

SAVIORS OF SOVEREIGNTY: THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN
THE RADICALIZATION OF ECUADOR AND VENEZUELA

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
General Studies

by

JESSICA FARRELL, MAJOR, U.S. ARMY

LLM, The Judge Advocate General's Legal Center and School, Charlottesville, VA, 2013
JD, The University of Connecticut School of Law, West Hartford, CT, 2003

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
2018

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. United States Fair Use determination or copyright permission has been obtained for the use of pictures, maps, graphics, and any other works incorporated into the manuscript. This author may be protected by more restrictions in their home countries, in which case further publication or sale of copyrighted images is not permissible.

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE				<i>Form Approved</i> <i>OMB No. 0704-0188</i>	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.					
1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 15-06-2018		2. REPORT TYPE Master's Thesis		3. DATES COVERED (From - To) AUG 2017– JUN 2018	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Saviors of Sovereignty: The Role of the Military in the Radicalization of Ecuador and Venezuela				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) MAJ Jessica Farrell				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army Command and General Staff College ATTN: ATZL-SWD-GD Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301				8. PERFORMING ORG REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT This thesis examines the role of the military in the radicalization of Ecuador and Venezuela. Specifically, the research explores Bolivarianismo and Socialism for the 21st Century and the impact these ideologies have had on the military in each country. The thesis provides an overview of the history of civil-military relations in Ecuador and Venezuela from colonial independence to 2013. The thesis examines the history of the civil-military relationship in Ecuador and Venezuela; the formation of the military in each country; and the lessons learned from each experience of radicalization. In addition, Professor John Samuel Fitch's four formal roles of the armed forces: professionalist, constitutionalist, arbiter, and developmentalist are used to analyze the role of the military in Ecuador and Venezuela both historically, and during the period of radicalization from the 1990s to the mid-2000s.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS John Samuel Fitch, Socialism for the 21st Century, Bolivarianism, Ecuadorian Military, Venezuela Military, Latin America, Radicalization					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT (U)	b. ABSTRACT (U)	c. THIS PAGE (U)			19b. PHONE NUMBER (include area code)
			(U)	99	

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of Candidate: MAJ Jessica Farrell

Thesis Title: Saviors of Sovereignty: The Role of the Military in the Radicalization of Ecuador and Venezuela

Approved by:

_____, Thesis Committee Chair
Prisco R. Hernandez, Ph.D.

_____, Member
DeEtte A. Lombard, M.A., M.S.

_____, Member
Alan C. Lowe, MMAS

Accepted this 15th day of June 2018 by:

_____, Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

SAVIORS OF SOVEREIGNTY: THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN THE
RADICALIZATION OF ECUADOR AND VENEZUELA, by MAJ Jessica Farrell,
99 pages.

This thesis examines the role of the military in the radicalization of Ecuador and Venezuela. Specifically, the research explores Bolivarianismo and Socialism for the 21st Century and the impact these ideologies have had on the military in each country. The thesis provides an overview of the history of civil-military relations in Ecuador and Venezuela from colonial independence to 2013. The thesis examines the history of the civil-military relationship in Ecuador and Venezuela; the formation of the military in each country; and the lessons learned from each experience of radicalization. In addition, Professor John Samuel Fitch's four formal roles of the armed forces: professionalist, constitutionalist, arbiter, and developmentalist are used to analyze the role of the military in Ecuador and Venezuela both historically, and during the period of radicalization from the 1990s to the mid-2000s.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Thank you very much to my committee, Dr. Prisco Hernandez, Ms. DeEtte Lombard, and Mr. Alan Lowe, for their patient oversight and collaboration. They provided invaluable insight and feedback despite my procrastination. Also thanks to Dr. Thomas Ward, Mr. Dwayne Wagner, and Mr. Bud Meador for their encouragement and support throughout the year.

A special thank you to Carlos Vera, Dr. Gerardo Apolo, Colonel (Retired) Mario Raúl Pazmiño, Mr. David Randolph and Luis Montalvo for their invaluable resources and information. Each of these gentlemen spent numerous hours discussing the Ecuadorian armed forces with me. In addition, Dr. Apolo sent me numerous texts from Ecuador that were critical to my research.

I am indebted to my parents, Brian and Barbara Farrell, for their investment in my education, their prayers, and unconditional support. Thanks to my siblings and friends who cheered me on and kept me sane during the writing process. A special thank you to my husband, Luis Montalvo, and our children Emma and Alistair for their loving support. Without their love, joy, and support no undertaking would be worth it.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE THESIS APPROVAL PAGE	iii
ABSTRACT.....	iv
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	v
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	vi
ACRONYMS.....	viii
ILLUSTRATIONS	ix
TABLES	x
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION	1
Overview.....	1
Primary Research Question	2
Secondary Research Question	2
The Value of this Study	2
Qualifications.....	3
Definitions and Terms	3
Assumptions, Limitations, and Delimitations.....	7
Conclusion	8
CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW	9
Introduction.....	9
What is the Role of the Ecuadorian Military and the Venezuelan Military in Civil Society?.....	10
What is the Impact of Socialism for the 21st Century in Ecuador and Venezuela?	20
Conclusion	22
CHAPTER 3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY	23
Introduction.....	23
Research Methodology	23
Threats to Validity and Biases	27
Conclusion	28
CHAPTER 4 ANALYSIS	29
Introduction.....	29

Ecuador: a History of Civil-Military Relations	29
Venezuela: a History of Civil-Military Relations	38
Radicalization: the Pink Tide.....	49
Implementing Revolution	50
The <i>Foro de São Paulo</i>	50
The Bolivarian Alliance of the Americas	52
Impact of Radicalization on the Ecuadorian Military.....	54
Impact of Radicalization on Venezuelan Military	63
Similarities	70
Common History.....	70
Broad Constitutional Mandates.....	70
Ideologies	71
Differences.....	71
Leadership.....	71
Self-Identity	72
Role	73
Conclusion	75
 CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS	 76
Introduction.....	76
Recommendations.....	76
Conclusion	77
Epilogue	79
 BIBLIOGRAPHY	 82

ACRONYMS

ALBA	<i>Alternativa Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América</i> [<u>Bolivarian Alternative of the Americas</u>]
MBR-200	<i>Movimiento Bolivariano Revolucionario-200</i> [Revolutionary Bolivarian Movement-200]

ILLUSTRATIONS

	Page
Figure 1. Ecuadorian Military Role in Civil Society (1833 to 2017).....	31
Figure 2. Venezuelan Military Role in Civil Society (1811 to 2017)	40
Figure 3. Role Comparison of Ecuadorian and Venezuelan Military in Radicalization.	74

TABLES

	Page
Table 1. Formal Roles of a Military Officer	24

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Overview

Since the late 1990s, politics in Ecuador and Venezuela has been fueled by strident pleas for equality and freedom from oppression by the United States and national oligarchs. Voters responded, supporting Hugo Chávez’s Bolivarian Revolution in Venezuela and largely supporting the leftist leadership of Rafael Correa in Ecuador. In both countries, liberties such as freedom of the press and the right to bear arms were slowly narrowed and eventually dissolved. Constitutional limitations on term limits disappeared as leaders consolidated political gains and sought unfettered power. Onlookers worried that these changes were a harbinger of further authoritarian shifts in Latin America.

This thesis examines the role of the military in Ecuador and Venezuela during the leftist revolutions led by Rafael Correa and Hugo Chavez, respectively. Chapter 2 reviews important concepts and applicable academic investigation. Chapter 3 explains the research methodology behind the information and analysis provided. Chapter 4 examines the military in both Ecuador and Venezuela from a historical perspective. This section specifically discusses military training and education in Ecuador and Venezuela. In addition, Chapter 4 discusses Socialism for the 21st Century, known as *Socialismo XXI*, in conjunction with the “Bolivarian Revolution” in Venezuela and its impact on the military. Chapter 4 focuses on the military’s response, if any, to the leftist shift in politics and policy in Ecuador and Venezuela. Chapter 4 also includes a comparison of the

similarities and differences in the experience of each country. Chapter 5 provides a summary and offers conclusions and recommendations for further research.

Primary Research Question

The primary research question is: what is the role of the military in the radicalization of Ecuador and Venezuela? The title of the thesis is “Saviors of Sovereignty: The Role of the Military in the Radicalization of Ecuador and Venezuela.” This study examines the military as a tool of national power and influence.

Secondary Research Question

A satisfactory response to the primary research question requires the researcher to adequately answer a number of secondary research questions. The focus of these secondary questions is civil-military relations in Ecuador and Venezuela. In addition, it is necessary to analyze the recent rise of radical ideologies in Ecuador and Venezuela and to examine the impacts of such movements on the military. The secondary questions are: what is the role of the Ecuadorian military in civil society? What is the role of the Venezuelan military in civil society? What is the impact of Bolivarianismo and *Socialismo XXI* in each country? How do Bolivarianismo and *Socialismo XXI* impact the role of the military in each country?

The Value of this Study

This study is significant to military professionals and other scholars because it reflects on the role of the military in the midst of sweeping ideological change. This research will provide common themes and lessons from each unique radicalization experience. Much is written about Venezuela, but the coverage on Ecuador is less

abundant. This research project endeavors to close that coverage gap and to provide critical analysis of the role of the military in each country.

This research fills a gap in the scholarly literature by providing an analysis of traditional civil-military relationships in Latin America and the impact of the revolutionary ideology known as *Socialismo XXI*. In addition, it explores “Bolivarianismo,” a movement at the heart of seismic change across Latin America. A comparison of the role of the military in the two countries provides useful insights into the structure of the military and its influence in the national zeitgeist from the late 1990s to the present.

Qualifications

The author is qualified to explore this topic based on previous study of civil-military relations, personal experience living and working in Ecuador, and Spanish fluency which provides better access to relevant primary sources. The author is a judge advocate with 13 years in the United States Army. As an Army officer the author has preconceived notions of how military members should react to civil society or to political movements based on professional military education. To achieve greater objectivity, the author’s research focused on the context of each country before assessing the role of the military in each. In addition, the author discussed the research with a committee of three faculty members and other colleagues to minimize bias.

Definitions and Terms

The following definitions and terms provide clarity and common understanding of key concepts used throughout this thesis.

Alternativa Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América [Bolivarian Alternative of the Americas] (ALBA): Regional infrastructure conceived by Hugo Chávez and Fidel Castro on December 14, 2004.¹ The ALBA is rooted in the Bolivarian ideal of a regional “Great Fatherland” linked politically and economically.² The ALBA features a regional bank, a military school, and an internal currency.³ The many facets of the ALBA are tools used to expand Bolivarianismo and Socialism for the 21st Century throughout Latin America.

Bolivarianismo: An ideology, largely attributed to Hugo Chávez, based upon the independence-focused, anti-hegemonic, regionalist legacy of 19th century Latin American leader Simón Bolívar.⁴

Civil-Military Relations: The manner in which civilian society interacts with the military is a topic of great interest to a host of academics, military leaders, and civilians. Constitutional analysis, sociology, foreign affairs, and history all play a role in the study of civil-military relations.

¹ Joel Hirst, “A Guide to ALBA,” *Americas Quarterly*, accessed March 26, 2018, <http://www.americasquarter.org/hirst/article>.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Carlos de la Torre, “El bolivarianismo,” *El Pais*, September 25, 2015, accessed October 2, 2017, https://elpais.com/internacional/2015/09/25/actualidad/1443142773_008162.html.

