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MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

**EVOLVING THE JOINT QUALIFICATION SYSTEM
FOR DSCA: FROM WHOLE OF DOD TO WHOLE OF
GOVERNMENT**

by

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September 2019

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FROM WHOLE OF DOD TO WHOLE OF GOVERNMENT**

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ABSTRACT

In 2013, a Government Accountability Report gap analysis on the state of joint professional military education (JPME) identified deficiencies in many areas that are critical to success in the defense support to civil authorities (DSCA) mission. This thesis utilized a case study methodology to discover the leadership qualities required of DSCA officers and ways that the Joint Qualification System could be modified to develop DSCA leaders. Cases of the downrange mission and the homeland mission were examined. This thesis found that the downrange mission has evolved significantly since World War II's industrial age under MacArthur, past Operation Eagle Claw and the resulting Goldwater–Nichols Act, into Desert Storm, and finally to Operation Iraqi Freedom's information age under McChrystal. The homeland mission has evolved on a path that parallels the downrange mission by failing during Hurricane Katrina, enacting the dual-status commander concept, and succeeding at Superstorm Sandy. However, the homeland mission has yet to evolve toward the kind of shared leadership and adaptability required in the complex information age. Recommendations include evolving the JQS to include DSCA specific paths, leveraging the National Guard as well as the best and brightest universities and academia throughout the nation, and modifying the Center for Homeland Defense and Security's graduate program to qualify as JPME II credit.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AJPME	advanced joint professional military education
ATP	advanced targeting pod
BUD/S	Basic Underwater Demolition/SEAL
CHDS	Center for Homeland Defense and Security
CJCS	chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
COA	course of action
CORE	Colorado OutReach Exchange
DoD	Department of Defense
DSC	dual-status commander
DSCA	defense support to civil authorities
E-JDA	experience path joint duty assignment
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
GAO	Government Accountability Office
GNA	Goldwater–Nichols Act
IKE	Integrated Kinetic Index
IRA	immediate response authority
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
ISR	intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
JCWS-H	Joint and Combined Warfighting School-Hybrid
JDAL	joint duty assignment list
JP	joint publication
JPME	joint professional military education
JQO	joint qualified officer
JQS	Joint Qualification System
LANTIRN	low altitude navigation and targeting infrared for night
LNO	liaison officer
MECC	Military Education Coordination Council
NORAD	North American Aerospace Defense Command
O&I	operations and intelligence
OEC	Operation Eagle Claw

OIF	Operation Iraqi Freedom
OPMEP	<i>Officer Professional Military Education Policy</i>
PME	professional military education
SAD	state active duty
SEAL	Navy Sea Air and Land
S-JDA	standard path joint duty assignment
TAG	the adjutant general
USNORTHCOM	United States Northern Command
VOCO	vocal order
WWII	World War II

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Department of Defense (DoD) owns the downrange mission, but it is also a critical player in the homeland mission. DoD leadership development is focused heavily on the downrange mission but gives only notional consideration to the homeland mission. In 2005, Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) claimed the lives of 846 Americans, yet during a single event beginning on August 23, 2005, Hurricane Katrina claimed the lives of 1,833 Americans.¹ These figures tell a tale of evolution. While they are from the same year, they highlight the fact that leadership development for the homeland mission was (and still is) far to the left on the evolutionary continuum while leadership development for the downrange mission was (and still is) far to the right. The construct that the DoD uses to develop military leaders has evolved over time. It must further evolve to include content with a primary focus on defense support to civil authorities (DSCA). Searching for ways to improve DoD leadership development for the DSCA mission involves research focused on three areas.

The first area examines how the world is evolving so that conclusions can be made about what leadership qualities are required of DSCA officers. This research reveals that because the world is evolving, so too is leadership theory. Vertical leadership theories dominated the industrial age. Traits, behaviors, and motivations seemed to be the proscriptive recipe for the top-down “hero” leader during an industrial age of efficiency. The efficiency-based industrial age, however, has given way to the information age. This transition has been a game-changer and has had a profound impact on leadership theory. In the information age, nearly everyone has access to nearly everything, nearly instantaneously. Consequently, all of us undoubtedly know more than one of us. Today’s leader cannot possibly know all the answers, so leadership theory has evolved to include

¹ “American Soldiers Killed in Iraq up to 2018,” Statista, accessed September 3, 2018, <https://www.statista.com/statistics/263798/american-soldiers-killed-in-iraq/>; “Fatalities by Year and Country: Iraq,” iCasualties, accessed August 21, 2019, <http://icasualties.org/>; and Adam Levenson, “Decade of Destruction: The High Cost of Hurricanes [Infographic],” University of North Carolina, September 30, 2014, <https://onlinempa.unc.edu/decade-destruction-high-cost-hurricanes-infographic/>.

not only the vertical leadership theory from the past but also theories of shared leadership that can tap into the minds of many.

The second area examines how the downrange mission is evolving. In addition to the transition from the industrial age to the information age, this research revealed another transition: from complicated to complex. Complicated is like a mechanical factory machine; although there are many moving parts—one connected to and interacting with the next—altering a component generally has predictable and linear results. On the other hand, complex is like the cell phone network of Al Qaeda in which every player is connected to and interacts with every other player, and outcomes are exponential and unpredictable. As a result, the downrange mission has evolved from the rigid top-down MacArthur leadership approach from World War II, silos and command; to the shared leadership approach of Schwarzkopf in the Gulf War, commanding teams; to the bottom-up agile and adaptable approach of McChrystal in Operation Iraqi Freedom, commanding a team of teams.

The third area examines how the homeland mission is evolving. Given the transition from the industrial age to the information age and a transition from complicated to complex, has homeland leadership development evolved in parallel with the downrange mission? In parallel, yes. The errors of silos and command in WW II and Operation Eagle Claw in Iran were course-corrected by the mandate of the Goldwater–Nichols Act. Similarly, the DSCA errors of Hurricane Katrina were course-corrected by the creation of the dual-status commander, but that evolutionary progress was separated by decades, and the downrange mission has continued to evolve while the homeland mission has stagnated.

Academia says that leadership theory is evolving beyond vertical leadership styles to include shared leadership qualities. Case studies of practitioners in the field, both downrange and in the homeland, both governmental and corporate, also reveal a transition away from hierarchical solutions toward bottom-up solutions. The downrange mission has evolved from command to commanding teams, to commanding a team of teams. The homeland DSCA mission has evolved in the same way but has yet to fully embrace the latter approach. Investing in a DSCA-focused Joint Qualification System (JQS) is the way to make it happen. Upon reviewing research about the evolving world and blending it with

research on the evolution of academic, downrange practitioner, homeland practitioner, corporate, and government views on leadership, some JQS recommendations become rather intuitive.

The first recommendation is to evolve the JQS to include content with a DSCA focus, bringing the homeland mission to the evolutionary state of the downrange mission. Second, as the National Guard Network is uniquely positioned in the DSCA mission, it should be leveraged as a JQS multiplier. Third, implement some available “plug-and-play” solutions to modify the JQS at a low cost. Fourth, while the current rigid JQS structure is a dinosaur of the past, there is a way for it to become adaptive and agile, accessing the best and brightest professors, institutions, students, and experiences throughout the nation rather than accepting only those who are willing and able to fit in the current top-down JQS structure.

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I. INTRODUCTION

The Goldwater–Nichols Act (GNA) of 1986 was one of the most significant overhauls in the history of the Department of Defense (DoD). Failures during Operation Eagle Claw, the Iran hostage rescue in 1980, was the impetus for the GNA, but DoD joint operability challenges had been known for decades.¹ Interservice rivalry was the root cause of those challenges, and that flaw was also obvious to U.S. allies during World War II (WWII). A British air marshal once said, “The violence of inter-service rivalry in the United States had to be seen to be believed and was an appreciable handicap to their [the U.S.] war effort.”² From the outside looking in, the dysfunction was obvious, but it took 40 years, a failed rescue, and an act of Congress to force the DoD to start thinking in terms of an integrated, rather than a service-centric, organization. The “joint matters” philosophy and the Joint Qualification System (JQS) construct provided by the GNA have proven an effective template for developing joint leaders for the downrange mission, but there is a glaring gap in developing joint leaders for the homeland-focused DSCA mission.

In October 2013, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued a report to Congress on joint professional military education (JPME). As described in the GAO report titled *Actions Needed to Implement DoD Recommendations for Enhancing Leadership Development*, “The MECC [Military Education Coordination Council] . . . conducted a gap analysis to identify and crosswalk the desired leader attributes for Joint Force 2020 with the current officer and enlisted personnel JPME education continuums.”³ According to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “The MECC principals are: DJ-7 [deputy directors–joint force development]; the presidents, commandants, and directors of the joint and Service universities and colleges; and the heads of any other JPME-accredited institutions.

¹ Richard A. Radvanyi, “Operation Eagle Claw: Lessons Learned” (master’s thesis, U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 2002), <http://www.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA402471>.

² James R. Locher III, “Has It Worked?: The Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act,” *Naval War College Review* 54, no. 4 (Autumn 2001): 95–115.

³ Brenda S. Farrell, *Joint Military Education: Actions Needed to Implement DOD Recommendations for Enhancing Leadership Development* (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, October 2013), 13, <https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-29>.

The MECC Chairman may invite representatives from other commands and organizations as appropriate.”⁴ The report highlights gaps in the JPME curricula for meeting desired leader attributes. More specifically, the GAO’s report highlights areas that are directly related to the DSCA mission:

The MECC found that the 2010 HASC [House Armed Services Committee] report, for example, provided a detailed assessment of the state of JPME, and concluded that while the overall PME [professional military education] system was basically sound, some areas needed improvement, such as an increased emphasis on joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational operations.⁵

An argument can be made that the inter-agency environment of today is not unlike the inter-service environment of a pre-GNA DoD, where silos, waste, and turf wars prevailed. Leadership development is continually evolving, and varied theater environments and command authorities will require various solutions. Downrange, the DoD is accustomed to being the first-string quarterback in the theater of operations. Conversely, the homeland mission is not top-down with a DoD quarterback running the game plan. In the homeland, federalism and the Posse Comitatus Act relegate the DoD to a sixth-string status, even behind other federal agencies. Homeland missions are dealt with in a bottom-up approach, going from local to state, to state militia, to other states via Emergency Management Assistance Compacts, to federal, and finally to the DoD, as lower-level capacities are progressively exceeded.

This bottom-up DSCA environment offers some unique challenges for the DoD, but it also offers some unique opportunities. Evolving the JQS to leverage these unique opportunities may be the answer to developing DSCA leaders and closing the gap identified in the GAO report by improving joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational operations. The current JQS construct is geared toward leadership development that emphasizes leading the downrange mission and gives only notional consideration to supporting the homeland mission. In 1986, the GNA forced the DoD to evolve from inter-

⁴ “Military Education Coordination Council (MECC),” Joint Chiefs of Staff, accessed November 4, 2018, <http://www.jcs.mil/Doctrine/Joint-Education/MECC2018/>.

⁵ Farrell, *Joint Military Education*, 17.

service rivalry to the “whole of DoD” and the JQS concept. It is now time for JQS to evolve from a whole-of-DoD to a “whole-of-government” approach.

A. RESEARCH DESIGN

DoD directives and the opinions of DoD leadership provide the foundational understanding of DoD’s views on leadership development, as well as an understanding of the DSCA mission. Additionally, an overview of the evolution of leadership theory informs where leadership has been. These foundational backdrops comprise the knowledge baseline from which to begin a discourse on the evolution of DSCA-specific leadership development. Case studies of what has worked and not worked are used to build on this foundation. Finally, recommendations are made for appropriate policies to improve the JQS’s DSCA leadership development.

The topic of DoD leadership attracts disparate participants, who nonetheless are focused similarly on successful mission accomplishment. The National Defense University, the director of the National Guard Bureau, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), and governors are all key stakeholders. Yet Congress has the power to override them all and mandate change as it did with the GNA. A major objective (when it comes to the audience) is to navigate the balance of writing for military readers who are well versed in the DSCA mission as well as politicians who may have a lesser working knowledge of the DSCA mission. Understanding that CJCS can approve JQS adjustments and that Congress can mandate them helps to frame recommendations that result from the research.

Another challenge in suggesting improvements to DSCA leadership development is to find ways that satisfy joint officer policy requirements for professional military education yet retain flexibility. Having the flexibility to take advantage of unique opportunities and challenges is essential to agility and relevant content. By leveraging opportunities and challenges, the DoD can learn broad lessons across various disciplines. The thesis highlights possible solutions; however, the goal is to reveal the need for DSCA-focused leadership development, not a specific program or approach.

B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Because leadership, experience, education, JQS, and DSCA are all topics that provide ample opportunities to meander, two research questions serve to focus the scope and intent. The first part of this thesis attempts to address the following question: What are the leadership qualities required of officers working in domestic interagency environments? Another part offers potential solutions to the following question: How should the Joint Qualification System, as used by the DoD, be modified for officers working in DSCA and true interagency environments? Narrowing the scope to these two questions provides the compass to steer research, discourse, case-study selection, and solution suggestions. Answering the leadership qualities question provides the data needed to then suggest solutions for the modification question.

II. EVOLUTION OF LEADERSHIP THEORY

The greatest enemy of learning is knowing.

—John Maxwell

A. BACKGROUND: DOCTRINE

While knowing doctrine and procedures can set the foundation for understanding and give the practitioner a valuable head start, much of the DSCA mission, as with any mission, involves learning techniques and localisms. Doctrinal sources for DSCA include acts of Congress, DoD instructions, DoD manuals, joint publications (JPs), secretary of defense strategic documents, combatant command concept plans, service-level instructions, and policies established by the joint institutions themselves. The most important act of Congress applicable to DSCA is the Posse Comitatus Act, passed in 1878, which restricts the government's use of federal military forces in domestic law enforcement issues.⁶ Notably, the restrictions enumerated in this act do not apply to National Guard state militias. The most important act of Congress applicable to JPME/JQS is the Goldwater–Nichols Act of 1986, which was followed shortly thereafter by the Skelton Report in 1989.⁷ Together, these two documents represent the single most extensive overhaul of the DoD and the creation of the joint-matters concept. The concept is all about combining JPME with joint experience. At the instruction level, DoD Instruction 3025.22 speaks to the National Guard's role in DSCA.⁸ At the operational level, DoD Manual 3025.01 spells out learning points from the past as well as current operational-level DSCA policy and is the foundation for subordinate publications.⁹ Three joint publications form

⁶ Posse Comitatus Act, Public Law 45-263, *U.S. Statutes at Large* 20 (1878):152, <http://legisworks.org/congress/45/session-2/chap-263.pdf>.

⁷ Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, Public Law 99-433, *U.S. Statutes at Large* 100 (1986): 992–1075, <https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-100/pdf/STATUTE-100-Pg992.pdf>; and *Report of the Panel on Military Education*, House of Representatives, 101st Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1989).

⁸ Department of Defense, *The Use of the National Guard for Defense Support of Civil Authorities*, DoD Instruction 3025.22 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2013).

⁹ Department of Defense, *Defense Support of Civil Authorities: Overview*, DoD Manual 3025.01, vol. 1 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2016).

the foundation for DSCA: JP 3-28 is about the armed forces and DSCA; JP 3-41 details chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear response; and JP 3-08 reveals policy for interagency coordination including with foreign governments and civilian authorities.¹⁰ These primary sources of DSCA doctrine will give the reader who is unfamiliar with DSCA a foundational understanding of the structure and procedure involved in the mission.

Opinion sources on DSCA comprise innumerable GAO reports, congressional studies, theses, and scholarly articles, thereby doing a cogent review beyond the scope of this literature review; however, this thesis draws on some of these relevant sources throughout the paper. Additionally, in opening the aperture to leadership theory, the following section broadens the scope to include a myriad of books and other sources.

B. ANTECEDENT: VERTICAL LEADERSHIP

Identifying leadership qualities required of officers working in DSCA environments and making recommendations about the evolution of JQS must necessarily include a review of the literature on the evolution of leadership theory. Without a review of leadership theory evolution, there is a risk of devolving to a solution that has previously proven inadequate or incomplete. Examining roads previously traveled and competing theories enables a genuinely informed attempt at paving new ground for the JQS.

1. Trait Theory

Leaders are born, not made. The hypothesis of trait theory is that successful leaders possess key attributes. This research has attempted to identify intellectual, psychological, physical, or emotional traits that can be used to select potential leaders. While some traits at times seem better than others, trait theory literature does not settle on any consistently

¹⁰ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Defense Support of Civil Authorities*, Joint Publication 3-28 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2013), http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_28.pdf; Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Consequence Management*, Joint Publication 3-41 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2012); and Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Interorganizational Coordination during Joint Operations*, Joint Publication 3-08 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011).

clear leadership trends or traits.¹¹ Trait theory proves to be incomplete, as it discounts the idea that other factors can be just as critical to leadership success.

2. Behavior Theory

This work focuses more on what leaders do than on the inborn attributes they possess.¹² Researchers at Michigan State, Ohio State, and other universities have studied leadership behaviors and how those behaviors intersect with organizations, essentially attempting to craft a recipe book for leadership.¹³ The results of this research have given rise to the notion that if leadership is not an inborn trait, then it can be taught.¹⁴ Building on this work, Blake, Shepard, and Mouton have developed the leadership factors of concern for people, concern for output, and flexibility.¹⁵ While behavior theory suggests that leadership can be taught, it does more to categorize leadership styles than to prescribe the proper components to teach. Moreover, it serves to highlight the idea that leadership is more complex than merely being innate.

3. Contingency Theory

Many and varied contingency theories allege that effective leadership depends on the interplay of two or more variables. Fred Fiedler suggests that leadership style and situational favorability to that style are the magic formula.¹⁶ Path-goal theory presents the importance of follower motivation and a leader's ability to satisfy it. Vroom and Yetton

¹¹ Luther Lee Bernard, *An Introduction to Social Psychology* (New York: Holt, 1926).

¹² A. W. Halpin and B. J. Winer, "A Factorial Study of the Leader Behavior Description," in *Leader Behavior: Its Description and Measurement*, ed. Ralph M. Stogdill and Alvin E. Coons (Columbus: Ohio State University, 1957), 39-51; and Ralph Melvin Stogdill and Alvin E. Coons, eds., *Leader Behavior: Its Description and Measurement* (Columbus: Ohio State University, 1957).

¹³ John K. Hemphill and Alvin E. Coons, "Development of the Leader Behavior Description Questionnaire," in *Leader Behavior: Its Description and Measurement*, ed. Ralph M. Stogdill and Alvin E. Coons (Columbus: Ohio State University, 1957), 38.

¹⁴ Frank E. Saal and Patrick A. Knight, *Industrial/Organizational Psychology: Science and Practice* (Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole Publishing, 1988).

¹⁵ Robert Rogers Blake, Herbert A. Shepard, and Jane S. Mouton, *Managing Intergroup Conflict in Industry* (Houston: Gulf, 1964).

¹⁶ Fred Edward Fiedler, *A Theory of Leadership Effectiveness* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967).

conclude that a decision tree is the solution.¹⁷ The vertical dyad linkage theory uses the in-group/out-group framework to establish the leader-member exchange theory.¹⁸ Thus, the advent of various contingency theories has broadened the scope of successful leadership study. To this point, the literature suggests that traits and behaviors of the leader, situational context, and follower characteristics are all components of successful leadership.

4. Culture Theory

Leadership research has also broadened to include consideration of organizational culture.¹⁹ Leaders like Steve Jobs of Apple and Sergey Brin and Larry Page of Google are often credited as leading a culture that has been the source of company success. Companies like Apple and Google are agile largely due to leadership that inculcates an innovative culture into the company ethos. The innovative culture of Apple and Google makes them receptive to evolutionary change.²⁰

5. Motivation Theory

The idea behind motivation theory is summed up by the following cliché: “If you take care of the people, they will take care of the mission.” Frederick Herzberg’s two-factor satisfaction/dissatisfaction model lists satisfaction as a motivator and hygiene factors as de-motivators.²¹ Herzberg contends that satisfaction and dissatisfaction are separate continua that leaders must address individually. Maslow’s hierarchy of needs proposes that followers must satisfy lower-order needs before they address higher-order ones.²² Clayton

¹⁷ Victor H. Vroom and Philip W. Yetton, *Leadership and Decision-Making* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1973).

