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THESIS

**THE “ENGLISH DISEASE” AND POLITICAL PROTEST:
HOW SOCIAL IDENTITY THEORY CAN ENHANCE
PUBLIC SAFETY AT CROWD EVENTS**

by

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September 2019

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HOW SOCIAL IDENTITY THEORY CAN ENHANCE
PUBLIC SAFETY AT CROWD EVENTS**

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ABSTRACT

The existing methodologies used by law enforcement to manage crowd events to ensure public safety do not adequately address current protester-on-protester violence. Outdated methodologies, based on classical crowd psychology, may increase the chances of violence between crowd groups. Case study analysis using soccer hooliganism as a proxy for intergroup protest violence demonstrates the relevance of modern crowd psychology in this new protest paradigm. This thesis finds that law enforcement could effectively use social identity theory to understand differing groups' needs and reduce protester-on-protester violence.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ESIM	Elaborated Social Identity Model
GNR	<i>Guarda Nacional Republicana</i>
NYPD	New York Police Department
PLT	police liaison team
PSP	<i>Policia de Seguranca Publica</i>
SIT	Social Identity Theory
UEFA	Union of European Football Associations
WTO	World Trade Organization

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This thesis explores the question of how to address a new violent crowd event paradigm to ensure public safety. Continued intergroup violence at crowd events not only jeopardizes public safety but also undermines core expectations of democratic values in a civil society. An analysis of crowd control theory and methodologies used to address soccer hooliganism as a proxy for political protest intergroup violence shows how modern crowd psychology theory offers insight and the means to engage crowd protest groups proactively to reduce violence, thereby ensuring a civil society. This research examines three case studies in which a crowd event had the potential to devolve into intergroup violence. Analysis of each event was derived from either after-action reports, news reporting, scholarly journal articles, or a combination thereof. Each case study examined, in relation to specific components of modern crowd psychology, components of social identity theory (SIT) and the elaborated social identity model (ESIM) as a framework for comparative analysis. The findings from this analysis show that applying modern crowd theory to crowd control methodologies can mitigate group violence.

The use of SIT and ESIM provides law enforcement a more dynamic, proactive relationship with crowd groups. Understanding group identity through the lens of SIT provides a strategic awareness based on specific analytical markers.¹ ESIM builds upon this awareness to understand how group identity may change based on external influences and the changing perceptions of legitimacy.² The context gained through group identity analysis affords the opportunity for communication and responsiveness between law enforcement and crowd groups. This dynamic relationship could mitigate violent intergroup tendencies.

¹ David Brannan, Kristin Darken, and Anders Strindberg, *A Practitioner's Way Forward: Terrorism Analysis* (Salinas, CA: Agile Press, 2014), 67.

² Clifford Stott and Stephen Reicher, "How Conflict Escalates: The Inter-Group Dynamics of Collective Football Crowd 'Violence,'" *Sociology* 32, no. 2 (May 1998): 363–64, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0038038598032002007>.

SIT and ESIM directly correlate with crowd control methodologies in practical ways. Research into soccer hooliganism as a proxy for political protest, as well as comparative case study analysis, illustrates that specific crowd control methodologies are effective at enhancing legitimacy. Intelligence analysis and outreach in advance of events build relationships between law enforcement and anticipated crowd groups. The use of specific officers as liaisons before, during, and after events enhances communication and might prevent misunderstandings that shift group identities. Finally, scaling police tactics to meet group identity and posture could foster legitimacy between all groups. A concerted effort by all groups to communicate their needs and intentions, coupled with actions that convey legitimacy to all, could avert circumstances that might alter the identities of those more prone to violence.

The modern lens of SIT and ESIM fosters a greater awareness of group identity and a crowd-control posture intent on intergroup violence prevention. The assurance of public safety at political protests helps create the conditions for a civil society.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

*Ohh Heyyy come on Rose City
Show them all what 'No Pity' means
We're gonna take over the world you see,
The Timbers Army and the boys in green*

—Timbers Army, “Take Over the World” Chant

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I. PROTEST VIOLENCE: A NEW FORM OF THE “ENGLISH DISEASE”?

A rally in Oregon sponsored by the right-wing group Patriot Prayer turned violent on Saturday as demonstrators clashed with anti-fascist protesters, who showed up in opposition to the event. . . . More than 100 demonstrators attended the event in support of Patriot Prayer, while more than 100 counterprotesters . . . threw eggs, half-empty water bottles and firecrackers at demonstrators shortly after the march by right-wingers began.

—Carla Herreria, Huffington Post¹

A. PURPOSE OF STUDY

Today’s law enforcement agencies face a new challenge in their ability to manage crowd behavior and ensure public safety. Violence between protest groups has increased over the past three years, with the threat to local communities rising accordingly.² Conflict and violence between protesters and law enforcement are often studied, yet protester-on-protester violence receives little attention. This thesis analyzes a separate crowd behavior paradigm in which research on intergroup behavior has identified successful methodologies for law enforcement crowd management. A comparative analysis of law enforcement methodologies highlights how efforts in the United Kingdom and Europe to address soccer hooliganism can inform policies to benefit American law enforcement agencies in their efforts to address growing political protest violence.³

B. PROBLEM STATEMENT

Violence at political protests is now a real threat in the United States. During the 2016 U.S. presidential election, the national discussion over the competing campaigns of

¹ Carla Herreria, “Right-Wing Portland Rally Declared Riot amid Clashes with Antifa Protesters,” Huffington Post, July 1, 2018, https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/patriot-prayer-portland-riot_us_5b383170e4b0f3c221a17a8f.

² Colin Dwyer, “As U.S. Copes with Charlottesville Violence, Protesters Take to the Streets,” NPR, August 13, 2017, <https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/08/13/543259431/as-u-s-cope-with-charlottesville-violence-protesters-take-to-the-streets>.

³ While the term *football* is more accepted in the United Kingdom and Europe, where football hooliganism was first identified and researched, this thesis instead uses the American term, *soccer*.

Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton exacerbated an already evident political and social divide. In the weeks between the election of President Trump and his inauguration, elements of the national discussion evolved into public protests.⁴ Local communities throughout the United States experienced these protests, some of which turned violent.⁵ In certain communities, the recurrence of protests and counter-protests spawned by the rhetoric of President Trump continue three years after his election. Violence among protesters is now more evident across the country.⁶ Of specific concern are the repeated confrontations between right-wing conservative and anti-fascist groups.⁷ Protest violence has a long tradition in U.S. history. Previous crowd control methodologies have addressed all participating groups as one, thereby creating a dynamic of protester versus law enforcement that differs from today's crowd management challenge. The stated intent of current protest groups opposing one another is to voice their objections publicly, yet the resulting intimidation and, at times, violence between right-wing conservative and anti-fascist protest groups leave city leadership and public safety responders at a loss to solve the liberty-versus-security dilemma and effectively protect the community.⁸

In light of this trend, local governments face the challenge of ensuring both public safety and First Amendment rights in the face of antagonistic, and sometimes violent, protest/counter-protest events. Conflicting protest groups and the public often misunderstand local government efforts to achieve safe, open protest environments and object to the efforts as violations of civil societal norms or outright favoritism of one protest

⁴ Jonathan Landay and Scott Malone, "Violence Flares in Washington during Trump Inauguration," Reuters, January 19, 2017, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-inauguration-protests-idUSKBN1540J7>.

⁵ Niraj Chokshi, "Assaults Increased when Cities Hosted Trump Rallies, Study Finds," *New York Times*, March 16, 2018, <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/16/us/trump-rally-violence.html>.

⁶ Avi Selk, "Political Violence Goes Coast to Coast as Proud Boys and Antifa Activists Clash in New York, Portland," *Washington Post*, October 14, 2018, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2018/10/14/political-violence-goes-coast-coast-proud-boys-antifa-activists-clash-new-york-portland/>.

⁷ Gillian Flaccus, "Violent Protests Again Draw Attention to Portland, Oregon," *Seattle Times*, June 9, 2018, <https://www.seattletimes.com/nation-world/violent-protests-again-draw-attention-to-portland-oregon/>.

⁸ Leah Sottile, "Protests Again Convulse Portland, Ore., as Groups on the Right and Left Face Off," *Washington Post*, August 6, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2018/08/04/protests-again-convulse-portland-ore-as-groups-on-the-right-and-left-face-off/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.68a1c4c2713d.

group over the other. This dilemma places law enforcement in the difficult position of having to ensure civil liberties and public safety while attempting to satisfy opposing crowd groups.

Communities have struggled to implement crowd management tactics that ensure public safety while providing free-speech opportunities for all ideologies. After the 1960s, the roles of protesters and law enforcement in political protests were static, with each side seeing the other as a threat.⁹ These roles changed over the next few decades as the transnational threats of drug trafficking, illegal immigration, and organized crime began to affect local communities.¹⁰ The 1981 Cooperation Act allowed American law enforcement to address these new threats by emulating the U.S. military, thereby developing a more aggressive, paramilitary approach.¹¹ The application of this new approach eventually extended to crowd management events, thus conflating political activism with a security threat.¹² This new paramilitary approach has altered the previous institutionalized law enforcement crowd-control response from decades earlier and created a contentious protest environment where the expression of civil liberties becomes a challenge.

In sum, community civic leaders are caught between abiding by federal law—while working to maintain the safety of the public and protesters—and answering to public scrutiny. Past crowd management methodologies are insufficient for maintaining public safety. Instead, law enforcement should work to understand the individual protest group ideologies and develop legitimacy among all crowd groups to provide safe opportunities for free speech. This thesis examines the challenge of conflicting protest groups—specifically those between right-wing conservative and anti-fascist groups—and applies social identity theory (SIT) analysis to identify ideas for enhanced public safety planning.

⁹ John D. McCarthy and Clark McPhail, “The Institutionalization of Protests in the United States,” in *The Social Movement Society: Contentious Politics for a New Century*, ed. David S. Meyer and Sidney Tarrow (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997), 84–85.

¹⁰ Stephen Hill and Randall Beger, “A Paramilitary Policing Juggernaut,” *Social Justice* 36, no. 1 (2009): 27–28.

¹¹ Hill and Beger, 29.

¹² Hill and Beger, 31.

C. RESEARCH QUESTION

How can social identity theory explain protester-on-protester violence and assist with better public safety planning?

D. RESEARCH DESIGN

Research on protest violence fills volumes. The history of protest violence within the United States is vast enough to consider its nature, issues, and dynamics without even examining its history around the world. Based on historical significance, prior research and discussion centers almost exclusively on the conflict between protesters and law enforcement. But violence between protester groups is a subtler variant of protest violence without significant research. This thesis examines intergroup violence within the soccer hooliganism paradigm, evident in many countries outside the United States, as a proxy for understanding intergroup U.S. protest violence.

Soccer hooliganism, as opposed to other intergroup dynamics, may seem dissimilar to protest violence. A study of gang culture and group dynamics or the conflict inherent in nation-state armies may seem more appropriate. However, neither of these dynamics embody a choice in group identification free of commitment or obligation, which is inherent to those participating in intergroup violence associated with soccer club rivalries. In addition, group identification in gangs or nation-state armies is associated with financial gain for the individual, which is not the case for soccer hooligans. As is the case for participants in violent political protests, soccer fans have neither financial gain nor legal or coerced commitment. For this reason, this thesis examines soccer hooliganism as a proxy for political protests to understand the application of crowd psychology theory to intergroup protest violence.

Although crowd psychology is time-tested research, current theories run counter to historical understandings of crowd behavior. This thesis discusses two specific theories that provide a modern understanding of crowd group behavior. These theories articulate differences in group dynamics that relate to both crowd intention and evolving behaviors. This insight reveals opportunities for law enforcement to apply methodologies that could prevent or minimize the chance of intergroup violence.

The translation of current crowd behavior theory from soccer hooliganism to political protest becomes evident when considering specific events. Comparative analysis allows for the understanding of similarities and differences between events that provide insight for new practical applications. This thesis uses case study analysis across paradigms and crowd psychology theories to establish the relevancy of soccer hooliganism to political protest as well as the applicability of current crowd theories.

E. CHAPTER OVERVIEW

Chapter II provides a review of relevant literature on general theory, covering the subjects of civil society, political protests, and SIT. It explores relevant background information, which leads to a more in-depth discussion in subsequent chapters.

Chapter III examines SIT and crowd management. As soccer hooliganism is the proxy for understanding these concepts, the chapter begins by examining the use of sport to understand society. Soccer hooliganism is then described within the context of general soccer violence. SIT is then outlined within the context of soccer hooliganism, including an examination of analytical markers. The elaborated social identity model (ESIM) is introduced as a mechanism for understanding the evolution of group identity in relation to external influences. The chapter concludes by drawing an analogy between soccer hooliganism and intergroup violence at political protests.

Chapter IV comparatively examines three separate case studies of crowd behavior, the application of law enforcement crowd-control methodologies, and their subsequent outcomes. Specifically, the cases include the 2004 Union of European Football Associations Tournament; the 2007 Free Speech Rally in Portland, Oregon; and the 2017 Unite the Right Rally in Charlottesville, Virginia. These case studies cross paradigms, apply different theories of crowd psychology in their understanding of crowd behavior, and implement different crowd control tactics based on their understandings.

Chapter V concludes this thesis by providing analysis and findings on the use of SIT to understand crowd intergroup dynamics for ensuring public safety. The chapter makes recommendations for the application of SIT and ESIM at crowd events—drawn from the soccer hooliganism paradigm—that could reduce intergroup violence at political protests in the United States.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW

A civil society is a society of civility in the conduct of the members of the society towards each other. Civility enters into conduct between individuals and between individuals towards society. It likewise regulates the relations of collectivities towards each other, the relations between collectivities and the state and the relations of individuals with the state.

—Edward Shils¹³

This literature review analyzes scholarly and public policy works related to crowd psychology, crowd management, and public safety. It examines the academic debates surrounding a civil society's role in a democracy, policing and protest, and finally SIT on crowd psychology and soccer hooliganism.

A. THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN A DEMOCRACY

This body of literature, including the works of prominent scholars like Linz and Stepan as well as Walzer, argues that the civility of society is the hallmark of democracy. Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan have examined the development of the broad definition of democracy in countries transitioning from non-democratic regimes.¹⁴ The authors believe a new democracy reaches democratic consolidation when, among other things, it achieves the constitutional dimension of resolving political conflicts through established norms, at which point resolution outside such norms is unproductive and expensive.¹⁵ Such a consolidated democratic government must provide its citizenry conditions for “the development of a free and lively civil society . . . [and] a rule of law to ensure legal guarantees for citizens’ freedoms and independent associational life.”¹⁶ Linz and Stepan posit that without achieving a level of democratic consolidation where such conditions can be met, societies are not inherently civil, and the opportunity for repressing protest groups

¹³ Edward Shils, “The Virtue of a Civil Society,” in *The Civil Society Reader*, ed. Virginia A. Hodgkinson and Michael W. Foley (Hanover, NH: Tufts University Press, 2003), 292, ProQuest.

¹⁴ Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Community Europe* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996).

¹⁵ Linz and Stepan, 5.

¹⁶ Linz and Stepan, 7.

exists.¹⁷ This observation is an important reminder for local communities that struggle to provide for free-speech opportunities while containing violent protester conflicts.

Theorists disagree about the requirements for a good life, but Michael Walzer supports democratic consolidation, arguing that the formation of small groups of people and their collective organizing efforts toward the good of society creates a civil democracy.¹⁸ The author initiates his discussion by examining four perspectives—from democratic to republican states, from market-centric to nationalistic outlooks—on the question of what setting is best for a good life. After examining answers to this question, Walzer’s work culminates in the idea that “the good life can only be lived in a civil society, the realm of fragmentation and struggle but also of concrete and authentic solidarities.”¹⁹ Walzer posits that a singular focus on any of these four separate perspectives is discredited because of its narrow view: “Civil society is a setting of settings: all are included, none is preferred.”²⁰ In this broader view, where perspectives overlap, he argues that a democratic state and civil society coexist in support of one another.²¹ When narrower perspectives are inflexible with competing beliefs, the civility of democratic society becomes lost.

Lucan Way agrees with Walzer to a point but finds democracy threatened when such small groups emerge without strong national institutions. Similar to Walzer, Way envisions civil society as a “network of voluntary and autonomous organizations and institutions that exist outside the state, market, and family, and which are difficult for state leaders to control or eliminate.”²² Within the context of the 2013–2014 EuroMaidan uprising in Ukraine, Way describes how the strength of this protest effort was the civil society created within it: multiple small groups, working together toward a better protest

¹⁷ Linz and Stepan, 17.

¹⁸ Michael Walzer, “A Better Vision: The Idea of Civil Society,” in *The Civil Society Reader*, ed. Virginia A. Hodgkinson and Michael W. Foley (Hanover, NH: Tufts University Press, 2003), 317, ProQuest.

¹⁹ Walzer, 314.

²⁰ Walzer, 311.

²¹ Walzer, 316–17.

²² Lucan Way, “Civil Society and Democratization,” *Journal of Democracy* 25, no. 3 (2014): 36, <https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2014.0042>.

and ultimately a better Ukraine.²³ The author describes how the EuroMaidan protest was seen not as the collective view of the entire country but as the efforts of specific political and social movements.²⁴ Like Walzer, Way attributes the success of the EuroMaidan protest to small groups, each with its own perspective on a new way forward for the Ukrainian people, together capturing the multifaceted nature of the desired democracy.²⁵ The author asserts that not all protests are successful when small groups unite toward a common goal, citing earlier protests in Ukraine and others in Cameroon, but in the EuroMaidan case, it succeeded.²⁶ Violence attributed to civil societies, such as violent episodes that occurred during the EuroMaidan movement, can undermine a movement's overall intent and vision.²⁷ As Way describes, the idea of civil society both applies around the world toward creating better communities and acts as a cautionary tale to avoid violence for fear of losing that vision. Small protest groups may or may not represent the views of the greater society, but their actions are critical to the viability of their message.

