THESIS

CAMPUS POLICE PARTICIPATION IN JOINT TERRORISM TASK FORCES

by

Ronnell A. Higgins

March 2020

Co-Advisors: Lauren Wollman (contractor) Carolyn C. Halladay

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# Campus Police Participation in Joint Terrorism Task Forces

**Abstract**

The strategy a campus police leader and university administration adopt in a post-9/11 world must consider the context of campus attacks and foiled plots over the past 12 years: the 2007 Virginia Tech massacre, the 2014 University of California Santa Barbara attack killing six, and, tangentially, the 2015 arrest by Boston Police of a Boston Police captain’s son for plotting an Islamic State-inspired attack against a college campus. The nexus among the three attacks is that the campus and campus community were the direct targets of the attacks. Whether it be the threat of an individual’s radicalization or an untreated mental illness, American college campuses are today and shall foreseeably remain locations challenged by the potential for violence. This issue can be examined internally through threat assessment teams or campus partnerships with key stakeholders and externally through community policing partnerships, training, and networking. Given the increasing complexity and diverse social fabric of colleges and universities, campus police leaders must understand and prepare for a wide range of threats in a post-9/11 and politically polarized era.

**Subject Terms**
campus police, Joint Terrorism Task Force, campus terrorism attacks, academic security

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CAMPUS POLICE PARTICIPATION IN JOINT TERRORISM TASK FORCES

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Director of Public Safety and Chief of Police, Yale University
BS, University of New Haven, 2006

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
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ABSTRACT

The strategy a campus police leader and university administration adopt in a post-9/11 world must consider the context of campus attacks and foiled plots over the past 12 years: the 2007 Virginia Tech massacre, the 2014 University of California Santa Barbara attack killing six, and, tangentially, the 2015 arrest by Boston Police of a Boston Police captain’s son for plotting an Islamic State-inspired attack against a college campus. The nexus among the three attacks is that the campus and campus community were the direct targets of the attacks. Whether it be the threat of an individual’s radicalization or an untreated mental illness, American college campuses are today and shall foreseeably remain locations challenged by the potential for violence. This issue can be examined internally through threat assessment teams or campus partnerships with key stakeholders and externally through community policing partnerships, training, and networking. Given the increasing complexity and diverse social fabric of colleges and universities, campus police leaders must understand and prepare for a wide range of threats in a post-9/11 and politically polarized era.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Given the increasing complexity and diverse social fabric of colleges and universities, campus police leaders must understand and prepare for a wide range of threats in a post-9/11 and politically polarized era. Of the many complexities facing campus police leaders, determining how best to apply successful policing strategies in the campus setting while being mindful of the current threats to homeland security is particularly vexing. Much like their municipal counterparts, campus safety officials must be constantly aware of and review potential threats to their campus communities. They must also continually expand their knowledge of the types of threats that may occur as well as proactively identify risk and effectively address threats.

Following the Boston Marathon attack in 2013, I, along with a number of senior leaders in campus policing, questioned how many other would-be attackers like Dzhokhar Tsarnaev—a student at UMass Dartmouth—are enrolled at our institutions of higher learning and living in campus housing. The complexity of managing risk in a campus environment requires that campus leaders and their administrators have a reasonable understanding of the current threat environment, assess inherent risk, and appraise campus readiness. Understanding the lessons of this counterfactual analysis (CFA) requires careful analysis and discussion on the uniqueness of campus policing and the campus environment, and how best to apply successful policing strategies in the campus setting, while being mindful of the current threats to homeland security. Campus police leaders are expected to be knowledgeable, skillful, and committed to their own campuses, in addition to being an institutional resource for collaboration with local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies. This CFA is intended to identify key strategies and practices that will illuminate the benefits of assigning a campus police task force officer (TFO) to the Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF) versus the cost of not doing so in this current threat environment.

Several campus incidents highlighted the new challenges that call for campus safety leaders to be involved in threat assessment and counterterrorism strategies. Although the Boston Marathon bombing did not occur on a college campus, there was a strong nexus to local colleges and universities. This CFA identified chokepoints in the timeline of the
Boston Marathon bombing wherein campus police involvement may have impacted the outcome. The purpose of the CFA is not to second-guess the FBI, police officials at UMass Dartmouth, MIT, Boston police, or any college or university administrators affected directly or indirectly by the Boston Marathon bombing. Rather, the CFA juxtaposes several key behaviors and actions of the two perpetrators prior to, during, and after the attack against the uniqueness of FBI JTTFs and their practices, campus populations, and campus public safety practices. The analysis of the CFA enabled this writer explore and identify unrecognized opportunities to intervene.

This CFA built upon community policing practices on college campuses and how these practices can take on many forms, similar to how community policing is applied by municipal police in an urban community versus a suburban community. Whether the campus is suburban or urban or at a private or state university, the principles of community policing are relevant and should form the framework of the department’s community policing strategy. A campus community policing strategy must consider (1) community engagement and partnerships, (2) problem solving and prevention; (3) organizational development and change; and (4) analysis, measurement, and evaluation, which are essential for understanding and improving performance outcomes. This CFA postulates that a robust community policing on strategy on campuses enables campus police leaders to address campus policing challenges and to recognize the nexus between threats to the homeland and to college campuses.

The Clery Act has provided a national framework for disclosing campus crime statistics and information about safety policies and programs. The CFA examines the Clery Act against the inherent openness and accessibility of college campuses, which make them uniquely vulnerable to targeted violence and terrorist plots. This CFA details the strategies campus police can use to maintain a safe campus and how campus safety leaders can engage in and benefit from the broader homeland security efforts. Several campus incidents highlighted the new challenges that call for campus safety leaders to be involved in threat assessment and counterterrorism strategies. For example, the massacre at Virginia Tech in 2006 made violent crime and threat assessment at institutions of higher education a key focus, as is chronicled in a 2010 report coauthored by members of the U.S. Secret Service,
the U.S. Department of Education, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.¹ One decade later, in 2016, a new challenge emerged when 13 people were injured after an Ohio State student from Somalia drove his car into a crowd of people on campus and then pursued the onlookers with a butcher knife before being shot and killed by an Ohio State University police officer. The FBI found that the attacker, Abdul Razak Ali Artan, had not been the subject of any investigations before the attack and that he acted alone without any direction from a terrorist organization, but it concluded that “he was influenced by the Islamic State.”² In August 2017, armed white nationalists marched through the campus of the University of Virginia with tiki torches chanting “White lives matter” and “Jews will not replace us,” signaling yet another complex threat dynamic campus police must consider.³ Mass shootings, terrorism, and violence and intimidation by domestic violent extremists have expanded the range and complexity of threats facing college campuses.


ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

An endeavor of this nature—researching and writing a thesis on a complex, contemporaneous topic—is not accomplished in a vacuum. This journey provided opportunities for personal and professional growth, introspection, and examination in a field to which I have devoted my entire career. It is my sincere desire that this body of work helps to advance campus policing in an era of continued terrorist threats. This work would not have been possible without the support of a select group of people.

I am thankful to my manager, Dr. Janet Lindner, Yale University’s vice president for Human Resources and Administration, for her steadfast support throughout this entire process.

To the women and men of the Yale University Police Department and Yale Public Safety, I thank them all—they teach me something every day.

Instrumental to my work throughout the development of this thesis have been Dr. Carolyn Halladay, and Dr. Lauren Wollman, my second reader. In addition to providing valued guidance and strategic direction, they both extracted ideas from me that I didn’t know were in there.

I want to extend appreciation to all of those in the field who have come before me and contributed to the body of knowledge of campus policing. I hope that I have served them well—and I stand with them in that we need to continue to write about ourselves and our contributions to further learning and education in this important field.

To those in campus policing, we cannot look to others to advance our profession. It is our time and our mission to do this work. We need to take the baton and run with it as we educate others about the complexities of our job. We must also take the lead in educating our communities and working collaboratively with local, state, and federal agencies—defining what our role is and, importantly, what it should be in furthering strategies that strengthen our college and university campuses.

Finally, it would be impossible to fathom an undertaking of this scope without the unwavering support of my wife, Robin, and our children, R.J. and Rayona. There was many
a missed dinner, missed “Dad time,” and missed family moment as I devoted my time to this thesis. They gave me unconditional love and patience throughout these past few years and, for that, I am deeply grateful for them.
I. INTRODUCTION

The strategy a campus police leader and university administration adopts in a post–9/11 world must take into consideration the context of campus attacks and foiled plots over the past 12 years. These offenses and the men responsible include the 2007 Virginia Tech massacre (committed by Seung-Hui Cho), the 2014 University of California, Santa Barbara, attack killing six (committed by Elliot Rodger), and, tangentially, the 2015 arrest by Boston Police of a Boston Police captain’s son (Alexander Ciccolo) for plotting an Islamic State–inspired attack against a college campus.¹

The nexus among the three attacks is that the campus and campus community were the direct target of the attacks. Whether it be the threat of an individual’s radicalization or an untreated mental illness, American college campuses are today and shall foreseeably remain locations challenged by the potential for violence. This issue can be examined internally through threat assessment teams or campus partnerships with key stakeholders and externally through community policing partnerships, training, and networking.² Given the increasing complexity and diverse social fabric of colleges and universities, campus police leaders must understand and prepare for a wide range of threats in a post–9/11 and politically polarized era.

Of the many complexities facing campus police leaders, determining how best to apply successful policing strategies in the campus setting while being mindful of the current threats to homeland security is particularly vexing. Much like their municipal counterparts, campus safety officials must be constantly aware of and review potential


threats to their campus communities. They must also continually expand their knowledge of the types of threats that may occur as well as proactively identify risk and effectively address threats. This expansion of knowledge includes learning about and engaging in new and emerging tools, including campus threat assessments and counterterrorism strategies.3

Several campus incidents highlighted the new challenges that call for campus safety leaders to be involved in threat assessment and counterterrorism strategies. For example, the massacre at Virginia Tech in 2007 made violent crime and threat assessment at institutions of higher education a key focus, as is chronicled in a 2010 report coauthored by members of the U.S. Secret Service, the U.S. Department of Education, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).4 One decade later, in 2016, a new challenge emerged when 13 people were injured after an Ohio State student from Somalia drove his car into a crowd of people on campus and then pursued the onlookers with a butcher knife before being shot and killed by an Ohio State University police officer. The FBI found that the attacker, Abdul Razak Ali Artan, had not been the subject of any investigations prior to the attack. Furthermore, while the FBI’s review demonstrated that Artan had acted independently and not specifically under the purview of a terrorist organization, they believe that “he was influenced by the Islamic State.”5 In August 2017, armed white nationalists marched through the campus of the University of Virginia with tiki torches chanting “White lives matter” and “Jews will not replace us,” signaling yet another complex threat dynamic campus police must consider.6 Mass shootings, terrorism, and violence and intimidation by domestic violent extremists have expanded the range and complexity of threats facing college campuses.

4 Drysdale, Modzeleski, and Simons.
Campus police leaders may become engaged in the analysis of campus threats through the assignment of officers to FBI Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs). (JTTFs represent a collaborative effort to prevent and respond to the threat of terrorism and work under the jurisdiction of the FBI.) Still, it seems that often neither campus police leaders nor administrators fully realize the value and importance of including campus police representatives on JTTFs. This oversight makes for a significant security gap that could, for example, be exploited by nontraditional collectors of intelligence (researchers and faculty members) working on behalf of the People’s Republic of China involved in collaborative research on a college campus. Or, as in the Boston Marathon bombing case, a student enrolled at a college or university could contrive and execute an attack while residing under the protection of the campus police.

All four people arrested and convicted in the Boston Marathon bombing or for impeding the investigation were UMass Dartmouth students: Dzhokhar Tsarnaev and three of his friends, who lied to the FBI and/or removed evidence from Tsarnaev’s dorm room after learning of his involvement in the Marathon bombing. Two of the three fatalities of the attack had a direct connection with a college in Boston. One of the three killed by the blast at the finish line was a Chinese national student attending Boston University (BU). Officer Sean Collier, who was murdered by the Tsarnaev brothers three days after the bombing, worked for the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) police department. There were no campus police officers assigned to the FBI JTTF in the months and years leading up to the bombing. The Boston Marathon bombing offers a window into campus populations, jurisdictions, public safety capabilities, and public safety personnel.

