



**NAVAL
POSTGRADUATE
SCHOOL**

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

**PRECISION POLICING: A WAY FORWARD
TO REDUCE CRIME**

by

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March 2020

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			<i>Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188</i>
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503.			
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)	2. REPORT DATE March 2020	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Master's thesis	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE PRECISION POLICING: A WAY FORWARD TO REDUCE CRIME		5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR(S) Muhammad J. Ashraf			
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5000		8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) N/A		10. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.			
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.		12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE A	
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) For years, law enforcement practitioners and policymakers have sought innovative ways to reduce crime. But experience has shown that reducing crime without retaining the community's trust—such as through heavy-handed policing—can be venomous for society. In New York City, the precision policing model combines predictive policing analysis with increased neighborhood coordination to predict crime and then uses interventions from neighborhood coordination officers to prevent crimes altogether. This thesis examines the precision policing model implemented by the NYPD and finds that it has reduced crime and increased community trust in the police, even with diminished police resources. This thesis recommends that other law enforcement agencies use the precision policing formula of predictive and community policing as an effective crime reduction tool while building relationships with the community.			
14. SUBJECT TERMS predictive policing, community policing, neighborhood coordination, precision policing, NYPD, smart practices		15. NUMBER OF PAGES 87	
		16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UU

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PRECISION POLICING: A WAY FORWARD TO REDUCE CRIME

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

**MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES
(HOMELAND SECURITY AND DEFENSE)**

from the

**NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
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ABSTRACT

For years, law enforcement practitioners and policymakers have sought innovative ways to reduce crime. But experience has shown that reducing crime without retaining the community's trust—such as through heavy-handed policing—can be venomous for society. In New York City, the precision policing model combines predictive policing analysis with increased neighborhood coordination to predict crime and then uses interventions from neighborhood coordination officers to prevent crimes altogether. This thesis examines the precision policing model implemented by the NYPD and finds that it has reduced crime and increased community trust in the police, even with diminished police resources. This thesis recommends that other law enforcement agencies use the precision policing formula of predictive and community policing as an effective crime reduction tool while building relationships with the community.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

BWC	body worn camera
CCRB	Civilian Complaint Review Board
CompStat	computer statistics
CPOP	community police officer on patrol
DB	Detective Bureau
DNA	deoxyribonucleic acid
NCO	neighborhood coordination officer
NYC	New York City
NYPD	New York City Police Department
OCCB	Organized Crime Control Bureau
PDS	Precinct Detective Squad
RICO	Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization (Act)
SMART	Social Media Analysis and Research Team
SNEU	Street Narcotics Enforcement Unit
SQF	stop, question, and frisk
UCR	Uniform Crime Reporting

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In 2014, the New York City Police Department (NYPD) initiated a new means of policing after tensions between police and communities were high following various issues nationwide. During that time, New York City (NYC) communities were outraged in the wake of excessive stop-and-frisk incidents and a high number of arrests, particularly in minority communities. The NYPD introduced precision policing, which combined predictive policing analysis and community policing in the form of neighborhood coordination programs, to reduce crime while building trust between the police and communities.

The NYPD's precision policing consists of two important components: an intelligence-led investigative component and a neighborhood coordination component. The intelligence-led investigative side of this policy uses predictive analysis of all crimes to identify the small population of criminals who commit most of the violent crimes.¹ It also identifies small areas on the map with a higher intensity of crime, otherwise known as hot spots.² This new approach targets illegal firearms, precisely identifies gangs, and establishes a database for recidivists. The second component connects citizens with the police through an initiative known as neighborhood coordination. This program has three core goals: to reduce crime further, to promote trust and respect, and to solve problems by collaborating with residents. Many small community concerns are being solved collectively rather than through strict enforcement of minor crimes.

The goal of this thesis was to conduct a case study of precision policing, particularly to evaluate the NYPD's strong claims that it has caused a reduction in crime and improved trust between the police and community. If these claims proved to be conclusive, enough

¹ William J. Bratton and Jon Murad, "Precision Policing: A Strategy for the Challenges of 21st Century Law Enforcement," in *Urban Policy 2018* (New York: Manhattan Institute for Policy Research, 2018), <https://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/urban-policy-2018-precision-policing-strategy-21st-century-law-enforcement-11508.html>.

² "Practice Profile: Hot Spots Policing," National Institute of Justice, accessed January 11, 2020, <https://www.crimesolutions.gov/PracticeDetails.aspx?ID=8>.

evidence might be gathered to develop this model of policing as a smart practice for other major metropolitan police departments.

This study began with selecting four NYC police precincts in four separate boroughs comprising residents of disparate racial groups. The community trust within these selected precincts was measured using data from civilian complaints filed by NYC residents with the Civilian Complaint Review Board (CCRB), which was used as a primary indicator of trust. Additionally, crimes within these four precincts were analyzed statistically; staffing structure, arrest numbers, summonses issued, technology advancements, and training mechanisms were tracked to determine whether the crimes increased or declined in relation to this model of policing. This thesis found that in the early years of predictive policing, all major crimes were reduced. Fewer violent crimes were committed even with fewer police officers, arrests, summonses, and stop, question, and frisk reports.

Through statistical analysis of CCRB complaints filed by NYC citizens, data showed that the number of complaints had decreased citywide. Additionally, the number of these complaints had decreased in the four precincts in question. One conclusion could be that trust must have increased because complaints have decreased.

In analyzing crime statistics and CCRB data before and after the implementation of precision policing, this thesis concluded that the constant decline in crime and fewer complaints by citizens against the police indicate that trust between the police and community increased. However, other variables might have affected this increase in trust. For one, the new approach does not utilize arrest numbers as a measure of performance for police officers, and it gives officers the power of discretion to resolve many small issues without taking enforcement action.

In this approach, it is vital for the entire police department to develop a mindset of community outreach while accurately identifying elements that cause the most violence to take enforcement action precisely. The NYPD has used this model of policing for five years; however, not much scholarly research and analysis has been dedicated to evaluate this policy. At the five-year anniversary of its implementation and given the sample of

variables, this model seems to be working and can be used as a smart practice for other jurisdictions.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

First and foremost, I am forever grateful for the support of the New York City Police Department in sending me to participate in the prestigious graduate program at the Center for Homeland Defense and Security at the Naval Postgraduate School. Without the backing of the NYPD, I would not have been accepted to NPS. I would like to acknowledge the support from former Police Commissioner James P. O'Neil for selecting me to attend this master's program. I would also like to recognize Police Commissioner Dermot Shea for his unwavering support of educational opportunities within the police department.

This journey would not have been possible without the help and support of the NYPD executives with whom I work directly. I am forever indebted to my previous chief, Assistant Chief Jason Wilcox, for not only giving me a valuable recommendation to attend this program but also being a practical supporter. I am also indebted to my current chief, Deputy Chief Timothy McCormack, for his continued support throughout this tough journey. I would also like to recognize two of my colleagues, Sergeant Ferdinand Rivera and Sergeant Alberto Puente, for their splendid support and for working double duty, so I could keep a functional workplace while I attended this program. I am also thankful for the men and women of the 43rd Precinct Detective Squad for their unconditional support, working hard day in and day out to bring closure for crime victims and proving themselves as the world's greatest detectives. Finally, I would like to thank my fellow cohortians of 1805/1806, especially my brothers and sisters in blue and, more specifically, a fellow cop from the NYPD, Sergeant Patrick Mullane. I am forever grateful for his friendship, support, and leadership. Because of this support, I was able to successfully earn this degree, and I am a better person and a better homeland security contributor.

I would also like to acknowledge and express my highest gratitude for the NPS professors and support staff who work diligently to develop every student as a critical thinker and provide more than enough growth to every student academically. I would like to express my special thanks to Dr. Lauren Wollman, Dr. Erik Dahl, and Patrick Miller for guiding me to produce this thesis. I was able to conduct my research with their guidance, knowledge, and mastery. I am also greatly appreciative of Marianne Taflinger and Noel

Yucuis, who worked thoroughly and tirelessly to help me produce a quality research product.

Finally, I wish to acknowledge my wife, Mehwish, who gave me strength and support. Through your encouragement, I completed this tough program. Thank you for being patient with me and taking on double duty at home with the kids while I studied. I dedicate this thesis to our children, Safi, Saria, Simra, and Subhan. Thank you for your understanding and patience. I hope my struggle through this journey can instill the values of hard work and education in you. Lastly, I wish to thank my mom, dad, and brother for their support to get me through this academic challenge.

I. INTRODUCTION

New York City (NYC) has achieved remarkable reductions in crime in recent years. For example, the New York City Police Department (NYPD) recorded only 295 homicides in 2018 and 292 homicides in 2017, the lowest numbers of homicides recorded in 70 years of documented history.¹ In contrast, as recently as 1990, 2,245 people died in homicides. With the population of NYC estimated to be 8.6 million in 2018, this represents 3.3 murders per 100,000 people, which is well below the national average of 5.3 murders per 100,000.² Overall index crimes, which include violent felonies like rape, robbery, felony assault, burglary, grand larceny, and auto theft, also decreased by 13.7 percent, from 111,135 in 2014 to 95,883 in 2018.³

Many people attribute this marked success to the adoption in 2014 of a strategy known as precision policing. Former Police Commissioner William Bratton said, “Precision policing is working to keep crime and disorder under control. Indeed, New York is safer than ever.”⁴ The NYPD’s precision policing consists of two important components: an intelligence-led investigative component and a neighborhood coordination component. The intelligence-led investigative side of this policy uses a predictive analysis of all crime to identify the small population of criminals who commit most of the violent crimes.⁵ It also identifies small areas on the map with a higher frequency of crime, otherwise known as hot spots.⁶ This new approach targets illegal firearms, precisely identifies gangs, and establishes a database for recidivists. The second component of this new perspective

¹ “Crime Statistics,” New York City Police Department, accessed February 6, 2020, <https://www1.nyc.gov/site/nypd/stats/crime-statistics/crime-statistics-landing.page>.

² “Home Page,” Census Bureau, accessed February 6, 2020, <https://www.census.gov/en.html>.

³ New York City Police Department, “Crime Statistics.”

⁴ William J. Bratton and Jon Murad, “How Precision Policing Made New York Even Safer,” *New York Post*, July 29, 2018, <https://nypost.com/2018/07/29/how-precision-policing-made-new-york-even-safer/>.

⁵ William J. Bratton and Jon Murad, “Precision Policing: A Strategy for the Challenges of 21st Century Law Enforcement,” in *Urban Policy 2018* (New York: Manhattan Institute for Policy Research, 2018), <https://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/urban-policy-2018-precision-policing-strategy-21st-century-law-enforcement-11508.html>.

⁶ “Practice Profile: Hot Spots Policing,” National Institute of Justice, accessed January 11, 2020, <https://www.crimesolutions.gov/PracticeDetails.aspx?ID=8>.

connects citizens with the police through an initiative known as neighborhood coordination. This program has three core goals: to reduce crime further, to promote trust and respect, and to solve problems by collaborating with residents. Many small community concerns are being solved collectively rather than through strict enforcement of minor crimes.