Mercado Comun del Sur [Common Market of the South] (MERCOSUR): South American economic bloc created in 1992 by the Treaty of Asuncion.⁵ Brazil and Argentina are the dominant members of the organization.⁶ Its aim is the free movement of goods and services between partner nations.⁷

Dictablanda: A Spanish blend of two concepts: *dictadura* [dictator] and *blanda* [soft]. Translated as “soft dictator or dictatorship” this term refers to a government led by an authoritarian leader who does not rely on repression to rule.

Forum of São Paulo: The forum is a conference of leftist governments and organizations from across Latin America established by the Brazilian Worker’s Party in 1990.⁸ The fall of the Berlin Wall triggered the creation of the group.⁹ The annual meeting, held in a different Latin American city each year, is a stage for collaboration and relationship building among leftist groups.¹⁰ The forum has been influential across Latin America, facilitating the spread of Socialism for the 21st Century and Bolivarianismo.¹¹

⁵ BBC News, “Profile: MERCOSUR–Common Market of the South,” February 15, 2012, accessed April 11, 2018, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/5195834.stm>.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Alejandro Peña Esclusa, *El Foro de São Paulo contra Álvaro Uribe* (Bogotá, Columbia: Random House Mondadori, August 2008), 17.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid., 18.

¹¹ Alex Newman, “Resurgent Communism in Latin America,” *The New American*, March 16, 2010, accessed December 12, 2017, <https://www.thenewamerican.com>

Pink Tide: Moniker used by the media and political scientists to describe the leftist movement across Latin America during the late 1990s and 2000s. Larry Rohter, a writer for the *New York Times*, coined the term to contrast the softer socialist movements in Latin America from the color red used to denote hard-line communism.¹² The “pink tide” generally describes populist, anti-American, progressive Latin American governments.¹³

Radicalization: The action or process of causing someone to adopt extreme positions on political or social issues.¹⁴ In this discussion, radicalization means the adoption of Bolivarianismo and Socialism for the 21st Century in Ecuador and Venezuela.

Socialism for the 21st Century: An ideology attributed to German sociologist Heinz Dieterich Steffan based on the idea of participatory democracy aimed at the actualization of each citizen.¹⁵ Many Latin American leaders have espoused this ideology, including Rafael Correa and Hugo Chávez. Socialism for the 21st Century invokes anti-imperialist, progressive principles.

american.com/world-news/south-america/item/10497-resurgent-communism-in-latin-america.

¹² Larry Rohter. “With New Chief, Uruguay Veers Left, in a Latin Pattern,” *New York Times*, March 1, 2005, accessed May 22, 2018, <https://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/01/world/americas/with-new-chief-uruguay-veers-left-in-a-latin-pattern.html>.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Oxford Living Dictionary, “Radicalization,” accessed May 25, 2017, <https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/radicalization>.

¹⁵ Heinz Dieterich Steffan, “Socialismo del Siglo XXI,” *Rebelión.org*, accessed September 13, 2017, <http://www.rebelion.org/docs/121968.pdf>.

Assumptions, Limitations, and Delimitations

The role of the military is a broad topic, especially when applied to two different countries. As such, some assumptions, limitations, and delimitations were applied to this research study. Assumptions are ideas or facts the researcher uses as a basis for analysis. In this case, radicalization is assumed. As discussed above, radicalization refers to the adoption of Bolivarianismo and Socialism for the 21st Century in Ecuador and Venezuela. Both ideologies require commitment to populism, anti-imperialism, anti-capitalism and other leftist ideals. Little time will be spent arguing the applicability of radicalization to Ecuador and Venezuela because based on academic study and broad, non-partisan news coverage, the assumption that both societies have gone through a period of radicalization is sound.

Delimitations are self-imposed restrictions on the research project that serve to focus the thesis and empower the researcher to establish helpful parameters to streamline the thesis process. Though the study provides a comprehensive history of the military in both Ecuador and Venezuela, the time frame of the comparative case study is limited to the late 1990s until the present. Another delimitation is the focus on the military. This research project is focused specifically on the role of the military in the radicalization of Venezuela and Ecuador. While there will be discussion of the role of the military generally, this delimitation gives the topic focus.

Limitations are potentially weak areas in the research. The researcher was able to speak to three individuals from Ecuador, but no Venezuelan interviewees emerged. This limitation is mitigated by the plethora of books and interviews that explore Venezuela.

Conclusion

The role of the military in Latin America, particularly during a time of great ideological shift, deserves examination. Comparing Ecuador and Venezuela provides distinct viewpoints and answers the primary research question: what is the role of the military in the radicalization of Ecuador and Venezuela? The literature review in chapter 2 provides context for the secondary questions regarding the radicalization of Ecuador and Venezuela and its consequences for the military in each country.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

The military is an integral part of Latin American Society. From Spanish *caudillos* to modern day armies, the legal use of force has shaped Latin American culture and politics for generations.¹⁶ Military leaders fill various roles in nascent democracies across Latin America.¹⁷ Instability and economic crisis often lead to civilian reliance on the military.¹⁸

A thorough review of the literature is critical to answer the primary research question, “What is the role of the military in the radicalization of Ecuador and Venezuela?” The literature review provides an overview of sources, studies, and books that are relevant to the primary or secondary research questions. This chapter organizes sources and topics according to various research questions.

¹⁶ Brian Loveman, *For la Patria: Politics and the Armed Forces in Latin America* (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1999), xi.

¹⁷ NBC News, “Is Latin America’s Military Making a Comeback?” July 28, 2014, accessed November 19, 2017, <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/latin-americas-military-making-comeback-n166846>.

¹⁸ Juan Rial, “Arms and Civil Society in Latin America,” in *Civil-Military Relations and Democracy*, eds. Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 50-51.

What is the Role of the Ecuadorian Military and
the Venezuelan Military in Civil Society?

Any discussion of the military's role in Ecuadorian or Venezuelan society requires exploration of Latin American history. The past is prologue, particularly with regard to governance. All societal relationships are subject to the vicissitudes of historical and political change. Four particularly important concepts are relevant to the present topic: caudilloism, Bolivarianismo, corporatism, and Socialism for the 21st Century.

Caudilloism, or *caudillismo* in Spanish, is rule by a leader who captivates the masses by force of personality and commitment to some larger movement or "ism" like patriotism, federalism, etc.¹⁹ *Caudillos* controlled Latin America during the early 19th Century.²⁰ Most boasted military rank and, if necessary, ruled with violence and repression.²¹ In the chaotic age of independence from Spain, *caudillos* instilled a sense of order and hierarchy.²² The *caudillo* legacy in Latin America made military rule historically palatable. Like the *caudillos* before them, military leaders bring order to chaos, although their visions of order do not necessarily align with the public good.

Bolivarianismo is a political movement linked to Simon Bolívar, known to many as the great liberator, who succeeded in casting off Spanish colonial rule and securing

¹⁹ Loveman, *For la Patria*, 39.

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ *Ibid.*

²² *Ibid.*

independence for Venezuela, Bolivia, Colombia, Panama, Ecuador, and Peru.²³ Bolívar is a cultural saint in Latin America.²⁴ Reference to his legacy can be surprisingly effective. Hugo Chávez was the third national leader to have Bolívar's remains exhumed, publicly crying over the bones.²⁵ Bolivarianismo, also espoused by Rafael Correa in Ecuador, is an anti-imperialist movement against the United States or any other forces that may infringe upon Venezuelan (or Ecuadorian) national sovereignty.²⁶

These recent invocations of the Bolívar legacy further the theme of regional unity. In 1819 Simon Bolívar unified Colombia, Venezuela, and Ecuador to establish Gran Colombia.²⁷ His goal was to unite South America against imperialist forces.²⁸ Hugo Chávez shared that goal, evidenced by his partnership with Fidel Castro in 2004 to create the Alternativa Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América (ALBA), an international organization aimed at consolidating power against all imperialism and providing an alternative to the Free Trade Area of the Americas.²⁹ The members of ALBA, now nine to include Ecuador, have a slim majority in the Organization of

²³ Marie Arana, "Latin America's Go-To Hero," *The New York Times*, April 17, 2013, accessed October 11, 2017, <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/18/opinion/arana-latin-americas-go-to-hero.html>.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ de la Torre, "El bolivarianismo."

²⁷ Jerome R. Adams, *Liberators and Patriots of Latin America: Biographies of 23 Leaders* (Jefferson, NC: McFarland and Company, 1991), 34.

²⁸ Ibid., 35.

²⁹ Ibid.

American States, the “premier regional forum for political discussion, policy analysis and decision-making in Western Hemisphere affairs.”³⁰ Thus, the regional influence of ALBA is significant. The ALBA also established a military training school, The Juan José Torres Anti-Imperialist School, in Santa Cruz, Bolivia to teach anti-imperial strategy to students.³¹

Scholars continue to explore and debate the true nature of Simon Bolívar’s legacy. A valid inquiry exists as to whether he was a liberator or a dictator. For instance, while championing equality and the abolishment of slavery he made himself a dictator and espoused lifetime appointments for presidents.³² Although he fought for freedom, Bolívar envisioned a *caudillo* or some autocratic leader controlling the future state.³³ This dichotomy is reflected in the legacy of leaders like Hugo Chavez and Rafael Correa.

Corporatism is hugely influential in Latin America and shapes modern civil-military relationships. Corporatism is a political system based on groups composed of people with common interests who govern the community, or “corpus” meaning body, as a whole.³⁴ At its best, corporatism represents inclusion, equality, and a just government

³⁰ Organization of American States, “Who We Are,” accessed May 28, 2018, http://www.oas.org/en/about/who_we_are.asp.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Arana, “Latin America’s Go-To Hero.”

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Howard J. Wiarda, *The Soul of Latin America* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001), 257.

focused on the communal good. At its worst corporatism becomes a tool for autocratic rule and cooptation or, when too many groups are represented, devolves into chaos.³⁵

There are four types of corporatism: natural—referring to identification with a family or tribe; ideological—a style rooted in the teachings of St. Thomas Aquinas; manifest or corporatism in power—more autocratic than the others; and modern neocorporatism—a softer, more democratic “corporatism of association” model that followed World War II and endures to the present.³⁶ Latin America has incorporated all models of corporatism depending on the era and the country. Corporatism is a philosophy that promotes institutional arrangements such as the creation of councils and heavy regulation. Corporatism has also been used to justify control and pressure on certain groups (labor unions, etc.).³⁷ Corporatism properly reflects the role of the military in much of Latin America. The military is often times the self-described guardian of cultural values.

Howard Wiarda and other academics posit that the strong influence of Catholic social teaching made corporatist ideals a natural fit for Latin Americans.³⁸ The “elitist, top-down, organic, unitary” nature of corporatism was easily relatable to Latin America where the people eschewed the individualism of liberalism.³⁹ The corporatist model was

³⁵ Wiarda, *The Soul of Latin America*, 280.

³⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 268-270.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 264.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 265.

applicable to military dictatorships and civilian democracies alike, demonstrating its flexibility in application.

Another feature of corporatism that resonated in Latin America was the central belief that “the government had to be based on the consent of the governed.”⁴⁰ This view provided a hopeful alternative to the harsh authoritarian experiences of many Latin American countries where leaders dominated every facet of life. In addition, corporatism was not demonized in Latin American as it was in Europe after World War II where people linked corporatism and fascism.⁴¹

Latin America had two waves of corporatism, one in the 1930s and a second wave in the 1970s.⁴² Corporatism in Latin American shifted from the more rigid natural model in 1930 to the softer, more democratic modern neoclassical version in 1970.⁴³ Although corporatism was never completely dismantled in Latin American, it enjoyed a strong resurgence in the 1960s and 1970s. However, at the time, many Latin American societies seemed to be fragmented. This was a direct threat to the unity required for successful corporatism.⁴⁴ The military proved effective at establishing the requisite unity, discipline,

⁴⁰ Wiarda, *The Soul of Latin America*, 266.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 271.