Dorota Pietrzyk examines the idea of civil society within new democracies, specifically in East-Central Europe. Agreeing with Way, Pietrzyk claims that in efforts to establish democracies after totalitarian regimes, East-Central European communities identified the goal of civil society as one that required civic engagement, separate from the state, with the intent of convincing the state of its opinion.²⁸ The author argues that such action ensures an enduring democratic state institution.²⁹ Pietrzyk expands on the concept of civil society, clarifying that not all organized community groups oppose the state or want solely to impose their views; rather, such groups may support the state and its market economy.³⁰ The author suggests that an equitable dynamic between an effective

²³ Way, 37.

²⁴ Way, 37.

²⁵ Way, 38.

²⁶ Way, 38.

²⁷ Way, 42.

²⁸ Dorota I. Pietrzyk, "Democracy or Civil Society?," *Politics* 23, no. 1 (2003): 38–39, <https://doi.org/10.1111%2F1467-9256.00178>.

²⁹ Pietrzyk, 39.

³⁰ Pietrzyk, 40.

government, a functioning market, and a civil society is essential for creating democracies.³¹ Although the democratic history of these countries is still in its infancy, their struggles to attain or retain democracy are stark reminders for the United States during times of political and social discontent.

In contrast to Walzer, Way, and Pietrzyk, Craig Calhoun articulates how civil societies can be the result of nation-states as well as democratic ideals.³² In this context, Calhoun argues that nationalistic feelings are just as important to civil societies as democratic ideals are, except that the former is devoted to the state whereas the latter concerns democratic institutional values.³³ Calhoun acknowledges how popular views see nationalism as opposed to civil societies through narrow-minded attitudes and some instances of evil tendencies.³⁴ The author posits that such nationalism is necessary in certain circumstances for the benefit of society.³⁵ He emphasizes this point by describing how nationalism provides local communities and global partners a method for forming partnerships and allows a nation's communities to commit to supporting public institutions and projects that benefit the whole.³⁶ The author questions the moral virtues of certain nationalist viewpoints, but based on the lack of other realistic alternatives, there is a "need to see the mutual relationship that has tied nationalism to democracy throughout the modern era."³⁷ Calhoun concludes that successful modern democracies must remember their success was a result of historical nationalism.³⁸ Nationalistic protest voices may not be socially acceptable to some, but one must recognize their place in society and allow them an opportunity to speak.

³¹ Pietrzyk, 40.

³² Craig Calhoun, "Nationalism and Cultures of Democracy," *Journal of Public Culture* 19, no. 1 (2007): 151–73, <https://doi.org/10.1215/08992363-2006-028>.

³³ Calhoun, 153.

³⁴ Calhoun, 152.

³⁵ Calhoun, 152.

³⁶ Calhoun, 153.

³⁷ Calhoun, 153.

³⁸ Calhoun, 171.

The theoretical discussion of civil society is often detached from the practice of democracy. Neera Chandhoke examines civil society theory but, like Calhoun, refuses to hold it as an easily attainable democratic ideal.³⁹ The author acknowledges that civil society is necessary in formal democracies, critical to social and political organizations, but only indirectly responsible for demonstrations of such ideals as activism and protest.⁴⁰ Instead, Chandhoke agrees with Linz and Stepan as well as Jean Cohen and Andrew Arato that civil society is one element of society, distinct from the state and its economy.⁴¹ Separate from these two elements, civil society is composed of plurality, privacy, publicity, and legality.⁴² These characteristics, she writes, differentiate civil society from the state and the economy but also establish it as a normative ideal.⁴³ While the theory of civil society might then be an ideal, Chandhoke concludes that the existence of civil society is more problematic and difficult.⁴⁴ The democratic ideal of protest and free speech are inherent to American culture, but providing opportunities for each can be challenging.

In summary, this body of literature helps define the parameters within which a democratic civil society can exist and for what purpose. Conversely, the literature also alludes to how civil society can be lost.

B. FREE SPEECH AND POLICING

A separate body of literature argues that protests in the United States are the application of free speech and their protection is the responsibility of local police forces. After the Revolutionary War, the authors of the U.S. Constitution demonstrated the importance of public dissent by ensuring this right as the First Amendment in the Bill of Rights:

³⁹ Neera Chandhoke, “The ‘Civil’ and the ‘Political’ in Civil Society: The Case of India,” in *Civil Society in Democratization*, ed. Peter Burnell and Peter Calvert (London: Routledge, 2004), 143–66, ProQuest.

⁴⁰ Chandhoke, 162.

⁴¹ Chandhoke, 146.

⁴² Chandhoke, 146.

⁴³ Chandhoke, 147.

⁴⁴ Chandhoke, 147.

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.⁴⁵

The U.S. government considers the protection of this constitutional right to be, in part, the responsibility of local law enforcement.⁴⁶ Local governments, such as the city of Portland, Oregon, agree by including a commitment to support the U.S Constitution as part of the oath of office taken by their police officers.⁴⁷

Police officers swear to protect the constitutional rights of their communities. Yet Jerome H. Skolnick suggests this might not be the best method. He notes that adhering to the protection of constitutional rights is not intrinsic to law enforcement practices.⁴⁸ Skolnick further stresses that the evolution of policing and police reform in the United States has shifted the approach of law enforcement from outright personally abusive tactics to those more aligned with the rule of law yet still subversive in their violation of a person's constitutional rights.⁴⁹ Although police reform continues to recruit those who will abide by the rule of law as a means of meeting the expectation of offering constitutional protections to local communities, Skolnick argues that the dichotomy between operational policies and their legality makes law enforcement incapable of fulfilling the ideal of protecting the citizens' constitutional rights.⁵⁰ While local law enforcement continues to work toward such protections, citizens expect their rights to be upheld, as described by the Constitution, when they choose to demonstrate these rights through protest.

⁴⁵ U.S. Const. amend. I.

⁴⁶ President's Task Force on 21st Century Policing, *Final Report of the President's Task Force on 21st Century Policing* (Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, 2015), https://cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/taskforce/taskforce_finalreport.pdf.

⁴⁷ Portland, OR, Code ch. 3.74, § 010, Form of Oath for Other Officer or Employee (2018), <https://www.portlandoregon.gov/citycode/article/14962>.

⁴⁸ Jerome H. Skolnick, *Justice without Trial: Law Enforcement in Democratic Society*, 4th ed. (New Orleans: Quid Pro Books, 2011).

⁴⁹ Skolnick, 28–29.

⁵⁰ Skolnick, 30.

Other literature discusses the effects of public protests and police responses on the democratic process. Robin Lipp, for one, examines the New York Police Department (NYPD) as a case study for protest management and public safety, noting the largest American city “is . . . of symbolic importance for protesters . . . and a city whose policy choices bear on the overall climate for dissent in the United States.”⁵¹ The author finds public protest a benefit to and of democracy. As an equal opportunity to speak out, public protest grants a means of discovering the democratic process and an opportunity that can spur others in a call to action.⁵² In the context of historical protest policing, Lipp highlights how the democratic and cultural value of protests to society has been lost in police department–led decision making.⁵³ The author examines two New York City protest events and the NYPD’s command-and-control tactics to enforce a “zero tolerance” approach to maintaining order.⁵⁴ NYPD crowd management tactics espoused at the time targeted minor crimes, such as property damage, to prevent an escalation to more unruly behavior, a policy known as the “broken windows” approach.⁵⁵ While acknowledging the potential harm of protests to host communities, Lipp finds that overly restrictive police efforts to maintain control and ensure public safety may explicitly contradict the notion of democracy.⁵⁶ The legal precedent and ability to espouse an opinion in public can be easily undercut by crowd control tactics implemented to safeguard this right.

Several scholars believe the ongoing militarization of police forces signifies an end to civil society. Stephen Hill and Randall Beger echo Lipp’s view by focusing on how the militarization of police forces fails to promote a democratic society.⁵⁷ The authors contend this process of militarization violates the norms of democratic policing that prioritize the

⁵¹ Robin Lipp, “Protest Policing in New York City: Balancing Safety and Expression,” *Harvard Law & Policy Review* 9 (2015): 276, http://harvardlpr.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/9-1_Lipp.pdf.

⁵² Lipp, 289–90.

⁵³ Lipp, 289.

⁵⁴ Lipp, 289.

⁵⁵ George L. Kelling and James Q. Wilson, “Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood Safety,” *Atlantic*, March 1982, <https://perma.cc/NJ27-FSRX>.

⁵⁶ Lipp, “Protest Policing in New York,” 293.

⁵⁷ Hill and Beger, “A Paramilitary Policing Juggernaut,” 31.

needs of citizens, hold police accountable to the law, and expect transparent action.⁵⁸ Additionally, Hill and Beger cite how the militarization of policing violates the norm of human rights, especially free speech and the right to protest, which corresponds with Lipp's ideas. An analysis of the European Gendarmerie Force—a paramilitary police force deployed to manage crises yet granted immunity from criminal prosecution for tactics used in the completion of its mission—certainly validates the scholars' concerns.⁵⁹ Achieving full police militarization may be the tipping point at which all expected norms of democratic policing are lost.

Another body of literature analyzes how the police response to public protests has evolved while public protests have virtually remained unchanged.⁶⁰ Regarding this connection, Charlotte Guerra examines a shift in policing, from safeguarding civil liberties to developing warrior mentality, in the shadow of the 1999 World Trade Organization (WTO) Conference in Seattle, Washington.⁶¹ Guerra indicates that the Seattle Police Department's response to demonstrations surrounding the WTO Conference escalated from crowd control and management to special weapons and tactics raids, city emergency orders, and the deployment of the National Guard in response to 40,000 protesters.⁶² The author argues that when a police response displays a posture of confrontation with the protesters, it reflects the department's intent to curtail free speech rather than protect the ability to speak freely.⁶³ The author emphasizes protests are a “right of the masses to speak in a public format to express their dissatisfaction[,] . . . a critical liberty that requires safeguarding. It is a staple of our nation's political process, and a right rooted in the very

⁵⁸ Hill and Beger, 31.

⁵⁹ Hill and Beger, 33–34.

⁶⁰ Charlotte Guerra, “Living under the Boot: Militarization and Peaceful Protest,” *Seattle Journal for Social Justice* 14, no. 2 (2016): 521–22, <https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1818&context=sjsj>.

⁶¹ Guerra.

⁶² Guerra, 529–30.

⁶³ Guerra, 531.

start of our nation.”⁶⁴ Guerra further warns that protests encumbered by restrictions or opposition will persist and evolve until their voices are heard.⁶⁵

The recent persistence and evolution of politically oriented protests in the United States have elevated the concerns of public safety agencies, thereby enhancing their response to maintain public safety. Hill and Beger agree with Guerra, citing the American Civil Liberties Union report documenting the Seattle Police Department’s tactics during the 1999 WTO protests that systematically stopped all organized protests.⁶⁶ Such team tactics, including those that violate search and seizure rights, are antithetical to civil society, contend the authors, and far exceed any reasonable norm for ensuring public safety and protecting free speech during protests.⁶⁷ Local governments and their law enforcement officers should be aware of how aggressive police crowd control tactics can both inflame crowd actions and signal problems within the implicit norms of civil society.

Finally, an examination of protests is not complete without looking at the protesters. Hannah Arendt has articulated ideas of disobedience in civil society, separating conscientious objectors from civil protesters.⁶⁸ The author finds the latter can only exist as a member of a larger group while the former can object as individuals, separate from others.⁶⁹ The objection by a group warrants the term “civil disobedience,” finds Arendt, as opposed to a single person ignoring a traffic law, for example, which rarely sends a message to society.⁷⁰ The author expands on this idea:

⁶⁴ Guerra, 576.

⁶⁵ Guerra, 575.

⁶⁶ Hill and Beger, “A Paramilitary Policing Juggernaut,” 32.

⁶⁷ Hill and Beger, 32.

⁶⁸ Hannah Arendt, *Crises of the Republic* (New York: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1972), 56, <http://blogs.law.columbia.edu/uprising1313/files/2017/10/Arendt-Disobedience.pdf>.

⁶⁹ Arendt, 55.

⁷⁰ Arendt, 55.

Civil disobedience arises when a significant number of citizens have become convinced either that the normal channels of change no longer function, and grievances will not be heard or acted upon, or that . . . the government is about to change and has embarked upon . . . modes of action whose legality and constitutionality are open to grave doubt.⁷¹

Arendt argues such disobedience is not criminal, as it occurs in the open and not in a clandestine manner, nor does it take exception for itself.⁷² She finds the use of violence a distinguishing factor between a civil disobedient and a rebel, as the former recognizes the authority of a government and its laws.⁷³ Therefore, discrediting or defining legal protest events as acts of civil disobedience merely on the basis of being criminal or rebellious fails to acknowledge the moral distinction between the two.

In sum, this section has highlighted how civil disobedience and the shift toward aggressive protest management tactics by police can infringe on the democratic norms of civil society. The goal of ensuring public safety at protests extends not only to the public but also to officer safety, which Guerra and Lipp acknowledge is part of law enforcement's reasoning in the shift to more aggressive police tactics. However, viable alternative methods do exist that achieve the safety of both the public and law enforcement by ensuring a civil society.

C. CROWD PSYCHOLOGY AND SOCCER HOOLIGANISM

This body of literature examines the psychology of crowd formation and action. Gustave Le Bon's seminal work on crowd psychology posits that an organized group of people loses individuality in favor of a collective consciousness.⁷⁴ Le Bon likens a mass of people to a single living form, an amalgamation of people like cells in the body with collective characteristics that display the psychological law of mental unity.⁷⁵ The author cites three causes of organized crowd characteristics. First, an individual joining a crowd

⁷¹ Arendt, 74.

⁷² Arendt, 75.

⁷³ Arendt, 77.

⁷⁴ Gustave Le Bon, *The Crowd*, 11th ed. (New York: Viking Press, 1960), 24.

⁷⁵ Le Bon, 26.

feels a sense of power that would otherwise be restrained when on one's own.⁷⁶ Second, the feeling and behavior of a crowd are contagious to the extent that the individual sacrifices his singular interest for the joint interest.⁷⁷ And third, crowd characteristics can be quite different from those of the individuals who make up the group.⁷⁸ Le Bon describes these three forming characteristics to emphasize the individual who assimilates into a crowd. Yet, while Le Bon finds the act of joining a crowd diminishes an individual, he notes the collective crowd may act better or worse than its individuals, depending on its influences.⁷⁹ This classic work in group identity provides a basis for later theories of crowd psychology.

While identity theories explain how crowd groups behave, SIT provides a specific understanding of group identity, which helps achieve public safety. Michael Hogg, Deborah Terry, and Katherine White compare two psychological theories applicable to the understanding of crowd behavior—identity theory and SIT—both of which examine the relationship between the individual self and society.⁸⁰ Identity theory, explain the authors, describes how society influences one's behaviors while SIT instead finds group dynamics are the influencing factor.⁸¹ Despite both theories offering insight into how individuals define themselves, the authors pinpoint significant differences.⁸² Identity theory focuses on an individual's roles and corresponding behaviors within society whereas SIT focuses on the group dynamic and an individual's behaviors within the groups.⁸³ The authors cite recent developments in self-categorization that advance SIT beyond identity theory in

⁷⁶ Le Bon, 30.

⁷⁷ Le Bon, 30.

⁷⁸ Le Bon, 30.

⁷⁹ Le Bon, 33.

⁸⁰ Michael A. Hogg, Deborah J. Terry, and Katherine M. White, "A Tale of Two Theories: A Critical Comparison of Identity Theory with Social Identity Theory," *Social Psychology Quarterly* 58, no. 4 (1995): 265, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2787127>.

⁸¹ Hogg, Terry, and White, 256, 259.

⁸² Hogg, Terry, and White, 255.

⁸³ Hogg, Terry, and White, 266.

explaining how intergroup development can define the self.⁸⁴ Finally, according to Hogg, Terry, and White, the ideas of an individual in society, as described by identity theory, are different from his membership in a group, as articulated by SIT.⁸⁵ Analysis of crowd behavior within the context of ensuring public safety could benefit from the context provided by SIT.

SIT could offer a significant benefit to law enforcement and their goal of public safety while managing crowd events. Building on work by Henri Tajfel and John Turner, Stephen Reicher advanced SIT when describing group behavior in his examination of the precipitating events of the 1980 St. Paul's Riot in Bristol, England.⁸⁶ Reicher found Le Bon's ideas lacking consideration of social influences in group behaviors.⁸⁷ Instead, Reicher categorized the geographic identity, group relation to local law enforcement, and questions of group legitimacy as social factors that dictated the actions of the crowd participants before the violence.⁸⁸ Reicher's message—that “not only is crowd behaviour moulded by social identity but conversely, crowd behaviour may mould social identity” (original spelling)—altered the understanding and implications of crowd behavior.⁸⁹ This change in perspective is still not understood completely by law enforcement nor totally evident in crowd management methodologies.

Stephen Reicher further developed his ideas of SIT by applying the theory to crowd control methodologies used by law enforcement. In accordance with studies by Clifford Stott and John Drury et al., Reicher et al. posit that a singular perspective on crowd behavior can mislead management efforts while also miss an opportunity to advance new

⁸⁴ Self-categorization theory, as first described by John Turner in 1985, describes the process whereby an individual identifies with ingroups and toward outgroups as well as the effects on individual behaviors. Hogg, Terry, and White, “A Tale of Two Theories,” 266.

⁸⁵ Hogg, Terry, and White, 266.

⁸⁶ Stephen D. Reicher, “The St. Pauls' Riot: An Explanation of the Limits of Crowd Action in Terms of a Social Identity Model,” *European Journal of Social Psychology* 14, no. 1 (January 1984): 1–21, <https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.2420140102>.