Before presenting precision policing and its assorted debates in detail, the following paragraphs revisit its roots. First, starting in the mid-1980s, the NYPD initially began the Community Patrol Officer Program without much top-down support.⁷ Then, in the early 1990s, when violent crime was at its peak, William Bratton became the police commissioner of the NYPD and introduced a new way of policing that concentrated on low-level quality-of-life offenses such as petty crimes and vagrancy.⁸ This new way of policing stemmed from George Kelling's broken windows theory, which argued that preventing minor crimes would reduce the likelihood of more violent crimes.⁹ Bratton's strategy proved successful in reducing quality-of-life issues and violent crimes, making New York a more livable city.¹⁰ The NYPD experienced a correlation between high enforcement and reduced crime as it introduced "Operation Impact," an extension of broken windows-style policing.¹¹ However, over the course of many years, an extraordinary level of enforcement and overenthusiastic use of stop, question, and frisk frayed the bond of trust between the NYPD and the public.¹² Thus, the unintended consequence of this policy undermined its effectiveness.

⁷ Vera Institute of Justice, *The Community Patrol Officer Program* (New York: Vera Institute of Justice, 1984), <https://www.vera.org/publications/the-community-patrol-officer-program-a-pilot-program-in-community-oriented-policing-in-the-72nd-precinct-progress-report>.

⁸ William J. Bratton and Peter Knobler, *Turnaround: How America's Top Cop Reversed the Crime Epidemic* (New York: Random House, 1998).

⁹ George L. Kelling and William H. Sousa, *Do Police Matter? An Analysis of the Impact of New York City's Police Reforms*, no. 22 (New York: Manhattan Institute for Policy Research, 2001), 32.

¹⁰ Bratton and Knobler, *Turnaround*.

¹¹ Dennis C. Smith and Robert Purtell, *An Empirical Assessment of NYPD's "Operation Impact": A Targeted Zone Crime Reduction Strategy* (New York: New York University, 2007), https://marroninstitute.nyu.edu/uploads/content/Dennis_Smith_Impact_Zone_Policing_Report.pdf.

¹² Shamrik Walton, "Zero Tolerance Policing: An Evaluation of the NYPD's Use of Stop and Frisk" (PhD diss., Northeastern University, June 2014), 74, <https://repository.library.northeastern.edu/files/neu:336406/fulltext.pdf>.

In 2014, after a couple of police-involved shootings led to nationwide protests and riots, the NYPD recognized the need to reduce crime effectively while engaging positively with its communities.¹³ Thus, the NYPD introduced a new methodology known as precision policing that caused many internal organizational changes and new ways to reduce crime while building trust with the communities.

One critical action in the implementation of precision policing was the reorganization of various investigative entities to unite them toward one common mission. Previously, investigations conducted by the Organized Crime Control Bureau detectives were not shared with other investigative units, specifically in the Detective Bureau (DB).¹⁴ The NYPD addressed this problem by simply uniting organized crime investigations such as gang investigations and narcotics investigations with DB investigations, homicides, shootings, robberies, burglaries, and other criminal investigations. In 2016, all investigative operations, including the Organized Crime Control Bureau, were unified under the DB umbrella.¹⁵

Since precision policing has neither been widely studied from an objective perspective nor been validated as an effective crime reduction practice, it bears investigation. Before it can be exported to other cities, the components of its success or weakness need be to evaluated to determine whether it could be a smart practice for other municipalities. Eugene Bardach defines a practice as “a tangible and visible behavior.”¹⁶ A practice could also be a description of how such a practice requires an action to reach an objective. Bardach explains further that “some ideas are particularly clever. The practices

¹³ Justin Nix and Scott E. Wolfe, “Sensitivity to the Ferguson Effect: The Role of Managerial Organizational Justice,” *Journal of Criminal Justice* 47 (December 2016): 12–20, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcrimjus.2016.06.002>.

¹⁴ Ashley Southall, “New York City Police Reorganizing to Focus More on Gangs,” *New York Times*, February 9, 2016, <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/10/nyregion/new-york-city-police-reorganizing-to-focus-more-on-gangs.html>.

¹⁵ Southall.

¹⁶ Eugene Bardach, *A Practical Guide for Policy Analysis: The Eightfold Path to More Effective Problem Solving*, 5th ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 2004), 126.

that embody them we call ‘smart practices.’”¹⁷ The simple tool in a smart practice is its potential to reach a goal at low cost.¹⁸

A. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

1. How might the NYPD precision policing model constitute a new smart practice?
2. What are the intended and unintended consequences of precision policing?
3. Based on the evaluation of the components of the precision policing model used by the NYPD, can the model be developed into a smart practice for other municipalities?

B. LITERATURE REVIEW

This literature review addresses two areas that constitute precision policing: intelligence-led policing to reduce crime, and neighborhood coordination, which is a form of focused community policing. The first part of the literature review discusses intelligence-led policing and how it led to the era of predictive policing, as well as how the NYPD utilized data-mining and crime data analysis to understand trends, patterns, and recidivism to reduce crime. The second part of the review focuses on neighborhood coordination and how it transitioned from community policing with some specific differences in the application of the previous community policing model.

1. Intelligence-Led to Predictive Policing

The word *intelligence* is often confused with the word *information*; however, intelligence is more than mere information. According to Mark Lowenthal, intelligence is an eight step process that moves in a cycle, starting with identifying requirements; collecting, processing, analyzing, producing, disseminating, and consuming data; and

¹⁷ Bardach, 126.

¹⁸ Bardach.

providing feedback.¹⁹ According to Marilyn Peterson, law enforcement intelligence was adapted from military intelligence, which dates back to ancient times, and had been used within law enforcement agencies from the 1970s until about 2001.²⁰ Peterson explains further that security intelligence was reformed for use in law enforcement agencies after World War II. Communications intelligence systems used by the military provided guidance for how police would analyze telephone records as well as practices used to gather human intelligence through confidential informants.²¹ But the concept of “intelligence-led policing” began in the 1990s with the Kent Constabulary in Great Britain in response to increased property crimes. The Kent Constabulary focused enforcement on repeat offenders, successfully reducing property crimes by 24 percent.²² Based on this success, a newer model of policing emerged that used data and information to evaluate trends and crime issues, in keeping with a business model.²³ This evaluation process allowed top decision makers to effectively and efficiently deploy resources and develop crime control strategies.²⁴

Finally, intelligence-led policing aims to reduce crime through a top-down management approach and by combining the analysis of crime with intelligence.²⁵ It focuses on the repeat and serious offenders to allocate police resources effectively, based on criminal behavior patterns.²⁶ The ultimate goal of intelligence-led policing is to prevent crime proactively instead of reacting to crimes after they occur.

Predictive policing is one of the policing practices that evolved from intelligence-led policing. It employs a similar intelligence collection and dissemination cycle to extract

¹⁹ Mark Lowenthal, *Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy*, 7th ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: CQ Press, 2017), 74.

²⁰ Marilyn Peterson, *Intelligence-Led Policing: The New Intelligence Architecture* (Washington, DC: Department of Justice, 2005), 12, <https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bja/210681.pdf>.

²¹ Peterson, 12.

²² Peterson, 15.

²³ Peterson, 15.

²⁴ Peterson, 16.

²⁵ Jerry H. Ratcliffe, *Intelligence-Led Policing: Anticipating Risk and Influencing Action* (London: Routledge, 2016).

²⁶ Ratcliffe.

data from various sources and analyze them to project future crimes.²⁷ Charlie Beck, former chief of the Los Angeles Police Department, described predictive policing as “the predictive vision [that] moves law enforcement from focusing on what happened to focusing on what will happen and how to effectively deploy resources in front of crime, thereby changing outcomes.”²⁸

Predictive policing applies analytical tools, specifically quantitative methods, to solve past crimes through statistical predictions of behavioral patterns or to identify individuals who are predisposed to criminal activity and target them for intervention.²⁹ For decades, the police have used arithmetical and geospatial analysis to estimate crimes. However, advances in information technology, collection, and analysis of data have made projections an easier and more popular crime prevention tool.³⁰ Police departments use analytical tools previously used by large businesses to study and predict customer behavior. For example, Walmart has used these analytical tools to stock certain items in the same grocery aisle during hurricanes based on previous sale trends.³¹ Similarly, police agencies analyze information about previous crimes and other relevant intelligence to forecast and prevent future crimes. Statistically, strong evidence supports the predictability of crime based on criminals’ past behaviors.

Criminals, for the most part, tend to commit crimes within their comfort zone, meaning they repeat the same crimes in the same vicinity that they have successfully committed crimes in the past.³² According to Tayebi and Glasser, predictive policing represents a new paradigm in the analysis of crimes and their trends by systematically examining co-offending networks for multiple approaches to criminal collaboration. It also

²⁷ Beth Pearsall, “Predictive Policing: The Future of Law Enforcement?,” *National Institute of Justice Journal* no. 266 (June 2010), <https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nji/230414.pdf>.

²⁸ Pearsall, 17.

²⁹ Walt L. Perry, *Predictive Policing: The Role of Crime Forecasting in Law Enforcement Operations* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2013), 35.

³⁰ Perry.

³¹ Joel Rubin, “Stopping Crime Before It Starts,” *Los Angeles Times*, August 21, 2010, <https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2010-aug-21-la-me-predictcrime-20100427-1-story.html>.

³² Rubin.

provides decision-making capabilities to the leadership to deploy resources and make tactical police decisions. With more data collection and the rise of new data science, a new model of predictive policing has emerged from crime analysis to study criminal behaviors, identify crime hot spots, and make accurate predictions.³³

2. Community Policing to Neighborhood Coordination

Community policing combines three components: “community partnership, organizational transformation, and problem solving.”³⁴ The goal is to develop solutions, increase trust between the police and community, and solve problems collaboratively. The mechanism of problem solving needs to be proactive and systematic, not to mention routinely involve community members and groups.³⁵ Despite a volume of literature that evaluates community policing, its definition differs among police departments. Scholars and practitioners agree that combatting crime requires the key elements of collaborating with the community and solving problems actively. Building on that definition, the Department of Justice defines community policing as “a philosophy that promotes organizational strategies that support the systematic use of partnerships and problem-solving techniques to proactively address the immediate conditions that give rise to public safety issues such as crime, social disorder, and fear of crime.”³⁶ Thus, this policing model recognizes that police alone cannot solve the public’s safety issues and promotes a continuous partnership to do so more effectively.

The NYPD had previously implemented a plan from 1984 to 1994 that closely resembled community policing but inadvertently created friction between police officers and a disconnect between the police and community. The NYPD’s implementation of the initiative known as community police officer on patrol (CPOP) involved only a small

³³ Mohammad A. Tayebi and Uwe Glasser, *Social Network Analysis in Predictive Policing* (New York: Springer, 2016), 7–8.

³⁴ Community Oriented Policing Services, *Community Policing Defined* (Washington, DC: Community Oriented Policing Services, 2014), 16, <https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=766797>.

³⁵ Community Oriented Policing Services.

³⁶ Community Oriented Policing Services, 1.

number of police officers engaging with community members.³⁷ Connecting police officers to local residents and businesses achieved many objectives of this program—as the police officers became more familiar with the local residents on their beats, community problems were not only identified but also rapidly resolved there. The implementation of this initiative was not uniform across the department, and only a small number of officers in each precinct performed CPOP duties. Not only did it create a divide among the police officers, but it also failed as a crime reduction tool and in its mission to connect police with communities, as set out in the implementation.³⁸ According to William Bratton, the NYPD had assigned a small number of officers to CPOP to interact with community members while most police ran from one 9-1-1 call to the next.³⁹ This initiative split regular police officers from CPOP because each group disengaged from the work of the others. Patrol officers felt removed from community affairs just as CPOPs lost their day-to-day policing perspective. Consequently, this community policing model of the 1990s failed to gain much traction. Therefore, the program failed to connect the police to the community or the community to the police in a meaningful way.