⁴² *Ibid.*

⁴³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 275.

and order.⁴⁵ Thus, the 1970 corporatism wave is called military corporatism.⁴⁶ Using the military to assist the political process in this manner paid short-term dividends, but created long-term costs for the legitimacy of civilian governance.

The role of the military in Ecuador and Venezuela requires discussion of civil-military relations. A seminal work for any observer of civil-military relations is *The Soldier and the State*, by Samuel Huntington. This text represents the historical standard for the civil-military relationship. In it, Huntington offers two different images to the reader. The ideal relationship, according to Huntington, features “objective civilian control” whereby civilian decision-makers identify the ends and trust professional military officers to give their best military advice as to the way to achieve the ends.⁴⁷ The second model is the “subjective control” model. In this arrangement an attempt is made to make the military mirror the state. The objective control model relies on a professional, politically neutral military officer. The subjective model focuses on conflict between military personnel and civilians.

Though Huntington’s paradigm has framed the civil-military discussion for decades, many academics acknowledge the need for an updated version. For example, Major General William E. Rapp, former Commandant of the United States Army War College, identifies the requirement for military professionals to go beyond their proverbial lanes to establish healthy lines of communication with the civilian

⁴⁵ Wiarda, *The Soul of Latin America*, 276.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 279.

⁴⁷ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), 80-85.

workforce.⁴⁸ Many political scientists recognize that due to unique realities in Latin American countries, the Huntington model may not be the best analytic framework to apply.⁴⁹

Latin America has a long history of military intervention.⁵⁰ Like the *caudillos* and strongmen during the colonial period, military leaders have used the resources at their disposal to impose order on civil society.⁵¹ These military governments have differed widely. From repressive authoritarianism in Chile and Argentina to the *dictablanda*, or soft dictatorship, in Ecuador, current civil-military relationships in Latin America owe much to the legacy of military dictatorships in the 1960s and 1970s.⁵² Latin American countries are vulnerable to military intervention due to weak civilian institutions and civilian governments that struggle to lead without resources and stability.⁵³ Given this context, political scientists and academics argue that Latin America is more nuanced than

⁴⁸ William E. Rapp, "Civil-Military Relations: The Role of Military Leaders in Strategy Making," *Parameters* 45, no. 3 (Autumn 2015): 13-26, accessed September 17, 2017, https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/parameters/issues/Autumn_2015/5_rapp.pdf.

⁴⁹ Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, *Civil-Military Relations and Democracy* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996). This text includes a chapter from Samuel Huntington highlighting the unique nature of Latin American civil-military relationships.

⁵⁰ Loveman, *For la Patria*, 171-173.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

⁵² *Ibid.*

⁵³ *Ibid.*

Huntington's objective or subjective model.⁵⁴ Thus, they devote their energy and research to properly articulate the Latin American civil-military relationship.

David Pion-Berlin, Professor of Political Science at the University of California-Riverside, offers a theory of a new civil-military pragmatism in Latin America.⁵⁵ He describes how the Organization of American States has been a force for stemming military invention, particularly coups.⁵⁶ When democratic governance is undermined by military intervention, the Inter-American Democratic Charter provides guidelines for sanctions.⁵⁷ The Latin American trading bloc, *Mercado Comun del Sur* [Common Market of the South] (MERCOSUR), makes stable democratic rule a prerequisite for membership to incentivize peaceful transitions of power.⁵⁸ Pion-Berlin describes the tension between the regional cost of military intervention and the cost of non-intervention in countries that suffer the effects of poverty and weak institutions.⁵⁹ Pion-Berlin suggests that as long as military members do not take positions in which they make

⁵⁴ David Pion-Berlin, "A New Civil-Military Pragmatism in Latin America," RESDAL Red de Seguridad y Defensa de América Latina, October 30, 2003, accessed March 20, 2018, http://www.fes-seguridadregional.org/images/stories/docs/0888-001_g.pdf.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

policy or withhold decision-making power from political leaders, the civil-military relationship model can function.⁶⁰

Deborah Norden, a political scientist and university professor, focuses on the elements of domination, management, and authority in her examination of civil-military relationships in Venezuela.⁶¹ Norden prudently recommends a division between military policy, the structure and function of the military, and defense (or security policy) which includes internal police forces.⁶² The majority of other academics who study civil-military relationships usually group the two areas. The corporatism influence is clear in her analysis, as she argues that shared values can foster proper civilian control of the military.⁶³ She focuses on Venezuelan efforts to shape ideological agreement among military officials in order to consolidate political power over the military.⁶⁴

Civil control over the military is the democratic ideal.⁶⁵ This model is difficult in Latin America because of weak civilian institutions. Many political scientists, like Juan Rial, suggest educating and empowering a capable civilian defense ministry in order to

⁶⁰ Pion-Berlin, "A New Civil-Military Pragmatism in Latin America."

⁶¹ Deborah Norden, "Civilian Authority without Civilian Dominance? Assessing Venezuelan Political-Military Relations under Chávez," *Nueva Sociedad* no. 213 (2008): 1-18, accessed April 3, 2018, <https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=wcUrnN4AAAAJ&hl=en>.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*.

make legitimate defense policy.⁶⁶ The exodus of civilian elites in Venezuela and military isolationism in Ecuador manifest in weak civilian institutions. An increase in civilian professionalism decreases the potential for military coups and widespread reliance on military answers to problems that can be solved by civilian institutions.⁶⁷ Rial portends that the future of military missions will be domestically focused.⁶⁸

John Samuel Fitch, Professor of Political Science at the University of Colorado, studied the Ecuadorian Military from 1948 to 1966.⁶⁹ He emphasized the importance of military self-identity in the civil-military relationship. He suggested four types of military officer:

1. a professionalist who is totally apolitical and loyal to a constituted order;
2. a constitutionalist who views the military role as fixed and limited in scope;
3. the arbiter who views the military role as a variable one which expands during national crisis; and
4. a developmentalist who views the military as totally politicized and loyal to national security.⁷⁰

Though the Fitch study only covers until 1966, his model is useful. Professor Fitch identified four different models of military officer based on the officer's perspective on

⁶⁶ Diamond and Plattner, *Civil-Relations and Democracy*, xviii.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 62.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 61.

⁶⁹ John Samuel Fitch, *The Military Coup D'etat as a Political Process* (Baltimore, MD: The John Hopkins University Press, 1977).

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 129.

proper civil-military relations. Fitch's research is particularly helpful to this thesis in that the models offer a concrete analytical lens to examine the role of the Ecuadorian and Venezuelan militaries. Accordingly, Fitch's four formal roles will be applied to the Ecuadorian and Venezuelan militaries in the analysis in chapter 4.

What is the Impact of Socialism for the 21st Century in Ecuador and Venezuela?

Socialismo XXI is a manifesto, written by German sociologist Heinz Dieterich Steffan, that heavily influenced Venezuela, Ecuador, and several other Latin American countries as heads of state, including Hugo Chávez, adopted its principles.⁷¹ In *Socialismo XXI*, Steffan argues that disenfranchised countries should fight against the hegemonic tendencies of superpowers like the United States.⁷² Like Bolívar, he suggests Latin America join together to create a regional bloc of power to rival similar alliances like the European Union.⁷³ He describes a new nationalism based on "participatory democracy" in which each member of society shares in a cultural revolution and benefits equally.⁷⁴

Socialismo XXI set the stage for a new milieu expressed in various national strategy documents. Ecuador's *Strategic Defense Plan 2014-2017* and its 2008

⁷¹ Steffan, "Socialismo del Siglo XXI."

⁷² Heinz Dieterich, *La Cuarta Vía al Poder: El 21 de enero desde una perspectiva latinoamericana* (Quito, Ecuador: Abaya Yala, November 2000), 28-29.

⁷³ Steffan, "Socialismo del Siglo XXI," 72.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 47.

Constitution reflect this new reality.⁷⁵ These documents task the Ecuadorian Armed Forces with a new internal mission set that focuses, in part, on protecting natural resources.⁷⁶ In 2008, Ecuadorian Military members ceased being “guarantors of democracy” and instead became actors that work to protect the rights of the citizenry.⁷⁷ Given the military corporatist model discussed above, it is logical that the military would be empowered to protect the rights of the citizenry. Depending on the country, chances are the military may already be doing something similar.

Socialism for the 21st Century is the ideology inspired by Steffan’s manifesto.⁷⁸ It reflects the principles of Bolívarianismo—sovereignty, regional unity, and anti-imperialism—and the unique personality and institutional flavor of the country in question.⁷⁹ For example, Chávez pushed for constitutional change and privatization in Venezuela while Correa maintained dollarization but closed the United States Military base at Manta in Ecuador.⁸⁰ Many critics argue that Bolívarianism in Venezuela is as

⁷⁵ Ministerio de Defensa Nacional de la República del Ecuador, Resolución Ministerial No. 004, *Plan Estratégico Institucional* (Quito, Ecuador: Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, January 11, 2017), accessed March 18, 2018, <http://www.oficial.ec/ministerio-defensa-nacional>.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷⁷ El Telégrafo, “Las FF.AA. son militares y militantes del buen vivir,” March 25, 2013, accessed April 16, 2018, <https://www.defensa.gob.ec/las-ff-aa-son-militares-y-militantes-del-buen-vivir/>.

⁷⁸ Steffan, “Socialismo del Siglo XXI.”

⁷⁹ Iselin Åsedotter Strønen, “‘A Civil-Military Alliance’: The Venezuelan Armed Forces before and during the Chávez era,” Christian Michelsen Institute, 2016, accessed September 13, 2017, <https://www.cmi.no/publications/5808-a-civil-military-alliance>.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

much about the cult of personality of Hugo Chávez as it is anything else.⁸¹ In fact some suggest that without Chávez, who died in 2013, the “cult” will not last.⁸² However, Chávez’s selected successor, Nicolás Maduro, has maintained power for the last five years and has continued the Bolivarian Revolution despite Chávez’s death.

Examining the impact of Bolívarianism and Socialism for the 21st Century required a particular focus on Latin American newspaper articles and journal articles from the last five years. The sources used come from a variety of perspectives ranging from clear Chavez loyalists like Martena Harnecker and Heinz Deitreich to conservative news outlets like Fox News and studies by development research organizations like the Christian Michelsen Institute. This approach ideally serves to get as close to the truth as possible. In addition, it adds polemic to a topic that is nuanced and rife with debate.

Conclusion

This chapter provides an overview of sources and authors whose research helps address the role of the military in the radicalization of Ecuador and Venezuela. Every researcher stands on the shoulders of those who have gone before. The analysis and responses to the research questions in chapter 4 are possible only because of the literature discussed above. Any gaps or deficiencies are the fault of this author alone. The research methodology for this thesis is explained in chapter 3.

⁸¹ de la Torre, “El bolivarianismo.”

⁸² Ibid.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Introduction

A qualitative comparative study is used to answer the research questions. An examination of the academic literature written about civil-military relationships in Latin America and the role of the military in Ecuador and Venezuela provides important context to the study. Semi-structured interviews with individuals who have lived and worked in Ecuador, including a retired Ecuadorian intelligence officer and a former Deputy Chief of Mission in Quito, Ecuador, give a unique perspective to the analysis. Finally, the comparative case study of Ecuador and Venezuela draws out any useful insights gained from comparing and contrasting the two experiences.

Research Methodology

The primary question regarding the role of the military in the radicalization of Ecuador and Venezuela is answered using the following steps:

Step 1: Determine and refine the primary research question and the secondary research questions. This step is continuous and is informed by exploring relevant information on the topic.