My familiarity with the JTTF began following 9/11. The Yale police was one of the first campus police departments to assign an officer to the JTTF. A detective was assigned full time from 2001 to 2007. Campus administrators did not question the efficacy of the assignment. By contrast, university administrators recognized an imperative need for increased unity of effort and collaboration across traditional boundaries. The Campus

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Liaison Program and National Security Higher Education Advisory Board were not yet created, so there were few options for the chief and university administrators to consider. The university itself fully supported Yale police involvement in the JTTF despite concern among some students and faculty about the perceived lack of respect for civil liberties.\(^8\)

Fifteen years later, in 2016, I contemplated the reassignment of a Yale police officer to the JTTF following a series of threats to some notable faculty whose international profile, work, and public comments came to the attention of some of America’s sworn enemies. One notable threat involved Professor Robert Schiller, a prominent Yale economist and Nobel Prize winner. An article appeared in the September 2015 edition of *Inspire* magazine, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’s English language magazine, calling for the killing of famous American economists as a way to cripple the Western economy.\(^9\) My concern was for the safety of this faculty member and the campus community as a whole. In developing a business case for the reassignment of a Yale police officer to the JTTF, I had to consider the efficacy of the assignment and the relative benefit to the institution versus the cost of not doing so. At the time, no playbook existed that I could refer to in seeking my institution’s approval for the assignment. The complexity of managing risk in a campus environment requires that campus leaders and their administrators have a reasonable understanding of the current threat environment, assess inherent risk, and appraise campus readiness. A feasible solution was the reassignment of a Yale police officer to the New Haven FBI JTTF. The assignment enabled the officer to forge strategic partnerships among other federal agencies, senior members of the campus research community, state religious leaders, and the FBI. Such alliances offer tools and campaigns that can complement a comprehensive campus safety strategy while delivering proactive measures for identifying and addressing potential situations.

More than 18 years after 9/11, campus police chiefs and administrators are still unsure about the role campus police officers can play on a JTTF. This thesis uses CFA to examine how campus police participation in the FBI JTTF could have helped the FBI

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\(^8\) Adler.

\(^9\) “Assassinations: Field Tactics,” *Inspire*, 14, no. 1436 (Summer 2015): 43. See Appendix B.
intercede sooner and prevent some or all the events surrounding the attacks studied in this research.

A. RESEARCH QUESTION

What does a CFA of the Boston Marathon bombing reveal about the potential value of campus police inclusion in FBI JTTFs?

B. LITERATURE REVIEW

The practice of campus policing has existed for more than 100 years. However, the events of 9/11 have had far-reaching safety and security implications on federal, state, and local levels as well as in the college environment with respect to terrorist threats and activity. This has been more recently highlighted through the Boston Marathon bombing and the Charlottesville incidents as well as on the campuses of the University of California, Berkeley, and St. Catherine University in St. Paul. Situations such as these have created an imperative for campus police and all stakeholders in the war on terrorism to ensure a more cohesive approach to connecting the dots—from identifying actionable threats and intelligence to formulating appropriate strategies to better create an aligned and proactive response—including forming partnerships such as JTTFs.

Numerous arguments and recommendations for collaboration across the spectrum of the homeland security enterprise (HSE) appear in government-sponsored reports and studies, such as the 2005 “National Summit on Campus Public Safety.”10 Specifically, one of the recommendations stated, “Campus police and security operations should be a viable part of the nation’s intelligence gathering, sharing, analysis, and application processes and should be incorporated into all regional and national efforts to improve the intelligence network.”11


11 Greenberg.
According to a few sources, the FBI encourages campus police to be participants in JTTFs. In her 2011 article in *Campus Safety* magazine, Robin Hattersley-Gray supported the efforts of the FBI to collaborate with campus police and spoke to the broader efforts of the FBI in strengthening and supporting campuses through the Campus Liaison Initiative. In September 2019, FBI Special Agent and Adviser for Campus Public Safety Jeff Allison spoke to the members of the International Association of Campus Law Enforcement Administrators about the FBI’s efforts to partner with campus police.

Similarly, former Secretary of Homeland Security Tom Ridge offers his perspective on the role of universities in protecting the homeland in the *National Summit report*:

Universities have truly helped America keep its republic—not just by imparting knowledge—but by fighting for the basic freedoms that have helped us perfect our democratic experiment, freedoms that simultaneously give hope to oppressed people everywhere. Our contemporary challenge is even broader. We must secure our free republic from those who seek to destroy it, who threaten not just our liberties, but also our lives. And universities can help.

Ridge stops short of providing specifics; however, it can be reasonably argued that his comments are meant to include the thought leadership, relevant resources, and innovation in universities. Thus, institutions of higher learning and the HSE must determine how the challenges Ridge describes can be effectively addressed.

The university’s role in securing the homeland against potential destroyers, as Ridge prescribes, suggests campus police assist intelligence, identify hostile attackers, and actively monitor known threats. Such a role would be consistent with the basic tenet

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15 Greenberg, “National Summit on Campus Public Safety.”
presented by the Brennan Center for Justice of “intelligence-led policing.” Its underlying principle is “to collect information about possible perpetrators and intervene before a crime is committed.” This approach is sound and can also be applied to an academic environment. Intelligence-led policing in the context of counterterrorism suggests that “analyzing even innocuous or disparate pieces of information can help ‘connect the dots’ and reveal potential terrorist plots.” Campus law enforcement can facilitate not only the reporting of these seemingly disparate “dots” but also their up-close and proactive observation and analysis.

Yet, citing privacy grounds, other documents reveal a strong resistance to the incorporation of campus police with the FBI and JTTFs. Dating back more than a decade, some campus newspapers expressed concerns that campus police officers were working alongside the FBI, raising suspicions of anti-privacy (political surveillance) and a perceived infringement on the civil liberties of students and others. In 2005, Alexandra Adler of the Yale Daily News reported that the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) “cited evidence on their website accusing the FBI of using the task forces to spy and interrogate both residents and college students in several states.” Justin Elliott in the Brown Herald reported similarly in 2008, emphasizing the concerns of the ACLU, writing that he “believes that cooperation and information sharing between law enforcement agencies—including campus police forces—are absolutely important, but that the task forces have raised serious concerns about civil liberties.” This reporting—spanning a


17 Price.

18 Price.


20 Adler, “Yale Cop Reports to FBI.

three-year period and less than a decade removed from the attacks on 9/11—illustrate a student perspective that rejects campus police involvement in JTTFs.

Some scholars contend that the roles and missions of campus police have changed significantly. Michael Gould-Wartofsky described the shift in his 2012 article *Homeland Security Goes to College*: “Step by step, at school after school, the homeland security campus has executed a silent coup in the decade since September 11. The university, thus usurped, has increasingly become an instrument not of higher learning, but of intelligence gathering and paramilitary training.”

Although Gould-Wartofsky’s tone is relatively disparaging here, he nevertheless highlights a major and undeniable paradigm shift in campus police expectations and not merely purpose. In my analysis, there is some substance to his points. While it is true that there has been an undeniable trend, it is not to the extent that Gould-Wartofsky described. Detailed agreements, including mutual aid agreements that describe the operational framework and collaborative working relationship between the departments, are often created between municipal police agencies and campus police. This is especially important due to the frequency of protests and student demonstrations on some campuses. The Police Executive Research Forum 2018 report *The Police Response to Mass Demonstrations: Promising Practices and Lessons Learned*, concluded that “mass demonstrations and other major events are too large and complex for a single agency to manage alone.”

In 1894, Yale University became the first private college to enter into an agreement with its host city (New Haven) to formally appoint two New Haven police officers as Yale

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University police officers to patrol the campus.\textsuperscript{25} The two officers were hired following tense interactions between Yale students and the New Haven police following accusations that Yale Medical School students were removing bodies from a local cemetery and using them as cadavers.\textsuperscript{26} Although the two officers were appointed by the New Haven Board of Police Commissioners and approved by the president of Yale and the mayor of New Haven, there was no formal agreement as to the services provided by the city to the university in case of an emergency. The New Haven Police Department and Yale University’s Police Department did not formalize the operational framework and collaborative working relationship by the departments until nearly 100 years later, in 1992, with the creation of an official memorandum of understanding.\textsuperscript{27}

In 2007, Steven Healy, former president of the International Association of Campus Law Enforcement Administrators, testified before the United States Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. In his testimony, Healy stated, “College and university campuses are traditionally open and accessible environments that reflect our free and democratic society. We must balance the openness that is the hallmark of the American system of higher education with the need to protect students, faculty, staff, and visitors.”\textsuperscript{28} Those expectations are not unreasonable and are not analogous to efforts to militarize the police, as Gould-Wartofsky stated.\textsuperscript{29}

Historically, some colleges and universities have found themselves needing to address student protests or crime. Gary Margolis, Ph.D., argued in his dissertation


\textsuperscript{26} Gehrand; Sloan.

\textsuperscript{27} “Memorandum of Understanding. New Haven Police Department–Yale Police Department” (New Haven, CT: Yale University Police Department, September 29, 1992). See Appendix A for the full memorandum of understanding.


\textsuperscript{29} Gould-Wartofsky, “Homeland Security Goes to College,”
“Exploring Education and Leadership: A Police Chief’s Personal Journey of Convergence,” that “student unrest and crime on college campuses has been an issue reported as early as 1800 on such campuses as Miami University, Amherst, Brown, the University of South Carolina, Harvard, Yale, Dartmouth, Lafayette, Bowdoin, the City University of New York, Dickenson, and DePauw.”

In 2007, James Christopher Wada argued in his doctoral dissertation “Betwixt and Between: The Perceived Legitimacy of Campus Police,” that “the formalization of campus police, at Yale, appears to be an exception rather than the rule in that time period,” referring to the late 1800s. It does not appear that the more expansive use of campus police occurred until the latter part of the 1960s, resulting from campus protests and demonstrations that corresponded with the civil unrest that occurred in cities across the country during that period.

In my analysis, formalizing campus police authority through the creation of memoranda of understanding between colleges and universities and municipal or state police creates an expectation that campus police protect the campus and provide professional services to students, faculty, staff, and visitors. Yale University’s agreement with New Haven to have their officers be appointed by the New Haven Board of Police Commissioners with the same authority as New Haven Police officers (municipal officers) is an example of a private university police department possessing the same police authority as the local police. The University of Texas police, a state university campus police department, was given police authority by the state following the killing of seventeen people and injury of thirty-five others during a shooting spree by Charles Whitman on August 1, 1966, at the University of Texas. At Yale and the University of Texas, a precipitating campus event led to a change in how the


campus was policed. In my analysis, campus police acquiring municipal or state police authority, through memoranda of understanding, aligns with Steven Healy’s statement to the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs in 2007—that the openness and accessibility of campuses reflective of our democratic society require campus police to protect students, faculty, staff, and visitors.34

Just as Gould-Wartofsky argued that campus policing has begun to follow a paramilitary trend, the JTTFs to which campus police representatives could belong are not without their own problems. A 2012 research paper authored by Tung Yin advances the argument that JTTFs infringe on the civil liberties of Americans.35 Moreover, Yin’s research shows that the city of Portland, Oregon, is the only city that has ever withdrawn (removed from service) a local police officer for fear of rights infringement.36 Yin’s research summarizes the debate on “security versus liberty.”37 Further review of the concerns delineated in the Portland/JTTF case in Yin’s research is arguably analogous to the concerns raised by or to be expected by campus administrators wrestling with the idea of assigning a campus police officer to the JTTF. Portland, Oregon, is recognized for its liberal political views. According to Yin, “Portland’s decision to withdraw from, and then later to rejoin, the JTTF provides a good opportunity to analyze another instance of government decision makers’ attempt to determine the best balance point between national security and civil liberties.”38 Nonetheless, it is important to remember that there have

34 Security on America’s College Campuses: Testimony before U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs.


37 Yin, “Joint Terrorism,” 105.

38 Yin, 133.
been over 100 known terrorism plots since 9/11. With the ever-present threat of potential terrorist activity on university campuses, deeper partnerships must exist between campus police and local public safety agencies in determining the best balance point for campus police participation in JTTF. The literature is clear on the origins of campus policing, citing the first-ever American campus police department at Yale University in 1894 through the 1960s, when campus police departments became the norm as a result of civil unrest and crime. One can even infer that the phenomenon of active shooter was started on a college campus with the Whitman shooting spree at the University of Texas, thus necessitating a deeper look into the authority need by campus police, as did the state of Texas following the shooting spree. In my analysis of the available literature, there is a gap as to the role of campus police in our nation’s counterterrorism efforts. This thesis is intended to provide clarity on what role campus police can play in supporting our nation’s counterterrorism efforts.