⁸⁷ Reicher, 2.

⁸⁸ Reicher, 18.

⁸⁹ Reicher, 19.

approaches for interacting with the crowd in a manner that supports civil rights.⁹⁰ Instead, Reicher et al. suggest that law enforcement tasked with providing safety and security measures for crowd events work to understand the different group identities that constitute the collective crowd to provide equal priority to all crowd groups.⁹¹ The authors argue that the classical approach to crowd psychology overlooks the dynamics of different groups within a crowd and limits law enforcement's understanding and ability to respond proactively.⁹² Observing a crowd within the SIT paradigm allows for an understanding that multiple psychological groups can exist within a crowd and has great practicality for maintaining order, the authors write.⁹³ By applying SIT to crowd management, Reicher et al. find three positive effects: (1) the ability to understand and interact with specific crowd groups can promote trust between law enforcement and the crowd; (2) the response to law enforcement by the crowd can be directly attributed to the ability of law enforcement to understand and interact with specific agitators within a crowd; and (3) different crowd groups can police themselves to maintain order, thereby aiding police in maintaining order and allowing for greater event legitimacy.⁹⁴ The benefits of SIT have real-world application for law enforcement crowd-management tactics.

Research finds SIT valid beyond its application at crowd events. Anders Strindberg and Mats Wärn articulate the significance of SIT and its application to understanding intergroup dynamics within global terrorist groups.⁹⁵ Although an analogy between terrorists and protesters might be overblown for some, the authors stress their accompanying framework is an analysis of group identity and intergroup dynamics to

⁹⁰ Stephen Reicher et al., "An Integrated Approach to Crowd Psychology and Public Order Policing," *Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management* 27, no. 4 (December 2004): 558, <https://doi.org/10.1108/13639510410566271>.

⁹¹ Reicher et al., 558.

⁹² Gustave Le Bon's classical theories on crowd psychology espoused in his book *The Crowd* consider a crowd to be one mindless group, incapable of reason or judgement. Reicher et al., "Crowd Psychology and Public Order Policing," 559.

⁹³ Reicher et al., 562.

⁹⁴ Reicher et al., 563.

⁹⁵ Anders Strindberg and Mats Wärn, *Islamism: Religion, Radicalization, and Resistance* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2011), 64.

understand conflict.⁹⁶ Brannan, Esler, and Strindberg build on these ideas, advocating for SIT because understanding an individual's perspective in group relations "allows the researcher to account for her or his own hermeneutic biases as well as those of the research subject."⁹⁷ Understanding an individual's perspective in relation to group dynamics without bias is crucial for accurate social analysis, argue the authors.⁹⁸ Schwartz, Dunkel, and Waterman concur with the previous authors and build on the argument to include how intergroup dynamics lead ingroups to draw such strict lines that perceived inferiority differences "dehumanize" the outgroup.⁹⁹ The application of SIT is not limited to crowd psychology; scholars have found it applicable in other disciplines.

Scholars argue that the natural tendency toward social categorization among multiple groups has both positive and negative effects. Fathali M. Moghaddam discusses how the social categorization of individuals within a group is a predisposition of humans and evident from childhood to adulthood.¹⁰⁰ The author stresses the importance of considering social stimuli in group identification as a means of understanding the vast number of influences that individuals encounter.¹⁰¹ Because of these influences, as Moghaddam discusses, individuals may self-categorize with a number of groups, based on group and cultural factors.¹⁰² The author cites Marilynn Brewer in understanding how multiple group identities are a means of reducing group bias.¹⁰³ The fact that individuals may identify with several groups is relevant to changing crowd group affiliations and the evolution of group actions.

⁹⁶ Strindberg and Wörn, 65.

⁹⁷ David W. Brannan, Philip F. Esler, and N. T. Anders Strindberg, "Talking to 'Terrorists': Towards an Independent Analytical Framework for the Study of Violent Substate Activism," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 24, no. 1 (2001): 5, <https://doi.org/10.1080/105761001118602>.

⁹⁸ Brannan, Esler, and Anders Strindberg, 5.

⁹⁹ Seth J. Schwartz, Curtis S. Dunkel, and Alan S. Waterman, "Terrorism: An Identity Theory Perspective," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 32, no. 6 (2009): 542, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10576100902888453>.

¹⁰⁰ Fathali M. Moghaddam, *Multiculturalism and Intergroup Relations: Psychological Implications for Democracy in Global Context* (Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 2008), 31.

¹⁰¹ Moghaddam, 32.

¹⁰² Moghaddam, 32.

¹⁰³ Moghaddam, 32.

A group's identity can change when it is challenged by other groups that are viewed as dominant. Jim Berger affirms that social identity provides insight into adversarial groups but focuses solely on the ingroup "legitimacy" that defines how a "collective identity group may rightfully be defined, maintained, and/or protected."¹⁰⁴ Berger emphasizes the possibility of instability in groups that align their social identities with ideas of nation, race, or religion as their identity is closely tied with legitimacy.¹⁰⁵ A cultural understanding rooted in SIT can provide more accurate insight into group dynamics, which is not achievable with more subjective methodologies.

Research on SIT has proven insightful within the soccer hooliganism paradigm. Clifford Stott and Geoff Pearson find that despite violence being associated with soccer since its inception, the term "soccer hooligan" is a media creation, without a specific definition, describing violence associated with the game since the 1960s.¹⁰⁶ The authors acknowledge previous research into soccer hooliganism in the United Kingdom considered social influences but in a limited way, which prevented a full grasp of the social issues that influenced group behavior.¹⁰⁷ Stott built on Reicher's explanation of crowd behavior to understand the evolution of protest crowd behavior to violent actions.¹⁰⁸ Stott and Pearson articulate the validity of applying SIT to describe the evolution of soccer hooliganism as a crowd behavior, akin to other violent crowd events but not an isolated issue of social violence.¹⁰⁹ Stott and Pearson's work sheds light on how social influences explain crowd violence, not only within the soccer hooliganism paradigm but also in all crowds presenting intergroup violence.

¹⁰⁴ Jim Berger, *Extremist Construction of Identity: How Escalating Demands for Legitimacy Shape and Define In-Group and Out-Group Dynamics* (The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2017), 3–4, <https://icct.nl/publication/extremist-construction-of-identity-how-escalating-demands-for-legitimacy-shape-and-define-in-group-and-out-group-dynamics/>.

¹⁰⁵ Berger, 4.

¹⁰⁶ Clifford Stott and Geoff Pearson, *Football Hooliganism: Policing the War on the English Disease* (London: Pennant Books, 2007), 14–15.

¹⁰⁷ Stott and Pearson, 48.

¹⁰⁸ Clifford Stott and John Drury, "Crowds, Context and Identity: Dynamic Categorization Processes in the 'Poll Tax Riot,'" *Human Relations* 53, no. 2 (2000): 247–73, <https://doi.org/10.1177/a010563>.

¹⁰⁹ Stott and Pearson, *Football Hooliganism*, 328.

The point at which crowd violence may occur is important for law enforcement in ensuring public safety. Stott and Reicher expand the understanding of crowd conflict through SIT analysis of soccer hooliganism violence, positing that outgroup violence is more likely to result from ingroup actions than from a tendency toward violence by the outgroup.¹¹⁰ In this sense, Stott and Reicher align with Hill, Beger, and Guerra, citing how police tactics for crowd control can incite violence from a crowd that sees its legitimate rights being infringed upon.¹¹¹ The authors articulate this idea in light of the perception of aggressive police tactics as standard and indiscriminate; the resulting outgroup response may be rooted in a desire for self-protection and as a means of limiting the use of violence by the ingroup.¹¹² Although coinciding with Stott and Reicher's analysis, Anthony King arrived at his conclusions differently.¹¹³ The author concludes that a lack of objective norms and rules predispose ingroup/outgroup dynamics to violence through a form of Waddington's flashpoint model.¹¹⁴ Considering historical context—the psychological progression of crowds from calm to united and inflamed—King cites Waddington's theory in his opinion that violence related to soccer groups is not inevitable but based on group dynamics that develop in the moment.¹¹⁵ Although both sets of authors arrive at similar conclusions albeit different methods, King articulates their convergence and highlights the importance of ignoring preconceived assumptions or expectations about crowd violence in favor of group analysis.¹¹⁶ Recognizing that crowds may or may not react violently is crucial for law enforcement in planning for and implementing crowd control tactics.

¹¹⁰ Clifford Stott and Stephen Reicher, "How Conflict Escalates: The Inter-Group Dynamics of Collective Football Crowd 'Violence,'" *Sociology* 32, no. 2 (May 1998): 371, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0038038598032002007>.

¹¹¹ Stott and Reicher, 371.

¹¹² Stott and Reicher, 371–72.

¹¹³ Anthony King, "Football Hooliganism and the Practical Paradigm," *Sociology of Sport Journal* 16, no. 3 (1999): 273, <https://doi.org/10.1123/ssj.16.3.269>.

¹¹⁴ As discussed in King, Waddington et al. describe a crowd's response to police management as the "flashpoint theory." King, "Football Hooliganism," 272.

¹¹⁵ King, 270.

¹¹⁶ King, 273.

While acknowledging the relevance of SIT to crowd behavior, David Novelli et al. found that crowdedness mediates the theory in public gatherings where positive motivations exist between like-minded people.¹¹⁷ The authors studied crowd populations at two events where “personal space” was encroached upon, finding the loss of personal space at an event with positive connotations did not always result in negative emotions.¹¹⁸ Similar to Hogg, Terry, and White, Novelli et al. found significance in the theory of self-categorization when viewing crowd behavior through an SIT lens.¹¹⁹ Their analysis of a 2007 demonstration in central London shows a correlation between the importance of proximity to the demonstration’s center, as a function of participants’ relationship with the ingroup, and willingness to forego personal space, further confirming the relevance of self-categorization.¹²⁰ One’s ingroup relation to the crowd and the event can mitigate potential negative emotions related to crowdedness due to an individual’s ability to associate with different groups, assert the authors.¹²¹ This research relates to local efforts to develop public safety plans and manage crowd events where positive emotions and high attendance can create dense populations.

John Drury and Stephen Reicher further elaborated on the variability of group identity when subjected to outside influence. A crowd of multiple, separate outgroups may merge identities into one collective identity when ingroup influences are collectively viewed as illegitimate.¹²² The authors identified five implications of ESIM. First, the authors find empowerment a component of group actions.¹²³ Second, ESIM shapes

¹¹⁷ David Novelli et al., “Crowdedness Mediates the Effect of Social Identification on Positive Emotion in a Crowd: A Survey of Two Crowd Events,” *PLoS ONE* 8, no. 11 (November 2013), <http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0078983>.

¹¹⁸ Novelli et al.

¹¹⁹ Novelli et al.

¹²⁰ Novelli et al.

¹²¹ Novelli et al.

¹²² John Drury and Steve Reicher, “The Intergroup Dynamics of Collective Empowerment: Substantiating the Social Identity Model of Crowd Behavior,” *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations* 2, no. 4 (1999): 384, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1368430299024005>.

¹²³ Drury and Reicher, 384.

outgroup empowerment based on the influence of the ingroup.¹²⁴ Third, the authors find a challenge to ingroup power by the outgroup, based on its willingness to commit illegitimate actions.¹²⁵ Fourth, this willingness is shaped by ingroup actions collectively seen as illegitimate by the outgroup.¹²⁶ And finally, the ingroup response should be relative to group identity.¹²⁷ This elaboration offers insight into crowd actions, which law enforcement may use to project legitimacy to avoid crowd violence.

D. CONCLUSION

In sum, SIT is applicable and practical for understanding crowd behaviors. This understanding can be informative for law enforcement pre-event analysis, event operations, and long-term outreach and relationship building between ingroup and outgroup protesters prone to violence.

¹²⁴ Drury and Reicher, 384.

¹²⁵ Drury and Reicher, 384.

¹²⁶ Drury and Reicher, 384.

¹²⁷ Drury and Reicher, 384.

III. HOW SOCCER HOOLIGANISM INFORMS PROTEST VIOLENCE

There were people being carried away on stretchers, fans on the edge of the pitch and players constantly looking up at their families because billiard balls were being thrown at the directors' box," he says. "I can't tell you much about the football, because there was so much else going on. It was completely out of control.

—David Pleat, Luton Town F.C. Manager¹²⁸

This chapter examines crowd psychology and the theories of SIT and ESIM as a means for understanding intergroup violence. Crowd violence is most often studied within the adversarial paradigm between protesters and law enforcement. Protester-on-protester violence is less understood, and a new paradigm must be found to deepen an understanding of the dynamics involved. First, soccer hooliganism, a well-researched paradigm for understanding intergroup dynamics and violence, is defined. Second, the relevance of SIT and ESIM to soccer hooliganism is discussed. Finally, this chapter concludes with the correlation between soccer hooliganism and protester-on-protester violence.

A. SOCCER-RELATED VIOLENCE AND HOOLIGANISM

The analogy of life to sport has helped explain and inform societies for centuries. The popular myth of the Olympic Games' marathon origin depicts the distance endured by Pheidippides to communicate victory to Athens.¹²⁹ Battles are often the context used to describe opponents. Succeeding against the odds is a narrative used to describe scoring in a competitive game against an opponent. Admirable sports performances provide leadership examples and principles, and the strong ties between sport and cultures both inform and are informed by one another.

¹²⁸ Sean Ingle, "Luton Town v. Millwall 1985: The Night Football Died a Slow Death," *Guardian*, February 15, 2013, <https://www.theguardian.com/football/blog/2013/feb/15/luton-millwall-1985-fa-cup>.

¹²⁹ John A. Lucas, "A History of the Marathon Race—490 B.C. to 1975," *Journal of Sport History* 3, no. 2 (1976): 121–22, <https://digital.la84.org/digital/collection/p17103coll10/id/64/rec/3>.

Soccer hooliganism and protest violence seem odd bedfellows at first glance. What does the enthusiasm for a sport, especially one typically thought of as peripheral to the American sporting landscape, have to do with the seriousness of impassioned protest and the danger of interpersonal violence? The answer to this question begins with a brief examination of soccer-related violence and hooliganism.

Distinguishing the violence associated with the sport of soccer is important. Ramon Spaaij articulates the forms of soccer-related violence in his book on soccer hooliganism. Player violence on the playing field and spectator violence off the playing field are distinct yet intertwined.¹³⁰ The critical difference is between spectator violence that is triggered by violence on the playing field and spectator violence that is caused by spectators off the playing field.¹³¹ Player violence related to the competitiveness of the game may occur between players before, during, or after play.¹³² Player violence may also incite spectator violence off the playing field.¹³³ However, violence between fan groups associated with organized soccer clubs off the playing field has been the hallmark of soccer hooliganism dating back to the 1970s in the United Kingdom.¹³⁴ Despite different genres of violence associated with the sport of soccer, fan group violence is directly associated with soccer hooliganism.

For populations outside the United States, the term *hooliganism* related to soccer describes a particular phenomenon familiar to those populations where soccer is a predominant sport. Clifford Stott—a professor of social psychology who studies crowd psychology and soccer hooliganism extensively—notes that the phenomenon, often

¹³⁰ Ramón Spaaij, *Understanding Football Hooliganism: A Comparison of Six Western European Football Clubs* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2006), 10.

¹³¹ Spaaij, 10.

¹³² Stanley Kay, “MLS Playoffs 2017: Toronto FC, New York Red Bulls Brawl,” *Sports Illustrated*, November 5, 2017, <https://www.si.com/soccer/2017/11/05/toronto-new-york-red-bulls-mls-playoffs-brawl-video-jozy-altidore-sacha-kljestan>.

¹³³ “Football Fight Sparks 36 Red Cards,” *Telegraph*, March 4, 2011, <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newsttopics/howaboutthat/8361547/Football-fight-sparks-36-red-cards.html>.

¹³⁴ Jamie Jackson, “The Hooligan Problem and Football Violence That Just Won’t Go Away,” *Guardian*, August 22, 2010, <https://www.theguardian.com/football/2010/aug/22/football-violence-hooligans>.

described as the “English disease,” is a media creation that lacks a legal definition.¹³⁵ Spaaij provides the most precise definition on the subject: “the competitive violence of socially organized fan groups in [soccer], principally directed against the opposing fan groups.”¹³⁶ Fans who identify with supporter groups predisposed to violence correspond with Spaaij’s definition and self-categorize as hooligans, as opposed to organized non-violent fans who support their teams for competition and identity.¹³⁷

The seriousness of soccer hooliganism in the United Kingdom was evident both in the extent of the violence over the years and the research devoted to the issue. Rioting, looting, and assaults en route to, during, and around matches became commonplace. Opposing supporters infiltrated reserved stadium areas with the intent to assault and racially abuse minority soccer players and fans. Over the 10 years that the British Home Office recorded soccer-related arrests, annual arrests increased from 3,752 to 6,106 across the top four divisions.¹³⁸ A 1985 clash between the Millwall Football Club’s Bushwacker hooligans and the Luton Town Football Club’s Men in Gear hooligans left 47 people injured and led to a new supporter membership plan, as well as temporary bans for visiting fans.¹³⁹ Eventually, the extent of the soccer hooligan problem in the United Kingdom led Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher to form a “war cabinet” on the issue in the mid-1980s.¹⁴⁰ As a result, the study of soccer hooliganism and crowd psychology blossomed to an extent later criticized by some as “over researched and ‘overpopulated,’” writes Spaaij.¹⁴¹

¹³⁵ Stott and Pearson, *Football Hooliganism*, 15.

¹³⁶ Spaaij, *Understanding Football Hooliganism*, 11.

¹³⁷ Stephen Reicher, “‘The Battle of Westminster’: Developing the Social Identity Model of Crowd Behavior in Order to Explain the Initiation and Development of Collective Conflict,” *European Journal of Social Psychology* 26 (1996): 16, <http://people.wku.edu/douglas.smith/Reicher.pdf>.