Step 2: The literature review informs Step 1 but also gives the researcher a context or framework for the study. The literature review is presented in chapter 2. The analysis of the literature is described in chapter 4. Conclusions based on the research are presented in chapter 5.

Step 3: The third step is to choose an analytical framework to evaluate and answer the research questions. The framework for this analysis will be John Samuel Fitch’s four “formal role definitions” of the Ecuadorian military officer in the early 20th Century.⁸³ Each role embodies a distinct approach to civil-military relations.⁸⁴ In his study of the coup d’état as a political process in Ecuador, Fitch used the model to analyze how individual officers chose whether or not to support a coup. The model is equally applicable to the role of the military in society during periods of radicalization. Though originally applied in the Ecuadorian context, the framework may be applied to Venezuela as well. Fitch found that the roles changed based on the officer’s views of the respective governing capacity of civilian authorities and the strength of the military as a competent institution. The following chart depicts the four formal roles. Though the roles are depicted in distinct quadrants, in reality two or more roles may apply.

Table 1. Formal Roles of a Military Officer

PROFESSIONALIST	ARBITER
Allegiance to the constituted order	Allegiance to the national interest
Totally apolitical	Variable role that expands in crisis
CONSTITUTIONALIST	DEVELOPMENTALIST
Allegiance to the constitution	Allegiance to national security
Military’s role is fixed and limited in scope	Total politicization

Source: Created by author.

⁸³ Fitch, *The Military Coup D’Etat as a Political Process*, 129.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

The professionalist is absolutely loyal to the constituted order.⁸⁵ As such he will equally serve a military despot or a democratically elected president.⁸⁶ A professionalist views the military as an instrument of the state to provide external security and, if needed, internal security.⁸⁷ Thus a professionalist army will focus on the art of war exclusively, eschewing all ancillary tasks irrelevant to its purpose.⁸⁸ The professionalist is apolitical.⁸⁹ All energy is focused on serving the government in power. According to Fitch, the professionalist model requires the military to have high regard for civilian competence and capability, and low confidence in military governance.⁹⁰

The constitutionalist model is rooted in Article 153 of the 1966 Ecuadorian Constitution.⁹¹ “For the defense of the Republic and the maintenance of constitutional order, there shall be military armed forces.”⁹² The plain language of Article 153 indicates that the Ecuadorian armed forces exist to protect the constitution. Many Latin American countries have similar constitutional language in early constitutions, to include Venezuela.⁹³ This mandate is emphasized in Ecuadorian professional military education.

⁸⁵ Fitch, *The Military Coup D’Etat as a Political Process*, 129.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ Ibid., 130.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ Ibid., 137.

⁹¹ Ibid., 101.

⁹² Ibid., 102.

⁹³ Ibid.

Cadets are educated in the constitutionalist vision of the military role: “internal defense, internal order, and maintenance of the constitution.”⁹⁴ At graduation, cadets kneel before the flag and pledge their lives to the flag and the constitution.⁹⁵ Over time the constitutional model came to include the requirement to maintain order, providing further justification for military intervention in civilian affairs. According to Fitch, the constitutionalist model works best when the military has moderate confidence in civilian competence and low confidence in the military’s political capability.⁹⁶

The arbiter model usually applies when the military perceives civilians as somewhat weak or incapable of successful political organization while believing that the military is moderately qualified to lead.⁹⁷ The arbiter views the role of the military as subject to change, depending on the circumstances.⁹⁸ According to the arbiter, if the nation is in crisis and civilian institutions fail to bring order to chaos, the military must step up to fill the void. This model varies significantly from the strictly military approach of the professionalist and the limited, fixed role of the military under the constitutionalist model.⁹⁹ The military in both Ecuador and Venezuela have played the arbiter at different times in their rather tumultuous history.

⁹⁴ Fitch, *The Military Coup D’Etat as a Political Process*, 102.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 137.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 129.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*

The developmentalist model is characterized by a military that has a low opinion of civilian capacity for governance and a high degree of confidence in the military's ability to lead the country.¹⁰⁰ The developmentalist model is characterized by a total politicization of the armed forces and a priority of focus on national security.¹⁰¹ Instead of the “military only” professionalist, the developmentalist is more likely to consider and utilize other instruments of national power and factor in socioeconomic impacts. The radicalization of Ecuador and Venezuela marked a doctrinal shift to the developmentalist model in both countries.

Step 4: The analysis and comparison of the case studies using Fitch's four model framework, along with the results of the literature review answers the primary research question. Secondary research questions are also answered.

Step 5: Useful elements from steps one through four are aggregated in the conclusion. Any recommendations regarding further research are suggested.

Threats to Validity and Biases

Bias threatens to distort fact and undermine legitimate conclusions. This researcher has potential biases based on personal experience in Ecuador, presumed dominance of the Spanish language, and resistance to approaching this subject matter from the North American perspective. To avoid these pitfalls, the researcher followed the steps above. Literature from individuals fomenting a “radicalization” in Ecuador and Venezuela was examined. The researcher sought different perspectives on the topic and,

¹⁰⁰ Fitch, *The Military Coup D'Etat as a Political Process*, 137.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 129.

to avoid bias or myopia, did not seek to make recommendations regarding policy lessons for the United States Army or the United States Government. In addition, three knowledgeable committee members and an outside reader examined the study in an effort to minimize false assumptions or biases.

Conclusion

The research methodology described above resulted in an unbiased, valid answer to the question: what is the role of the military in the radicalization of Ecuador and Venezuela? Information and context from the literature review answers the secondary questions. Interviews and the comparative case study fill in information gaps and offer perspective on this nuanced, multi-faceted area. Data presentation and analysis is provided in the next chapter, chapter 4.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Introduction

This chapter presents an analysis of the information gleaned from the literature review, interviews, and a comparison of the role of the military in the radicalization of Ecuador and Venezuela. The chapter begins with a comprehensive overview of civil-military relations in each country. This discussion provides context for the shift to the political left in Ecuador and Venezuela and provides some elements for comparison.

Ecuador: a History of Civil-Military Relations

The Ecuadorian Military, like many in Latin America, has a long history of intervention in governance.¹⁰² The military is one of the most trusted institutions in Ecuador, and the civilian population largely trusts the military to reorient the country when corrupt political leaders go astray.¹⁰³ Ecuador's constitutional framework supports this role. Historically, the Ecuadorian military has the constitutional mandate to enforce liberty and sovereignty.¹⁰⁴ Over time, this has come to justify coups as a valid form of regime change.¹⁰⁵ Despite its broad power, the Ecuadorian military has been willing to

¹⁰² Anita Isaacs, *Military Rule and Transition in Ecuador, 1972-1992* (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1993).

¹⁰³ Hernández, "La batalla sospechosa de Correa contra los militares," *Cuatro Pelagatos*, February 16, 2016, accessed May 5, 2018, <http://4pelagatos.com/2016/02/26/la-batalla-sospechosa-de-correa-contra-los-militares/>.

¹⁰⁴ Dieterich, *La Cuarta Via al Poder*, 60-65.

¹⁰⁵ Fitch, *The Military Coup D'Etat as a Political Process*, 143-145.

yield back power to civilian leaders. This willingness to submit to civilian rule makes the Ecuadorian Military uniquely passive compared to some of its regional neighbors.¹⁰⁶

Before providing an overview of civil-military relations in Ecuador, it is useful to briefly apply Fitch's formal role definitions to the Ecuadorian military to put its pre-radicalization journey in context. After the post-independence transition, the Ecuadorian military began in the constitutionalist mold. Its role was fixed and inextricably linked to constitutional protection. The military then had a professionalist period, supporting a variety of civilian governments. This era was punctuated by arbiter periods where the military either ruled the country or triggered transition. Overall, the story of the Ecuadorian Military from 1830 to the mid-2000s is one of a journey from constitutionalist to professionalist to constitutionalist with a mission that became developmentalist after radicalization. This path is punctuated with moments when the Ecuadorian Armed Forces acted as arbiter. The chart below demonstrates the Ecuadorian Military transition from post-colonialism through radicalization.

¹⁰⁶ Dieterich, *La Cuarta Via al Poder*, 67.




Figure 1. Ecuadorian Military Role in Civil Society (1833 to 2017)

Source: Created by author.

The 19th Century Ecuadorian civil-military relationship was a nascent one ruled by military-political *caudillos*.¹⁰⁷ It was the era of the strongman, as military and civilian leaders filled a power vacuum left by the Spanish colonial masters. Ecuador achieved independence from Spain in 1830.¹⁰⁸ Juan José Flores, a Venezuelan parvenu and soldier,

¹⁰⁷ Fitch, *The Military Coup D'etat as a Political Process*, 15.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*

married into the Quito aristocracy and became the first President of Ecuador.¹⁰⁹ In keeping with the Spanish *caudillo* tradition, a series of military generals ruled the country from 1833 until 1916.¹¹⁰ Though individual military officers had power, the military as an institution was fragile and was defeated multiple times by armed militias.¹¹¹ In fact, it was not until the mid-1870s that Latin American militaries began to develop common doctrine, training, and skills.¹¹²

The 20th Century ushered in a shift to a more professionalized, non-partisan Ecuadorian military, largely due to a bitter defeat. In 1941 Ecuador lost over one half of its territory to Peru after a long struggle.¹¹³ Military leaders blamed the loss on a lack of preparedness caused by political pressure to expend military resources buttressing President Arroyo del Rio's failing presidency.¹¹⁴ This episode increased mistrust between political leaders and the military, as each blamed the other for losing territory to Peru. The backlash from frustrated military leaders who felt the military had allowed politics to interfere in military operations resulted in widespread changes to military education. A constitutional law class was added to the curriculum at the war academy and recruits

¹⁰⁹ Loveman, *For la Patria*, 36.

¹¹⁰ Fitch, *The Military Coup D'etat as a Political Process*, 14.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, 16.

¹¹² Loveman, *For la Patria*, 39.

¹¹³ Isaacs, *Military Rule and Transition in Ecuador, 1972-92*, 2.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*

were indoctrinated with a sense of their duty to the country over individual officeholders.¹¹⁵

The military deliberately receded from governance issues and focused on readiness, training, and professional education.¹¹⁶ In Fitch's terms, the military entered a professionalist period in which it was determined to be apolitical and focused on the tasks of war.¹¹⁷ Consequently, the 1995 Cenepa War with Peru featured a more focused, professional Ecuadorian Military.¹¹⁸ Perceived military success in this engagement increased the credibility and influence of the Ecuadorian Military and its leaders. It also strengthened the identity of the military as an institution.

Civilian control over military spending has been limited in Ecuador, largely due to economic programs that directly fund the military. The Ecuadorian Military receives income from the state run oil company, *Petroecuador*, and its parent company *Direccion de Industrias del Ejercito*.¹¹⁹ In addition, military provision of security services for private extractive companies has been a lucrative proposition for the Ecuadorian Armed

¹¹⁵ Isaacs, *Military Rule and Transition in Ecuador, 1972-92*, 2.

¹¹⁶ Council on Hemispheric Affairs, "An Armed Forces Anomaly: Key Ingredients to Ecuador's Democratic Consistency," August 4, 2010, November 2, 2017, 2, <http://www.coha.org/an-armed-forces-anomaly-key-ingredients-to-ecuador's-democratic-consistency/#>.

¹¹⁷ Fitch, *The Military Coup D'etat as a Political Process*, 129.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*

Forces.¹²⁰ This separate funding stream insulates Ecuadorian Military budgets from civilian control and congressional oversight, giving military leaders additional independence.