This disconnect and approach to policing became a hot topic in the 1993 mayoral elections when Rudy Giuliani equated police work with social work incapable of crime reduction.⁴⁰ After his victory, Giuliani appointed William Bratton as the police commissioner to change policing from CPOP to a more proactive model. After 1994, Bratton began many initiatives that changed policing and reduced crime in NYC. One of those controversial initiatives is known as broken windows policing.⁴¹

³⁷ Walton, “Zero Tolerance Policing,” 30.

³⁸ William J. Bratton, *The NYPD Plan of Action and the Neighborhood Policing Plan* (New York: New York City Police Department, 2015), 7.

³⁹ Bratton.

⁴⁰ “The 1993 Campaign: The Race for Mayor; The Candidates on the Issues: In Their Own Words,” *New York Times*, November 1, 1993, <https://www.nytimes.com/1993/11/01/nyregion/1993-campaign-race-for-mayor-candidates-issues-their-own-words.html>.

⁴¹ William H. Sousa and George L. Kelling, “‘Broken Windows’ Criminology and Criminal Justice,” *Semantic Scholar*, October 2004, <https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/830f/0500535157da60135209b95683fd37f8c05e.pdf>.

In the mid-1990s, the NYPD moved from one end of the spectrum—community policing—to the opposite when it adopted broken windows policing.⁴² It applied aggressive policing without giving police officers the power of discretion and pressured officers to enforce every minor offense with the goal of reducing more violent crimes.⁴³ The city saw violent crimes start to decrease after the new policy was implemented. It also made the quality of life better for the residents and visitors of NYC as it helped clean up many uncomfortable sights, such as street prostitution, squeegee men, public gambling, dice games, and narcotics sales.⁴⁴

The effects of broken windows policing on crime and disorder were tremendous under Bratton. Bratton’s successors—Howard Safir, Bernard Kerik, and Raymond Kelly—continued this style of policing and kept driving the crime numbers lower.⁴⁵ In 2002, when Raymond Kelly became the police commissioner, he not only supported broken windows policing but also added more fuel to this program by starting a new initiative known as Operation Impact.⁴⁶

As the NYPD under Kelly believed in a strong correlation between heavy enforcement and crime reduction, Operation Impact, also known as the hot spot method of policing, deployed police officers to identified high-crime areas.⁴⁷ When the NYPD conducted an analysis to identify the concentrated violent crime zones, or impact zones, it identified 30 in the city. The root of this operation was to assign and deploy nearly all recruits who had recently graduated from the police academy.⁴⁸

⁴² Michael D. White, “The New York City Police Department, Its Crime Control Strategies and Organizational Changes, 1970–2009,” *Justice Quarterly* 31, no. 1 (2014): 74–95, <https://doi.org/10.1080/07418825.2012.723032>.

⁴³ White.

⁴⁴ White.

⁴⁵ “Mayor Bloomberg and Police Commissioner Kelly Announce Operation Impact II,” Official Website of the City of New York, January 12, 2004, <https://www1.nyc.gov/office-of-the-mayor/news/007-04/mayor-michael-bloomberg-police-commissioner-raymond-w-kelly-i-operation-impact>.

⁴⁶ Official Website of the City of New York.

⁴⁷ David Weisburd and John E. Eck, “What Can Police Do to Reduce Crime, Disorder, and Fear?,” *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 593, no. 1 (May 2004): 58, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716203262548>.

⁴⁸ Smith and Purtell, *An Empirical Assessment*.

In 2004, the first year of Operation Impact, police officers issued 3.6 million summonses and arrested 351,801 offenders for various misdemeanors and felonies.⁴⁹ These figures were an increase from the previous year, when officers issued 3.5 million summonses and made 334,163 arrests for similar crimes.⁵⁰ With a numeric increase of 120,592 more summonses and 17,638 more arrests, the NYPD's initial assessment was that high enforcement correlated with low crime numbers, especially for murders, robberies, and assaults. During the years of Operation Impact and its increased enforcement measures, crime declined further, and Commissioner Kelly thought that its continued application was the only successful solution for crime reduction in New York.⁵¹

Operation Impact lasted from 2004 to 2014. What started out as a quality-of-life initiative became a 10-year nightmare for the residents of the city. Instead of examining true root causes and innovating with newer crime fighting tools, the NYPD attempted to solve crime problems with the hammer of more enforcement. Commissioner Kelly launched Operation Impact as a productivity measurement tool and started to quantify how police officers were spending their tours of duty. The standard to measure performance was the number of arrests, summonses, and stop reports.⁵² This tactic turned police officers into revenue-generating robots, and it did little to encourage police officers to know and build relationships with the community members they served. The pressure to enforce every offense negatively affected the way police interacted with the communities they served during that decade.⁵³

To strengthen the relationship between the police and community, in 2014, the NYPD implemented a neighborhood coordination program, which merged the functions of patrol and community officers so that the entire department—rather than a small number of designated officers—would be involved in the community. The NYPD restructured

⁴⁹ Raymond W. Kelly, Joseph J. Esposito, and Garry McCarthy, *CompStat: Week Covering the Week of Year End 2004* (New York: New York City Police Department, 2005).

⁵⁰ Kelly, Esposito, and McCarthy.

⁵¹ Smith and Purtell, *An Empirical Assessment*.

⁵² Walton, "Zero Tolerance Policing."

⁵³ Walton.

police precincts to four or five sectors from the previous eight to ten sectors. Sectors conformed with actual neighborhood boundaries, establishing a connection between the residents and the police officers. Police officers became permanently assigned to these sectors, interacting daily with the same community residents.

In addition to permanent patrol officers, two-officer teams, known as neighborhood coordination officers (NCOs), worked in each sector.⁵⁴ According to a plan of action detailed by then-Commissioner William Bratton, NCOs—along with other patrol officers and the residents—played an important leadership role in each sector as they identified crime trends, local patterns, and other issues and found solutions to these problems. NCOs answered calls for service during their shifts, but most of their time involved generating contacts with the community to form cooperative planning measures. NCOs analyzed crime conditions and developed intelligence about local criminals and where to deploy targeted enforcement.⁵⁵ The NCOs received training in problem solving as investigators and community outreach workers. The NYPD expected them to become problem solvers by actively working with community groups as well as answering calls and following up on current and previous crimes.⁵⁶ The NCOs received in-depth training in public speaking, social services, mediation, street narcotics identification, and enforcement.

C. RESEARCH DESIGN

This thesis presents a detailed review and analysis of the precision policing model implemented by the NYPD in 2014. The NYPD has credited precision policing with historic crime reduction and improved community relations as it connects with the residents through a component called neighborhood coordination.

This thesis offers a comparative analysis of four NYPD precincts—33rd, 43rd, 67th, and 100th—that were early adopters of this new methodology. These four precincts represent four different boroughs of NYC as well as different diversity and ethnic groups

⁵⁴ Bratton, *The NYPD Plan of Action*, 5.

⁵⁵ Bratton, 5.

⁵⁶ Bratton, 5.

among their residents. Data from before and after the adoption of precision policing were examined to analyze its effects on crime in each of these four precincts. This comparative analysis used multiple statistics, including crime rates, arrest rates, technology, training, and staffing structure, to indicate changes in numbers before and after the implementation of this policy.

Furthermore, this thesis analyzes the degree to which precision policing has affected relationships between the police and community. The NCO, a role that evolved from community policing, was studied to pinpoint how it helped the NYPD regain community trust. One indicator of such trust was the number of civilian complaint reports filed by the public with the NYC Civilian Complaint Review Board (CCRB). This comparison involved evaluating the number of complaints against police officers before and after the implementation of precision policing. In selecting four different precincts, this thesis attempted to make the study as generalizable as possible.

D. THESIS OVERVIEW

Chapter II describes several organizational and structural changes the NYPD has put in place in recent years to unify all the department's resources under a single investigative chain of command. This chapter argues that because of the unification brought to all investigations, the NYPD has attained better coordination among investigative units, a prerequisite for predictive policing.

Chapter III describes the first component of precision policing: predictive policing analysis. This chapter provides a historical perspective to help the reader understand the circumstances that led the NYPD toward this new approach. This chapter also presents a statistical analysis of crimes within four police precincts to determine whether this new model contributed to an increase or reduction in crime.

Chapter IV describes the second component of precision policing: neighborhood coordination. This chapter describes various models of policing previously implemented by the NYPD to develop trust between the police and communities. It then measures community trust by presenting a comparative analysis of civilian complaints filed against police officers before and after the implementation of the policy.

Chapter V analyzes whether the NYPD's precision policing model might be considered a "smart practice" that could be adopted by other municipalities. Chapter VI then concludes the thesis by reviewing the findings of the research and making four recommendations for future research. These recommendations could be beneficial in further reducing crime and enhancing relationships with the public.

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II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE NYPD'S PRECISION POLICING

This chapter details the restructuring of the resources within police precincts and the unification of investigative units under precision policing. The chapter examines and defines how the previous model of disparate investigations transformed into the new unified investigative model. It also details the structure of many units within all police precincts before and after the implementation of precision policing. Finally, the chapter focuses on the benefits and challenges of the staffing restructuring in both models to reveal whether increased staffing led to crime reduction after the implementation of precision policing.

A. INVESTIGATIVE UNITS OF THE PREVIOUS MODEL

Before detailing previous models and approaches, defining such investigative entities is important.

(1) Detective Bureau

The Detective Bureau of the NYPD detected and investigated crimes to prevent future violence. The Detective Bureau investigated homicides, shootings, serious assaults, rapes, robberies, and burglaries.⁵⁷

(2) Organized Crime Control Bureau

After the Knapp commission hearings examined a corruption scandal, followed by a recession and a push toward a more professional police department, massive restructuring took place in the 1980s.⁵⁸ The Organized Crime Control Bureau (OCCB) was formed to address widespread corruption, mismanagement within the NYPD, public trust, and drug enforcement.⁵⁹ The creation of this new bureau resolved many of the aforementioned

⁵⁷ "Bureaus," New York City Police Department, accessed January 16, 2020, <https://www1.nyc.gov/site/nypd/bureaus/bureaus.page>.

⁵⁸ John Dombrink, "The Touchables: Vice and Police Corruption in the 1980's," *Law and Contemporary Problems* 51, no. 1 (1988): 201, <https://doi.org/10.2307/1191720>.

⁵⁹ Dombrink.

concerns. The OCCB primarily conducted investigations for narcotics, gangs, vice enforcement, auto crime, firearm suppression, and organized crime investigations. A three-star chief or deputy commissioner who reported directly to the chief of the NYPD oversaw this department.⁶⁰

(3) Narcotics Division

The Narcotics Division worked within the OCCB and dealt with enforcement and the dismantling of narcotics organizations. The primary investigative tool used by the narcotics division was the buy-and-bust operation through undercover officers to reach the highest source of organizations and cartels.⁶¹

(4) Gang Division

The Gang Division also fell under the hierarchy of the OCCB and was primarily responsible for identifying members of gangs and crews and establishing a plan to dismantle organized criminal groups through intelligence, enforcement, and well-collaborated prosecutions. The Gang Division worked with local schools, community members, and social media to identify and monitor the activities, recruitment strategies, and motivational factors that led these crews and gangs to commit acts of violence.⁶²

B. PRECINCT STAFFING IN THE PREVIOUS MODEL

The NYPD also changed and restructured precinct personnel after the implementation of precision policing under the NCO component. Previously, the following units were part of every precinct.

