THE SOFTEST TARGET: SECURITY PLANNING
FOR HOUSES OF WORSHIP

by

John E. Stein

December 2019

Co-Advisors: David W. Brannan (contractor) Carolyn C. Halladay

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THE SOFTEST TARGET: SECURITY PLANNING FOR HOUSES OF WORSHIP

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES (HOMELAND SECURITY AND DEFENSE) from the

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ABSTRACT

Defending houses of worship has become an ever-increasing need in homeland security. The rise of threats against faith-based organizations is growing, and the unique nature of sanctuaries makes them an ever-increasing soft target. What security help can assist houses of worship, and how can homeland security experts advise faith-based organizations?

This thesis employs an appreciative inquiry approach to define the security problem that houses of worship face in specific threats and hurdles unique to them. Chapters review available resources at the government level, in the commercial space, and by faith-based organizations themselves. The material was then synthesized by developing an emergency operations plan for one house of worship: Northminster Presbyterian Church in Tucson, Arizona. This thesis suggests that overcoming the hurdles to security strategies within a house of worship is much more nuanced than previously believed, and the construction of a security plan for any house of worship is far more difficult than previously understood. Rather than seeking a one-size-fits-all or a packaged solution, houses of worship would best be served by engaging in a local effort to analyze security challenges and solutions. Little empirical study treats how houses of worship use, acquire, and find value in protection strategies on their campuses, and this thesis starts the conversation into this rarely discussed space.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION
   A. PROBLEM STATEMENT .................................................................1
   B. RESEARCH QUESTION .............................................................2
   C. SOFT TARGETS ........................................................................2
   D. LITERATURE REVIEW ............................................................5
      1. Legal Applicability ..............................................................5
      2. Soft Target Mitigation Theory ..............................................7
   E. RESEARCH DESIGN ...............................................................8
   F. THESIS OVERVIEW ..............................................................10

II. CURRENT STATE OF SECURITY IN HOUSES OF WORSHIP ....11
   A. THREATS TO THE RELIGIOUS SPACE ................................12
      1. International Terrorist Organizations ..............................12
      2. Homegrown Terrorism ....................................................13
      3. Religiously Motivated Violence ......................................16
      4. Other Threats .................................................................17
   B. CHALLENGES IN HARDENING HOUSES OF WORSHIP .....20
      1. Risk Management ............................................................21
      2. Funding ...........................................................................24
      3. Unique Nature of Religious Spaces .................................25

III. SOFT-TARGET DEFENSE STRATEGIES FOR THE RELIGIOUS
     SPACE ..........................................................................................27
   A. FEDERAL AND STATE ASSISTANCE .................................27
      1. Guides ..............................................................................28
      2. Audits and Exercises .......................................................31
      3. Information Networks, Campaigns, and Webinars ............33
      4. Public Events .................................................................36
   B. SELF-HELP ..........................................................................37
      1. Religious-based Security Networks .................................38
      2. Faith-based Security Teams .............................................40
   C. COMMERCIAL SPACE .........................................................41
      1. Ministries and Marketing ...............................................42
      2. Publicly Available Resources .........................................45
IV. NORTHMINSTER PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH EMERGENCY OPERATIONS PLANNING ............................................................. 49
    A. PRIOR SECURITY PLANNING .......................................................................................... 50
    B. SITE VISIT .................................................................................................................. 51
    C. BUILDING AN EMERGENCY OPERATIONS PLAN .................................................. 53
    D. LESSONS LEARNED .................................................................................................. 56

V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS ................................................................. 59
    A. KEY FINDINGS ........................................................................................................... 59
    B. GROWING THREATS ............................................................................................... 63
    C. AVENUES OF ADDITIONAL RESEARCH .............................................................. 64

APPENDIX. NORTHMINSTER PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH—EMERGENCY OPERATIONS PLAN (CURRENT DRAFT) ......................................... 67

LIST OF REFERENCES ........................................................................................................ 107

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST ......................................................................................... 129
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
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<td>Anti-Defamation League</td>
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<td>ALICE</td>
<td>alert, lockdown, inform, counter, evacuate</td>
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<td>AZCSN</td>
<td>Arizona Church Security Network</td>
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<td>CAIR</td>
<td>Council on American-Islamic Relations</td>
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<td>Disaster Preparedness and Response Plan</td>
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<td>IC</td>
<td>incident commander</td>
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<td>ISIS</td>
<td>Islamic State of Iraq and Syria</td>
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<td>NPC</td>
<td>Northminster Presbyterian Church</td>
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<td>PSA</td>
<td>protective security advisor</td>
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<td>SCN</td>
<td>Secure Community Network</td>
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<td>SEAR</td>
<td>Special Event Assessment Rating</td>
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<td>TLP</td>
<td>traffic light protocol</td>
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<td>UKIP</td>
<td>United Kingdom Independence Party</td>
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<td>VBIED</td>
<td>vehicle borne improvised explosive device</td>
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Institutions particularly vulnerable to attack due to a lack of security measures and a high concentration of people are what analysts typically refer to as soft targets.\(^1\) The unique nature of a house of worship, with its inviting atmosphere and open doors, limits the constructs available to develop holistic security plans for these soft targets. How can homeland security experts assist in resolving security matters in the religious space, especially when houses of worship lack the resources to protect themselves?

In looking for targets to select, terrorists, as rational actors, will choose a target that inspires the greatest fear and spreads their message.\(^2\) The softer the target, the greater effect is a cornerstone of the terrorist attack strategy. The action of hardening a target will increase the perceived cost to terrorist actors, which causes them to make the rational decision not to attack the target. Deterrence by denial involves taking soft targets and making them too difficult to attack without excessive costs and planning.\(^3\) Houses of worship sit as some to the most vulnerable soft targets and how soft target mitigation deterrence strategies are utilized is the impetus of this thesis.

Using an Appreciative Inquiry Model, this thesis seeks to develop a portfolio that homeland security experts can use to assist in the development and implementation of security plans in houses of worship.\(^4\) The Appreciative Inquiry Model has five steps: define, discover, dream, design, and deliver.\(^5\) The first step exactly defines the scope of the thesis as it relates to securing religious spaces: soft space protection strategies that will best fit in the religious space. The discovery phase researches three distinct areas of

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\(^5\) *The Appreciative Inquiry Commons* (blog).
soft space security: current programs utilized by houses of worship, government programs to assist religious organizations, and commercially offered programs for houses of worship. Once a large data set of strategies and plans is unearthed, the next phase analyzes the next best steps and attempts to envision the best possible plans for houses of worship. Within the design and delivery phases, an actual security plan is developed for Northminster Presbyterian Church (NPC) with the goal of extracting the best strategies and research to apply it to a real-world scenario. In delivering an emergency operations plan within a microcosm of one venue, many valuable lessons can be applied to other faith-based organizations.

Religious spaces are vulnerable and the symbolic nature of acts against a house of worship makes them a prime target for various criminal and terrorist actors. In combination with the threat is the lack of preparedness that houses of worship face as their strained resources and unique hurdles set up roadblocks that prevent the majority of religious institutions from having a plan at all. A lack of a plan is not from a lack of resources, though. Resources abound from government agencies, private vendors, and other religious institutions to assist in securing houses of worship. Homeland security experts have outlined the threats to religious spaces and provided the tactics and strategies necessary to assist in the protection of these unique spaces. Guides, audits, exercises, webinars, public events, and information networks have been created at the federal level to assist houses of worship. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency are active in assisting faith-based organizations at every level of preparedness, planning, and mitigation. Religious institutions also have developed their own networks and security teams to build resiliency, prepare for possible threats, and mitigate hazards. If neither is of interest to a faith-based organization, commercial programs offered by insurance companies and vendors offer holistic security systems for faith-based organizations.

2013 by the Department of Education in conjunction with FEMA, was used to frame and develop a security plan for NPC. Protective security advisors from the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency came to NPC to perform what is known as an “assist visit,” which is an audit of a commercial soft target space. The Safety Committee then developed an emergency operations plan based on best practices found throughout the soft target security space landscape. The committee has not completed the work of developing a plan, which speaks to the difficulty of the task that houses of worship encounter when developing a plan. The complexity of security on a diverse campus, while integrating multiple voices, is a major hurdle for faith-based organizations. The dedication and time required to follow through can easily explain why NPC is in the third iteration of a security planning team.

Those not committed to planning and modifying their soft spaces leave themselves most vulnerable as the threat continues to grow. Houses of worship are particularly vulnerable and have become an ever-increasing target in recent years. Assessing vulnerabilities and then planning for the worst-case scenarios are an integral step in defending the sacred spaces that religious orders occupy. More steps must be taken beyond planning for a response to threats and more must be done to determine the effectiveness of strategies already employed. As seen with the development of an emergency operations plan at NPC, the process of creating a plan is in itself inherently valuable and allows a faith-based community to answer questions necessary to improving site security.

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The various resources available to houses of worship and the roadblocks to implementation of any plan are outlined, but many avenues of research are still needed to obtain a full picture of the faith-based security landscape. Investigation into implementation is the next step. Questions remain as to who is using the plans, at what level they are being implemented, and are faith-based organizations continuing to plan as the threat evolves. Plans outlined have not necessarily been evaluated for effectiveness, whether the federal government or individual entities developed them. The Department of Homeland Security measures plans through a protective measure index, which evaluates the weakest links in a security structure through resiliency measures. Research into the difficulties of execution has not been discussed. The most pressing questions are what actually happened during active assailant events in a house of worship and what are the lessons learned that could be disseminated to other communities. Acknowledgement of the issues surrounding domestic violence within the religious community and creating tools to combat domestic violence through houses of worship was frequently discussed in various sources for this thesis and needs further development. Houses of worship and their role in disaster preparedness and recovery is another avenue worth exploring.

This thesis attempts to provide a comprehensive look at the security landscape for houses of worship and filter them through the creation of a security plan for an individual faith-based organization. The difficulty of creating an emergency operations plan for an individual congregation is representative of the information found regarding church security. There are many voices, many ways to get to the finish line, and many ways to fall off the path and end up without improving the security posture of the sacred space. Site audits, planning committees, federal and local resources, and other religious orders are great places for a house of worship to start. Homeland security experts are just one key piece of the security puzzle for faith-based organizations. Internal security and threat mitigation planning has taken on a life of its’ own within houses of worship, and especially within minority communities of the Jewish and Muslim faith. Sharing of lessons learned by faith-based organizations can have a lasting effect of communal

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integration and collaboration, strengthen the community, lessen the risk of attack, and create resiliency amongst attendees.
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

First and foremost, to my lovely wife who has been there every step of the way, sometimes dragging me kicking and screaming, to the finish line. If her name could be on the thesis, it deserves to be, for the sacrifices she has made. The time away from my three bright and beautiful children, Mara, Maverick, and Rocco, made this program an immense challenge that has taught us all the value of service and dedication to craft.

To those at Northminster Presbyterian Church, the opportunity to develop a security plan that will make our house of worship safer is an honor that I do not take lightly. The dedication that Kathy Lee has shown in this process is praiseworthy. Thank you for selecting me for this fine work, Pastor Andy, and thank you to the Safety Committee members. We will finish this task!

The cohort of 1803/1804 has been met with many challenges and heartbreaks. Those new to our cohort and those who will be done in the next cohort are all family. Chris, I am inspired by your recovery and dedication. I could mention everyone by name and fill a page of praise, but I think we have heard enough of my discursive frame!

Framing this entire project were the two advisors that I could not have completed this project without: Dr. David Brannan and Dr. Carolyn Halladay. Team of teams for sure, their push-and-pull method moved the thesis down the track at a considerable clip. I will be forever grateful.

To the staff at the Tucson Coordination Center who stepped in to allow me to complete this process, words cannot express my gratitude. Our team in the Tucson Sector is the finest in the U.S. Border Patrol, and I would not have wanted to share this experience with any others. I owe a great personal debt to Carrie, Jeff, and Manases for all the time and energy that they needed to expend on my behalf to finish this process. Somehow, I am sure you will think of a way I can pay you all back.
I. INTRODUCTION

An Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) sympathizer is arrested after planning an attack on a synagogue in Toledo.\(^1\) A murderous rampage takes place at The Tree of Life Synagogue on the Sabbath.\(^2\) Sutherland Springs First Baptist Church suffers horrific loss of life when a lone shooter murders 26 parishioners.\(^3\) Even though mass shootings have entered the realm of commonplace, targeted attacks on unsuspecting worshippers still evokes a particular abhorrence.\(^4\) Yet, very little has been done to harden the defenses of religious communities. Only 20 percent to 25 percent of churches have some form of security plan in place and a year after the Tree of Life Synagogue shooting, a survey of 154 synagogues revealed that 30 percent still had no plan for responding to a threat on their premises.\(^5\)

A. PROBLEM STATEMENT

The unique nature of a house of worship, with its inviting atmosphere and open doors, limits the constructs available to develop holistic security plans. Such private firms as Full Armor Church, LLC have plans to assist houses of worship in creating a security ministry or strategy and no empirical inquiry suggests any ideas being presented are truly

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useful. Valuable information in the security space is applicable to faith-based organizations (FBOs)—for example, the plans developed by Jennifer Hesterman—but the unique nature of the religious space is absent, and religious institutions are dealt with as though they have the same security needs as a shopping mall or school. A lack of empirical research leaves agencies with very little guidance of value to provide to religious institutions requesting assistance. Religious institutions lack the proper training and skills to create their security plans independently. Due to the inherent separation between the church and the state, collaborative efforts meet resistance by both sides.

B. RESEARCH QUESTION

How can homeland security experts assist in resolving security matters in the religious space, especially where houses of worship lack the resources to protect themselves?

C. SOFT TARGETS

Institutions particularly vulnerable to attack due to a lack of security measures and a high concentration of people are what analysts typically refer to as soft targets. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) defines soft targets within a framework that includes crowded spaces. The DHS defines a soft target as “locations that are easily accessible to large numbers of people and that have limited security or protective measures in place making them vulnerable to attack.” Jennifer Hesterman defines a soft target as a civilian venue less protected and more vulnerable to terrorist attacks.


10 Fagel and Hesterman, Soft Targets and Crisis Management, 2.
Schmid explains that terrorists partly choose symbolic targets for intimidation, coercion, or propaganda, which turn them into targets of attention, targets of terror, or targets of demand.\footnote{11} Asal et al. explain that soft targets, being targets of attention or targets of violence, are particularly vulnerable and are the focus of terrorist plots.\footnote{12} The authors of “The Softest of Targets: A Study on Terrorist Target Selection” argue that soft targets are easy because they are unlikely to see themselves as targets and take very little precautions to prevent it.\footnote{13} Those wishing to instill terror also select targets that guarantee a higher level of success, especially when they have limited resources.\footnote{14} When soft targets are privately held, another layer of complexities arises since security and management of any risks are the responsibility of the owner.\footnote{15} These privately held spaces make attractive targets for terrorists because multiple entrances, exits, and easy vehicle access make them easy to exploit.\footnote{16} Clarke and Serena explain that the number of soft targets is nearly endless.\footnote{17} Houses of worship and religious institutions fall into this category.

Considerable resources, though, are spent at the federal, state, and local level to protect privately held soft targets. Super Bowl LII, a private event, was considered a soft target. Local security expenditures on the event totaled $6.08 million.\footnote{18} The DHS considers the Super Bowl and such events as the Indianapolis 500 to be matters of

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item[13] Asal et al., 259.
\end{enumerate}
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national security, and thus label them as a Special Event Assessment Rating (SEAR).\textsuperscript{19} The SEAR rating—determined by an algorithm based on attendance, facility type, and iconic value—affords an event special status that includes a coordinated security response from the federal, state, and local level.\textsuperscript{20} If a target is of high value to a perceived threat, whether it is in the public or private sphere, the government has shown a duty to respond.