¹³⁸ David Blunt, “Football-Related Arrests Statistics, England and Wales, 1984 to 1985 Season to 1999 to 2000 Season,” Home Office, November 23, 2017, <https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/football-related-arrests-statistics-england-and-wales-1984-to-1985-through-to-1999-to-2000>.

¹³⁹ Ingle, “The Night Football Died.”

¹⁴⁰ Dominic Harris, “Thatcher Government Set Up War Cabinet to Deal with Football Fans,” *Independent*, February 19, 2016, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/margaret-thatchers-government-thought-football-fans-so-violent-she-set-up-a-war-cabinet-a6883226.html>.

¹⁴¹ Spaaij, *Understanding Football Hooliganism*, 3.

Numerous, varied, and often conflicting opinions about the subject constitute Spaaij's argument for the necessity of continued research.¹⁴²

While termed the English disease, soccer hooliganism is also a problem for other countries, as reporting and research indicate. The diffusion of soccer hooliganism to European countries is partly related to the travel of English fans to games around Europe and instances of English soccer hooligan violence at soccer matches.¹⁴³ A seminal event in Brussels, Belgium, occurred in 1985 when 39 people died and 500 people were injured after being crushed against a wall because a supporter group for the Liverpool Football Club, an English team, breached police containment lines and charged an Italian Juventus Football Club supporter group.¹⁴⁴ Known as the Heysel disaster, this tragedy prompted more significant research into soccer hooliganism and the development of methods for addressing such intergroup violence.

Soccer hooliganism is endemic to soccer supporter groups outside the United Kingdom as well. German sports culture has its own soccer hooliganism, such as the Northside and Frontline hooligan groups associated with Borussia Dortmund.¹⁴⁵ Violence perpetrated by German soccer supporter groups arises not only between rival domestic and international teams but also between groups supporting the same team.¹⁴⁶ According to Italy's Parliamentary Antimafia Commission, Italian soccer hooligans, known as *ultras*, operate like the Mafia—they care little for the game but aim to defend their group pride,

¹⁴² Spaaij, 4.

¹⁴³ Rohan Pathak, "5 Times European Football Fans Turned Hooligans," *Quint*, July 2, 2017, <https://www.thequint.com/sports/2016/06/22/5-times-football-fans-turned-hooligans-world-cup-98-uefa-cup-74-arsenal-liverpool-france-england>.

¹⁴⁴ Robert Chalmers, "Remembering the Heysel Stadium Disaster," *GQ* (UK), May 29, 2015, <https://www.gq-magazine.co.uk/article/heysel-stadium-disaster-30-anniversary>.

¹⁴⁵ "Rätselraten um Fan-Randale [Guesswork about Fan-Rampage,]" *Westdeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, December 21, 2009, <https://www.waz.de/staedte/dortmund/raetselraten-um-fan-randale-id2296418.html>.

¹⁴⁶ "Fear on the Yellow Wall: Borussia Dortmund Ultras Threatened by Right-Wing Hooligans," *Deutsche Welle*, November 11, 2018, <https://www.dw.com/en/fear-on-the-yellow-wall-borussia-dortmund-ultras-threatened-by-right-wing-hooligans/a-46364501>.

their team's home area, and engage in violence.¹⁴⁷ In Argentina, research has identified intergroup violence among its soccer fans as far back as 1932.¹⁴⁸ Argentinian rivalries and violence continue to this day, as demonstrated by the confrontation between the Boca Juniors and River Plate supporter groups at the 2018 Copa Libertadores Finals in Buenos Aires.¹⁴⁹ Additionally, Israel has struggled with La Familia's violent anti-Muslim support of Beitar Jerusalem, an Israeli Premier League team.¹⁵⁰ These examples of violence around the world all align with Spaaij's definition of soccer hooliganism, demonstrating the issue as a global one, extending beyond the United Kingdom.

B. USING SOCIAL IDENTITY THEORY TO UNDERSTAND SOCCER HOOLIGANISM

The study of soccer hooliganism helps to uncover intergroup dynamics. The changing relationships between groups are rooted in the reasoning behind an individual's choice to associate with a group. In the context of crowd psychology, a duality of analysis has evolved between understanding a crowd either as one mass or as multiple groups. Although this thesis advocates the latter, the former remains in practice within law enforcement and affects crowd management methodologies.

1. Crowd Psychology

As discussed in Chapter II, crowd management methodologies originated with Le Bon's late nineteenth-century social psychology theory that a crowd is one mass, without conscious personality, susceptible to suggestion or influence.¹⁵¹ The concept of crowd intellectual inferiority, advocated by Le Bon, propagates an idea that crowds are easily

¹⁴⁷ Tobias Jones, "Beyond the Violence, the Shocking Power the Ultras Wield Over Italian Football," *Guardian*, April 29, 2018, <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/apr/29/beyond-the-violence-shocking-power-ultras-wield-over-italian-football>.

¹⁴⁸ Vic Duke and Liz Crolley, "Football Spectator Behaviour in Argentina: A Case of Separate Evolution," *Sociological Review* 44, no. 2 (1996): 275, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-954X.1996.tb00425.x>.

¹⁴⁹ Mike Meehall Wood, "Why the Copa Libertadores Riot Goes Much Further Than Just River and Boca," *Forbes*, November 27, 2018, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/mikemeehallwood/2018/11/27/why-the-copa-libertadores-riot-goes-much-further-than-just-river-and-boca/>.

¹⁵⁰ Sam Patterson, "Chaos on the Right Wing," *Howler*, Fall 2017.

¹⁵¹ Le Bon, *The Crowd*, 50.

susceptible to irrationality, including violence. This understanding has informed law enforcement crowd-management methodologies for decades. Indiscriminate police actions against crowds are evident in the history of many countries, including the 1984–1985 miners’ strike in the United Kingdom as well as throughout the civil rights movement in the United States.¹⁵² More recent research finds that the perception of crowds acting as one irrational group is incorrect and misses opportunities for cooperation and conflict avoidance. Crowd management policies based on Le Bon’s view of crowds still exist, limiting law enforcement’s ability to ensure public safety.

Conversely, SIT emerged in social psychology by Henri Tajfel and John Turner in the late twentieth century as an alternative method for understanding group dynamics.¹⁵³ The nature of a person’s decision to self-categorize with one group instead of another depends on a host of social constructs that determine accessibility and fit.¹⁵⁴ These social constructs create an identity that highlights the dynamics between groups and helps to explain actions proactively or reactively. The relevance of SIT in understanding intergroup dynamics is especially evident when considering intergroup conflict.¹⁵⁵ The ability for subsequent scholars to comprehend an emic understanding of crowd behavior informed the United Kingdom’s law enforcement in attempting to comprehend the social constructs among soccer hooligan groups. Such a comprehension provides greater context, allowing for preventative actions by law enforcement when working to limit violence and ensure public safety.

¹⁵² Michael Mansfield, “The Miners’ Strike 1984–1985,” *Socialist Lawyer*, June 2009, <https://static1.squarespace.com/static/562e7d33e4b0da14ad6d202f/t/566f1987a2bab8b3e48522ec/1450121607218/SocialistLawyer52.pdf>; and Sara Bullard, *Free at Last: A History of the Civil Rights Movement and Those Who Died in the Struggle* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).

¹⁵³ Henri Tajfel, “Social Identity and Intergroup Behaviour,” *Social Science Information* 13, no. 2 (April 1974): 65–93, <https://doi.org/10.1177/053901847401300204>.

¹⁵⁴ Self-categorization is a complementary theory to social identity, developed by John Turner. Michael A. Hogg et al., “The Social Identity Perspective: Intergroup Relations, Self-Conception, and Small Groups,” *Small Group Research* 35, no. 3 (2004): 254, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1046496404263424>.

¹⁵⁵ David Brannan, Kristin Darken, and Anders Strindberg, *A Practitioner’s Way Forward: Terrorism Analysis* (Salinas, CA: Agile Press, 2014), 49.

2. Using Social Identity Theory to Distinguish Soccer Hooligan Groups

When comprehending a subject's social identity construction, the context gained provides not only the emic understanding of the individual but also his group affiliations. Conversely, applying SIT to soccer hooligan groups provides the context of a group's socially constructed identity as well as insight into individual identities. What is crucial in either examination is the definition of a *group*. According to Henri Tajfel, a group comprises one or more of the following three variables: (1) an individual must know he belongs to the group, (2) the idea of the group or membership may be positive or negative, and (3) these elements accompany emotions that reflect the individual's view of the group or those in relation to the group.¹⁵⁶ These cognitive, evaluative, and emotional components provide a general definition of groups—irrespective of size, scope, or structure—from which further analysis of group dynamics can proceed.¹⁵⁷ The resulting appreciation of a group's dynamics can help remove bias when attempting to understand its actions.

In the context of groups in conflict, the ingroup/outgroup narrative can further inform the intergroup dynamics and actions. The choice of affiliation defines one's ingroup.¹⁵⁸ Nevertheless, the ingroup's and outgroup's narratives of dominance may differ dramatically. For example, a sports player from a small market identifies his team as the ingroup based on employment.¹⁵⁹ However, the player's team may be the outgroup to the larger-market ingroup based on financial resources and fan support. If the player's team cannot financially satisfy the player, this failure might become an incentive to shift group identities if and when the opportunity arrives. The variables of each changing perspective construct a different ingroup/outgroup narrative, which may allow for mobility between social groups. Each analytical perspective provides a different insight into the two teams' intergroup dynamics and social movement between groups.

¹⁵⁶ Henri Tajfel, *Differentiation between Social Groups: Studies in the Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations* (London: Academic Press, 1978), 28–29.

¹⁵⁷ Brannan, Darken, and Strindberg, *A Practitioner's Way Forward*, 53.

¹⁵⁸ Brannan, Darken, and Strindberg, 55.

¹⁵⁹ The geographic location of a sports team determines its economic market, based on population density and regional economies. Large-market teams, as compared to small-market teams, have greater financial resources, which often suggest a potential for success.

Several analytical markers distinguish the ingroup/outgroup dynamic that help define a group, as described by Brannan, Darken, and Strindberg. Such markers provide insight into groups, their actions, and potential conflict.¹⁶⁰ These markers are the “patron-client relationship, honor/shame paradigm, limited good, and the challenge/response cycle.”¹⁶¹ A short discussion of these markers in relation to specific soccer teams and supporter groups illustrates the applicability of SIT.

a. Patron-Client Relationship

The analytical marker of a patron-client relationship not only demonstrates the structure of intergroup dynamics but can explain harmony between groups.¹⁶² West Ham United Football Club is an East London team in the English Premier League and counts a devoted fan base, as evident by the crowds wearing the claret and blue team colors at their London Stadium playing field each game.¹⁶³ As a team with historic success in the league, lucrative television contracts, endorsements, and financial backing from its owner provide financial assurance and sustainability for West Ham United. It enjoys and appreciates a broad fan base, which includes hooligan groups such as Inter City Firm, yet does not depend on them for financial support to sustain the team.¹⁶⁴ Conversely, its fans depend on West Ham United as the central reason for their fan support. Without West Ham United, there would be no need to self-categorize as fans of the team. This patronage by West Ham United of its client fans provides a central group identity for its fans and cohesion to achieve whatever goals the fans have.¹⁶⁵

The patron-client relationship is not always controlled hierarchically nor adhered to mutually. Although the club acts as the hub of the relationship, the client may not adhere to its patron’s wishes if they are deemed illegitimate. Following a 2009 match with

¹⁶⁰ Brannan, Darken, and Strindberg, *A Practitioner’s Way Forward*, 67.

¹⁶¹ Brannan, Darken, and Strindberg, 70.

¹⁶² Brannan, Darken, and Strindberg, 74.

¹⁶³ “Home Page,” West Ham United, accessed August 3, 2019, <https://www.whufc.com/>.

¹⁶⁴ Spaaij, *Understanding Football Hooliganism*, 133.

¹⁶⁵ Brannan, Darken, and Strindberg, *A Practitioner’s Way Forward*, 75.

Millwall Football Club that devolved into violence during and after the game, West Ham United officials condemned the violence of its own fans.¹⁶⁶ Yet some West Ham supporter groups continue to support violence and intimidation despite the club's best efforts.¹⁶⁷ The club propels its supporter group identities, but not all groups strictly adhere to the club's patronage. In such a case, the challenge/response marker might offer new insight into this intergroup dynamic.

b. Honor/Shame Paradigm

Honor accorded to a group stems from admiration or respect and reflects on the individuals who participate in that group identity.¹⁶⁸ Conversely, the shame afforded to a group based on ridicule and disrespect mirrors both the group and its individuals, further defining ingroup/outgroup dynamics. The rivalry between Real Madrid Football Club and Football Club Barcelona is rooted equally in the sport of soccer as in the history of Spain. The comparable success of each La Liga team fuels the fan rivalry as both teams seek dominance, yet the social-political context adds greater context to the honor/shame identity of each supporter group. Since the 1910s, "F.C. Barcelona gradually evolved into an important symbol of Catalan political, social, and cultural identity and came to be regarded by its supporters as *més que un club* ('more than a club')." ¹⁶⁹ The support garnered by Spanish military dictatorships for Real Madrid F.C. bolstered the rivalry and erupted in episodes of violence and sporting insult between both supporter groups throughout the twentieth century.¹⁷⁰ The historical political imbalance between the Spanish government and its Catalan state defines an ingroup/outgroup disparity between each team's supporter

¹⁶⁶ Ken Dyer, "West Ham Vows to Hunt Down Thugs as Gianfranco Zola Reveals His Despair," *Evening Standard* (London), August 26, 2009, <http://www.thisislondon.co.uk/standard-sport/football/article-23736819-details/West+Ham+vow+to+hunt+down+thugs+as+Gianfranco+Zola+reveals+his+despair/article.do>.

¹⁶⁷ Thomas Atzenhoffer, "20 Most Thuggish Fanbases in World Football," Bleacher Report, January 28, 2012, <https://bleacherreport.com/articles/1035747-20-most-thuggish-fan-bases-in-world-football>; and Ken Dyer, "West Ham Distance Themselves from Notorious Fan Group Founded by Inter-City Firm Members," *Evening Standard* (London), March 8, 2018, <https://www.standard.co.uk/sport/football/west-ham-distance-themselves-from-notorious-fan-group-founded-by-intercity-firm-members-a3784951.html>.

¹⁶⁸ Spaaij, *Understanding Football Hooliganism*, 77.

¹⁶⁹ Spaaij, 279.

¹⁷⁰ Spaaij, 283–84.

groups still at present.¹⁷¹ The historical and pervasive political and sporting affiliation between Real Madrid and Spanish far-right politics has deepened the rivalry and defined the honor/shame dynamic for the F.C Barcelona supporter groups. This dynamic, as well as a desire for more active fan participation, saw the creation of the *Boixos Nois* (Crazy Boy) hooligan group in 1981.¹⁷² Seven hundred *Boixos Nois* affiliate groups now exist and have demonstrated their violent tendencies since inception.¹⁷³ The honor/shame marker is insightful in explaining conflicting group identities.

c. Limited Good

Soccer supporter and hooligan group dynamics are not restricted to opposing teams. The analytical marker based on the anthropological concept of a limited good applies to not only visiting supporter groups but also supporters of the same team. In the Dutch *Eredivisie* premier soccer league, Feyenoord Rotterdam has a distinct history of hooligan violence between supporter groups based on its stadium field seating. Although the team typically attracted the older working-class communities of South Rotterdam, youth attendance increased in 1960, as evident in two distinct seating areas at the opposite ends of the playing field, Vak G and Vak S.¹⁷⁴ By the end of the decade, the two youth sections consolidated their presence and claim to Vak S.¹⁷⁵ Emboldened by a violent confrontation with Tottenham Hotspurs Football Club supporters at a 1974 Union of European Football Associations (UEFA) Cup final, the Vak S youth violently defended their seating territory at subsequent home games against other Feyernoord supporter groups.¹⁷⁶ Claims of physical space as part of a socially constructed identity can help define the identity but also may inform behavior.

¹⁷¹ Raphael Minder, "A Year After Catalonia Secession Vote, New Unrest and Still No Resolution," *New York Times*, October 1, 2018, <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/01/world/europe/spain-catalonia-independence.html>.

¹⁷² Spaaij, *Understanding Football Hooliganism*, 287.

¹⁷³ Spaaij, 289–90.

¹⁷⁴ Spaaij, 192.

¹⁷⁵ Spaaij, 192.

¹⁷⁶ Spaaij, 193–94.

The dynamic of a visiting supporter group to a home field is emblematic of the anthropological idea of a limited good.¹⁷⁷ The home team supporter groups claim their field as their space, including a majority of the fan stadium seats and the surrounding neighborhood or city. The presence of the visiting team's supporter groups, typically afforded a smaller portion of the stadium seats, is not only a loss of home "space" for the home team supporters but can be a physical manifestation of the visiting team's supporter groups' outgroup status.

d. Challenge/Response Cycle

The process of challenging one another to elicit a response is a mechanism for determining group honor or status.¹⁷⁸ The success or failure of both the challenge and the response depends on the emic analytical hermeneutic. Sparta Rotterdam supporters were generally considered "friendly" compared to the spectrum of other *Eredivisie* supporter groups.¹⁷⁹ However, like other teams, youth participation in supporter groups increased over time, and the Sparta Youth Crew emerged. The 1999 assault and serious injury of a Sparta Youth Crew member by opposing Willhem II supporters catalyzed their opposition to opposing groups and their desire to increase their hooligan standing through repeated violence against Willhem II and its supporter groups.¹⁸⁰ Sparta Youth Crew perceived the assault against its members as a challenge to its honor that necessitated a response and a shift in group identity in favor of violence.