⁶⁰ New York City Police Department.

⁶¹ New York City Police Department.

⁶² New York City Police Department.

(1) Conditions Unit

Conditions Units addressed local problems ranging from quality-of-life problems to various crimes. The police officers assigned to Conditions Units worked in uniform and addressed all local problems by issuing summonses and effecting arrests.⁶³

(2) Street Narcotics Enforcement Unit

The Street Narcotics Enforcement Unit (SNEU) addressed local narcotics issues within a precinct by directly observing either narcotics sales or use. Unlike the Narcotics Division, the SNEU did not use undercover officers and confidential informants to purchase narcotics. The SNEU remained within a precinct and relied strictly on observations before taking any enforcement actions.⁶⁴

(3) Anti-crime Unit

Anti-Crime Unit officers patrolled in plain clothes and addressed crimes of robbery, burglary, and weapons in progress. This unit remained intact, even after the implementation of precision policing.⁶⁵

(4) Impact Unit

Impact Unit police officers also worked in uniform and foot-patrolled a small area to suppress violent crimes there by strictly enforcing quality-of-life violations and various crimes.⁶⁶

⁶³ Smith and Purtell, *An Empirical Assessment*.

⁶⁴ Smith and Purtell.

⁶⁵ Smith and Purtell.

⁶⁶ Smith and Purtell.

C. COMPSTAT

The NYPD started using computer statistics (CompStat) in 1994.⁶⁷ CompStat meetings occurred on a weekly basis and served as a management tool for the top brass to question local precinct commanders about resource deployments, crime spikes, and investigations into various violent crimes.⁶⁸ The top brass also uses this forum for future crime-control strategies. By discussing crime and personnel accountability, the NYPD used this forum to disseminate crime-control strategies to the entire police department.⁶⁹

D. PREVIOUS MODELS

The NYPD's previous model had two investigative bureaus responsible for criminal investigations; see Figure 1. Both bureau chiefs reported to the chief, the highest uniformed member of the police department. All organized crimes that included narcotics, gangs, vice, or vehicles were investigated by the chief of the OCCB. All other crimes, including homicides, shootings, serious assaults, robberies, and burglaries, were investigated by the chief of detectives.




Figure 1. Previous Model for Chief Reporting

⁶⁷ Bureau of Justice Assistance and Police Executive Research Forum, *CompStat: Its Origins, Evolution, and Future in Law Enforcement Agencies* (Washington, DC: Police Executive Research Forum, 2013), <https://www.bja.gov/Publications/PERF-Compstat.pdf>.

⁶⁸ Bureau of Justice Assistance and Police Executive Research Forum.

⁶⁹ Bureau of Justice Assistance and Police Executive Research Forum.

In many instances, homicides and shootings, for example, were motivated by either gangs or the narcotics trade. Having two different bureau detectives work to resolve the same crime could have worked; however, as they worked for separate chiefs, little collaboration happened in these investigations. The detectives assigned to the DB focused only on the identification of the perpetrator without much knowledge or expertise in the root cause of the crime. Without a means to identify the root cause, future violence was difficult to predict, and accurate focus was difficult to develop.⁷⁰

The detectives from Narcotics and Gang Units conducted investigations from their perspective, which was never shared with DB detectives. In the previous model, CompStat had been used as an accountability forum to ensure that various detectives from these units working the same investigation had been sharing information. However, CompStat failed to meet its intended purpose because OCCB detectives did not understand DB investigations, and DB detectives did not understand those of the OCCB. Therefore, detectives from these two investigative bureaus did not share valuable investigative information to determine the root cause of violent criminal behavior and stop further retaliatory violence.

E. THE CURRENT NYPD INVESTIGATIVE MODEL

Under the current investigative approach, both the DB and OCCB were merged under the chief of detectives to eliminate the OCCB's chief position.⁷¹ Additionally, the DB created new units to oversee gun crimes and suppress gun violence.⁷² With this new approach, the chief of detectives created violence reduction task forces, comprising precinct detectives, patrol officers, gang detectives, narcotics detectives, and others, to target violent groups and investigate them comprehensively.⁷³ One goal achieved by this

⁷⁰ Per-Olof H. Wikström, "Why Crime Happens: A Situational Action Theory," in *Analytical Sociology*, ed. Gianluca Manzo (Chichester, UK: Wiley, 2014), 71–94, <https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118762707.ch03>.

⁷¹ Southall, "Reorganizing to Focus More on Gangs."

⁷² William J. Bratton, "NYPD up to the Challenge of Gang Violence: Commissioner Bratton," *New York Daily News*, December 13, 2015, <https://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/nyc-crime/nypd-challenge-gang-violence-bratton-article-1.2464755>.

⁷³ Bratton.

restructuring was improved coordination between all investigative units.⁷⁴ In this new investigative model, various expert detectives could identify the organizational structure of different street gangs involved in the narcotics trade as well as shooting incidents that were initiated for protection or in competition with rival gangs.⁷⁵ Figure 2 is an organizational chart that explains the new chain-of-command structure.




Figure 2. Current NYPD Investigative Model⁷⁶

(1) Borough Investigative Chiefs

Under the current investigative approach, Manhattan, Brooklyn, and Queens have been divided into north and south boroughs due to their large size and populations; Bronx and Staten Island have not been divided. In each of these eight boroughs, designated investigative chiefs coordinate all investigative work and bring uniformity to all

⁷⁴ Liz Cho et al., “Exclusive: A Look at NYPD ‘Precision Policing’ Targeting Violent Gangs,” ABC 7 New York, December 13, 2016, <https://abc7ny.com/news/exclusive-a-look-at-nypd-precision-policing-targeting-violent-gangs/1654336/>.

⁷⁵ Cho et al.

⁷⁶ Adapted from “Leadership,” New York City Police Department, accessed February 9, 2020, <https://www1.nyc.gov/site/nypd/about/leadership/leadership-landing.page>.

investigations. These investigative chiefs oversee local precinct Detective, Gang, Narcotics, Homicide, and Overdose Squads.⁷⁷

(2) Gang Squad

Gang Squad detectives work closely with schools, community groups, and other law enforcement members to identify local gangs and crews. They also monitor social media constantly for gang and crew identification. Their primary goal is to develop actionable intelligence upon learning about such gangs or crews and advance that knowledge into targeted enforcement that leads ultimately to prosecution. These detectives study methods of recruitment, gang-motivated crimes, and gang activity on a daily basis.⁷⁸

(3) Narcotics Borough

Narcotics Borough detectives work within each respective borough and conduct investigations and enforcement based on narcotics complaints either from the community or other law enforcement partners. Most of their investigations begin with street-level narcotics enforcement with the goal of dismantling narcotics organizations.⁷⁹

(4) Precinct Detective Squad

Precinct Detective Squads (PDSs) work from each precinct, 77 in total, and investigate most of the crimes within that precinct. Precinct squad detectives investigate everything from shootings to homicides to petty theft and work closely with patrol and other investigative units to investigate, solve, and prevent crimes.⁸⁰

F. BENEFITS AND CHALLENGES OF THE UNIFIED INVESTIGATIVE MODEL

The unification of investigative units under a single chain of command has some benefits. With the new structure, one chief presides over the flow of information and takes

⁷⁷ New York City Police Department.

⁷⁸ New York City Police Department.

⁷⁹ New York City Police Department.

⁸⁰ New York City Police Department.

responsibility for investigations. With the current model, during homicide investigations, many stakeholders target the enforcement efforts against rival gangs or narcotics crews to dismantle them effectively.⁸¹ As a result, police more precisely identify these gangs and crews to disrupt their trade more quickly.⁸²

This unification also opens new avenues for prosecutions in local and federal courts. Traditionally, PDS detectives responsible for conducting most violent investigations had not been knowledgeable about federal statutes and the nexus between local shooting incidents and gangs that could lead to further violence. Detectives assigned to units of the OCCB had extensive knowledge of federal and local prosecutions to eliminate criminal enterprises. Unifying investigative entities has been a proven tool in crime reduction because PDS detectives and gang detectives work jointly toward the same mission.⁸³

Although many benefits accompany this new model, some challenges still exist. One of the biggest challenges is that detectives from one respective field do not always recognize the perspectives and expertise of their colleagues from another field. Many major investigations have many common motivations. For example, detectives from various backgrounds come together in an investigation when a homicide victim is part of a gang and has been shot due to a narcotics-related territorial dispute with a rival gang member. However, detectives working in narcotics, gang, and vice enforcement have no understanding of actual homicide investigations, and homicide detectives understand little of the others' investigations. The new unified investigative model is an important component of the targeted approach adopted under predictive analysis policing. With this unification, multiple specialist detectives contribute simultaneously toward the identification of motive and the development of recidivist patterns to stop further violence. These unified investigative efforts, combined with predictive analysis as discussed in

⁸¹ Tina Moore, "NYPD Shakes up Mafia Investigation Unit," *New York Post*, February 9, 2016, <https://nypost.com/2016/02/09/nypd-shuts-down-mafia-investigation-unit/>.

⁸² Rafael A. Mangual, "No, NYC Can't Afford to Stop Tracking Gang Members," *New York Post*, December 24, 2019, <https://nypost.com/2019/12/24/no-nyc-cant-afford-to-stop-tracking-gang-members/>.

⁸³ Bratton, "NYPD up to the Challenge."

Chapter III and combined with community outreach intervention as discussed in Chapter IV, have led to reduced crime and increased community trust.

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III. PREDICTIVE POLICING ANALYSIS

This chapter evaluates and analyzes the targeted investigative approach of the NYPD. This approach depends on an analysis of crime hot spots and repeat offenders identified by predictive policing algorithms; then, rather than sending more police officers in higher-crime areas to suppress crimes with a police presence, predictive policing uses NCOs for crime prevention and intervention, as explained in Chapter IV. This chapter compares four NYPD precincts before and after the implementation of precision policing—through arrest, crime, and staffing numbers as well as structure, technology, and use of the new investigative approach—to uncover the cause of crime reduction. The analysis reveals that violent crime has been declining despite decreased numbers of arrests, summonses, and staffing.

A. BACKGROUND AND PREVIOUS APPROACHES

The NYPD has introduced many innovations to policing over the past 50 years, particularly after the corruption scandal investigated by the Knapp commission.⁸⁴ New York City suffered an exponential crime increase in the 1980s that could be linked to the narcotics trade.⁸⁵ The spike in the number of murders from 1,392 in 1985 to 2,262 in 1990 represents this crime surge.⁸⁶ As detailed in previous chapters, the NYPD employed various policing models leading up to precision policing. Previously, the NYPD had reacted to acts of violence such as shootings, homicides, or robberies in areas by sending more police officers to enforce minor crimes.⁸⁷ The NYPD believed that less enforcement of minor crimes in these areas caused greater, more violent crimes later. At the time, the department did not have a database of perpetrators from which to analyze violent

⁸⁴ Dombrink, “The Touchables.”