The Ecuadorian Constitution, while highly variable,¹²¹ defines the role of the military in Ecuadorian society. Versions of the constitution before 1998 describe the military as “protectors of the constitution.”¹²² Ironically, the military was frequently operating against the constitution by installing leaders without elections as military confidence in civilian leadership decreased.¹²³ This reality is reflected in the following declaration of the Ecuadorian Armed Forces upon seizing power in 1972:

Faced with this situation, the armed forces, in accordance with their responsibility for the survival of the Ecuadorian state, have assumed power, without leaders or caudillos, but as an institution, to implant a new national political doctrine, which will make possible the execution of the substantial transformations of the socioeconomic and legal order that the present chaotic state of the Republic demands.¹²⁴

This sentiment of the military bringing order to civilian-made chaos is what Professor Fitch describes as the shift from the constitutionalist perspective of the military role to

¹²⁰ Resilience.org, “Ecuador—Oil Companies’ Links with Military Revealed,” June 18, 2005, accessed March 30, 2018, <https://resilience.org/stories/2005-06-18/ecuador-oil-companies'-links-military-revealed/>.

¹²¹ There have been twenty Ecuadorian constitutions since 1830.

¹²² Fitch, *The Military Coup d’Etat as a Political Process*, 102.

¹²³ *Ibid.*, 143-145.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, 145.

more of an arbiter role.¹²⁵ It is a shift that continued as Ecuador experienced six presidents, in a six-year period.

In early 1997, President Abdala Bucaram served for six months before Congress voted him out of office for “mental incapacity.”¹²⁶ A constitutional crisis evolved whereby President Bucaram, the Vice President, and a Congressman all claimed the Presidency.¹²⁷ In that instance Armed Forces Chief of Staff Paco Moncayo, the Army Commander in the 1995 Cenepa War, urged a quick solution but declared that the armed forces, although constitutionally authorized, would not take action to ameliorate the situation.¹²⁸ Using Professor Fitch’s analysis, Moncayo’s professionalist approach would not last long.

Just two years later, on January 21, 1999, a frustrated Ecuadorian Army Colonel, Lucio Gutiérrez, began pushing his superiors to take action against the policies of then President Jamil Mahuad.¹²⁹ A combination of high inflation, external debt, and a banking crisis put President Mahuad’s presidency in extremis. Gutiérrez and other like-minded Ecuadorians were weary of what they perceived as corruption, white collar crime and

¹²⁵ Fitch, *The Military Coup d’Etat as a Political Process*, 145.

¹²⁶ CNN World News, “Crisis in Ecuador as 3 Claim Presidency,” February 7, 1997, accessed October 2, 2017, <http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/9702/07/ecuador/>.

¹²⁷ Ibid.

¹²⁸ Ibid.

¹²⁹ Dieterich, *La Cuarta Via al Poder*, 65.

widespread lack of ethical accountability by politicians.¹³⁰ Then Gutiérrez urged military members to take on their “historic role” as constitutional protectors by joining the Ecuadorian people to oust the president.¹³¹ In Fitch’s terms, though Gutiérrez espoused a constitutionalist argument, he really fulfilled the role of arbiter as the military expanded its role in a national crisis to protect the national interest.¹³² While younger officers were dissatisfied with civilian leadership, senior generals were less inclined to take action.¹³³ On one hand senior Ecuadorian Army leaders had pensions to protect.¹³⁴ On the other hand, regional disdain for extra-constitutional regime change and United States pressure to use democratic solutions made inaction the safest route.¹³⁵

On July 21, 2000, 400 Ecuadorian officers and soldiers marched on the National Congress building in Quito.¹³⁶ Gutiérrez convinced the military personnel guarding the Congress to join his “patriotic act” and gained entry to Congress.¹³⁷ Once inside, military leaders, indigenous leaders, and Congressional representatives sang the Ecuadorian national anthem.¹³⁸ Two decrees were presented, one denouncing governmental

¹³⁰ Dieterich, *La Cuarta Via al Poder*, 65.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, 61.

¹³² Fitch, *The Military Coup d’Etat as a Political Process*, 129.

¹³³ *Ibid.*, 103-110.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*

corruption and injustice and the other announcing the creation of the Junta of National Salvation, made up of Antonio Vargas, the president of the powerful indigenous group Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador, Doctor Carlos Solorzano, ex-president of the Ecuadorian Supreme Court, and Colonel Gutierrez as president of the junta.¹³⁹ Gutiérrez was forced to abdicate his role to Army Chief of Staff General Carlos Mendoza. General Mendoza convinced the junta to transfer power to Vice President Gustavo Noboa, peacefully concluding what became known as the “indigenous-popular-military uprising.”¹⁴⁰ This peaceful transition illustrates the general lack of institutional confidence in the Ecuadorian military in its own ability to govern. In Ecuador, the military acts typically as arbiter only to quickly cede power to civilian authorities.

For his part in the coup Gutiérrez spent 138 days in prison and was expelled from the Army.¹⁴¹ Even after his sentence, using a constitutionalist argument, he insisted the actions taken on January 21, 2000 comported with the role of the military as stated in Article 183 of the 1998 Constitution.¹⁴² He defended the military action as a heroic response to the Ecuadorian cry for justice.¹⁴³ According to Gutiérrez, as defenders of national sovereignty the military had to respond.¹⁴⁴ Antonio Vargas, the indigenous

¹³⁹ Fitch, *The Military Coup d’Etat as a Political Process*, 66.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 7.

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 70.

¹⁴² *Ibid.* 67.

¹⁴³ *Ibid.* 62.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

member of the Junta of National Salvation, was disappointed by what he deemed the betrayal of the generals.¹⁴⁵ Those involved in the coup considered it a successful movement of diverse populations for the good of the country.¹⁴⁶ Just five years later the Ecuadorian public would oust President Gutiérrez in similar fashion.

In 2005, after just two years in office, Lucio Gutiérrez dissolved the Supreme Court and declared a state of emergency.¹⁴⁷ The nation quickly grew weary of Gutierrez's orthodox economic policies and the President exhausted his good will with warring political factions.¹⁴⁸ The Vice President accused President Gutiérrez of being a dictator and the police chief resigned to avoid being forced to take action against anti-Gutiérrez protestors.¹⁴⁹ Finally, the military, as arbiters and defenders of constitutional order, physically ushered President Gutiérrez out of office and he obtained asylum from Brazil.¹⁵⁰ Rafael Correa, an economist and former finance minister, would ride this "citizen revolution" into office the following year and remain in power until 2017.

Venezuela: a History of Civil-Military Relations

Applying Fitch's model to the Venezuelan experience illustrates important differences between the role of the military in Ecuador and in Venezuela before and

¹⁴⁵ Fitch, *The Military Coup d'Etat as a Political Process*, 45.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁷ The Economist, "A Coup by Congress and the Street," April 25, 2005, accessed April 28, 2018, <https://www.economist.com/node/3893731>.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

during radicalization. The Venezuelan Military enjoyed more time in a professionalist role than the Ecuadorian Military. This reality was not the product of choice or doctrine or education. It was a direct result of the relatively stable environment in Venezuela from 1958 until the late 1990s. Although the Venezuelan Military demonstrated some arbiter traits, it was not called upon to guide the country through tumult or regime change as much as its Ecuadorian counterpart. That said, the trajectory of formal roles mirrors the Ecuadorian experience for the most part. The main difference is the Venezuelan Military acted less as an arbiter and had a longer professionalist period than the military in Ecuador. However, with radicalization, the Venezuelan Military became deeply politicized and developmentalist. The chart below represents the role of the Venezuelan Military from colonial independence to radicalization.




Figure 2. Venezuelan Military Role in Civil Society (1811 to 2017)

Source: Created by author.

The emergence of civil-military relations in Venezuela largely mirrors Ecuador. In 1811, Venezuela was the first Latin American country to declare its independence from Spain. The power vacuum left by the colonists was filled by politico-military *caudillos* who raised *llaneros*, mixed race irregular cavalry forces who fought for their leader, for treasure, and for liberty from governmental control.¹⁵¹ Like Juan José Flores,

¹⁵¹ Loveman, *For la Patria*, 35-36.

José Antonio Páez demonstrated the social mobility claimed by *llaneros* when he rose from a simple plainsman to become the first Venezuelan President in 1830.¹⁵²

In 1912, Venezuelan General Juan Vicente Gómez requested Chilean Colonel Samuel McGill to direct Venezuelan academy military training.¹⁵³ The Chilean Military completed a number of military missions to “Europeanize” local militaries in Venezuela, Ecuador, Colombia, and El Salvador.¹⁵⁴ During this period, military professionalism was prioritized. The *Military Newsletter* was created in 1910, publishing articles on military tactics and techniques.¹⁵⁵ In addition, literacy classes were introduced for enlisted soldiers, new weapons were purchased from Germany, and classes were formed for non-commissioned officers to promote professional education.¹⁵⁶ A petroleum boom from 1908 to 1935 allowed the Venezuelan Military to focus on centralizing operations and professionalism.¹⁵⁷

Compared to its neighbors, Venezuela enjoyed relative stability during the 20th Century. In 1948, a coup involving parts of the Army, Navy, and Air Force swept Colonel Pérez Jiménez, a dictator, into power. He ruled the country for 10 years.¹⁵⁸ In

¹⁵² Loveman, *For la Patria*, 36.

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*, 74.

¹⁵⁴ Alain Rouquie, *The Military and the State in Latin America* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), 83.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 195.

1958, Pérez Jiménez fled the country, ending military rule in Venezuela. The next year, politicians from the Social Democratic Party, *Acción Democrática* [or Democratic Action] and the Christian Democratic Party signed the *Pact of Punto Fijo*, [translated as the Pact of Fixed Point], it was an extremely effective power-sharing agreement between the two political parties.¹⁵⁹ Under that agreement, the two parties alternated control of Venezuela for the next 40 years.¹⁶⁰

After military rule, civilian leaders sought to consolidate control over the military and structurally limit cooperation among the armed services.¹⁶¹ They crafted legislation to abolish centralized command structures and delegated authority to the individual services, fomenting competition for resources and segregation.¹⁶² This measure made joint collaboration difficult and decreased the potential for military intervention. In addition, civilian leaders sought control of the military through a policy of appeasement, increasing the defense budget and broader benefits for soldiers.¹⁶³ These policies incentivized military members to comport with civilian leadership and continue in military service. Once the rules were in place, the new democratic administration threatened consequences if the military got out of its lane. Civilian leaders also retained

¹⁵⁹ Harold A. Trikunas, “The Crisis in Venezuelan Civil-Military Relations: From Punto Fijo to the Fifth Republic,” *Latin American Research Review* 37 no. 1 (2002): 41-76, accessed November 1, 2017, <http://lasa2.univ.pitt.edu/LARR/prot/search/retrieve/?Vol=37&Num=1&Start=41>.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁶² *Ibid.*

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*

the power to choose commanders, deny promotions, and change policy.¹⁶⁴ Thus continued the professionalist period for the Venezuelan Military.

For two decades, the civilian sector treated the Venezuelan Military with “benign neglect.”¹⁶⁵ While this approach kept the military in check and out of governance, it allowed for increased autonomy for the Venezuelan Armed Forces.¹⁶⁶ As the oil boom of the 1970s began to slow, tensions grew between the Venezuelan population and the civilian leadership.¹⁶⁷ These societal pressures beckoned the military out of its apolitical, professionalist cocoon.

Tensions also grew among military personnel, particularly senior leaders and younger officers, in the same time period. The military was a means of social mobility in Venezuela. Soldiers were increasingly recruited from the margins of society.¹⁶⁸ In 1970, the Venezuelan Army transitioned under the Plan Andrés Bello.¹⁶⁹ The plan made the Venezuelan Military Academy a college-level institution.¹⁷⁰ The curriculum was revised

¹⁶⁴ Trikunas, “The Crisis in Venezuelan Civil-Military Relations: From Punto Fijo to the Fifth Republic,” 41-76.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 46.