C. RESEARCH DESIGN

This thesis uses a CFA to develop a conceivable alternative narrative to a terrorism event that occurred in a densely populated community known for its many colleges and universities: Boston, Massachusetts. The CFA utilizes the idiographic case-study approach, which “highlights points of indeterminacy at particular junctures” or what will be referred to as chokepoints before, during, and after the Boston Marathon bombing. Specifically, the analysis explores what might have been different if UMass Dartmouth police and/or MIT police had officers assigned to the JTTF at key points leading up to,
during, and after the bombing. This event allows the FBI and campus police leaders alike to dig retrospectively into all of the missed opportunities to identify where a partnership among campus police leaders, the FBI, and the JTTF might have produced a different outcome.

The antecedent or independent variable for this CFA is the assignment of an MIT or UMass Dartmouth police officer to the Boston FBI JTTF prior to the Boston Marathon bombing (the dependent variable). The more likely the antecedent (UMass Dartmouth and MIT have qualified sworn police officers), the more probable the conclusion (campus police are assigned to JTTFs in the Northeast and throughout the country). With the number of other things that would change because of the antecedent (participation by MIT or UMass Dartmouth Police could bring about changes in how information is shared—before, during, and after an event), the easier it is to understand the antecedent (all of these are easily understood) and the better the counterfactual becomes. In this case, the antecedent is obvious, intuitive, highly probable, easily imagined, and uniquely suited to a CFA.

To advance the understanding and effectiveness of campus police participation in JTTFs, I hypothesize that an assignment of a UMass Dartmouth police officer and/or MIT police officer to the JTTF before, during, or after the attack might have impacted the attack in four ways: (1) prevented the attack; (2) reduced the timeframe for capturing the suspects; (3) reduced casualties, namely the killing of officer Sean Collier; and (4) improved the chances of the older brother, Tamerlan Tsarnaev, being captured alive.

D. THESIS ROADMAP

In Chapter II, a comprehensive CFA of the Boston Marathon bombing is presented, including recommendations for campus police leaders and campus administrators. Chapter III discusses the nexus of counterterrorism. This chapter also present strategies for crime prevention and problem solving as well as methods of assessment. Chapter IV describes alliances and the relationships among the Department of Homeland Security, Joint Terrorism Task Forces, and other agencies in an effort to better identify and prevent campus threats.
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II. THE COUNTERFACTUAL ANALYSIS: BOSTON MARATHON BOMBING AND JTTFs

This chapter applies a CFA to the Boston Marathon bombing that enables us to draw cause-and-effect conclusions in lieu of controlled experiments. This analysis only deals with chokepoints where there was a nexus to campus police involvement, not chokepoints of governmental intervention or lack thereof. While there were failures of the federal government, this CFA only examines those where campus police involvement may have impacted the outcome. The purpose of the CFA is not to second-guess the FBI, police officials at UMass Dartmouth, MIT, Boston police, or any college or university administrators affected directly or indirectly by the Boston Marathon bombing. Rather, the CFA in this chapter juxtaposes several key behaviors and actions of the two perpetrators prior to, during, and after the attack against the uniqueness of FBI JTTFs and their practices, campus populations, and campus public safety practices, in order to explore and identify unrecognized opportunities to intervene. Although the Boston Marathon bombing did not occur on a college campus, there was a strong nexus to local colleges and universities.

The first step of the CFA is to examine the reasonableness of the scenario based on the conditions established in Chapter I. For example, both UMass Dartmouth and MIT police have fully trained and certified police officers, lending to the reasonableness of their potential participation in the JTTF. The second step is to analyze the scenario to determine how the participation of UMass Dartmouth and MIT police in Boston’s FBI JTTF might have affected law enforcement efforts leading up to the attack. The third step is to discern whether UMass Dartmouth and MIT police activity could have affected law enforcement’s response following the attack and during the ensuing five-day manhunt and investigation. Last, the chapter examines the scenario to determine likely complications with campus police participation.
A. THE TIMELINE

1. 2009: Tamerlan Tsarnaev was interviewed for a feature photo essay titled “Will Box for Passport” in The Comment, a BU graduate student magazine. During the interview, in which he spoke about his amateur boxing career, he told the reporter, “I don’t have a single American friend, I don’t understand them,” referring to his frustration in assimilating to American life.43

2. 2011: Tamerlan came to the attention of the Russian Federal Security Services, which contacted the FBI to report their suspicion that Tsarnaev was becoming radicalized and might return to Russia to join extremists there.44 The Boston JTTF “initiated an assessment to determine if Tamerlan Tsarnaev did indeed pose a terrorist threat” based on the Russian information.45 According to the House Homeland Security report, threat assessments are guided by “the Attorney General Guidelines for Domestic FBI Operations.”46 The House report noted that an assessment is the least intrusive level of inquiry, smaller in scope compared to a preliminary investigation or full investigation.47 The Boston JTTF completed its assessment in June 2011, having found no link to terrorism.48 Nevertheless, a JTTF agent requested that Tamerlan Tsarnaev’s name be added to the Treasury Enforcement Communications System; this would ensure that an


45 Federation of American Scientists, 11.

46 Federation of American Scientists, 12.

47 Federation of American Scientists, 13.

48 Federation of American Scientists, 13.
electronic message would be sent to U.S. Customs officials whenever he left or reentered the United States. Also, in 2011, the Central Intelligence Agency requested that Tamerlan’s name be added to the National Counterterrorism Center’s watch list.  

3. January 2012: Tamerlan Tsarnaev traveled to Dagestan, the war-torn, Northern Caucasus/Chechnya region in Russia, where he was believed to have joined Islamic Radicals, “the al-Qaeda affiliated Caucasus Emirate.” He was neither stopped nor questioned on his departure from the United States or upon re-entry to the United States in July 2012.

4. January 2013: three months before he and his brother detonated bombs at the Boston Marathon and months after Tamerlan Tsarnaev returned from Dagestan, Dzhokhar Tsarnaev learned his financial aid at UMass Dartmouth would be revoked due to poor grades. He appealed the decision to revoke his financial aid, claiming that “he lost too many loved relatives” in the Chechen Republic, where his family resided (Figure 1). In his appeal, Dzhokhar wrote that Russian soldiers “falsely accuse and abduct innocent men under false pretenses and terrorism accusations.” Such a statement may have been informed or influenced by his brother’s recent experiences while traveling in the region. In the same month Dzhokhar learned he was losing his financial aid, Tamerlan Tsarnaev attended prayer at the Islamic Society of Boston on the holiday celebrating the birthday of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. While there, he engaged in a shouting match with religious

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49 Federation of American Scientists, 13.

50 Colin P. Clarke, Jihadist Violence in the Caucasus: Russia Between Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency, Testimony presented before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade and Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2017), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/CT400/CT483/RAND_CT483.pdf

51 DeLuca, “Dzhokhar Tsarnaev Attributed His 1.094 GPA to Chechen-Russian Relations.”
leaders, alleging they were hypocrites for encouraging Muslims to observe American holidays.\textsuperscript{52}

![UMass Dartmouth academic progress appeal form](image)

Figure 1. Dzhokhar Tsarnaev’s academic progress appeal at UMass Dartmouth citing Chechen-Russian issues and his family’s situation for his academic problems\textsuperscript{53}

5. Pre-Marathon: Preparation for the Monday, April 15, 2013, Boston Marathon involved multiple local, state, and federal law enforcement and emergency management agencies, including the Boston Fire Department, Boston Emergency Medical Services, Massachusetts Bay Transit Authority,

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and Boston Regional Intelligence Center. The public safety infrastructure, operating under a unified command structure, was in place and operating by 7 a.m. The race began at 9 a.m. in the town of Hopkinton, Massachusetts. In total, 50 agencies comprised the interagency public safety team supporting the marathon. By 11 a.m., an estimated 27,000 runners were running the marathon. The concurrent Boston Red Sox season opener began at 11:05 a.m.; nearly an hour and a half later, the elite marathon runners completed the 26.2-mile race. The Red Sox game ended at 2:08 p.m. Spectators filled the streets and Kenmore Square, located near Fenway Park along the final stretch of the marathon route, cheering the remaining runners on to the finish line. At 2:49 p.m., 41 minutes after the Red Sox game ended, the first bomb detonated near the finish line. Thirteen seconds later, the second bomb detonated less than 200 yards from the site of the initial explosion. Three people lost their lives, and 180 were injured—some maimed for life.

While local state and federal law enforcement began investigating these explosions and area hospitals were taking in the injured, Tamerlan Tsarnaev returned to his home and Dzhokhar Tsarnaev returned to his dorm room on campus at UMass Dartmouth. At 5:04 p.m., Dzhokhar Tweeted, “Ain’t no love in the heart of the city, stay safe people” (Figure 2).


On April 18, 2013, three days after the marathon attack, the FBI provided an update on their investigation and released photographs of the suspects: Tamerlan, “black hat,” and Dzhokhar, “white hat.” In an appeal for the public’s help in identifying them. The FBI’s tip line is inundated with calls. Five hours later and still not identified, he Tsarnaev brothers walk onto the MIT campus and kill officer Dean Collier.

Now that the FBI had distributed images of the brothers nationwide, through local and national news and social media, the Tsarnaev brothers feared someone would recognize them and call the FBI. They armed themselves with guns and bombs and decided to leave the Boston area to elude capture. Prior to leaving, the Tsarnaev brothers robbed a convenience store not far from the MIT campus at around 10:28 p.m., putting them in walking distance of officer Sean Collier, who was carrying out his work responsibilities that evening. Although the MIT Police Department received information from and contributed information to the JTTF, those efforts did not prevent Officer Sean Collier of the MIT Police Department from being shot and killed while seated in his patrol car on campus in an ambush-style attack by the Tsarnaev brothers on Thursday, April 18, at 10:31 p.m., three days after the bombing.\textsuperscript{57} His assassination was witnessed by an MIT mathematics Ph.D. candidate riding a bike on campus.\textsuperscript{58}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{56} Tsarnaev.
\item \textsuperscript{57} Federation of American Scientists, “The Road to Boston.”
\item \textsuperscript{58} Federation of American Scientists.
\end{itemize}
B. CHOKEPOINTS

My research and analysis using open-source news reports, after action reports prepared by state and federal agencies, and information derived from congressional hearings and reports have uncovered three chokepoints in the timeline, which together represent opportunities to have possibly interceded and prevented some or all the events surrounding the Tsarnaev brothers’ attacks. This analysis was conducted only with chokepoints with a direct nexus to campus police. See timelines #1, #4, and #6 in Section A of this chapter.

1. The Comment Interview

In 2009, Tamerlan Tsarnaev was interviewed by Johannes Hirn, a student reporter at BU, about his amateur boxing career for a photo essay titled “Will Box for Passport.” Hirn was a writer for The Comment, a BU graduate magazine. Tamerlan Tsarnaev was a student at Bunker Hill Community College for three semesters—fall 2006, spring 2007, and fall 2008.59 Tsarnaev made ambivalent statements about assimilation to American life in the interview. Tamerlan Tsarnaev said, “I don’t have a single American friend, I don’t understand them,” describing his difficulty adapting to American life, despite his attendance at Bunker Hill Community College in Boston. Tamerlan Tsarnaev’s statement to Hirn was not actionable; it did not contain a threat of any kind. However, given the context of the emerging threat picture, his statements were concerning.

a. Alternative State

The campus police Task Force Officer (TFO) assigned to the Boston FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force regularly receives analyzed and packaged intelligence products, developed by interagency personnel from relevant open sources. Campus police TFOs maintain a connection to their campuses while developing a broader network in the communities within their jurisdiction. Part of the FBI’s counterterrorism mission entails an

effort to “identify and disrupt” terrorism plots; therefore, campus police and Boston Police TFOs are in regular contact with leaders of the local Islamic centers and are familiar with the Muslim Student Association Leadership and Islamic campus centers. Following the publication of “Will Box for Passport,” TFOs—in addition to pushing a copy directly to the Boston JTTF—contact the Islamic Center leaders to make them aware of the article and recommend reaching out to Tamerlan.