3. A Progression to an Elaborated Social Identity Model

When applied in the crowd management paradigm of law enforcement, SIT is a means of providing an emic understanding of intergroup dynamics using analytical markers. Yet there is a danger of inferring, through law enforcement analysis during crowd events, that intergroup conflict is inherent in either or both groups. Before Stephen

¹⁷⁷ Brannan, Darken, and Strindberg, *A Practitioner's Way Forward*, 79.

¹⁷⁸ Brannan, Darken, and Strindberg, 69.

¹⁷⁹ Spaaij, *Understanding Football Hooliganism*, 224.

¹⁸⁰ Spaaij, 237.

Reicher's research into the 1988 Westminster Bridge protest violence in London, the understanding of social identity did not account for the influence of law enforcement on conflicting crowd groups during the event.¹⁸¹ Since then, continued crowd psychology research has progressed to ESIM, which examines how intergroup dynamics and group identities can shift. This model considers an individual's group identity with potential or legitimate actions surrounding the position within the group. If one's social position changes in the course of a crowd event, one's social identity changes along such dimensions as identity content ("who we are"), identity-boundaries (who counts as "one of us"), definitions of legitimate behavior, and empowerment.¹⁸²

The insight gained from SIT—in articulating how group behaviors and self-categorization can change based on external influences—reveals opportunities for law enforcement to employ new crowd management methodologies to limit crowd violence and ensure public safety. Where SIT suggests group identity, ESIM shows how crowds will act based on that identity and external influences they see as legitimate or otherwise.¹⁸³ This insight helps to explain factors that either precipitate or prevent crowd violence.

4. The Elaborated Social Identity Model and Police Use of Force

While this thesis has discussed ESIM to this point regarding crowd intergroup violence, external influences on crowd groups must be considered, too. The relevance of ESIM is how crowd groups may change their collective identity based on the influences of other groups and how law enforcement crowd-management effort can influence group identity.

An understanding of the crowd determines the influence of law enforcement on crowd groups. As discussed earlier, Le Bon's classical view of crowds is of a singular mass

¹⁸¹ Reicher, "The Battle of Westminster," 117.

¹⁸² John Drury and Steve Reicher, "Explaining Enduring Empowerment: A Comparative Study of Collective Action and Psychological Outcomes," *European Journal of Social Psychology* 35, no. 1 (2005): 36–37, <https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.231>.

¹⁸³ John Drury, Clifford Stott, and Tom Farsides, "The Role of Police Perceptions and Practices in the Development of 'Public Disorder,'" *Journal of Applied Social Psychology* 33, no. 7 (July 2003): 1481, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1559-1816.2003.tb01959.x>.

that attains one collective mind, which is susceptible to irrational outside influences. This theory used to shape the view of crowds by United Kingdom law enforcement, as demonstrated by Drury et al. in 2003: “Officers, at least in the United Kingdom, see the crowd as essentially irrational and prone to the influences of powerful minorities, and hence disorder.”¹⁸⁴ This perspective conflicts with the insights provided by SIT and contradicts the understanding SIT affords law enforcement in influencing a crowd’s potential for violence.

ESIM updates this understanding of law enforcement’s influence, demonstrating how crowds without violent tendencies may turn violent upon encountering law enforcement or actively suppress individual violent acts from within their own group to retain a non-violent identity. As shown in research on violent encounters between law enforcement and soccer supporters, when crowd control methodologies become indiscriminately aggressive, supporter groups without violent tendencies may become violent when control methodologies are deemed illegitimate.¹⁸⁵ In other cases where crowd control measures were indiscriminately applied, previously incongruent crowd groups altered their group identities to align collectively against law enforcement tactics, which were deemed illegitimate and required a violent, defensive response.¹⁸⁶ Evidence demonstrates that external framing, based on classical views of a crowd, often drives crowd control methodologies.¹⁸⁷ Fomenting the idea and fear of potentially violent crowd groups can initiate crowd control methodologies that may not be appropriate for the actual crowd group identities.¹⁸⁸ Such inappropriate methodologies may then alter a non-violent group identity to one of violence.¹⁸⁹ Even a passive-aggressive approach to crowd control, such as deploying paramilitary law enforcement forces as a deterrence, may be seen as

¹⁸⁴ Drury, Stott, and Farsides, 1496.

¹⁸⁵ Stott and Reicher, “How Conflict Escalates,” 363–64.

¹⁸⁶ Stott and Reicher, 359.

¹⁸⁷ James Hoggett and Clifford Stott, “Crowd Psychology, Public Order Police Training and the Policing of Football Crowds,” *Policing* 33, no. 2 (2010): 233–34, <https://doi.org/10.1108/13639511011044858>.

¹⁸⁸ Stott and Reicher, “How Conflict Escalates,” 366.

¹⁸⁹ Stott and Reicher, 367.

illegitimate and shift group identities toward violence.¹⁹⁰ This failure in applying an understanding of ESIM featured prominently in the law enforcement efforts used to address soccer hooligans, as seen in past news reports and research.

The appropriate application of ESIM in managing crowds to avoid violence is based on four principles identified by the research of Stephen Reicher and colleagues: education, facilitation, communication, and differentiation.¹⁹¹ Educating law enforcement on group identities through crowd management resources is a precondition for helping differentiate between legitimate group intentions and isolated insurgent actions that could both interrupt intergroup dynamics and be mistaken by law enforcement as actual group intentions.¹⁹² Next, understanding the legitimate intentions of groups can assist crowd management efforts in facilitating the groups' intentions.¹⁹³ Instead of presupposing a need for reactive crowd control efforts, facilitation provides for proactive crowd management by conferring not only group legitimacy but the legitimacy of law enforcement's actions as well. Moreover, while communication between law enforcement and crowd groups is vital, especially in moments of conflict, the method and means are just as critical.¹⁹⁴ Planning efforts should consider the sender/receiver relationship between law enforcement and each group, as well as the means for honest communication during tense and emotional situations. Finally, the ability for crowd management efforts to differentiate between crowd groups is crucial in understanding legitimate crowd actions and behaviors that run counter to the group identity, which could disrupt non-violent crowd events.¹⁹⁵ These final three components are outcomes of applying ESIM as a means of reducing influences that might incite crowd violence.

¹⁹⁰ Clifford Stott et al., "Tackling Football Hooliganism: A Quantitative Study of Public Order, Policing and Crowd Psychology," *Psychology, Public Policy, and Law* 14, no. 2 (2008): 16, <https://doi.org/10.1037/a0013419>.

¹⁹¹ Reicher et al., "Crowd Psychology and Public Order Policing," 566–69.

¹⁹² Reicher et al., 566.

¹⁹³ Reicher et al., 567.

¹⁹⁴ Reicher et al., 567.

¹⁹⁵ Reicher et al., 568.

SIT provides a framework for the analysis of group dynamics. The analytical markers provide insight into possible group motivations and responses. ESIM advances the psychological understanding of group dynamics and how they can change. The awareness of a group's socially constructed identity and its propensity to change based on external influences provides a greater understanding of possible group behaviors.

5. Police Liaison Teams

As discussed earlier, the ability for law enforcement to communicate with crowd groups before, during, and after an event is one principle of ESIM. This critical ability helps law enforcement—intent on facilitating legitimate crowd group intentions—to prevent misunderstandings with groups as well as explain changing law enforcement behaviors to help maintain its legitimacy in the groups' eyes. This approach, known as “liaison-based public order policing” in the United Kingdom, finds communication between crowd management efforts and crowd groups through dedicated liaison police officers successful in reducing conflict.¹⁹⁶

The use of these officers in liaison-based public order policing, known as police liaison teams (PLTs), offers many opportunities to convey legitimacy and thereby minimize intergroup conflict:

Their function is to promote perceptions of police legitimacy among crowd participants and use their communication and negotiation skills to resolve and create solutions for minor problems. They also play an important role in building relationships of trust with crowd participants, gathering information and otherwise creating a police capability for avoiding the undifferentiated use of force against crowds as a whole.¹⁹⁷

While representative of the ESIM communication principle, their principal role is in facilitating the human right to gather and voice an opinion.¹⁹⁸ Common crowd control

¹⁹⁶ Clifford Stott, Martin Scothern, and Hugo Gorringer, “Advances in Liaison Based Public Order Policing in England: Human Rights and Negotiating the Management of Protest?,” *Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice* 7, no. 2 (June 2013): 213, <https://doi.org/10.1093/police/pat007>.

¹⁹⁷ Clifford Stott, Owen West, and Matthew Radburn, “Policing Football ‘Risk’? A Participant Action Research Case Study of a Liaison-Based Approach to ‘Public Order,’” *Policing and Society* 28, no. 1 (2018): 2, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10439463.2015.1126267>.

¹⁹⁸ Stott, West, and Radburn, 2.

tactics, such as kettling (large police formations that move collectively to isolate and contain crowd elements), cordoning off areas, and controlling traffic, may be seen as offensive to certain crowd groups who do not understand the method nor the reasoning for its application.¹⁹⁹ PLTs are separate from these tactics, solely providing direct communication between groups and law enforcement leaders.

The communication link between crowd groups and law enforcement is best initiated by PLTs in advance of the event. The intention is to build rapport with the hope of establishing both a long-term relationship and understood legitimacy of both the group identities by law enforcement and law enforcement crowd-management methods by the groups.²⁰⁰ Establishing this relationship over time builds long-term trust that is helpful during moments of intense emotion that arise at crowd events. Such developed trust between PLTs and groups can help overcome tense exchanges during stressful events while also being a long-term point of contact between groups and law enforcement. In either case, the development of greater interconnections between police and crowd groups is critical to PLT effectiveness and can positively shape long-term relationships between both parties.

During the event, the ability to communicate directly between groups and law enforcement leadership allows greater facilitation of the desired group intent. Group behavior and actions can be translated to law enforcement in the moment so that any misunderstanding is resolved. In this respect, the application of more aggressive crowd management tactics to address legitimate group behavior can be avoided through direct discussion with PLTs by group leaders. Additionally, law enforcement leadership may advise or redirect group actions that are requested, thereby offering alternative yet legitimate options that remain within legal crowd behaviors and avoiding more aggressive crowd control tactics.²⁰¹ The ability to act as a conduit for messaging between groups and law enforcement leadership places PLTs in a critical position.

¹⁹⁹ Reicher et al., “Crowd Psychology and Public Order Policing,” 561.

²⁰⁰ Mike Smith, *The Use of Police Liaison Teams in the Policing of Events* (Coventry, England: College of Policing, May 2015), 15.

²⁰¹ Stott, Scothern, and Gorringer, “Liaison Based Public Order Policing,” 213.

Communication after the event is also a critical role for PLTs as it can provide context to actions that might not have been conveyed in a completely effective manner during the event. A discussion afterward allows for greater understanding from both parties as to group intent and actions. As the goal of law enforcement is ongoing public safety, these opportunities for post-event communication become preparatory communication in advance of the next event.²⁰² The role of PLTs and the relationships that develop foster a cyclical mode of communication, which can have a lasting, positive impact and foster legitimacy for all parties.

PTLs play more than a passive role in their position as a messaging conduit. Not only do PLTs confer legitimacy through communication with crowd groups, but they also do the same in their communication with police leadership. Crowd management leadership can, even with PLTs embedded in crowd groups, opt to make ill-conceived decisions that might undermine legitimacy.²⁰³ Embedded PLTs, proficient in effective crowd management objectives and the legitimate intents of groups, may have a better perspective on necessary tactical decisions than their crowd management leadership. If their leadership intends to implement tactics or force that would jeopardize the legitimacy of an event, PLTs can police the actions and decisions of leadership by providing their embedded perspective to further ensure legitimacy and the intended right of free speech.²⁰⁴ According to Stott, West, and Radburn, “PLTs assist in the avoidance of conflict because they also actively prevent disproportionate use of coercion by police. . . . In other words, PLTs do not simply play a role in policing crowds, they are also important in policing the police.”²⁰⁵ In this manner, the role of PLT facilitation is bi-directional and more influential than merely a messenger.

The use of PLTs to achieve liaison-based public order policing in the United Kingdom is seen as taking the next step in the progression of modern policing. The

²⁰² Smith, Use of Police Liaison Teams, 10.

²⁰³ Stott, West, and Radburn, “Policing Football ‘Risk,’” 2.

²⁰⁴ Stott, Scothern, and Gorringe, “Liaison Based Public Order Policing,” 212.

²⁰⁵ Stott, West, and Radburn, “Policing Football ‘Risk,’” 2.

securitized era of policing, an advent of more aggressive protest events over the past decades, has led to a methodology that reduces risk to crowd management resources through “strategic incapacitation” of protest groups.²⁰⁶ While enhancing methodologies that provide greater security for crowd management resources, the management method itself may incite the protest unrest it aims to prevent. The use of PLTs within the SIT and ESIM paradigm shift the crowd management methodology to a new “strategic facilitation” model whose purpose is to encourage legitimate, democratic protests and avoid undifferentiated use of force intended to achieve public safety.²⁰⁷ Not only can PLTs address the risk associated with identified crowd groups, but in averting intergroup conflict, PLTs also address the risk of a loss in public trust in law enforcement from illegitimate violence or crowd management tactics.²⁰⁸ PLTs are a proactive tool for both crowd management efforts and crowd groups, mitigating issues before they become problems that lead to unfortunate outcomes.

C. THE CORRELATION OF SOCCER HOOLIGANISM AND PROTESTER-ON-PROTESTER VIOLENCE

Despite the depth of research into intergroup violence associated with soccer supporter groups, is the political protest environment appropriately analogous? The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution protects the right to assemble peacefully and voice grievances against the government. As such, many consider political protest sacrosanct, so the relevance of its correlation with soccer hooliganism deserves further explanation.

1. Analogical Analysis of Soccer Hooliganism and Protester-on-Protester Violence

Soccer hooliganism and protester-on-protester violence share four commonalities, presenting law enforcement with both opportunities and challenges. First, both paradigms endanger public safety when intergroup violence occurs. At least one of the following four metrics—arrests, property damage, injury, or death—are evident in intergroup violence in

²⁰⁶ Stott, Scothern, and Gorringer, “Liaison Based Public Order Policing,” 211.

²⁰⁷ Stott, Scothern, and Gorringer, 212.

²⁰⁸ Stott, West, and Radburn, “Policing Football ‘Risk,’” 13.

either paradigm. These threats, within each paradigm, pose a danger to public safety that should be understood *prima facie*. Second, law enforcement methodologies based on classical crowd psychology theories can endanger public safety. Research demonstrates that methodologies that consider crowd groups as an undifferentiated mass exacerbate the dynamic, making any aggressive police action a reason for the crowd to question police legitimacy and re-categorize its group identity to challenge law enforcement.²⁰⁹ This same research has found similar group identification between soccer hooliganism and protest violence. Third, analytical markers explain intergroup dynamics in both paradigms. And fourth, in each paradigm, the labile nature of group identity is incongruent with classical crowd control methodologies. Regardless of paradigm, the nature of the conflict is explained by intergroup dynamics and the analytical markers that define groups. These commonalities demonstrate a correlation between the two paradigms and establish a need for comparative analysis, which is presented in Chapter IV, to examine how public safety benefits from the application of SIT by law enforcement to the protester-on-protester paradigm.

2. A Framework for Analogy

Frameworks for comparative analysis are a familiar academic tool for identifying similarities and differences. Within the soccer hooliganism paradigm, past research has used frameworks to differentiate all forms of soccer-related violence. Duke and Crowley posited an initial framework for forms of soccer-related violence in 1996.²¹⁰ Ten years later, Ramon Spaaij expanded on their framework in his seminal research on soccer hooliganism across European cultures to address a wider range of supporter group behaviors that tended toward violence.²¹¹ In keeping with Spaaij's methodology, Table 1 presents a framework to further clarify the three commonalities possessed by soccer hooliganism and protester-on-protester violence. Expanding on Spaaij's framework, Table 1 validates the correlation between soccer hooliganism and protester-on-protester violence

²⁰⁹ Stott and Reicher, "How Conflict Escalates," 371–72.

²¹⁰ Duke and Crolley, "Football Spectator Behaviour in Argentina," 290.

²¹¹ Spaaij, *Understanding Football Hooliganism*, 21.

by identifying the applicability of SIT analytical markers, the nature of violence, and socially organized variables.

Table 1. Framework for Comparative Analysis of Soccer Hooliganism and Protester-on-Protester Violence²¹²

Nature of Violence	Socially Organized Intergroup Violence	
	<i>Soccer Hooliganism</i>	<i>Protester-on-Protester</i>
Violence against or fighting between rivals	X	X
Violence against players or match officials	X	
Violence against police officers or security	X	X
Damage to property	X	X
Missile throwing/use of weapons	X	X
Intra-group violence	X	
Racial abuse or violence	X	X
Use of weapons	X	X
Ingroup/Outgroup	X	X
Patron-Client	X	X
Limited Good	X	X
Honor/Shame	X	X
Challenge/Response	X	X
Shifting group identities	X	X

Although this simple framework identifies a strong similarity between the two paradigms of intergroup violence, its limitations must be noted. First, both forms of violence are a small part of the overall problem of violence in civil society, and many factors not listed above can account for violence. Therefore, a greater elaboration of these factors might result in a different analysis. Second, the global nature of soccer hooliganism means countless underlying variables of violence may be attributable to specific countries,

²¹² Adapted from Spaaij, *Understanding Football Hooliganism*, 21.

regions, and cultures. Nevertheless, in that sense, SIT's ability to span these cultures and norms further demonstrates its relevance.

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IV. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS: SOCIAL IDENTITY THEORY AND CROWD MANAGEMENT METHODOLOGIES

At that moment, a massive column of hundreds of Unite the Right demonstrators marched west down Market Street towards the southeast entrance of Emancipation Park. Led by members of the League of the South and the Traditionalist Worker Party, they wore helmets and carried shields, flagpoles, and pepper spray. The crowd of counter-protesters saw this, and they rushed east to form their own blockade in front of the clergy. They locked arms and blocked Market Street. . . . Unite the Right demonstrators pushed forward with their shields and hit the counter-protesters with flagpoles. . . . The counter-protesters fought back and tried to grab the flagpoles away. Eventually, the demonstrators pushed the counter-protesters away with brute force and a cloud of pepper spray.

