/brasil/bolsonaro-diz-que-comercio-com-china-podera-ser-ampliado-em-seu-governo-23212557.html>.
- Fleischman, Luis. *Latin America in the Post-Chavez Era: The Security Threat to the United States*. Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2013.
- Government of China. “Top Legislator Lauds China-Brazil Strategic Partnership.” Accessed 31 October 2018. http://www.gov.cn/english/2006-09/01/content_375045.htm.
- . *China’s Policy Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean*. 5 November 2008. Accessed 11 December 2018. http://www.gov.cn/english/official/2008-11/05/content_1140347.htm.
- Gvosdev, Nikolas K., and Christopher Marsh. *Russian Foreign Policy: Interests, Vectors, and Sectors*. Los Angeles, CA: CQ Press, 2014. p. 383.
- Hirst, Monica. *Understanding Brazil-United States Relations: Contemporary History, Current Complexities and Prospects for the 21st Century*. Brasília, DF, Brazil: Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão, 2013.
- Horta, Loro. “Brazil-China Relation.” S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies working paper no. 287. 10 March 2015. Accessed 05 April 2019. <https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/WP287.pdf>.

- Instituto Igarapé, and Centro Conjunto de Operações de Paz do Brasil. *A Participação do Brasil na MINUSTAH (2004-2017): Percepções, Lições e Práticas Relevantes para Futuras Missões*. Rio de Janeiro, RJ: Instituto Igarapé, 2018. Accessed 1 April 2019. <https://igarape.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/2018-03-06-AE-MINUSTAH-PT.pdf>.
- Instituto Nacional de Estudos e Pesquisas Educacionais Anísio Teixeira. “Exame Nacional do Ensino Medio.” 2019. Accessed 26 March 2019. <https://enem.inep.gov.br/antes#leia-o-edital>.
- Ionescu, Imanuela. “Brazil_Russia Military-Technical Cooperation A fruit of the Post-Cold War World Order.” *Military Review* (November-December 2018): 66-79.
- Kaplan, Stephen. “China is investing seriously in Latin America. Should you worry?” *The Washington Post*, 24 January 2018. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/01/24/china-is-investing-seriously-in-latin-america-should-you-worry/?utm_term=.9219c6265155.
- Marcos Pontes Astronauta do Brasil. “Vida e Realizações.” December 2013. Accessed 28 March 2019. [http://www.marcospontes.com/\\$SETOR/MCP/VIDA/biografia.html](http://www.marcospontes.com/$SETOR/MCP/VIDA/biografia.html).
- Merriam-Webster. “Influence.” Accessed 25 February 2019. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/influence>.
- . “National Interest.” Accessed 25 February 2019. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/national%20interest>.
- Miles, Richard. “Virtual Russian Influence in Latin America.” Center for Strategic & International Studies, 9 May 2018. Accessed 13 December 2018. <https://www.csis.org/analysis/virtual-russian-influence-latin-america>.
- Ministério da Educação. “Japonês e mandarim estão entre as opções para alunos paulistas.” 23 June 2015. Accessed 31 March 2019. <http://portal.mec.gov.br/busca-geral/222-noticias/537011943/21416-japones-e-mandarim-estao-entre-as-opcoes-para-alunos-paulistas>.
- Mora, Frank O., R. Evan Ellis, and Gary Bjorge. “Cultural and ‘Soft Power’ Influences of China and Russia in the Americas.” Panel, organized by Cultural & Area Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 28 March 2019.
- Neak, Laura. 2018. *Studying Foreign Policy Comparatively: Cases and Analysis*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

- Noak, Rick. “The divide on Venezuela: Who’s supporting Maduro, and who’s following the U.S. lead in recognizing Guaidó” *The Washington Post*, 28 January 2019. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2019/01/28/divide-venezuela-whos-supporting-maduro-whos-following-us-lead-recognizing-guaid/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.74490314604f.
- Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual – Joint Risk Analysis*. Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, 14 October 2016. Accessed 27 April 2019. <https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Library/Manuals/CJCSM%203105.01%20C%20A0.pdf?ver=2017-02-15-105309-907>.
- . *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*. Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, February 2019. Accessed 27 April 2019. <https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/dictionary.pdf>.
- . *Joint Doctrine Note 1-18: Strategy*. Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, 25 April 2018. p. II-5. Accessed 27 April 2019. https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/jdn_jg/jdn1_18.pdf?ver=2018-04-25-150439-540.
- Park, Kyunghee, and Fabiola Moura. “Embraer cogita abrir fábrica de aviões comerciais na China.” *Bloomerg*, 11 September 2017. Accessed 1 April 2019. <https://www.bloomberg.com.br/blog/embraer-cogita-abrir-fabrica-de-avioes-comerciais-na-china/>.
- Pecequilo, Cristina Soreanu. *Manual do Candidato: Política Internacional*. Brasília, DF, Brazil: Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão, 2010.
- Pereira, Carlos, and João Augusto De Castro Neves. “Brazil and China: South-South Partnership or North-South Competition?” Brookings, 4 April 2011. Accessed 31 October 2018. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/03_brazil_china_pereira.pdf.
- Piccone, Ted. “The Geopolitics of China’s Rise in Latin America.” Brookings, November 2016. Accessed 27 April 2019. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/the-geopolitics-of-chinas-rise-in-latin-america_ted-piccone.pdf.
- Romildo, José, and Ana Cristina Campos. “Brazil, China celebrate 30-year-old satellite cooperation.” Empresa Brasil de Comunicação, 29 August 2018. Accessed 12 December 2018. <http://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/en/internacional/noticia/2018-08/brazil-china-celebrate-30-year-old-satellite-cooperation>.
- Schipani, Andres. “Jair Bolsonaro’s inner circle: who’s who.” *Financial Times*, 22 November 2018. Accessed 12 December 2018. <https://www.ft.com/content/cc6331fc-ecde-11e8-8180-9cf212677a57>.