⁸⁵ Dombrink.

⁸⁶ George James, “New York Killings Set a Record, While Other Crimes Fell in 1990,” *New York Times*, April 23, 1991, <https://www.nytimes.com/1991/04/23/nyregion/new-york-killings-set-a-record-while-other-crimes-fell-in-1990.html>.

⁸⁷ Smith and Purtell, *An Empirical Assessment*.

recidivists. Moreover, it did not study gang rivalries to understand the root cause of retaliatory violence, which would have allowed preemptive intervention.⁸⁸

In 2014, after William Bratton became the NYPD police commissioner for a second tenure, his primary goal was to mend the police–community relationship while achieving crime reduction. Reconstructing such relationships would depend on the identification of gangs and the development of a recidivism database thanks to the algorithms used in predictive policing.⁸⁹

B. CRIME STATISTICS UNDER THE OLD MODEL IN 2013

For this study, four NYPD precincts were selected because they were the early adaptors of the precision policing model in 2014. These precincts lie in three different boroughs of NYC and encompass a range of ethnic and racial groups of residents. This section analyzes geographic diversity, staffing structure, crime numbers, arrest numbers, technology, and training before the adoption of precision policing model.

1. 33rd Precinct

The NYPD’s 33rd Precinct lies in the northern part of Manhattan, otherwise known as Washington Heights.⁹⁰ The precinct covers large residential and commercial areas. It is culturally rich as residents encompass immigrants from various countries. However, this area reflects immigrants predominantly from the Dominican Republic and is densely populated and congested. This area is a combination of various multi-family residential buildings as well as many small businesses and historic sites.⁹¹ Twenty-eight houses of worship for many religions lie within the confines of this precinct, and the residents are of various racial groups including white, black, Hispanic, and Asian.⁹²

⁸⁸ Smith and Purtell.

⁸⁹ Bratton and Murad, “How Precision Policing Made New York Even Safer.”

⁹⁰ “33rd Precinct,” New York City Police Department, accessed December 3, 2019, <https://www1.nyc.gov/site/nypd/bureaus/patrol/precincts/33rd-precinct.page>.

⁹¹ New York City Police Department.

⁹² New York City Police Department.

In 2013, the precinct staff included 220 personnel comprising 196 police officers, 31 sergeants, 11 lieutenants, and two captains. At that time, the staffing structure of the precinct reflected the old model: 16 police officers and two sergeants worked on the Conditions Unit, eight police officers and one sergeant the SNEU, 10 police officers and two sergeants the Anti-Crime Unit, and 30 police officers, one sergeant, and one lieutenant the Impact Unit. The remainder of the workforce served as patrol officers whose primary function was responding to 9-1-1 calls for service.⁹³ In 2013, the NYPD was not technologically advanced.⁹⁴ Police officers had no mobile cellphone devices, but some police vehicles had mobile digital terminals to run queries. Neither did police officers have body worn cameras (BWCs) or tasers.

The NYPD has participated in the Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) system established by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.⁹⁵ In 2013, the 927 total UCR crimes recorded in this precinct ranked it number 65 out of 77 precincts.⁹⁶ These crimes included two murders, 202 robberies, and 200 felonious assaults. Likewise, there were eight victims of non-fatal shootings in seven incidents. The precinct recorded 5,462 arrests and 29,395 various summonses.⁹⁷ Figure 3 shows the map of the 33rd Precinct.

⁹³ New York City Police Department's Personnel Online System for Transfers Database, unpublished data, November 26, 2019.

⁹⁴ New York City Police Department's Personnel Online System for Transfers Database.

⁹⁵ "Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program," Federal Bureau of Investigation, accessed December 3, 2019, <https://www.fbi.gov/services/cjis/ucr>.

⁹⁶ William J. Bratton, John Bilich, and Philip Banks III, *CompStat: Year End 2013* (New York: New York City Police Department, January 17, 2014), 123.

⁹⁷ Bratton, Bilich, and Banks.



Figure 3. Map of the NYPD's 33rd Precinct⁹⁸

2. 43rd Precinct

The NYPD's 43rd Precinct lies in southeast Bronx, covering approximately four square miles, including Soundview, Castle Hill, and Parkchester.⁹⁹ This precinct is a much larger area than the 33rd and 34th Precincts. The majority of the 43rd Precinct is residential, but it also has many commercial corridors and malls. The precinct is politically complex due to its ethnic makeup. The majority of the precinct's residents are of Puerto Rican descent. This precinct also has a large African-American population as well as residents from small migrant communities in Mexico, the Dominican Republic, and Bangladesh.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁸ Source: "Find Your Precinct and Sector," New York City Police Department, accessed January 16, 2020, <https://www1.nyc.gov/site/nypd/bureaus/patrol/find-your-precinct.page>.

⁹⁹ "43rd Precinct," New York City Police Department, accessed December 14, 2019, <https://www1.nyc.gov/site/nypd/bureaus/patrol/precincts/43rd-precinct.page>.

¹⁰⁰ New York City Police Department.

In 2013, the precinct staff included 375 personnel comprising 334 police officers, 34 sergeants, 14 lieutenants, and four captains.¹⁰¹ Its staffing structure reflected the old model: 16 police officers and two sergeants were assigned to the Conditions Unit, eight police officers and one sergeant to the SNEU, 10 police officers and two sergeants to the Anti-Crime Unit, and 30 police officers, one sergeant, and one lieutenant to the Impact Unit. The remainder of the workforce served as patrol officers whose primary function was responding to 9-1-1 calls for service.¹⁰² Like the other NYPD precincts in 2013, the 43rd Precinct was not technologically advanced

In 2013, this precinct reported a total of 2,480 UCR crimes, which ranked it the third highest crime district among the 77 precincts.¹⁰³ These crimes included nine murders, 586 robberies, and 600 felonious assaults. Non-fatal shootings involved 30 victims in 26 incidents. The precinct recorded 8,134 arrests and 25,817 various summonses.¹⁰⁴ Figure 4 shows the map of the 43rd Precinct.

¹⁰¹ New York City Police Department's Personnel Online System for Transfers Database, unpublished data, November 26, 2019.

¹⁰² New York City Police Department's Personnel Online System for Transfers Database.

¹⁰³ Bratton, Bilich, and Banks, *CompStat*.

¹⁰⁴ Bratton, Bilich, and Banks.

The precinct was staffed with 385 personnel comprising 351 police officers, 35 sergeants, 11 lieutenants, and two captains.¹⁰⁹ In 2013, none of the police officers were equipped with police department mobile cellphones. Some police vehicles had mobile digital terminals for various database checks, but most officers utilized their handheld very high frequency radios for checks such as warrants and license information. In 2013, police officers were not equipped with BWCs, departmental cellphones, or tasers.

In 2013, the staffing structure of the precinct was under the old model: 16 police officers and two sergeants were assigned to the Conditions Unit, eight police officers and one sergeant to the SNEU, 10 police officers and two sergeants to the Anti-Crime Unit, and 30 police officers, one sergeant, and one lieutenant to the Impact Unit. The remainder of the workforce served as patrol officers whose primary function was responding to 9-1-1 calls for service.¹¹⁰

In 2013, the 67th precinct reported a total of 2,383 UCR crimes, ranking it the fourth highest crime district out of 77 precincts.¹¹¹ These crimes included 11 murders, 519 robberies, and 569 felonious assaults. Non-fatal shootings involved 93 victims in 63 incidents. The precinct recorded 7,004 arrests and 42,591 various summonses.¹¹² Figure 5 shows the map of the 67th Precinct.

¹⁰⁹ New York City Police Department's Personnel Online System for Transfers Database, unpublished data, November 26, 2019.

¹¹⁰ New York City Police Department's Personnel Online System for Transfers Database.

¹¹¹ Bratton, Bilich, and Banks, *CompStat*.

¹¹² Bratton, Bilich, and Banks.




Figure 5. Map of the NYPD’s 67th Precinct¹¹³

4. 100th Precinct

The 100th Precinct covers the southern areas of Queens encompassing the Rockaways, Breezy Point, and Bell Harbor.¹¹⁴ Regarding racial demographics of this area, African Americans make up approximately 44.7 percent, whites 25.5 percent, and many other races small percentages of the population.¹¹⁵ This very diverse neighborhood contains immigrants from Guyana, Jamaica, Russia, and Ukraine. Most of the precinct is residential and attracts many tourists to its beautiful beach during the summer months.¹¹⁶

The precinct staff included 150 personnel comprising 121 police officers, 22 sergeants, six lieutenants, and one captain.¹¹⁷ In 2013, the staffing structure of the precinct reflected the old model: 16 police officers and two sergeants were assigned to the

¹¹³ Source: New York City Police Department, “Find Your Precinct and Sector.”

¹¹⁴ “100th Precinct,” New York City Police Department, accessed December 14, 2019, <https://www1.nyc.gov/site/nypd/bureaus/patrol/precincts/100th-precinct.page>.

¹¹⁵ Official Website of the City of New York, “Total Population.”

¹¹⁶ New York City Police Department, “100th Precinct.”

¹¹⁷ New York City Police Department’s Personnel Online System for Transfers Database, unpublished data, November 26, 2019.

Conditions Unit, eight police officers and one sergeant to the SNEU, 10 police officers and two sergeants to the Anti-Crime Unit, and 30 police officers, one sergeant, and one lieutenant to the Impact unit. The remainder of the workforce served as patrol officers whose primary function was responding to 9-1-1 calls for service.¹¹⁸ In 2013, this precinct was not technologically advanced. Police officers had no mobile cellphones, BWS, or tasers, but some police vehicles had mobile digital terminals to run queries.

In 2013, the 100th Precinct reported 558 UCR crimes, which ranked it number 75 out of 77 precincts.¹¹⁹ These crimes included three murders, 61 robberies, and 147 felonious assaults. There were nine victims of non-fatal shootings in three incidents. The precinct recorded 1,861 arrests and 15,185 various summonses.¹²⁰ Figure 6 shows the map of the 100th precinct.




Figure 6. Map of the NYPD's 100th Precinct¹²¹

¹¹⁸ New York City Police Department's Personnel Online System for Transfers Database.

¹¹⁹ Bratton, Bilich, and Banks, *CompStat*.

¹²⁰ Bratton, Bilich, and Banks.

¹²¹ Source: New York City Police Department, "Find Your Precinct and Sector."

C. THE CURRENT APPROACH'S IMPACT ON GANG AND ORGANIZED CRIME PROSECUTIONS

One major change that accompanied precision policing included developing more cases under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization (RICO) Act to combat many organized crimes.¹²² Precisely identifying gang members involved in organized crime built the foundation for prosecuting these cases.¹²³ RICO cases are evidence-based and long-term and require extensive interagency collaboration. As the NYPD's Commissioner Shea describes,

Targeting and dismantling gangs and crews, and preventing the violence so often associated with their illegal activities, continues to be among the highest priorities for the NYPD. We continue . . . relentlessly with our law enforcement partners to identify, arrest, and build the strongest possible cases to hold to account anyone who involves themselves in such behavior.¹²⁴

In coordination with NCOs, Gang and Social Media Analysis and Research Team (SMART) Units started to create a recidivism database and develop methodologies for learning about repeat offenders. Such technological advances within the police department communicated the severity of recidivists to all police officers instead of isolating the information among executives and investigators. The department also began collecting more DNA evidence and comparing that DNA with similar crimes through forensic laboratory work. Moreover, under new approach and with advancements in technology, the department has digitized some old investigative techniques such as prisoner debriefing to share intelligence and information with stakeholders.