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁸ Strønen, “‘A Civil-Military Alliance’: The Venezuelan Armed Forces before and during the Chavez era,” 12.

¹⁶⁹ Trikunas, “The Crisis in Venezuelan Civil-Military Relations: From Punto Fijo to the Fifth Republic,” 45.

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

to focus on honor, self-discipline, and patriotism.¹⁷¹ Cadets studied Simon Bolívar as a model of valor. The younger officers from humble backgrounds, molded in the military academy, grew increasingly disheartened by public corruption and began to question the loyalty of careerist generals.¹⁷² In Fitch's terms this shift was the beginning of a pivot from professionalist to developmentalist, and a turning point for the Venezuelan Military.

In 1989, the embers of societal tension in Venezuela ignited with the *Caracazo*. Named for the Venezuelan capital of Caracas, the *Caracazo* profoundly affected civil-military relationships in Venezuela. On January 27, 1989 the Venezuelan public revolted after President Carlos Andres Pérez signed a "structural agreement statement" with the International Monetary Fund.¹⁷³ Pérez became president on promises of economic improvement, not conciliatory measures to pacify the global economic community.¹⁷⁴ Desperate, Pérez declared a state of emergency and called on the Venezuelan Army to control the citizenry.¹⁷⁵ Tanks rolled down the streets of Caracas, targeting the very people the military were charged with protecting. Between 300 and 3,000 Venezuelans were killed during the *Caracazo*.¹⁷⁶

¹⁷¹ Trikunas, "The Crisis in Venezuelan Civil-Military Relations: From Punto Fijo to the Fifth Republic," 45.

¹⁷² *Ibid.*

¹⁷³ Ewan Robertson, "Venezuela Marks 25 Years Since 'Caracazo' Uprising Against Neoliberalism," *Venezuelaanalysis.com*, February 28, 2017, accessed April 26, 2018, <https://venezuelaanalysis.com/print/10431>.

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

The *Caracazo* haunted members of the Venezuelan Armed Forces.¹⁷⁷ As professionalists, the Venezuelan Military served the constituted order, in this case a troubled President Pérez. Given its allegiance to the constituted order, the Venezuelan Military was collectively incredulous that the nation ordered it to use force against its own people.¹⁷⁸ Many of the attacks occurred in marginalized neighborhoods, near the childhood homes of a large number of junior officers.¹⁷⁹ The *Caracazo* exacerbated the grievances of those military academy graduates from the class of 1974 who felt the nation needed to go in a different direction.¹⁸⁰ Thus, the Venezuelan Military began to move from a longstanding professionalist role to an arbiter (developmentalist) role.¹⁸¹ One graduate, Hugo Chávez, became the leader of these revolutionary-minded officers.¹⁸² According to Chávez, it was the *Caracazo* that set in motion the Bolívarian Revolution and the coup of 1992.¹⁸³

¹⁷⁷ Dieterich, *La cuarta via al poder*, 189.

¹⁷⁸ Hector Armando Grooscors Hurtado, “Cambios y persistencias de la identidad politica ‘chavista’: Aproximacion al proceso politico venezolano reciente, 1999-2007” (Thesis, SEDE Academico de Mexico, 2015), 12, accessed March 9, 2018, <https://flacso.repositorioinstitucional.mx/jspui/handle/1026/12>.

¹⁷⁹ Robertson, “Venezuela Marks 25 Years Since ‘Caracazo’ Uprising Against Neoliberalism.”

¹⁸⁰ Strønen, “A Civil-Military Alliance”: The Venezuelan Armed Forces before and during the Chávez era,” 19.

¹⁸¹ Fitch, *The Military Coup d’Etat as a Political Process*, 129.

¹⁸² *Ibid.*

¹⁸³ Dieterich, *La cuarta via al poder*, 189.

During the 1970s and 1980s mid-level and junior officers formed a variety of self-help groups.¹⁸⁴ Members shared information, debated issues, and socialized.¹⁸⁵ In 1983, a group of military academy graduates formed the *Movimiento Bolivariano Revolucionario-200* [Bolivarian Revolution Movement-200] (MBR-200).¹⁸⁶ These initiatives reflected the growing developmentalist approach in Venezuela. The military became increasingly political and preoccupied with corruption and socioeconomic issues. Longstanding legislative initiatives designed to divide and decentralize the military caused senior leaders and elites to grow distant from the rank and file of the armed forces. This division enabled factions to emerge within the ranks and flourish. The officers of the MBR-200 committed themselves to fight corruption, maintain the dignity of the military profession, and restore patriotic values to Venezuela.¹⁸⁷ Thus, Lieutenant Colonel Chávez did not have to look far for co-conspirators when he determined that military force was necessary to create the Bolivarian democracy he espoused.

The members of MBR-200 considered themselves better officers than their superiors who were educated in the 1960s.¹⁸⁸ They invoked Bolívar and disdained

¹⁸⁴ Trikunas, “The Crisis in Venezuelan Civil-Military Relations: From Punto Fijo to the Fifth Republic.”

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁷ Hurtado, “Cambios y persistencias de la identidad política ‘chavista’: Aproximacion al proceso politico venezolano reciente, 1999-2007,” 68.

¹⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

neoliberal economic policies, foreign intervention, and political corruption.¹⁸⁹ For years, they believed civilian leaders were not fulfilling their constitutional duties to provide justice and stability to the nation.¹⁹⁰ Thus, just like Lucio Gutiérrez in Ecuador, Chávez and his supporters believed it was their duty to save the nation. The Venezuelan experience clearly reflects Fitch's determination that a loss of confidence in civilian competence can trigger a change in the role of the military. In Venezuela in the early 1990s, a loss of confidence in civilian political capacity coupled with the military's strong allegiance to the national interest resulted in military action. The Venezuelan Military surged from the developmentalist model to arbiter with a coup attempt.

Two attempts were made to topple the Pérez Administration. The first occurred on February 4, 1992. The coup plan was leaked to senior leaders before it began, enabling the administration to prepare a defense.¹⁹¹ The plan suffered from tactical mishaps and fragmentation which prevented participation from other services. After the failed coup Chávez and his co-conspirators were imprisoned for two years.¹⁹² On November 27, 1992, with Chávez in prison, high-ranking officers from the Venezuelan Navy and Army tried again.¹⁹³ The November coup operation was a joint effort but mistrust between the

¹⁸⁹ Hurtado, "Cambios y persistencias de la identidad política 'chavista': Aproximación al proceso político venezolano reciente, 1999-2007," 68.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid.

¹⁹¹ Ibid.

¹⁹² Ibid.

¹⁹³ Ibid.

services and a lack of leadership allowed Pérez to maintain power.¹⁹⁴ Nonetheless, Pérez never garnered public confidence and was impeached on May 20, 1993.

Rafael Caldera took power in 1994 and stabilized the civil-military relationship. He used the same appeasement measures and “divide and conquer” measures that worked in 1958.¹⁹⁵ First, he reemphasized his position as Commander in Chief by firing Admiral Muñoz León as Defense Minister and replacing him with a junior general officer.¹⁹⁶ This change forced the retirement of several more senior officers and instilled a sense of confidence in junior officers who were dissatisfied with their senior leaders.¹⁹⁷ He also pardoned Hugo Chávez and his co-conspirators in exchange for their immediate retirement from the armed forces.¹⁹⁸ Caldera increased military professionalism by placing the armed forces at the Colombian border to fight guerillas.¹⁹⁹ He also used the military for public services-Venezuelan soldiers acted as air traffic controllers and manned the subway during a strike.²⁰⁰ These measures produced another seismic shift as the Venezuelan Military once again changed its role from developmentalist (arbiter) back to professionalist.

¹⁹⁴ Hurtado, “Cambios y persistencias de la identidad política ‘chavista’: Aproximacion al proceso politico venezolano reciente, 1999-2007,” 56.

¹⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 44.

¹⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 56.

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 56-57.

Radicalization: the Pink Tide

Beginning with the 1998 election of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, a wave of leftist leaders came to power across Latin America.²⁰¹ By 2005, 75 percent of South Americans were governed by leftist leaders.²⁰² In 2005, *New York Times* reporter Larry Rohter coined the phrase pink tide to characterize this ideological shift in Ecuador, Bolivia, and Uruguay.²⁰³ “They [the governments] are not so much a red tide as a pink one.”²⁰⁴ This reference differentiates the recent leftist movements in Latin America with the harsher authoritarian shifts in the region during the 1970s or with the “surging blood red-tide of communism.”²⁰⁵ According to Rohter, the pink tide is characterized by pragmatism. Pink Tide leaders, for example, are progressive but not in a way that will undermine themselves or their policies. Interestingly, Rohter specifically excluded Venezuela from his pink tide analysis since Venezuela’s shift was more intense than others.²⁰⁶

Beginning with his *Movimiento Bolivariano Revolucionario 200*, Hugo Chávez envisioned a new possibility for Venezuelan independence based on the legacy of Simón Bolívar he had studied in the military academy.²⁰⁷ He and his cohort at the academy

²⁰¹ Hurtado, “Cambios y persistencias de la identidad política ‘chavista’: Aproximación al proceso político venezolano reciente, 1999-2007,” 56-57.

²⁰² Newman, “Resurgent Communism in Latin America.”

²⁰³ Rohter, “With New Chief, Uruguay Veers Left, in a Latin Pattern.”

²⁰⁴ Ibid.

²⁰⁵ John Dumbrell, *President Lyndon Johnson and Soviet Communism* (New York: Manchester University Press, 2004), 9.

²⁰⁶ Ibid.

²⁰⁷ Dieterich, *La Cuarta Vía al Poder*, 192-193.

envisioned another “Great Fatherland” free from the control of the United States and free from oppressive socio-economic divisions. He came to power promising a “Bolivarian Revolution.”²⁰⁸ He also promoted regional integration to protect sovereignty and resist dollar diplomacy and the hegemonic influence of the United States. Leading change from within the institution, Chávez forever transformed the role of the Venezuelan Military from professionalist to developmentalist, and then to a highly politicized blend of the two roles.

Hugo Chávez left prison in 1994. That same year he traveled to Cuba and received a hero’s welcome.²⁰⁹ This initial meeting resulted in an alliance that would transform Latin America. Both leaders stood to profit from the relationship. Fidel Castro would benefit from the petrodollars and discounted oil Chávez provided, while Castro sent doctors, educators, and military advisors to Venezuela.²¹⁰ In addition, the two men reinvigorated the Bolivarian dream of an integrated Latin America and helped establish tools for its implementation.

Implementing Revolution

The Foro de São Paulo

The *Foro de São Paulo* [São Paulo Forum] is an annual meeting created in 1990 by the President of Brazil, Lula da Silva, Fidel Castro, and the Brazilian Workers Party.

²⁰⁸ Dieterich, *La Cuarta Via al Poder*, 192-193.

²⁰⁹ Esclusa, *El Foro de São Paulo contra Álvaro Uribe*, 27.

²¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 29. This support was codified in the Convenio Integral de Cooperacion entre la Republica de Cuba y la Republica Bolivariana de Venezuela, an October 30, 2000 agreement signed by Fidel Castro and Hugo Chavez.