TFOs have access to FBI data resources, including the eGuardian system that provides a common site and universal access to “thousands of law enforcement personnel and analysts directly supporting law enforcement.” The TFOs also have access to suspicious activity reports (SAR). Access to SARs information and the eGuardian reporting system, which includes legacy reports, creates a robust picture. These two systems enable cross-jurisdictional collecting and sharing of information about terrorism-related activities by campus police, members of various law enforcement agencies, and others. A campus police TFO initiates a new entry into the system documenting their outreach and intervention efforts at the local Islamic center leadership based upon Tamerlan’s account in The Comment.

b. Alternative Outcome

The campus police TFO learns of the magazine article “Will Box for Passport” and shares it with the JTTF and TFOs from the Boston Police. The FBI links it to the State Department and ICE databases and takes another look at Tsarnaev. TFOs connect with Islamic leaders to suggest an intervention based on his Tsarnaev comments. The campus TFO’s initial outreach establishes a sense of familiarity and trust between the Islamic Center and the campus TFO. The Islamic Center reports back to the campus TFO that Tamerlan was loud and argumentative toward the religious leadership when discussing slain civil rights leader, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. In turn, the campus TFO then shares this new information with others, including the Boston Police TFOs. The information


61 Federal Bureau of Investigation.
received from the Islamic Center leadership is entered into eGuardian, which leads to additional data points and results in stronger profile development to the benefit of the JTTF, the Boston Police, and other federal agencies that now have Tamerlan on their radar as a person of concern. The Boston JTTF reviews the initial assessment of Tamerlan with this added information and determines a preliminary investigation is warranted. Knowing that he is on the FBI’s radar, he abandons his plot to commit the bombing.

2. Academic Concerns at UMass Dartmouth

In January 2013, Dzhokhar Tsarnaev is placed on academic probation at UMass Dartmouth; he submits an appeal to the university after learning he is in jeopardy of losing financial aid. In his appeal, he writes he has “lost too many loved relatives” and that his “relatives live in Chechnya, Russia” (Figure 1). 62 Dzhokhar’s self-reported background, circumstances, and possible traumatization are concerning. Arguably, the content of Dzhokhar’s appeal is unusual.

a. Alternative State

The substance and tone of Dzhokhar’s appeal—his despairing reports of violence, chaos, and crisis among family in a heavily radicalized part of the world—raise a red flag among those on the financial aid committee. They notify and share the appeal letter with the UMass Dartmouth mental health and crisis team now represented on the campus threat assessment team. Based on the referral from the mental health and crisis team, the campus threat assessment team deploys its resources and experts to engage and assess Dzhokhar. They interview him; the mental health team members recommend (and provide campus resources for) culturally appropriate mental health and academic support services. The Dean of Student Affairs Office contacts Dzhokhar’s mother, who is now aware of the situation and the stressors impacting her son’s academic progress. Campus public safety members, as participants in the threat assessment process, learn that Dzhokhar is also a heavy marijuana user and make their campus police aware.

62 DeLuca, “Dzhokhar Tsarnaev Attributed His 1.094 GPA to Chechen-Russian Relations.”
The TFO, while attending an investigative briefing at the department, learns of Dzhokhar’s heavy marijuana use and how the information came to light (his appeal to student financial aid). The TFO shares this information with his task force supervisor and makes an entry into the eGuardian system created to enable the sharing of suspicious activity reports and other terrorism-related activities nationwide. When entering information about Dzhokhar Tsarnaev into the system, the TFO learns of an entry for Tamerlan Tsarnaev and discovers that they are brothers, which prompts the JTTF once again to revisit, and now expand, its scrutiny of the Tsarnaevs.

b. Alternative Outcome

The campus police TFO shares information about Dzhokhar with the Boston Police, JTTF, and TFOs. Dzhokhar is on the radar of the campus threat assessment team as a student of concern. His class attendance, academic performance, and behavior are monitored by student affairs officials. Each of his professors provides a weekly email update describing his attendance, conduct, any conversations they had with him, the context of the conversation(s), and information relevant to his academic progress or lack thereof. He has weekly appointments with a counselor at campus mental health services. Dzhokhar’s well-being is closely examined on campus, thus enabling campus officials to develop a baseline of normalcy and allowing them to determine signs of stress or abnormality. Close scrutiny of Dzhokhar provides opportunities for immediate intervention by the institution. And again, pull it all out to the plausible conclusions. For whatever reason, because of change of heart or the knowledge that he is heavily surveilled, who knows why, he does not allow his brother to recruit him. Or maybe he does, but the authorities find out and arrest Tamerlan for the plot. Either way, the timeline stops.

3. Identifying the Bombers

On April 15, 2013, at approximately 5:20 p.m., the FBI holds a press conference and releases photo arrays of the two as-yet unidentified bombing suspects. In an appeal

for the public’s help in identifying them, Special Agent in Charge Richard DesLauriers
tells reporters, “Somebody out there knows these individuals.” The FBI’s tip line is
inundated with calls and the agency receives several thousand additional leads comprising
of video and photos. The quantity of leads “almost became a management problem, there
was so much of it.” Some five hours later and still not identified by public safety or law
enforcement officers, the Tsarnaev brothers walk onto the MIT campus. The FBI is
known for commandeering structures and other assets during an emergency. Despite the
campus infrastructure in Boston (existence of campus email and emergency text messages
to communicate information in emergencies), the FBI did not utilize any of it to
communicate.

a. Alternative State

The participation of campus TFOs on the JTTF during the course of the
investigation gives TFOs direct access to the Boston Police and others as well as grants the
JTTF access to Greater Boston campuses, all affected in some way by the Boston Marathon
bombing. Campus police officers and other investigators assigned to the JTTF receive
images of suspect number 1 (black hat) and suspect number 2 (white hat) at the same time
the public receives the information. All begin to check in with their sources to identify the
suspects. Campus TFOs, after viewing the images and noting the possible ages of both,
assume they are or could have been enrolled at or work for a Boston-area college or
university. The campus officers provide the images to the heads of the campus police and
security departments in Greater Boston with a request that the images be spread broadly
via campus communications channels (email, smartphone Safety App, and text message).
Campus police, campus security, and all campus community members receive the images

64 Cindy Boren, “Boston Marathon Explosions: Day 4,” Washington Post, April 18, 2013,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/early-lead/wp/2013/04/18/boston-marathon-explosions-live-
updates-2/?utm_term=.4dd584835eeb.

65 David Montgomery, Sari Horwitz, and Marc Fisher, “Police, Citizens and Technology Factor Into
national-security/inside-the-investigation-of-the-boston-marathon-bombing/2013/04/20/19d8c322-a8ff-
11e2-b029-8fb7e977ef71_story.html?utm_term=.b81e5450a8d7.

66 Montgomery, Horwitz, and Fisher.
of the suspects within 30 minutes. UMass Dartmouth police begin to receive information that one of the suspects (white hat) is a student there.

This information triggers a cascade of actions enabling the JTTF to tap immediately into the campus public safety network. The TFO quickly directs campus police to compare the image to Dzhokhar’s campus identification card and sends this information to the Boston FBI. The TFO also requests campus police flag his ID card, thus enabling the police to monitor his movements (those locations into which he swipes his card) and check Dzhokhar’s card access history to see if he has swiped into any campus buildings recently. They also begin aligning his card access history with campus video cameras to see if they can locate him anywhere near those locations where he swiped in most recently. Searching and aligning campus video also enables campus police to convert recent video into digital images to be shared with the FBI. The images provide a clothing description. Campus police also confer with campus IT support to see if Dzhokhar is currently logged into the Wi-Fi network, which would indicate he is on or near campus. They check with campus parking to see if he owns any vehicles and, if so, where he has parking privileges. Campus police begin to review biographical information about Dzhokhar and the police chief recalls his name being mentioned in a threat assessment team meeting in January.

b. Alternative Outcome

On April 15, 2013, as the FBI begins its press conference, it simultaneously releases the suspects’ photos via social media and asks that area campuses do so as well. In an appeal for the public’s help in identifying the suspects, Special Agent in Charge DesLauriers tells reporters, “Somebody out there knows these individuals” and then specifies the importance of a whole-community approach in identifying them. DesLauriers recognizes the geographical footprint of college campuses in Boston and calls upon that higher education community during the press conference, asking them to circulate the photos within their campus networks utilizing their internal media for communication. The FBI’s tip line is inundated with calls, as are the cell phones of the campus TFOs and Boston Police TFOs. The police TFOs’ connections to the campus community network and Boston area Islamic community prove to be extremely valuable. The Tsarnaevs are identified early,
and an alert to all police is issued throughout the Boston area. The MIT police are notified that the suspects were sighted near their campus. In addition to informing their police officers, the MIT police issue a Public Safety Advisory advising the MIT campus community that they have reports of the suspects being seen near campus. The advisory instructs campus members to use caution, limit their movements, and to contact campus police if they have information or have seen the suspects. There is now a heightened sense of awareness and anxiety at MIT. Neighboring colleges take note, sharing the MIT Public Safety Advisory with their campus community via email and text message. The media reports on these campus notices and, thus, the opportunities for the Tsarnaev brothers to traverse the MIT campus and other campus areas undetected are significantly reduced. Collier is warned. He is out of his vehicle patrolling on foot and positioned to see the faces of passersby on campus. His situational awareness and subsequent behaviors reduce the opportunity for anyone to approach him without being detected, and he does not die.

After the bombing, both Tsarnaevs are captured, whether dead or alive, within hours, saving the city from the nightmare of the marathon bombing and the tragic loss of life and serious injuries that resulted. Boston area campus police and campus leadership are appreciative of the FBI’s diligence and inclusivity in the press briefing. They recognize the value of campus police partnerships with the FBI.

C. COUNTERFACTUAL SUMMARY

Evaluating the Boston Marathon bombing counterfactually at three distinct chokepoints juxtaposed against campus police participation in JTTF created opportunities for me to assess opportunities to intercede and possibly prevent the bombing, or expedite the identification and capture of the brothers before any additional loss of life. As stated in Chapter I, the Boston Marathon bombing did not happen on a college campus. However, CFA of the bombing provides campus police leaders, campus administrators, and the FBI a lens into assessing the potential value of including campus police in FBI JTTFs. Counterfactual analysis also allowed me to evaluate campus populations, campus jurisdictions, campus public safety capabilities, and campus public safety personnel.
It is impossible to say with any certainty that key actions and behaviors related to campus police involvement in JTTFs would have prevented the attack or expedited the capture of the Tsarnaev brothers. Having assessed three chokepoints in the timeline, I believe that campus police involvement in JTTFs can provide a myriad of opportunities for the FBI and campus police. Essentially, assigning a campus police TFO to a JTTF connects two diametrically opposite environments (higher education and federal law enforcement), strengthens campuses’ ability to prevent and detect terrorism, and strengthens the FBI’s ability to carry out its counterterrorism mission.

D. PROPOSED RECOMMENDATIONS

Following are recommendations for policing strategies inspired by the events in Boston Marathon bombing for the FBI, campus police leaders, and campus administrators. Key practices and lessons learned through researching community policing and college campuses, JTTFs, and the relationship of university campuses to Homeland Security at three separate chokepoints have yielded the following recommendations.

(1) Recommendation #1: FBI Field Offices Should Prioritize Recruitment of Campus Police TFOs

The value of increased cooperation and campus police participation in the JTTFs can help campuses remain abreast of potential terrorist activities. Campus police TFOs can also strengthen the JTTFs and provide invaluable training for the TFOs. As a first step, I recommend the FBI field offices identify armed and commissioned campus police departments in their state. The FBI should compile a list of campus police departments that have TFOs assigned and discuss the benefits of participation to those that do not.

(2) Recommendation #2: Campus Administrators Should Consider a Memorandum of Understanding Between the Institution and the JTTF to Clarify the Role of a Campus Police TFO

Dzhokhar Tsarnaev’s note to campus officials appealing his academic suspension—fearing he would lose financial aid—underscores the roles of campus police and campus administration in applying a multidisciplinary approach to managing students in crisis. If the threat assessment team had met to discuss Dzhokhar following submission
of his appeal, the meeting may have created an opportunity for intercession. Communications and collaboration among key internal campus stakeholders around student wellness issues is important. For example, campus stakeholders such as deans, faculty, cultural advisors, public safety, campus housing, athletic coaches, and healthcare professionals are most often in the best position to assess, gather, and share information related to students in distress. Campus Behavioral Threat Assessment Team information is most often confidential unless a community threat exists, requiring the skillful, collaborative intervention by campus police, campus administrators, or healthcare professionals. At the time Dzhokhar wrote the letter, nothing suggested he posed a danger to himself or others. At this point, Dzhokhar is not in any way a person of concern for the UMass Dartmouth police or any other policing agency leading up to the Boston Marathon attack.