Under the predictive policing paradigm, identifying gangs and crews to tackle repeat offenders falls under the RICO doctrine. For this purpose, the NYPD has developed

¹²² Department of Justice, "RICO Charges," in *Criminal Resource Manual* (Washington, DC: Department of Justice, 2020), § 109, <https://www.justice.gov/jm/criminal-resource-manual-109-rico-charges>.

¹²³ "Leaders of Latin Kings Set Charged in Manhattan Federal Court with Racketeering, Narcotics, and Firearms Offenses," U.S. Attorney's Office, Southern District of New York, December 5, 2019, <https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/leaders-latin-kings-set-charged-manhattan-federal-court-racketeering-narcotics-and>.

¹²⁴ U.S. Attorney's Office, Southern District of New York.

an initiative called Ceasefire, which is similar to a Chicago initiative that uses heat maps.¹²⁵ Theoretically, its prediction of crimes is combined with intervention to develop better social opportunities, particularly for the youngest and most vulnerable segments of society. Such crime prediction involves other elements of civil society to intervene in ways other than policing, including providing young people with access to public parks and libraries.

Ceasefire is a comprehensive violence prevention strategy used to address gang violence in NYC.¹²⁶ This strategy promotes coordination and trust among various groups including social services, the community, and the police department to openly involve members of violent gangs, providing them with various opportunities to remain non-violent members of society.¹²⁷ The message is simple: let gang members know that the NYPD wants them alive, safe, and out of the prison system—and they can either stop the violence or face real consequences.¹²⁸ The police department and other involved stakeholders assure crew and gang members that they are willing to help and provide services.¹²⁹ Each member identified as a potential catalyst for violence or who could retaliate receives a custom letter offering him services and warning him not to carry out violent acts by detailing consequences. Presently, the impact of this initiative is unknown because it has been in place for too short a time to measure its results.¹³⁰

1. 33rd Precinct

The NYPD has made huge technological strides since 2013. All police officers have BWCs, cellphones capable of doing most investigative searches, and tasers. In precincts, the NCO model has eliminated specialty units, such as the SNEU and Conditions Unit, as

¹²⁵ Matt Stroud, “The Minority Report: Chicago’s New Police Computer Predicts Crimes, but Is It Racist?,” *Verge*, February 19, 2014, <https://www.theverge.com/2014/2/19/5419854/the-minority-report-this-computer-predicts-crime-but-is-it-racist>.

¹²⁶ Abigail Kramer, “Ceasefire: The NYPD Zeroes in on Violent Crime,” *City & State New York*, May 1, 2015, <https://www.cityandstateny.com/articles/politics/new-york-city/ceasefire-the-nypd-zeroes-in-on-violent-crime.html>.

¹²⁷ Kramer.

¹²⁸ “Collaborative Policing,” New York City Police Department, accessed January 16, 2020, <https://www1.nyc.gov/site/nypd/bureaus/administrative/collaborative-policing.page>.

¹²⁹ New York City Police Department.

¹³⁰ New York City Police Department.

well as school safety officers as most of these tasks have been absorbed by sector NCOs. In 2019, the 33rd Precinct has a total of 185 personnel, comprising 156 police officers, 21 sergeants, six lieutenants, and two captains, or 16 percent fewer staff members than in 2013.¹³¹ In 2019, a total of 778 UCR crimes were recorded in this precinct, a reduction of 16.5 percent from the 2013 total of 932, which ranks it at 65 out of 77 precincts.¹³² These crimes included four murders, 146 robberies, and 201 felonious assaults. Non-fatal shootings involved seven victims in 65 incidents. The precinct recorded 2,209 arrests and 14,041 various summonses.¹³³ Arrests were down 65 percent since the inception of precision policing. Figure 7 depicts UCR crime trends for the 33rd Precinct from 2010 to 2019.




Figure 7. 33rd Precinct Crime Trends¹³⁴

¹³¹ New York City Police Department’s Personnel Online System for Transfers Database, unpublished data, November 26, 2019.

¹³² Dermot F. Shea, Michael J. LiPetri, and Terence A. Monahan, *CompStat: Year End 2019 Preliminary* (New York: New York City Police Department, January 1, 2020), 136.

¹³³ Shea, LiPetri, and Monahan.

¹³⁴ Adapted from Bratton, Bilich, and Banks, *CompStat*; Shea, LiPetri, and Monahan, *CompStat*.

2. 43rd Precinct

The staffing structure in 2019 for the 43rd Precinct features 244 police officers, 21 sergeants, five lieutenants, and two captains, totaling 275 assigned personnel and representing a 26.7 percent decrease in staff since 2013.¹³⁵ In 2019, a total of 1,863 UCR crimes were recorded in this precinct, ranking it 11 out of 77 precincts and representing a 25 percent decrease in crime since the start of precision policing.¹³⁶ These crimes included five murders, 359 robberies, and 557 felonious assaults. Non-fatal shootings involved 15 victims in 13 incidents. The precinct recorded 4,007 arrests and 19,219 various summonses.¹³⁷ Figure 8 depicts UCR crime trends for the 43rd Precinct from 2010 to 2019.




Figure 8. 43rd Precinct Crime Trends¹³⁸

¹³⁵ New York City Police Department's Personnel Online System for Transfers Database, unpublished data, November 26, 2019.

¹³⁶ Shea, LiPetri, and Monahan, *CompStat*.

¹³⁷ Shea, LiPetri, and Monahan.

¹³⁸ Adapted from Bratton, Bilich, and Banks, *CompStat*; Shea, LiPetri, and Monahan, *CompStat*.

3. 67th Precinct

The staffing structure in 2019 for the 67th Precinct has 283 police officers, 28 sergeants, eight lieutenants, and two captains, totaling 321 personnel.¹³⁹ In 2019, a total of 1,630 UCR crimes in this precinct gave it a ranking of 14 out of 77 precincts, or a 32 percent decrease in crime since the adoption of precision policing.¹⁴⁰ These crimes included seven murders, 235 robberies, and 485 felonious assaults. Non-fatal shootings affected 39 victims in 29 incidents. The precinct recorded 4,038 arrests and 20,392 various summonses.¹⁴¹ Figure 9 depicts UCR crime trends for the 67th Precinct from 2010 to 2019.




Figure 9. 67th Precinct Crime Trends¹⁴²

¹³⁹ New York City Police Department's Personnel Online System for Transfers Database, unpublished data, November 26, 2019.

¹⁴⁰ Shea, LiPetri, and Monahan, *CompStat*.

¹⁴¹ Shea, LiPetri, and Monahan.

¹⁴² Adapted from Bratton, Bilich, and Banks, *CompStat*; Shea, LiPetri, and Monahan, *CompStat*.

4. 100th Precinct

The staffing structure in 2019 for the 100th Precinct has 116 police officers, 18 sergeants, six lieutenants, and one captain, totaling 141 personnel or a 6 percent reduction in staff since 2013.¹⁴³ In 2019, a total of 452 UCR crimes were recorded in this precinct, ranking it number 69 out of 77 precincts and representing a 19.2 percent reduction in crime since 2013.¹⁴⁴ These crimes included two murders, 40 robberies, and 144 felonious assaults. Non-fatal shootings affected five victims in three incidents. The precinct recorded 1,358 arrests and 11,071 various summonses.¹⁴⁵ Figure 10 depicts UCR crime trends for the 100th Precinct from 2010 to 2019, and Table 1 summarizes the statistics for key crimes in all four precincts.




Figure 10. 100th Precinct Crime Trends¹⁴⁶

¹⁴³ New York City Police Department's Personnel Online System for Transfers Database, unpublished data, November 26, 2019.

¹⁴⁴ Shea, LiPetri, and Monahan, *CompStat*.

¹⁴⁵ Shea, LiPetri, and Monahan.

¹⁴⁶ Adapted from Bratton, Bilich, and Banks, *CompStat*; Shea, LiPetri, and Monahan, *CompStat*.

Table 1. UCR Crimes in Four NYPD Precincts, 2013 vs. 2019¹⁴⁷

Year	33rd Precinct		43rd Precinct		67th Precinct		100th Precinct	
	2013	2019	2013	2019	2013	2019	2013	2019
Total UCR	927	778	2,480	1,293	2,383	1,630	558	452
Murder	2	4	9	5	11	7	3	2
Shootings	7	6	26	13	63	29	3	3
Shooting Victims	8	7	30	15	92	33	9	3
Robbery	202	146	586	359	519	235	61	40
Assault	200	201	600	557	569	485	147	144
Arrest	5,462	2,209	8,134	4,007	7,004	4,038	1,861	1,358
Summonses	29,395	14,041	25,817	19,219	42,591	20,392	15,185	10,506

D. CONCLUSION

This study has demonstrated that the UCR crimes all dropped in the four selected precincts. UCR crimes fell by 16.5 percent for the 33rd Precinct, 48 percent for the 43rd, 32 percent for the 67th, and 32 percent for the 100th. Additionally, in three out of four precincts, shootings dropped sharply: the 43rd precinct decreased by 54 percent, the 67th by 48 percent, and the 100th by 33 percent, while the 33rd saw no change. Likewise, the number of arrests declined since the implementation of precision policing: the 33rd Precinct saw 65 percent fewer arrests, the 43rd 58 percent fewer, the 67th 42 percent fewer, and the 100th 36 percent fewer. These findings suggest that crime reduction followed the new model in all four of these districts across most categories, even as the number of officers dropped.

¹⁴⁷ Adapted from Bratton, Bilich, and Banks, *CompStat*, 123; Shea, LiPetri, and Monahan, *CompStat*.

It would seem that the number of personnel alone does not have any major impact on reducing crime because staffing has continually declined within these precincts just as crime has. There have been several changes in approach toward community interactions; the creation of NCOs, development of hot spots, and predictive analysis for recidivism are key components of precision policing. The number of factors considered for this thesis shows that crime reduction was not achieved by increasing the number of police officers, technological advancements, arrests, or summonses. However, this subject requires further studies and research to consider other potential factors such as socioeconomic changes and education. By merely looking at crime trends, a conclusion could be drawn that predictive policing was responsible for reducing crime in NYC. However, it would be unreasonable to credit precision policing without considering many other factors.

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IV. COMMUNITY OUTREACH ANALYSIS

This chapter analyzes the trust between the police and communities in NYC using Civilian Complaint Review Board complaints as a measure. As with the previous chapter, this chapter compares the four selected precincts before and after the implementation of the NCO program to measure the program's effect. This chapter finds that NCOs have increased community trust.

A. BACKGROUND

Over the course of policing history, many different policing models have been employed, but community policing has been the most popular model thus far. Its critics have questioned whether it reduces crime or appeases communities with reduced enforcement. As Sir Robert Peel, founder of the Metropolitan Police, stated in 1829, "The basic mission for which the police exist is to prevent crime and disorder and the ability of police to perform their duties is dependent upon public approval of police actions."¹⁴⁸ The public's approval of which Peel spoke derives from elected officials in the form of policies. Prior to 2014, policing became divisive in America because of continued proactive policing measures for decades that exploded in three high-profile incidents across the nation: Michael Brown, Eric Garner, and Kimani Gray.¹⁴⁹ This thesis presents a historical perspective of the NYPD's various models of policing that evolved into today's NCO program, starting with CPOP. A detailed discussion of CPOP appeared in Chapter I of this thesis. Broken windows-style policing followed it.