- The Observatory of Economic Complexity. “What does Brazil export to Russia? (2016)” Accessed 13 December 2018. https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/export/bra/rus/show/2016/.
- . “What does Brazil Export? (2008)” Accessed 15 January 2019. https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/export/bra/all/show/2008/.
- . “What does Brazil Export? (2016)” Accessed 15 January 2019. https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/export/bra/all/show/2016/.
- . “What does Brazil Export? (2017)” Accessed 26 March 2018. https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/export/bra/all/show/2017/.
- . “What does Brazil import from Russia? (2016)” Accessed 13 December 2018. https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/import/bra/rus/show/2016/.
- . “What does Brazil Import? (2017)” Accessed 26 March 2018. https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/import/bra/all/show/2017/.
- . “What does China Import from Brazil? (2008)” Accessed 15 January 2019. https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/import/chn/bra/show/2008/.
- . “What does China Import from Brazil? (2016)” Accessed 15 January 2019. https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/import/chn/bra/show/2016/.
- . “What does Russia Import from Brazil? (2008)” Accessed 15 January 2019. https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/import/rus/bra/show/2008/.
- . “What does the United States Import from Brazil? (2008)” Accessed 15 January 2019. https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/import/usa/bra/show/2008/.
- . “What does the United States Import from Brazil? (2016)” Accessed 15 January 2019. https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/import/usa/bra/show/2016/.
- . “Where does Brazil Export Cars to? (2017)” Accessed 26 March 2018. https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/export/bra/show/8703/2017/.
- . “Where does Brazil Export Crude Petroleum to? (2017)” Accessed 26 March 2018. https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/export/bra/show/2709/2017/.

- . “Where does Brazil Export Iron Ore to? (2017)” Accessed 26 March 2018. https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/export/bra/show/2601/2017/.
- . “Where does Brazil Export Raw Sugar to? (2017)” Accessed 26 March 2018. https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/export/bra/show/1701/2017/.
- . “Where does Brazil Export Soybeans to? (2017)” Accessed 26 March 2018. https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/export/bra/show/1201/%202017/.
- . “Where Does Brazil Export to? (2017)” Accessed 26 March 2019. https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/export/bra/show/all/2017/.
- . “Where does Brazil Import Cars from? (2017)” Accessed 26 March 2018. https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/import/bra/show/8703/2017/.
- . “Where Does Brazil Import from? (2017)” Accessed 26 March 2019. https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/import/bra/show/all/2017/.
- . “Where does Brazil Import Integrated Circuits from? (2017)” Accessed 26 March 2018. https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/import/bra/show/8542/2017/.
- . “Where does Brazil Import Package Medicaments from? (2017)” Accessed 26 March 2018. https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/import/bra/show/3004/2017/.
- . “Where does Brazil Import Refined Petroleum from? (2017)” Accessed 26 March 2018. https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/import/bra/show/2710/2017/.
- . “Where does Brazil Import Vehicle Parts from? (2017)” Accessed 26 March 2018. https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/import/bra/show/8708/2017/.
- . “Where does China Import Soybeans from? (2017)” Accessed 26 March 2019. https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/import/chn/show/1201/2017/.

The White House. “Remarks by National Security Advisor Ambassador John R. Bolton on the Administration’s Policies in Latin America.” 2 November 2018. Accessed 11 December 2018. <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-national-security-advisor-ambassador-john-r-bolton-administrations-policies-latin-america/>.

- Tidd, Kurt W. *Posture Statement of Admiral Kurt W. Tidd Commander, United States Southern Command*. 15 February 2018. Accessed 09 September 2018, https://www.southcom.mil/Portals/7/Documents/Posture%20Statements/SOUTHCOM_2018_Posture_Statement_FINAL.PDF?ver=2018-02-15-090330-243.
- Trump, Donald J. *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*. Washington, DC: The White House, December 2017. Accessed 26 March 2019. <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf>.
- Turtelli, Camila. “Marcos Pontes Defende Uso Comercial da Base de Alcântara, no Maranhão.” *Estadão*, 01 November 2018. Accessed 13 December 2018. <https://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,marcos-pontes-defende-uso-comercial-da-base-de-alcantara-no-maranhao,70002580189>.
- U.S. Embassy & Consulates in Brazil. “U.S.-Brazil Diplomatic History.” Accessed 31 October 2018. <https://br.usembassy.gov/our-relationship/policy-history/io/>.
- Universidade de Pernambuco. “Instituto Confucio.” 2018. Accessed 31 March 2019. <http://www.upe.br/instituto-confucio>.
- University of Toronto. “BRICS Information Center – BRIC Leaders Meet.” 9 July 2008. Accessed 11 December 2018. <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/080709-leaders.html>.
- Wegrzynowski, Ricardo. “União de dois gigantes – Nova parceria com a Federação da Rússia pode levar o Brasil ao topo da tecnologia de defesa.” *Desafios do Desenvolvimento – Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada* 5, no. 43 (May 2008). Accessed 17 January 2019. http://www.ipea.gov.br/desafios/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1511:catid=28&Itemid=23.
- Yeo, Ghim-Lay. “Embraer Partnership.” *Flight Global*, 10 January 2019. Accessed 15 March 2019. <https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/brazil-approves-boeing-and-embraer-partnership-454944/>.
- YouTube. “Brazil will no longer be a socialist country: Eduardo Bolsonaro.” 30 November 2018. Accessed 11 December 2018. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OXpbGl3x7MM>.