Furthermore, having spent over two decades in higher education public safety and almost a decade in senior leadership, I can say with a high degree of certainty that campus administrators would not support campus police facilitating the usage of a student in distress as an FBI source. A memorandum of understanding between the JTTF and the campus institution would help clarify the role of the TFO. I recommend the FBI research the Portland Police Bureau’s decision to leave the JTTF and rejoin following the development of a memorandum of understanding because this could very well be a best practice. The FBI should expect campus administrators to weigh the balance between national security and civil liberties in deciding to assign a TFO. Offering to enter into a memorandum of understanding may assuage any concerns campus administrators have.

(3) Recommendation #3: Campus Police Should Ensure Programs and Initiatives to Support Both Ethnic and Marginalized Students Are in Place and Active

My analysis of the facts and circumstances learned through CFA of Chokepoint 1 did not reveal any information to suggest that participation of UMass Dartmouth police or MIT police in the Boston JTTF could have impacted Tamerlan Tsarnaev’s actions at this point. Tamerlan Tsarnaev’s statements during his interview with The Comment created an opportunity for community-minded police officers and others in the Boston area to
intervene and assist Tamerlan in adjusting to life in America. If community-minded police officers had intervened, by way of referring Tamerlan to a program or reaching out to develop a rapport with him, Tamerlan may have found assimilation to American life easier and might not have become radicalized. A retrospective look at the seemingly innocuous statements Tamerlan made suggests a deep personal struggle. That same struggle could possibly exist among other similarly situated Muslims in Western society—whether enrolled in college or not. I recommend campus administrators work collaboratively within their campus community, with external stakeholders like their local police department, and with mosques and cultural centers to ensure ethnic-minority students can access resources to both support their inclusivity on and off campus and support them in upholding their traditions. The literature is replete with examples of campus police building and maintaining relationships with traditionally marginalized communities adding instant value to campus policing efforts. Campus police can assist their institutions in bridging the gap between the institution and marginalized communities by ensuring their community policing strategies include outreach to and support of ethnic students and by assigning liaisons to cultural centers that involve the promotion and preservation of culture.

(4) Recommendation #4: The FBI Should Leverage the Emergency Communication Networks of Local Campuses

The CFA at Chokepoint 3 revealed an opportunity for the Boston FBI JTTF to involve campus police and campus administrators in a whole-community approach to learn the identity of the two men. As full JTTF members, campus police TFOs are involved in the investigation and are expected to provide insight and access to their respective networks. Given the apparent age of the men in the photos (college-aged), it is reasonable to believe campus police TFOs would suggest FBI leadership appeal to campus administrators on an institutional level—asking them to share the photographs within their campus networks using campus communication media. Additionally, it is further conceivable that campus police TFOs would appeal to Boston area campus police chiefs on a collegial level, asking them to distribute the photos in the same manner through campus public safety networks. Faculty, staff, and students would have those images on their phones and computers courtesy of the institution or campus safety.
Recommendation #5: The FBI Should Reestablish the National Security Higher Education Advisory Board

As each alternative state and alternative outcome in this counterfactual demonstrates, the need for collaboration and innovation is imperative. The FBI is in a position to convene the higher education community and other federal agencies around national security issues related to the higher education community. Opportunities for information sharing between the FBI and campuses, focus and review of campus police outreach and engagement programs in light of emerging threats, and engagement of campus administrators were revealed during this CFA. Following 9/11, the National Security Higher Education Advisory Board (NSHEAB) served as a forum for discussing national security issues related to higher education and the work of federal agencies such as the FBI, the CIA, the National Security Agency, the Office of National Intelligence, and the Department of Defense. Reconvening the NSHEAB creates a unity of effort around key national security issues. I believe the NSHEAB created a substructure necessary for security concerns to be raised by the higher education community and its absence presents a significant gap in information sharing between the higher education community and the federal government.

E. COUNTERFACTUAL CONCLUSION

This thesis began with the question: “What does a CFA of the Boston Marathon bombing reveal about the potential value of campus police inclusion in FBI JTTFs?” A CFA of the 2013 Boston Marathon attack at three distinct chokepoints in the timeline demonstrated key opportunities for campus police TFOs to have participated in interceding and possibly preventing some or all of the events surrounding the Tsarnaev brothers’ attacks. These include chokepoint #1: placing Tamerlan Tsarnaev on the radar of the JTTF following a 2010 interview in a graduate student magazine of Boston University; chokepoint #4: bringing Dzhokhar Tsarnaev to the attention of a university threat assessment team after he is placed on academic probation; and chokepoint #6: expediting the identification and capture of the Tsarnaev brothers following the release of photographs by the FBI.
The CFA at chokepoint #1 suggests campus police participation as TFOs in the Boston FBI JTTF would not have aided in placing Tamerlan Tsarnaev on the radar of the FBI sooner. The CFA at chokepoint #4 did not reveal evidence to suggest that Dzhokhar Tsarnaev’s note appealing his academic suspension would have triggered a chain of notices leading to him being reported to the Boston FBI JTTF. An analysis at chokepoint #6, however, suggests that the FBI harnessing the communication networks of Boston area campuses with the assistance of campus police TFOs may have supported the earlier identification of the Tsarnaev brothers, thus leading to a capture more quickly. I believe an opportunity exists for JTTFs to leverage the relationships campus police TFOs have with campus communication networks in times of crisis. At the same time, it is imperative that there be links with local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies that may not be as familiar with practices on today’s college campuses, including emergency notification systems and email and text messages. It is incumbent for college campus police and public safety officials to provide these law enforcement agencies at all levels with education that goes beyond making them apprised of simply the professionalism and capability of the campus police organization. Rather, a broader campus context that speaks to proactive infrastructures must be shared, in addition to information about practices used in a reactive mode after a threat, incident, or crisis. Comprehensive planning with partners extending beyond the university community is essential and discussed with specific examples in Chapter III, including the nexus of college campuses with counterterrorism as well as assessment and problem-solving tactics. The unity of effort that results from collaborative policing is discussed in Chapter IV, pointing to the importance of furthering key alliances between Institutes of Higher Education and the broader law enforcement and Homeland Security community. In particular, this extends the value of the CFA to deepening relationships between campus police and JTTFs and building them where they are not already in existence in order to improve proactive assessment and possible prevention of campus threats. This is especially prescient given recognition at the federal level (former FBI director Robert Mueller describing the mission to close the gaps between the intelligence community and academia with respect to national security issues) and in light of current threats of Chinese espionage and theft of research on college campuses as noted
by current FBI Director Christopher Wray. Understanding the lessons of the CFA requires careful analysis and discussion on the uniqueness of campus policing and the campus environment. Campus police leaders are expected to be knowledgeable, skillful, and committed to their own campuses, in addition to being an institutional resource for collaboration with local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies. I am unaware of any similar expectation for local, state, and federal law enforcement agency that faces the range of threats as do campuses and campus police leaders. This is especially significant for those leaders of federal law enforcement agencies and field offices with campus research institutions conducting government-funded or groundbreaking research within their geographical area. To increase understanding and awareness across the spectrum of law enforcement, I recommend state and federal law enforcement leaders experience some training and professional development in the role of campus police, campus police leaders, and the contemporary challenges facing campuses. A unity of effort must also continue and be supported through communities of practice as college campuses further develop their blueprint for contemporary campus policing in an environment of terrorist threats, strengthen their key alliances and collaborative partnerships, and consistently fortify their best practices.
III. COMMUNITY POLICING AND COLLEGE CAMPUSES

Community policing on a college campus can take on many forms, similar to how community policing is applied by municipal police in an urban community versus a suburban community. Similarly, whether the campus is suburban or urban or at a private or state university, the principles of community policing are relevant and should form the framework of the department’s community policing strategy. A campus community policing strategy must consider (1) community engagement and partnerships and the health of those strategic relationships and mechanisms for information sharing and reporting; (2) problem solving and prevention along with the adequacy of their resources; (3) organizational development and change as well as the readiness of campus leadership to understand the potential problems in order to address the full spectrum of potential threats to their campuses; and (4) analysis, measurement, and evaluation, which are essential for understanding and improving performance outcomes. This chapter describes community policing on campuses, the challenges campus police leaders face, and the nexus between threats to the homeland and to college campuses.

A. COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT AND PARTNERSHIPS

Each college or university employs a range of police or security services charged with ensuring the safety of their campuses—whether the officers are contracted, unarmed security guards employed by the institution or armed sworn police officers or a hybrid. In 2011–2012, the U.S. Department of Justice conducted a survey of campus law enforcement officials on 905 four-year colleges and universities characterized as traditional institutions. The results showed that three-quarters of these institutions employ sworn officers who have police academy training background and who can make arrests.67 Campuses with sworn police officers are well suited to engage with state, local, and federal law enforcement in training, investigations, and confidential briefings. Each of these activities is critically necessary to address campus crimes ranging from burglary, larceny, and robbery to sexual

assault. In other words, responding to calls for service—routine or emergency—is a core function of any campus police or public safety agency and one of the more concrete “outputs” of policing.68 Thus, appropriate training, properly conducted investigations, and timely and confidential briefings are imperative to thwart campus threats, targeted campus violence (including active shooters), and homegrown violent extremism.

According to the U.S. Department of Justice, Community Relations Services Toolkit for Policing report, community “members’ willingness to collaborate with the police depends on the community members’ belief that their actions reflect community values.”69 The toolkit does not specifically mention campus police leaders or campus policing; however, the precepts described are intended to assist police leaders in promoting trust and legitimacy in their agencies. According to Yale Law professor Tom Tyler, “legitimacy reflects the belief that the police ought to be allowed to exercise their authority to maintain social order, manage conflicts and solve problems in their communities.”70 This is especially important for campus police in areas where crime and opportunities for crime are more prevalent. In a campus environment, campus police can coordinate with key internal departments such as student affairs, athletics, student health, environmental health and safety, risk management, parking and transit, and administrative services; all can be integral to the success of the public safety department. Campus police should also coordinate with fraternities, sororities, cultural organizations, and victim advocacy groups. The ability of campus police to serve the community in a manner that reflects community values enhances how they are perceived as legitimate authority figures on campus.

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Visibility and engagement can be fundamental to the success of a campus patrol strategy and should include police on foot or bicycle to increase exposure and allow for meaningful engagement. As stated in the Department of Justice’s Community Relations Services Toolkit for Policing, “Strong relationships of mutual trust between police agencies and the communities they serve are critical to maintaining public safety and effective policing.”

As outlined in the 2014 Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) report, “This process [of trust] must begin at the executive level but should be implemented department-wide” by department leadership. Therefore, the professional profile, community engagement, and accessibility of the department leadership is not enough to settle a campus’s expectation of legitimacy within their police department. The actions of all members at each level of the department should reflect community values, and this begins with the department leadership.

The National Center for Campus Safety recommends the COPS report to campus police leaders as a guide in establishing clear policies, protocols, and communication practices among all stakeholders to help foster collaboration. Clear procedures, policies, protocols, and means of communication among stakeholders are core elements of best practices in place within all levels of a department. Liaison officers can be instrumental in cross-departmental coordination, convening a campus public safety advisory committee and providing quarterly campus safety briefs to departments. Likewise, campus police can extend the value of collaboration by urging department representatives to participate on committees and task forces convened by these groups. All of these initiatives can help to ensure campus police departments are successful in managing relationships with internal departments.

71 U.S. Department of Justice, Community Relations Services Toolkit for Policing, “Importance of Police-Community Relationships.”


Some campus police leaders must consider their popularity and accessibility to the general public as well as the quasi-public nature of their facilities. A 2014 COPS publication describes a community as “assets such as people and institutions, schools and hospitals, businesses, land.” Many campuses have theaters, museums, art galleries, bars, and restaurants, forums for talks, and athletic venues that attract the general public as well as the campus community. Most talks are offered free on campuses and many are open to the public. The affordability of campus museums and galleries and the popularity of the sports teams and nearby bars and restaurants are all considerations campus safety leaders should factor into their patrol strategies to ensure they have adequate personnel on duty, especially during peak hours. Some campuses have extensive library collections and their libraries can serve as places where non-campus community members can access computers and have a quiet place to read or study. Libraries must make government publications available for public access in their facilities; thus, campus police leaders should consider the need for their staff to contribute to fostering an open, inviting campus environment through their visibility and engaging nature of their staff while on patrol. Quasi-public campus venues, campus police, and security are also major touch points for an institution and contribute to the community’s attitude toward the institution.

Campus community members (faculty, staff, and students) must be willing to partner with campus public safety to support overall campus safety; in other words, co-production. College-aged students arrive on campus from a variety of places, with different backgrounds and diverse experiences. While there may arguably be benefits to campus public safety officials extending invitations to students for pizza in order to discuss campus safety and security, this action alone would likely fall short. This strategy of partnering with students is discussed in an article appearing in the International Review of Administrative Sciences.