¹⁸ George Graen, “Role-Making Processes within Complex Organizations,” in *Handbook of Industrial and Organizational Psychology* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1976).

¹⁹ Edgar H. Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2006).

²⁰ Angela Baron, “Going Public with Studies on Culture Management,” *People Management* 1, no. 19 (September 1995): 60.

²¹ Chartered Management Institute, “Frederick Herzberg: The Hygiene Motivation Theory” (London: Chartered Management Institute, June 2003), <https://www.managers.org.uk/~media/Campus%20Resources/Frederick%20Herzberg%20-%20The%20hygiene%20motivation%20theory.ashx>.

²² Abraham H. Maslow, *Toward a Psychology of Being* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2013).

Alderfer posits that there are only three needs: existence, relatedness, and growth.²³ Henry Murray takes the opposite approach in suggesting there are many needs.²⁴ Expectancy theory is based on expected outcomes.²⁵ Equity theory is based on input and output.²⁶ Goal-setting theory assumes that followers are motivated to achieve goals set by leaders.²⁷ Finally, consequences are the core motivator in reinforcement theory.²⁸ The vertical theories to this point have focused on the roles of leaders and followers, but a transition has affected those traditional roles and forced leadership theory to evolve.

C. TRANSITION: INDUSTRIAL AGE TO INFORMATION AGE

The work of Frederick Winslow Taylor is an example of vertical-style industrial age leadership. Taylor was a visionary who had an incredible global impact. In *The One Best Way*, Jeremy Rifkin says, “[Taylor] has probably had a greater effect on the private and public lives of the men and women of the twentieth century than any other single individual.”²⁹ Peter Drucker places him ahead of Marx and on par with Darwin and Freud as an intellectual thinker.³⁰ His self-described “scientific methods” were essentially prescriptive, vertical leadership directives aimed at squeezing every ounce of efficiency possible from a given process. He was known for carrying a stopwatch and clocking tasks to find the single best, most efficient way to complete a task. The results were undeniable. Efficiency gains at a pig iron plant went from 12.5 to 47 tons of steel and from 600 workers

²³ Clayton P. Alderfer, “An Empirical Test of a New Theory of Human Needs,” *Organizational Behavior and Human Performance* 4, no. 2 (May 1969): 142–75, [https://doi.org/10.1016/0030-5073\(69\)90004-X](https://doi.org/10.1016/0030-5073(69)90004-X).

²⁴ Henry A. Murray, *Explorations in Personality* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1938).

²⁵ Victor H. Vroom, *Work and Motivation* (New York: Wiley, 1964).

²⁶ J. S. Adams, “Inequity in Social Exchange,” in *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, vol. 2, ed. L. Berkowitz (New York: Academic Press, 1965), 267–299.

²⁷ Edwin A. Locke, “Toward a Theory of Task Motivation and Incentives,” *Organizational Behavior and Human Performance* 3, no. 2 (1968): 157–189.

²⁸ B. F. Skinner, *Cumulative Record*, definitive ed. (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1959).

²⁹ Robert Kanigel, *The One Best Way: Frederick Winslow Taylor and the Enigma of Efficiency* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), 8, https://books.google.com/books?id=2PgXCC5Ck_MC.

³⁰ Kanigel, 502–3.

down to only 40.³¹ A ball bearing factory went from 120 to 35 workers.³² Material costs at a paper mill were reduced from \$75 to \$35 per ton, and labor costs were cut from \$30 to just eight dollars per ton for an overall 60 percent reduction in costs.³³ Taylor was immensely successful in the industrial age, yet his leadership style may not work with today's information age workforce. An excerpt from his book is a case in point:

[A laborer] shall be so stupid and so phlegmatic that he more nearly resembles in his mental make-up the ox than any other type. . . . The workman who is best suited to handling pig iron is unable to understand the real science of doing this class of work. He is so stupid that the word "percentage" has no meaning to him, and he must consequently be trained by a man more intelligent than himself into the habit of working in accordance with the laws of this science before he can be successful.³⁴

The literature on leadership theory is continually evolving because the workplace and the worker are continually evolving. The information age puts knowledge in the hands of nearly anyone who desires to evolve beyond the "phlegmatic" worker that Taylor speaks of. Presumably, the methods to develop leadership qualities of officers working in domestic interagency environments should evolve, too. That is not to say that old, or even new, research is wrong. Valuable nuggets of wisdom can be harvested from past and present leadership theories. Certainly, the efficiencies of scientific management can still be applied today. Nevertheless, it is the vast body of work in its entirety that begins to reveal what may have initially been viewed as merely a complicated field is fast becoming a complex one.³⁵ The past decade or so has seen a trend in leadership research that continues to build upon previous works to generate a more holistic approach to leadership in the new information age. Transactional leadership theory, which seeks to lead with the goal of task completion, is giving way to transformational theory.³⁶

³¹ Frederick Winslow Taylor, *The Principles of Scientific Management* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1913), 42, 43, Google Books.

³² Kanigel, *The One Best Way*, 304.

³³ Kanigel, 260.

³⁴ Taylor, *The Principles of Scientific Management*, 59.

³⁵ The difference between complicated and complex are discussed more thoroughly later in this thesis.

³⁶ James MacGregor Burns, *Leadership* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1978).

Transformational leadership theory, which seems to affect follower performance more positively, is more about motivation and organizational change.³⁷ A meta-analysis comparing singular and transformational leadership reveals that the latter is a more effective approach for team effectiveness.³⁸ Each of these draws from previous theories and builds on them to make sense of growing complexity. According to Wilson, George, and Wellins, “One of the greatest changes in our business world is the transformation of an industrial-based economy into an information-based economy.”³⁹ This new information age requires speed, agility, and innovation at a pace that is accelerating. Moore’s law, which so far has proven to be generally true, says that transistors in a circuit will double every two years.⁴⁰ This notion that processing speeds double every two years is often used as a metaphor for the notion that information, change, and life are accelerating similarly. For example, a Standard & Poor’s 500 company in the 1950s could expect to reign for 60 years, but in 2017, Credit Suisse claimed that time at the top would last only for 20 years.⁴¹ Innosight says that time at the top will be only 14 years by 2026.⁴² This evolution from a relatively static efficiency-focused industrial age to an ever-accelerating, agility-focused information age is, not surprisingly, affecting the evolution of leadership theory. In her

³⁷ Bernard M. Bass, *Leadership and Performance beyond Expectations* (New York: Free Press, 1985); and Timothy A. Judge and Ronald F. Piccolo, “Transformational and Transactional Leadership: A Meta-Analytic Test of Their Relative Validity,” *Journal of Applied Psychology* 89, no. 5 (2004): 755–768, <https://doi.org/10.1037/0021-9010.89.5.755>.

³⁸ Judge and Piccolo, “Transformational and Transactional Leadership, 755–68. “The foundation of scientific research is based on primary studies that collect data under a given set of conditions (i.e., experiments or field studies) and examine effects on, or relationships among, the observed variables of interest. However, all research is subject to limitations and no single study is definitive. Thus, there is considerable value in the use of a meta-analysis to quantitatively combine multiple primary studies and summarize their findings.” National Research Council, *Enhancing the Effectiveness of Team Science* (Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2015), box 3-1, <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK310384/>.

³⁹ Jeanne M. Wilson, Jill George, and Richard S. Wellins, *Leadership Trapeze: Strategies for Leadership in Team-Based Organizations* (San Francisco, Jossey-Bass, 1994), 18.

⁴⁰ G. E. Moore, “Cramming More Components onto Integrated Circuits,” *IEEE Solid-State Circuits Society Newsletter* 11, no. 3 (September 2006): 33–35, <https://doi.org/10.1109/N-SSC.2006.4785860>.

⁴¹ Michael J. Mauboussin, Dan Callahan, and Darius Majd, *Corporate Longevity, Index Turnover and Corporate Performance* (Zurich: Credit Suisse, February 7, 2017), https://research-doc.credit-suisse.com/docView?language=ENG&format=PDF&sourceid=em&document_id=1070991801&serialid=TqtAPA%2FTEBUW%2BgCJnJNtkenIBO4nHiyPL7Muuz0FI%3D.

⁴² Scott D. Anthony, Patrick S. Viguier, and Andrew Waldeck, “Corporate Longevity: Turbulence Ahead for Large Organizations” (executive briefing, Innosight, Spring 2016), 2, <https://www.innosight.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Corporate-Longevity-2016-Final.pdf>.

comprehensive review of leadership theory, Melissa Horner concludes, “It is suggested that tomorrow’s leaders may need to hold visions, values, assumptions and paradigms that are in agreement with having a team-oriented, empowered workforce in order to be most successful.”⁴³ This team-oriented mindset, borne of the information age, is generating a new area of leadership theory.

D. SUBSEQUENT: SHARED LEADERSHIP

Vertical industrial-age leadership literature from the past tends to focus on the two roles of leader and follower.⁴⁴ Information-age leadership literature in the present is immature but trending away from those old-school top-down hierarchical approaches and toward flatter, more distributed, shared leadership approaches.⁴⁵ These distributed team approaches share responsibilities and leadership roles in pursuit of common goals and seek to leverage the power and agility of multiple minds rather than depend on the mind and abilities of a single leader.⁴⁶ There are branches of the shared leadership concept. Carson, Tesluk, and Marrone espouse an overall shared leadership theory.⁴⁷ Pearce and Ensley embrace a shared vision model.⁴⁸ Hmieleski, Cole, and Baron adopt a shared authentic

⁴³ Melissa Horner, “Leadership Theory: Past, Present and Future,” *Team Performance Management: An International Journal* 3, no. 4 (December 1997): 282, <https://doi.org/10.1108/13527599710195402>; and Charles C. Manz and Henry P. Sims Jr., “Leading Workers to Lead Themselves: The External Leadership of Self-Managing Work Teams,” *Administrative Science Quarterly* 32, no. 1 (March 1987): 106–29, <https://doi.org/doi:10.2307/2392745>.

⁴⁴ Bernard M. Bass and Ruth Bass, *The Bass Handbook of Leadership: Theory, Research, and Managerial Applications* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2009), Google Books.

⁴⁵ David V. Day, “Leadership Development: A Review in Context,” *Leadership Quarterly* 11, no. 4 (December 2000): 581–613, [https://doi.org/10.1016/S1048-9843\(00\)00061-8](https://doi.org/10.1016/S1048-9843(00)00061-8); David V. Day and Michelle M. Harrison, “A Multilevel, Identity-Based Approach to Leadership Development,” *Human Resource Management Review* 17, no. 4 (December 2007): 360–73, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.hrmr.2007.08.007>; and Ajay Mehra et al., “Distributed Leadership in Teams: The Network of Leadership Perceptions and Team Performance,” *Leadership Quarterly* 17, no. 3 (June 2006): 232–45, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.leaqua.2006.02.003>.

⁴⁶ Jay B. Carson, Paul E. Tesluk, and Jennifer A. Marrone, “Shared Leadership in Teams: An Investigation of Antecedent Conditions and Performance,” *Academy of Management Journal* 50, no. 5 (October 2007): 1217–34, <https://doi.org/10.5465/amj.2007.20159921>.

⁴⁷ Carson, Tesluk, and Marrone, 1217–34.

⁴⁸ Craig L. Pearce and Michael D. Ensley, “A Reciprocal and Longitudinal Investigation of the Innovation Process: The Central Role of Shared Vision in Product and Process Innovation Teams,” *Journal of Organizational Behavior* 25, no. 2 (2004): 259–278, <https://doi.org/10.1002/job.235>.

framework.⁴⁹ Regardless of the specific shared leadership construct, the underlying premise follows:

In short, more recent approaches view effective leadership as less of a top-down, leader-centric process, and more of a follower-centric process through which certain understandings of leadership (e.g., sense making, vision, and so forth) emerge from lower organizational levels.⁵⁰

In “A Meta-Analysis of Shared Leadership and Team Effectiveness,” Wang, Waldman, and Zhang found that there is a positive relationship between shared leadership and team effectiveness. Among many other metrics, this one stands out: “The effects of shared leadership are stronger when the work of team members is complex.”⁵¹ In 2015, a committee from the National Academy of Sciences recognized that “team science . . . has led to scientific breakthroughs that would not otherwise have been possible.”⁵² Researchers and corporate giants like Boeing have come to realize that there is power in teams. As a result, shared leadership concepts are the latest evolution of leadership theory.

One thing, however, remains constant in the literature: every new contribution builds on the foundation of literature that has come before it. As such, shared leadership literature is a broadening of, not a replacement for, vertical leadership theory: “Shared leadership is not mutually exclusive to other leadership forms and behaviors, but can be engaged in simultaneously with other approaches such as vertical leadership.”⁵³

⁴⁹ Keith M. Hmieleski, Michael S. Cole, and Robert A. Baron, “Shared Authentic Leadership and New Venture Performance,” *Journal of Management* 38, no. 5 (2012): 1476–99, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0149206311415419>.

⁵⁰ Danni Wang, David A. Waldman, and Zhen Zhang, “A Meta-Analysis of Shared Leadership and Team Effectiveness,” *Journal of Applied Psychology* 99, no. 2 (March 2014): 181, <http://doi.org/10.1037/a0034531>.

⁵¹ Wang, Waldman, and Zhang, 181.

⁵² National Research Council, *Enhancing the Effectiveness of Team Science*, 1.

⁵³ Julia E. Hoch and James H. Dulebohn, “Shared Leadership in Enterprise Resource Planning and Human Resource Management System Implementation,” *Human Resource Management Review* 23, no. 1 (March 2013): 114–25, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.hrmr.2012.06.007>.

E. CONCLUSION

Vertical leadership literature is extensive and, at times, contradictory. Generally speaking, however, an analysis of the literature reveals that successful leadership does not happen on its own. It usually begins with some level of personal aptitude (trait theory) but is further developed with experience and education about organizations, cultures, contingencies, and environments. It then culminates with the understanding of what behaviors and motivators to use in a given context by bringing together all three: aptitude, experience, and education.

Shared (team) leadership literature is growing in response to a transition from the leader-centric industrial age to a follower-centric information age where the pace is fast, agility is required, and leadership is much more distributed. Aptitude, education, and experience are all still required for effective leadership, but the ability to apply them in a flatter environment is the paradigm shift. The environment of the interagency is one of collaboration, and the mission is bottom-up.⁵⁴ A vertical top-down authoritarian approach is simply not possible when the mission has not yet reached the top, and someone else has the authority. Leaders must have shared leadership skills to be successful in the DSCA environment. The literature is clear. Leadership theory is evolving in parallel with a fast-paced information age that does not wait for hierarchy. Corporations either shift to team leadership and agility or they die. In the DSCA mission, real people die, not corporations.

⁵⁴ DSCA missions start at the local level, then become state, and then become federal.

III. EVOLUTION OF THE DOWNRANGE MISSION

In the previous chapter, a quick survey of the literature on leadership shows that in addition to the traditional vertical leadership qualities of the industrial age, the required leadership qualities are evolving to include the shared leadership qualities of the information age. Practitioners in this chapter tell a story of evolution as well. The background case studies of WWII and Operation Eagle Claw highlight functional silos and the problem of command, a hierarchical mentality that produced less-than-optimum results and is often still prevalent in the interagency. Congress eventually mandated a change to improve results. In looking for leadership qualities required of DSCA officers, it might be tempting to stop at the antecedent case study, the Gulf War. The Gulf War's command-of-teams construct certainly produced fantastic results, and its leaders understood the importance of shared leadership.⁵⁵ However, just as the industrial age evolved into the information age, the information age is causing another evolution of the environment in which DSCA leaders operate. The information age has the power to transform complicated problems into complex ones. General A. Stanley McChrystal reveals valuable leadership qualities for DSCA officers in this chapter's subsequent section, a case study on Operation Iraqi Freedom and McChrystal's team-of-teams concept.

A. BACKGROUND: SILOS AND COMMAND

The general who advances without coveting fame and retreats without fearing disgrace, whose only thought is to protect his country and do good service for his sovereign, is the jewel of the kingdom.

—Sun Tzu⁵⁶

⁵⁵ Although the concept is discussed in more detail later, the command of teams during the Gulf War was framed by GNA and the joint-matters philosophy whereby service rivalry was replaced with a coordinated effort and shared leadership across the coalition. The coalition leadership commanded services in a way that was synchronized and synergistic.

⁵⁶ Sunzi, Sun Tzu, and Wu Sun, *The Art of War*, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), 128.

1. Command: World War II

General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz were not the jewels of the kingdom, as highlighted by Jason B. Barlow in “Interservice Rivalry in the Pacific.” Barlow paints a picture of ego and service rivalry taking precedence over sound military judgment in the Pacific Theater. MacArthur was the ranking general and war hero.⁵⁷ On the other hand, the Navy was accustomed to treating the Pacific as its own “special preserve,” and was adamantly against MacArthur as Supreme Commander.⁵⁸ After five weeks of gridlock, the Joint Chiefs finally decided to divide the Pacific Theater, with MacArthur in charge of the Southwest Pacific and Nimitz in charge of the rest of the Pacific.⁵⁹ Unity of command, it seemed, would take a back seat to politics and ego. MacArthur was incredulous:

Of all the faulty decisions of the war . . . perhaps the most unexplainable one was the failure to unify the command in the Pacific. The principle involved is perhaps the most fundamental one in the doctrine and tradition of command. . . . The failure to do so in the Pacific cannot be defended in logic, in theory, or even in common sense. Other motives must be ascribed. It resulted in divided effort, and the consequent extension of the war with added casualties and cost.⁶⁰

Despite his adamant view that command should be unified, MacArthur did not yield for the greater good. He coveted fame, and he feared disgrace. Similarly, Nimitz and his Navy, despite being inferior in rank, refused to yield a traditionally Navy-run Pacific to MacArthur. The Joint Chiefs, as evidenced by taking five weeks to decide nothing—by leaving two commands in place—were an extension of service rivalry. The *Joint* Chiefs did not embrace “jointness,” and unity of effort was at the mercy of service silos (see Figure 1).

⁵⁷ Ronald H. Spector, *Eagle against the Sun: The American War with Japan* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2012), 144, Google Books.

⁵⁸ Jason B. Barlow, “Interservice Rivalry in the Pacific,” *Joint Forces Quarterly* (Spring 1994): 77, <http://www.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA528913>.

⁵⁹ John Costello, *The Pacific War: 1941–1945* (New York: Harper Collins, 1982), 225, Google Books.

⁶⁰ Louis Morton, *The War in the Pacific: Strategy and Command: The First Two Years*, United States Army in World War II (Washington, DC: Center for Military History, 2000), 250, https://history.army.mil/html/books/005/5-1/CMH_Pub_5-1.pdf.




Figure 1. Silos and Command⁶¹

2. Command: Operation Eagle Claw

Operation Eagle Claw was another example of DoD service silos, and the results were disastrous. The services had not trained together, the helicopter pilots had not been adequately trained for the low-altitude ingress tactics, the weather forecast had not addressed the infamous haboob sandstorm phenomenon, and the services had met for the first time in the desert in Iran.⁶² Colonel James Kyle, who was the senior commander at the Desert One landing zone in Iran, would recall that there were “four commanders at the scene without visible identification, incompatible radios, and no agreed-upon plan, not even a designated location for the commander.”⁶³ In short, only 75 percent of the helicopters made it to the rendezvous point, after which one broke down. At that point, the mission was aborted, and one of the departing helicopters collided with a C-130, killing eight and leaving gear and secret documents behind.⁶⁴ Yet again, unity of effort was at the mercy of service silos.