After the September 11 terrorist attacks, airport security was moved from the private sector to the government in response to the possibility of additional threats. The federal government now spends approximately $4.175 billion on the Transportation and Security Administration to protect the public and private structures.\textsuperscript{21} Although private industry has a “duty to care” and protect and is liable if it does not make reasonable steps to ensure the safety of customers, the federal government involves itself at multiple levels of soft target security.\textsuperscript{22} Direct government involvement in soft target security represents a shift in public involvement in commercial affairs. An industry previously expected to protect itself is now working with the government on protection strategies. The basic legal framework and past practices of the federal government uphold the concept that the protection of privately held soft targets is in the best interest of the public.

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\textsuperscript{20} H.R., Mass Gathering Security, 7.
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D. LITERATURE REVIEW

The convergence of religion and security is a slowly growing field of study. Security matters within houses of worship fall in the realm of what is known as soft targets and soft target mitigation theory addresses the development of counter measures to “harden” vulnerable spaces, and is as important as the legal framework surrounding the intersection of church and state. It is not only a question of how can homeland security assist faith-based organizations with securing their premises, but also a matter of can a federal system with a clear line between the church and state reach out to religious organizations to lessen the potential of attacks on a vulnerable soft target.

1. Legal Applicability

Americans have always been leery of government involvement in religious institutions, and more recently, extremely cautious of religious involvement in government institutions. The First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States reads, “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,” and the line between the government and the religious bodies of the United States has been redrawn endless times. In the past, the line excluded federal funds from being used by any religious organization. As early as the 1990s, this thought process changed as secular religious activities started to receive federal funding. Based on Bowen v. Kendrick, legislation expanded the use of federal grants in religious venues for non-religious activity. After September 11, federal money

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26 Jonathan A. Wright, Separation of Church and State, Historical Guides to Controversial Issues in America (Santa Barbara, CA: Greenwood, 2010), 147.
began to be appropriated for the protection of soft targets, as part of an overall preparedness strategy.\textsuperscript{27}

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, grants and protective status began to flow to soft targets of great vulnerability, including religious institutions. Important landmarks, whether public, private, or religious, were now labeled critical infrastructure under the Homeland Security Presidential Security Directive 7 in 2003.\textsuperscript{28} In 2005, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) began providing grants to nonprofits through a specific program known as the Nonprofit Security Grant Program, with a total appropriation of $60 million.\textsuperscript{29} Nonprofits vulnerable to terrorist attacks win grant awards to assist them in creating protective barriers.\textsuperscript{30} Religious organizations are eligible for these grants and actively seek them.\textsuperscript{31} Others have also argued that religious sites should be considered critical infrastructure.\textsuperscript{32} Roadblocks to federal assistance for houses of worship have been reduced under the banner of emergency preparedness, but Presidential Policy Directive 21 in 2013 eliminated the national monuments and icons sector from the list of critical infrastructure sectors, which included religious monuments.\textsuperscript{33} The movement of important religious landmarks in and out of the realm of critical infrastructure signals the changing belief structures within the government and it’s perception of threats to symbolic structures.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{31} Jewish Community Relations Council, Nonprofit Security Grant Program Updates.
\item \textsuperscript{32} Crockett, “Federal Role in the Security of Religious Venues in America,” 29.
\end{itemize}
2. **Soft Target Mitigation Theory**

A growing field of research involves the development of strategies to “harden” soft targets. In looking for targets to select, terrorists, as rational actors, will choose a target that inspires the greatest fear and spreads their message.\(^{34}\) The softer the target, the greater effect is a cornerstone of the terrorist attack strategy. The basic concept behind attempting to thwart terrorist actions against an unaware populace is known as a deterrence strategy.

The theory behind deterrence strategy contains two elements, “(1) a threat or action designed to increase an adversary’s perceived costs of engaging in particular behavior, and (2) an implicit or explicit offer of an alternative state of affairs if the adversary refrains from that behavior.”\(^{35}\) The action of hardening a target will increase the perceived cost to terrorist actors, which causes them to make the rational decision not to attack the target. Deterrence by denial involves taking soft targets and making them too difficult to attack without excessive costs and planning.\(^{36}\) Johnson, Mueller, and Taft segment the idea into strategic and tactical deterrence, with tactical deterrence applying to soft targets as a way to prevent actions of an adversary.\(^{37}\) Tactical deterrence has often been seen militarily as stockpiling nuclear weapons or amassing troops, but not as a function of boots on the ground, but more the concept of having a ferocious dog guarding private property.\(^{38}\) The desired effect is to deter any wrong doers from entering your property tactically, not to prevent wrongdoing.\(^{39}\)

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\(^{34}\) Asal et al., “The Softest of Targets,” 260.


\(^{36}\) Trager and Zagorcheva, 91.


Common themes and tactics appear within deterrence strategies to “harden” soft spaces. Closed-circuit television, observations of multiple visits by single individuals, intelligence sharing, and encouraging people to report suspicious behavior are all common tactics. The “If you see something, say something” DHS campaign is widespread. Coaffee et al. argue that targets can be hardened simply by the design of the public structure, which make it less likely to be attacked and more resilient from damage if such an attack occurs. Similarly, Linda Jashari argues that protective design elements can be appealing and aesthetically pleasing and that the correct environmental design can lessen risk and reduce costs. Insurers are also looking into terrorist modeling and building owners’ security plans to manage risk, which pushes organizations to harden targets to reduce insurance costs. Deterrence in soft spaces generally tends to be a visual cue that efforts have been made to prevent attacks and “hardening” the religious space creates a look and feel counter to what most organizations are trying to create.

E. RESEARCH DESIGN

Using an Appreciative Inquiry Model, this thesis seeks to develop a portfolio that homeland security experts can use to assist in the development and implementation of security plans in houses of worship. The Appreciative Inquiry Model has five steps: define, discover, dream, design, and deliver.

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46 The Appreciative Inquiry Commons (blog).
The first step exactly defines the scope of the thesis as it relates to securing religious spaces: soft space protection strategies that will best fit in the religious space. The discovery phase researches three distinct areas of soft space security: current programs utilized by houses of worship, government programs to assist religious organizations, and commercially offered programs for houses of worship. Within the discovery phase, the research focuses on operation plans, strategies, guides, and reference material that have been published for or implemented by various religious organizations.

Once a large data set of strategies and plans is unearthed, the next phase analyzes what works best and attempts to envision the best possible plans for houses of worship. Within the design phase, I will be working within my church, Northminster Presbyterian Church, to develop a security plan. The goal is to extract the best strategies and research from the discovery phase, and then apply it to a real-world scenario, a faith-based organization that has no security plan. The security plan will be created using the Guide for Developing High Quality Emergency Operations Plans for Houses of Worship published by FEMA as a framework to build an emergency operations plan. As the plan for this specific site is developed and augmented from ideas developed in the discovery phase, a ground up emergency operations plan will be delivered.

In delivering an emergency operations plan within a microcosm of one venue, many valuable lessons can be applied to other faith-based organizations. Value is intrinsic in the planning process and in understanding how a small team works together to overcome issues while collaborating. Within intradistrict emergency planning teams, a major hurdle is agreement on a mission while sharing a common vernacular, and the spiritual side and the security side of a faith-based collaboration while planning a security strategy may have the same problem. Conflicts between the goals of a religious order—for example, open doors and an open campus—will also collide with those more concerned with security than access. With limited resources available, faith-based

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organizations also must look for cost effective solutions that also meet their goals. A belief in an all hazards approach is the norm for emergency planning, yet the soft target of a house of worship may not have the available resources, time, energy, or desire to mitigate all factors.49 The delivery of a security plan for one site is an attempt to flesh out problems commonly found when faith-based organizations attempt security planning and devise solutions applicable to other organizations. Solutions and lessons learned from the delivery of a security plan for a medium sized faith-based campus can be applied to other organizations struggling to create a plan of their own.

F. THESIS OVERVIEW

Following this introduction, Chapter II addresses the state of security in houses of worship. Chapter II discusses the various threats to faith-based organizations and the challenges unique to soft target security in the religious space. Chapter III is a review of materials available to religious organizations within the security landscape. The chapter explores commercially available products, internal religious plans, and the federal assistance offered. Chapter IV is an exploration of security planning within one institution, Northminster Presbyterian Church, as it develops an emergency operations plan and how the lessons learned by one religious order can be applied to other faith-based organizations. The final chapter provides a review of key findings, recommendations, and the areas of additional research.

II. CURRENT STATE OF SECURITY IN HOUSES OF WORSHIP

A cursory search of criminal activity that occurs on religious property finds thousands of hits for events ranging from vandalism to mass shootings. Federal law prohibits intentional damage or destruction of religious real property and intentional obstruction by threat or force of a person’s free exercise of religious beliefs. Still, the pull to injure or interfere with people engaged in religious activity is strong. Religiously biased hate crimes, of which 1,542 were reported in 2017, occur at a frequency of about 15 percent on the campus of a religious order. Carl Chinn has been tracking violent events on the campuses of faith-based organizations, and logged a total of 118 deaths on the grounds of a house of worship in 2017. The U.S. Secret Service report on Mass Attacks in Public Spaces notes that three attacks occurred on houses of worship in the last two years where at least three people were injured. These attacks account for roughly 6 percent of all public space attacks, with the most common being in places of business. A more historical study completed by the Center for Homicide Research, which compiled a list of shootings at houses of worship from 1980 to 2005, found that 88.5 percent of shootings had less than three victims. Lesser events will occur and be unreported in even local newspapers while the most violent events will get massive media play and response from local and national politicians. Religious spaces are vulnerable and the


symbolic nature of acts against a house of worship makes them a prime target for various criminal and terrorist actors. In combination with the threat is the lack of preparedness that houses of worship face as their strained resources and unique hurdles set up roadblocks that prevent the majority of religious institutions from having a plan at all.56

A. THREATS TO THE RELIGIOUS SPACE

As most currently active terrorist organizations are linked to some type of religious belief system, they invariably will have a penchant to attack the religious organizations of their perceived enemies.57 It can be seen around the globe from the destruction of religious artifacts, tombs, houses of worship, the burning of primarily minority churches in the southern United States, to the loss of life from kidnappings and beheadings in developing nations. The crimes that lie underneath the headlines are just as disturbing. As houses of worship look at external threats, there is more to worry about than terrorism, as the risk of theft and violence from within is all the more likely. To compound the issue, faith-based organizations have unique challenges that other soft targets do not tend to struggle with, for example, domestic violence among congregants spilling over into the sanctuary. The threats, seen and unseen, create a unique landscape that necessitates a delicately manicured response.

1. International Terrorist Organizations

The biggest fear and most unlikely event to occur on a religious space in the United States is an attack by the ISIS. An ISIS supporting Syrian refugee was plotting to attack a Christian Church in Pittsburgh.58 His motivation may have been a response to the 2018 killing of Shiite protesters by the Nigerian military, so his target was the Legacy International Worship Center, as that congregation has a large Nigerian population.59

56 Sheepdog Church Security, “Church Security Assessment.”
Although the threat to houses of worship from international terrorist organizations is very real within the United States, the vast majority of attacks are limited to developing countries.\textsuperscript{60}

The real or perceived threat of terrorist violence against religious institutions is a motivating factor in the creation of security plans. Regardless of political or religious affiliation, polls indicate that the majority of Americans believe that Muslim Americans experience prejudice.\textsuperscript{61} This prejudice toward Muslim Americans carries with it the belief that Muslims, including those in the United States, are potential terrorists.\textsuperscript{62} Whether the source is the perception of risk of an attack on a religious institution, terrorist activity has emboldened faith-based organizations to plan for the possible.

2. **Homegrown Terrorism**

Plots against worshippers have occurred with some frequency in the United States. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) recently arrested a young man in the San Francisco Bay area who was planning to attack a synagogue with an assault rifle that he had built at his home.\textsuperscript{63} Authorities stated that the shootings at a synagogue in Poway, California, and the massacre at mosques in Christchurch, New Zealand were part of his inspiration.\textsuperscript{64}

The biggest focus, based on the daily news cycle, regarding attacks on religious organizations are attacks focused on those of the Jewish faith. The Anti-Defamation League (ADL) has been tracking anti-Semitic crimes since the 1970s and noted that 2018


marked the third-highest number of assaults on Jews and Jewish institutions since the ADL began keeping such statistics. The year 2018 also witnessed the deadliest incident on record, the shooting at the Tree of Life Synagogue in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. The attacker posted multiple anti-Semitic rants on Gab, a social media site, and his anti-Semitic beliefs may have been the motivation for the shooting. The Poway, California, incident was similar; the attacker opened fire at the Chabad of Poway Synagogue to “defend my country nation against the Jewish people” and posted a manifesto on 8chan that was eerily similar to the manifesto posted by the Christchurch killer. Even though the attack in Christchurch, New Zealand targeted mosques and the attacks in the United States were against synagogues, the similar white nationalist beliefs are a clear motivation for the terrorist activity.

The majority of lower-profile anti-Semitic incidents involve harassment and vandalism, accounting for 1967 of the 1986 incidents in 2017. Incidents within this category include robocalls, campaigns placing fliers on cars at houses of worship and homes, and online harassment, almost exclusively by white-supremacist hate groups.

White supremacists have also targeted other denominations and their followers. Recent events in the United States have elevated this particular group to its list of priority

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terrorist threats against the nation. In the 1920s heyday of the Ku Klux Klan, Klansmen burned Catholic churches along with the various intimidation tactics used against a variety of non-Protestant religious organizations. In 2015, the Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church was specifically targeted because it was the oldest black church in the south and the assailant assumed that no white people would be in attendance. Although the attacker was not motivated specifically by hatred of a particular religious organization, the vulnerability of the campus, and the makeup of its members made it a prime target. In 2012, a neo-Nazi attacked a Sikh Temple in Oak Creek, Wisconsin, killing six people. Various attacks on religious groups by white supremacists have been on the rise around the globe as well, noting that this increase is not just an American phenomenon.

Politically and personally motivated attacks have also caused carnage within the walls of religious organizations. In 2009, George Tiller was killed while handing out bulletins inside his church because he was a later-term abortion provider, according to statements made by the assailant. A Herndon, Virginia, man opened fire in 2012 inside the Family Research Council, a lobbying group for conservative Christian values, based on the organization’s opposition to gay marriage. In Antioch, Tennessee, the Burnette Chapel Church of Christ was attacked by an assailant who was motivated to kill white...
churchgoers, based on a note left on his car, in retaliation for the attack on the Charleston, South Carolina church by a white supremacist teen in 2015.\textsuperscript{76} The worst attack on an American religious site occurred in Sutherland Springs, Texas, on November 5, 2017, when an assailant was reportedly angry with his mother-in-law who attended the church. The mother-in-law was not attending services that day and 26 people were murdered.\textsuperscript{77} In sum, religious facilities are a target for those attempting to make a statement, whether it is political or religious in nature.

3. \textbf{Religiously Motivated Violence}

Personal religious beliefs are also a driving force in violence against houses of worship. A small few in the Christian Church feel that attacks on their faith are not taken as seriously as those on other faiths. Gerard Batten, the leader of the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), when speaking about the Christchurch shootings, states that it is “not because the World thinks [Christians] matter less but because the World does not fear them, as it does the ‘religion of peace.’”\textsuperscript{78} The UKIP party has gained far right prominence with its attacks on what it calls the “Islamification” of Europe.\textsuperscript{79} This sense of becoming a second-class citizen of the world has become an impetus for attacks by white supremacists, including the Christchurch shooter who may have contributed a donation to the Identitarian Movement of Austria, which is a counterpart to UKIP.\textsuperscript{80} The attacks on the Christchurch mosques were perpetrated by a devoted white supremacist who had a Christian historical perspective that intertwined the view of Christianity with


\textsuperscript{78} Taylor and Noack, “Christianity under Attack?”

\textsuperscript{79} Joe Mulhall, \textit{The Contemporary British Far Right} (United Kingdom: Commission for Countering Extremism, 2019), 8.

white nationalism.81 The identification with Christian white nationalists and their in-group narrative is an impetus for attacks, even if the political and religious leaders are condemning such acts.