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74 National Center for Campus Public Safety.


Administrative Sciences, *The Co-production of Campus Safety and Security: A Case Study at the University of Georgia.*\(^{77}\) Campus police community engagement initiatives should be developed based on community needs and input. Partnering with campus community groups enables campus police to learn of issues and respond before the issues become a bigger problem. Inviting students, faculty, and community stakeholders alike “has become the de facto mandate” for police, according to John G. Reece, Ph.D., Colorado Mesa University, and Judy Macy, Chief of Police, Fruita, Colorado, Police Department in their co-authored work, *Citizen Advisory Boards in Contemporary Practice.*\(^{78}\) Reece and Macy determined that these programs must be evaluated annually to assess how effectively they meet goals designed to prevent and reduce crime, further develop relationships, and share information.\(^{79}\) When campus community members serve in an advisory capacity on a board or committee, their voices and viewpoints help enhance understanding and cooperation between the campus community and campus safety department. Although campus police and security play a major role in the prevention of crime, they cannot effectively do the job alone.

A number of practices allow partnerships to bring value to the campus community and the community-at-large. One of the conclusions reached in a study of *Campus-Community Policing Partnerships (CCPP) at Historically Black Colleges and Universities* authored by the COPS office of the U.S. Department of Justice was that campus community policing partnerships “promoted safe living and increased community awareness of safety through community interaction with law enforcement officers.”\(^{80}\) Although this study by the COPS office focused on three colleges, it provided meaningful, innovative approaches

\(^{77}\) Williams et al.


\(^{79}\) Reece and Macy.

to community policing on campuses, an area not often studied by the federal government. Campus police partnerships could include speaking to campus groups on crime prevention topics, recent trends, and police or security initiatives. They could also include aligning community outreach strategies with international student populations on campuses by assigning liaisons to cultural centers and instituting citizen police academies. Campuses can also provide cultural awareness training to staff members and foster other activities geared toward developing familiarity with international students. Tailoring the delivery of police services, staff recruitment, training, and professional development are all initiatives to consider when developing a campus community policing strategy responsive to contemporary challenges.

B. PROBLEM SOLVING AND PREVENTION

A safe and secure campus environment is integral to helping a college or university achieve its mission and the police play an integral role on college campuses. Professor Herman Goldstein’s book, *Problem Oriented Policing*, hypothesized that “police would be more effective in their work if they were more proactive in their efforts to understand and control crime rather than just responding to crimes after they have occurred.”

Goldstein’s work was not specific to college campuses or campus police leaders; however, his work has been studied and adopted across the spectrum of police departments both nationally and internationally. A campus setting provides an ideal environment for campus police to identify problems and implement solutions tailored for their campus. The first step in problem solving and prevention is developing systems and practices to identify problems.

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83 Goldstein, Problem-Oriented Policing.
More than 125 years have passed since the formation of the oldest campus police department in the United States at Yale University in 1894. Its establishment predated the federal government’s recognition of the need to regulate campuses and campus public safety. Yale University and the city of New Haven’s decision to appoint New Haven police officers to patrol the campus can arguably been seen as one of the earliest examples of problem solving well before Goldstein’s work. Ninety-two years later, in 1986, the murder and rape of Jeanne Clery on the Lehigh University campus and the massacre of more than 30 people at Virginia Tech 21 years later in 2007 galvanized the federal government to institute measures to regulate and ensure campus safety. Recognizing the vulnerability and complexity of college campuses, the Jeanne Clery Act was established to “provide transparency around campus crime policy and statistics.” After Jeanne Clery was murdered in her dorm room, her parents alleged Lehigh University had a “rapidly escalating crime rate which they didn’t tell anybody about.” There was no requirement to report crime statistics about campus crime or crime near campus prior to the enactment of the Clery Act. The Clery Act requires campuses to identify, collect, and publish crime statistics on or near campus, thus enabling problem solving and prevention, especially in the face of rising crime.

The Clery Act has several required components intended to make crime incidents on or near campus transparent to the public. One component of the Clery Act directly related to a campus’s crime prevention efforts requires campuses “to provide, and describe in their annual security reports, ongoing prevention and awareness campaigns for students

84 Gehrand, “University Policing.”


and employees.” This requirement ensures campuses have programs in place as an institutional responsibility. All campuses must publish and maintain a daily crime log, usually managed by campus police or security. Crime logs are intended to keep the community informed of crimes on a day-to-day basis and must be accessible to the public. The Clery Act also requires that campus police leaders disclose campus crime statistics and security policy summaries in their annual security report (ASR), published in October of each year. An ASR must be made available to the public, potential students, and employees. Disclosing crime statistics, maintaining a daily crime log, and publishing policy summaries provides transparency as to the types of crimes recorded on and around campus while describing the policies and programs in place to address the crime. An ASR provides information on how campus departments collaborate to address complex matters such as sexual assault, harassment, and stalking, areas of tremendous focus due to their prevalence on college campuses. An ASR must use federally mandated definitions concerning the locations and types of crimes to allow for comparisons across campuses; however, terrorism is not a required category according to the U.S. Department of Education, *Handbook for Campus Safety and Security Reporting*.

Timely warnings and crime notification, also mandated by the Clery Act, provide institutional transparency. Whenever a crime occurs that meets the threshold for a “timely warning,” campus safety leaders are required to notify the entire campus community via email. An email informing the campus of the crime, its location, and the time it occurred improves community members’ situational awareness regarding their own safety. Such

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90 Department of Public Safety.


92 U.S. Department of Education.
emails ensure that the campus remains informed and that community members have access to the information and resources they deserve. To provide the campus community with timely information about certain crimes, campus safety leaders and police administrations must have adequate systems and processes in place. For more imminent dangers, such as an active shooter, an emergency notification email and text message communications protocol should be used by campus safety officials in reaching out to all campus members. The Clery Act was expanded in 2008 to include emergency notifications as an institutional requirement.93 Such communication will help campus safety officials in their efforts to ensure campus safety.94 Preventing and reducing crime are institutional responsibilities on college campuses. Increased and timely notifications and access to information about crimes and the policies in place to address crime enable campus police representatives to identify at-risk areas, thus enhancing the potential value of preventative measures.

A preventative measure recommended by the U.S. Department of Education is the use of multidisciplinary threat assessment teams.95 Threat assessment teams are a best practice and facilitate a team approach in response to student behaviors that may be escalating and causing concern or risk to others.96 Although the existence of a campus threat assessment team is not required by federal law, states such as Virginia and Connecticut require colleges and universities to have a threat assessment team in place.97 Typically, threat assessment teams consist of the heads of campus safety, student affairs, and mental health; a legal representative; an academic affairs representative; and a

94 U.S. Department of Education.
university administration representative representing a unity of effort to coordinate and manage very complex and important work.

C. ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND CHANGE

The focus on increasing communication between the campus community and campus police representatives through new organizational strategies can contribute to heightened awareness of campus needs and communication among all community stakeholders. When these channels of communication are open, greater collaboration and sharing of information is more likely, thus contributing to improved safety overall. The organization of campus police departments should, accordingly, be based on the services, needs, and capabilities of the campus community. This is analogous to a local government considering the unique aspects of their respective communities.

Understanding the makeup of a campus community is paramount in navigating conversations and advancing a culture of cohesion and trust between campus administration, the police, and the other key campus offices. For example, according to the Pew Research Center, the population of the United States includes just over three million Muslims as of 2015, roughly 1 percent of the country’s entire population. However, in Michigan, the Muslim population represents 2.75 percent of the overall state at nearly 274,000 members. In a 2018 thesis by Joseph Murray at the Naval Postgraduate School, titled The Challenges Associated with Providing Efficient and Effective Fire Services to Large Arab-American Populations and the Resources Required to Meet Them, Murray posited that “the city of Dearborn, Michigan, hosts one of the largest Arab-American

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populations outside the Middle East.” To better serve Arab-Americans and Middle Eastern communities, public safety (police, fire, and emergency medical services) must work to build bridges to such communities as the fire services team in Dearborn has done. This is particularly important because there has been a 23.6 percent increase in reported hate crimes in Michigan—from 309 to 399—according to Karam. And while a direct connection between increases in hate crime and the Muslim population in Michigan has not been drawn, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for Michigan is leading two initiatives that reflect a commitment and adaptation to the state’s increase in Muslims and hate crimes. They are the Michigan Alliance Against Hate Crimes (MIAAHC) and Building Respect in Diverse Groups to Enhance Sensitivity (BRIDGES). MIAAHC is a statewide coalition developed to promote “consistent and coordinated response to hate crimes and bias incidents perpetrated in Michigan.” BRIDGES was established shortly after 9/11 and combines leaders representing both Arab-American and Middle Eastern communities throughout the metro-Detroit region with representatives of various federal law enforcement agencies. Among the organization’s key goals are taking action to promote a better cultural understanding and sensitivity, collaborating with law enforcement and addressing what members of local Arab-American and Middle Eastern communities have experienced in the way of backlash. Campus police awareness of the issues facing their unique populations provide opportunities for them to assess their organizations’ capacity to foster respect and understanding while promoting a coordinated response to hate crimes on campus similar to the MIAAHC. Likewise, BRIDGES provides campus police an example of a collaborative effort between Arab-American and Middle Eastern communities and local, state, and federal law enforcement to improve cultural


102 Karam, “Impact Report.”


understanding. An example of a campus police department’s adoption of this precept in order to increase communication through an organizational strategy can be found at the Michigan State University Police Department. The Michigan State University police campus worked with their community to proactively address the unique needs of the Arab-American and Middle Eastern (Muslim) community as well.

The Michigan State University Police Department created an Inclusion and Anti-Bias Unit in 2016 to improve community relations with the Muslim community. The department is “committed to proactively addressing police and community-related issues associated with bias.” According to the department’s website, “The unit … will work in collaboration with all members of the university community to provide internal and external training to raise awareness and help create an inclusive culture on the MSU campus.” This mission statement is a solid example of how campus police adapted in an innovative manner to the rising number of hate crimes.

The diversity of a campus can be either deliberate or unintentional. To illustrate, elite institutions, including Yale, Harvard, Cornell, Princeton, Dartmouth, UPenn, Brown, and Columbia, attract and enroll a large percentage of international students. While international students comprised 4 percent of total student enrollment in all institutions of higher education in the United States in 2015—from small private colleges to large state universities—they represented 10.6 percent of student enrollment among the eight Ivy League schools. This difference represents more than 6,000 international students among these eight schools. According to the Institute of International Education’s Open Doors report, the number of foreign students in the United States has been on an upward

106 Michigan State University.
108 Yale University.
trajectory for the last decade. Campus police leaders, along with their administrators, must recognize and devise an organizational strategy to meet the needs of an international community. This can be achieved by performing specific tasks that would include assigning campus police as liaisons to campus cultural centers, engaging community cultural organizations, and recruiting police officers with varied ethnic backgrounds to serve on college campuses.

D. ANALYSIS, MEASUREMENT, AND EVALUATION

Another core component of community policing and college campuses is the analysis, measurement, and evaluation of crime statistics and the effectiveness of crime reduction programs. To guide their operations, campus police and college campuses must analyze, measure, and evaluate the efficacy of what they do. Campus crime statistics provide key data for such analysis. The U.S. Department of Education’s “The Tools You Need for Campus Safety and Security Analysis,” which provides an analysis of crime statistics, attests to the importance of such data. Likewise, data provided in the most recent Bureau of Justice Statistics Campus Law Enforcement Special Report further validates this view. Both sources of data provide the public with information about campus crime and fire data. These sources continue to illustrate that university and college campuses are generally safe places with campus crime decreasing by 35 percent since 2005. This statistic is consistent with the national trend. Burglary accounts for more than 50 percent of campus crime and sexual assault accounts for 32 percent of campus


Such crime reports can help campus police to focus their efforts on securing personal property as well as personal safety.

Analysis, evaluation, and measurement of campus safety strategies can vary significantly from campus to campus. This discrepancy may be largely due to two factors: the complexity of campus public safety—including sworn police, non-sworn security, or a hybrid of the two; and the composition and demographics of colleges and universities—urban, rural, state, or private. To account for this divergence, the evaluation of campus safety strategies should consider continuously improving the following cycle of activities that I find applicable to all of the four campus settings: preventing and reducing crime, enforcing the law, and serving the community. Campus police can institutionalize this cycle of activities by adopting crime reduction and accountability meetings using the CompStat process. CompStat is a process for using crime statistics on a block-by-block basis that allows management to target its resources where crimes take place. This increased focus on management and trend analysis is far more effective than random patrols or ineffective resource management by municipal or campus police.