⁶¹ Source: Stanley McChrystal et al., *Team of Teams: New Rules of Engagement for a Complex World* (New York: Penguin, 2015), loc. 2371 of 6029, Kindle.

⁶² Locher, “Has It Worked?” 5.

⁶³ Locher, 100.

⁶⁴ Locher, 100.

The House and Senate each began hearings in response to the Operation Eagle Claw (OEC) failure. Additionally, the DoD's Special Operations Review Group, otherwise known as the Holloway Commission, began its review.⁶⁵ Aside from technical and service training issues, the commission identified one fundamental strategic shortcoming: "The ad hoc nature of the organization and planning [was] related to most of the major issues and underl[ay] the group's conclusions."⁶⁶ Interservice rivalry had been the Achilles heel of the DoD for decades, but OEC was the final straw. The Holloway Report became the catalyst that eventually led to the Goldwater–Nichols Act of 1986, which then led to the JQS, breaking down silos and setting the scene for the Gulf War.

B. ANTECEDENT: THE GULF WAR AND COMMAND OF TEAMS

1. Congressional Mandate: The Goldwater–Nichols Act

There is a broad consensus that a change was needed to fix service silos, and there is general agreement that the GNA was the remedy. Jones and Adolph, Stile, and Hitt say that the GNA did not go far enough.⁶⁷ Conversely, Luttwak says that the GNA went too far.⁶⁸ The debate over whether the GNA worked, went too far, or did not go far enough, while interesting, is irrelevant to the scope of this thesis. Nevertheless, it is well within its scope to highlight DoD leadership opinions on what the GNA and the JQS attempted to accomplish. Martin Dempsey, the former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (October 2011–September 2015), is perhaps the most vocal champion of the post-GNA joint leadership renaissance.⁶⁹ General Dempsey is not alone in his belief in the primacy of joint

⁶⁵ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Iran Hostage Rescue Mission Report* (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 1980), 60, <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//NSAEBB/NSAEBB63/doc8.pdf>.

⁶⁶ Joint Chiefs of Staff, 60.

⁶⁷ R. Jones, "Goldwater-Nichols Act Take II: The Need for Legislative Change in the Interagency" (Norfolk, VA: Joint Forces Staff College), 3–5; and Robert B. Adolph Jr., Charles W. Stiles, and Franklin D. Hitt Jr., "Why Goldwater-Nichols Didn't Go Far Enough" *Joint Forces Quarterly* (Spring 1995), <http://www.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA528916>.

⁶⁸ Edward N. Luttwak, "Washington's Biggest Scandal," *Commentary* 97, no. 5 (May 1994): 29–33; and Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation, *Another Crossroads? Professional Military Education Two Decades after the Goldwater-Nichols Act and the Skelton Panel*, Committee Print 111-4 (Washington, DC: House of Representatives, April 2010), <https://eric.ed.gov/?id=ED509594>.

⁶⁹ "About," Joint Chiefs of Staff, accessed November 4, 2018, <http://www.jcs.mil/About/The-Joint-Staff/Chairman/>.

leadership development. This view is evident in strategic guidance documents and directives of senior leaders. In his strategic guidance, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta discusses a “smaller and leaner” DoD and goes on to describe the path toward the joint force of 2020: “The DoD will manage the force in ways that protect its ability to regenerate capabilities that might be needed to meet future, unforeseen demands, maintaining intellectual capital and rank structure that could be called upon to expand key elements of the force.”⁷⁰ General Dempsey also defines joint leadership as the foundation of the profession.⁷¹ Former CJCS Admiral Mike Mullen (October 2007–September 2011) presents joint force leadership as the first of three key themes in his *National Military Strategy*: “[Joint] Leadership is how we exercise the full spectrum of power to defend our national interests and advance international security and stability.”⁷² Admiral Mullen also describes full-spectrum leadership approaches that include the roles of facilitator, enabler, convener, and guarantor, which directly correlate with the DSCA mission.⁷³ Not surprisingly, national military leaders are unanimous in their support of joint leadership development. The GNA was the watershed event that gave birth to the new joint paradigm, and the department has had over 30 years to mature and adjust to the GNA mandate. Joint matters are continually evolving, and joint leadership development within the JQS should also evolve, especially given the increased emphasis on DSCA missions and increasing reliance on the reserve component as an operational force.

2. The Joint Qualification System

Before the GNA, a joint billet was the kiss of death for a military officer and was seen as the fast track to separation or retirement. Given the extent of turf protection, silos, and inter-service rivalries of the time, this was not an unexpected revelation. As the GNA

⁷⁰ Department of Defense, *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, January 2012), http://nssarchive.us/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/defense_strategic_guidance.pdf.

⁷¹ Martin E. Dempsey, *Joint Education* (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 16, 2012), 3, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/concepts/cjcs_wp_education.pdf?ver=2017-12-28-162044-527.

⁷² Joint Chiefs of Staff, “About.”

⁷³ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *The National Military Strategy of the United States of America, 2011: Redefining America’s Military Leadership* (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, February 8, 2011).

supplanted the prior construct, however, the old generation of military was replaced by the new one. Consequently, the old-school silo mindset has slowly evolved into one that values joint matters. The JQS is the system that approves joint-matters leadership development and creates joint qualified officers (JQOs). There are two requirements for becoming a JQO. The first requirement is JPME. The second requirement is to experience a full tour of duty in a joint assignment. This tour can be satisfied by either the standard path (S-JDA) selected from the joint duty assignment list or the experience path (E-JDA; see Figure 2). The bottom line is that a JQO is created by combining education with training and experience.⁷⁴ Over the years, the list of institutions approved to teach JPME has evolved. Most recently, the intelligence-centric course taught at the National Intelligence University and the international-centric course taught at the College of International Security affairs were added to the education piece of JQS. Additionally, the E-JDA was added to the experience side of the JQS (see Figure 2). The goal of the GNA and JQS mandate was to develop joint leaders who could succeed where WWII and OEC did not. The Gulf War would provide the proving ground.

⁷⁴ See Appendix A for the JQS Primer, which explains the JQS in more detail.

JOINT LEADER DEVELOPMENT		
EDUCATION		EXPERIENCE
Program	Initial Certification or Accreditation Date	JPME Phase(s)
National War College (NWC)	1 June 1989	Single-Phase ¹⁰
Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF)/(ES)	1 June 1989	Single-Phase ¹⁰
School of Information Warfare and Strategy (SIWS)	10 May 1995 ¹	Single-Phase I and II
Joint Forces Staff College (JFSC) (intermediate-level college)	1 June 1989 ²	I and II
Joint and Combined Staff Officer School (JCSOS) (JFSC ³)	15 July 1990 ⁴	II
Joint and Combined Warfighting School (JCWS) (JFSC ³)	25 October 1994	II
U.S. Army War College (USAWC)	1 June 1989 ⁵ 28 September 2007 ⁹	I II
USAWC (Non-resident)	16 February 1999	I
Army Command and General Staff College (ACGSC) (Resident)	1 June 1989 ⁵ (Phase I credit for AY 90)	I
ACGSC (Non-resident)	3 July 1991 (1st graduates produced in 1992)	I
College of Naval Warfare (CNW)	1 June 1989 ⁵ 18 May 2007 ⁹	I II
College of Naval Command and Staff (CNCS) (Resident)	1 June 1989 ⁵	I
College of Continuing Education/College of Distance Education (Navy ILC Non-resident) ⁷	29 March 1991	I
Naval Postgraduate School (NPS)	11 December 1995 ⁶	I
Air War College (AWC)	1 June 1989 ⁵ 16 November 2006 ⁹	I II
Air Command and Staff College (ACSC) (Resident)	1 June 1989 ⁵	I
ACSC (Non-resident)	2 November 1990	I
Marine Corps War College (MCWAR)	18 December 1992 14 September 2006 ⁹	I II
Marine Corps Command and Staff College (MCCSC) (Resident)	1 June 1989 ⁵	I
Marine Corps College of Continuing Education (MCCCE) (Non-resident)	28 January 1994	I ¹²
Advanced Joint Professional Military Education (AJPME)	17 December 2004	N/A ⁸
Joint Advanced Warfighting School (JAWS)	25 April 2008	Single-Phase ¹⁰
National Intelligence University (NIU)-JPME Cohort	26 October 2012	I
College of International Security Affairs (CISA)-CSCT Program Cohort	25 June 2014	II ¹¹
Notes ¹ SIWS terminated as an SLC after academic year (AY) 95-96. ² Certified as JPME Phase-I ILC prior to transformation into current configuration as JPME Phase-II program. Graduates of JFSC ILC program in Jan 89, Jan 90 and Jan 90 received both JPME Phase-I and -II credit. ³ The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 changed the name of the Armed Forces Staff College to Joint Forces Staff College. ⁴ First class to receive JPME Phase-II credit was conducted July through September 1990. ⁵ Certain officers who completed the joint track program portion of Service ILCs and SLCs in AY 89 received both JPME Phase-I and -II credit. Officers who completed Service ILCs and SLCs in AY 85 through AY 89 and completed JCSOS (JFSC) by 1 January 1994 received both JPME Phase-I and -II credit. ⁶ NPS terminated its JPME program after AY 00. ⁷ This program is currently titled the College of Distance Education. ⁸ An assessment review performed. Congressionally directed as similar, but not equal to, JPME Phase-II. Does not meet the in-residence title 10 requirements for JPME Phase-II. ⁹ Program ceased awarding JPME Phase-I credit once certified/accredited to award JPME Phase-II credit. ¹⁰ Single-Phase JPME ¹ authority rescinded upon completion of AY 11-12. Effective with AY 12-13, course is only JPME-II granting (10, U.S.C., 2155). ¹¹ AY 13-14 & 14-15 cohort graduates of the pilot curriculums are authorized to receive JPME-II credit. Accreditation of the CSCT Program as a permanent POI is expected by the end of AY 14-15. ¹² Program name changed to Marine Corps College of Distance Education and Training.		
		Standard Path (S-JDA) - Joint Duty Assignment List Tours
		Insert sampling of JDAL here
		Experience Path (E-JDA) - Joint Duty Assignment List Tours
		Insert sampling of approved self nominations here

Figure 2. JQS Leader Development Framework⁷⁵

⁷⁵ Source: Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Officer Professional Military Education Policy*, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 1800.01E (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, May 29, 2015), http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Library/Instructions/1800_01a.pdf?ver=2016-02-05-175009-547.

3. Command of Teams: The Gulf War

The Gulf War's Operation Desert Storm is the holy grail for GNA and JQS advocates. Operation Desert Storm was a mechanistic marvel that Taylor, Goldwater, Nichols, and the Holloway Commission would be proud of. It was the pinnacle of efficiency and jointness. Resolution 678 of the United Nations gave Saddam Hussein until January 15, 1991, to withdraw from Kuwait or risk being forced out.⁷⁶ On January 17, 1991, the coalition forces began prepping the battlefield by launching a 39-day bombing campaign. The ground assault commenced on February 24, 1991, and although Iraq had one of the largest armies in the world, it was concluded 100 hours later.⁷⁷ In *An Operational Analysis of the Persian Gulf War*, Colonel Douglass W. Craft presents two of the most critical contributors to success. The first was “an intellectual renaissance and the development of a professional education system for officers and NCO's.”⁷⁸ The second was the National Training Center. Both were implemented many years before Desert Storm. The Gulf War coalition consisted primarily of British, U.S., French, and Saudi forces in a dual-command authority construct. General Schwarzkopf commanded U.S. forces (commander in chief of Central Command) and had operational control over British forces while Saudi Lieutenant General Khalid bin Sultan commanded Arab forces (the Joint Force Theater of Operations Command) and have operational control (initially) over French forces.⁷⁹ The dual-command structure of Schwarzkopf and Khalid could have easily resulted in a silo-centric operational quagmire reminiscent of MacArthur and Nimitz's needless extension of WWII. Fortunately, the two Gulf War generals rejected silo mentality to command the various countries' teams, and common education and training

⁷⁶ G.A. Res. 678, at 27 (November 29, 1990), <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/678>.

⁷⁷ “Iraq and the World's Biggest Armies,” *Los Angeles Times*, March 6, 1991, http://articles.latimes.com/1991-03-06/news/mn-359_1_north-korea; and Richard S. Lowry, *The Gulf War Chronicles* (New York: iUniverse, 2003), 1, 74, 80.

⁷⁸ Douglas W. Craft, *An Operational Analysis of the Persian Gulf War* (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, August 31, 1992), 6, <https://doi.org/10.21236/ADA256145>.

⁷⁹ “Lieutenant General Khalid bin Sultan commanded the Joint Force/Theater of Operations Command which consisted of the Saudi Arabian Armed Forces (SAAF), the Saudi Arabian National Guard (SANG), the Arab/Islamic Corps consisting of two Egyptian and one Syrian divisions, and all other Arab and Islamic forces from the Persian Gulf and regional neighbors.” Upon commencement of the Desert Storm portion of the war, General Schwarzkopf had operational control of the French forces. Craft, *An Operational Analysis of the Persian Gulf War*, 22–23.

were foundational to their shared leadership. As Craft describes, “The relationship between General Schwarzkopf and Lieutenant General Khalid developed as one of lead and support. . . . He [Khalid] was educated in U.S. military schools at Fort Leavenworth and Maxwell Air Force Base and this training provided a common basis of language and doctrine.”⁸⁰ At the operational level, effective command of teams grounded in common education, language, and doctrine is why the Persian Gulf War was so impressive (see Figure 3).




Figure 3. Command of Teams⁸¹

C. TRANSITION: COMPLICATED TO COMPLEX

It would be tempting to stop at the Gulf War when searching for leadership qualities that DSCA officers need to develop. After all, everything seemed to go right. Indeed, there are good command-of-teams lessons to take from the Gulf War; however, it was nearly three decades ago, and the downrange environment has evolved dramatically. The transition in the previous chapter identified the shift from an industrial age to an information age and its role in the evolution of leadership theory toward shared leadership. The information age has brought with it never-before-seen data volume at everyone’s fingertips. That knowledge is not only quickening the pace of change but also changing the kinds of changes. The increased awareness that big data and the information age provides is causing a change from complicated to complex. Henry Ford’s assembly line was complicated but generally linear and could be broken down into industrial-age Tayloristic,

⁸⁰ Craft, 23.

⁸¹ Source: McChrystal et al., *Team of Teams*, loc. 2371.

reductionist tasks.⁸² Conversely, Boeing's construction of a 787 airliner is a complex endeavor that comprises an expansive team of suppliers, workers, countries, and minds.⁸³ Accordingly, a tsunami in Asia, tariffs on steel, or sanctions on Iran could all have a ripple effect in such a complex network of interdependencies.

Complicated and *complex* are often used as synonyms, but there are important differences. In WWII, cracking the code for Japanese hierarchical transmissions was a complicated effort involving the construction of a replica of the Japanese coding machine known as the "Purple Machine."⁸⁴ Knowing that the Japanese changed the cipher every three months further complicated the effort. That said, when something is complicated, it is generally linear and predictable. Even though being complicated may involve many parts, each is connected in simple, linear succession. McChrystal et al. explain complicated as follows:

The workings of a complicated device like an internal combustion engine might be confusing, but they ultimately can be broken down into a series of neat and tidy deterministic relationships; by the end, you will be able to predict with relative certainty what will happen when one part of the device is activated or altered.⁸⁵

Complex, on the other hand, is generally unpredictable due to the vast number of interconnections. Tracking the transmissions of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) involved a distributed network of transmissions using a virtual private network and

⁸² Taylorism emphasizes maximum efficiency to the extent of timed reductionist task cards. Taylor, *The Principles of Scientific Management*.

⁸³ Dominic Gates, "Boeing 787: Parts from Around World Will Be Swiftly Integrated," *Seattle Times*, September 11, 2005, <https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-787-parts-from-around-world-will-be-swiftly-integrated/>.

⁸⁴ Erik J. Dahl, *Intelligence and Surprise Attack: Failure and Success from Pearl Harbor to 9/11 and Beyond* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2013), loc. 758, Kindle.

⁸⁵ McChrystal et al., *Team of Teams*, loc. 1068.

The Onion Router to access the Dark Web to send anonymous messages via Telegram.⁸⁶ Sure, intercepting ISIS transmissions is difficult, but the information age also provides big data. It is often assumed that big data can sift through all the complexity and find the answer, but it cannot. Big data alone cannot offset the challenge of complexity. The story of Tarek al-Tyeb Mohamed Bouszizi is an example of how the information age is turning what might have been a locally complicated fruit vendor's protest in the town square into something as internationally complex as the Arab Spring:

When he [Tarek al-Tayeb Mohamed Bouazizi] douses himself with gasoline and self-immolates, events spiral out of control at breakneck speed: A crowd protests his death, and his cousin records the scene on his iPhone. Videos appear on YouTube within two days, along with a picture of Tarek, aflame and dying. More protests erupt. Videos of those protests wind up on Facebook. Arabs everywhere see their Tunisian brethren in the streets. Not only Al Jazeera, but The New York Times and The Guardian make trips to the small town of Sidi Bouzid. Within three months, the thirty-year reign of Hosni Mubarak is brought to an end some 1,400 miles away in Cairo, Muammar Gaddafi starts losing control of Libya after four decades in power, and Syria begins its descent into intractable civil war. Despite having more data about Arab societies—and about individuals like Tarek—than at any time in history, no government, search engine, or social media platform foresaw Tarek's self-immolation or the impact it would have.⁸⁷

There is no Tayloristic task card, no doctrinal source, no Watson computer, and no big-data processing capability that could have predicted a fruit vendor named Tarek in Tunisia would set off a chain reaction of human events like the Arab Spring. The information age is turning complicated problems into complex ones, and leaders must be developed not only to recognize it but also to counter it. Complex means that shared

⁸⁶ Ruixi Yuan and W. Timothy Strayer, *Virtual Private Networks: Technologies and Solutions* (Boston: Addison-Wesley, 2001), 2; Jett Goldsmith, "The Jihadists' Digital Toolbox: How ISIS Keeps Quiet on the Web," *Bellingcat* (blog), July 22, 2016, <https://www.bellingcat.com/news/mena/2016/07/22/the-jihadists-digital-toolbox-how-isis-keeps-quiet-on-the-web/>; M. G. Reed, P. F. Syverson, and D. M. Goldschlag, "Anonymous Connections and Onion Routing," *IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications* 16, no. 4 (May 1998): 482–94, <https://doi.org/10.1109/49.668972>; Hsinchun Chen et al., "Uncovering the Dark Web: A Case Study of Jihad on the Web," *Journal of the American Society for Information Science and Technology* 59, no. 8 (June 2008): 1347–59, <https://doi.org/10.1002/asi.20838>; and Ellis Hamburger, "Why Telegram Has Become the Hottest Messaging App in the World," *Verge*, February 25, 2014, <https://www.theverge.com/2014/2/25/5445864/telegram-messenger-hottest-app-in-the-world>.

⁸⁷ McChrystal et al., *Team of Teams*, loc. 1021.

leadership skills and commanding teams, the skills that made Schwarzkopf and Khalid more efficient than MacArthur and Nimitz, are no longer enough (see Figure 4).




Figure 4. Complicated versus Complex⁸⁸

Fast forward to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). General Stanley McChrystal learned through experience that complexity required the Gulf War skills of shared leadership and command of teams to be taken to the next level. The evolution from the industrial age to the information age, which in turn has created an evolution from complicated to complex, necessarily requires leaders and leadership-development programs to evolve. General McChrystal agrees and critiques the early part of OIF: “In Iraq, we were using complicated solutions to attack a complex problem.”⁸⁹ He goes on to say, “We have moved from data-poor but fairly predictable settings to data-rich, uncertain ones.”⁹⁰

⁸⁸ Source: McChrystal et al., loc. 1090.

⁸⁹ McChrystal et al., loc. 1301.

⁹⁰ McChrystal et al., loc. 1355.