1. Broken Windows Theory

The broken windows theory of policing emerged from George Kelling's claim that by averting minor crimes, more violent crimes could be prevented.¹⁵⁰ After being

¹⁴⁸ "Sir Robert Peel's Principles of Law Enforcement," Durham Constabulary, accessed February 9, 2020, https://www.durham.police.uk/about-us/documents/peels_principles_of_law_enforcement.pdf.

¹⁴⁹ Charles M. Blow, "The Perfect Victim Pitfall," *New York Times*, December 3, 2014, <https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/04/opinion/charles-blow-first-michael-brown-now-eric-garner.html>.

¹⁵⁰ Kelling and Sousa, *Do Police Matter?*, 32.

appointed in 1994, William Bratton used this strategy of policing, which proved successful in reducing quality-of-life issues and violent crimes, thus making New York a more livable city.¹⁵¹ However, over the course of the next 20 years, an astonishing level of enforcement and obsessive use of the stop, question, and frisk procedure unraveled the trust between the NYPD and the public.¹⁵² A policing tool known as a “Terry stop” was brought to light in a landmark decision by the Supreme Court in 1968 in *Terry v. Ohio*, ultimately causing the NYPD to change its approach.¹⁵³

The NYPD refers to Terry stops as stop, question, and frisk (SQF) reports. Not only did they continue years after Bratton had implemented them, but Raymond Kelly turned them into one of the key performance measurement tools for police officers. For Terry stops, police officers need only “reasonable suspicion that the stopped person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a penal felony or a misdemeanor.”¹⁵⁴ Moreover, the officers could officially use a reasonable amount of force. In 2013, the last year of Ray Kelly’s commissionership, the NYPD generated 191,851 SQF reports but reached its highest levels in 2011 with 685,724 citizens stopped.¹⁵⁵

In January 2014, when Kelly vacated the top cop position, trust between the police and their communities was at its lowest level. Trust is vital to keeping residents safe and to getting help from the residents in solving and reducing crimes. The NYPD also faced a lawsuit in *Floyd v. the City of New York*. Judge Scheindlin found the application of “Stop and Frisk by the NYPD . . . a violation of citizens’ constitutional rights.”¹⁵⁶ In this lawsuit, the plaintiff asserted that his Fourth and 14th Amendment rights had been violated with the

¹⁵¹ Bratton and Knobler, *Turnaround*.

¹⁵² Walton, “Zero Tolerance Policing,” 74.

¹⁵³ *Terry v. Ohio*, 392 S. Ct. 1 (1968), <https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/392/1/>.

¹⁵⁴ New York City Police Department, *Investigative Encounters: Requests for Information, Common Law Right of Inquiry and Level 3 Stops*, Procedure No. 212-11 (New York: New York City Police Department, October 19, 2018), 16, <https://www1.nyc.gov/site/nypd/about/about-nypd/patrol-guide.page>.

¹⁵⁵ “Stop-and-Frisk Data,” New York Civil Liberties Union, January 2, 2012, <https://www.nyclu.org/en/stop-and-frisk-data>.

¹⁵⁶ *Floyd v. City of New York*, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).

use of an SQF.¹⁵⁷ The Fourth Amendment protects citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures, and the 14th Amendment grants equal civil rights to citizens.¹⁵⁸ This landmark case highlighted tensions between public safety and the liberty of citizens, particularly over the use of SQF as a policing tool, and scrutinized its overuse, especially among minority communities.¹⁵⁹ The lawsuit brought many changes and reforms within the NYPD including the acquisition of BWCs and the appointment of an independent monitor by the federal government.¹⁶⁰ William Bratton was appointed in 2014 as Kelly's successor in part due to the *Floyd* case.¹⁶¹ A number of large protests due to nationwide events welcomed Bratton on his return to office.¹⁶² Overriding Kelly's legacy, Bratton's second commissionership saw SQFs fall to 45,787 in 2014 and decline further to their lowest levels in 2018, with only 1,683 recorded.¹⁶³

Bratton also introduced initiatives, such as the neighborhood coordination officer program, to develop a positive image of the police by advocating to the public that crime reduction is a shared responsibility.¹⁶⁴ Bratton claimed that implementing NCOs would increase trust between the police and communities. He distinguished NCOs from CPOPs by involving the entire police department, not only a small select group of police officers. NCOs set out to fulfill three goals: reduce crime, promote trust, and solve problems jointly at the local level.¹⁶⁵

¹⁵⁷ *Floyd*, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540.

¹⁵⁸ "The Constitution," White House, accessed January 12, 2020, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/about-the-white-house/the-constitution/>.

¹⁵⁹ *Floyd*, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540.

¹⁶⁰ *Floyd*, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540; Jessica L. Fangman, "Stop the 'Stop and Frisk?' How *Floyd v. City of New York* Will Limit the Power of Law Enforcement across the Nation," *Public Interest Law Reporter* 19, no. 1 (Fall 2013), <http://lawecommons.luc.edu/pilr/vol19/iss1/9>.

¹⁶¹ Fangman, "Stop the 'Stop and Frisk?'"

¹⁶² Blow, "The Perfect Victim Pitfall."

¹⁶³ New York Civil Liberties Union, "Stop-and-Frisk Data."

¹⁶⁴ William J. Bratton, "Cops Count, Police Matter: Preventing Crime and Disorder in the 21st Century," Lecture No. 1286 (Washington, DC: Heritage Foundation, March 27, 2018), <https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2018-03/HL1286.pdf>.

¹⁶⁵ New York City Police Department, *The Police Commissioner's Report*, vol. 80, no.1-2 (New York: New York City Police Department, January 2017), <https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/nypd/downloads/pdf/publications/pc-report-2017.pdf>.

2. Community Outreach through Neighborhood Coordination Officers

In 2014, the NYPD initiated the precision policing model with its neighborhood coordination program and gradually restructured the police department.¹⁶⁶ This restructuring helped to create NCOs within the precincts. It further eliminated most small units responsible for proactive enforcement.¹⁶⁷ With the implementation of NCOs, new sector boundaries have been established within each precinct.¹⁶⁸ A sector is a small geographical area within a precinct, and a precinct might have three to five sectors, depending on its size. Each sector has two NCOs assigned to address problems, and they are equipped with the resources of other agencies to provide guidance and assistance in resolving issues. In addition to two NCOs, two to four cars patrol the sector. The steady sector cars are driven by patrol officers who respond to 9-1-1 calls.¹⁶⁹ Finally, response autos, whose primary function is to backfill and supplement the steady sector cars, also patrol each sector.

The NYPD's new model of staffing designates the NCOs as the quarterbacks in all police-involved efforts.¹⁷⁰ The NCOs' primary goal is to fight crime and address minor community issues including conditions that could escalate into crime and disorder. NCOs design strategies to accomplish these goals jointly by developing plans with community and police partners.¹⁷¹ The NCO implementation pioneered the use of community meetings called "Build the Block."¹⁷² Each NCO sector holds meetings where members of the community engage in joint problem-solving to address neighborhood crime and quality-of-life issues.¹⁷³ These meetings provide a forum for the community on a small scale to

¹⁶⁶ Susan P. Crawford and Laura Adler, "Culture Change and Digital Technology: The NYPD under Commissioner William Bratton, 2014–2016," Publication No. 2016-13 (Cambridge, MA: Berkman Klein Center, September 12, 2016), <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2839004>.

¹⁶⁷ Crawford and Adler.

¹⁶⁸ Crawford and Adler.

¹⁶⁹ Crawford and Adler.

¹⁷⁰ Crawford and Adler.

¹⁷¹ Crawford and Adler.

¹⁷² "Find Your Build the Block Meeting," New York City Police Department, accessed January 12, 2020, <https://www1.nyc.gov/site/nypd/bureaus/patrol/find-your-meeting.page>.

¹⁷³ New York City Police Department.

learn about crime and safety concerns, as well as a voice to develop solutions for such issues.¹⁷⁴ As NCOs view local problems on a small scale, they also assist in identifying high-risk offenders, victims, and locations to target for special attention in the form of increased police presence, intervention, or enforcement or a change to the physical environment to reduce the likelihood of the problem occurring.

3. The Citizen Complaint Review Board

The NYC Civilian Complaint Review Board (CCRB) was established in 1993.¹⁷⁵ It is an oversight agency that functions independently and investigates complaints from civilians for alleged use of excessive force, abuse of authority, offensive language, and discourtesy.¹⁷⁶ The board retains the powers of investigation, subpoena, prosecution, and mediation to resolve complaints.¹⁷⁷ The CCRB represents an external oversight mechanism that provides remedies for citizens who are unhappy with the police, and it also instills a feeling of accountability for the NYPD. For this thesis, the CCRB acts as a proxy measure of trust between the citizens of NYC and the police department. For all of NYC in 2013, the CCRB received a total of 5,388 complaints, which have been on a steady decline to 4,745 in 2018.¹⁷⁸

The following subsections compare the same four precincts discussed in Chapter III to gauge whether the presence of NCOs has affected the number of CCRB complaints. Overall, the CCRB investigated 643 fewer complaints, which is an indication of increased trust between the citizens of NYC and the police. Figure 11 depicts the number of CCRB complaints for the entire city from 2006 to 2019.

¹⁷⁴ New York City Police Department.

¹⁷⁵ “About CCRB,” New York City Civilian Complaint Review Board, accessed December 18, 2019, <https://www1.nyc.gov/site/ccrb/about/about.page>.

¹⁷⁶ New York City Civilian Complaint Review Board.

¹⁷⁷ New York City Civilian Complaint Review Board.

¹⁷⁸ New York City Civilian Complaint Review Board, “Appendix A: CCRB Complaint Data 2013” (New York: New York City Civilian Complaint Review Board, 2013), https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/ccrb/downloads/pdf/policy_pdf/annual_bi-annual/2013_annual-appendix.pdf.




Figure 11. Complaints Received by the CCRB, 2006–2019¹⁷⁹

a. 33rd Police Precinct

In 2013, police officers assigned to the 33rd Precinct received a total of 314 CCRB complaints, which dropped to 216 in 2018.¹⁸⁰

b. 43rd Police Precinct

In 2013, police officers assigned to the 43rd Precinct received a total of 637 CCRB complaints, which fell to 436 at the end of 2018.¹⁸¹

¹⁷⁹ Source: “Complaint Activity Map,” New York City Civilian Complaint Review Board, accessed January 16, 2020, <https://www1.nyc.gov/site/ccrb/policy/complaint-activity-map.page>.

¹⁸⁰ New York City Civilian Complaint Review Board, “CCRB Complaint Data 2013”; New York City Civilian Complaint Review Board, “Appendix: CCRB Complaint Data 2018” (New York: New York City Civilian Complaint Review Board, 2019), https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/ccrb/downloads/pdf/policy_pdf/annual_bi-annual/2018_annual-appendix.pdf.