—Independent Review of the 2017 Protest Events in Charlottesville²¹³

A. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS BACKGROUND

Crowd violence may never be eradicated, but significantly reducing or resolving it to a minor or isolated issue can appreciably increase public safety. Identifying useful theories and methodologies is possible through an analytical comparison of events to differentiate between outcomes that are applicable and those that are not. When viewed separately, soccer hooliganism and protester-on-protester violence both exemplify intergroup conflict. Despite one based in sport and the other in politics, both represent groups of individuals whose identity is rooted in their perceived group identity and allegiance. The existence of group identity between both paradigms aligns with SIT, which allows for comparative analysis.

1. Methodology

This chapter uses comparative case study analysis to identify commonalities and differences across multiple crowd events to determine the relevance of SIT and ESIM in identifying crowd control methodologies that can help ensure public safety. This research

²¹³ Hunton & Williams, *Final Report: Independent Review of the 2017 Protest Events in Charlottesville, Virginia* (Washington, DC: Police Foundation, November 24, 2107), 130, <https://www.policefoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Charlottesville-Critical-Incident-Review-2017.pdf>.

uses a comparative lens analysis method to establish the correlation between soccer hooliganism and protester-on-protester violence.²¹⁴ In 2004, UEFA held its European Championship, a quadrennial soccer competition among European national soccer teams known as Euro2004. UEFA sold 1.5 million tickets for 31 soccer matches, presenting a significant crowd management challenge to Portuguese law enforcement.²¹⁵ The Portuguese government led a significant planning effort to address the influx of people attending the tournament, including potential soccer hooligan supporter groups.²¹⁶ A 2017 far-right, conservative rally in Portland, Oregon, challenged local law enforcement to afford political groups with divergent opinions the opportunity to voice their opinions. Following months of violent protest clashes and the murder of two civilians by a white supremacist, this crowd event ended peacefully. Later that same year, thousands of protesters clashed repeatedly in Charlottesville, Virginia, over the removal of Confederate-era statues.²¹⁷ Despite concerted efforts by the Charlottesville Police Department and the Virginia State Police to prepare a crowd management plan, the attendance and violence of the August Unite the Right rally caught the agencies unprepared.

These cases are analyzed along four components: group analysis, coordination, crowd control methodology, and legitimacy. Each component is crucial in using SIT and an ESIM in crowd management to prevent or minimize crowd violence and ensure public safety.

2. Grounds for Comparison

A major European soccer tournament may seem at odds with a large urban protest, but after further analysis, certain commonalities allow such a comparison. Crowd size, law enforcement, and incidents that jeopardized public safety are objective variables for

²¹⁴ Kerry Walk, "How to Write a Comparative Analysis," Harvard College Writing Center, accessed August 3, 2019, <https://writingcenter.fas.harvard.edu/pages/how-write-comparative-analysis>.

²¹⁵ "1.5 Million Euro Fans for Portugal," CNN International, April 5, 2004, <http://edition.cnn.com/2004/SPORT/football/04/05/euro.fans/>.

²¹⁶ Clifford Stott and Otto Adang, *End of Award Report: Crowd Dynamics, Policing, and "Hooliganism" at "Euro2004"* (Liverpool: University of Liverpool, 2005), 4, <https://s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com>.

²¹⁷ Hunton & Williams, Independent Review of the 2017 Protest, 1–4.

comparison. Crowd group passion is a subjective variable without measurement but was an element apparent in each case study.

Euro2004 consisted of 31 separate soccer matches across Portugal, each averaging 33,780 for match attendance.²¹⁸ In contrast, the 2017 Portland crowd event drew only several thousand participants but posed similar complex crowd management challenges. The attendance by protesters and counter-protesters at the series of Charlottesville protests in 2017 grew to a size and complexity on par with that faced by Portuguese match cities.

Both leadership and event planners marshaled significant numbers of law enforcement to prepare for the sizeable crowds at each event. Although research showed no specific number of law enforcement officers, the Portuguese Security Police and National Guard deployed significant numbers of riot squads and other response elements for each Euro2004 soccer match.²¹⁹ Portland Police coordinated their response between local and federal law enforcement to manage numerous crowd groups with conflicting identities. During the Charlottesville protests, agencies from the city of Charlottesville, the Charlottesville Sheriff's Office, the Albermarle County Sheriff's Office and emergency communications, the University of Virginia, and the State of Virginia assisted the Charlottesville Police Department in planning crowd control efforts.²²⁰ Each event had command-and-control elements, officers, and riot squads available for crowd control, among other response elements.

Although passion is hard to quantify, a discussion of identified groups present at each event begins to shed light on the seriousness with which each approached their attendance. Euro2004 involved national soccer teams from 16 European nations. Although elements of each national supporter group attended the tournament, officials were chiefly concerned with the attendance of large high-risk German and English hooligan supporter groups prone to intergroup violence.²²¹ In comparison, the participant passion and

²¹⁸ "UEFA Euro 2004," Union of European Football Associations, accessed August 3, 2019, <https://www.uefa.com/uefaeuro/season=2004/index.html>.

²¹⁹ Stott et al., "Tackling Football Hooliganism," 15.

²²⁰ Hunton & Williams, *Independent Review of the 2017 Protest*, 41–46.

²²¹ Stott et al., "Tackling Football Hooliganism," 3.

dedication surrounding the nationalist and racial themes that spawned the Portland and Charlottesville protests were equal to that of the Euro2004 tournament. Though different in interests and motivations, all groups represented strong allegiance, outgroup affiliation, and a real threat of violent confrontation.

This case study focuses solely on the Unite the Right rally on August 12, out of the three crowd events that occurred in Charlottesville in 2017. This specific event correlates with the Euro2004 tournament and Portland rally in several ways. All events were planned and legal. The prior notice for each event allowed significant planning opportunities for local and state officials. Law enforcement agencies at each event considered and implemented a crowd management methodology. Additionally, substantial information on the crowd groups' perception of legitimacy was available for all events.

B. CASE STUDY: 2004 UNION OF EUROPEAN FOOTBALL ASSOCIATIONS EUROPEAN SOCCER TOURNAMENT

The unexpected Greek victory in the 2004 UEFA European Championship concluded a tournament with relatively few instances of intergroup violence. A quadrennial tournament of European national men's soccer teams, this event prompted concerns of various national hooligan supporter groups descending upon Portugal and its host cities.²²² Past national team tournaments experienced significant problems with hooligans. The 1998 World Cup saw intense violence at several games, including 35 hospitalized and 50 arrested at the England v. Tunisia game.²²³ The 2000 UEFA European Championship tournament totaled 965 English fans arrested for rioting.²²⁴ Such disturbances set the stage for the 2004 iteration, and Portuguese officials intended to be prepared.

Ahead of the tournament, Portuguese planning officials established a partnership with British social psychology researchers to implement contemporary crowd psychology

²²² "Hooliganism Threat to Euro 2004," News 24, January 10, 2004, <https://www.news24.com/xArchive/Sport/Soccer/Hooliganism-threat-to-Euro-2004-20040110>.

²²³ Christopher Clarey, "World Cup '98: Fans Set Off Another Day of Violence," *New York Times*, June 16, 1998, <https://www.nytimes.com/1998/06/16/sports/world-cup-98-fans-set-off-another-day-of-violence.html>.

²²⁴ Stott et al., "Tackling Football Hooliganism," 3.

and identified best practices.²²⁵ The tournament was used to study and find conclusions regarding crowd management methodologies at the Euro2004 tournament with the stated intent “to minimize conflict and promote non-violence among high-risk fan groups.”²²⁶ Research was conducted at 16 of the 31 matches across the 31 days of the tournament. Of interest from an analytical perspective, the partnership covered only the *Policia de Seguranca Publica* (Public Security Police, or PSP) and not the *Guarda Nacional Republicana* (Republican National Guard, or GNR), yet observational research was conducted at games where both security forces managed crowd control.

1. Group Analysis

Before the tournament, the research group and Portuguese authorities attempted to understand the potential crowd groups that might attend the tournament. Games between teams with historical hooligan groups or rivalries were considered higher risk. Attention was not limited to historical hooligan groups but included the underlying culture of soccer fans to differentiate between violent and enthusiastic group behaviors. This awareness aligned with an understanding of crowd groups based on SIT.

2. Coordination

Providing an effective and consistent crowd control methodology is determined by the coordination of the agencies involved in planning and implementation. The PSP led extensive discussions on the use of SIT and ESIM and its relation to policing, crowd control, and crowd dynamics.²²⁷ This consultation translated into instruction and education for PSP leadership, as well as training for PSP commanders and police trainers to establish a foundation for understanding the concepts of SIT and ESIM.²²⁸ The GNR chose not to

²²⁵ Clifford Stott, “Crowd Psychology and Public Order Policing: An Overview of Scientific Theory and Evidence” (Liverpool: University of Liverpool, September 14, 2009), 2, <http://www.epcollegeonline.com>.

²²⁶ Stott and Adang, *Crowd Dynamics*, 4.

²²⁷ Stott and Adang, 4.

²²⁸ Stott and Adang, 4.

participate in applying these concepts.²²⁹ Outcomes discussed later highlight how this dichotomy further illuminates the usefulness of SIT and ESIM in crowd management.

3. Crowd Control Management

PSP forces implemented a graduated crowd management methodology. At the lowest level, pairs of officers in standard uniforms solely surveilled, communicated with, and encouraged lawful, enthusiastic fan actions.²³⁰ This non-aggressive, relational police presence in the crowd correlates with the liaison-based protest policing model and the use of dedicated PLTs, as discussed in Chapter III. Additional groups of four officers who could rapidly deploy supported the patrol pairs, either with or without protective riot gear, depending on the difficulty of the issue.²³¹ Finally, intervention squads were available, with protective riot gear and weapons, to operate in support with an aggressive riot mode.²³² This graduated approach implemented “a strategy of ‘low profile’ policing with graded and information-led interventions designed specifically to differentiate between those acting in a ‘disorderly’ manner and those fans who were behaving legitimately.”²³³ This strategy aligned with concepts of group identity and the ability of groups to shift identity when faced with influences deemed illegitimate.²³⁴

4. Legitimacy

The perception of crowd management by fans was considered in the application of this graduated approach. During games between teams with no or low-risk supporter groups, only plainclothes officers monitored fan activity and intergroup dynamics.²³⁵ At games with groups of higher concern, the PSP had paramilitary crowd management forces available to support operations aggressively, if needed. These forces were intentionally

²²⁹ Stott and Adang, 4.

²³⁰ Stott and Adang, 7.

²³¹ Stott and Adang, 7–8.

²³² Stott and Adang, 8.

²³³ Stott and Adang, 7.

²³⁴ Stott, “Crowd Psychology and Public Order Policing,” 12.

²³⁵ Stott and Adang, *Crowd Dynamics*, 8.

concealed from attendees of the tournament games so that the perceived legitimacy of crowd management methodologies and the potential use of paramilitary forces did not motivate crowd groups to alter identity and social construction to an aggressive posture.²³⁶ Demonstrating restraint by interdicting isolated crowd issues, rather than indiscriminately applying aggressive crowd management tactics toward all crowd groups, builds legitimacy for both the law enforcement efforts and the identities of individual crowd groups.²³⁷ This restraint, in turn, promotes groups' "self-policing" of members whose actions contradict the group identity.²³⁸ The legitimacy conferred on a crowd group by law enforcement through crowd management methodologies can be reciprocated when groups address individual acts of disruption to prevent their loss of legitimacy. This balanced crowd control methodology demonstrated to fans the legitimacy and appropriateness of efforts, based on the understood risk.

5. Outcomes

The general opinion of Euro2004 concluded it was one of the safest international soccer tournaments staged in Europe.²³⁹ Despite the attendance of known hooligan groups, Portuguese security limited its violent influence.²⁴⁰ Statistics from the tournament indicate that two incidents of serious violence and 53 arrests occurred.²⁴¹ Post-event analysis by the associated social psychology researchers indicates, however, the policing methods were indeed a significant contributing factor.²⁴² The different crowd management methodologies applied by PSP and GNR forces affected the outcomes. As noted earlier, the PSP aligned its crowd management methodologies with best practices identified by the researchers, which included SIT and ESIM. The GNR chose not to adopt these methodologies. Where the GNR did provide crowd management, it used methodologies

²³⁶ Stott and Adang, 8.

²³⁷ Stott, "Crowd Psychology and Public Order Policing," 14.

²³⁸ Stott, 14.

²³⁹ Stott et al., "Tackling Football Hooliganism," 3.

²⁴⁰ Stott and Adang, *Crowd Dynamics*, 8–9.

²⁴¹ Stott and Adang, 8.

²⁴² Stott and Adang, 11.

indiscriminately without factoring in legitimate group identities and behaviors or graduating application.²⁴³ The relevance of SIT and ESIM becomes apparent when the violence and arrest statistics are parsed between the security forces. The two serious incidents of violence and all but one arrest occurred in Albufeira, where GNR forces managed crowd control.²⁴⁴ Tournament sites managed by the PSP incurred only one arrest during the entire tournament.²⁴⁵ The applicability of SIT and an ESIM is evident through this lens.

Post-tournament research found that issues of legitimacy contributed greatly toward influencing non-violent behaviors among crowd groups, thus enhancing public safety. Less than half of the fans surveyed recognized an overall police presence.²⁴⁶ This graduated presence of crowd management forces produced a positive view and sense of legitimacy of the methodology in the majority of fans.²⁴⁷ This positive view and legitimacy extended between supporter groups, including identified hooligan groups as well.²⁴⁸

C. CASE STUDY: JUNE 4, 2017, FREE SPEECH RALLY IN PORTLAND, OREGON

In the eight months before June 4, 2017, Portland experienced numerous violent protest events involving conservative and liberal groups. Following the 2016 presidential election, three days of peaceful protests devolved into riots between anarchist groups involved in “criminal and destructive behavior” and fellow protesters attempting to prevent their damaging acts.²⁴⁹ In March 2017, a neighboring city hosted a pro-Trump rally that was met with counter-protesters who engaged in verbal confrontations, with a few reported

²⁴³ Stott and Adang, 8.

²⁴⁴ Stott and Adang, 8.

²⁴⁵ Stott and Adang, 8.

²⁴⁶ Stott et al., “Tackling Football Hooliganism,” 9.

²⁴⁷ Stott et al., 12.

²⁴⁸ Stott et al., 13.

²⁴⁹ Camila Domonoske, “Anti-Trump Protest Turn in Portland, Ore., Turns Destructive, Declared Riot,” NPR, November 11, 2016, <https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/11/11/501685976/anti-trump-protest-in-portland-ore-turns-destructive-declared-a-riot>.

minor scuffles.²⁵⁰ The following month, an annual Portland parade had to be canceled after receiving threats of violence for including a float sponsored by the local Republican party.²⁵¹ Permitted Portland May Day events were declared a riot as different liberal protest groups caused significant damage to Portland’s downtown property.²⁵² Later that month, two men were stabbed to death while defending two Muslim women from the verbal abuse of a man later found to have connections to local white supremacist and extremist groups.²⁵³ The local response to these events, coupled with the shock from the murders, coalesced in a counter-protest response to the permitted Free Speech Rally on June 4 in support of President Trump and the First Amendment, organized by Joey Gibson, conservative activist and founder of the national far-right group, Patriot Prayer.²⁵⁴

1. Group Analysis

Whether the Portland Police Bureau specifically understood and utilized SIT to appreciate the intergroup dynamics in advance of the June 4 crowd event is unknown. The preparatory actions by the special events sergeant, the officer in charge of the bureau’s Rapid Response Team, suggest a desire to understand and work with all the attending groups to ensure public safety, which is reminiscent of SIT and ESIM. Weeks prior to the event, the sergeant contacted Gibson and Patriot Prayer to define expectations for a peaceful rally.²⁵⁵ Through this process, he identified several other conservative action

²⁵⁰ Eder Campuzano, “March 4 Trump Meets Resistance during Lake Oswego Rally,” *Oregonian*, March 5, 2017, https://www.oregonlive.com/today/2017/03/march_4_trump_lake_oswego.html.

²⁵¹ Casey Michel, “How Liberal Portland Became America’s Most Politically Violent City,” *Politico*, June 30, 2017, <https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/06/30/how-liberal-portland-became-americas-most-politically-violent-city-215322>.

²⁵² Jim Ryan, “Portland May Day March Erupts into Fiery Riot; 25 Arrested,” *Oregonian*, May 2, 2017, https://www.oregonlive.com/portland/2017/05/portland_may_day_demonstration.html.

²⁵³ Amy B. Wang, “‘Final Act of Bravery’: Men Who Were Fatally Stabbed Trying to Stop Anti-Muslim Rants Identified,” *Washington Post*, May 27, 2017, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2017/05/27/man-fatally-stabs-2-on-portland-ore-train-after-they-interrupted-his-anti-muslim-rants-police-say/>.

²⁵⁴ Jason Wilson, “Portland Knife Attack: Tension High as ‘Free Speech Rally’ Set for Weekend,” *Guardian*, May 29, 2017, <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/may/28/portland-knife-attack-free-speech-rally--sunday>.