A string of homegrown terrorist activity has also been inspired by allegiance to radical Muslim ideologies. A Long Beach, California, resident, inspired by ISIS, considered attacking houses of worship before being apprehended.82 Recently, authorities arrested an Ohio man and seized two AR-15 rifles in his possession based on information that he was planning to attack a synagogue in the Toledo area out of allegiance to ISIS. A plot to bomb the Riverdale Jewish Community Center was foiled by authorities and four converts to Islam were convicted and sentenced to life in prison for their role.83 In 2006, a man who stated, “I am a Muslim American, angry at Israel,” shot six women at the Jewish Federation building in Seattle.84 These examples demonstrate a string of plots and incidents in which those swearing allegiance to one faith attacked or planned to attack others based solely on their faith.

4. Other Threats

The majority of criminal activity on religious properties within the United States does not result in the loss of life. Worldwide, the most attention is given to deaths on holy ground, but criminal activity on the campuses of religious organizations is daily. Domestic disturbances often spill over onto the campuses of the family’s religious organization. More than 542 reported instances of domestic violence have led to deadly


force incidents on the campus of a religious organization in the last 18 years.\textsuperscript{85} As religious organizations are seen as easy targets, theft is also common. Vandalism, especially by young people, is seen quite frequently. The most devastating acts involve a higher level of vandalism, arson and its destructive force.

The specter of domestic violence seems to pervade religious organizations as they grapple with the definition of submission and authority over the home.\textsuperscript{86} Taking advantage of a perceived license of total dominion over the home, domestic violence is just as common in a religious home as a home of no faith.\textsuperscript{87} The difference is that violence in the homes of religious practitioners has spilled into the house of worship.\textsuperscript{88} Domestic violence is an internal threat that faith-based organizations can have a hand in mitigating, if they so choose, where other threats that houses of worship have less control over can be just as devastating.

Attacks against the sacred are neither always personal nor spiritually motivated. Religious sites are often left unguarded, vacant most of the time, and open to the public. The Church of England saw a total loss of 4.5 million pounds from theft in 2010–2011.\textsuperscript{89} Church security analysts reported an increase of 50 percent in church theft from 2011 to 2012. In the last three years, 445 crimes of criminal damage have occurred toward religious institutions in Northern Ireland.\textsuperscript{90} Breaking and entering into the properties of


faith-based organizations is low risk for the perpetrator, as religious sites generally do not have enhanced protections. Others perceive houses of worship as wealthy and able to incur the loss, and that even if caught, the beliefs that congregations hold will forgive. After more than 20 burglaries of local houses of worship in Barbour County, Alabama, the religious communities’ shock prompted religious organizations to begin installing cameras and take additional security precautions even after the culprits were apprehended.91 Violence in these instances is rare but can occur, and the most egregious example was the 1991 killing of nine people at a Buddhist temple in Waddell, Arizona during an armed robbery.92

The most expensive threat to the physical property of a religious site is fire, accidental or intentional. The Poway Synagogue shooter also claimed on 8chan to have set fire to a mosque.93 Church burnings in France have become epidemic with no sense of what is causing them.94 The executive director of the Observatory of Intolerance and Discrimination against Christians in Europe suspects a rise in anti-Christian violence is the cause of an increase in arson, as the attacks appear to target sacred symbols.95 A common intimidation tactic by extremist in the United States has been the burning of the cross on the religious space itself. A spate of church burnings in Louisiana in March and April were attributed to a subject with interest in anti-church propaganda.96 About five

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93 Edevane, “California Police Find Nazi Literature.”


95 Cole.

acts of arson occur a week on religious sites, and three of these have caused significant damage to the site.97

In sum, faith-based organizations are faced with old and new threats coming from international and domestic players and a host of thieves looking for easy targets online and in the physical space. Such a cacophony of threats, real and perceived, increases the desire for threat mitigation planning in houses of worship. Homegrown terrorism has increased the pressure within the federal government to reach out to faith-based organizations to help prepare for and guard against potential threats.

B. CHALLENGES IN HARDENING HOUSES OF WORSHIP

Soft targets are difficult to protect from attack and the nature of houses of worship presents a unique difficulty for security planning. Not only are the threats to houses of worship real, protecting soft targets against the threat of attack is really challenging. Houses of worship are especially vulnerable, as they have a unique set of challenges facing their specific type of campus. Faith-based organizations have a structure and ethos to be open and inviting, which makes them more susceptible to attack. What little funding that may exist for threat mitigation is pulled in multiple directions and managing risk is a construct that faith-based organizations struggle to control. In the eyes of an opportunistic thief, the potential for exploitation certainly exists. The DHS has outlined some of the common vulnerabilities that houses of worship face, for example, easy access.98 Ultimately, the difficulty is in determining if the time, energy and money is being projected in the right direction, which is systemic for all soft targets.


1. Risk Management

What is the size of the house of worship and what is the need? Defining the need can be accomplished through understanding and utilizing risk management, which for businesses is “a process that allows individual risk events and overall risk to be understood and managed proactively, optimising success by minimising threats and maximising opportunities.” The larger the resources, the more likely the houses of worship seem to have taken an active role in risk management. An armed guard at New Life Church, in Colorado Springs, Colorado, stopped an active assailant after he killed two people in the parking lot as he entered the sanctuary with enough ammunition to kill hundreds more. New Life has 20 armed safety team members—not enough to stop all deaths, but they did prevent a mass tragedy. The average house of worship does not have such resources and the question becomes how best to use the resources available. To maximize capabilities, FBOs can look to risk management strategies and security audits.

Risk management is a fledgling concept, particularly in the world of nonprofits and houses of worship, where institutions and organizations are accustomed to taking risks but not necessarily to managing them. For a house of worship, risk management is the “intentional effort to minimize the effect of conflict on God’s creation.” Houses of worship generally tend to look at risk management through having comprehensive insurance for protection, but not necessarily looking at mitigation. Nonprofit organizations are unlikely to understand the need for risk management and a common idea among religious leaders is that divine intervention would prevent a tragedy from

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101 DeMarche.


happening.105 Insurance companies are the primary drivers for risk management. They are attempting to change the dynamic of static risk management in houses of worship by awarding facilities for their safety programs.106

Performing a risk review is an initial step in knowing what is needed to lessen the impact of catastrophic events on a house of worship.107 After reviewing the most impactful or costly negative outcomes, houses of worship can then assess how to treat the risk identified. The next step is how to treat the defined risk through risk transfer, risk avoidance, risk retention, or risk control.108 Risk transfer is the most common tactic used by houses of worship, as it involves insurance, which is required by most religious organizations for membership.109 Risk avoidance is the concept of not entering into an activity and therefore minimizing the risk to the organization.110 Faith-based organizations can avoid risk by limiting who is allowed to use and rent their space. Risk retention is taking the responsibility for losses on the organization without protection, which can come in the form of lowered premiums for a house of worship in exchange for extensive risk management procedures.111 Controlling risk is done through minimizing


exposure or abandoning activities considered too risky. 112 Scheduling maintenance is a common way to control risk. 113 Once risks are identified, a determination is made on how to manage those risks, and a comprehensive plan is then created and implemented. 114

A common belief is that managing risk for a house of worship means closing the doors to the people they are trying to reach. 115 In fact, managing risk is attempting to avoid adverse outcomes, deciding on which ways an organization will handle the risk, and allowing for flexible decision making within the context of an FBO’s unique space. 116 By identifying the risks and analyzing possible negative outcomes, a house of worship will have better control over those matters that will hopefully lessen the downside of any catastrophic event. 117 Individual organizations also encourage utilizing risk management tools to prevent unneeded negative press and exposure. 118

Assessing risk is the key to security in a house of worship. The Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) considers assessing vulnerabilities a best practice. Mosques are encouraged to assess what vulnerabilities exist, what risks they are facing, and look at what is possible given the resources available. 119 As suggested in the literature from CAIR, the Cybersecurity and Information Security Agency (CISA) will send a protective security advisor to any house of worship that requests it and perform an

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112 iEduNote, “Risk Management.”
114 iEduNote, “Risk Management.”
assist audit. Local law enforcement also offers security audits and site surveys for houses of worship. Individual fellowships also look to assessments as a critical step in security planning. Assessment of the current state of site security is instrumental in discovering the biggest security threats. Security needs are then balanced with the other risk factors facing a house of worship.

2. Funding

Religious institutions face the dilemma of paying for added security in a time of tight budgets. The Chai Center, a Chabad synagogue in Dix Hills, New York, estimates that the physical security enhancements that they are implementing will cost $150,000. Such expenses are not possible for many houses of worship. As religious institutions grapple with a downturn in funding from reduced giving, paying for basic security needs—cameras and alarms, for example—seems extravagant. Church giving has been in decline since the 1960s and so has membership. Most houses of worship have fewer than 200 parishioners, and 66.8 percent of congregations have fewer than 100

123 McLamb, Keeping Religious Institutions Secure, 44–47; Sheepdog Church Security, “Church Security Assessment.”
attendees. Such small bodies struggle to raise and maintain the resources to keep the lights on, let alone allocating time and money to plan, prepare, and prevent violence on their premises. At the same time, houses of worship feel it is necessary to spend money on securing facilities, as the threat of loss of life or property appears to be growing.

3. **Unique Nature of Religious Spaces**

Faith-based organizations have differing views on whether a higher power will protect them and the congregation from violence. A belief that fate or a predetermined outcome is common among the world’s religions. With this belief comes the idea that a death from an attack by the “enemy” of the faith can help to grow the faith. According to the Pastor of First Baptist Church of Sutherland Springs, Frank Pomeroy, those who died are now martyrs and the growth of the church is a result of their sacrifice. Acquiring followers by making yourself an easy target is not a popular idea, though. Within the Christian church, recent catastrophic events in Charleston and Sutherland Springs has shifted the opinion of most regarding a need for security but a minority still feel investing in security measures is evidence of a lack in trust for God’s plan. In contrast, synagogues struggle with how much security, but having it is not in question.

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Houses of worship are seen as a place of refuge, where the tired, hungry, and broken go in times of need. Access to a campus is considered sacrosanct and people trust that those on campus are there for help. Believing that people come on the campus of an FBO for good reasons does not mean that those on the campus cannot look for threat indicators and be on guard. As the belief that houses of worship are to be open and inviting, the architecture also creates a security concern.

Simple construction of a religious site can bring resistance from citizens and local governments. Refugee populations within certain religious orders will have experienced religious oppression and that fear of the government will not simply disappear. Houses of worship with large immigrant populations, legal and illegal, may also be reluctant to work with the DHS as it actively shields immigrants from deportation. Fear of government intrusion and violence toward minority groups pushes these same groups away from the assistance offered for security planning, which makes them even more vulnerable.

The lack of knowledge about how to create a security plan, the inability to gather resources, and the reticence of houses of worship to request assistance from government partners creates hurdles for security planning at faith-based sites. The task itself can be so overwhelming and the research needed to sort through all the programs that exist creates a bridge too far for some religious leaders. Soft target mitigation literature for houses of worship can be filtered into a usable format with the understanding of where the material is and how to access it succinctly.

III. SOFT-TARGET DEFENSE STRATEGIES FOR THE RELIGIOUS SPACE

Shemot in the Torah is the story of the Israelites fleeing the persecution of the Pharaoh. Jesus said, “Blessed are those who are persecuted because of righteousness, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven.” The Quran states, “Remember! Moses said to his people, “Call to mind the favour of Allah to you when He delivered you from the people of Pharaoh: they set you hard tasks and punishments, slaughtered your sons, and let your women-folk live: therein was a tremendous trial from your Lord.” Religions worldwide have faced persecution and death from those who oppose their views. Most religions speak of and expect persecution, but instead of accepting persecution and death, U.S. religious organizations are taking a more active role in protecting their followers. To protect houses of worship, leaders have looked for strategies to assist them in the protection of their members.

Homeland security experts also have contributed to understanding the threats to religious spaces and the tactics and strategies necessary to assist in the protection of these unique spaces. Indeed, a cottage industry of “ministries,” and commercial providers has developed to assist houses of worship in preparing for the hazards that they face. The material created by the various organizations involved in this homeland security space is robust, complex, and at many times, overwhelming for the lay person attempting to create a plan to protect a faith-based organization.

A. FEDERAL AND STATE ASSISTANCE

Houses of worship have an almost unending source of material from government agencies to assist them with developing plans for their protection. Guides from various federal organizations have been created to assist houses of worship in the five stages of emergency planning (prevention, protection, mitigation, response, recovery). Assistance

at the local level includes audits from federal and local agencies of religious sites to review each site’s capabilities. The federal government also monitors and propagates information networks to permit the sharing and dissemination of best practices. Direct outreach through conferences and public meetings closes the circle for federal support toward houses of worship as they attempt to spread the most valuable concepts to different religious organizations. Federal and state outreach attempts to assist organizations, regardless of religious affiliation, through various outreach campaigns, webinars, videos, guides, and exercises.

1. Guides

Major resources offered at the federal level assist FBOs in security planning and the reference guides produced by various agencies act as the framework for assistance in security planning. One such resource is the Guide for Developing High Quality Emergency Operations Plans for Houses of Worship, which is an all-hazards approach to the development of an emergency operations plan (EOP) for a specific site. The resource is an essential first step into the development of an EOP and even provides specifics on how to develop an evacuation plan. The guide is available through the FEMA “Resources to Protect Houses of Worship” website, which is a clearinghouse for all things related to the protection of religious sites.139 The guide walks a faith-based organization through the planning process to the creation of an emergency operations plan and gives the basic content that a general security plan should have.

Within the framework of an EOP, FEMA outlines several key components. A major focus is placed on how to create what is termed “functional annexes” around evacuations, lockdowns, and shelter-in-place action plans.140 Another section of the guide gives greater insight into active shooter scenarios and what is needed for congregations to prepare, prevent, respond, and recover from a possible attack.141 As with many guides, it


is essential to understand the function and focus, as this guide is written for the specific creation of an operations plan. In looking for other such essential elements beyond an evacuation plan as threat and hazard identification (although it is mentioned in the document), a house of worship would need to go elsewhere.

Less specific to houses of worship, but just as valuable, is a resource guide developed by CISA. Its *Security of Soft Targets and Crowded Places Resource Guide* was last updated in April 2019. This guide is a jumping off point for homeland security practitioners of every persuasion to gain basic knowledge about the threats present, how to identify suspicious behavior, what to do prior to and during an active assailant, and prevention and response to bombnings. Outlined with annotations to the target audience of each resource, those concerned with FBO security can move directly to the areas of greatest interest to their congregation. Of particular interest are the sections on identifying suspicious behavior and the preparation and response to active assailants, two areas where houses of worship have historically had the least experience.

Within the material on the identification of suspicious behavior are various links to guides and materials, with brief descriptions, and most notably, action guides on how to identify and mitigate those on the path to violence. Within the links to preparing and responding to active assailants, multiple action guides relate to different types of possible attacks. Each guide links to a two-page resource for that particular type of attack that outlines protective measures, what to do in case of an attack, and reminders on ways to be alert. For those needing more information, a list of links and contacts is provided. As

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143 Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Agency, 12–14.

144 Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Agency, 13.

145 Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Agency, 17–18.

stated by the Assistant Director for Infrastructure Security, a division of CISA, the guide is a tool for those attending houses of worship, or other mass gatherings, to raise awareness and assist in the mitigation of those threats.\textsuperscript{147}

Government repositories have a deep expertise that focuses on assisting government agencies in understanding the abilities and needs of religious organizations in their area. FEMA has also provided guides to help agencies engage with religious organizations before, after, and during disasters so that organizations will consider their unique needs and perspectives.\textsuperscript{148} Tip sheets have been created to outline the religious and cultural issues that particular organizations may have and the products have been developed with the assistance of religious and cultural leaders.\textsuperscript{149} If a homeland security operator needed to assist a Sikh fellowship with a security plan, for example, the tip sheet would be a good tool to give an agent an understanding of the cultural norms of this particular group. Agencies have given the tools to understand the social construct that religious organizations live in, which in turn can help agents build unique strategies tailored to the needs of individual belief systems, such as using security cameras to assist in monitoring the campus of the faith-based organization that also can benefit those who are homebound by linking the system to a broadcast over the internet.