D. SUBSEQUENT: OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM AND COMMANDING A TEAM OF TEAMS

The Gulf War was a complicated problem to solve in a data-poor, predictable setting. OIF was a complex problem to solve in a data-rich, uncertain one. While General McChrystal had a supremely efficient GNA- and JQS-enabled DoD at his disposal during OIF, just as General Schwarzkopf had during the Gulf War, the two generals faced vastly different adversaries. Schwarzkopf faced a complicated force-on-force tactical problem while McChrystal faced a complex counterinsurgency tactical problem. Consider the fact that the Gulf War occurred in 1991, and “the internet was mainstream among researchers by 1989, among Silicon Valley movers and shakers by mid-1995, and by most US households by 2001.”⁹¹ Consider also that while mobile phone technology existed, it was in its infancy. In 1992, the Motorola International 3200 was a state-of-the-art mobile phone and classified as “very small” at brick-size with a six-inch antennae.⁹² It weighed in at over one pound and boasted 30–60 minutes of talk time on a five-hour charge. Conversely, during OIF, the internet was mainstream, and the smallest cell phones could take pictures, access the internet, and fit in a pocket. Technology accelerating at the pace of Moore’s law turned an environment that was geographically the same from complicated to complex. Leaders of the future will need to accept, even embrace, the pace of change and uncertainty that Moore’s law and complexity bring, and they will need to develop new ways to deal with it.

McChrystal came to realize that the efficiency machine that was the DoD, while formidable and the most advanced fighting force on the planet, was not in itself adequate to deal with the complex threat that he faced. The DoD was efficient to be sure, but it was also mired in processes and procedures that often impeded flexibility and resilience. His solution was to pivot away from efficiency in favor of adaptability, trust, and transparency (see Figure 5):

⁹¹ Shane Greenstein, *How the Internet Became Commercial: Innovation, Privatization, and the Birth of a New Network* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015).

⁹² “International 3200 GSM SLF1770 A or B,” Radio Museum, accessed August 25, 2018, https://www.radiomuseum.org/r/motorola_international_3200_gsm_slf1770_a_or_b.html.

The solution we devised was a “team of teams”—an organization within which the relationships between constituent teams resembled those between individuals on a single team: teams that had traditionally resided in separate silos would now have to become fused to one another via trust and purpose.⁹³




Figure 5. Commanding a Team of Teams⁹⁴

1. Adaptability

McChrystal’s Task Force was continually frustrated by the enemy’s ability to outplay them. Despite having command of teams and an understanding of shared leadership, and despite having the most advanced technology and weaponry, the Task Force found that the enemy could adapt faster than it could. Policies, procedures, distrust, silos, and information sharing were all barriers to Task Force adaptability. In hindsight, all of the information, intelligence, equipment, and expertise were available to thwart the enemy’s operation, but often they came together too late. The complex environment of the enemy was moving at information-age speeds. McChrystal’s leadership challenge was in finding a way for his Task Force to move at information-age speeds, too. He needed a more adaptable Task Force. The enemy was adaptable, and McChrystal knew of adaptable teams in his organization. Navy Sea Air and Land (SEAL) Team Six is the premier adaptability organization. Whether rescuing Captain Philips from a dinghy at sea or abducting a high-value target like Osama Bin Laden in Abbottabad, Pakistan, SEAL Team Six is extensively

⁹³ McChrystal et al., *Team of Teams*, loc. 2413.

⁹⁴ Source: McChrystal et al., loc. 2377.

trained and well versed in the unpredictable and complex. The Basic Underwater Demolition/SEAL (BUD/S) training course is a particularly grueling endeavor that not only educates and trains its graduates for the unpredictable and complex but also binds its graduates with a level of trust that is equal to or greater than a shared familial bloodline. For McChrystal, the team-of-teams revelation was not in the existence of adaptable, flexible, resilient teams like SEAL Team Six; trust and transparency were the two components that made small teams adaptable. The wicked problem for McChrystal was how to replicate the small team dynamic throughout his giant task force so that it could adapt at information-age speeds. His solution, a team of teams, is a template even for the gargantuan interagency force of the DSCA mission. Moreover, the leadership qualities that McChrystal's officers needed to develop—shared leadership, adaptability, trust, embedding, and transparency—are the same leadership qualities that DSCA officers need to develop. The leadership qualities are the same; there are just different names for the silos that have to be overcome.

2. Trust

Building a Task Force team of teams would require trust, and embedding was how the task force created that trust. Just as the shared experience of BUD/S builds the foundation of trust for Navy SEALs, so too did the embedding program in Iraq build a foundation of trust for the Task Force. The idea was controversial at first because the best and brightest proven battlefield superstars were chosen for liaison officer (LNO) positions in places far from the battlefield like embassies and agency operations centers. As time passed, however, the task force began to realize that “by building personal relationships, [it] could build between teams some of the fluency that traditionally exists within teams. . . . And their feelings of trust and understanding would expand to the other unit, even if they'd only really gotten to know a single operator.”⁹⁵ McChrystal writes, “We became LNO fanatics.”⁹⁶

⁹⁵ McChrystal et al., loc. 3182, 3201.

⁹⁶ McChrystal et al., loc. 3219.

One key point to re-emphasize is that the embedding program was successful because the Task Force chose LNOs who were the best possible representatives from their organizations because these LNOs would personify the host agency's or organization's impression of the Task Force. If the task force sent a dimwit to be an LNO, then the host would view the Task Force as a force of dimwits. McChrystal and his leadership team understood that while it was painful to send the best and brightest, it was the only way to build a team of teams based on trust: "When asking for LNO nominations to fill critical positions, we used two criteria: (1) if it doesn't pain you to give the person up, pick someone else; (2) if it's not someone whose voice you'll recognize when they call you at home at 2:00 a.m., pick someone else."⁹⁷

Make no mistake, the level of trust created by the task-force embedding program and the level of trust created by the BUD/S program are not the same. Trust within a team of deeply connected members will always be stronger than the trust forged by liaison-level connection. Fortunately for the task force, the liaison-level connection built enough trust to enable transparency and information sharing to establish a "shared consciousness" throughout the task force.

3. Shared Consciousness: Transparency and Information Sharing

While the goal of the embedding program was to build trust in pursuit of adaptability, McChrystal discovered another valuable tool to kick-start the cycle. That tool was the daily operations and intelligence (O&I) briefing. McChrystal took a decidedly different approach to the O&I briefing. Instead of the old "need to know" paradigm, he let the entire enterprise look behind the curtain. In his quest for "shared consciousness," McChrystal strived to share everything possible with the widest possible audience. Successes, failures, wicked problems, innovative solutions—everything was on the table. The Task Force and its partners would need to overcome cultural barriers and the silo mindset if transparency had a chance. The Task Force would have to take the first leap of faith, and the O&I briefing was the mechanism. In time, the example set by the O&I briefing's transparency began to breed buy-in from other stakeholders, and a systemic

⁹⁷ McChrystal et al., loc. 3223.

understanding began to emerge to complement the lateral connectivity that the embedding program provided: “Together, these two cornerstones—systemic understanding and strong lateral connectivity—grounded shared consciousness.”⁹⁸ The story that *A Team of Teams* tells regarding intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets highlights the importance of shared consciousness. The technological advances that ISR provided were invaluable to ground commanders in theater. The ability to continuously watch the enemy in full-motion video provided opportunities never before seen. Accordingly, commanders were loath to give up the capability, and when the assets were taken from them, it caused “internal convulsions in the task force.” In time, however, shared consciousness began to have the intended effect:

Before, these decisions took place behind closed doors. Now, the resourcing conversations sometimes occurred right in front of them during an O&I. “When we started constantly talking at lower levels of the organization,” explains an enlisted SEAL who worked with the Task Force in Iraq, “we could basically see where the fight was hot, where it wasn’t, and where people needed ISR the most. Plus, we could see that it was actually to our benefit sometimes to surrender that asset.” With that awareness came a faith that when theirs was the priority mission, they would get what they needed when they needed it.⁹⁹

E. CONCLUSION

The downrange mission has evolved tremendously over the years. WWII and Operation Eagle Claw were examples of service rivalry, silos, and command. A change was needed. When the DoD could not act, Congress rightly did. While the GNA and JQS fuel debate to this day, there is no disputing that the Gulf War was a marvel of military execution. On those grounds, evolving to the GNA and JQS had the desired effect. Moving to jointness and the command of teams resulted in mission success. Even so, the battlespace is an ever-changing environment. General Schwarzkopf (Gulf War) and General McChrystal (OIF) faced the same geography but radically different environments. The information age (and a different mission objective) changed Schwarzkopf’s complicated environment into McChrystal’s complex one. Success in this new complex environment

⁹⁸ McChrystal et al., loc. 3406.

⁹⁹ McChrystal et al., loc. 3293.

required not only the DoD's industrial-age efficiency but also a command evolution to a team of teams whereby jointness was taken to the next level via the trust and shared consciousness that embedding and transparency provides.

Regardless of whether they come from top-down mandate or self-awareness, lessons from the downrange mission can and must be applied to the homeland mission. While the GNA was successful top-down legislation that evolved the downrange mission from command to the command of teams, a similar piece of homeland legislation might have less utility in the legally bottom-up homeland mission. For the homeland mission, the objective of the top-down component should be modeled after McChrystal's authority in changing paradigms and challenging outdated processes and assumptions to enable a bottom-up team of teams.

IV. EVOLUTION OF THE HOMELAND MISSION

Chapter II presented the leadership qualities required through the lens of academia. The industrial age has given way to the information age, and leadership theory has evolved from vertical leadership qualities toward shared leadership qualities. Chapter III presented leadership qualities required of officers through the lens of downrange practitioners and case studies. Downrange leadership has evolved from the silos and command of WWII and Operation Eagle Claw to the command of teams of the Gulf War to commanding a team of teams in OIF. The information age has turned the complicated into the complex; therefore, downrange officers require qualities such as adaptability, trust, and shared consciousness to leverage the entire enterprise.

This chapter presents the leadership qualities required of DSCA officers through the lens of homeland DSCA practitioners and case studies. Homeland DSCA leadership has evolved from the silos and command of Hurricane Katrina to the command of teams of Superstorm Sandy but has yet to fully evolve into commanding a team of teams as in the downrange mission. To evolve into commanding a team of teams, the DSCA mission must leverage and develop the same critical adaptability, agility, trust, and shared consciousness components that the downrange mission did.

A. BACKGROUND: DSCA AND THE LAW

Evolving the DSCA mission from commanding teams to commanding a team of teams is not as simple as copying the downrange task force template. It requires an understanding of distinct legal differences that differentiate the Homeland DSCA mission. The United States of America was framed by founding fathers with a common distrust of standing armies.¹⁰⁰ Thomas Jefferson, who wrote the first draft of the Declaration of Independence and later became the nation's third president, argued strongly for state's

¹⁰⁰ Alex Dalenberg, "The Master Builder," *TIME*, The Founding Fathers, special edition, 2018, 74–75.

rights.¹⁰¹ Moreover, Article X of the U.S. Constitution reads, “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States, respectively, or to the people.”¹⁰² Additionally, James Madison, one of the principal authors of the Constitution, was a proponent of state militias and authored the Second Amendment.¹⁰³ It reads as follows: “A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”¹⁰⁴ It is against this backdrop that the laws relating to the DSCA mission were written. DSCA officers must be mindful that while the DSCA environment has many parallels to the downrange environment, there are distinctions shaped by legislation.

1. The Posse Comitatus Act of 1878

The most prevalent and often cited DSCA legislation is the Posse Comitatus Act. This act has a significant effect on the DSCA mission because it restricts the use of federal military personnel in response to domestic law enforcement issues.¹⁰⁵

Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or the Air Force as a posse Comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.¹⁰⁶

Some key exceptions to the Posse Comitatus Act are National Guard militias in Title 32 status, the Coast Guard (assistance from the Navy is acceptable), aerial search and surveillance, operations in the “war on drugs,” and troops in a federal status who can be used to suppress domestic violence.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰¹ John Ferling, “The Rivalry That Forged a Nation,” *TIME*, The Founding Fathers, special edition, 2018, 37; and Alex Dalenberg, “The Great American Paradox,” *TIME*, The Founding Fathers, special edition, 2018, 40.

¹⁰² U.S. Const. art. X, <http://www.americasfreedom.com/us-constitution/article10.html>.

¹⁰³ Dalenberg, “Master Builder,” 70, 75.

¹⁰⁴ U.S. Const. amend. II, <https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-CONAN-2017/pdf/GPO-CONAN-2017-7.pdf>.

¹⁰⁵ “Appendix D: Overview of the Posse Comitatus Act,” RAND Corporation, accessed June 30, 2017, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1251/MR1251.AppD.pdf.

¹⁰⁶ Posse Comitatus Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (1956), <https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCODE-2017-title18/pdf/USCODE-2017-title18-partI-chap67-sec1385.pdf>.

¹⁰⁷ RAND Corporation, “Overview,” 244.

2. The Insurrection Act

The Insurrection Act is a prime example of the nation's aversion to using a standing army in the homeland, but situations like rebellion warrant the use of federal-status troops to suppress domestic violence. The president may use his authority or respond to a state's request. The act is a compilation of statutes enacted over several years:

(1) The Calling Forth Act: 10 U.S.C. § 334 (1792)

The Calling Forth Act gave President Washington the authority to call on the militia and was later used in the Whiskey Rebellion of 1793.

(2) 10 U.S.C. § 331 (1795) (1807)

The Calling Forth Act was strengthened in 1795 with the addition of the provision for governor or state legislature requests to the president for assistance. In 1807, President Thomas Jefferson requested the ability to use not only the militia but the standing army as well.

(3) 10 U.S.C. § 332 (1861)

Enacted on the request of President Abraham Lincoln in anticipation of the Civil War, it allows the president to use federal forces on his authority rather than wait for a request from the state.

(4) 10 U.S.C. § 333 (1869)

It was used by President Grant to deal with the Ku Klux Klan in the aftermath of the Civil War.

In summary, the Insurrection Act says that the president can use federal forces for law enforcement on his authority without a request from the state.¹⁰⁸ Considering today's political environment, however, and the nation's historical aversion to using a standing army in the domestic environment, the president is unlikely, except in grave circumstances, to act without a request from the state. Such a request relieves the president of defending his assessment of "insurrection" as justification for pressing the limits of Article X of the Constitution and the Posse Comitatus Act.

¹⁰⁸ John R. Brinkerhoff, "Understanding the Posse Comitatus Act and the Insurrection Act," *State Defense Force Journal* 4, no. 1 (Fall 2008), <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a494583>.

3. The Stafford Act (1988)

The Stafford Act is a culmination of disaster relief legislation, and the name is often used generically as a surrogate when the federal government provides disaster relief because state and local capacities are exceeded. In 1950, the Federal Disaster Relief Program was passed to supplement state and local capacity, but it authorized assistance only in response to disasters. The year 1979 saw the creation of the Federal Emergency Management Agency whereby statutory authorities were consolidated into one agency.¹⁰⁹ In 1988, the Stafford Act was passed.¹¹⁰ It is the mechanism that allows the federal government, including the DoD, to get involved when tribal, local, and state capacity is exceeded. This involvement entails the governor formally requesting assistance, thereby certifying his capacity has been exhausted, and federal assistance is needed, which is then followed by an emergency declaration by the president. In 1996, the Disaster Relief Act expanded the authority of the Federal Disaster Relief Program to include recovery as well as disaster response. See the *Domestic Operational Law Handbook* for further discussion, detail, and nuance of the Stafford Act.¹¹¹

4. The Economy Act

The Economy Act provides a mechanism for government entities to purchase goods and services from other government entities. For DSCA, this essentially means that the DoD should be reimbursed for goods and services rendered.¹¹² Commanders should not, however, withhold assistance that would “save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage” under their immediate response authority simply because the cost or ability to reimburse is in question.¹¹³

¹⁰⁹ In 2002, the Federal Emergency Management Agency was placed under the newly created Department of Homeland Security. Since then, both have applied the Stafford Act.

¹¹⁰ Stafford Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, Public Law 93-288, *U.S. Statutes at Large* 102 (1987) 4689, codified 42 U.S.C. § 5121 et seq., <https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1519395888776-af5f95a1a9237302af7e3fd5b0d07d71/StaffordAct.pdf>.

¹¹¹ John Rawcliffe and Jeannine Smith, eds., *Operational Law Handbook* (Charlottesville, VA: Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School, August 2006), <https://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/law0806.pdf>.

¹¹² “Lesson 1: Military Response and Integration of Military Support,” Federal Emergency Management Agency, accessed July 16, 2017, <https://emilms.fema.gov/is75/MREM0101summary.htm>.

¹¹³ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Defense Support of Civil Authorities*.

The overarching theme throughout all of the DSCA legislation is that DSCA is a mission that does not rise to the federal level until state and local capacity has been exceeded. Even then, federal military forces are used only in the event that other federal capacities either do not exist or are exceeded. DSCA officers must be well versed in the legal distinctions between the homeland mission and the downrange mission. The downrange mission, although formally structured hierarchically, has evolved to commanding a team of teams. A case study comparison of Hurricane Katrina and Superstorm Sandy highlights how the DSCA mission has evolved in parallel to the downrange mission.

B. APPLES TO APPLES: HURRICANE KATRINA VERSUS SUPERSTORM SANDY

Comparing the two storms, it could be argued, is invalid because Katrina was a hurricane and Sandy was a post-tropical cyclone informally called a “superstorm” by the media. Yet, in terms of destruction and cost, Katrina and Sandy are near peers (see Figure 6). Furthermore, as told in a *Daily Mail* headline, “Sandy WAS more powerful than Hurricane Katrina—and it ranks as the second mightiest storm in modern history” (original emphasis).¹¹⁴ This article and others refer to the comparative Integrated Kinetic Energy Index (IKE) of each storm.¹¹⁵ Hurricane Sandy’s IKE of 140 Terajoules exceeded Katrina’s by 20 Terajoules.¹¹⁶ The point here is that, despite the semantic labels of hurricane and superstorm, the two storms were relative peers in terms of strength and physical destruction. Leaders in both scenarios faced a similar order of magnitude, but there is no question that Katrina was vastly more destructive in terms of human cost. Valid leadership failures and successes, as well as leadership qualities required of DSCA officers, can be gleaned from the two-storm case study.

¹¹⁴ “Sandy Was More Powerful Than Hurricane Katrina—and It Ranks as the Second Mightiest Storm in Modern History,” *Daily Mail*, November 3, 2012, <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/worldnews/article-2227487/Hurricane-Sandy-Storm-WAS-powerful-Hurricane-Katrina.html>.

¹¹⁵ Andrew Freedman, “Scientists Develop New Way of Classifying Hurricanes,” *Climate Central*, May 7, 2013, <http://www.climatecentral.org/news/scientists-propose-new-way-of-classifying-hurricanes-15956>; and V. Misra, S. DiNapoli, and M. Powell, “The Track Integrated Kinetic Energy of Atlantic Tropical Cyclones,” *Monthly Weather Review* 141, no. 7 (2013): 2383–9.

¹¹⁶ “Sandy Was More Powerful Than Hurricane Katrina.”




Figure 6. University of North Carolina Hurricane Infographic¹¹⁷

¹¹⁷ Source: Adam Levenson, “Decade of Destruction: The High Cost of Hurricanes [Infographic],” University of North Carolina, September 30, 2014, <https://onlinempa.unc.edu/decade-destruction-high-cost-hurricanes-infographic/>.

C. HURRICANE KATRINA: MORE SILOS AND COMMAND

1. Lack of Trust

If the two storms were relatively similar in terms of destructive power, why then was Katrina a human disaster and Sandy a human triumph? One of the answers is eerily similar to the silo days of MacArthur and Nimitz wherein distrust, and a refusal to give up authority for the greater good, negatively affected the mission.