¹⁸¹ New York City Civilian Complaint Review Board, “CCRB Complaint Data 2013”; New York City Civilian Complaint Review Board, “CCRB Complaint Data 2018.”

c. 67th Police Precinct

In 2013, police officers assigned to the 67th Precinct received a total of 672 CCRB complaints, which declined to 517 at the end of 2018.¹⁸²

d. 100th Police Precinct

In 2013, police officers assigned to the 100th Precinct received a total of 28 CCRB complaints, which dropped to 27 at the end of 2018, a small reduction to an already low history of complaints.¹⁸³

B. CONCLUSION

A statistical analysis of CCRB complaints filed by the citizens of NYC shows that the number of complaints has decreased citywide. Additionally, the number of these complaints have decreased in the four precincts in question. A conclusion could be drawn that because complaints have dropped, trust must have increased. However, before reaching that conclusion, several factors must also be considered. The decreased number of complaints could also be a direct result of decreased enforcement. Chapter III of this thesis showed that the number of arrests, summonses, and SQF reports have all decreased tremendously. The reduced number of CCRB complaints could be a direct result of fewer enforcement interactions instead of increased trust between the police and communities. Without considering all other factors, it would be unjust to credit the NCO program with increased trust while using CCRB as a measure.

¹⁸² New York City Civilian Complaint Review Board, “CCRB Complaint Data 2013”; New York City Civilian Complaint Review Board, “CCRB Complaint Data 2018.”

¹⁸³ New York City Civilian Complaint Review Board, “CCRB Complaint Data 2013”; New York City Civilian Complaint Review Board, “CCRB Complaint Data 2018.”

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V. IS PRECISION POLICING A SMART PRACTICE?

This thesis has examined various phases of NYPD's policing models. Although precision policing has been touted for effectively reducing crime and improving the trust between the police and the public, it has not been extensively studied. Thus, the intent here has been to study its value and whether it has the potential for other contexts. To do so, this thesis used the smart practice concept.

A complete description of a smart practice involves four fundamentals: the explanation of a problem, the explanation of a practice, strengths of the practice, and vulnerabilities of the practice.¹⁸⁴ First, Eugene Bardach defines a practice as “a tangible and visible behavior.”¹⁸⁵ A practice could also be seen as a description of how such a practice requires an action to reach an objective. Bardach explains further that “some ideas are particularly clever. The practices that embody them we call ‘smart practices.’”¹⁸⁶ The simple tool in a smart practice is its potential to reach a goal at low cost.¹⁸⁷ Bardach explains that “a smart practice is made up of (1) the latent potential for creating value, plus (2) the mechanism for extracting and focusing that potential.”¹⁸⁸ A few such practices implemented by the NYPD in the precision policing model follow.

1. Evidence-Based Policing to Build Long-Term Cases

The practice of building evidence based on long-term cases has been effective in the new approach to combat organized crimes. The NYPD has been developing a recidivism database to identify the small group of people who are responsible for most of the violent crimes. The database is being used to build long-term, evidence-based cases that fall under RICO statutes for arresting violent gang members. Such cases require extensive interagency collaboration.

¹⁸⁴ Bardach, *A Practical Guide for Policy Analysis*.

¹⁸⁵ Bardach, 126.

¹⁸⁶ Bardach, 126.

¹⁸⁷ Bardach.

¹⁸⁸ Bardach, 131.

2. Interagency Collaboration

The NYPD has worked with multiple federal and local law enforcement agencies to develop and prosecute long-term RICO cases. The creation of violence reduction task forces within the new investigative model—which consists of precinct detectives, patrol officers, gang detectives, narcotics detectives, and federal agencies—to build cases against the most violent groups has been proven comprehensive strategy. These cases cannot be built without coordination within the agency because the structure of criminally organized groups is built through such coordination. Interagency coordination is also an important ingredient as prosecutions for RICO cases are led by federal courts.

3. Developing Build-the-Block Meetings with NCOs

NCOs view local issues on a local scale by holding joint problem-solving meetings with the community called Build the Block. These meetings are held at the sector level, which covers a very small area, to engage community members with joint problem-solving. These meeting also provide a forum where the community on a small scale learns about crime and safety concerns as well as voices solutions for such issues.¹⁸⁹ The goal of the NCOs is to resolve many issues with interventions before enforcement.

Precision policing combines the two concepts of predictive analysis and community policing. It has rearranged the entire structure of the NYPD around information and data science to develop better investigations of the suspects responsible for most crimes. For the implementation of precision policing, the NYPD modernized its intelligence and data systems and promoted community outreach through NCOs. Organizational changes affected every patrol precinct as well as all investigative entities by unifying all criminal investigative entities and creating better interagency collaboration. The development of the NCO program has shifted the focus to community collaboration. In a crime statistic briefing, New York City Mayor Bill de Blasio credited precision policing with the downward crime trend through the first half of 2019: “What’s working is neighborhood

¹⁸⁹ New York City Police Department, “Find Your Build the Block Meeting.”

policing. What’s working is precision policing.”¹⁹⁰ John Seabrook wrote in the *New Yorker* that “zero tolerance has been replaced by ‘precision policing’ and a focus on pacifying violent groups. Stop-and-frisk is on the way out, and violent crime continues to go down.”¹⁹¹

Analyzing crime statistics and CCRB data from before and after the implementation of precision policing demonstrates that crime has been on a constant decline, and fewer complaints are being made by the citizens against the police, possibly suggesting that trust between the police and community has increased. However, this increased trust may have other contributing variables, as described in Chapter IV. The new approach does not use arrest numbers as a measure of performance for police officers; it gives police officers the power of discretion to resolve many small issues without taking an enforcement action through mediation by NCOs. With this approach, it is vital to develop a mindset of community outreach among the entire police department while accurately identifying elements that are causing most violence—to take precise enforcement action.

This model of policing has been implemented for five years, but little scholarly research has been dedicated to evaluating this policy. At the five-year anniversary of its implementation and given the sample of variables, this model seems to be working and can be used as a smart practice for other jurisdictions.

¹⁹⁰ Richard Khavkine, “Murders Plummet to Record Low; Citywide, Crime Dips Again,” *Chief*, July 12, 2019, http://thechiefleader.com/news/news_of_the_week/murders-plummet-to-record-low-citywide-crime-dips-again/article_89ced4fe-a296-11e9-a0b4-0b920fd5782d.html.

¹⁹¹ John Seabrook, “Operation Ceasefire and the Unlikely Advent of Precision Policing,” *New Yorker*, September 26, 2018, <https://www.newyorker.com/culture/culture-desk/operation-ceasefire-and-the-unlikely-advent-of-precision-policing>.

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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

The NYPD cleverly combined two models of policing into one. With predictive policing analysis and the NCO program, crime has decreased substantially in NYC. The number of police personnel assigned to precincts has also decreased, which means that crime reduction is being achieved with even fewer police on the streets. Additionally, the number of arrests and summonses have been reduced since the implementation of precision policing. Finally, based on this model, a conclusion can be made that predicting crime is not a complete solution without interdiction, and interdiction must be achieved using NCOs—who have received a tremendous level of support from the upper police brass, are given the freedom to carry out mediation and the responsibility to solve crimes, and are well aware that these interventions rely on relationships with community members.

Another part of the research evaluated the public’s trust of the NYPD using CCRB complaints as an indicator. Trust between communities and the police is also an important element for collaborative crime reduction efforts. The research found that since the implementation of new philosophy known as the NCO program, trust has increased. This increased trust, however, might correlate with other factors, such as technological advancements, the issuance of BWCs to all officers, fewer arrests, fewer summonses, and fewer SQF reports.

This research aimed to answer whether this model could be used as a blueprint for other jurisdictions to follow and whether this policy has any consequences and implications for the residents of NYC. The findings are inconclusive and will require further research to rule out other factors as potential contributors in crime reduction and increased trust.

A. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

The crime reduction strategy implemented by the NYPD along with community policing seems like a practical solution, as highlighted in this thesis. Some unanswered questions in this thesis could be explored in future research. The following subsections offer recommendations for future research that analyzes precision policing in greater depth.

1. Intervening Variables in Crime Reduction

In this thesis, internal policing factors were considered and credited for crime reduction, including predictive analysis, focused investigations, the creation of recidivism databases, and advancements in technology and computer science. Other factors—such as socioeconomic changes, increased education among the residents, greater awareness of consequences of crimes through social media, more employment opportunities, and higher income per capita—may also contribute to crime reduction. These contributors could be researched and studied to determine their specific impact on crime reduction. Finally, this thesis focused on major UCR crimes, but future work could examine whether precision policing has had an impact on less serious but still important crimes such as graffiti, public urination, loitering, and prostitution.

2. Measuring Trust

This study used one indicator of trust: the number of CCRB complaints filed against police officers by the residents of NYC. But could trust have increased due to the acquisition of BWCs or due to fewer arrests, summonses, and SQF reports? Might CCRB complaints have been reduced with fewer police contacts with residents? Might community meetings, Build-the-Block interactions, and various other interactions between the police and citizens, which do not result in arrests or summonses, be considered alternative interactions between the police and community? The NYPD has not surveyed communities to measure such trust. However, to evaluate the impact on crime, New Yorkers' trust in the NYPD, the effects on investigations, and the attitudes of NYPD police officers toward neighborhood coordination, the RAND Corporation has initiated a study of the NYPD's neighborhood coordination program.¹⁹² The RAND study began in 2018 and will continue until 2021. The results of this research will be publicly released in 2021, and future researchers may be able to build on them.

¹⁹² “What Is the Impact of NYPD’s Neighborhood Policing?,” RAND Corporation, January 2019, <https://doi.org/10.7249/CP919-2019-01>. RAND expects to provide preliminary results to the NYPD in 2019 with the goal of releasing its final report to the public in 2021.

3. Means for Outreach

Predicting crime has been a valuable strategy for police in prevention and enforcement. But are there other ways to reach out to young people, particularly those who live in poor communities and are more vulnerable to joining gangs and increasing violence? Might the predictive policing model be used to predict the most vulnerable individuals and areas but, instead of solving the issue with policing, using civic organizations for engagement and providing services?

The predictive analysis and policing tool could be used to develop better social opportunities. If a neighborhood is prone to crime and violence, and policing prediction shows vulnerabilities, neighborhood investments such as more parks and playgrounds and educational programs, rather than heavy policing, could lead residents in a positive direction. The first step after identifying juvenile crews and gangs must be intervention—instead of enforcement and prosecution—to provide social services and counseling.

4. Education in Schools

Many young people do not understand or realize the severity of the crimes they commit. The police department should focus more on establishing an educational program in schools to teach children the types of crime and the consequences of committing crimes. This could deter many adolescents from becoming involved in criminal activities.

B. CONCLUSION

This research presented a case study of the precision policing model implemented by the NYPD in 2014. The case study focused on crime reduction achieved through predictive analysis and community trust through neighborhood coordination. This study was conducted by selecting four NYC police precincts in four disparate boroughs of NYC, consisting of various racial groups as residents. The first part of the study determined that all major crimes have been reduced since the implementation of this model. The reduction in violent crimes was achieved even with fewer police officers, arrests, summonses, and SQF reports. The second part of the study measured community trust in these selected precincts using civilian complaint trends reported by the CCRB, which were used as a

primary indicator of trust. By analyzing crime statistics and the CCRB data from before and after the implementation of precision policing, this thesis concludes that because crime has been on a constant decline and fewer complaints are being made by the citizens against the police, trust between the police and community has increased. This research suggests that other municipalities may wish to adopt precision policing as a smart practice, blending predictive analysis with community outreach and prevention.

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