Guides presented by FEMA and CISA are a great starting point to assist in the planning and preparation of emergency action plans, but they lack clarity and structure needed to complete the process. As the government takes an all-hazards approach, the amount of information grows into seemingly infinite amounts. Such a large amount of information becomes burdensome for local congregations, as leaders have to wade through various guides to look for what they may need. Ultimately, it creates a barrier to effective assistance without more direction. Government agencies, though, do not simply


create guides in a vacuum. Agencies have developed numerous ways to promote and assist FBOs with not only understanding their guides for protecting houses of worship, but they will also help build guides through audits and exercises.

2. **Audits and Exercises**

Implementing a plan, practicing a security plan, and identifying the major risks to a house of worship is also instrumental. Agencies not only provide guides to develop security plans, they will also work with individual sites through audits and exercises to help enhance planning and evolve security plans. Opportunities are available to participate in tabletop exercises with first responders through FEMA and CISA. CISA is also available to perform informal and formal site audits through assist visits.\(^{150}\)

CISA offers different avenues for face-to-face contact with their protective security advisors (PSA) and other operators.\(^{151}\) PSAs work with other DHS components to advise private sector facilities on infrastructure protection and vulnerability mitigation through local field activities.\(^{152}\) Critical infrastructure vulnerability assessments are the field activities that CISA uses to identify critical infrastructure needs.\(^{153}\) Within the assessments offered, assist visits are of particular interest to religious organizations, as they can be tooled to provide the information that houses of worship must develop the proper plans, as well as be an opportunity to have an expert assess the vulnerability of the particular property.\(^{154}\) Although mainly focused on large-scale operations, for example malls and convention centers, advisors are able to tailor visits.

A step further in the process is the Infrastructure Survey Tool, a survey that assists in identifying the security strength of a site.\(^{155}\) A final step that CISA offers is the

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\(^{150}\) Department of Homeland Security, “Assist Visits.”


\(^{152}\) Department of Homeland Security.


\(^{154}\) Department of Homeland Security, “Assist Visits.”

Emergency Services Specific Tabletop Exercise Program, a discussion-based exercise led by PSAs to conduct workshops on possible scenarios and identify critical faults in prior plans. Information regarding the program is rather vague but each tabletop exercise is tailored to the specific infrastructure division and is designed to incorporate a large number of participants, which makes it an unlikely resource for an individual property unless it is involved in a larger exercise.

FEMA is much more involved in the creation and implementation of exercises for houses of worship than other elements of DHS. The most dynamic tool FEMA has created is the Preparedness Toolkit. Individual organizations can register and gain access to the entire cadre of preparedness planning available, which includes developing exercises to check for capability and discover gaps. The Emergency Management Institute can be contacted to develop an exercise for stakeholders tied to a faith-based community and provides these organizations the opportunity to join a planned exercise through its portal. Within the Institute, individuals can also receive free training through their Independent Study Program at https://training.fema.gov/emi.aspx. Courses are available to prepare for active shooters, surveillance awareness, and community preparedness, to name a few. Exercises and independent studies give FBOs an opportunity to work through campus security techniques that may be applicable to their location while leveraging the expertise of government officials.


3. Information Networks, Campaigns, and Webinars

FEMA has developed a series of webinars targeted at houses of worship to assist in the creation of nationally aligned EOPs, as well as education in specialized areas. Through its main site, and in Ready.gov, FEMA has built in various webinars to outline the value that houses of worship play in disasters and how to prevent a disaster on their own campuses.161 FEMA has developed such webinars as IS-360: Preparing for Mass Casualty Incidents: A Guide for Schools, Higher Education, and Houses of Worship, which covers the “key considerations and strategies for preparing for mass casualty incident.”162 The limits of this webinar is similar to other guides in that it provides general information only without addressing such specific considerations of houses of worship as the need to balance the desire to keep doors open during services to create a welcoming environment and the need to protect those in attendance. Specialized videos for specific events are also available to the general public, for example how to respond to a bomb threat.163 The general presupposition of most webinars is that houses of worship and educational settings have very similar needs and operations, which is true, but the subtle differences between these two settings are important.

A FEMA webinar housed on the Readiness and Emergency Management for Schools Technical Assistance Center website titled, “An Overview of the Guide for Developing High-Quality Emergency Operations Plans for Houses of Worship,” is a companion to the guide developed by FEMA.164 The webinar walks viewers through the planning process to create an EOP and specifically introduces the active shooter portion of the planning process.165 Watching the webinar is intended to be done while following

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165 Department of Education.
the companion guide, “Developing High Quality Emergency Operation Plans for Houses of Worship,” which can be found on the link at the site.\(^{166}\) Homeland security practitioners with firsthand knowledge from agents who responded to actual acts of violence on the campuses of FBOs created this webinar.\(^{167}\)

At the end of the webinar, viewers are encouraged to sign up on the FEMA community website.\(^{168}\) Because the webinar is from 2013, and the FEMA website has been updated since the creation of the webinar, the links discussed in the webinar have changed, for example fema.gov/plan.\(^{169}\) Information discussed in the webinar, such as active shooter response, can be found through simple searches on the FEMA and Ready.gov websites, however, and it remains practical.

Faith-based organizations may also receive updated information about evolving threats and new strategies for securing their places of worship through the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN).\(^{170}\) The purpose of the HSIN is a trusted share site for partners in the homeland security apparatus allowing for the sharing of best practices across the network based on subsets including critical infrastructure.\(^{171}\) Within the critical infrastructure node is a share point for faith-based organizations to have two-way communication with other concerned organizations and homeland security experts.\(^{172}\)

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The site is protected by a password and all members must be screened and are provided an invitation by the requested community of interest (COI).\textsuperscript{173}

Once approved to a COI, access to all posts is generated by anyone in that workgroup. This type of approval gives FBOs an opportunity to share with other religious facilities and experts in the field of security management behind a secure site, as some of the information is considered sensitive. A major hurdle is that each COI is run independently and the HSIN has little control over each community of interest so when an issue arises, the help desk can only refer the matter to the facilitator of the community and wait for a response. It has been more than six months since the author requested access to the Faith-Based Organizations Community of Interest, and after multiple calls and emails, the request still has not been resolved. It is not at all possible to value the material within the COI without access.

Other areas within HSIN have been accessed, and provide valuable resources for planners interested in assisting houses of worship. Law enforcement officials have posted aides to assist other law enforcement entities with assisting FBOs in the commercial facilities node of the HSIN. For example, a tabletop exercise template has been posted to assist law enforcement with planning for an active assailant scenario at a house of worship.\textsuperscript{174} All the materials for planning, presenting, and engaging with FBOs is available to any member of the HSIN who has access to the commercial facilities node. Access to the commercial facilities node is given to law enforcement or those given permission by a host organization.\textsuperscript{175}

FEMA and other entities within the DHS will direct houses of worship to their various public information campaigns. “You Are the Help until Help Arrives” is the newest campaign rolled out by FEMA in an effort to create action by bystanders at


\textsuperscript{175}Department of Homeland Security, “How to Join the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN).”
traumatic incidents before emergency services arrives. The five steps of the program include Call 9-1-1, stay safe, stop the bleeding, position the injured, and provide comfort. The concept behind this new campaign is that first responders are on the way, but bystanders can also provide lifesaving measures until professionals arrive. Web-based training and in person training is available, something of value to prepare for many hazards that may occur on the campus of a religious organization.

The most well-known DHS campaign, “If you see something, say something” encourages all to act and the DHS provides training to help people recognize threat indicators. An integral part of any active assailant defense plan, the DHS stresses, is the run, hide, fight doctrine stressed at every level of the government. The simple strategy is adaptable and can act as the foundation to multiple response strategies. The familiarity of these programs with the general public are a good start to creating a dialogue with local religious groups and can act as a catalyst to planning and response better to an emergency on the campus of an FBO.

4. Public Events

U.S. Attorney’s Offices have held security summits with local religious leaders since 2015. Beginning in Detroit, protecting houses of worship events have been held across the country. The FBI Office of Partner Engagement engages with religious groups to inform them more effectively of threat information that they receive. The

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177 Federal Emergency Management Agency.


Department of Justice also offers training to start religious groups of all faiths on the path to developing their own security plans. The DHS partners with local counties to put on “safety and security” evenings to discuss planning, preparedness, and response.

As many of the crimes that occur on religious campuses can be labeled hate crimes, the DHS Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties also performs roundtables throughout the country. FEMA routinely puts on workshops, including those designed specifically for active shooter planning. Face-to-face events are intended to raise awareness and improve relationships with stakeholders in religious organizations.

B. SELF-HELP

Activities surrounding emergency planning also are done by individual congregations, ad hoc security networks, and by the national fellowships. Networks built by organizations assist houses of worship in building plans, prepare constituents for possible threats, and organize response teams. The development of security teams is a spreading phenomenon as houses of worship recognize that the first responders to any event will be themselves. To organize teams, most congregations have built emergency operation plans, action plans, or security plans to memorialize what is supposed to be done if an emergency were to occur.

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1. Religious-based Security Networks

An instrumental portion of planning and preparing for security on the campus of a faith-based organization is the ability to communicate with those in the same faith; not as an exclusion to the security of other faiths, but developed to target an audience with similar facilities and world views. Multiple faiths have organized themselves to help secure those of likeminded organizations. For example, those of the Christian faith have multiple networks to connect with to prepare, plan, and recover from an incident. The Arizona Church Security Network (AZCSN) was founded in 2017 to provide training and opportunities to all faith-based organizations in Arizona. The AZCSN provides monthly lunch and learn sessions. It held its first conference in September 2019. The Faith Based Security Network (FBSN) is another non-denominational, Christian group of law enforcement professionals. The unique nature of the FBSN is the development of single page best practice guides available to members. The downside is that the information is semipublic, as it is only available to members, which can include anyone involved at any level of security in a religious organization.

Those of the Jewish faith have also developed their own network in preparation of any possible attack. Some of the most highly publicized attacks in recent years have come against members of the Jewish faith in their own synagogues. The Secure Community Network (SCN) was founded in 2004 to serve the American Jewish community and address all hazards that the community may face. SCN has its own suite of training nodes and the web site is the premier information-sharing portal for faith-based organizations. Assistance with grant writing and security planning are just

192 Faith Based Security Network.
some of the functions that the SCN performs for the Jewish community. The DHS has partnered with the SCN on multiple occasions, and most recently as CISA ran a joint exercise with the SCN regarding incident response. As the most robust faith-based security organization, the SCN has a far reach, yet it will even admit more is to be done.

Outside actual religious orders, non-profit networks are also interested in faith-based security matters. One such organization is the Faith-Based Information Sharing and Analysis Organization (FB-ISAO). ISAOs are nationally recognized networks considered an integral part of the national strategy by promoting information sharing and distributive capabilities. FB-ISAO requires membership, which can range from free to $480 a year with member access to various traffic light protocols (TLPs) dependent on which membership is chosen. The ISAO shares threats and reports to members after analyzing the information and leveraging the knowledge of its members to focus efforts on the most likely threats. As their first membership meeting occurred in October 2019, and they have not completed any workshops or events yet, like many other online resources, an FBO must use due diligence before spending constituents’ money.

Faith-based security networks provide a valuable asset to individual congregations as they look for assistance in securing religious sites. The SCN is allied

with the Jewish Federation and the Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations and every member is encouraged to use them in an official capacity.\textsuperscript{203} Multiple denominations are involved in the Arizona Church Security Network, as they hold trainings at various and different sites including Protestant and Catholic churches.\textsuperscript{204} As these organizations grow to assist more houses of worship, their inherent value increases to the religious community.

2. Faith-based Security Teams

A seemingly obvious choice for FBOs is to have protective security around the perimeter of an event or meeting. Most organizations have greeters or ushers to assist those entering the house of worship and an extension may include perimeter security. The Council on American-Islamic Relations considers ushers acting as security a best practice.\textsuperscript{205} Such a simple act requires planning and tact, and the balance between security and openness is paramount.\textsuperscript{206} The development of teams can be ad hoc or fully formed, based on the individual strategy of the community they serve. An armed volunteer on the security team at New Life Church in Colorado Springs, Colorado ended an attack on that church in 2007; 12 hours after the subject attacked a defenseless Youth with a Mission campus in which he killed two.\textsuperscript{207} Houses of worship may create teams in reaction to a mass shooting or in response to a public event. More organized activities would include the development of procedures through a committee or coopting plans from national and local models.

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Beyond organization at the individual congregation level, some organizations look to community patrols. The Muslim Community Patrol in New York was created to provide extra security to Islamic schools and mosques and was partially formed in response to the Christchurch massacre. Governments also responded after the Christchurch massacre with protective details of their own. Such a presence in the aftermath of a tragedy gives comfort to worshippers. Nassau County in Florida has proposed a mandatory law enforcement presence at all houses of worship, with support from the religious community. Continual presence at religious institutions by law enforcement is not a long-term solution and FBOs are more inclined to keep security matters internal. Security teams are generally volunteer, and take some kind of training. Armed security is another question with which houses of worship struggle. Such a decision will depend on state and local requirements and the beliefs of an individual house of worship. As Iman Jodeh of the Colorado Muslim Society says in response to armed attendants, “we realize that prayer can’t be our only form of defense.”

C. COMMERCIAL SPACE

Myriad agencies and private corporations are willing to step in and assist, and the numbers appear to be endless. Searching the internet for “church security” will give


523,000,000 results, and the first page mostly provides links to fee for service sites.\textsuperscript{214} Not all are costly, and some are catered to a specific religious belief system, such as the Sheepdog Seminars; others develop material as part of their overall security services to other agencies, and a third group appears to be attempting to make a fast profit from the security concerns of faith-based organizations. The difficulty lies in understanding what is available that is useful and affordable, especially as some small groups do not have the ability to invest in their own defense.

1. **Ministries and Marketing**

The ALICE Training Institute offers the most well recognized and developed program available. ALICE (alert, lockdown, inform, counter, evacuate) is a for cost training that has seen the greatest success with school emergency planning. It offers a specific plan for houses of worship and reduced costs for non-profit organizations.\textsuperscript{215} Free webinars and packets to assist in planning are all linked to an overall protection package. The institute recently purchased SafePlans, LLC that developed the Emergency Response Information Portal, an all-inclusive emergency preparedness solution geared to schools that could be used by houses of worship. Certification training costs $695, which provides an instructor to teach the congregation and utilize the resources the ALICE Institute provides.\textsuperscript{216} A house of worship with funds to create an immediate impact in security planning can look to the ALICE Institute as a one-stop shop. ALICE is performing very similar functions that FEMA and CISA operators do, but in a more concise and organized manner, just as the concepts ALICE training espouses are parallel to what the DHS recommends.

\textsuperscript{214} “Church Security,” Google, accessed July 14, 2019, https://www.google.com/search?q=church+security&rlz=1C1SQJL_enUS789US789&oq=church+security&aqs=chrome..69i57j69i6\color{red}1j35i39j0j69i60j0.3990j0j7&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8.


Less expensive, but targeted to those of the Christian faith, are the Sheepdog Seminars, begun by Dave Grossman. Dave Grossman is known for his international training seminars on building resiliency in law enforcement officers and promoting school security.\textsuperscript{217} As an offshoot to his current activities, he has partnered with such other experts as Jimmy Meeks and Carl Chinn to deliver the message about the importance of building a plan to combat the threats that already exist and may come to the door of a service.\textsuperscript{218} The material is intensely focused on protestant churches and ideology and, although the material is valuable, other religious faiths may be uncomfortable with the delivery, as it is focused on training “Christian Sheepdogs” to defend the Church in Jesus’ name.\textsuperscript{219} Costs for the seminars held throughout the country range from $59 to $99, depending on the place in which it is held, but the organization offers other options in an attempt to offer the information to as many groups as possible.\textsuperscript{220} Seminars are not intended to have attendees come back with a plan to implement when they return to their house of worship, but with the inspiration to start one.