Nagin [the mayor of New Orleans] suggested that Lt. Gen. Russel Honore, the Pentagon's on-scene commander, be put in charge. According to Senator Vitter, Bush turned to Governor Blanco and said, "Well, what do you think of that, Governor?" Blanco told Bush, "I'd rather talk to you about that privately." To which Nagin responded, "Well, why don't you do that now?" The meeting broke up. Bush and Blanco disappeared to talk. More than a week later, there was still no agreement. Blanco didn't want to give up her authority, and Bush didn't press.¹¹⁸

Unity of effort is not a controversial concept until the point of deciding who will be in charge. That is where the distrust, silos, rivalries, and turf wars contribute to failure. The lessons of WWII, Operation Eagle Claw, and Hurricane Katrina are all examples of the need to choose a leader in the interest of unity of effort. Choosing a leader to unify the mission is no easy task and is not as simple as someone who is "born with it" (see the discussion on trait theory in Chapter II of this thesis). The chosen leader needs the education and experience required for the crisis at hand. Presumably, Bush, Blanco, and Nagin were all born with some level of personal aptitude. It is next to impossible to reach their leadership levels without it. However, no leader can know everything, especially in a complex world that moves at information-age speeds. The information age practically guarantees that all of us know more than one of us. The closed-door conversation between Governor Blanco and President Bush highlights the distrust and silo mindset of the time—a mindset that certainly hindered the unity of effort that shared consciousness can facilitate.

¹¹⁸ Evan Thomas, "The Government Response to Katrina: A Disaster within a Disaster," *Newsweek*, September 18, 2005, <http://www.newsweek.com/government-response-katrina-disaster-within-disaster-118257>.

2. Lack of Awareness (Shared Consciousness)

In addition to Governor Blanco's reluctance to give up authority, the governor's apparent lack of military awareness was the second most glaring reason for hurricane Katrina's DSCA leadership failure. As described by Evan Thomas for *Newsweek*, "Blanco did not specifically ask for a massive intervention by the active-duty military. 'She wouldn't know the 82nd Airborne from the Harlem Boys' Choir,' said an official in the governor's office, who did not wish to be identified talking about his boss's conversations with the president."¹¹⁹ Governor Blanco apparently did not have the awareness needed to unify the National Guard and active component troops, nor did she unify the overall effort by giving up her authority. Hers was an environment of silos and command. Fast forward seven years later, and the state governors who served in affected states that were struck by Superstorm Sandy had the advantage of the dual-status commander (DSC) construct, which evolved the DSCA mission to the command of teams.¹²⁰

D. ANTECEDENT: SUPERSTORM SANDY AND COMMAND OF TEAMS

Superstorm Sandy was a success because DSCA evolved from silos and command to the command of teams. A lack of awareness during Katrina was structurally fixed in Superstorm Sandy by the DSC construct. The DSC served not only to unify command of teams but also to synchronize the unity of effort to bring additional capacity to bear. The silos and lack of trust during Katrina were remedied in Superstorm Sandy by the strong relationships of trust between the adjutant general (TAG), DSC, and their governors.

1. DSCA and the Dual-Status Commander

The DSC concept was that there should be a mechanism in place to allow for one person to command both federal Title 10 and state Title 32 teams to affect unity of effort

¹¹⁹ Thomas.

¹²⁰ Under 32 U.S.C. § 325(a)(2), a National Guard dual-status commander "provides limited authority for a National Guard officer to serve simultaneously in both state and Federal statuses. The dual-status commander can concurrently command both Federal (Title 10) and state (Title 32, State Active Duty) forces. This dual status requires the authority of the President (currently delegated to the SECDEF) and the consent of the officer's Governor to serve in both duty statuses." David H. Lee, ed., *Operational Law Handbook* (Charlottesville, VA: Judge Advocate General's Legal Center and School, 2015), 207, http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/operational-law-handbook_2015.pdf.

in the DSCA environment. The DSC is a bottom-up construct that made all the difference between the results of Katrina and those of Sandy.¹²¹ As DoD News reported, “Navy Adm. James A. ‘Sandy’ Winnefeld Jr., vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, created the concept while he served as NORTHCOM commander (May 2010–August 2011), and has called the DSC concept one of his proudest accomplishments.”¹²²

2. Governor’s Trust: The Key to Commanding DSCA Teams

Although Superstorm Sandy was more powerful than Hurricane Katrina, affected twice as many states, and caused almost three times as many power outages, there were 93 percent fewer deaths (see Figure 6). DSCA leadership succeeded during Hurricane Sandy because of the trust that DSCs had from their governors, the secretary of defense, and the combatant commander. DoD News captured this dynamic: “As Sandy was whirling its way toward the U.S. coastline in late October, Defense Secretary Leon E. Panetta responded to requests by several state governors in its anticipated path by appointing dual-status commanders in New Jersey, New Hampshire, New York, Maryland and Rhode Island.”¹²³ The response to Super-storm Sandy reaffirmed the value of a new command structure that Army General Charles H. Jacoby Jr., commander of the U.S. Northern Command, called “one of the most important initiatives to improve defense support of civilian authorities in more than a decade.”¹²⁴

The fact that the DSCs were requested before Sandy arrived is evidence of the evolution of the governor and TAG relationship in each state. This relationship built on trust cannot be overstated. In the event state civilian capacity is exceeded, the governor can activate his militia to state active duty (SAD), thereby providing additional capacity and potentially avoiding a request for federal assistance. By law, states are required to exhaust

¹²¹ “Dual-Status, Single Purpose: A Unified Military Response to Hurricane,” Air National Guard, accessed August 27, 2018, <http://www.ang.af.mil/Media/Article-Display/Article/435355/dual-status-single-purpose-a-unified-military-response-to-hurricane-sandy/>.

¹²² Donna Miles, “Sandy Response Reaffirms Value of Dual-Status Commanders,” Department of Defense News, January 11, 2013, <http://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=118975>. Admiral Winnefeld was the NORAD and USNORTHCOM commander from May 2010 to August 2011.

¹²³ Miles.

¹²⁴ Miles.

their resources/capacity before requesting federal assistance.¹²⁵ Not only is it a requirement of law, but it is also a practical requirement of politics. On the one hand, governors are expected to care for their constituents. As described by the National Guard,

A crew from the Colorado National Guard was there for its neighbors Thursday, when the four Soldiers evacuated residents trapped by high water and debris following flooding in the Beulah area. No injuries were reported in the flood. The Soldiers responded after a verbal executive order from Gov. John Hickenlooper.¹²⁶

Success stories like these bolster a governor's standing with constituents. They also serve as a small-scale unity-of-effort proving ground and build trust within the interagency in the state. As long as SAD can handle the event, there is political value to the governor in being seen as commander in chief of the state militia.

On the other hand, constituents will not understand if a governor is slow in asking for—or never recognizes the need to ask for—federal help when her capacity to care for them has been exceeded, as was the case following Hurricane Katrina. Events that do not meet the threshold for a presidential federal Title 10 DSCA activation, but do meet the threshold for SAD, serve to strengthen the trust not only between TAG and the governor but also between the citizen-soldier and the general public. In fact, the public trust that SAD missions generate can even affect elections. The *New York Times* alluded to this effect in discussing the 2014 gubernatorial election in Colorado: “Voters ratified a governor who had led the state through floods, fires, and a mass shooting inside a movie theater.”¹²⁷

¹²⁵ Richard J. Hayes Jr. “DOD Response under the Stafford Act: A Call to Action,” *Joint Force Quarterly* 77, no. 2 (2015): 84–90, <http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/Article/581880/dod-response-under-the-stafford-act-a-call-to-action/>; and “Overview of Stafford Act to Support States,” Federal Emergency Management Agency, accessed June 30, 2017, <https://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/nrf-stafford.pdf>.

¹²⁶ “Colorado National Guard Flies Flood Victims to Safety,” National Guard, accessed July 1, 2017, <http://www.nationalguard.mil/News/tabid/3336/Article/1180898/colorado-national-guard-flies-flood-victims-to-safety.aspx>.

¹²⁷ Jack Healy, “As Other Democrats Fall, Colorado Governor Goes from Angst to Relief,” *New York Times*, November 5, 2014, <https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/06/us/john-hickenlooper-wins-second-term-as-colorado-governor.html?auth=login-email&login=email>. See also “Governor Hickenlooper Executive Orders,” Colorado State Archives, accessed August 27, 2019, <https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/archives/governor-hickenlooper-executive-orders#eo2014>.

It would be tempting to stop at Superstorm Sandy when searching for leadership qualities that DSCA officers need to develop. After all, the nightmare that was Katrina seemed to have been fixed. Governors trusted their DSCs, and DSCs provided unity of command and unity of effort to access additionally needed capacities. Indeed, there are good command-of-teams lessons to take from Superstorm Sandy; however, the information age and complexity continue to change the environment. Just as the downrange mission needed to evolve from the Gulf War—commanding teams—in favor of Operation Iraqi Freedom—commanding a team of teams—so, too, must the homeland mission evolve from the commanding of teams during Superstorm Sandy to commanding a team of teams in the DSCA future.

E. SUBSEQUENT: DSCA’S BOTTOM-UP EVOLUTION TOWARD COMMANDING A TEAM OF TEAMS

So far, this thesis has highlighted antecedent, transitional, and subsequent case study evolution. However, for the homeland mission, there is no “subsequent” case study for DSCA because the transition is incomplete. Complexity has set in motion the evolutionary transition from rigid, top-down, hierarchical mandates toward adaptive, agile, bottom-up solutions based on trust and shared consciousness. Evolving the homeland mission further to commanding a team of teams will require the same concepts that the Task Force used to evolve the downrange mission from the Gulf War—the command of teams—to Operation Iraqi Freedom—commanding a team of teams. Notably, however, there is a distinction between the downrange mission and the homeland mission. The homeland mission is legally structured as a bottom-up mission while the downrange mission has a top-down, hierarchical structure.

Curiously though, the downrange mission was the first to recognize the value of bottom-up flatter organizational execution in the form of a team of teams. In the book of the same name, McChrystal et al. define the version of bottom-up adaptability, “empowered execution.” Corporate America has recognized the value of a bottom-up team of teams in the Lean movement.¹²⁸ Finally, the DSCA mission, too, albeit belatedly,

¹²⁸ The Lean movement is described later in this chapter.

implemented downrange lessons by moving to a bottom-up approach with the DSC construct, which evolved the DSCA mission from Katrina’s silos and command to Sandy’s commanding of teams. The concepts required of DSCA leadership to connect small teams in a way that enables commanding a team of teams at the enterprise level are bottom-up adaptability and agility, trust, and shared consciousness.

1. Adaptability and Agility: Harnessing the Power of Small Teams

The transition section in Chapter III focused on the transition from complicated to complex. Fighting complexity for the Task Force meant becoming adaptable. Similar complexities exist in the homeland DSCA environment when dealing with terrorist adversaries. Mother nature, too, can be an unpredictable adversary for the DSCA community. Moreover, the homeland environment can be just as complex as the overseas environment when multiple agencies, jurisdictions, and civil liberties are considered.

This chapter’s “transition” focuses on leveraging from the bottom up, which is how McChrystal’s Task Force was able to learn to adapt quickly. As McChrystal et al. describe, “The connectivity of trust and purpose imbues teams with an ability to solve problems that could never be foreseen by a single manager—their solutions often emerge as the bottom-up result of interactions, rather than from top-down orders.”¹²⁹ A report from the Center for a New American Security also supports the bottom-up notion: “To the extent that intensive intelligence analysis pays dividends against IEDs [improvised explosive devices], it appears to occur when analysts are closest to where the problem is—at the ground level.”¹³⁰ General Martin Dempsey agrees: “The best information, the most important intelligence, and the context that provides the best understanding come from the bottom up, not from the top down.”¹³¹ McChrystal says, “Small teams are effective in large part because they are small—people know each other intimately and have clocked

¹²⁹ McChrystal et al., *Team of Teams*, loc. 2126.

¹³⁰ Michael T. Flynn, Matt Pottinger, and Paul D. Batchelor, *Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan* (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, January 2010), 22.

¹³¹ Martin E. Dempsey, “Our Army’s Campaign of Learning” (remarks at the Association of the U.S. Army’s Chapter Presidents’ Dinner, Washington, DC, October 4, 2009), 4, <https://www.ausa.org/sites/default/files/LPE-09-3-Our-Armys-Campaign-of-Learning.pdf>.

hundreds of hours with each other.”¹³² He goes on to highlight the fact that current technologies, such as the real-time, full-motion video provided by ISR, while great for shared consciousness, also create the temptation to micro-manage in a top-down fashion. McChrystal’s idea of empowered execution recognizes that speed depends on low-level execution, armed with as much higher-level awareness as possible:

While shared consciousness had helped us overcome the interdependence of the environment, speed, the second ingredient of complexity, still posed a challenge. Effective adaptation to emerging threats and opportunities requires the disciplined practice of empowered execution. Individuals and teams closest to the problem, armed with unprecedented levels of insights from across the network, offer the best ability to decide and act decisively.¹³³

General McChrystal found that the transition to commanding a team of teams required the bottom-up adaptability of empowered execution.

a. Agile Development

There is a similar bottom-up concept to General McChrystal’s empowered execution interpretation of adaptability in private-sector software development, called agile development. Eric Ries provides the basic idea behind agile development in his book *The Lean Startup: How Today’s Entrepreneurs Use Continuous Innovation to Create Radically Successful Businesses*. In it, Ries describes how, despite seemingly violating all of the traditional methodologies, he was able to build a successful \$50 million company with more than 100 employees:

¹³² McChrystal et al., *Team of Teams*, 2321.

¹³³ McChrystal et al., loc. 3979.

We do everything wrong: instead of spending years perfecting our technology, we build a minimum viable product, an early product that is terrible, full of bugs and crash-your-computer-yes-really stability problems. Then we ship it to customers way before it's ready. And we charge money for it. After securing initial customers, we change the product constantly—much too fast by traditional standards—shipping new versions of our product dozens of times every single day.¹³⁴

Ries had found that the early adopters, the ones who value being on the cutting edge more than receiving a perfect product, were critical to product development and the elimination of waste. In many cases, early adopters revealed that the company's conceived program features would have involved countless, unnecessary hours of complicated code writing. On the other hand, he found that some early-adopter feature requests, which were simple to code but had not been envisioned by his team, were wildly popular. The early adopters began to see themselves as a critical and necessary part of the development team. Ries began to discover that small-batch bottom-up development was more agile and responsive to product success. He had tried before and failed with seemingly great business plans: "We were building a way for college kids to create online profiles for the purpose of sharing . . . with employers. Oops."¹³⁵ But this time, he was a success. The transition to bottom-up has made all the difference in the complex world of software development that moves at Moore's law pace.

b. Lean Manufacturing

The manufacturing world is also migrating to a bottom-up concept—similar to General McChrystal's empowered execution and software developer Eric Reis's agile development—called Lean manufacturing. Toyota Motor Corporation has made Lean manufacturing commonplace. Taiichi Ohno, inventor of the Toyota production system and Lean manufacturing says, "Look for and eliminate waste."¹³⁶ The Andon cord is a big part of the small batches and waste-elimination concept that the Toyota production system

¹³⁴ Eric Ries, *The Lean Startup: How Today's Entrepreneurs Use Continuous Innovation to Create Radically Successful Businesses* (New York: Crown Publishing Group, 2011), 4, Kindle.

¹³⁵ Ries, 1–2.

¹³⁶ Taiichi Ohno, *Toyota Production System: Beyond Large-Scale Production* (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 1988), x.

embodies. The Andon cord empowers workers to call for help or even stop the production line if a problem is noticed: “The paradoxical Toyota proverb, ‘Stop production so that production never has to stop’” means that fixing small problems now eliminates big problems later.¹³⁷ While workers have the Andon cord, leaders rely on *genchi gembutsu*, which means “get out of the office and see for yourself.”¹³⁸ Both the Andon cord and *genchi gembutsu* are bottom-up tools that manufacturing uses to combat complexity.

c. The Lean Startup

The military uses empowered execution, software developers use agile development, and manufacturing uses Lean production. All are bottom-up tools to combat complexity in the information age. Entrepreneurship is also migrating to the bottom-up approach. Steve Blank is the pioneer of a customer-development process of entrepreneurship. A core component of that concept is also to get out of the office and listen to the customer.¹³⁹ Steve Blank and Eric Ries, together, are the champions of a concept called the Lean startup, which combines an initial set of hypotheses (what would traditionally be called a business plan), agile development, and *genchi gembutsu*.¹⁴⁰ The Lean startup sermon preaches a build, measure, learn methodology. Start with hypotheses. Build a small-batch, minimum viable product solution, much like the early adopter beta tests in agile development, and measure the response. Then get out of the office to learn what it means.

Armed with data from the field, a decision to either pivot and start the cycle again or persevere and start the cycle again can be made.¹⁴¹ The entire cycle is predicated on bottom-up agility and asking the right questions early to prevent waste and find truly what

¹³⁷ Ries, *The Lean Startup*, 227.

¹³⁸ Ries, 86.

¹³⁹ Steve Blank is an adjunct professor at Stanford University, a senior fellow at Columbia University, and a lecturer at the University of California, Berkeley. He has been either a cofounder or an early employee at eight high-tech startups, and he helped start the National Science Foundation Innovation Corps and the Hacking for Defense and Hacking for Diplomacy program. He writes articles for his eponymously named blog. Steve Blank, “Why the Lean Start-Up Changes Everything,” *Harvard Business Review*, May 1, 2013, <https://hbr.org/2013/05/why-the-lean-start-up-changes-everything>.

¹⁴⁰ Blank.

¹⁴¹ Blank.

the customer needs. John E. Kelly III, International Business Machines' senior vice president for cognitive solutions and research, says, "In the twenty-first century, knowing all the answers won't distinguish someone's intelligence—rather, the ability to ask all the right questions will be the mark of true genius."¹⁴² Complexity and the information age practically guarantee that future DSCA leaders will not know all the answers. "Why?" is often the right question to ask. National Guardsmen have been known to ask why when the top-down, hierarchical, bureaucratic, overpriced, slow-moving answer seems to make little sense.

d. National Guard: The Power of Small Teams

The downrange military, software developers, manufacturing, and entrepreneurs have all recognized that bottom-up adaptability and agility are the way to combat the complexity of the information age. Fortunately for the DSCA mission, National Guard militias throughout the nation already form a network of small bottom-up teams that have demonstrated agility, innovation, and adaptation. Many National Guard leaders are effective at thinking outside the box because they "live" outside the box in their full-time civilian jobs. Proficiency in both civilian and military disciplines enables these citizen-soldier leaders to reason beyond the groupthink mentality of Department of Homeland Security stovepipes and DoD silos. For example, when fiscal constraints forced the Air Force to decide not to fund National Guard fighter jets for targeting pods that would have enabled them to guide smart laser weapons to the target, the Air National Guard was agile in the political process by securing congressional funding via the National Guard and Reserve Equipment Appropriations process.¹⁴³ The National Guard's agility generated this funding to buy advanced targeting pods (ATPs), which enabled the operational relevance of Air Guard fighter jets.¹⁴⁴

¹⁴² Ries, *The Lean Startup*, 227.

¹⁴³ "National Guard and Reserve Equipment Appropriation (NGREA)," Defense Acquisition University, accessed August 27, 2019, <https://www.dau.edu/acquikipedia/pages/article/details.aspx#!544>.

¹⁴⁴ Mark Faram, "Equipping the Guard for the 21st Century," *National Guard Magazine*, accessed August 27, 2019, http://lobby.la.psu.edu/_107th/092_C_130_Procurement/Organizational_Statements/NGA/NGUAS_equipping_guard.htm.

The hierarchically structured, top-down DoD should recognize the National Guard's agility as a valuable tool in facilitating mission accomplishment. A mission-focused mentality would realize that the total force is better because of the National Guard's unique agility and innovation. The top-down bureaucratic solution was an expensive low altitude navigation and targeting infrared for night (LANTIRN) pod system procured only for active-component fighter jets. The bottom-up National Guard solution became the Litening and Sniper ATPs. Now used by active- and reserve-component fighter jets alike, these less expensive, more capable targeting systems have replaced LANTIRN as well as expanded to bomber aircraft. Bottom-up National Guard adaptation and agility produced a better solution than the top-down DoD bureaucracy.