The initial meeting arose from the desire to redefine liberalism after the fall of the Soviet Union.²¹¹ Each year in a different South American city hundreds of governmental representatives, political parties, and grassroots movements come together to foster regional relationships. Democratically elected presidents share the room with self-proclaimed rebels from militant groups like the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia.²¹²

Hugo Chávez became a member of the *Foro de São Paulo* in 1995, during his nascent campaign for president.²¹³ When he was elected president in 1998 membership in the forum grew exponentially.²¹⁴ The expansion was partially rooted in an October 30, 2000 mutual support agreement between Cuba and Venezuela, giving Cuba and the forum a substantial increase in petrodollars.²¹⁵ The forum used the funds to support leftist campaigns throughout the region.²¹⁶ Strong evidence exists connecting the forum with drug trade proceeds, especially because a number of the groups in the forum, like the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia and the National Liberation Army, rely on drug production and sales.²¹⁷

²¹¹ Esclusa, *El Foro de São Paulo contra Álvaro Uribe*, 29.

²¹² *Ibid.*, 24-25.

²¹³ *Ibid.*, 27.

²¹⁴ *Ibid.*

²¹⁵ *Ibid.*

²¹⁶ *Ibid.*

²¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 24.

The Bolivarian Alliance of the Americas

On December 14, 2004, Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez and Cuban President Fidel Castro created the Bolivarian Alliance of the Americas.²¹⁸ The intent of the alliance was to challenge foreign regional blocks like the European Union and to integrate Latin American nations to abrogate hegemonic infiltration from the United States.²¹⁹ A variety of institutions grew out of the alliance, giving partners security and resources to build a Bolivarian utopia in their respective nations.²²⁰ Indeed Simon Bolívar spent his life trying to establish “Gran Colombia,” a South American nation-state led by a *caudillo*, to ward off aggression and competition from the United States.²²¹

The Bolivarian Alliance of the Americas (ALBA) functions as a supranational governing body.²²² It has a bank, regional currency called the SUCRE for intergovernmental transactions, and a military academy in Bolivia named for former

²¹⁸ Hirst, “Guide to the ALBA.”

²¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²²⁰ *Ibid.*

²²¹ *Ibid.*

²²² Another supranational organization in Latin America is the Union de Naciones Suramericanas, the Union of South American Nations (Unasur). All South American nations are members Unasur which is modeled after the United Nations, although in April 2018 Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Brasil, Paraguay, and Peru suspended participation in the group citing the institutional dysfunction manifest in the inability to elect a Unasur president. El Tiempo, “Colombia y cinco países más dejarán de participar en Unasur,” April 21, 2018, accessed April 26, 2018, <http://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/latinoamerica/colombia-argentina-chile-brasil-paraguay-y-peru-dejaran-de-participar-en-unasur-207788>.

leftist Bolivian President, General Juan José Torres.²²³ “We want to build anti-colonial and anti-capitalist thinking with this school that binds the armed forces to social movements and counteracts the influence of the School of the Americas that always saw the indigenous as internal enemies,” said Bolivian President Evo Morales at the opening of the school.²²⁴ President Morales’s description reflects the developmentalist ideal.

The school is housed in a military training center in Santa Cruz, Bolivia that previously trained the Bolivian Armed Forces for United Nation’s peacekeeping missions. The school boasts professors like Argentine Marxist Atilio Baron.²²⁵ It provides instruction in strategy, geopolitics, and acts as a countermeasure to the influence of the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation at Fort Benning, Georgia which trains Latin American officers on democracy and the armed forces, the rule of law, civilian authority over the military, and ethics.²²⁶ All Bolivian officers must attend the Juan José Torres Anti-Imperialist School to attain the rank of captain.²²⁷ Hugo Chávez

²²³ Newman, “Resurgent Communism in Latin America.”

²²⁴ Ibid. In this quotation Morales uses the name of the institution that preceded the current day Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation. The School of the Americas which closed on January 17, 2001 and had developed a questionable reputation for instructing Latin American military leaders who went on to commit human rights violations.

²²⁵ Carlos Valdez, “Anti-Imperialism School Now a Must for Bolivian Officers,” The Associated Press, August 17, 2016, accessed April 10, 2018, <https://www.apnews.com/5b9624aaef484935854d513f1d4ee18f>.

²²⁶ Valdez, “Anti-Imperialism School Now a Must for Bolivian Officers,” The Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation website, accessed April 11, 2018, <http://www.benning.army.mil/tenant/whinsec/>.

²²⁷ Fox News, “Bolivian Military Officers must Take Anti-Imperialist Training to Counter U.S. Influence,” August 18, 2016, accessed April 12, 2018,

hoped the Bolivian school would become a regional training center.²²⁸ In that spirit, just last year, the Venezuelan Defense Minister announced plans to send soldiers from the Venezuela National Bolivarian Armed forces to the Juan José Torres Anti-Imperialist School for training.²²⁹

The following sections will explore how the pink tide impacted the role of the military in Ecuador and Venezuela. In addition, the four models of officer introduced by Professor John Samuel Fitch—professionalist, constitutionalist, arbiter, and developmentalist—will be applied to Ecuador and Venezuela to clarify the role of the military in each respective nation.

Impact of Radicalization on the Ecuadorian Military

O él tritura a los militares 'antipatria' o ellos lo trituran a él.
[Or he crushes unpatriotic soldiers or they will crush him.]²³⁰

Rafael Correa is an economist with degrees from Ecuador, Belgium, and the United States.²³¹ He served as finance minister before launching his successful campaign

<http://www.foxnews.com/world/2016/08/18/bolivian-military-officers-must-take-anti-imperialist-training-to-counter-us.html>.

²²⁸ Ibid.

²²⁹ TeleSur English, “Venezuela to Send Troops to Train at Bolivia’s ‘Anti-Imperialist’ Military Academy,” June 6, 2017, accessed April 12, 2018, <https://www.telesurtv.net/english/news/Venezuela-to-Send-Troops-to-Train-at-Bolivias-Anti-Imperialist-Military-Academy-20170606-0009.html>.

²³⁰ Redaccion Plan V, “La batalla de Correa contra Las Fuerzas Armadas,” August 29, 2016, accessed April 10, 2018, <http://www.planv.com.ec/historias/politica/la-batalla-correa-contra-fuerzas-armadas>.

²³¹ James North, “Why Ecuador’s Rafael Corea Is One of Latin America’s Most Popular Leaders,” *The Nation*, June 4, 2015, accessed April 8, 2018,

for president in 2006.²³² Throughout his presidency, Correa considered the military to be “a state within a state;” an institution that refused to properly serve a democratically elected president.²³³ According to Professor Fitch’s framework, the Ecuadorian Military during Correa’s presidency executed a developmentalist mission but most resembled a blend of the constitutionalist and the professionalist model in practice in that the military remained apoliticized and viewed its role as a fixed, limited one.

Less than a year after his election in December 2006, Rafael Correa initiated a constitutional referendum, known as a Constituent Assembly, to codify his “citizen’s revolution” in a new constitution.²³⁴ As a result, the role of the military changed in several critical ways. First, Article 183 of the 1998 Ecuadorian Constitution combined both the armed forces and the national police into one entity known as “the public force.”²³⁵ The 2008 Ecuadorian Constitution described the armed forces and the national police as separate entities and clarified the mission of each.²³⁶ Secondly, the new constitution decreased the scope of the military. The Ecuadorian Constitution of 1998

<https://www.thenation.com/article/why-ecuadors-rafael-correa-one-latin-americas-most-popular-leaders/>.

²³² Ibid.

²³³ Redaccion Plan V, “La batalla de Correa contra Las Fuerzas Armadas,” 1.

²³⁴ Pablo Celi, “La seguridad y la defensa en una nueva perspectiva,” in *Ecuadorian Constitutional Analysis*, ed. Raúl Borja (Ecuador: Revista la Tendencia, 2008).

²³⁵ Ibid.

²³⁶ Ibid.

gave the armed forces a tutelary role.²³⁷ The armed forces were responsible for “the conservation of national sovereignty, the defense of the integrity and independence of the State and the guarantee of its legal order.”²³⁸ The 2008 Ecuadorian Constitution limited the armed forces role to the “defense of the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.”²³⁹

A 2013 interview with then defense minister Maria Fernanda Espinoza demonstrates the link between Socialism for the 21st Century and the new role of the military.²⁴⁰ She explained that “sovereignty” refers to the right of the Ecuadorian people to think critically and choose their own destiny.²⁴¹ Thus the armed forces are charged with protecting each citizen’s right to self-actualization. This is indicative of the anti-imperialist spirit at the heart of Socialism for the 21st Century.²⁴² She also highlighted the role of the armed forces in defending Ecuadorian resources.²⁴³ Espinoza’s commentary reflects the corporatist nature of Socialism for the 21st Century. The military is seen as a partner, sharing the same values as the people, and the people’s fight for

²³⁷ Celi, “La seguridad y la defensa en una nueva perspectiva.”

²³⁸ Corporacion de Estudios y Publicaciones. *Constitucion Politica de la Republica del Ecuador*. Quito, Ecuador: Corporacion de Estudios y Publicaciones, 1999.

²³⁹ Corporacion de Estudios y Publicaciones. *Constitucion Politica de la Republica del Ecuador*. Quito, Ecuador: Corporacion de Estudios y Publicaciones, 2008.

²⁴⁰ El Telégrafo, “Las FF.AA. son militares y militantes del buen vivir.”

²⁴¹ Ibid.

²⁴² Ibid.

²⁴³ Ibid.

liberty. Thus, in Ecuador, Socialism for the 21st Century aimed to make the military developmentalist in nature.

Fitch notes that modern, more expansive, approaches to national security were important to the evolution of military roles.²⁴⁴ In both Ecuador and Venezuela, radical leaders linked natural resources and internal security with national security. A developmentalist military bears allegiance to national security and all that it entails. This was a major philosophical transition in both Ecuador and Venezuela.

As discussed previously, the Ecuadorian Military was one of the most trusted institutions in the country when Correa took the helm.²⁴⁵ To consolidate power and increase civilian control over the military, Correa attempted to divide and weaken the military.²⁴⁶ Using the Socialism for the 21st Century rhetoric, Correa emphasized class differences and actively sowed mistrust between seniors and subordinates.²⁴⁷ He provided choice assignments and unique benefits to senior officers to breed loyalty and corruption.²⁴⁸ At the same time he affirmed enlistered suspicions that, just like the

²⁴⁴ Fitch, *The Military Coup d'Etat as a Political Process*, 129.

²⁴⁵ Thalia Flores, "Rafael Correa llama a los soldados del Ejército ecuatoriano a rebelarse," *ABC International*, September 14, 2016, accessed May 1, 2018, http://www.abc.es/internacional/abci-rafael-correa-llama-soldados-ejercito-ecuadoriano-rebelarse-201609131620_noticia.html.

²⁴⁶ Colonel (Retired) Mario Raúl Pazmiño, Interview by author, April 7, 2018.

²⁴⁷ Flores, "Rafael Correa llama a los soldados del Ejército ecuatoriano a rebelarse."

²⁴⁸ Hernández, "La batalla sospechosa de Correa contra los militares."

oligarchs, the officer class only cared for themselves.²⁴⁹ In public speeches, he suggested that the armed forces were infiltrated by fascists and invited troops to rebel against such influences.²⁵⁰

President Correa also changed the nature of military missions to gain control over the military and weaken its self-identity.²⁵¹ For example, he ordered the armed forces to fight fires in local barrios and collect trash in an attempt to denigrate them.²⁵² Correa sought to eliminate dissent by generals and senior colonels by granting them benefits and promotion in exchange for loyalty.²⁵³ This model recalls the division between senior leaders and junior officers during the 2000 coup.²⁵⁴ In that instance the generals backed out of the junta due to career pressures, while younger officers, farther away from pension payments, forced change.²⁵⁵ Correa made it clear that if the military leaders did not share the president's "vision" for the country, they would be replaced.²⁵⁶

Correa's aggressive approach with the military was not effective. He set out to make the military developmentalist on one hand and professionalist on the other. He

²⁴⁹ Hernández, "La batalla sospechosa de Correa contra los militares."