A more focused approach is to partner with an organization like the Church Security Alliance. The Church Security Alliance is a fee-based service that provides a variety of security activities and plans ready for immediate use and implementation. They offer free planning videos and an assessment; other resources and services are offered for a fee.\textsuperscript{221} Shepherd’s Watch will also provide training. Working in concert with Brotherhood Mutual to bring a sense of legitimacy, the Brotherhood Mutual is one of the

\begin{footnotes}
\item \textsuperscript{219} “Sheepdog Creed,” Sheepdog Church Security, accessed October 30, 2019, https://sheepdogchurchsecurity.net/.
\item \textsuperscript{221} “Products,” Church Security Alliance, accessed July 24, 2019, https://churchsecurityalliance.com/shop/.
\end{footnotes}
major insurers of churches and ministries throughout the country. On its website, it offers webinars and articles to assist in the development of building security plans, at no expense. Also available is its “Safe and Secure Church” kit, a training guide for recruiting, planning, and preparing a security team. The cost of the kit, at $249.99, would put it out of reach for many smaller congregations.

Outside the larger, more well-known groups, others have developed trainings and guidance to assist houses of worship. Tina Lewis Rowe is a speaker and consultant who works with local police departments and FBOs. She has developed a Safety and Security guide for houses of worship to use. The guide is a robust 183-page document meant to walk a planner through the development of a safety and security team. The various material in the guide, including a survey tool, are free for use and intended to assist in the development of a plan no matter the complexity. Rowe offers the opportunity to bring her services in to produce a seminar or consult on the development of such plans. Jim McGuffey, founder of churchsecurityconsultant.com, is an independent security consultant who has partnered with various local agencies and faith-based organizations. He was also instrumental in the development of Security Risk Assessments for the DHS Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative.

Other groups, for example Full Armor Church, Public Safety University, and Church Security University, offer all types of assistance. Each of these groups initially request funds to view their plans and the Public Safety University website is no longer functioning, which raises the question as to what a religious organization may have received for its $20 monthly membership. Faith-based organizations have to be cautious, as the attempt to find a quick security solution may expose the community to more risk rather than minimizing it.

With the wealth of information available through professionals, religious leaders would naturally look to them for assistance. Many treat the need for security as a ministry that is not meant to make money and all appear to be looking out for the greater good when developing programs. All the programs and material point to the same concept that a house of worship must develop a cadre of members who will plan for emergency events, implement the plans, and continue the process. Different levels of assistance are offered, but the individual congregation must take action. The difficulty is in choosing who will provide the “best” product to provide the most safety, within the parameters the congregation is comfortable with and can sustain. As trainers would point out, it is an individual choice.229

2. Publicly Available Resources

The lack of access to participatory resources does not limit the ability of a house of worship to protect themselves. Not only have FEMA, CISA, and other federal agencies provided resources, individuals and various organizations have also encouraged the use of their online documents. Beyond that, a wealth of information can be found by searching for articles on how to develop a plan or what it should require. Understanding the role of government in the mitigation of threats and emergencies is also valuable, as congregations must understand what and who is coming to help in order to prepare members of the religious faith to react predictably to first responders who follow specific protocols in emergency situations, such as the treating all subjects as potential threats.

The National Disaster Interfaith Network, in conjunction with University of Southern California Center for Religion and Civic Culture, has created a field guide titled *Working with U.S. Faith Communities during Crises, Disasters & Public Health Emergencies.* The guide is meant to educate disaster responders to working with religious groups and attempting to streamline cooperation. Church Mutual Insurance provides a self-inspection program free of charge to help understand gaps in security. Bill Harvey offers multiple security strategies for houses of worship. The concepts of vulnerability studies, securing the property, and elimination of easy targets within the religious site are issues covered. ASIS International, through its Houses of Worship Committee, has developed a best practices doctrine that is available as a free resource. Put together by people considered experts in the field of security for FBOs—notably Jim McGuffey and Carl Chinn—the nine-page guide walks a leader through the basic needs for securing any house of worship. A search for a specific need, for example closed-circuit television, will also garner plenty of results.

A massive amount of material is available to the general public. Federal, state, local, private, and public sources are widely distributed. People are standing at the ready, some for a fee or donation, to help plan for the worst-case scenario. Hundreds of houses of worship and their attendees have been trained to act in mass casualty incidents. Yet, only a minority of houses of worship have any sort of soft target mitigation capability at all. Worse yet, many have started and stopped planning, forgetting the lessons that they

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have already learned and are now having to relearn as turnover forces new leadership to wonder what was done before.\textsuperscript{235}

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IV. NORTHMINSTER PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH EMERGENCY OPERATIONS PLANNING

As a real-world exercise, the Guide for Developing High-Quality Emergency Operations Plans for Houses of Worship, along with the webinar recorded on July 25, 2013 by the Department of Education in conjunction with FEMA, was used to frame and develop a security plan for Northminster Presbyterian Church (NPC). Located in Tucson, Arizona, NPC is a mid-sized congregation of 959 members with a campus consisting of a main sanctuary, a school, multiple outlying buildings, and a personal residence. On Sundays, Northminster offers three worship services in English, an Arabic language service, and a multilingual African service. During the week, Northminster Christian School is operational and the business center is open for appointments and visits. Monday nights include a meal service to those in need while on Wednesday nights, traditional services and youth outreach programs take place. The diversity of activities is intended to offer a rich environment for many different worshippers and also creates a much larger target profile if an assailant wishes to harm someone from the refugee or Middle Eastern community. In the past, Northminster has experienced threats of violence against members of the Middle Eastern fellowship, property theft, and domestic disturbances.

NPC has created security plans, and has one in place. The execution, as with most houses of worship, is the major issue for the security plan. To enact a plan fully, NPC followed the planning process recommended by FEMA to include forming a collaborative team, understanding the situation and identifying threats and hazards through a site visit, determining goals and objectives, developing an approved plan, and implementing that plan.237


A. PRIOR SECURITY PLANNING

Northminster Presbyterian Church, recognizing the potential issues with security, has made multiple attempts to develop a site security plan. The initial impetus was the shooting that took place on January 8, 2011 outside a Safeway in Oro Valley, Arizona, in which U.S. Representative Gabrielle Giffords was shot along with 18 others. Of the six killed in the incident, one was a member of Northminster Presbyterian Church—Phyllis Schneck. Thus, the incident deeply affected the congregation and out of the tragic events, the initial attempt to create a security plan was attempted.

Initially led by a retired law enforcement officer, the initial attempt at a security plan was completed. A safety committee was formed and a safety manual was created. The basic tenets of an emergency operation plan—a response framework with specific roles for responders—were created. The committee also created shelter in place kits that were distributed on the campus of the church. When the creator of the plan moved to New Mexico, the plan itself was set aside.

The work continued when Northminster initiated a disaster preparedness and response plan (DPRP) in 2018. Taking a different approach than the initial security plan, the DPRP focuses on preparation and response, which is a modification of the five steps FEMA outlines in emergency planning of prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery. Used as a general guideline for any and all incidents, the plan develops roles and responsibilities for key actors in the church. Once an incident has occurred, the team members are to act in their various roles to assist in the response to an emergency. Material in the DPRP is based on the materials provided to Northminster from the Presbyterian Disaster Assistance ministry. Intended as a living document, the DPRP is

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240 Northminster Presbyterian Church, Disaster Preparedness and Response Plan (Tucson, AZ: Northminster Presbyterian Church, 2018), 4.

241 Northminster Presbyterian Church, 5.
to be reviewed and modified as needed. Approved in February 2018, the DPRP has never been enacted and has since not been modified. As with many faith-based organizations, the plan is simply the beginning and the execution becomes the biggest hurdle.  

In the belief that something more comprehensive needed to be created, Northminster leadership wished to create a comprehensive emergency operations plan that specifically memorialized what was to be done during an emergency, specifically the steps needed to be taken when an active assailant is on campus. Past instances of active assailants on the grounds of Northminster have led people to reflect on the events, which created the need to improve the security of the facility. Pastors and church administrators have attended trainings and events regarding security planning, but nothing has been formalized. The greatest concern is that something will occur and the ill-preparedness of the community will cause a greater loss of life.  

As a measure to prepare for action during any possible catastrophic event, Northminster created a committee to develop a security plan. The Security Committee was tasked with building an EOP and to look at the vulnerabilities of the NPC campus. To direct our energies and to follow the planning process outlined by FEMA, NPC enlisted the help of PSAs from the DHS Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency.  

B. SITE VISIT  

PSAs from the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency came to Northminster Presbyterian Church to perform what is known as an assist visit. Assist visits are an integral part of the CISA outreach mission to inform those running key infrastructure facilities (in this case, a commercial soft target space) of CISA’s mission and resources available to improve security, preparedness, and resiliency. The visit can help to note gaps in current plans or to create a foundation to start the creation of a formal

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security plan. For NPC, the assist visit was for the latter. It pointed out the basics of a
security plan and the most obvious needs of the physical security of the building.

Meeting with CISA provided a wealth of knowledge for NPC staff and volunteers
to learn about the basics of a security plan, as well as how to move forward with
formalized planning. The most telling matter is the concept of six minutes. PSAs advised
that the average response time for police in an emergency situation is six minutes and that
NPC owned those six minutes. “What are you going to do in those six minutes?” is a
question that must be asked and answered within the plan created. From this discussion
came the need to inform the congregation of the concept of “run, hide, fight,” the national
response strategy in the event of an active shooter. To implement an effective response,
the planning committee must know who among the congregation carry firearms. Anyone
who plans or is carrying a firearm should be trained through a certified active shooter-
training course. CISA identifies designated security as “active walkers.” The ushers in the
church are already familiar with those in the congregation, and with training, can best
identify a possible threat. CISA advisors informed those in the meeting how to identify
atypical behaviors and red flags to watch out for. A formal written plan based on a site
survey of needs is the best way to identify gaps and areas for improvements for any house
of worship.

Even without a formal plan, a quick walk through with the PSAs identified
multiple enhancements needed to improve the physical security of the property in
preparation for all hazards. Although the walk through simply noted obvious deficiencies,
incremental changes can ensure a building is ready for whatever may occur from illnesses
to active assailants. Many of the doors in the church lack strike plates, which means the
doors can easily be kicked in. An assailant is then able to enter a room where people are
huddling for safety. Many of the exit signs in the church are missing, so if people enter an
unfamiliar room, they may not know how to exit. Also, important to note that in
emergency situations, these observations serve as reminders for people who may not be
familiar with the space. Houses of worship desire to have safety and security for those
arriving on campus and attention to obvious safety issues can make the space more comfortable, inviting, and secure.\textsuperscript{244}

The PSAs also exposed less obvious, but more critical matters. The gas main for the church is not protected in any way, nor is the electrical panel that is in close proximity to the gas main. A vehicle borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) can possibly destroy the entire church. The front entrance to the church is also a target for a VBIED. The front entrance has been locked in recent years to cut down on the number of entries to the foyer prior to service, but as noted, the front entrance is in line with the road across the street. As such, it is not possible to stop a vehicle from traveling straight through the front door of the main building. Some rooms can be barricaded and blocked, but have no signage. An automated external defibrillator is on site, but the number of first aid kits needed increasing. The camera system for the facility has great coverage, but recent thefts have led to discussions that the holes in the coverage must be fixed. PSAs noted a great awareness among staff and that the current informal plan in place is a great start to a secure facility. NPC struggles with the same issues as other houses of worship in that a security plan is greatly desired, attempts are made to secure the site, but execution of said plan is lacking.\textsuperscript{245}

C. BUILDING AN EMERGENCY OPERATIONS PLAN

Due to the size and complexity of the security needs at NPC, formalized planning is a necessity. The Safety Committee now understands the situation at NPC from the PSA site visit and from meetings with senior leadership. From this information, goals and objectives for the EOP were created through assessing the possible risks associated with the various threats. Outlining the purposes and scope of the plan provides direction to the committee as the plan developed courses of action (COA) to respond to hazards identified. Each COA is tied to a functional annex as a response to the threat occurring on


campus. The roles and responsibilities of each team member are spelled out in the EOP as suggested by FEMA.  

Creating an EOP for NPC first meant determining possible risks to the campus. The threat of such incidents as severe storms and natural hazards is rather low. The threat of theft is high and continues to rise on the campus and the greatest fear is that of an active assailant. With these two key issues in mind, developing a safety team and forming the functional annexes of response for the safety team became the primary focus of the EOP. The safety team is to be vigilant about possible threats and to respond to events occurring on campus where further assistance may be needed. Physical security activities were not addressed in the EOP, as the plan is directed at COAs to take in the event of an emergency. The plan assumes that doors can be locked and that shelter-in-place kits are housed in the proper place. Safety team members, in an ancillary role, bring safety matters to the attention of the committee. While the safety committee recommends decisions concerning the funding of new safety equipment or programs, the decision ultimately rests with the Northminster administration and leadership.

The safety team’s role encompasses the planning and execution of functional annexes during an emergency situation. To fulfill this role, multiple decisions needed to be made. A key decision for any security plan is who will be in charge. Within the NPC EOP, the lead pastor or designee was determined to be the incident commander (IC). Some planners promote the idea that a member of the safety team should be the IC. However, the decision was made that the congregation would look to the lead pastor in an emergency situation, and not a safety team member. Another crucial decision is whether the safety team is an extension of the ministry of the ushers or a separate function. In meetings with lead ushers, it was determined that the role of the safety team needed to be filled by a separate group and that the ushers would take a secondary role in

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assisting the Welcome Team during any functional annex. How specific the language of each functional annex and COA was a final hurdle in writing the EOP. It was determined that general, flexible language was necessary in the descriptions of roles and procedures for safety team members. The inclusion of where to stand and when would limit the teams’ ability to act. A general language plan approach was used to allow for COAs and functional annexes to be easily understood and adaptable to multiple situations.

With major decisions made regarding the overall goals and direction of the EOP, the actual plan was written. Decisions regarding maintenance of the plan, chain of command, and purpose were all included in the EOP. Roles and responsibilities of the various safety team members (IC, safety ministry team lead, welcome team, ushers, and children’s ministry team) were outlined. Each team member was given specific roles during any time the EOP was executed. COAs provide further specifics of what to do when an event occurs in the following categories:

- Severe storm
- Medical emergency
- Fire
- Utility failure
- Hazardous material incident
- Bomb threat
- Active assailant
- Abandoned child

The active assailant COA is the priority. Particular attention was made to explain the different actions people were to take if an active assailant were to be discovered on campus. The run, hide, fight methodology was explained and the roles of safety team members in this scenario varied based on the situation at hand. As with all the COAs,
everyone’s personal safety is the primary goal with no expectation that any safety team members will be asked to sacrifice themselves.

Each COA is attached to a functional annex. Essentially, the decision in each COA is to apply one or more of the functional annexes: evacuation, shelter-in-place or lockdown. In a severe storm, for instance, a shelter-in-place annex will be initiated while the course of action during a fire will be the institution of an evacuation protocol. Each functional annex describes the major roles of the IC and the safety team lead in each annex and the general actions taken to assist people on campus to the appropriate place. A final functional annex describes the membership, roles, and COAs for safety team members.

Currently, the leadership has not approved the EOP. When the leadership does approve the NPC EOP, the next important steps are finding safety team volunteers and training stakeholders. Once the EOP is approved, members of the safety team can be recruited, approved, and trained. With a safety team in place, exercises and testing of the capability of the plan will happen next. Then, modifications to the security plan are sure to be made, as NPC continues to adapt to the needs of the congregation.