CompStat was created by the New York Police Department (NYPD) and police scholars credit it for reducing crime in New York City. The process revolutionized policing by using a data-driven approach. At its most basic level, CompStat uses computerized statistical information and mapping capability that enables police leaders to see crime trends on a weekly, monthly, quarterly, and annual basis. Inimai M. Chettiar, director of the Justice Program at New York University Law School’s Brennan Center, opined that the “hallmarks of CompStat are its strong management and accountability techniques within a police department as well as its reliance on data collection to identify

crime patterns.” Thorough analysis of crimes and trends allows police personnel to devise strategies and tactics to solve problems, reduce crime, and ultimately improve the quality of life in their communities. The prompt availability of information positions department leadership to assess and implement strategies to address increases in crime and use resources more efficiently in the process. CompStat has empowered police departments to focus the resources of the departments around their core mission, which is most often to reduce crime and the fear of crime. Arguably, the use of CompStat reduces arrests by disrupting the opportunities for crimes to occur. Tangentially, CompStat also improves organizational efficiency, response to crime, and commitment to service in the community.

Campus safety personnel should have their own form of CompStat-style crime reduction meetings as an opportunity to engage their management team and members of their community. Weekly, biweekly, or monthly CompStat-style crime analysis and accountability meetings with staff provide campus leaders an opportunity to measure the most recent crime statistics against another period, allowing for a structured process for helping to ensure accountability and focus. Supervisors are held accountable for helping to develop and execute strategies to address existing crime problems or community concerns. The close scrutiny of previous crimes and crime trends by policing leaders enables them to allocate resources to prevent future incidents.

Combining the primary elements of community policing, “community partnerships between the police and other organizations; organizational transformation to support community partnerships and problem-solving; the systematic examination of problems to develop and evaluate effective responses”—in addition to adhering to the Clery Act in a comprehensive campus policing program—can provide synergies similar to those realized in many cities that have adopted and instituted these core practices. Numerous measures have proven readily transferable to the campus environment, from establishing key alliances through strategic partnerships among stakeholders to pursuing initiatives that

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117 Community Oriented Policing Services, Community Policing Defined.
foster campus engagement and involvement. Many campuses are already elevating the presence of their safety personnel through high-visibility patrols. In addition, many campuses are recognizing the value of leveraging connections among their police with on-campus organizations and activities. These efforts open valuable channels of communication fundamental in ensuring sustainable change and organizational transformation to support best practices and desired outcomes, especially in a post-9/11 world. A campus police department committed to community policing, familiar with its campus community, knowledgeable of campus crime trends, aligned with campus stakeholders, skilled in using programs and systems for communicating, and fully aware of its campus’s unique issues, positions the department to assist federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies, including the counterterrorism efforts of the FBI.
IV. UNDERSTANDING HOW UNIVERSITY CAMPUSES CAN CONTRIBUTE TO COUNTERTERRORISM

Although campuses have become safer since the passage of the Clery Act and many campus police leaders are applying the principles of community policing, the inherent openness and accessibility of college campuses make them uniquely vulnerable to targeted violence and terrorist plots. Campuses were identified as potential “soft targets” for terrorists by FBI Director Robert Mueller in testimony before Congress in February 2003.118 Furthermore, the 9/11 Commission Report called for a unity of effort in five areas, one of which has a direct impact on local law enforcement: strengthening the FBI and homeland security defenders.119 Although the 9/11 Commission Report does not reference campus police directly, it can be reasonably argued that its statement includes them.

Following the Virginia Tech massacre in 2007, Steven Healy, former president of the International Association of Campus Law Enforcement Administrators, opined in his speech before the House Committee on Education and Labor that “campuses are not immune from safety threats and other dangers facing our society.”120 Healy further stated that campuses must be “realistic about these threats and act proactively to prevent and respond to the inevitable crises and incidents.”121 This chapter details the strategies campus police can use to maintain a safe campus and how campus safety leaders can engage in and benefit from the broader homeland security efforts.

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120 Healy, “Best Practices.”

121 Healy.
A. ALLIANCES AMONG INSTITUTES OF HIGHER EDUCATION AND THE GOVERNMENT

In a 2005, report, the U.S. Department of Justice’s Office of Community Oriented Policing recommended that “campus police and security operations should be a viable part of the nation’s intelligence gathering, sharing, analysis, and application processes.”\(^{122}\) That same year, former FBI Director Mueller established the National Security Higher Education Advisory Board (NSHEAB). The NSHEAB comprises approximately 25 university chancellors and presidents and its objective is to promote a deeper understanding and cooperation between higher education and several government agencies. The NSHEAB’s specific mission is “to bridge historical gaps between the U.S. Intelligence Community and academe with respect to national security issues.”\(^{123}\) The board meets several times a year in Washington, DC, and discusses national security matters relevant to academic research facilities. The College and University Security Effort, or CAUSE, joins FBI agents in charge of the 56 field offices with the heads of colleges and universities in their areas to discuss issues brought up at NSHEAB meetings, which enables a feedback loop.

In 2008, as part of a broader effort by the FBI to reach out to campuses, the bureau created the Campus Liaison Initiative “to combat the threat of international and domestic terrorism.”\(^{124}\) Each campus—regardless of whether it has a police department or non-sworn security department within the jurisdiction of a field office—is assigned an FBI agent. The assignment of an agent establishes a point of contact for each campus, promotes two-way information sharing, increases awareness, and provides training for campus administrators and public safety personnel. Arguably, the FBI’s efforts to align federal resources with the higher education community in advancing their counterterrorism efforts include some of the same trademarks of community policing: partnerships and problem

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\(^{122}\) Community Oriented Policing Services, *Community Policing Defined.*


\(^{124}\) Collier, “Inside the Controversial Government Centers.”
solving. As Herman Goldstein described in his book, *Problem Oriented Policing*, the “police would be more effective in their work if they were more proactive in their efforts to understand and control crime rather than just responding to crimes after they have occurred.”

The FBI’s NSHEAB and Campus Liaison Program create pathways for senior campus administrators, campus police, and security to form partnerships, share information and concerns, and engage in problem solving before an incident or crime occurs on campus.

Former President Jimmy Carter remarked in a speech at Yale University in 2014 that “the most revered or respected institutions in America are its universities and its military.” Unlike the country’s military installations, college campuses are neither fortresses nor have they been designed to reduce opportunities for attacks. Quite the opposite, they are designed as open communities within a host community—a city or town—promoting access to education and research, serving as attractions for employment and tourism while positively impacting local and regional economies.

A 2014 study by Annette Steinacker titled *The Economic Effect of Urban Colleges on their Surrounding Communities* supports this claim. Steinacker concluded “that even small campuses can play a very strong economic role in their hometowns” in describing the economic impact of small colleges with a predominately commuter population in its host city. Steinacker’s study focuses on urban colleges because not much is known about the economic impact of small suburban colleges. Her work adds to what is already known about the positive economic impact of larger institutions and those in non-urban areas.

In a study of how colleges and universities can help their local economies, Abel and Deitz argued in the *Journal of Economic Geography* that “colleges and universities are

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125 Goldstein, “Problem-Oriented Policing.”
128 Steinacker, 1173.
increasingly being viewed as engines of local economic development.” Later, in 2015, a Task Force on the Federal Regulation of Higher Education convened by a bipartisan group of senators completed its work and noted in its executive summary that “postsecondary education is a linchpin in the nation’s social and economic strength.” Research by Jonathan Rothwell of the Brookings Institute concluded in 2015 that “the average bachelor’s degree holder contributes $278,000 more to local economies through direct spending over the course of his or her lifetime and 42 percent of alumni from four-year colleges remain in the area where they attended college” following graduation. These reports do not outline the steps campuses should take to guard against local crime or potential terrorist attacks, nor do they discuss the economic impact of crime or terrorism. Insofar as campuses have become linked to local, regional, and state economic success, the safety of our campuses should be a high a priority on local, state, and federal levels. Campus police and security are positioned as key stakeholders in a campus’s counterterrorism efforts.

B. JOINT TERRORISM TASK FORCES

The FBI’s counterterrorism efforts and safety of American campuses could be improved beyond the FBI’s NSHEAB and Campus Liaison Program through its JTTFs. JTTFs represent a collaborative effort to prevent and respond to the threat of terrorism and work under the jurisdiction of the FBI. Each field office features a diverse staffing model with JTTF officers deputized as special U.S. marshals. As such, they are required to obtain top-secret security clearance. Regular meetings ensure that appropriate leaders are briefed on current matters germane to their jurisdictions as well as regional and national trends.


C. THREATS TO CAMPUSES

A spate of attacks on campus have highlighted the need for campus security to have countermeasures for terrorism. The attack at Ohio State in 2016 and, more recently, the January 2018 indictment of 19-year-old Tnuza Jamal Hassan, a former student at St. Catherine University in St. Paul, Minnesota, indicted for setting multiple fires on campus, exacerbated this shift. According to the criminal complaint against Hassan, she started the fires after “reading about the U.S. military destroying schools in Iraq or Afghanistan and she felt that she should do exactly the same thing.” Solo actors remain a concern to virtually all cities and communities because they may not have any obvious connection to a particular institution or cause. Likewise, colleges and universities should understand that the collective security of the nation relies on the ability to prevent, detect, and disrupt such a wide range of actors and groups unaffiliated with the institution.

Today’s campus safety leaders operate in an environment in which the institution’s mission to propagate an exchange of ideas conflicts with a growing intolerance for differing opinions in today’s students. The openness and accessibility of college campuses along with a heightened awareness of the duty to protect community members with differing views from harassment and discrimination are all emerging and converging challenges facing university campuses today. The most vivid example of extreme views conflicting on an open campus happened at the University of Virginia in August 2017. Protesting the removal of Confederate statues from a local park, white supremacists marched through the campus carrying torches while chanting racist and anti-Semitic slogans on the evening before a scheduled rally. The march was covered by the national media and print

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133 U.S. Attorney’s Office, District of Minnesota.

newspapers. These actions represented a bold, intimidating, and highly visible way of expressing extremist views and garnering support on a college campus.

Traditionally, university campuses are recognized as environments that promote civility in intellectual growth along with encouraging an exchange of ideas. In response to guest speakers espousing both conservative and liberal views, the media have increasingly reported similar situations on college campuses nationwide. The greatest resistance has been to speakers who espouse violence. Right-wing political commentator Ben Shapiro spoke at UC Berkeley in 2017, garnering the attention of hundreds of protestors. The university spent $600,000 for security to protect his rights and those of his supporters and detractors when he delivered his speech on campus. Students and faculty alike risk being threatened physically, harassed on social media, or subjected to reputational harm for exercising their right to free speech on college campuses.

Extreme views expressed in increasingly violent ways on college campuses threaten the well-regarded process for intellectual growth and discovery in a democratic society. In a 1975 report, C. Vann Woodward stated intellectual growth and discovery represents the “need for unfettered freedom, the right to think the unthinkable, discuss the unmentionable, and challenge the unchallengeable.” Woodward also noted that on our campuses, “curtailing free expression strikes twice at intellectual freedom, for whoever deprives another of the right to state unpopular views necessarily also deprives others of the right to listen to those views.” While Woodward does not qualify what, precisely, constitutes an unpopular view, it can be construed that views expressed by any speaker are never representative of an entire audience or population. Depending on the sentiments and ideas shared by a speaker on a college campus and the audience in attendance, the reaction could easily range from overwhelming support to expressions of disagreement or even

137 Yale University.
outrage. For example, conservative students on the campus of the University of Minnesota were subjected to threats on social media and became the focus of protestors for inviting conservative speakers to campus in December 2017. Conversely, at Princeton University, an assistant professor of African-American studies felt compelled to cancel several public speaking engagements following “hateful messages and death threats” she had received because of her criticism of President Donald Trump and commencement remarks he had made at another university. A professor at Drexel University was prevented from coming onto the college campus without a police escort and was forced to teach a class remotely after he posted several controversial posts about race on social media. He received numerous death threats. Campus upheaval resulting from extremist viewpoints can set the stage for a tipping point event wherein one side attempts to go to extremes (such as in Charlottesville) or an even more lethal event such as a bombing or mass shooting.