Politicians would also be well served to recognize the power of small-team, bottom-up, National Guard agility. Defense-spending watchdogs should welcome the National Guard's agility and innovation, which find cheaper and more capable systems than the traditional defense procurement enterprise. McChrystal, Reis, Ohno, and Blank have all learned the power of leveraging small teams. Likewise, DSCA leadership development should leverage the small agile teams that are the National Guard's militias. Lieutenant General Joseph L. Lengyel once asked General Mattis about the tension sometimes created by the different lenses of the active and reserve components.¹⁴⁵ According to Lengyel, Mattis gave him this advice: "It doesn't matter what component you are in or what your job is. The only lens that ever matters is the lens of the national defense and national security of the United States."¹⁴⁶

2. Public Trust: The Key to Commanding a DSCA Team of Teams

As discussed earlier, the silos and command of Hurricane Katrina evolved into the command of teams during Superstorm Sandy in large part due to the trust between

¹⁴⁵ At the time, Lieutenant General Lengyel was working for General Mattis, the commander of U.S. Central Command, as a defense attaché in Egypt and had just been selected to be vice chief of the National Guard Bureau. General Lengyel is now the chief of the National Guard Bureau, and Mattis is the former secretary of defense (January 2017–January 2019).

¹⁴⁶ "A Conversation with Gen. Joseph L. Lengyel, Chief of the National Guard Bureau," *National Guard Magazine*, September 2018, 28, http://www.nationalguardmagazine.com/publication/?i=520662#%22issue_id%22:520662,%22page%22:0.

governors and their TAGs and DSCs. In order for the evolution to continue to the next level of commanding a team of teams, the DSCA mission needs the kind of trust that General McChrystal was able to generate with his O&I briefings and his embedding program. Fortunately for the DSCA mission, National Guard militias throughout the nation already form a network of small bottom-up teams that have demonstrated the ability to build the same kind of trust that the Task Force did. For example, in 2017, the governor of Colorado activated his state militia seven times. Four were for wildfires, one was for an interagency Emergency Management Assistance Compact to assist the Hurricane Harvey recovery, one was for force protection, and one was for manning related to a mass-population influx to view the solar eclipse. Events like these are what create a team of teams between National Guardsmen, first responders, politicians, and civilians not only in the course of one year but also throughout the many events that span the career of a guardsman. These kinds of relationships build interagency trust, public confidence, and a National Guard network that is analogous to the Task Force's team of teams. In some cases, a guardsman's trust within the interagency is based on stressful life events, creating a trust that runs as deep as familial bloodlines; in others, it is less profound and more like that of an embedded LNO as part of a network of shared consciousness. In any case, one of the key mechanisms to transform the DSCA mission from commanding teams to commanding a team of teams is to leverage National Guard relationships that are based on years of shared events and genuine trust.

3. Shared Consciousness: Unique National Guard Teams

Not only do shared events create the trust that is critical in establishing a team of teams, but they also act as a real-world interagency proving ground—the foundation of connectivity, the shared consciousness of the National Guard network. A National Guard DSC is likely to have first-responder numbers in his cell phone long before a crisis ever starts and may even know those first responders by name or through a shared event from the past. Evolving the DSCA mission toward a bottom-up team of teams must not involve discourse on who should command the teams, nor must it involve discourse on how to create the network of small teams and connectivity. Both already exist. DSCA leadership development simply needs to leverage the National Guard network.

a. *Uniquely Connected: The National Guard Network*

There is certainly transferrable expertise between defense operations overseas and DSCA operations in the homeland. A National Guard unit working flood relief with the Red Cross within its state will undoubtedly apply that knowledge to tsunami relief work with the Red Cross in Asia. Likewise, the intricacies of working with various tribal and ethnic factions overseas will have many parallels to working with urban and metropolitan districts within a state. Though knowledge and experience are somewhat transferable, relationships are not.

In the homeland, tribal leaders, county teams, state government, non-governmental organizations, and National Guardsmen have typically been working together long before a Title 10 active-component member's arrival and will be working together long after the active-component service member leaves in two to three years for his normal rotation. Accordingly, their relationship is one that spans years of direct and indirect interaction. The relationship between a governor and his or her adjutant general is the obvious example, but that top-level leadership development must be expanded to lower small-team levels. While generals, governors, and members of Congress choose courses of action, it is the action officers, deputy department directors, and staffers who develop the courses of action (COAs) from which they choose. Whereas the commander or politician is in that seat for only a limited time, quite often the COA developers are more entrenched. A guardsman may be a constituent in the same state for 10, 20, or more years. Department leaders and senior staffers are often deeply rooted as well. Therefore, introductions at the lieutenant colonel, deputy director, and senior staff levels can progress over the years to a relationship of trust at the general, governor, and congressman levels. A Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) regional director's relationship to a DSC may have begun years ago as part of a reconstruction team in a state emergency such as a flood, wildfire, or hurricane. A wing commander's relationship to an influential businessman may have begun in a city council meeting just outside the base as a lieutenant and an activist. Relationships built in local meetings, regional disasters, and local, state, and federal politics are critical to DSCA success. While active-component forces are not incapable of building these types

of relationships, their nomadic nature makes it more difficult to maintain the kind of network established with genuine trust through the National Guard.

b. Uniquely Accessible

National Guardsmen are readily available. In fact, the Immediate Response Authority (IRA) mentioned earlier is just that. Troops, active or guard, can immediately mobilize in response to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage.¹⁴⁷ Beyond IRA, the governor can activate his state militia on a vocal order if need be. SAD activations are the most expeditious because members live within the communities experiencing an event, and the governor can be accessed relatively easily to issue a vocal order (VOCO) to SAD. Beyond IRA, the president of the United States can also activate his DoD service members to Title 10 DSCA if need be; however, the challenges of the federal bureaucracy and presidential access tend to require more effort and significantly more time than a simple SAD VOCO activation.

c. Uniquely Inexpensive

In January 2013, the Reserve Forces Advisory Board, an independent advisory board to the secretary of defense, conducted a study that concluded a National Guard member costs about one-third that of his active-duty counterpart.¹⁴⁸ A Reserve Forces Policy Board report in 2014 supports the reserve component's long-held belief that it is more cost-effective than its active-duty counterparts, even when mobilized.¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁷ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Defense Support of Civil Authorities*.

¹⁴⁸ Reserve Forces Policy Board, *Eliminating Major Gaps in DoD Data on the Fully-Burdened and Life-Cycle Cost of Military Personnel: Cost Elements Should Be Mandated by Policy*, RFPB Report FY13-02 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, January 7, 2013), https://rfpb.defense.gov/Portals/67/Documents/RFPB_Cost_Methodology_Final_Report_7Jan13.pdf.

¹⁴⁹ Reserve Forces Policy Board, *Reserve Component Use, Balance, Cost and Savings: A Response to Questions from the Secretary of Defense*, RFPB Report FY14-02 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, February 11, 2014), <https://www.ngaus.org/sites/default/files/CAPE%20FINAL%20ACRCMixReport.pdf>.

F. CONCLUSION

The homeland mission has evolved in parallel with the downrange mission, from silos and command to the command of teams. During WWII and OEC, inter-agency silos and mistrust led to unnecessary loss of life and extended the war. During hurricane Katrina, a lack of trust and awareness resulted in the human disaster of 1,833 lives lost. In evolving to the command of teams, both the downrange mission in the form of the GNA/JQS and the homeland mission in the form of DSCs benefitted from a new structure that served to break down silos and foster unity of effort. As a result, both the Gulf War and Superstorm Sandy were deemed a success. Because of the success of the command of teams, it would be tempting to stop there to define the required leadership qualities of DSCA officers. That may be fine if the environment stopped evolving, but it will not. The information age put knowledge at the fingertips of everyone and, in so doing, has changed complicated environments into complex ones. General McChrystal's Task Force realized that adaptability was the key to fighting in a complex era, and bottom-up was the way to do it. As a result, the downrange mission has evolved to commanding a team of teams. The homeland mission, however, is still behind.

While the homeland DSCA mission does have some legal differences, the concepts that worked to evolve the downrange mission to commanding a team of teams will be the same concepts needed to evolve the homeland mission to commanding a team of teams. The first concept needed to evolve DSCA is adaptability and agility. The military and corporate America have learned the value of leveraging adaptability and agility from the bottom up to conquer the complex. Fail small, fail early, and pivot or persevere. Small teams like the SEALs and National Guard units by nature of their size and established relationships are the model for adaptability and agility. The second concept needed to evolve DSCA is trust. Replicating the trust that enables small-team adaptability and agility will require embedding and interaction between teams. Embedding and common experiences enable teams to understand other teams as well as build trust and shared consciousness. A quote from McChrystal is worth repeating here:

While shared consciousness had helped us overcome the interdependence of the environment, speed, the second ingredient of complexity, still posed a challenge. Effective adaptation to emerging threats and opportunities requires the disciplined practice of empowered execution. Individuals and teams closest to the problem, armed with unprecedented levels of insights from across the network, offer the best ability to decide and act decisively.¹⁵⁰

Fortunately, the homeland DSCA mission already has a unique National Guard network of deeply rooted relationships that connect the small teams of the state interagency and allow for speedy adaptability. Additionally, the unique National Guard network provides the shared consciousness that helps overcome interdependency challenges. The homeland DSCA mission has all of the tools available to evolve from commanding teams to commanding a team of teams. Doing so will evolve the homeland DSCA mission from a whole-of-DoD to a whole-of-government approach. DSCA-focused JQS will be the spark that ignites and formalizes the evolution process.

¹⁵⁰ McChrystal et al., *Team of Teams*, loc. 3979.

V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Two questions served to frame and focus the research and case study selection for this thesis. Answers to the first question—What are the leadership qualities required of officers working in domestic interagency environments?—are provided in the following conclusions section. Answers to the second question—How should the Joint Qualification System, as used by the DoD, be modified for officers working in DSCA and true interagency environments?—are provided in the following recommendations sections.

A. CONCLUSIONS: LEADERSHIP QUALITIES REQUIRED OF DSCA OFFICERS

1. Information Age: Shared Leadership

In Chapter II, research from academia showed how the industrial age is giving way to the information age, and with it, leadership qualities required of DSCA leaders are changing. That is not to say the efficiency-based leadership qualities of the industrial age are obsolete. Vertical leadership, trait, behavior, contingency, culture, and motivational theories all still apply, but in the information age, nearly everyone can have nearly all the data, nearly instantly. That is especially true of the DSCA mission, which is not hamstrung by data classification restrictions. Information-age leadership literature is yet immature but trending away from top-down, hierarchical approaches and toward flatter, more distributed, shared leadership approaches.¹⁵¹ These distributed team approaches share responsibilities and leadership roles in pursuit of common goals and seek to leverage the power and agility of multiple minds rather than depend on the mind and abilities of a single leader.¹⁵² Among many other metrics, one that stands out is that “the effects of shared leadership are stronger when the work of team members is complex.”¹⁵³ The idea that all of us will invariably know more than one of us is beginning to shift the focus away from the “hero” leader. Shared leadership skills are the emergent requirement for DSCA officers.

¹⁵¹ Day, “Leadership Development, 581–613; Day and Harrison, “A Multilevel, Identity-Based Approach,” 360–73; and Mehra et al., “Distributed Leadership in Teams,” 232–45.

¹⁵² Carson, Tesluk, and Marrone, “Shared Leadership in Teams,” 1217–34.

¹⁵³ Wang, Waldman, and Zhang, “A Meta-Analysis of Shared Leadership,” 181.

There is no better place to learn and hone shared leadership skills than the DSCA environment, where authorities are dispersed among jurisdictions and subject-matter experts are spread throughout complex disciplines, domains, and demographics.

2. Complex: Adaptability/Agility and Shared Consciousness

The quickening pace of change and the increasing availability of information mean that yesterday's known complicated battlespace is today's complex unknown battlespace. General Stanley McChrystal identified adaptability as the key to confronting complexity by harnessing the power of small teams. For McChrystal, such power extends the trust inherent in the small team to the larger enterprise by creating a "shared consciousness" via information-sharing and embedding liaisons in partner organizations.

In the private sector, the word *agility* is used rather than the military's preferred *adaptability*. While semantically different, the idea is similar. The private sector identifies agility as the key to confronting complexity by harnessing the power of small batches. For the private sector, harnessing the power of small batches means failing small and failing early. Computer programmers do it with agile development and beta tests. Small batches allow for small failures and early pivots and are the source of agility. The term *Lean* is a critical component of the Lean startup cycle of building (a minimum viable product), measuring, and learning. Learning means getting out of the office and seeing for oneself (*genchi gembutsu*), not unlike McChrystal's embedding program. Establishing a team-of-teams environment, which includes adaptability/agility, and shared consciousness is a critical requirement of DSCA officers.

3. Bottom-Up: Trust and Relationships

A relationship is worth a thousand processes. Possibly, the single most important leadership quality required of DSCA officers working in domestic interagency environments is the trust borne of relationships. There is an inherent professional trust among peers across agencies, but inter-service/inter-agency silos and turf protection are also a source of distrust. Trust based on relationships is far stronger than professional trust among peers across agencies. National Guardsmen are citizen-soldiers who live within their communities for years—and, sometimes, an entire career. They are teachers,

policemen, firefighters, politicians, business leaders, and administrators from every discipline, domain, and demographic. National Guardsmen have a network that is woefully under-leveraged by the JQS.

B. JQS RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Fix the Glaring Gap

In October 2013, The U.S. Government Accountability Office issued a report to Congress on joint professional military education (JPME). In the report titled *Actions Needed to Implement DoD Recommendations for Enhancing Leadership Development*, the GAO detailed the following: “The MECC [Military Education Coordination Council] . . . conducted a gap analysis to identify and crosswalk the desired leader attributes for Joint Force 2020 with the current officer and enlisted personnel JPME education continuums.”¹⁵⁴ The report highlighted gaps in the JPME curricula for meeting desired leader attributes. More specifically, the report highlighted areas directly related to the DSCA mission:

The MECC found that the 2010 HASC [House Armed Services Committee] report, for example, provided a detailed assessment of the state of JPME, and concluded that while the overall PME system was basically sound, some areas needed improvement, such as an increased emphasis on joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational operations.¹⁵⁵

2. Necessary Investment

Incredibly, even though Hurricane Katrina happened 60 years after WWII and 25 years after Operation Eagle Claw, similar systemic issues prevailed. Especially frustrating is the fact that while General McChrystal was learning team-of-teams lessons far to the right on the evolutionary continuum from 2003 to 2008 during OIF, the interagency was repeating silo failures far to the left on the evolutionary continuum in 2005 during Katrina. To illustrate, the death toll in Iraq in 2005 was 846 while the death

¹⁵⁴ Farrell, *Joint Military Education*, 13.

¹⁵⁵ Farrell, 17.

toll for Hurricane Katrina the same year was 1,833.¹⁵⁶ Leadership development has a cost, but so does a lack of leadership development. Thankfully, the death toll for Superstorm Sandy, a peer storm to Katrina, was far lower at 132.¹⁵⁷ In the past, wholesale failure was required (WWII, OEC, and Katrina) before a course correction was made with the mandate of legislation or the self-awareness of a McChrystal or DSC. Multi-disciplined leadership development is a worthy investment and preferable course of action to allowing history to repeat itself. The experiences and lessons learned by today's DCSs must be captured and passed on to tomorrow's by evolving the JQS to better encompass the homeland DSCA mission.

3. Approach

Based on the research in this thesis, how then should the glaring gap in DSCA leadership development be approached?

a. The MacArthur Approach

It could be argued that moving from the whole of DoD (as mandated by the GNA) to the whole of government should be accomplished with more GNA-type legislation.¹⁵⁸ To borrow from General McChrystal again, that would be like “using complicated solutions to attack a complex problem.”¹⁵⁹ A top-down mandate is not the answer for the bottom-up DSCA mission. While legislation might be *a* solution, it is not the *best* solution. The best solution involves bottom-up, agile, small-batch programs. Not only is a top-down GNA solution less than optimum, but the *Officer Professional Military Education Policy* (OPMEP) itself may need to become more agile to ensure relevant DSCA leadership development. Proponents of this type of approach are prone to ask questions like “What do we have to do to meet the requirements of the OPMEP?” rather than “How does the

¹⁵⁶ “American Soldiers Killed in Iraq up to 2018,” Statista, accessed September 3, 2018, <https://www.statista.com/statistics/263798/american-soldiers-killed-in-iraq/>; “Fatalities by Year and Country: Iraq,” iCasualties, accessed August 21, 2019, <http://icasualties.org/>; and Levenson, “Decade of Destruction.”

¹⁵⁷ Levenson, “Decade of Destruction.”

¹⁵⁸ Jason A. Camilletti, “An Interagency Goldwater-Nichols Act Is Needed for a Truly Effective Whole-of-Government Approach” (master’s thesis, Air University, 2011).

¹⁵⁹ McChrystal et al., *Team of Teams*, loc. 1301.

OPMEP need to change to accommodate the new complex environment and DSCA mission?” “MacArthur solutions” are rooted in established structure and “the way we have always done it.” This is not to say that all previous processes and structures are useless, but using them as a barrier to mission requirements is unacceptable. The requirements are spelled out in the previous section’s conclusions. When discourse on possible solutions to the glaring gap arises, participants must have the vision to be McChrystals, not MacArthurs. In that light, the MECC should advise the CJCS to approve DSCA leadership development with an eye toward what is needed rather than to what is currently procedural. If they will not, then Congress should.

b. The McChrystal Approach

The point in highlighting approaches here is not to condemn established processes and procedures but rather to highlight the dangers in becoming paralyzed by them. McChrystal did not do away with the O&I briefing; he made it better by making it transparent and inclusive to create a shared consciousness, a complete paradigm shift away from the previous “need to know” policy. “McChrystal solutions” are innovative, bottom-up solutions that are not constrained by conventional approaches and procedures. They are agile, pioneer new ground, and think outside the box. Pioneers throughout this thesis represent the McChrystal approach. Eric Reis thought outside the box in creating agile development for software design. Toyota’s genchi gembutsu was unconventional thinking—until it was not. Steve Blank’s Lean startup methodology of build, measure, and learn made no sense in the industrial age when a company’s reign on the Standard and Poor’s 500 was 60 years. The National Guard’s purchase of Litening pods was not the “pod of choice” then, but it is now. Steve Jobs, Sergey Brin, and Larry Page all created a new leadership style that emphasized culture. Admiral Winnefeld did not complain there was no structure in place to command troops in different statuses; he created a new structure called the dual-status commander. This agile pioneering spirit, not silos or procedural restrictions, must be the compass that guides DSCA leadership-development discourse.

4. Modify the JQS for DSCA Leadership Development

Joint leader development within the JQS combines the two pillars of education and experience to create a joint qualified officer (see Figure 2, Chapter III). The education pillar requires attendance in a certified joint course (JPME). The experience pillar can be satisfied by the S-JDA while serving for a qualifying period in a joint duty assignment list billet. Another method to obtain credit toward the experience pillar is by participating in qualifying events. E-JDA events are reviewed and approved on a case-by-case basis. While the JQS is the rigid procedural method to gain JQO status, in the past, the system demonstrated agility and adaptability in the changing environment. Figure 2 showed the dates of various JPME program additions. Of note are the intelligence-focused program added in 2012 and an internationally focused program added in 2014. Additionally, Figure 11 highlights the roll-out of the E-JDA program with an initial self-nomination deadline for the E-JDA event review and approval in 2013. In like fashion, the JQS could adapt by accommodating new DSCA-centric qualifications in both the education and experience pillars (see Figure 7). While there will undoubtedly be many opinions and debate on how to do this—and the devil is most certainly in the details—the following pages detail this author’s initial recommendations. Fully developing each recommendation is beyond the scope of this thesis. The intent of this thesis is to highlight the need for DSCA leadership development, identify qualities required of DSCA leaders, and provide recommendations that initiate further discourse, research, and recommendation development.¹⁶⁰

¹⁶⁰ Regarding approval authority, the DoD’s JPME programs are approved by the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on recommendations from MECC. Alternatively, Congress could mandate DSCA JQS evolution just as it mandated the evolution of the DoD with the GNA, but this is a less desirable approach.