D. LESSONS LEARNED

Leaders of houses of worship are not sure what they need. Within the Northminster leadership, each person in a position of leadership has a voice and the needs, thoughts, and desires of each are different. Senior Pastor Ross wants to know what three things to say in an active assailant situation. Run, hide, fight is an answer; stay calm, pray, and listen to instructions is also an answer. Even with the dissemination of a plan that everyone agrees to abide by, some in the crowd are not going to know what to do and may panic no matter what is said from behind the pulpit. As NPC has taken the necessary steps through the planning process to implement a security plan, the capability of church leadership to understand possible threats and how to respond, ideally, will grow.

Members of the NPC staff have grown in a knowledge and understanding of emergency operations planning. The growth in understanding of the planning process can
be transferred to other planning tasks within the church. The planning process outlined by FEMA used for this exercise is rather universal and can apply to such other long-term activities as maintenance and building growth. In learning the procedures and walking through an actual planning exercise, the amount of labor involved in standing up a security team is beyond expectations. Meeting with various groups and committees and coordinating schedules makes the planning process arduous. The dedication and time required to follow through can easily explain why NPC is in the third iteration of a security planning team.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

Soft target mitigation is an expanding practice in the homeland security field as the number of hardened spaces grows and the aperture of soft targets closes. Those not committed to planning and modifying their soft spaces leave themselves most vulnerable as the threat continues to grow. The first step is recognizing a need to plan for threats and that those plans need to be tailored to fit each individual soft target. Houses of worship are particularly vulnerable and have become an ever-increasing target in recent years.\(^{249}\) Assessing vulnerabilities and then planning for the worst-case scenarios are an integral step in defending the sacred spaces that religious orders occupy. More steps must be taken beyond planning to respond to threats and more must be done to determine the effectiveness of strategies already employed.

A. KEY FINDINGS

It is perceived that security planning is expensive, but the real expense is time and energy. Plans can be completed for next to nothing, but the missing piece is getting a dedicated team to perform the function. This team then must wade through a seemingly never-ending stream of information coming from the government, other houses of worship, and commercial vendors who all have ideas on how to harden a house of worship from attack. If a faith-based organization does have the time, working with CISA and walking through the planning documents offered by FEMA and the DHS can yield significant increases in a house of worship’s security posture. With less time and more money, off-the-shelf security plans are available, but no instrument exists to prove their effectiveness and even turnkey products require the development of a team. Success may come in a combination of factors where houses of worship link up through networks to share best practices and encourage each other to build a more robust security stance, as is seen in the Jewish community through the SCN.

Much information can assist an FBO in how to create or build a security plan. If anything, too much information is available and it takes a keen eye to wade through these hundreds of ideas to survey what is a best fit for any individual house of worship. Federal entities pay special attention to ensure that all their soft target planning is all-inclusive; yet, most commercial planning is done with “churches” in mind. So much so that even the Council on American-Islamic Relations recommends the use of a Christian-based commercial church security firm.\textsuperscript{250} Jewish institutions have a long-standing history of security planning. They have set up their own network to assist any institutions of the Jewish faith.\textsuperscript{251} Lesser-known organizations may be focused on protecting non-Judeo Christian organizations, but they are out of the public eye.

The federal government must make material more user friendly. To create a security plan at NPC utilizing the FEMA \textit{Guide to Developing High-Quality Emergency Operations Plans for Houses of Worship} took nearly nine months to get from the initial step of forming a collaborative team to the fifth of six steps: plan preparation, review, and approval. The plan is still pending approval before the actual implementation of the security can even occur. The time invested to create a fully functioning security team with an approved plan in place may take upwards of an entire calendar year. As seen at Northminster in the past, the likelihood of individuals sticking through the entire process as time passes on without a completed plan is low. A simpler solution from the federal government can be created. If a plug and play module was created for use in houses of worship, the impact would be significant. The major impetus of many commercial products is that they can get a security team up and running very quickly.\textsuperscript{252} Plans and offerings at the federal level for houses of worship can be tailored to better fit the immediate need of FBOs as they struggle to contend with threats and hazards.

As funding is at a crossroads, houses of worship can look to a multitude of resources, including the federal government, for assistance. Many activities to assist in


\textsuperscript{251} Secure Community Network, “What Is the Secure Community Network?”

securing religious sites can be done for free or low cost. The number of resources available through the federal and state governments is growing and FEMA has grants available specifically to address FBOs that may be at high risk of terrorist attacks. The DHS also offers a list of protective measures that houses of worship with limited security budgets can implement. Protective measures in the realm of procedures, personnel, and information sharing can all be done with no cost. Something as simple as securing trash containers and checking for locked doors during services can lessen the risk an organization has without spending. Implementing safety protocols and plans can also reduce the cost of insurance for houses of worship, which then offsets the costs of security measures. States offer security grants as well, sometimes with very few applicants. Multiple faith-based organizations can get together to form a “community security working group” to pool resources and hold joint trainings. A major concern is that there is a cost associated to being secure, and through risk management and proper planning, those matters can be addressed to prepare and possibly prevent tragedy.

Design elements can be created to retain the feel of a welcoming environment while bolstering security. Such elements as secure window film provide a safer shelter without sacrificing to aesthetics. Installation of planters along doorways to prevent

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255 Protective Security Coordination Division, Office of Infrastructure Protection, 10.


258 Meyer.


vehicle entry is aesthetically pleasing and can prevent tragedy.\textsuperscript{261} A shift in attitude and architecture can improve a house of worship’s security stance without a loss to the core mission of the site.

As seen with the development of an emergency operations plan at NPC, the process of creating a plan is in itself inherently valuable and allows a faith-based community to answer questions necessary to improving site security. Identifying risks is an initial step in risk management.\textsuperscript{262} Involving partners like CISA allows a focused view on where the threats lie at that particular site. Other houses of worship can use the same resource to develop a list of security needs that can be addressed through a security planning committee. Once the needs were identified, the committee process showed how even basic planning operations become very site specific. The Safety Committee at Northminster struggled with the concept of who would be the IC on any particular day, as no specific chain of command exists within their church structure outside the lead pastor. Other houses of worship have similar issues with an incident command structure. For example, the Sikh faith that has no ordained leader and instead each gurdwara is run by a board of directors and services can be run by anyone in the faith.\textsuperscript{263} The structure of an EOP with an incident commander would need to be modified to meet the needs of Sikh congregations. The difficulty in moving from a committee to an actual implemented plan is a lesson from which other houses of worship can learn. At this point, Northminster does not have an approved emergency operations plan, but it is not due to a lack of effort. This scenario is common in any planning process and any faith-based organization that undergoes a church security plan must be ready to meet strategic goals and deadlines to move the process forward.\textsuperscript{264}

\textsuperscript{261} McGuffey et al., \textit{Recommended Best Practices for Securing Houses of Worship around the World for People of All Faiths}, 4.

\textsuperscript{262} iEduNote, “Risk Management.”


B. GROWING THREATS

A muddled relationship between church and state is also building an undercurrent of mistrust within the United States. The fear within religious organizations of crackdowns on refugees and illegal aliens may prevent FBOs from reaching out to the DHS for help. As the government reaches out to provide more law enforcement support to houses of worship, the prevailing thought is that those communities will also report back to law enforcement about bad actors in their midst. Tensions over protecting the religious freedoms of individual members and the safety of the community as a whole have resulted. Other tensions arise as religious organizations are requested to help the government. FBOs have been assisting immigrant families released by the federal government and those who oppose the release of immigrants to the streets are now targeting those houses of worship. Federal policies in one department of the DHS (Immigration and Customs Enforcement) may be instigating a growing need for another department (FEMA) to reach out and educate houses of worship on how they can protect themselves.

Current events outside the realm of government are also increasing the possible threats toward them. As religious organizations begin to reconcile with the past in which abusive relationships were accepted by the religious leaders, the more likely it is for people to come to the house of worship for help, which increases the possibility that more domestic conflicts will arrive at the door of the church. The growing anti-Semitic violence worldwide and the gamification of mass shootings has clearly placed mass

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gatherings, which includes houses of worship, in the crosshairs. The most recent attack on a synagogue in Halle, Germany shows that attackers are attempting to make a spectacle of their hatred and that simple security measures (the doors to the synagogue were locked) can prevent tragedy. With the fear gathering at the gates of FBOs, their request for assistance from the government is going to continue to grow, which makes it all the more necessary for the government to respond.

C. AVENUES OF ADDITIONAL RESEARCH

As this thesis outlined, even with the various resources available to houses of worship and the roadblocks to the implementation of any plan, many avenues of research are still needed to obtain a full picture of the faith-based security landscape. Investigation into implementation is the next step. Questions must be asked as to who is using the plans, at what level they are implemented, and are faith-based organizations continuing to plan as the threat evolves.

Plans outlined have not necessarily been evaluated for effectiveness, whether the federal government or individual entities have developed them. It is not really possible to measure a security plan for effectiveness except by comparing it to other plans. The DHS measures plans through a protective measure index, which evaluates the weakest links in a security structure through resiliency measures. Measurements for effectiveness are elusive, and it is nearly impossible to measure if an activity prevents an attack without one occurring. No one wants an attack to occur, and the ability to measure one is usually only weighed against the best practices of others.

Past the planning phase is the execution phase. What is missing in the execution phase and the hurdles in execution have not been discussed. The debate about whether

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271 Petit et al., Resilience Measurement Index, 1.
armed security in a place of worship is effective has not been discussed. Another avenue for further discussion is the reactions during an active assailant in the congregation. What did the congregation and any security staff do in an actual security event? If any training occurred prior to the event, did it change what happened and were lives saved?

Other avenues of research within religious communities could yield value as well. Acknowledgement of the issues surrounding domestic violence within the religious community and creating tools to combat domestic violence through houses of worship was frequently discussed in various sources for this thesis. A further discussion into the connections that faith-based communities have with stopping domestic violence is warranted. Physical security has been discussed but cyber security for houses of worship need be explored, as a distinct vulnerability exists. Houses of worship and their role in disaster preparedness and recovery is another avenue worth exploring.

This thesis attempted to provide a comprehensive look at the security landscape for houses of worship and filter them through the creation of a security plan for an individual faith-based organization. The difficulty of creating an EOP for an individual congregation is representative of the information found regarding church security. There are many voices, many ways to get to the finish line, and many ways to fall off the path and end up without improving the security posture of the sacred space. Site audits, planning committees, federal and local resources, and other religious orders are great places for a house of worship to start. Homeland security experts are just one key piece of the security puzzle for faith-based organizations. Internal security and threat mitigation planning has taken on a life of its own within houses of worship, especially within minority communities of the Jewish and Muslim faith. The experience gained by groups like the SCN must be sorted and disseminated for consumption by other FBOs. Sharing lessons learned by faith-based organizations can have a lasting effect of communal integration and collaboration, which thereby strengthens the community.

As religious communities share lessons learned through security networks and information sharing, the bond between them will continue to grow. A threat to one religious community is a threat to all religious communities, as active assailants have not proved to be discretionary in their violence. Collaboration amongst security experts, the
government, and the FBOs can only create a stronger community prepared to protect the innocent. It is apparent that a compromise will not be made in the beliefs of a congregation for the sake of security. Houses of worship, though, no matter the belief system, appear very open to the idea of help. Recent mass shootings have galvanized the religious community to act and protect itself, which starts the conversation. Once faith-based organizations open the door to homeland security operators, the opportunity exists to expand the conversation to all-hazards planning and training.
Contents
1. Administrative Documentation ........................................................................................................ 4
  1.1 Approval and Implementation .................................................................................................... 4
  1.2. Record of Changes .................................................................................................................... 5
  1.3. Record of Distribution ............................................................................................................... 6
2. Purpose and Situation Overview .................................................................................................... 7
  2.1. Purpose and Scope .................................................................................................................... 7
  2.2. Situation Overview ................................................................................................................... 7
3. Concept of Operations .................................................................................................................... 9
4. Organization and Assignment of Responsibilities ......................................................................... 10
  4.1 Incident Commander (Senior Pastor or Designee) .................................................................. 10
  4.2 Safety Ministry Team Lead ....................................................................................................... 11
  4.3 Safety Team Members - Safety Team ....................................................................................... 11
  4.4 Ushers ...................................................................................................................................... 12
  4.5 Children’s Ministries .................................................................................................................. 12
  4.6 Perimeter Team .......................................................................................................................... 13
5. Direction, Control, and Coordination ............................................................................................ 14
  5.1 Organizational Chart ................................................................................................................ 14
  5.2 Emergency Management Communications .............................................................................. 15
6. Training and Exercises .................................................................................................................. 16
  6.1 Training and Exercises Implementation and Coordination ..................................................... 16
7. Plan Development and Maintenance ............................................................................................. 17
  7.1 Planning Process ....................................................................................................................... 17
  7.2 Cycle of Review and Training .................................................................................................. 17
8. References ..................................................................................................................................... 18
  8.1 Emergency and Staff Information ............................................................................................ 18
  8.2 Phone Tree ............................................................................................................................... 18
  8.3 Evacuation Routes .................................................................................................................... 18
  8.4 Bomb Threat (DHS Bomb Threat Checklist) ............................................................................ 19
9. Functional Annexes ...................................................................................................................... 20
9.1 Evacuation................................................................................................................................. 21
9.2 Lockdown....................................................................................................................................... 24
9.3 Shelter-in-Place............................................................................................................................. 26
9.4 Recovery......................................................................................................................................... 28
9.5 Safety Team Ministry .................................................................................................................... 29

10. Hazard, Threat, or Incident-Specific Courses of Action ............................................................... 30
10.1 Severe Storm................................................................................................................................. 31
10.2 Medical.......................................................................................................................................... 32
10.3 Fire ................................................................................................................................................ 33
10.4 Utility Failure................................................................................................................................. 34
10.5 Hazardous Materials Incident ...................................................................................................... 35
10.6 Bomb Threat................................................................................................................................. 36
10.7 Active Assailant............................................................................................................................ 37
10.8 Abandoned Child.......................................................................................................................... 39
10.9 Mental Health Emergency ............................................................................................................ 40
1. Administrative Documentation

1.1 Approval and Implementation

The Emergency Operations Plan of Northminster Presbyterian Church was created to prepare the church to respond to a threat or hazard on campus that will be most likely to affect our congregation. To prepare for the possibility of an emergency on the campus of Northminster, the following document was created to organize and prepare staff and volunteers for such an event. To protect the physical assets and the community we serve it is necessary to prepare for the worst-case scenario and train to prevent tragedy. Through training, planning, and coordinated response to events, Northminster Presbyterian Church hopes to be best prepared to act when events beyond our control occur.

The Northminster Emergency Operations Plan will be in effect during church operations or when NPC sponsored activities are occurring on the campus.

Approval for the Emergency Operations Plan has come from Session and pastoral staff.

Signatures of Session/Leadership:

__________________________
Senior Pastor

__________________________
Approval Date by Session
1.2. Record of Changes

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2. Purpose and Situation Overview

This section provides a general description of the strategies and ethos behind the Emergency Operations Plan for NPC.

2.1. Purpose and Scope

The purpose of the Emergency Operations Plan (EOP) is to prepare Northminster Presbyterian Church (NPC) for the threats and hazards most likely to affect our congregation, staff, visitors, children, physical assets, and community we serve. The NPC EOP will identify the roles and responsibilities of church staff, members, and visitors in the immediate response to the hazards and threats most likely to affect our church facility, neighbors, members, and staff. The NPC EOP will be in effect during church operations or when NPC sponsored activities are occurring on the campus.

Developing, maintaining, and exercising the NPC EOP can strengthen our church safety and security while enhancing response and recovery operations. The procedures included in this plan will prepare our church for emergencies, some of which may be dangerous to life or property. NPC EOP will provide staff, members, and visitors from our community with assurances that NPC has prepared to respond to threats and hazards.