²⁵⁵ Jeffrey M. Niiya, “June 4th Free Speech Rally,” Followup Report #38, Case No. GO 42 2017-680687 (Portland: Portland Police Bureau, June 6, 2017), <https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/5746217/Niiya-Police-Report.pdf>.

groups intending to attend the rally. The Oath Keepers and the Three Percenters, additional far-right groups, planned to attend the rally to provide security for Patriot Prayer.²⁵⁶ Both groups, partners in the Pacific Patriot Network, had separately attended past local and state events with rifles and other weapons to protect conservative protest groups, prompting concern for violence at the Portland event on June 4.²⁵⁷ Continued contact from the sergeant with far-right rally attendees clarified which groups would be in attendance and which proclaimed representation but were no longer formally affiliated. This clarification differentiated various conservative ingroup/outgroup identities and their patronage dynamics, informing Portland Police intelligence prior to the Free Speech Rally.²⁵⁸

Through research and outreach, the special events sergeant identified separate groups within the liberal counter-protest movement as well. Efforts were made to contact local anti-fascist group Rose City Antifa to define the same expectations for a peaceful rally.²⁵⁹ Local and national Antifa groups espouse a violent physical defense against far-right efforts seen as white supremacist and hateful.²⁶⁰ Within the Antifa attendance, a Black Bloc group was expected that could bring an anarchist element of anti-government and anti-capitalism to an already tenuous event.²⁶¹ Additionally, non-violent protester groups were expected to present themselves as a counter-voice to perceived hateful messaging by Patriot Prayer. The competing interests within the Antifa movement presented challenging patronage dynamics for Portland Police to plan for. The mixture of peaceful liberal protesters with those who advocate violent conflict presented ingroup/outgroup dynamics within the counter-protest effort.

²⁵⁶ Niiya, 97–98; and “Oath Keepers and Three %ers Part of Growing Anti-Government Movement,” Anti-Defamation League, accessed August 11, 2019, <https://www.adl.org/resources/backgrounders/oath-keepers-and-three-ers-part-of-growing-anti-government-movement>.

²⁵⁷ “Partners,” Pacific Patriots Network, accessed August 3, 2019, <http://www.pacificpatriotsnetwork.com/partners.php>.

²⁵⁸ Niiya, “June 4th Free Speech Rally,” 98.

²⁵⁹ Niiya, 97.

²⁶⁰ Michel, “Liberal Portland.”

²⁶¹ Niiya, “June 4th Free Speech Rally,” 98.

2. Coordination

Preparation at the site of the Free Speech Rally required concerted coordination to ensure effective actions that granted public safety and free speech for all. The designated site in Portland, Oregon, for the rally was the Terry Shrunken Plaza, a property owned by the federal government. This required the involvement of the U.S. Federal Protective Service in the development of crowd expectations and an understanding of jurisdictional boundaries.²⁶² The special events sergeant spent significant time developing and delivering intelligence reports for the Portland Police Bureau on expected groups and their motivations.²⁶³ Portland Fire & Rescue embedded Rapid Response Team emergency medical technicians within the police response, coordinating efforts between the two agencies.²⁶⁴ Additionally, the sergeant actively remained in contact with all identified protest groups throughout the crowd event to communicate police concerns and actions, as well as address group-specific concerns and issues.²⁶⁵

3. Crowd Control Management

Crowd management efforts by Portland Police aimed to allow all participants the opportunity to voice their opinions freely in a safe environment.²⁶⁶ An area was designated for the permitted Free Speech Rally, separated from three distinct counter-protest groups by wide streets and enforced by police.²⁶⁷ As described earlier, the special events sergeant personally communicated with protest groups to address crowd issues, including the prohibition of projectiles and the infiltration of far-left protesters into the permitted Free Speech Rally group area.²⁶⁸ This non-aggressive, relational approach to communicating

²⁶² Niiya, 96.

²⁶³ Niiya, 98.

²⁶⁴ Don Russ, "June 4th Free Speech Rally Rapid Response Team EMS Assignment List (ICS 204)" (Portland: Portland Fire & Rescue, June 2, 2017).

²⁶⁵ Niiya, "June 4th Free Speech Rally," 100–121.

²⁶⁶ Niiya, 96.

²⁶⁷ Brad Schmidt, "Dueling Portland Rallies End without Major Violence, but Police Intervene," *Oregonian*, May 5, 2017, https://www.oregonlive.com/portland/2017/06/dueling_portland_rallies_end_w.html.

²⁶⁸ Niiya, "June 4th Free Speech Rally," 101.

with available crowd groups reflects the tenets of the liaison-based protest policing model used in the United Kingdom, as discussed in previous chapters.

The Portland Police Rapid Response Team deployed wearing full paramilitary-style tactical uniforms, based on the identified risk-profile of the event, to enforce the separate protest areas.²⁶⁹ Additionally, the team used explosives and pepper balls to prevent violent outbreaks and control isolated crowd unrest.²⁷⁰

4. Legitimacy

The Portland Police Bureau's efforts were consistent among all groups but were received differently depending on the groups' specific frame. The far-right groups were receptive to efforts to allow their event and ensure safety. These groups understood the police expectations for crowd groups and complied, agreeing not to act in a manner that could enflame crowd tension as they understood Portland Police were actively working to ensure their safety and the right to assemble.²⁷¹ These, as well as past involvements with Portland Police, created a frame of relative trust between local law enforcement and far-right groups that added legitimacy to the far-right groups ahead of the Free Speech Rally.

Conversely, the frame within which far-left groups perceived Portland Police was starkly different and did not create the same legitimacy. The special events sergeant had made the same overtures to different far-left groups, which received the communications negatively both before and during the rally.²⁷² Coupled with a perceived history of mistrust surrounding police violence and human rights violations, relative trust was not achieved before the rally. The deployment and actions of officers in paramilitary-style tactical uniforms at the event were seen as infringing upon the counter-protesters' rights to free speech and democracy, exactly as described by Hill and Berger in Chapter II.²⁷³

²⁶⁹ Schmidt, "Dueling Rallies End without Violence."

²⁷⁰ Schmidt.

²⁷¹ Niiya, "June 4th Free Speech Rally," 96–97.

²⁷² Niiya, 97, 118.

²⁷³ Kim Mason, "Analyzing the Police Response to the June 4th Protests in Portland," ACLU (Oregon), November 15, 2017, <https://aclu-or.org/en/news/analyzing-police-response-june-4th-protests-portland>.

5. Outcomes

Despite the threat of violence between politically opposed crowd groups, the June 4 Free Speech Rally suffered no crowd violence and relatively few arrests.²⁷⁴ Both Portland Police and city leaders were relieved that past instances of protest violence did not occur.²⁷⁵ It was reported that Joey Gibson had spent considerable time during the rally in a political debate with one counter-protester, resulting in mutual agreement, to an extent.²⁷⁶ Although no direct evidence was released stating SIT or ESIM were utilized by Portland Police to enhance public safety, the reported communications between law enforcement and crowd groups correlate with management methods associated with these crowd psychology theories.

D. CASE STUDY: 2017 UNITE THE RIGHT PROTESTS IN CHARLOTTESVILLE, VIRGINIA

The decision to remove statues of Confederate generals Robert E. Lee and Thomas “Stonewall” Jackson in 2017 from the Charlottesville, Virginia, town square prompted a series of protests steeped in the themes of nationalism, race, and local history that progressively became more complex for local law enforcement to manage in the face of protest violence. An initial unpermitted rally by the local and national extreme right protesting the removal of both statues in mid-May prompted a counter-protest the following day, provoking a further response from the opposition, which turned violent.²⁷⁷ Less than two months later, a permitted protest by a local Ku Klux Klan group provided law enforcement more time to prepare and resulted in no violence or arrests, despite the threat.²⁷⁸

²⁷⁴ Schmidt, “Dueling Rallies End without Violence.”

²⁷⁵ “Opposing Protests Largely Peaceful, Despite 14 Arrests,” Nexstar Broadcasting, June 4, 2017, <https://www.koin.com/archives/portland-rallies-pro-trump-anti-trump-06042017/870073917>.

²⁷⁶ Schmidt, “Dueling Rallies End without Violence.”

²⁷⁷ “Group Holds ‘Take Back Lee Park Rally’ in Response to Torchlight,” Frankly Media, May 14, 2017, <http://www.nbc29.com/story/35426536/group-holds-take-back-lee-park-rally-in-response-to-torchlight-protest>.

²⁷⁸ Hunton & Williams, *Independent Review of the 2017 Protest*, 65.

On August 12, a permitted rally dubbed “Unite the Right” prompted multiple groups to marshal their supporters to gather in protest or counter-protest of the professed ideologies. Despite a concerted planning effort, law enforcement was still unprepared for the crowd size and violence between protester groups, which turned deadly when a driver intentionally struck a protester with his car.²⁷⁹ The three protest events in August challenged local law enforcement in ways they were unprepared for and are emblematic of the threat all local communities may face during protest events.

1. Group Analysis

The Charlottesville Police Department was the agency described as conducting most of the information-gathering on possible crowd groups. Its efforts proceeded along three tracks: an open-source review, information from other law enforcement agencies and advocacy groups, and human intelligence.²⁸⁰ The information gathered addressed which groups and how many might attend and whether their intended purpose was violent or non-violent.²⁸¹ Four groups were identified with historical conflicts with at least one of the other three groups, along with numerous others whose conflict history could not be identified.²⁸² No specific approach for gathering group information was documented. Only a tenuous correlation might be made between the information-gathering efforts and SIT due to an indirect ingroup/outgroup awareness that different groups with conflicting intentions might attend the Unite the Right rally.

2. Coordination

The city of Charlottesville and its police department attempted to be the primary coordinators of the response to the rally. They relied on a range of other public and private relationships—including the Virginia State Patrol, the University of Virginia Police

²⁷⁹ Jason Wilson, “Man Charged with Murder Was Pictured at Neo-Nazi Rally,” *Guardian*, August 13, 2017, <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/aug/13/charlottesville-james-fields-charged-with-was-pictured-at-neo-nazi-rally-vanguard-america>.

²⁸⁰ Hunton & Williams, *Independent Review of the 2017 Protest*, 69–71.

²⁸¹ Hunton & Williams, 69–71.

²⁸² Hunton & Williams, 69–79.

Department, and the Charlottesville Fire Department—for assistance with information, logistics, and operational support.²⁸³ Before the rally, this coordination effort experienced both successes and failures. Outreach was achieved with the community, local clergy groups, rally organizers, identified groups planning to attend who were willing to speak with the police department, and partner emergency response agencies. However, individual actions or miscommunications among planners often thwarted these efforts. The Virginia State Patrol’s operational plan was intentionally withheld from the Charlottesville Police Department.²⁸⁴ Efforts to demonstrate transparency and legitimacy in the planned crowd control methods by communicating elements of the plan were rejected by Charlottesville Police Department leadership, as was an effort to induce all participating crowd groups to commit to non-violence to paint any violence as illegitimate.²⁸⁵

Other law enforcement agencies from around the country with experience in these particular crowd groups and management of protester-on-protester violence offered valuable operational information, but planning efforts failed to capitalize on it.²⁸⁶ The only system for coordination that was implemented was the Incident Command System, used by operational emergency responders in accordance with national practice.²⁸⁷ At the rally, the use of the Incident Command System failed to aid in incident coordination because of a lack of communication and full implementation among all responding agencies. Among the many efforts to communicate and coordinate between numerous planning and participant groups, no single successful effort was consistently applied throughout the event. Instead, many failures to coordinate were identified in the post-incident review.

²⁸³ Hunton & Williams.

²⁸⁴ Hunton & Williams, 85.

²⁸⁵ Hunton & Williams, 85.

²⁸⁶ Hunton & Williams, 88.

²⁸⁷ Department of Homeland Security, *National Incident Management System* (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2008), 45, https://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nims/NIMS_core.pdf.

3. Crowd Control Methodology

Before the rally, the Charlottesville Police Department did not discuss specific crowd control methodologies to be used.²⁸⁸ Moreover, Charlottesville Police Department personnel did not attend the Virginia State Patrol training in mobile field force, which was intended for all law enforcement members.²⁸⁹ No other preparation for crowd control was identified.

The implementation of crowd control methodologies by the Charlottesville Police Department and other law enforcement agencies conformed to those associated with a more classical understanding of crowd psychology behaviors. One hundred sixty officers were deployed around Emancipation Park.²⁹⁰ The site intended for crowd gathering was divided into two areas, one for the Unite the Right protesters and another for all other counter-protesters.²⁹¹ The implemented operational plan placed no officers within each crowd group to address specific incidents of violence.²⁹² Regarding instruction on disorderly conduct and when to engage to minimize the potential for greater violence, operational guidance changed abruptly just before the event, and Charlottesville officers understood it differently.²⁹³ Because Charlottesville officers did not receive protective gear for crowd control, they complained of a lack of safety planning and thus expressed a desire not to engage acts of public disorder.²⁹⁴ Ultimately, the plan was to wait until crowd disorder reached a level deemed an unlawful assembly, at which point the 200-member Virginia State Patrol paramilitary Mobile Field Force, staged at a distance, would clear the rally area.²⁹⁵ No evidence suggested any crowd management resources were dedicated to real-time communication with crowd groups with the intent to avoid intergroup conflict, as

²⁸⁸ Hunton & Williams, *Independent Review of the 2017 Protest*, 85.

²⁸⁹ Hunton & Williams, 87.

²⁹⁰ Hunton & Williams, 95.

²⁹¹ Hunton & Williams, 96.

²⁹² Hunton & Williams, 96.

²⁹³ Hunton & Williams, 98.

²⁹⁴ Hunton & Williams, 98.

²⁹⁵ Hunton & Williams, 98.

described in the liaison-based protest policing model discussed in Chapter III. Such a reductive response was emblematic of a classical view of crowd behavior.

4. Legitimacy

The legitimacy of law enforcement efforts at the Unite the Right rally was in question before it began and further devolved as the rally events unfolded. As noted earlier, the lack of planning and coordination among all agencies created an atmosphere of confusion and contradiction among the law enforcement officers tasked with providing crowd management. Competing perspectives on the gravity of the threat to public safety prevented timely assistance to University police officers by Charlottesville officers.²⁹⁶ Separate operational understandings between Charlottesville Police and Virginia State Patrol officers created questions of officer engagement and contradictory arrest protocols.²⁹⁷ Orders not to engage in instances of violence between protesters caused officers to fail to ensure public safety.²⁹⁸ Crowd group members asked the police to intervene in such instances but were rebuffed.²⁹⁹ These examples demonstrated a crowd control methodology without legitimacy to the crowd groups.

A lack of legitimacy altered group identity in the days before the Unite the Right rally. The perception of law enforcement's lack of ability to satisfy crowd group concerns over public safety affected the interactions of these groups with police. Groups permitted to attend the rally were not truthful with city planning efforts or changed their plans without informing the city.³⁰⁰ Other groups that had not intended to participate became concerned about law enforcement planning efforts, chose to attend the rally anyway, and refused cooperation with law enforcement.³⁰¹

²⁹⁶ Hunton & Williams, 116–19.

²⁹⁷ Hunton & Williams, 121–22.

²⁹⁸ Hunton & Williams, 126.

²⁹⁹ Hunton & Williams, 127.

³⁰⁰ Hunton & Williams, 115.

³⁰¹ Hunton & Williams, 119–20.

Because crowd groups met an environment without an effective means for ensuring public safety, the need to ensure their own safety legitimized the possible use of violence in self-defense, a newly constructed understanding of their group identities. Instances of violence and self-defense among many different crowd groups occurred while law enforcement took no action.³⁰² Although certain groups attending the Unite the Right rally might have been prone to violence, the number and scale of violent episodes among many crowd groups demonstrate, at least, the need for a violent response as a means of defense. Partaking in offensive or defensive actions that are contrary to a group's identity demonstrates a shifting social construction, which is described in ESIM of current crowd psychology.

5. Outcome

The Unite the Right rally had a lasting effect on the lives of many protesters and the city of Charlottesville. One protester was killed, and 14 were injured in protester-on-protester violence.³⁰³ Arrests were made on federal charges of attempting to incite a riot.³⁰⁴ The community of Charlottesville suffered a schism of identity that still divides it.³⁰⁵ There was no apparent application of SIT or ESIM principles to prevent or mitigate crowd violence. In hindsight, there were opportunities where it might have been valuable.

SIT provides the opportunity for analysis and understanding of intergroup dynamics. The post-incident review indicates that the Charlottesville Police Department did receive extensive information on crowd group planning.³⁰⁶ No understanding based on analytical markers provided insight that guided the department's planning. Nor did analysis

³⁰² Hunton & Williams, 130–33.

³⁰³ Doug Stanglin and Gabe Cavaliero, "1 Dead as Car Hits Crowd after a 'Unite the Right' Rally in Charlottesville," *USA Today*, August 12, 2017, <https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2017/08/12/charlottesville-va-braces-alt-right-rally-thousands-robert-e-lee-statue/561833001/>.

³⁰⁴ Rahima Nasa, "Four Men Arrested over Unrest during 2017 'Unite the Right' Rally," ProPublica, October 2, 2018, <https://www.propublica.org/article/four-men-arrested-over-unrest-during-2017-unite-the-right-rally>.

³⁰⁵ Debbie Elliot, "'Unite The Right' Rally Forced Charlottesville to Rethink Town's Racial History," NPR, August 9, 2018, <https://www.npr.org/2018/08/09/637230082/unite-the-right-rally-forced-charlottesville-to-rethink-town-s-racial-history>.

³⁰⁶ Hunton & Williams, *Independent Review of the 2017 Protest*, 152–53.

by any involved law enforcement agency lead to a consistent crowd control methodology. Despite a review of individual crowd groups, operations continued, rooted in a more classical understanding of crowd behaviors.

A lack of planning and coordination, as well as the crowd control methodology employed, created questions of legitimacy, which altered group identities in ways not understood by law enforcement. Crowd groups previously indisposed to violence or conflict with other groups acted either offensively or defensively in ways that jeopardized public safety.

E. SUMMARY

The following comparative analysis offers insight into whether SIT was applied in the three cases. The results of its use, or lack thereof, offer ideas for reducing crowd violence and enhancing public safety, which are discussed in Chapter V.