JOINT LEADER DEVELOPMENT				
EDUCATION			EXPERIENCE	
Program	Initial Certification or Accreditation Date	JPME Phase(s)	Standard Path (S-JDA) - Joint Duty Assignment List Tours	
National War College (NWC)	1 June 1989	Single-Phase ¹⁰	Insert sampling of JDAL here	
Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF)/ (ES)	1 June 1989	Single-Phase ¹⁰		
School of Information Warfare and Strategy (SIWS)	10 May 1995 ¹	Single-Phase I and II		
Joint Forces Staff College (JFSC) (intermediate-level college)	1 June 1989 ²	I and II		
Joint and Combined Staff Officer School (JCSOS) (JFSC ³)	15 July 1990 ⁴	II		
Joint and Combined Warfighting School (JCWS) (JFSC ³)	25 October 1994	II		
U.S. Army War College (USAWC)	1 June 1989 ⁵ 28 September 2007 ⁹	I II		
USAWC (Non-resident)	16 February 1999	I		
Army Command and General Staff College (ACGSC) (Resident)	1 June 1989 ⁵ (Phase I credit for AY 90)	I		
ACGSC (Non-resident)	3 July 1991 (1st graduates produced in 1992)	I		
College of Naval Warfare (CNW)	1 June 1989 ⁵ 18 May 2007 ⁹	I II		CO-S-JDA NY-S-JDA CA-S-JDA LA-S-JDA REGION VII-S-JDA
College of Naval Command and Staff (CNCS) (Resident)	1 June 1989 ⁵	I		
College of Continuing Education/College of Distance Education (Navy ILC Non-resident) ⁷	29 March 1991	I		
Naval Postgraduate School (NPS)	11 December 1995 ⁶	I		
Air War College (AWC)	1 June 1989 ⁵ 16 November 2006 ⁹	I II		
Air Command and Staff College (ACSC) (Resident)	1 June 1989 ⁵	I		Experience Path (E-JDA) - Joint Duty Assignment List Tours
ACSC (Non-resident)	2 November 1990	I		
Marine Corps War College (MCWAR)	18 December 1992 14 September 2006 ⁹	I II	Insert sampling of approved self nominations here	
Marine Corps Command and Staff College (MCCSC) (Resident)	1 June 1989 ⁵	I		
Marine Corps College of Continuing Education (MCCCE) (Non-resident)	28 January 1994	I ¹²		
Advanced Joint Professional Military Education (AJPME)	17 December 2004	N/A ⁸		
Joint Advanced Warfighting School (JAWS)	25 April 2008	Single-Phase ¹⁰		
National Intelligence University (NIU)-JPME Cohort	26 October 2012	I		
College of International Security Affairs (CISA)-CSCT Program Cohort	25 June 2014	II ¹¹		
Naval Postgraduate School CHDS Master's	1 January 2019	II		
<small> ¹ Joint Forces Staff College. ² First class to receive JPME Phase-II credit was conducted July through September 1990. ³ Certain officers who completed the joint track program portion of Service ILCs and SLCs in AY 89 received both JPME Phase-I and -II credit. Officers who completed Service ILCs and SLCs in AY 85 through AY 89 and completed JCSOS (JFSC) by 1 January 1994 received both JPME Phase-I and -II credit. ⁴ NPS terminated its JPME program after AY 00. ⁵ This program is currently titled the College of Distance Education. ⁶ An assessment review performed. Congressionally directed as similar, but not equal to, JPME Phase-II. Does not meet the in-residence title 10 requirements for JPME Phase-II. ⁷ Program ceased awarding JPME Phase-I credit once certified/accredited to award JPME Phase-II credit. ⁸ Single-Phase JPME¹ authority rescinded upon completion of AY 11-12. Effective with AY 12-13, course is only JPME-II granting (10, U.S.C., 2155). ⁹ AY 13-14 & 14-15 cohort graduates of the pilot curriculums are authorized to receive JPME-II credit. Accreditation of the CSCT Program as a permanent POI is expected by the end of AY 14-15. ¹⁰ Program name changed to Marine Corps College of Distance Education and Training. ¹¹ </small>				Harvey DSC E-JDA Irma DSC E-JDA Maria DSC E-JDA

Figure 7. Addition of DSCA to JQS Leader-Development Framework¹⁶¹

¹⁶¹ Adapted from Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Officer Professional Military Education Policy*.

C. DSCA JPME RECOMMENDATIONS

The focus of JPME depends on the institution that delivers it. The *Officer Professional Military Education Policy* spells out the baseline requirements: “JPME Phase II must, by law, include: (1) national security strategy; (2) theater strategy and campaigning; (3) joint planning processes and systems; and (4) joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational capabilities and the integration of those capabilities.”¹⁶² However, beyond those baseline requirements, each institution has its own focus, unique format, and educational angle. In addition to service-centric programs, there are reserve component-centric, joint-centric, information warfare-centric, intelligence-centric, and international-centric programs. In like fashion, there should be a DSCA-centric program. Two suggestions for a DSCA-centric JPME follow.

1. JPME II: Center for Homeland Defense and Security’s Graduate Program

A plug-and-play option to satisfy the DSCA-centric JPME II criteria would be to pair the Center for Homeland Defense and Security (CHDS)’s master’s degree program with the Joint and Combined Warfighting School-Hybrid (JCWS-H), formerly Advanced Joint Professional Military Education (AJPME).¹⁶³

a. CHDS Master’s Degree Program

Cohorts of approximately 30 students are competitively selected from high leadership levels throughout the interagency to create a truly joint environment. This program is far more joint than traditional joint PME. Existing joint PME programs may be joint in terms of multiple services, but they are still prone to DoD groupthink. The CHDS program is a truly whole-of-government joint environment of the highest caliber. As an AJPME graduate as well as a CHDS graduate, this author can personally attest that the academic rigor and joint applicability of the CHDS program far exceed those of the AJPME

¹⁶² Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Officer Professional Military Education Policy*.

¹⁶³ “Joint and Combined Warfighting School-Hybrid (JCWS-H),” Joint Forces Staff College, accessed July 19, 2019, <https://jfsc.ndu.edu/Academics/Joint-Continuing-and-Distance-Education-School/AJPME-Overview/>.

program. The CHDS program consists of 15–20 hours per week for 18 months of distance learning (approximately 1,500 hours) plus two weeks in residence every quarter, as well as completion of a master’s thesis.¹⁶⁴ Because the program is of the highest caliber, the relationships forged online and more deeply during the in-residence sessions are robust and rooted in a common academic struggle that is extremely challenging. A 2:00 a.m. phone call from a fellow cohort member would be welcomed and instantly recognized but also enthusiastically engaged. Again, a relationship is worth a thousand processes. Moreover, the CHDS alumni network is strong and active with high-level members throughout the interagency that are more than willing to help alumni who, by completing the CHDS course, have earned respect and are worthy of their time.

b. Joint and Combined Warfighting School-Hybrid

The JCWS-H program consists of “252 hours of distance learning coursework and two one week in residence sessions.”¹⁶⁵ The JCWS-H program, formerly AJPME, was built as a tailored program to meet the specific needs of reserve component officers. Based on civilian employment and reserve component officers’ time constraints, the JCWS-H program represents the minimum level of participation required to attain JPME II.

c. Combine JCWS-H with the CHDS Master’s Degree Program

A simple top-down procedural solution would be to combine the two programs without regard for the enormous workload. Moreover, why would someone do both programs when she could complete the short JCWS-H program to achieve AJPME II?

Visionaries look deeper for incentives to attract truly motivated DSCA leaders. Pioneers will find a way to combine the two programs so that the overall footprint and time required do not exceed the original CHDS footprint—even if that means thinking outside procedural constraints to break new ground. One way to accomplish this with minimal OPMEP turmoil would be to satisfy JPME II by combining the two programs and deleting

¹⁶⁴ “Master’s Degree Program,” Center for Homeland Defense and Security, accessed July 19, 2019, <https://www.chds.us/c/academic-programs/masters>.

¹⁶⁵ Joint Forces Staff College, “Joint and Combined Warfighting School.”

content that is unnecessary or covered elsewhere. As mentioned above, “JPME Phase II must, by law, include: (1) national security strategy; (2) theater strategy and campaigning; (3) joint planning processes and systems; and (4) joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational capabilities and the integration of those capabilities.”¹⁶⁶ The CHDS program covers nearly all four JPME components.

- National security strategy is covered in the American government and comparative government courses.
- Theater strategy and campaigning are covered in the unconventional threat, critical infrastructure, and intelligence courses but would need some additional JCWS-H content.
- Joint planning processes and systems are not covered in the CHDS program and would require a module from the JCWS curriculum. That said, it is highly unlikely that the active component would ever hand over the joint planning process to the reserve component. It is this author’s opinion that anything beyond a cursory overview of the planning process is a waste of time for reserve-component members. This time is better allocated to DSCA-centric studies and should be an area where the OPMEP evolves to the needs of the DSCA leader.
- Joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational capabilities are covered extensively and continuously in all of the CHDS courses. For this reason, the CHDS program is the premier option for DSCA-centric JPME.

In order to keep the CHDS footprint from expanding unnecessarily, the CHDS intelligence course would be sacrificed to provide bandwidth for areas beyond the needs of JCWS-H content. The intelligence course, while valuable, was necessarily held at the unclassified level, and military PME in general coupled with real-world classified experience would make up for the lost CHDS intelligence course content. The advantage of the CHDS option is that it is truly a premier interagency program. In fact, the program is ranked first nationally in homeland/national security and emergency management graduate programs—with Harvard ranked second—according to the 2018 U.S. News and World Report’s best graduate school rankings.¹⁶⁷ The downside of this option is that while

¹⁶⁶ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Officer Professional Military Education Policy*.

¹⁶⁷ “Homeland Security Programs,” U.S. News & World Report, accessed September 12, 2018, <https://www.usnews.com/best-graduate-schools/top-public-affairs-schools/natsec-emergency-management-rankings>.

there are two-week in-residence sessions every quarter, much of the work is done via distance learning, and slots would be limited.

2. JPME II: Best and Brightest Master's Degree

The best and brightest minds in our rising generation should be shaped by the best and brightest minds from both our military and civilian institutions.

—Martin E. Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff¹⁶⁸

Another DSCA-centric JPME recommendation is to combine JCWS-H and War College credits with the best and brightest professors and university programs nationally to create a DSCA-centric master's degree. The American Council on Education publishes a guide to evaluate educational experiences in the armed services.¹⁶⁹ These graduate-level credits from JCWS-H and the War College would transfer to a local “best and brightest” university to constitute half of a master's degree. The other half of the master's degree credits would be accrued at the approved participating university. This author knows from personal experience that such a combination of credits for a master's degree is feasible, as the author was about to begin one such program when accepted into the CHDS master's program. The beauty of this option is that it vastly expands the number of potential slots while also accessing many of the best and brightest students and professors that would otherwise be unable or unwilling to travel to participate in more traditional models. Moreover, this model enables in-residence time and the established relationships that come with personal contact because the programs would reside wherever the best and brightest live. The only downside is that it would require an aggressive McChrystal pioneering spirit to establish the best and brightest programs throughout the nation.

Many of those best and brightest minds reside in the National Guard network, which is woefully under-leveraged. In the past, leadership-development paths have had a decidedly active-component approach. Permanent changes of station and multiple temporary duty assignments are the norm for the active component but are untenable to

¹⁶⁸ Dempsey, *Joint Education*, 5.

¹⁶⁹ “Guide to the Evaluation of Educational Experiences in the Armed Services,” American Council on Education, accessed July 19, 2019, <https://www3.acenet.edu/militaryguide/CourseSearch.cfm>.

many in the reserve component, hence the relatively recent addition of JCWS-H to the JPME portfolio. General Dempsey states that one of his desires for joint education is to “attract and maintain civilian and military faculty members who are among the very best and brightest of their contemporaries.”¹⁷⁰ Moreover, he says, “We should also continue to recruit the best and brightest from civilian academia and the interagency to expand our educational expertise.”¹⁷¹ However, the “best and brightest” are sometimes not the same as the “willing and able.” Because leadership development is so important, accepting those who are merely willing and able to teach or attend residence courses at JPME institutions is unacceptable.

Unfortunately, however, for many of the best and the brightest, attendance is unrealistic. Throughout the nation, there are fantastic National Guard officers that are unable to change duty stations to an in-residence course due to parenting plans, limited slots, family health issues, and civilian career responsibilities, to name a few. Throughout the nation, there are also reputable universities with seasoned professors who would be excited to play a part in developing our military leaders if only they did not have to move to do it. Each state has an unharnessed collection of not only the best and brightest institutions, professors, and students but also the best and brightest from non-governmental and interagency organizations. If we truly want the best and the brightest, we have to move past the paradigm that they must come to us. Distance learning is helpful; however, face-to-face involvement builds stronger relationships and understanding. Leveraging the National Guard network provides an innovative bottom-up solution to bring together the best and brightest throughout the nation.

D. DSCA S-JDA STANDARD PATH RECOMMENDATIONS

1. State-Sponsored S-JDA Programs

This recommendation for S-JDA involves leveraging the National Guard network to the fullest extent to create state- or region-specific S-JDA billets. Every state has distinct

¹⁷⁰ Dempsey, 6.

¹⁷¹ Dempsey, 5.

opportunities and challenges and a distinct identity. In searching for innovative ways to fulfill the experience requirements to become a JQO, the JQS should leverage the National Guard network to produce agile, bottom-up S-JDA billets. For example, a program sponsored by California might leverage Silicon Valley in ways that pioneer cyber. Arizona might build an experience program that breaks new ground on border operations. Louisiana's proposal might produce valuable lessons learned in disaster relief efforts. New York may generate new approaches to terrorism response. In some cases, where opportunities are few or the pool of best and brightest is scarce, states might band together to build a regional program. Although each state would tailor its plan to unique challenges and opportunities of the state, the common vision that strategic and senior leader guidance provides would steer state content and establish the bar for program approval.

Just as McChrystal used his authority to create a framework that enabled a team of teams, so too could the CJCS use his authority to create a framework that enables states to create S-JDA billets that are centers of excellence in their unique fields. Current joint duty assignment list (JDAL) billets are most certainly tailored to specific job tasks; DSCA JDAL billets would be no different. The California DSCA billet would likely be the premier cyber billet in the nation if Silicon Valley were leveraged properly. The same could be said for other states' particular areas of expertise. Certainly, having a center of excellence in one's state does not automatically guarantee that a premier program can be built, but the National Guard network is most likely to have the relationships that make a state-sponsored S-JDA program possible. Figure 8 depicts a hypothetical S-JDA cyber billet sponsored by the California National Guard as an example of how a state might create such a billet. The purpose of this example is merely to illustrate the notion that a bottom-up solution could generate a level of creativity, adaptability, and agility that no rigid, top-down OPMEP could hope to.



Figure 8. Hypothetical JQO Cyber Billet, Sponsored by the California National Guard

a. JPME II: Best and Brightest Master’s Program

In this example, California has chosen to focus its program on cyber and selected the best and brightest path to satisfy the JPME education requirement. The California National Guard has paired with the Stanford University’s Cyber Policy Center at the Freeman Spogli Institute as the best and brightest institution for its master’s degree program. Half of the master’s credits will come from Stanford, and the other half will transfer from the national defense university colleges. At the completion of the master’s program, the student will be JPME II complete.

b. S-JDA: Cyber JDAL Billet

For the experience requirement, the California National Guard has a wealth of opportunities in the state to leverage the cyber domain.

- State partnership program fellowship: California partners with Nigeria and Ukraine.¹⁷² On December 23, 2015, Ukraine suffered a large-scale coordinated and sophisticated cyber warfare attack.¹⁷³ California might choose to leverage its relationship with Ukraine by creating a fellowship that collaborates and studies the attack to prevent similar attacks against U.S. critical infrastructure.
- Fortune 500 fellowships: The DoD is no stranger to the Fortune 500 company fellowship idea; however, these fellowships are generally inaccessible. National Guard relationships within a state can be leveraged to increase these kinds of invaluable experience opportunities. For California, the list of Fortune 500 companies just in the valley is impressive and presents an unusually rich landscape to work from in building a cyber fellowship.
- Interagency fellowships: The interagency is another area in which California has many options to create a meaningful DSCA fellowship as part of the S-JDA experience path. Oakland is home to a regional office of DHS Cybersecurity.¹⁷⁴ The California governor also has a Cybersecurity Task Force that brings together public and private expertise.¹⁷⁵ Additionally, FEMA's Region IX is in Oakland.¹⁷⁶ Again, there is no shortage of opportunity for a valuable DSCA experience.

The challenge for California in creating its S-JDA would be to find the balance between specific and wave top. If there are too many fellowships, the officer is receiving only a simple wave-top perspective of the issues that the host organization faces. If there are too few fellowships, the officer will get too deep in the weeds of what the host organization faces. Establishing relationships and understanding the challenges of the host organization is the objective.

¹⁷² “State Partnership Program,” National Guard, accessed July 19, 2019, <https://www.nationalguard.mil/Leadership/Joint-Staff/J-5/International-Affairs-Division/State-Partnership-Program/>.

¹⁷³ Julia E. Sullivan and Dmitriy Kamensky, “How Cyber-Attacks in Ukraine Show the Vulnerability of the U.S. Power Grid,” *Electricity Journal* 30, no. 3 (April 2017): 30–35, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tej.2017.02.006>.

¹⁷⁴ “Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency’s Regional Offices,” Department of Homeland Security, accessed August 24, 2019, <https://www.dhs.gov/cisa/cisa-regional-offices>. This regional office is the DHS Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency’s Infrastructure Security Division.

¹⁷⁵ “Cybersecurity Task Force,” California Governor’s Office of Emergency Services, accessed July 19, 2019, <https://www.caloes.ca.gov/cal-oes-divisions/cybersecurity-task-force>.

¹⁷⁶ “Regional Contact Information,” Federal Emergency Management Agency, accessed July 19, 2019, <https://www.fema.gov/regional-contact-information>.

2. NORTHCOM-Sponsored S-JDA Program

While states definitely have unique challenges and opportunities to solve and can certainly leverage them in creating a state-sponsored S-JDA program, United States Northern Command (NORTHCOM) is in a unique position to create a regional/combatant commander S-JDA program. Every morning, the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and USNORTHCOM commander receives an O&I briefing. In attendance are the usual joint directors, but around the circumference of the large room are dozens of interagency LNOs from every agency imaginable.

One COA might be for USNORTHCOM to develop a combatant commander-sponsored DSCA S-JDA billet whereby the service member is given access to and instruction from the various agency LNOs assigned to the command. On the plus side, practically every agency is represented at the command, and when real-world events occur, LNOs are included in most meetings as with the transparent O&I briefings of McChrystal.¹⁷⁷ On the downside, when there is no real-world mission or Tier 1 exercise happening, much of the “experience” would have to come from tabletop discussions with the various LNOs, and slots would be limited. On the flip side, having officers from the various state-sponsored S-JDA programs attend USNORTHCOM’s Tier 1 Ardent Sentry exercise as LNO/observers would be time well spent.

3. Empowered Execution

A top-down, definitive, proscriptive, mandated program is *not* what is needed. Bottom-up programs developed within the JQS framework by the innovation of small teams (states or regions) are the answer. McChrystal did not abrogate his authority; he used it in a way that enabled a bottom-up approach and a team of teams. He discovered that the best use of his top-down authority was to create a framework that would generate adaptability and agility. He called it empowered execution. The CJCS, on recommendation from the MECC, should do the same and allow states and regions to develop adaptable and agile S-JDA billets.