The EOP of NPC is enacted during the state of an emergency, as outlined in the preceding document. Once recovery efforts begin, the Disaster Preparedness and Response Team will take over recovery efforts.

2.2. Situation Overview

Northminster Presbyterian Church will be proactive in their approach to possible emergencies. It is too late to think about what to do in an emergency while it is occurring. Therefore NPC is intent on preparing for possible emergencies before they happen. Emergency response services are usually 6 minutes away in those 6 minutes NPC needs to have a comprehensive knowledge of what to do. Utilizing the Federal Emergency Management Administration’s five steps in emergency planning (Prevention, Protection, Mitigation, Response, Recovery) NPC has developed plans to respond to various emergency incidents. The focus is to prevent, prepare, plan and respond to a hazardous situation on the campus.
Prevention is to make the NPC campus inviting and open while also safe from hazards that are natural or manmade. If an emergency does occur, the preparations in place are intended to mitigate and lessen the impact of the event. The protocols and plans listed within this document are intended to save lives and property. Response to incidents in a helpful and constructive manner, as outlined in this guide, is to allow for coordination with other government entities after a major event.

Although not exhaustive, the threats and hazards that NPC plans for are:

- Severe Storms
- Medical Emergencies
- Fire
- Utility Failures
- Hazardous Material Incidents
- Bomb Threat
- Active Assailant

In response to any of these incidents, NPC is intent with working with any local, state, or federal authorities arriving on the campus. The intent is to leverage and develop skills of members on the NPC campus so that incidents and emergencies can be managed until emergency responders arrive to take command of the incident. Once an incident has been managed, the Disaster and Preparedness Response Team will manage recovery operations.
3. Concept of Operations

The intent of this document is an all-hazards approach to keeping parishioners and guests on the NPC campus safe during any incident. In the event of any incident, NPC staff or their designee, will institute the emergency operation plan and take on the role of Incident Commander (IC). Whether the plan has been enacted or not, staff on campus will begin implementing proactive measures when advised of an incident (for example, anyone reports a fire, staff will take action without direct notification). Depending on the incident, different plans will be enacted, herein described as Courses of Action (COA). The IC will follow the appropriate protocols to make contact with the correct authorities and implement the directives agreed upon. In all COAs, the utmost effort is made to ensure that the most vulnerable populations are cared for and that their safety is accounted for first. All COAs are designed to provide the safest response within the incident to prevent the greatest protection for those involved in the incident and for the preservation of church facilities. NPC will work in conjunction with other ministries and services on campus, such as the Northminster Christian School. The overarching goal of all actions taken by NPC staff and volunteers is to prevent, protect from, and mitigate the impact of an incident on the lives of people on campus. The protection of personal or NPC property is secondary.
4. Organization and Assignment of Responsibilities

This section provides an overview of the roles and responsibilities of NPC leadership and staff in the event of an emergency incident, contact with local emergency management officials and community partners, and an overview of organizational functions during all incidents.

4.1 Incident Commander (Senior Pastor or Designee):
In the event of an emergency, the Senior Pastor or his/her designee will assume the responsibility of Incident Commander. Incident Commander Responsibilities include:

a. Ensures that procedures described within the NPC EOP are followed during any incident

b. Communicates with NPC Safety Team Ministry members what emergency function is being conducted due to a specific threat or hazard.

c. Ensures that 911 has been called

d. Ensures that NPC Safety Team Ministry members know their roles and responsibilities

e. Maintains situational awareness during all church activities

f. Ensures that all occupants of the church facility(s) are kept informed during any potential threat or hazard

g. Coordinates all emergency functions including: Evacuations, Lockdowns, and Shelter in Place

h. Communicates and coordinates with responding public safety entities to ensure unified response and recovery operations.

i. Accounts for all persons within the church facility(s).

j. Serves as the liaison between NPC and the Presbytery (local, state, national entities)

k. Coordinates and provides public information statements
4.2 Safety Ministry Team Lead:

In the event of an emergency, the Safety Ministry Team Lead on duty will assume the role of second in command. The Safety Ministry Team Lead on duty’s responsibilities include:

a. Serves as the backup to the Incident Commander in the event s/he becomes incapacitated or unable to perform their responsibilities
b. Maintains situational awareness during all church activities
c. Follows NPC EOP procedures during any emergency
d. Follows directions given by Incident Commander
e. Provides information and instructions to all persons
f. Communicates with other Safety Ministry Team members
g. Ensures that 911 has been called
h. Ensures that all occupants of the church facility(s) are kept informed

4.3 Safety Team Members - Safety Team

Safety Team members’ responsibilities during an emergency include:

a. The designee will serve as the backup to the Safety Ministry Team Lead in the event s/he becomes incapacitated or unable to perform their responsibilities
b. Maintains situational awareness during all church activities
c. Follows NPC EOP procedures during any emergency
d. Follows directions given by Incident Commander or Safety Ministry Team Lead
e. Communicates with other Safety Ministry Team members
f. Ensures that all occupants of the church facility(s) are kept informed
g. Executes Evacuation, Lockdown, and Shelter in Place procedures
h. Responsible for maintaining order and providing a calming effect in the case of an emergency incident

i. Address concerns of those involved to communicate to Safety Ministry Team Lead

4.4 Ushers

Ushers’ responsibilities during an emergency include:

a. Maintains situational awareness during all church activities

b. Follows NPC EOP procedures during any emergency

c. Follows directions given by Incident Commander or Safety Ministry Team Lead

d. Communicates with other Safety Ministry Team members

e. Responsible for assisting in maintaining order and providing a calming effect in the case of an emergency incident

f. RESPONSIBLE WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF THE ELDERLY OR THE INFIRMED DURING EMERGENCY

4.5 Children’s Ministries

In the event an emergency occurs while children are on campus, anyone directly involved in ministering to children has the following responsibilities:

a. Maintains situational awareness during all church activities

b. Follows NPC EOP procedures during any emergency

c. Follows directions given by Incident Commander or Safety Ministry Team Lead

d. Communicates with other Safety Ministry Team members

e. Responsible for providing a calming effect

f. RESPONSIBLE WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF MONITORING AND MOVING CHILDREN DURING AN EMERGENCY
4.6 Perimeter Team

Perimeter Team member’s responsibilities include:

a. Maintain situational awareness of events occurring around the NPC campus
b. Notify a Safety Team member of any possible threat or disturbance that may need the attention of a safety team member. If a threat is substantial enough, as in all cases, a Perimeter Team member will contact local authorities first via 911 and then contact the Safety Team Lead
c. Follows NPC EOP procedures during any emergency
d. Follows directions given by Incident Commander or Safety Ministry Team Lead
e. Communicates with other Safety Ministry Team members
f. Assists in the execution of an Evacuation, Lockdown, and/or Shelter in Place procedure
5. Direction, Control, and Coordination
This section describes the organizational framework at NPC in regards to the EOP and the interaction with emergency management professionals.

5.1 Organizational Chart
5.2 Emergency Management Communications

In the event of an emergency, the Senior Pastor or his/her designee will act as the Incident Commander. The Incident Commander will be the primary designee or shall appoint someone to communicate with emergency management officials. To prevent miscommunication, Safety Team members will direct coordination efforts to the Incident Commander or his/her designee.

As the immediate incident is diffused and recovery operations commence, incident command will be turned over to the Disaster Preparedness and Response Team. The Incident Commander or his/her designee, working in conjunction with emergency services, will notify all emergency response personnel of the change of command.

The purpose in turnover of command and control to the Disaster Preparedness and Response Team after the situation has been determined safe by emergency management is to allow for members of the Safety Team and all involved the opportunity to attend to the physical, spiritual, and mental fatigue that occurs within the first 24 hours of an incident.
6. Training and Exercises

This section describes the critical training and exercise activities NPC will develop and execute in preparation for an event in which the EOP is enacted.

6.1 Training and Exercises Implementation and Coordination

Training will be instituted to prepare members of the Safety Ministry Team to respond to an incident. The objective of any training is to prepare members to react appropriately to an event unfolding on the campus of NPC. Training is to be coordinated through the Safety Ministry Team Lead/Committee and approved by the Head Pastor or his designee. Training can be held on the campus of NPC or through events held by other organizations offering faith-based safety team concepts. Funds for any training will be preapproved by NPC, and reimbursement for any activities not approved will be at the discretion of NPC. Training requirements will be set by the Safety Ministry Committee based on Pastoral guidance. All pieces of training must adhere to the fundamental principles of NPC.

Exercises are imperative to prepare members of NPC in case of an emergency. Just as fire drills prepare children for a possible evacuation, other exercises preparing congregants for fires, disasters, or active assailants are necessary. Any exercise will be performed will be in concert with the spirit of this document to prepare and calm members in the case of an emergency incident. Any exercise will be done with the approval of NPC staff and coordinated with local emergency management if applicable. The frequency of any exercise will be at the discretion of the Safety Ministry Committee and NPC staff.
7. Plan Development and Maintenance
This section discusses the overall approach to planning and the assignment of plan development and maintenance responsibilities. This section will describe the planning process, participants, and committees or other entities involved in approval.

7.1 Planning Process
Planning of the NPC EOP is a collaborative effort between staff at NPC, the Security Committee, and subject matter experts with the approval of Session. Security Committee members provide input from various sources and develop the plan through meetings. Completed guiding documents are then approved through Session for entry into the Manual of Operations.

Revisions will occur on an ad hoc basis when issues with the EOP are discovered. At least once a year, the EOP will be reviewed by the Security Committee for adjustments. Pastoral staff or a member of the Security Committee can call for a meeting to revise the EOP. Roles assigned through the planning process will be memorialized through duty assignments to be given to each member of the Safety Team.

7.2 Cycle of Review and Training
The NPC EOP will be reviewed periodically, and at least an annual basis, by the NPC Security Committee. Revisions of significance will go before Session for approval before implementation. Updates to the NPC EOP are logged in the Record of Changes in Section 1.3.

The cycle of training will be determined by the NPC Safety Team. On an as-needed basis, the NPC Safety Team will determine needed trainings that will then be approved through the Security Committee and applicable leadership. Funds for training are approved through the approved budgetary process.
8. References

This section provides reference materials to be used in the event of an emergency. Information will be available and posted where appropriate. In any case of an emergency, once emergency services have been contacted, the Incident Commander will make all contacts with coordinated emergency services.

8.1 Emergency and Staff Information

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONTACT</th>
<th>NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Life-Threatening Situation</td>
<td>911</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bomb Threat</td>
<td>911</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use DHS Bomb Threat Checklist (8.4)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospital</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banner UMC</td>
<td>520-694-0111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diamond Children’s Medical Center</td>
<td>520-694-5437</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poison Control Hotline</td>
<td>800-222-1222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pima County Public Health Department</td>
<td>520-724-7770</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southwest Gas – Gas Leak</td>
<td>911 and 877-860-6020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tucson Electric Power Outage</td>
<td>520-623-7711</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Downed Power Line</td>
<td>911</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tucson Water Department</td>
<td>520-791-4133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Behavioral Health Emergency</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPD Mental Health Support Team</td>
<td>866-495-6735</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8.2 Phone Tree
In Progress

8.3 Evacuation Routes
Maps in progress
8.4 Bomb Threat (DHS Bomb Threat Checklist)

BOMB THREAT PROCEDURES

This quick reference checklist is designed to help employees and decision makers of commercial facilities, schools, etc., respond to a bomb threat in an orderly and controlled manner with the first responders and other stakeholders.

Most bomb threats are received by phone. Bomb threats are serious until proven otherwise. Act quickly, but remain calm and obtain information with the checklist on the reverse of this card.

If a bomb threat is received by phone:
1. Remain calm. Keep the caller on the line for as long as possible, DO NOT HANG UP, even if the caller does.
2. Listen carefully. Be polite and show interest.
3. Try to keep the caller talking to learn more information.
4. If possible, write a note to a colleague to call the authorities or, as soon as the caller hangs up, immediately notify yourself.
5. If your phone has a display, copy the number and/or caller ID on the window display.
6. Complete the Bomb Threat Checklist immediately. Write down as much detail as you can remember. Try to get exact words.
7. Immediately upon termination of call, DO NOT HANG UP, but from a different phone, contact authorities immediately with information and ask for instructions.

If a bomb threat is received in handwriting:

- Call
- Handle note as minimally as possible.

If a bomb threat is received by e-mail:

- Call
- Do not delete the message.

Signs of a suspicious package:
- No return address
- Poor handwriting
- Excessive postage
- Mispelled words
- Stains
- Incorrect titles
- Strange odor
- Foreign postage
- Strange sounds
- Restrictive notes

- Unexpected delivery

*Refer to your local bomb threat emergency response plan for evacuation criteria*

DO NOT:
- Use two-way radios or cellular phones. Radio signals have the potential to detonate a bomb.
- Touch or move a suspicious package.

WHO TO CONTACT (Select One)
- 911
- Follow your local guidelines

For more information about this form contact the DHS Office for Bombing Prevention at OBPP@hs.dhs.gov

Homeland Security 2014
9. Functional Annexes

Functional annexes are the description of critical operations and activities in the event of an emergency. Some annexes may occur concurrently, meaning that there may be an evacuation and a lockdown occurring at the same time on campus. The Incident Commander shall communicate to the Security Ministry Team as to which annex is occurring.

Early on in the management of a crisis, a decision must be made as to whether evacuation or a shelter-in-place is warranted. There are four possible decisions in managing an emergency: let things remain as they are; evacuate everybody; execute a lockdown, or have everybody shelter-in-place. This decision must be made at the time of the emergency, but the considerations which guide the decision can be thought through much earlier.

EVACUATION is recommended in those situations where the source of danger is already in the building, and the occupants will be safer outside than inside.

LOCKDOWN is recommended in those situations when the source or threat of danger is outside buildings, and the occupants will be safer locked inside the buildings rather than inside.

SHELTER-IN-PLACE is a response to an emergency if there is no danger within the building, but the threat is outside, possibly a weather emergency or an active search.

Situations such as a medical emergency should be handled in the current location and often do not involve the relocation of any persons for safety, but people may be asked to stay in their current location to allow for emergency services to respond.
9.1 Evacuation

Examples are a fire in the building or imminently threatening the building, a chemical leak, or toxic vapor whose source is inside the building, a person with a weapon inside the building. The goal is to make sure that everyone evacuates the building in a safe manner and that everyone gathers at a predetermined location where they can be accounted for.

The following are evacuation routes that could be used. However, a specific situation might necessitate the use of a different route. The appropriate route will evacuate persons away from the danger and toward a gathering location which places as much of a safety barrier as possible between the evacuees and danger.

Evacuation must be in the direction away from the threat, it must involve everyone in the building(s), and it must be to a previously agreed-upon location. It is imperative to get all persons out of the buildings involved in the threat by the safest possible route in a manner that maximizes the safety of the evacuees and which minimizes danger to emergency responders. It is essential for all persons to evacuate and to assure that the buildings/rooms are cleared.

This task is the responsibility of the Safety Ministry Coordinator or his/her designee. Safety Ministry Team members will assist and clear buildings until first responders arrive, keeping in mind personal safety. Safety Ministry Team members are not expected to enter buildings at the risk of their own personal safety.

All those evacuated must go to a single designated gathering location so that everyone can be accounted for. If someone evacuates to a different location, they may be presumed to still be in the building, forcing a staff member or emergency responder to incur the risk of entering the building to search for the person.

Incident Commander will:

Designate the Safety Ministry Coordinator or designee to evacuate the building(s).
Determine if designating the role of a designee to first responders is necessary and make the assignment to a staff member.

Call 911 directly or direct his/her designee to do so

Announce instructions campus-wide by a combination of radios and telephone paging in plain English rather than code.

**Example: A fire is in Fellowship Hall Kitchen:**

"*Attention staff. Attention staff. This is not a drill. There is a fire reported on the campus. Evacuate each building using the southernmost available evacuation route. The gathering location is the ramada area at the south end of the campus. Gates to the ramada area will be open. Begin the evacuation now."