Another threat homeland security defenders and campus safety leaders are facing is online radicalization facilitated largely by the spreading of radical ideology over the internet. White supremacists disseminating white nationalist propaganda and jihadists delivering radical Islamic sermons can express their views freely on globally connected platforms to reach potential followers. College students can be seduced and recruited without a single conversation, a face-to-face meeting, or an exchange of money or personal information. A September 2015 *New York Times* article by Rukmini Callimachi, describing how a young woman in Washington State became friendly with ISIS supporters and converted to Islam through social media, illustrates the power of social media and how it


is used to influence.  

Brandi Lynn Evans Monroe also explored this situation in a 2016 thesis titled *Brand Caliphate and Recruitment between the Genders*. Monroe studied six cases in which Western women were “radicalized in support of IS.” A conclusion reached as a result of her research was that “the role in marketing and Brand Caliphate remains key in developing the initial interest in IS and the females probing for online information.” In Callimachi’s article, she further described how ISIS “maintains a 24-hour online operation,” noting, “the reach of the Islamic State’s recruiting effort has been multiplied by an enormous cadre of operators on social media.” Similar to college campuses, the Internet’s openness and accessibility enables people to connect with one another and exchange a wide variety of ideas and experiences.

Campus police leaders and university administrators are committed to creating a safe and secure campus community while maintaining an appropriately open, inviting, and vibrant campus environment. In addition to the normal range of security concerns that arise on any campus, they must now contend with a new range of potential threats to campuses. The vehicle and knife attack at Ohio State University, the acts of arson at St. Catherine University, the Unite the Right rally and march at the University of Virginia, and the damage caused by rioters at Berkeley are examples of the range of potential threats facing college campuses. Campus police leaders should endeavor to be even more engaged and open to partnerships with other local, state, and federal agencies.

D. CONCLUSION

In addressing the fundamental research question at the foundation of this thesis—what does a CFA of the Boston Marathon bombing reveal about the potential value of campus police inclusion in FBI JTTFs?—it is arguably clear that strategic partnerships

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143 Evans Monroe, 158.

144 Callimachi, “Lonely Young American.”
between campus police and the FBI can significantly enhance college campuses’ ability to identify, detect, prevent or deter, and investigate emerging threats. The CFA was critical in addressing a threat scenario for which there is little textbook or playbook guidance. This is discussed more fully in the Literature Review in Chapter I. Threats to campus safety represent a rapidly emerging field of study requiring new strategies, protocols, and solutions. Campus policing in an era of continued terrorist threats remains one of the biggest challenges in the decades ahead. Recommendations following the CFA of the Boston Marathon bombing offer solutions to be investigated and implemented.

Beginning with the Boston Marathon attack in 2013, a number of senior leaders in campus policing questioned how many other would-be attackers are enrolled at our institutions of higher learning and living in campus housing. In 2014, University of California, Santa Barbara, student Elliot Rodger killed six people and injured 14 others near the university. In 2015, the arrest of Alexander Ciccolo, a Boston Police captain’s son, for plotting an ISIS inspired attack against a college campus, was yet another reminder that campuses are attractive targets. In 2015, a college student, Faisal Mohammad, went on a crime spree, stabbing four people before being shot and killed by campus police on the campus of the University of California, Merced. In 2016, another campus attack at Ohio State University stunned the higher education community. The attacker, Abdul Razak Ali Artan, a Somali, injured 13 people when he drove his car into a crowd, exited the vehicle, and began attacking bystanders with a knife.

Threats to college campuses continue to develop. According to FBI Director Christopher Wray, nontraditional collectors of intelligence (researchers and faculty members) working on behalf of the People’s Republic of China are involved in collaborative research on American college campuses, threatening the security of American research and, by extension, campuses.145

Areas recommended for future research include campus police participation in JTTFs or other specialized units within the FBI to address emerging threats to academic research. Further research is also recommended into the applicability and feasibility of developing and instituting the equivalent of suspicious activity reports (SAR) used presently by the FBI, but created specifically for college campuses. This would provide a means by which to accurately capture, track, trend, and analyze potential and actual terrorist threats. A subsequent research study would be cross-referencing data with the eGuardian system, offering truly universal access across a community of law enforcement professionals at local, state, and federal levels and college campus police most in need of this critical data. Another important question to answer in the near future is this: What should campus security look like in a climate of ongoing terrorist threats?

Development and management oversight for such ambitious endeavors brings with it inherent challenges—from funding sources to accountability and authority. Questions likely to be raised, for example, are which entity would oversee a wholly unified, cross-referenced system: the FBI, the Department of Homeland Security, or another national agency. Additionally, the role that campus policing leadership would play in both development and implementation would need to be addressed. It is posited that there would be a very strong appetite for furthering this research and the identification, development, and implementation of methods that enhance overall campus safety in an environment replete with threats of potential terrorist activity.

My research and subsequent CFA attempted to determine the relative benefit of assigning a campus police TFO versus the cost of not doing so. It is my hope that this thesis contributes to the growing body of knowledge about campus policing and the value of campus police participation in JTTFs for the benefit of campus police chiefs, campus administrators, and the FBI.
APPENDIX A. NEW HAVEN POLICE DEPARTMENT–YALE POLICE DEPARTMENT: MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

Agreement made this 29th day of September, 1992 by and between Yale University, a corporation organized and existing by virtue of a special charter granted by the Colony and State of Connecticut (the "University"), and the City of New Haven, acting through its Board of Police Commissioners (the "Board").

WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 3 of Public Act 83-466, the City of New Haven, acting through the Board, may appoint persons designated by the University to act as Yale University police officers and such officers, having duly qualified under Section 7-294d of the Connecticut General Statutes and having been sworn, shall have all of the powers conferred upon municipal police officers of the city of New Haven; and

WHEREAS, pursuant to such statute, such officers shall be deemed for all purposes to be agents and employees of the University, subject to such conditions as may be mutually agreed upon by the City of New Haven, acting through the Board and the University;

NOW THEREFORE, the University and the Board do hereby agree as follows:

1. The University may designate and the Board may appoint as Yale University Police officers persons who have successfully completed training in a municipal police training academy meeting the requirements of Section 7-294d of the Connecticut General Statutes.

2. Yale University police officers, having been sworn, shall have and exercise the powers and authority conferred upon municipal police officers of the City of New Haven. The Chief or Assistant Chief of Police of New Haven, in coordination with the Chief of Police of the Yale University Police Department or his designee, may summon Yale University police officers for emergency service.

3. In all matters of promotion, termination, discipline and employment, personnel policies and procedures established by the University shall apply to Yale University Police Officers and shall be administered solely by the University. Such officers shall be deemed for all purposes to be agents and employees of the University and shall be paid for their services, including while in emergency service for the City of New Haven, and receive any benefits to which they are entitled by law, from the University.

Source: Yale University Police Department, “Memorandum of Understanding."
4. The University shall defend, and indemnify and hold
the City of New Haven harmless for any and all claims, damages,
losses and expenses, including cost of defense, reasonably and
necessarily incurred in any cause or action or claim against the
City or any of its boards, agencies, officers or employees
brought by any such Yale University officer or arising out of
the acts or omissions of any such Yale University officers,
except for any action or claim arising out of any acts or
omissions of such Yale University officers while in emergency
service for the City of New Haven.

Emergency service means police service provided in response
to a specific request from the Chief or Assistant Chief of the
City of New Haven for assistance on matters of an exigent nature
beyond routine police activity.

Emergency service does not refer to the longstanding
practice of Yale Police Officers backing up New Haven Police
Units or responding to assist officers on or near the University
campus.

5. The University shall maintain at its own expense with
an insurance company licensed to do business in Connecticut, at
least the following forms of insurance: (1) general liability
and property insurance for all liability assumed under the
indemnity clause with a combined limit of $1,000,000 each
occurrence, (2) automobile and property damage insurance,
including coverage for hired and borrowed cars, with a minimum
limit of $1,000,000 each accident.

The minimum amounts of all such insurance shall not be less
than those stated herein, but the stipulation of minimum amounts
or the acceptance by the City of certificates indicating the
limits of coverage shall in no way limit the liability of the
policyholder on whose behalf this certificate is issued to any
such amounts.

Certificates of insurance shall be submitted to the City
before or upon the effective date of this agreement. A
certified copy of the insurance policy shall be submitted upon
the City's request.

6. In the event of any suspension or termination of
employment a police officer by Yale University for any reason,
such officer's police powers shall be automatically suspended or
terminated, as the case may be, without further action on the
part of the City or its Board of Police Commissioners.

Any such officer who is reinstated or re-employed by the
University within a period of one year following any such
suspension of employment by Yale University shall be deemed
automatically reinstated or restored to such police powers by
said Board of Police Commissioners after redesignation by Yale
University.
Any such former officer who is reinstated or reemployed by the University following any such termination shall be reinstated or restored to such police powers by said Board of Police Commissioners after acting upon the redesignation and recommendation of Yale University.

7. There shall be an Appendix A to this agreement, consisting of a Memorandum of Operations describing the coordination of police services between the New Haven and Yale University Police Departments. This Appendix A may be revised from time to time by agreement of the Chiefs of Police of the New Haven and Yale University Police Departments and upon approval of the Board of Police Commissioners of the City of New Haven without the need for any amendment to this Agreement.

8. This Agreement supersedes the March 23, 1984 Memorandum of Agreement between the parties which agreement is hereby specifically terminated and any previous agreements as to the matters contained herein and may not be amended except upon the written agreement of the parties, and except as provided in paragraph 7 for the amendment of Appendix A, and shall continue in effect from the date hereof until terminated by mutual agreement of the parties or by one of the parties effective July 1 of any year upon no less than ten months advance written notice to the other.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this Agreement by their representatives thereunto duly authorized.

Witness:  

[Signature]

YALE UNIVERSITY  
By: [Signature]  
Michael Finnerty  
Its Vice President for Finance and Administration

Witness:  

[Signature]

BOARD OF POLICE COMMISSIONERS  
OF THE CITY OF NEW HAVEN  
By: [Signature]  
Donald McAuley  
Its President

Witness:  

[Signature]

APPROVED AS TO FORM AND CORRECTNESS  
[Signature]  
Assistant Corporation Counsel

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APPENDIX A

This memorandum of operations describes the coordination of police operations support services between the New Haven and Yale University Police Departments. In order to promote the most efficient operation of the two police departments, certain support services are provided by the New Haven Police Department to the Yale University Police Department including, but not limited to the following:

- Criminal investigation follow-up and supervision of major cases;
- Records processing and crime analysis services;
- Communication liaison and assignment of case numbers for incident reports;
- Identification and crime scene services;
- Prisoner transportation and detention;
- Prisoner processing and tracking and recordkeeping of court dispositions;
- Property and evidence services;
- Juvenile offender services;
- Assistance, upon request of the Yale Police Chief or his designee, in specific incidents, including but not limited to special events and demonstrations;
- Joint patrols, as agreed to by the Chiefs of the New Haven and Yale Police Departments;
- Bomb scene searches; and
- Other specialized police services.

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APPENDIX B. ASSASSINATIONS–FIELD TACTICS, INSPIRE MAGAZINE

ASSASSINATIONS – FIELD TACTICS

We present to you, a model to follow and an assassination list which will help us achieve strategic goals. We believe that placing this feasible programme to Lone Mujahideen will allow us to achieve great goals in this war. Whoever understands the components of the American economy knows the importance these personalities play in the revival of the America Economy. The assassination of these economic personalities or their migration from America or the mere fact that they live in insecurity, will later on bring instability to the American economy. The economy is a major component of America’s supremacy in the world. And we have mentioned in the previous issue on the importance of assassinating these economic personalities. We mentioned it through the method of using the hidden bomb, to achieve similar objectives. In this issue, we shall give more details in targeting these personalities. We talked about it in the previous issue under the topic “Cutting Nerves and separating the head”.

And we will divide these personalities as we have in the previous issue, into two categories:

A  ECONOMIC PERSONALITIES

BEN SHALOM BERNANEK

We have mentioned some of them in the previous issue such as Ben Shalom Bernanek, who was previously the president of the Federal Reserve bank and among the most influential people in the Global Market.

ROBERT JAMES SHILLER

Robert James is an American economist, a Professor of Economics at Yale University and a research associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research. Shiller is ranked among the 100 most influential economists of the world. Eugene Fama, Lars Peter Hansen and Shiller jointly received the 2013 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences.

Source: *Inspire*, “Assassinations: Field Tactics,” 43
LIST OF REFERENCES


INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

1. Defense Technical Information Center
   Ft. Belvoir, Virginia

2. Dudley Knox Library
   Naval Postgraduate School
   Monterey, California