¹⁷⁷ The author served as the First Air Force and Air Force’s northern LNO to the commander of NORAD and USNORTHCOM.

Leveraging the best and brightest people and programs in a state or region is the goal. The best and brightest from government, non-governmental organizations, military, politics, corporations, state-partnership programs, nation-state consulates, embassies, universities, and more should all be considered in building small-batch state or region programs to submit for approval as S-JDA programs. In many cases, existing DoD S-JDA JDAL billets involve a single joint-matters process repeated over and over throughout a multi-year assignment. A best and brightest S-JDA state- or region-sponsored program would have infinitely greater joint value for the DSCA enterprise. Leveraging the National Guard's trusted bottom-up teams is the way for DSCA leadership development to succeed in the complex information age. It will require vision and the courage to fail. Some programs may fail, but the key is to fail small, and fail early. Learn and pivot—that is the way of the startup. To borrow a metaphor from *A Team of Teams*, JQS should lead like a gardener: water valuable programs and prune lackluster ones.

E. DSCA E-JDA EXPERIENCE PATH RECOMMENDATIONS

Before E-JDA, there was only one path to satisfy the experience pillar of the JQS: fill a published JDAL billet. JQS was modified (see Appendix A) to include a second method, E-JDA, to satisfy the experience pillar toward becoming a JQO. E-JDA is a process whereby service members can receive joint points for joint experience in other than S-JDA JDAL billets. For example, with the new E-JDA program, a war planner coordinating and planning the theater game plan with other nations would receive joint credit for that downrange deployment even though he was not technically in an official S-JDA JDAL billet. The amount of credit depends on “what you do” and “whom you do it with” (see Appendix A). Service members can self-nominate for experiences that they believe are worthy of joint points. The nomination is evaluated, and joint points are either approved or denied. The complaint was that the paper pusher back home at an S-JDA JDAL billet desk was earning joint points while the warfighter downrange working directly with coalition warfighting forces was not. Common sense prevailed, and the JQS evolved to create E-JDA in response to the evolution of the mission.

This new E-JDA path means that actual joint experiences result in joint points creditable toward becoming a JQO. DSCs operate in the most joint environment imaginable, the interagency. DSCs who serve for real-world events should receive E-JDA credit for their indisputably joint experience. In addition, there are likely other DSCA experiences that would qualify for E-JDA points on a case-by-case basis in exactly the same way that downrange experiential credit is given.

1. E-JDA Credit for Real-World Emergency Events

Some examples that should qualify for experience-based joint points include

- Hurricane Harvey: Dual Status Commander
- Hurricane Irma: Dual Status Commander
- Hurricane Maria: Dual Status Commander

2. E-JDA Credit for Qualifying DSCA Training

Just as there are qualified downrange training events that meet the benchmark for E-JDA points, so too should qualifying DSCA training events be eligible for E-JDA points. One example of a DSCA training program that should qualify for E-JDA points is the Colorado OutReach Exchange Program.

C.O.R.E.
Colorado OutReach Exchange

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C.O.R.E. Goals

1. Establish a character-based development program for high-potential Guard leaders.
2. Build the National Guard's reputation locally by connecting senior Guard officers participating in the program with the community, business, politics and other agency leaders.
3. Create a national model in Colorado that can be replicated across the country and is self-sustaining.
4. Ensure the program is fun and intriguing for the participants, bridging their three worlds (Guard/family/ work), enhancing their careers overall, and not taking time away from their families.

Welcome to The Colorado OutReach Exchange

Mission

Article 1, Section 6 of the U.S. Constitution calls for a well-organized militia of citizen soldiers in each of the several states. Because the militia of Colorado serves its communities, its state and its nation, future leaders of the Colorado National Guard must be engaged with and an integral part of the State's business, civic and elected leadership. The leadership of the Guard must have access to and an ability to work with those who lead those it serves.

The mission of C.O.R.E. is to establish a character-based development program to provide high-potential, emerging leaders of the Colorado National Guard an opportunity to enhance their leadership abilities, create a network of relationships throughout the state and expand their influence within those communities. Our country has learned that it is these relationships that save lives and property in a time of emergency.

Americans are more aware and appreciative than ever of what this country's National Guard provides. From fighting terrorist threats worldwide to constant vigilance in the skies above our homeland to natural disaster response (please see video below), the leadership of the Colorado National Guard has done an incredible job in recent years of training, deployment and redeployment of their soldiers and airmen to serve across the globe.

Unfortunately, that focus has left little time to develop and maintain relationships with local private and government leadership at a time when the threat of a crisis at home has never been greater. The goal of C.O.R.E. is to establish and strengthen those relationships through an introduction to those community leaders and by fostering the necessary leadership skills.

Developed by Major General (Retired) Andy Love and Christian Anschutz, two respected Colorado leaders who understand the value of leadership and character development, the year-long program focuses on community engagement through a series of four all-day seminars while emphasizing personal, professional, and leadership development.

[Learn more about the C.O.R.E. program](#) [View Past Program Agendas](#)

Colorado National Guard - Colorado Floods of Sept...

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The Colorado OutReach Exchange
Cherry Hills Village, CO 80113
(303) 705-4210

Figure 9. Colorado OutReach Exchange¹⁷⁸

¹⁷⁸ Source: "Mission," Colorado OutReach Exchange, accessed August 24, 2019, <http://coloradooutreachexchange.org/>.

Two members of the “Colorado 30,” a group of the most influential leaders in Colorado, founded the not-for-profit Colorado OutReach Exchange Program (CORE). One of the founding members of CORE is a global-level businessman, and the other is a retired major general with vast political connections. Together, they have managed to build and fund a program that is essentially a small-scale version of the state- or region-sponsored S-JDA JDAL billet. Their business and political connections span the full-spectrum interagency.¹⁷⁹

The content of the CORE program was built with time constraints of the citizen-soldier working a full-time civilian job as well as an operational Guard job. As such, the 2013 program consisted of only four training days, a 30,000-foot overview, if you will. The focus of day one was personal and professional development, which included an insights discovery assessment of each individual’s leadership style. The focus of day two was government and politics, complete with a mock hearing where participants were grilled in a room at the capitol by a committee of actual General Assembly members. The focus of day three was the business community. The morning was filled with guest speakers from the top tier of the Denver business community, followed by a dirty bomb tabletop scenario facilitated by the ANSER Corporation with media, local hospital, business leaders, and CORE students as participants. Day four was inter-agency, incorporating a tabletop exercise and lessons learned discussion on the Waldo Canyon wildfire, which burned hundreds of homes in the Colorado Springs area. There was representation from USNORTHCOM, the U.S. Forest Service, the American Red Cross, the DSC’s J3, a former FEMA Region VIII administrator, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Colorado Department of Public Safety, and two county sheriffs. Additionally, the lunch-break guest speaker was the former chief of the National Guard Bureau, General Frank Grass.

CORE has packed a considerable amount of top-tier content into a four-day baseline program. Give CORE the time that a DSCA S-JDA billet affords, and the result will be nothing short of a world-class program that *involves* students in a full spectrum of *experiences* using real-world methods to which no book or in-residence classroom could

¹⁷⁹ This is an example of the kind of trusting relationships the National Guard brings to the table. These relationships will enable the creation of the S-JDA programs.

aspire. CORE is the type of experience that most certainly should qualify for E-JDA joint points. Nevertheless, this is only a four-day program, but those four days of joint DSCA experience far outweigh the four days spent at the copier in building two on a slow summer day at USNORTHCOM while in a JDAL billet. The E-JDA program needs to open the aperture to include DSCA events for joint points, and DSCs of real-world events are not the only experiences worthy of them.

F. FINAL THOUGHTS

The world is evolving. The information age has brought with it an unprecedented level of access and has thereby transformed what used to be a complicated environment into a complex one. The downrange mission has evolved in response by shifting to a bottom-up team-of-teams mindset that recognizes how the new environment requires adaptability and agility. The homeland mission has stagnated. Evolving the JQS to include DSCA-specific paths will be the spark that enables the homeland mission to catch up with the downrange mission. JPME II can be satisfied with a nearly off-the-shelf CHDS program or by tapping into the best and brightest universities throughout the nation.

The National Guard network is an in-place team of teams with existing relationships and opportunities that are wholly underutilized but could be used to create incredibly valuable centers of excellence for S-JDA billets. E-JDA opportunities are abundant in the National Guard as well, not only during national-level emergencies like Hurricane Katrina and Superstorm Sandy but also during smaller state emergencies that do not reach the presidential level. It is time for the JQS and the OPMEP to recognize that the homeland mission needs to evolve toward a DSCA-specific leadership development that emphasizes bottom-up agility and that the National Guard network is the in-place team of teams with the relationships and ability to make it happen.

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APPENDIX A. THE JOINT QUALIFICATION SYSTEM

Jan 2012



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE JOINT OFFICER MANAGEMENT PROGRAM



Fact Sheet

Joint Qualification System (JQS) Primer

REFERENCES:

- > DoDI 1300.19, DoD Joint Officer Management Program (<http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/130019p.pdf>)
- >> CJCSI 1330.05, Joint Officer Management Program Procedures (http://www.dtic.mil/cjcs_directives/cdata/unlimit/1330_05.pdf)
- > Sections 152, 154, 155, 164, 619a, 661-668, 2151-2155, 3033, 5033, 5043, and 8033 of Title 10 United States Code

WHY HAVE A JQS? -- Requirements for commissioned officers to be educated and experienced in joint matters were codified as part of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. The JQS builds upon this historic legislation in recognizing Standard Joint Duty Assignments (S-JDA) by additionally providing a structure that recognizes the expeditionary and inherently joint nature of how military forces operate in the 21st century.

WHAT YOU SHOULD KNOW -- The JQS provides Active and Reserve component (AC/RC) officers an opportunity to earn joint qualifications upon completion of the requisite joint professional military education *and* completion of a full tour of duty in a joint assignment (via either the standard path or the experience path). Completion of a S-JDA remains the primary means for an officer to achieve joint experience and joint duty credit.

- There are 4 levels of joint qualification [Level I, Level II, Level III (aka Joint Qualified Officer (JQO)), and Level IV] to recognize the career-long accumulation of joint knowledge, skills, and abilities.



LEVEL	CRITERIA
I	<p>a. Awarded upon joint certification of pre-commissioning <u>and</u> basic officer course completion. -- These courses provide learning objectives dealing with "Joint Introduction and Awareness." b. Junior Officers are focused on Service competencies. c. Qualification points begin to accrue following commissioning via opportune joint experiences, joint training, joint exercises, and other education.</p>
II	<p>a. Awarded upon completion of JPME Phase I and accrual of 18 points and certification by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or his designee. b. A minimum of 12 points must come from "Joint Experience." c. Discretionary points may be derived from joint training, joint exercises, and other education. NOTE: Officers who have Full Joint Tour Credit and have completed JPME Phase I may be nominated by their Service, in accordance with procedures established by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to be designated as Level II</p>
III	<p>a. Awarded upon completion of JPME Phase II or AJPME (Reserve Component officers) and accrual of a minimum of 36 total points (based on Level II point requirements, normally 18 more points since Level II) or Full Joint Duty Credit, and certification by the Secretary of Defense or his designee. b. Recency requirement a minimum of 12 points must come from "Joint Experience" earned in grade of O4 or above. c. Discretionary points may be derived from joint training, joint exercises, and other education. d. Formal designation: Joint Qualified Officer (JQO). e. Effective 1 Oct 2008, JQO required for appointment as an O-7 (AC Only).</p>
IV	<p>a. Awarded upon completion of CAPSTONE (AC only) and accrual of 24 joint experience points or full joint G/FO credit from an assignment in a G/FO joint billet in OSD/JS/COCOM HQs/JTF HQs, Defense Agency HQs, hold designation as a JQO, and certification by the Secretary of Defense or his designee. b. Officers must be a G/FO (for pay purposes) for at least one day while filling the G/FO S-JDA or during the period for which joint experience points are earned.</p>

OPR: ODUSD (Military Personnel Policy)

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Figure 10. Joint Qualification System Primer, Page 1¹⁸⁰

¹⁸⁰ Source: Department of Defense, "Joint Qualification System (JQS) Primer" (fact sheet, Washington, DC: Department of Defense, January 2012), 1, <https://prhome.defense.gov/Portals/52/Documents/RFM/MPP/OEPM/Docs/JOM%20Fact%20Sheet%20-%2030%20Mar%202010.pdf>.

Joint Qualification System (JQS) Primer Cont'd

Standard (S-JDA) Path:

- Assignment to a position listed on the Joint Duty Assignment List (JDAL) is considered the “standard” path to earning joint qualifications. Services and the joint organizations selectively fill JDAL positions. Generally, officers serving in a JDAL position are O-4 and above.
- AC and full-time RC officers in grades O-6 and below must complete at least 3 years and G/FOs must complete at least 2 years in a JDAL position in order to earn “full” joint duty credit. Exceptions for earlier assignment termination are listed in Enclosure 7 of DoDI 1300.19.
- The tour length for RC officers performing duty periodically in a JDAL position is 6 cumulative years for O-6s and below (initial assignment not less than three years) and 4 cumulative years for G/FOs (initial assignment not less than two years). DoDI 1300.19, Enclosure 13 provides details.

Experience (E-JDA) Path:

- Officers in the grades of O-1 through O-6 may self-nominate their experiences and request award of “joint experience points” by going to: <https://www.dmdc.osd.mil/appi/jmis/JQSindex.jsp>
- AC officers must submit within 12 months after completing their joint matters experience.
- RC officers must submit any qualifying RC joint matters experiences at the website link above as soon as possible, but no later than September 30, 2013. After this date, RC officers must submit within 12 months of tour completion.
- Service Joint Officer Management (JOM) and Personnel/Human Resource staffs first screen and vet experience submissions before forwarding to the Joint Staff for review.
 - The Joint Staff review may either: 1) validate the preponderance of duties met the joint matters standard and determine the intensity factor to be applied, or 2) recommend disapproval of the experience as clearly not having met the standard.
 - Recommendations on each officers’ experiences are forwarded to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or his designee, for approval.
- Officers in the grades of O-7 (or O-7 select) should contact their Service General or Flag Officer Matters office for details on how to self-nominate experiences.

“Joint Matters” – the litmus test...

The joint matters definition is codified in law and based on joint doctrine. Whether validating a position for placement on the JDAL or individual experiences, the criteria that must be met is the statutory definition of joint matters—both the “what you do” and “who you do it with” aspects.

(1) . . . matters related to the achievement of unified action by integrated military forces in operations conducted across domains such as land, sea, or air, in space, or in the information environment, including matters relating to –

- (A) national military strategy;
- (B) strategic planning and contingency planning;
- (C) command and control of operations under unified command;
- (D) national security planning with other departments and agencies of the United States; and
- (E) combined operations with military forces of allied nations.

(2) In the context of joint matters, the term “integrated military forces” refers to military forces that are involved in the planning or execution (or both) of operations involving participants from:

- (A) more than one military department, or
- (B) a military department and one or more of the following:
 - (i) Other departments and agencies of the United States.
 - (ii) The military forces or agencies of other countries.
 - (iii) Non-governmental persons or entities.

What You Do

Who You Do It With

Page 2 of 2

Figure 11. Joint Qualification System Primer, Page 2¹⁸¹

¹⁸¹ Source: Department of Defense, 2.

APPENDIX B. DEFINITIONS

The following definitions appear in the glossary of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction entitled *Officer Professional Military Education Policy*.¹⁸²

CAPSTONE: A mandated course for newly selected GO/FOs. The course objective is to make these individuals more effective in planning and employing U.S. Forces in joint and combined operations. The CAPSTONE curriculum examines major issues affecting national security decision making, military strategy, joint and combined doctrine, interoperability, and key allied nation issues

Joint Advanced Warfighting School (JAWS): A course designed to produce graduates that can create campaign-quality concepts, employ all elements of national power, accelerate transformation, succeed as joint force operational/strategic planners and commanders and be creative, conceptual, adaptive, and innovative. JAWS is envisioned to populate the Joint Staff and Combatant Commands with officers expert in the joint planning processes and capable of critical analysis in the application of all aspects of national power across the full range of military operations.

Joint Matters: Matters related to the achievement of unified action by integrated military forces in operations conducted across domains such as land, sea, air, space, or in the information environment, including matters relating to national military strategy; strategic planning and contingency planning; command and control of operations under unified command; national security planning with other departments and agencies of the United States; and combined operations with military forces of allied nations. “Multiple military forces” refers to forces that involve participants from the Armed Forces and one or more of the other departments and agencies of the United States; military forces or agencies of other countries; and non-governmental persons and entities.

Joint Professional Military Education (JPME): A CJCS-approved body of objectives, outcomes, policies, procedures and standards supporting the educational requirements for joint officer management. JPME phases: A three-phase joint education program taught at Service intermediate- or senior-level colleges, Joint Forces Staff College, and NDU that meets the educational requirements for joint officer management.

a. JPME Phase-I: A first phase of JPME is incorporated into the curriculums of intermediate- and senior-level Service colleges and other appropriate educational programs, which meet JPME criteria and are accredited by the Chairman. By law, the subject matter to be covered shall include at least the following: 1) national military strategy; 2) Joint planning at all levels of war; 3) Joint doctrine; 4) Joint command and control; and 5) Joint Force and joint requirements development.

¹⁸² Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Officer Professional Military Education Policy*, GL-7-8.

b. JPME Phase-II: A follow-on second phase of JPME for selected graduates of Service schools and other appropriate education programs that complements and enhances Phase-I instruction. This phase is taught at JFSC JCWS to both intermediate- and senior-level students and at Service senior-level colleges to senior-level students, and completes their educational requirement for joint officer management. In addition to the subjects specified in JPME Phase I above, by law, the curriculum for Phase II JPME shall include the following: 1) national security strategy; 2) theater strategy and campaigning; 3) Joint planning processes and systems; and 4) Joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational capabilities and the integration of those capabilities.

c. CAPSTONE: CAPSTONE is designated by title 10, U.S.C., as the third phase of a tiered approach to JPME.

Joint Qualification System (JQS): An officer designated by the Secretary of Defense, with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who is educated and trained in joint matters and has completed the Level 3 requirements for JQS designation. An officer must be in the grade of O-4 or above to be designated a JQS.

Joint training: Military training based on joint doctrine or JTTP to prepare individuals, joint commanders, joint staff, and joint forces to respond to strategic and operational requirements deemed necessary by Combatant Commanders to execute their assigned missions. Joint training involves forces of two or more Military Departments interacting with a Combatant Commander or subordinate Joint Force commander; involves joint forces and/or joint staffs; and/or individuals preparing to serve on a joint staff or in a joint organization and is conducted using joint doctrine or TTP.

National Guard Dual-Status Commander: Title 32 U.S.C. § 325(a)(2), provides limited authority for a National Guard officer to serve simultaneously in both state and Federal statuses. The dual-status commander can concurrently command both Federal (Title 10) and state (Title 32, State Active Duty) forces. This dual status requires the authority of the President (currently delegated to the SECDEF) and the consent of the officer's Governor to serve in both duty statuses.

Posse Comitatus: The entire body of the inhabitants who may be summoned by the sheriff to assist in preserving the public peace (as in a riot) or in executing a legal precept that is forcibly opposed including under the common law every male inhabitant who is above 15 years of age and not infirm.

Professional Military Education (PME): PME conveys the broad body of knowledge and develops the habits of mind essential to the military professional's expertise in the art and science of war.

The Onion Router (TOR): An open-source software program that allows users to protect their privacy and security against a common form of Internet surveillance known as traffic analysis. Tor was originally developed for the U.S. Navy in an effort to protect government communications. The name of the software originated as an acronym for The Onion Router, but Tor is now the official name of the program.

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