As soon as possible, move to either the gathering location and continue to manage the incident.

Provide information and instructions as necessary.

**Safety Ministry Coordinator will:**

Coordinate the Safety team to clear each of the rooms in the area, call out the announcement to evacuate, and the gathering location and clearly mark each of the rooms visited with tape or other means once it has been cleared.

Coordinate with Ushers to assist in the evacuation of those with disabilities and medical needs.

Report to the gathering location.

Ascertain and document who is accounted for and who is not.

Ascertain whether there are any medical emergencies among those who have evacuated.

**Children’s Ministries will:**

Assist with the evacuation of all children to the designated evacuation area.
Take attendance form with them to check that all children are present at the evacuation site.

Coordinate and transfer children to parents/guardians at the evacuation site.

**Evacuation Routes:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Threat from:</th>
<th>Evacuation Route:</th>
<th>Gathering Location:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>East (Tucson Blvd side)</td>
<td>Exit through south and north hallway doors</td>
<td>Northwest Parking Lot or corner of Jackson and Tucson BLVD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South (Hedrick Roadside)</td>
<td>Exit through Parlor doors, north hallway door, east Fellowship Hall door</td>
<td>Northwest Parking Lot or corner of Jackson and Tucson BLVD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West (Wasko apartment complex side)</td>
<td>Exit through Parlor doors, north hallway door, east Fellowship Hall door</td>
<td>Catalina Terrace parking lot or Cragin Elementary based on the nature of the threat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North (Fort Lowell side)</td>
<td>Exit through the south hallway door, Library door</td>
<td>Catalina Terrace parking lot or Cragin Elementary based on the nature of the threat</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
9.2 Lockdown

This annex focuses on the courses of action the house of worship will execute to secure buildings and grounds during incidents that pose an immediate threat of violence in or around the house of worship. The primary objective of a lockdown is to ensure all persons are secured quickly in the rooms away from immediate danger. Lockdowns generally occur when there is a threat outside, and the Lockdown is initiated to prevent the danger from entering a building.

**Incident Commander will:**

Designate the Safety Ministry Coordinator or designee.

Call 911 directly or direct his/her designee to do so. Most likely, a lockdown will be initiated based on the first-responder contact.

Announce instructions campus-wide by a combination of radios and telephone paging in plain English.

Example: A police report of an armed subject in the area

"Attention staff. Attention staff. This is not a drill. Proceed inside a building immediately, secure all locks, and listen to radios for further information and instructions."

As soon as possible, move to a location that is locked and secure.

Provide information and instructions as necessary.

With the coordination of first responders, lift lockdown.

**Safety Ministry Coordinator will:**

Coordinate the Safety team to check that buildings and doors are locked.

Rooms visited will be marked with tape or other means once it has been checked. If the area is considered unsafe, members will not enter.

Coordinate with Ushers to assist in the movement of those with disabilities and medical needs who may need to move to a locked location.

Coordinate with team members to move congregants to safe locations away from windows and doors.

Report to Incident Commander any locations not secured, if known.
Ascertain and document who is accounted for and who is not.
Ascertain whether there are any medical emergencies

Children’s Ministries will:
Lock doors in their immediate area and move children to a safe location within the room.
Take attendance form with them to check that all children are present.
Coordinate and transfer children to parent/guardian at the end of the lockdown.

THREATS EMERGING DURING LOCKDOWN:
If events occur in which a threat develops within a building/room during a lockdown, Safety Team members will initiate an evacuation of that building/room only.
Safety Team members will contact the Incident Commander of a change in status within the building. The Incident Commander will notify first responders of the evolving situation.
Safety Team members will assist in keeping other people on campus calm that may not be involved in the evolving incident.
9.3 Shelter-in-Place

When the emergency requires persons to Shelter-in-Place. Shelter-in-Place annex focuses on courses of action when persons are required to remain indoors, perhaps for an extended period, because it is safer inside the building or a room than outside. Depending on the threat or hazard, persons may be required to move to rooms that can be sealed (such as in the event of a chemical or biological hazard) or without windows, or to a weather shelter (such as in the event of a tornado).

**Incident Commander will:**

Ascertain the nature of the emergency

Announce instructions campus-wide by a combination of radios and telephone paging in plain English rather than code.

Example: Microburst or tornado is reported in the area

"Attention staff. Attention staff. This is not a drill. Proceed to the nearest Shelter-in-Place location immediately, secure all locks, and listen to radios for further information and instructions."

As soon as possible, move to the nearest Shelter-in-Place location and continue to manage the incident.

Designate off-campus gathering place for parents/guardians not on campus during incident. A place can be preplanned and information disseminated to parents through the Children’s ministry. (Catalina Terrace parking lot or Cragin Elementary)

Contact (by radio) the Shelter-in-Place locations and ascertain:

- Who is accounted for in each location and who is not.
- Whether there are any medical emergencies among those who have sheltered in place.
- Provide information and instructions as necessary.

With the coordination of first responders, lift Shelter-in-Place order.

**Safety Ministry Coordinator will:**

Report to the nearest Safety in Place location.

Call 911/emergency response services to ascertain the nature of the incident.
Inform first responders of where off-campus parents have gathered in preparation for pickup of children.

Keep the Incident Commander informed of pertinent information

Children's Ministries will:

Gather any children from the outside, lock doors in their immediate area, and move children to a designated safe location.

Take attendance form with them to check that all children are present.

Communicate with other rooms to determine if a child not in their location has moved to another room.

Coordinate and transfer children to parent/guardian at the end of the lockdown.

Shelter-in-Place location information:

The shelter location must be one which can be rendered somewhat safe, protected from the entry of toxic chemicals, vapors, or persons posing a threat, and capable of being locked from the inside. An Emergency Supplies Kit secured with zip-tie fastener will be stored in each Shelter in Place location with tools needed to secure the area.

The following are established Shelter in Place locations for the Northminster campus:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Campus Building</th>
<th>Designated Shelter in Place Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sanctuary</td>
<td>Main Sanctuary Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration - downstairs</td>
<td>Room # (Publications Office)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration - upstairs</td>
<td>Room # (Can Do Room)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fellowship Wing (including upstairs room and offices)</td>
<td>Room # (Parlor)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian Education Wing</td>
<td>Room 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multipurpose Building</td>
<td>Room # (Music Rehearsal Room)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Shelter-in-Place Safety Kit:

Each location’s kit will include:

- Flashlight
- Duct tape
- Water
- First Aid Kit
- Leather and neoprene gloves
- Multi-tool
- hammer
- Dust masks
- Emergency blankets
- Whistle
- Toilet paper
- Disinfectant wipes

9.4 Recovery

Recovery after any event will be conducted in accordance with the Disaster Preparedness and Response Plan. Incident Command will continue based on this EOP until Presbyterian Disaster Assistance responds and implements the Disaster Preparedness and Response Plan.
9.5 Safety Team Ministry

This annex focuses on the courses of action that the house of worship will implement on a routine, ongoing basis to secure the house of worship from criminal threats, including efforts done in conjunction with law enforcement.

Membership

All congregants are, in many ways, members of the Safety Team. Any attendee may see something that can be a cause for concern and create a need for implementation of safety protocols. A general belief of “See Something, Say Something” needs to pervade the congregation in these trying times so that all are vigilant of a possible threat whether that be accidental or intentional.

Safety Team members are to watch over the congregation and be the extra set of eyes and ears so that those attending church functions may primarily focus on events they are attending.

Ushers and those who work in the Children’s ministry, as outlined in 4.4 and 4.5, will perform ancillary roles on the Safety Team, primarily when there are emergency matters.

Members of the Welcome Team will be attendees in good standing who have been screened by the Security Committee. The Security Committee will develop core requirements for membership that will have approval by the Senior Pastor.

Courses of Action

Welcome Team will wear emblems or lanyards for easy identification.

The Primary functions of the Welcome Team:

- Perform the function of security for occupied areas of the campus.
- Escort all offerings to a secure location
- Respond to requests for medical or security assistance
- Implement any functional annex as requested by the Incident Commander or Safety Ministry Team Lead
- Assist first responders as needed or requested
10. Hazard, Threat, or Incident-Specific Courses of Action

The threat and hazard-specific annexes describe the courses of action (COA) unique to particular threats and hazards. Courses of action already outlined in a functional annex are not be repeated in a threat- or hazard-specific annex, they are intended to explain actions specific to events that are unfolding in real-time. Members of the Safety Ministry Team and pastoral staff should be familiar with the courses of action. Local, state, and Federal regulations or mandates are taken into account as applicable to the specific hazard described.
10.1 Severe Storm

Precautions/Pre-emergency Procedures

- Be completely familiar with this policy.
- Know the various shelter-in-place locations.
- Make sure parents of preschoolers know the off-campus location to gather for information if an emergency precludes their coming onto the campus.

Immediate Actions

- Typically Shelter-in-Place is the plan execute
- As nearly as possible, account for all persons known to be on the campus.
- Identify and move self to the nearest appropriate shelter-in-place location.
- Move all persons to the nearest appropriate shelter-in-place location.
- If possible, call 911.
- As soon as possible, communicate with first responders the location of the off-campus gathering location.
10.2 Medical

Precautions/Pre-emergency Procedures

- Be completely familiar with this policy.
- Have at least a basic knowledge of first aid.
- Be familiar with locations of first aid kits, Automatic External Defibrillators.
- Request assistance of medical professionals on campus

Immediate Actions

- Ascertained the nature of the emergency.
- **Typically, a functional annex will not need to be enacted** unless the medical emergency requires congregants to be clear of the area due to severity of the incident (severe blood loss, crime scene and/or subject may have expired)
- Unless it is minor in nature, call 911, and tell the 911 operator the specific location on the church campus.
- Provide first aid, if possible.
- Remain with the person needing assistance until the arrival of emergency personnel.
- Notify a member of the Safety Team who will report the incident to Incident Commander and Safety Team Lead.
10.3 Fire

Precautions/Pre-emergency Procedures

- Be completely familiar with this policy.
- Know the various evacuation routes.
- Make sure parents of children know the off-campus location to gather for information if an emergency precludes their coming onto the campus.

Immediate Actions

- Typically, an Evacuation is the annex to execute.
- Incident Commander or his/her designee will contact 911
- Identify the safest evacuation route.
- Evacuate all persons to the appropriate gathering location.
- As nearly as possible, work with Safety Team members to account for all persons known to be on the campus.
10.4 Utility Failure

Precautions/Pre-emergency Procedures

• Be completely familiar with this policy.
• Know the various evacuation routes.
• Make sure parents of children know the off-campus location to gather for information if an emergency precludes their coming onto the campus.

Immediate Actions

• Typically, an Evacuation is the annex to execute.
• If the nature of the incident includes downed power lines or a gas leak, typical evacuation routes may change.
• Incident Commander or his/her designee will contact 911.
• Identify the safest evacuation route and notify Safety Team members to assist in the evacuation.
• Evacuate all persons to the appropriate gathering location.
• As nearly as possible, work with Safety Team members to account for all persons known to be on the campus.
10.5 Hazardous Materials Incident

Precautions/Pre-emergency Procedures

- Be completely familiar with this policy.
- Know the various evacuation routes.
- Make sure parents of children know the off-campus location to gather for information if an emergency precludes their coming onto the campus.

Immediate Actions

- Typically, an Evacuation is the annex to execute.
- If the incident involves the possibility of toxic fumes outside, a Shelter-in-place may need to be enacted.
- Incident Commander or his/her designee will contact 911.
- Incident Commander or his/her designee will work with first responders to determine appropriate annex to execute. Safety Team members will work to keep all subjects sheltered until a decision to evacuate is made.
- As nearly as possible, work with Safety Team members to account for all persons known to be on the campus.
10.6 Bomb Threat

Precautions/Pre-emergency Procedures

- Be completely familiar with this policy and functional annexes.
- Be completely familiar with the FBI Bomb Data Center checklist.

Immediate Actions

- Upon receiving the initial telephone call, begin to complete the checklist.
- Notify the first person in the vicinity to contact a program staff member who will call 911.
- A staff member will call 911 while individual on phone continues to take information from subject on the phone.
- Incident Commander will ascertain, with the concurrence of first responders, whether an evacuation is going to take place. If so, activate the evacuation annex.
10.7 Active Assailant

An Active Assailant on campus is a unique situation that requires quick action to determine the most reasonable action to protect the largest number of people while keeping in mind that children are the priority over all other congregants. In this scenario, some areas of the campus may call for an Evacuation while other parts of the campus may need to perform a Lockdown. An example would be that an active assailant enters the main sanctuary. A lockdown of the entire facility will be initiated while the main sanctuary will attempt to evacuate. Such a situation is quickly evolving, and chaos will ensue. Active assailants generally look for the most likely, easy target and then attempt to flee. The fewer visible subjects, the better.

There are three general responses to an active assailant (all three will be occurring at the same time in most scenarios):

RUN:
- As in an evacuation, people will flee the presence of an active assailant
- If the decision to run is made, people will need to move and not look back
- As people evacuate, Safety Team members need to direct movement and prevent others from moving towards the assailant
- Do not stop for law enforcement unless directed to; their goal is to end the threat not direct evacuations

HIDE:
- As in a Lockdown, congregants will need to get behind locked doors and stay there until cleared by first responders
- Particular attention must be paid to staying out of the view of windows and prevent movement
- Safety Team members not directly engaged in evacuation need to perform lockdown procedures if possible

FIGHT:
- At the risk of life and limb, the decision to fight is the decision of last
resort for most people.
- It is an attempt to incapacitate or distract the assailant
- The decision to fight is a commitment to physical aggression with the intent to stop the active assailant

Precautions/Pre-emergency Procedures
- Know the details of this policy.
- Leave all appropriate doors locked.
- Know who should be on campus on any given day.
- Know the appropriate Lockdown and Evacuation procedures.

Immediate Actions
- Notify staff members and Safety Team members.
- Initiate Lockdown or evacuation procedures and communicate where active assailant is to include the direction of travel.
- Anyone not in direct contact with the assailant will call 911. Tell 911 that there is an ACTIVE ASSAILANT on campus and a description of what actions or threats have been made if known.
- All Safety Team members must be hyper-vigilant to a quickly changing environment
- When law enforcement arrives, show your hands and listen to all commands.
10.8 Abandoned Child

Precautions/Pre-emergency Procedures

- Be completely familiar with this policy.

Immediate Actions

- Ascertain whether the child needs immediate medical assistance. If so, call 911.
- If possible, ascertain from the child the name and phone number of parent or guardian, and contact that person.
- Assign someone to check the church campus for family members who may be seeking the abandoned (or missing) child.
- Assure that the office phone system is in a mode that allows for calls to be answered, and assign someone to wait in the area of the office.
- If it isn’t possible to identify the parent or guardian and if the church has not been contacted by the parent or guardian in a reasonable time, call 911.
- Due to the nature of the incident, the Incident Commander may enact a Lockdown.
10.9 Mental Health Emergency

Precautions/Pre-emergency Procedures
- Know the details of this policy.
- Know the appropriate Lockdown procedures.

Immediate Actions
- Notify staff members and Safety Team members.
- Be prepared to initiate Lockdown procedures and communicate where the subject is on campus to include direction of travel.
- Anyone not in direct contact with the subject will call 911. Tell 911 that there is a mentally unstable subject on campus and a description of what actions or threats have been made if known.
- Contact the TPD Mental Health Support Team at 866-495-6735
- Assist in the movement of people away from the subject
- Do not engage the subject unless they are making a specific threat to a person or persons
- All Safety Team members must be hyper-vigilant to a quickly changing environment
- When law enforcement arrives, show your hands and listen to all commands.
LIST OF REFERENCES


INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

1. Defense Technical Information Center  
   Ft. Belvoir, Virginia

2. Dudley Knox Library  
   Naval Postgraduate School  
   Monterey, California