1. Similarities

Law enforcement agencies involved with each crowd event applied some form of crowd theory to their preparation and management, whether knowingly or not. In Portugal, the planning effort consciously adopted the use of SIT and ESIM crowd theories under the guidance of research partners based on their success at previous crowd events. No official documentation indicated Portland Police consciously utilized SIT or ESIM in its crowd management methods, yet analysis indicates its methodology reflects the concepts of SIT and ESIM. By contrast, in Charlottesville, crowd management methods were rooted in classical views of the behavior of crowds.

Legitimacy, or a lack thereof, played a role in all three crowd events. In both Portugal and Portland, law enforcement planning and crowd methodologies both established and conveyed legitimacy. All crowd groups found the PSP's efforts to understand the various crowd groups, including both hooligan and non-violent supporter groups, and their graduated crowd management methodology to be justified and effective. Participating far-right crowd groups understood and validated Portland Police's concerted efforts as legitimate. In contrast, the far-left groups, based on historical mistrust, did not

appreciate these efforts. This targeted approach resulted in constructive communication during the event and the far-right groups' willingness to comply with police requests for non-violence. Conversely, police communication was not positively received during the event, and disorderly conduct did occur within the far-left crowd groups. No crowd management methods used by law enforcement in Charlottesville, Virginia, achieved legitimacy with the groups.

2. Differences

Although each case study indicates that a particular crowd theory guided law enforcement crowd management, the specific theoretical approaches used provided different outcomes. Where SIT and ESIM were applied, knowingly or not, instances of arrest, violence, and injury or death were low or non-existent. In Portugal and Portland, intergroup violence was low. The use of SIT and ESIM in Portugal and Portland did not wholly eliminate arrests or personal injury. The soccer matches managed by the PSP did incur one arrest for disorderly conduct. The Portland Police incurred only four arrests for disorderly conduct at the Free Speech Rally.³⁰⁷ Additionally, certain crowd groups did launch missiles at other groups and attempted to infiltrate opposing groups to cause disruption and unrest. However, no significant, ongoing violence between crowd groups erupted.

The classical approach to crowd behavior taken in Charlottesville provided different results. As discussed earlier, law enforcement understood the difference in groups attending the rally but categorized them all as one group whose expected irrationality would allow an indiscriminate crowd management methodology to resolve the incident. This approach resulted in numerous arrests, injuries, and the death of one rally attendee.

The methodology applied by the PSP in Portugal was markedly different from the other two case studies. The application of a graduated crowd management methodology, rooted in SIT and ESIM, allowed for tactical adjustment and alteration based on an understanding of the crowd groups and group behaviors. The graduation flexed to meet the

³⁰⁷ Nasa, "Four Men Arrested."

variables of identified crowd groups in the preplanning phase. Additionally, the scaled application of police officers in the field, as well as paramilitary units, allowed for flexibility in the moment by on-scene law enforcement leadership. The embrace of SIT and ESIM by the PSP directly affected its crowd management methodology, affording a graduated approach that flexed to meet changing intergroup dynamics.

The use of PLTs differentiated the methodology applied by the PSP and Portland Police from the Charlottesville case.³⁰⁸ Placing law enforcement officers among crowd groups with the intention of positively interacting with fans and addressing supporter questions, as well as to preemptively disrupt crowd instability, allowed the PSP to project legitimacy of both its crowd management efforts and crowd group intentions. Portland Police successfully projected legitimacy via communication from one member, whose role was emblematic of a PLT, with mixed results. In Charlottesville, crowd group members attempted to communicate with individual law enforcement officers with questions and concerns, but no direction was given to any officer to allow for a two-way exchange of information between crowd and incident leadership.

³⁰⁸ As noted earlier, the Portland Police Bureau operated at the June 4 rally with an officer tasked to communicate with crowd groups, but it is unclear whether this approach was based on SIT and ESIM methods.

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V. LEGITIMACY: A KEY TO REDUCED VIOLENCE

I have only good things to say about the way we were policed, it was mostly in the background, mostly observing. There was no in-your-face threatening police action, they were very helpful, easily approachable, probably my best experience of police control at an England match abroad.

—Clifford Stott et al.³⁰⁹

This final chapter presents findings from the research and conclusions on the application of SIT and ESIM at crowd events. The chapter recommends policy changes for the use of SIT and ESIM to aid in ensuring public safety during crowd events.

A. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

This thesis set out to answer the question of how SIT can explain protester-on-protester violence and assist with better public safety planning. This type of intergroup violence is unusual for American protest events. Historically, protest violence has occurred between law enforcement and a civilian mass protest. In more recent examples of intergroup violence, law enforcement has been forced to deploy a crowd management methodology to maintain both public safety and the right of free speech to all groups without showing preferential treatment to any specific protest group.

It is essential for law enforcement to play a role in crowd management as a means of ensuring a vital, civil, democratic society in the United States—as law enforcement does in the United Kingdom and other democratic European nations. The ideal of such democratic governments is a constitutional way of resolving political conflicts through established norms and where resolution outside such norms is seen as unproductive and expensive.³¹⁰ As discussed in Chapter II, democratic governments must provide their citizenry “conditions for the development of a free and lively society . . . [and] rule of law

³⁰⁹ Clifford Stott et al., “Variability in the Collective Behaviour of England Fans at Euro2004: ‘Hooliganism’, Public Order Policing and Social Change,” *European Journal of Social Psychology* 37, no. 1 (2007): 87, <https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.338>.

³¹⁰ Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transitions*, 5.

to ensure legal guarantees for citizens' freedoms and independent associational life."³¹¹ If a society cannot meet such democratic conditions, then it is inherently uncivil and may foster the repression of protest groups.³¹² The effort by law enforcement to ensure public safety during crowd events signifies these democratic principles of a civil society.

Crowd control is a challenging endeavor for law enforcement. The gathering of crowds can be rooted in emotion, differing perspectives, and intense loyalty to an idea or vision, no matter the paradigm. The role of law enforcement as an impartial arbiter of free speech and public safety places it in the difficult position of providing an equal opportunity to gather peacefully. But the confluence of a wary police force and the real possibility of intergroup violence demands innovative thinking and new methods for ensuring peaceful opportunities to gather publicly.

Soccer hooliganism is a viable proxy for comparison with protest violence. Some may find this a stretch and see no correlation between sporting enthusiasm and earnest political speech. Yet crowd psychology facilitates the search for an understanding of crowd behavior in either case, no matter the fundamental motivation. Researchers have long studied conflicts between law enforcement and protesters, but there has been little research within this paradigm on the protester-on-protester violence occurring with more frequency around the United States. American law enforcement dealing with protester-on-protester violence can learn from the study of crowd psychology, the intergroup dynamics of soccer hooliganism, and British law enforcement methodologies.

While earlier chapters described the theoretical correlation between soccer hooliganism and political protest, it should also be noted that researchers in the United Kingdom demonstrated the applicability of SIT and ESIM within the political protest paradigm as well. Past studies showed that the misapplication of British crowd control methodologies encouraged changes in group identity within protest groups, increasing the probability of violence. Researchers have found this group ability to determine identity but also exhibit rational choice to alter it upon being influenced is evidence of ESIM at play.

³¹¹ Linz and Stepan, 7.

³¹² Linz and Stepan, 17.

An examination of this research demonstrates the relevance in understanding intergroup dynamics and the ingroup/outgroup and patron relationships among protest groups—and in law enforcement—that can help determine intergroup behavior.

The applicability of SIT and ESIM to the political protest paradigm offers new methodologies for law enforcement. It is this translation of theory into practice that opens important opportunities for law enforcement to reduce intergroup violence. A graduated response to crowd management allows law enforcement to understand crowd groups and match their control efforts proactively to associated risks. This approach moves past a securitized response that expects a negative outcome from crowd groups or applies an aggressive response to all issues, no matter the gravity. Instead, scaling control efforts based on understood group identities creates bilateral legitimacy of both the crowd group identity and the measured police effort. This research found that the demonstration of legitimacy prevents or reduces intergroup violence within the European soccer hooliganism paradigm and at political protests in the United Kingdom, both in theory and practice.

A component of a graduated response is the use of PLTs. This real-time method for communicating prevents misunderstandings while both enhancing and maintaining legitimization because officers serve as points of contact between individual crowd groups and law enforcement leadership. This proactive effort is easier than reacting to misunderstandings or violence to regain trust and legitimacy. Over the long term, creating legitimacy with law enforcement crowd-control methodologies can achieve more than safe crowd events. Repeated demonstrations of crowd methodologies with equal respect for crowd group identities, the right to gather and voice an opinion, and a graduated response have improved public opinion and fostered trust in local law enforcement. Tactics seen as overly aggressive compromise public trust in law enforcement in communities, necessitating a shift in policing that reestablishes public trust.

As discussed in Chapter II, the opportunity for the citizenry to voice its opinion is integral to a democratic civil society. As noted earlier, Walzer finds that a civil society

supports all opinions without preferential treatment of one voice over another.³¹³ Crowd management methodologies based in SIT and ESIM, which foster greater legitimization, could be the start to this process. The new variable of intergroup violence adds to the challenge of crowd management for law enforcement. Maintaining public safety and freedom of speech while neither inciting protest violence nor showing favoritism toward any particular protest group comes with its challenges.

While SIT and ESIM are proven crowd psychological theories with demonstrated reductions in crowd violence, the theories have their detractors. Some researchers argue that such theories are only applicable to crowds with a rational, identifiable intent.³¹⁴ For crowd groups who riot or are already violent, their actions are more irrational and thus may be less open to negotiating a safe public event.³¹⁵ A reliance on crowd management methodologies rooted in a rationalist framework may create a tactical “blind spot” that leaves law enforcement unable to address irrational group dynamics.³¹⁶ While this analysis articulates a distinction between rational and irrational crowd behaviors, it fails to accurately comprehend the benefit of PLTs and a graduated response in applying SIT and ESIM to crowd events. Through developed relationships, PLTs can provide insight into internal group dynamics that addresses these concerns. Any dynamics that alter a group’s identify or rationality can be transmitted to crowd control management so that the response is adjusted. Similarly, the benefit of a graduated response provides for decisive crowd-containment efforts should crowd behaviors become irrational and jeopardize the greater public safety. Just because the methodology is graduated does not mean these containment efforts are unavailable to incapacitate crowd groups should the need arise. Critics of SIT and ESIM crowd management efforts are inaccurate in their descriptions of “soft policing” as without teeth. Their benefit is that such “hard” containment efforts are used only when necessary.

³¹³ Walzer, “A Better Vision,” 311.

³¹⁴ Christian Borch, “Crowd Theory and the Management of Crowds: A Controversial Relationship,” *Current Sociology* 61, no. 5–6 (2013): 596, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0011392113486443>.

³¹⁵ Borch, 596.

³¹⁶ Borch, 598.

Outside influence may limit law enforcement’s successful implementation of crowd management methodologies based on SIT and ESIM. Law enforcement, as the public safety agency of local government, operates according to established policies at the direction of public officials. The ability of public officials to influence or alter police strategies may profoundly affect the successful application of SIT and ESIM principles. As noted in the case study of Portland’s Free Speech Rally in 2017, the actions of the special events sergeant from the Portland Police Bureau suggest an understanding of these modern crowd theories. Nevertheless, after the crowd event, media reports that questioned communications between the sergeant and the far-right Patriot Prayer group caused a significant uproar among the public and officials.³¹⁷ The reaction of public officials forced the Portland Police Bureau to remove the sergeant in question from the position of overseeing crowd control, subsequently ending efforts indicative of SIT and ESIM. Only later was it reported that the sergeant had not shown preferential treatment to one group and had instead contacted both far-right and far-left groups.³¹⁸ The immediate reaction by public officials—without a full understanding of the scope of Portland Police crowd control efforts—was to end communications between the police department and crowd groups, thereby preventing the further development of productive partnerships. Despite the intent of law enforcement, political influence can negatively influence law enforcement efforts to manage crowd events proactively.

Further complicating the effort to address strategic crowd management efforts across the United States is a lack of a unifying law enforcement agency or legislative ability to implement or mandate local law enforcement best practices policies, such as in the United Kingdom. Such efforts in the United States take the form of recommendations that work their way either down from policy development groups or out from the successful initiatives of local law enforcement agencies. Examples of national policing policy groups

³¹⁷ Maxine Bernstein, “Portland Lieutenant under Fire over Texts with Right-Wing Group Leader Moving to Professional Standards,” *Oregonian*, April 5, 2019, <https://www.oregonlive.com/crime/2019/04/portland-police-lt-jeff-niyya-to-be-transferred-to-bureaus-professional-standards-division.html>.

³¹⁸ “Portland Police Lieutenant Communicated with Several Groups prior to 2017 Protest, Records Show,” KGW Portland, February 21, 2019, <https://www.kgw.com/article/news/local/portland-police-lieutenant-communicated-with-several-groups-prior-to-2017-protest-records-show/283-9c8bf5e2-38eb-464e-afe7-6f4c76fb0b53>.

that could offer recommendations on implementing social identity theory for crowd management include a future presidential task force, the International Association of Police Chiefs, the national Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, the National Associations of Police Organizations, or the International Association of Police Unions. Ultimately, these organizations have no power to mandate conformity in new crowd management policies, so implementation is left to local law enforcement agencies.

Protester-on-protester violence is a new variation of protest conflict that requires an examination outside the more prevalent protest research to understand intergroup conflict. The historical conflict between protesters and police officers has given way to a conflict between protesters that poses a unique challenge for crowd management efforts. The question for law enforcement is how to maintain public safety while providing for all protesters the freedom of speech without appearing preferential. The answer requires a greater knowledge of crowd psychology and an understanding of group identity. SIT provides the framework for understanding group identities while ESIM offers insight into how crowd identity evolves based on outside influences. This new approach, based on social psychology research, offers a path forward to address the new crowd management challenges faced by law enforcement.

Intergroup violence is too broad a human condition to be considered solvable. Crowd events in which opposing ideologies may lead to violence continue to occur.³¹⁹ The threat of violence to protesters and the public remains.³²⁰ It is the responsibility of law enforcement, as arbiters of civil democracy, to work to lessen opportunities for violence while ensuring everyone his individual rights. This work should encompass any new theory or methodology that demonstrates opportunities to minimize intergroup violence as much as possible.

³¹⁹ Chris Stewart, "Local Activists Reveal Plan for Klan Counter Protest in Dayton," *Dayton Daily News*, May 2, 2019, <https://www.daytondailynews.com/news/local/local-activists-reveal-plan-today-for-klan-counter-protest/LfQvVXShLL3Q1WqHd70vO/>.

³²⁰ Christina Morales, "Conservative Writer Andy Ngo Details Attack at Portland Protest," *Oregonian*, July 3, 2019, <https://www.oregonlive.com/news/2019/07/conservative-writer-andy-ngo-details-attack-at-portland-protest.html>.

This thesis has correlated soccer hooliganism with American protest violence as a proxy to understand intergroup conflict. After peeling back the sport and political rhetoric of each paradigm, the essential elements of either are intergroup dynamics. The relationship between rival soccer supporter groups equates with the competing voices of opposing political protest groups. Applying SIT and ESIM to the soccer hooliganism paradigm demonstrates the relevancy of these modern crowd psychology theories in political protester-on-protester violence. From a position of greater insight, crowd control methodologies that create greater legitimacy for all protest groups minimize instances of violence, thereby increasing public safety.

B. RECOMMENDATIONS

Improvements in crowd control methodologies must come from all levels of government. The following are specific recommendations, based on research and analysis, for improving public safety using the principles of SIT and ESIM at crowd events.

1. Seek Out a Greater Understanding of Crowd Groups

Contrary to previous understandings of crowds rooted in classical theory, the application of modern crowd theory offers law enforcement invaluable insight into group identity. The analytical markers provided by SIT informs intergroup relations that can indicate both group identity and the event intent, which allow law enforcement leadership to evaluate groups for their potential risk to public safety. Police officers should be trained in SIT as a means of analysis for daily interactions with groups. Law enforcement intelligence units can apply SIT in ongoing research to better inform their analysis and recommendations for decision making.

2. Build Flexibility into Crowd Management Methodologies

A graduated crowd management method allows for a scaled response that appropriately meets the identified risk profile of crowd groups. A scalable deployment model of crowd control officers provides law enforcement the flexibility to address changing event conditions. It presents law enforcement efforts in a manner that demonstrates legitimacy and meets the normative expectations of civil society.

3. Facilitate Legitimization between Law Enforcement and Crowd Groups

Implementing the concept of PLTs provides law enforcement leadership a means of communicating with crowd groups and may prevent misunderstandings that escalate to violence. Relationships that form between PLTs and crowd groups in advance of a crowd event can facilitate a better understanding of mutual expectations, thereby legitimizing law enforcement methods as well as group intent. Bilateral legitimization between groups and law enforcement reduces instances of violence that might arise from miscommunication.

4. Update Federal Policy to Reflect the Use of Social Identity Theory in Crowd Management

Explicit guidance and direction on the context and application of social identity theory would provide law enforcement agencies across the United States guidance for applying this modern crowd theory to their own agencies' policies. Federal policy could initiate research, training, and adoption by all law enforcement agencies, thereby maximizing individual communities' ability to address intergroup violence.

C. AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

American law enforcement has not understood the role SIT and ESIM can play in crowd management. Ideally, this thesis will initiate further research on the subject to facilitate its adoption. The following are some questions for future research:

- Would adopting SIT and ESIM as an agency policy for crowd management create policy confliction?
- How would SIT and ESIM and the ability to understand intergroup dynamics apply to other public safety agencies?

An effective democracy is neither efficient nor easy. Addressing intergroup violence in any form requires attention and continual effort. Ongoing, innovative thinking from across disciplines can further the discussion and determine effective ways to meet our democratic expectations while ensuring public safety.

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