²⁵⁰ Flores, "Rafael Correa llama a los soldados del Ejército ecuatoriano a rebelarse," 2.

²⁵¹ Ibid.

²⁵² Colonel (Retired) Mario Raúl Pazmiño, Interview.

²⁵³ Dieterich, *La Cuarta Via al Poder*, 120-121.

²⁵⁴ Esclusa, *El Foro de São Paulo contra Álvaro Uribe*, 60-71.

²⁵⁵ Ibid.

²⁵⁶ Hernández, "La batalla sospechosa de Correa contra los militares," 1.

wanted the military tethered to socioeconomic development and, under the professionalist model, completely linked and loyal to his leadership and Socialism for the 21st Century: the constituted order. The 2008 constitutional revision largely succeeded in framing the military's role in developmentalist terms, but the Ecuadorian Military refused to be politicized as an extension of Socialism for the 21st Century.

On September 30, 2010 Hugo Chávez was the first to report a *coup d'état* in Ecuador via Twitter.²⁵⁷ The events of that day are subject to much debate. It remains unclear if the event was indeed a coup or a mere labor dispute that ended in protest.²⁵⁸ The police began a protest in reaction to the Public Service Organic Law that threatened cuts to police and military benefits.²⁵⁹ President Correa's penchant for taking personal offense led him to confront disgruntled police at their barracks.²⁶⁰ He ripped open his shirt and challenged them to shoot him.²⁶¹ Tear gas was released and President Correa was ushered back to his office to recuperate.²⁶² The majority of the military remained loyal to Correa during this incident with the exception of some Air Force and Navy

²⁵⁷ Marc Becker, "The Correa Coup," *Latin American Perspectives*, April 15, 2015, accessed April 20, 2018, <http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0094582X15579897>.

²⁵⁸ Ibid.

²⁵⁹ Ibid.

²⁶⁰ Ibid.

²⁶¹ Ibid.

²⁶² Ibid.

personnel.²⁶³ The politics of the matter forced Correa to thank the military for saving him, but civil-military relations were far from auspicious.

In the aftermath of the incident, President Correa blamed the incident on a myriad of bad actors, to include military personnel trained at the School of the Americas.²⁶⁴ On June 27, 2012 Correa announced that all Ecuadorian Military personnel would be withdrawn from the School of the Americas, now known as the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation.²⁶⁵ Instead, Ecuadorian Military personnel were sent to Cuba, Russia, and Venezuela for training.²⁶⁶ However, the military largely refused what it viewed as the politicization of the armed forces and did not seek training at the ALBA anti-imperialist school in Bolivia.²⁶⁷ The hero of the 1995 Cepeda War, General Paco Moncayo, reflected the view of many military officials when he insisted “the armed forces are not a bastion of the commander-in-chief.”²⁶⁸

The already tense relationship between the president and the armed forces grew worse in August 2016 when Correa ordered the Institute of Social Security of the Armed Forces, which pays military pensions, to pay approximately \$41 million to the Ministry

²⁶³ Becker, “The Correa Coup.”

²⁶⁴ Ibid.

²⁶⁵ Ibid.

²⁶⁶ COL (Ret) Mario Raúl Pazmiño, Interview by author, April 7, 2017.

²⁶⁷ Ibid.

²⁶⁸ Jose Marulanda, “Will A Military Coup Oust Ecuadorian President Correa,” *Panam Post*, March 11, 2016, accessed April 18, 2018, <http://panamapost.com/jose-marulanda/2016/03/11-will-a-military-coup-oust-ecuadorian-president-correa/>.

of Environment to cover the cost of an alleged overpayment the Institute received in a land purchase.²⁶⁹ In addition, Correa proposed several changes to the military pension system.²⁷⁰ President Correa personally emailed all members of the military to discuss his concerns about the Institute of Social Security of the Armed Forces.²⁷¹ Several officers responded candidly, defending the military and condemning Correa's attacks on the honor and prestige of the Ecuadorian Armed Forces.²⁷² President Correa, through his Minister of Defense, demanded punishment from the naval disciplinary body.²⁷³ When naval superiors refused, he fired them.²⁷⁴ Shortly after, President Correa hosted an event at Quito's Parcayacu Military College. All retired military officers in attendance stood in protest and exited the auditorium.²⁷⁵ After the President Correa's address, not a single uniformed military member applauded, signaling the growing animus against the commander-in-chief.²⁷⁶

²⁶⁹ Redaccion Plan V, "La batalla de Correa contra Las Fuerzas Armadas."

²⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 3.

²⁷¹ Flores, "Rafael Correa llama a los soldados del Ejército ecuatoriano a rebelarse."

²⁷² Agencia EFE, "Una jueza de Ecuador ordena capacitar a soldados sobre obediencia a la autoridad civil," September 13, 2016, accessed March 10, 2018, <https://www.efe.com/efe/america/portada/una-jueza-de-ecuador-ordena-capacitar-a-soldados-sobre-obediencia-la-autoridad-civil/20000064-3038257>.

²⁷³ *Ibid.*

²⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁷⁵ Marulanda, "Will a Military Coup Oust Ecuadorian President Correa?"

²⁷⁶ Agencia EFE, "Una jueza de Ecuador ordena capacitar a soldados sobre obediencia a la autoridad civil."

Undeterred, President Correa took his case to civilian court in Quito to get an injunction against the department of defense disciplinary authority because the officers who responded to his email were not punished for disrespecting a superior.²⁷⁷ The cases were dismissed by the military because the president was not technically in the military chain of command and the emails were not “official,” since they were sent from personal email accounts during the weekend.²⁷⁸ The civilian judge, Karen Matamoros, ruled that the disciplinary proceedings should be repeated.²⁷⁹ She also declared that the department of defense should train all troops on the constitutional requirement to obey civil authority.²⁸⁰

The role of the Ecuadorian military in Rafael Correa’s “citizen revolution” was developmentalist by design but constitutionalist in execution. Despite aggressive executive tactics to create division and malign its sterling reputation, the Ecuadorian Armed Forces fought to remain apolitical. As they had in the past, Ecuadorian Military leaders would not allow the armed forces to be politicized and many lost their careers in the process. Throughout chaos and pressure the military stayed committed to its role as a deliberative, guardian of national sovereignty.

²⁷⁷ Agencia EFE, “Una jueza de Ecuador ordena capacitar a soldados sobre obediencia a la autoridad civil.”

²⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

Impact of Radicalization on Venezuelan Military

Patria, socialismo o muerte.—Venezuelan Military motto (2007-2013)²⁸¹
[Fatherland, socialism or death.]—Venezuelan Military motto (2007-2013)

Chávez vive, la Patria sigue. Independencia y patria socialista. Viviremos y venceremos.

—Venezuelan Military Motto (2013-present)²⁸²

[Chávez lives, the Fatherland follows. Independence and socialist fatherland, we will live and we will win.]

—Venezuelan Military Motto (2013-present)

Hugo Chávez gained immense credibility during his failed coup attempt in 1992.²⁸³ At the time, Venezuela was captivated by the young Lieutenant Colonel's *por ahora* or “for now” speech in which he unapologetically admitted that his objectives had not been attained, for now.²⁸⁴ He returned with gusto to win the December 1998 election and served as president until illness forced him to step down in 2013. His military background undoubtedly assisted President Chávez in galvanizing support for his Bolivarian Revolution. The Venezuelan Armed Forces represent the professionalist approach, as defined by Professor Fitch, meaning a highly politicized force committed to

²⁸¹ Reuters, “El *Ejército* venezolano estrena saludo: Patria, socialismo o muerte,” *El País*, May 12, 2007, accessed April 6, 2018, https://elpais.com/diario/2007/05/12/internacional/1178920814_850215.html.

²⁸² Miami Diario, “Los militares controlan el poder en Venezuela?” *MiamiDiario.com*, June 11, 2017, accessed March 28, 2018, <http://www.miamidiario.com/general/venezuela/protestas/militares-venezolanos/fanb/crisis-venezolana/vladimir-padrino-lopez/crisi-venezolana/pedro-pablo-penalosa/poder-en-venezuela/375837>.

²⁸³ Marta Harnecker, “The Venezuela Military: The Making of an Anomaly,” *The Monthly Review*, September 2003, accessed May 5, 2018, <https://venezuelananalysis.com/print/>.

²⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

a constituted order. This order is known as the “civil-military alliance” in which the military became a reflection of Bolívarian ideals.

Like Rafael Correa, and many Forum of São Paulo leaders, Hugo Chávez began his tenure with a new constitution. The following portion of the constitution regarding National Security reveals its populist, progressive orientation:

Article 326: National security is based on shared responsibility between the State and civil society to implement the principles of independence, democracy, equality, peace, freedom, justice, solidarity, promotion and conservation of the environment and affirmation of human rights, as well as on that of progressively meeting the individual and collective needs of Venezuelans, based on a sustainable and productive development policy providing full coverage for the national community. The principle of shared responsibility applies to the economic, social, political, cultural, geographical, environmental and military spheres.

This constitutional provision set the stage for what Chávez called the civil-military alliance, a relationship that empowered civilians and military personnel to focus on development. Plan Bolívar 2000 exemplifies this reality as military forces distributed medicine, built infrastructure, and participated in area cleanup.²⁸⁵ The program provided a counter-narrative to the *Caracazo* and reflected the sensibilities of the Revolutionary Bolivarian Movement-200 that Chávez began as a young military officer.²⁸⁶ While the military was involved in development during the Caldera Administration, Chávez united the military with the civilian population—a result of his own terrible experience when the military was called to use force against the citizenry. This tied the military to socioeconomic development and a developmentalist role.

²⁸⁵ Harnecker, “The Venezuela Military: The Making of an Anomaly,” 1.

²⁸⁶ Trikunas, “The Crisis in Venezuelan Civil-Military Relations: From Punto Fijo to the Fifth Republic.”

Article 328 of the Venezuelan Constitution describes the armed forces as “an essentially professional institution, with no political orientation.”²⁸⁷ That said, military personnel were given the right to vote in the new constitution.²⁸⁸ The 2000 election was a military referendum with several former officers, participants in the failed 1992 coup with Chávez, supporting Chávez’s opponent, Francisco Arias Cardenas.²⁸⁹ Cardenas was an original member of the Revolutionary Bolivarian Movement-200 and joined Chávez in the 2000 coup attempt.²⁹⁰ During the campaign, both Arias and Chávez accused the other of incompetence and treason.²⁹¹ In the end, Chávez prevailed in the July 2000 election and reaped the benefit of the extended term limits his new constitution put in place.²⁹²

Despite the constitutional language, the armed forces became rabidly politicized under Chávez. The military reflected the professionalist model. The pillars used to anchor the Venezuelan Military identity in the constitution are “discipline, obedience, and subordination.”²⁹³ After Chávez the armed forces identified themselves as “revolutionary,

²⁸⁷ Venezuelan Constitution, English translation, 1999, accessed May 15, 2018, <http://www.venezuelaemb.or.kr/english/ConstitutionoftheBolivarianingles.pdf>.

²⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, Article 330.

²⁸⁹ Juan Jesús Aznarez, “Un comandante desafía a Chávez,” *El Pais*, May 2, 2000, accessed November 16, 2017, https://elpais.com/diario/2000/05/02/internacional/957218419_850215.html.

²⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

²⁹¹ *Ibid.*

²⁹² *Ibid.*

²⁹³ Venezuelan Constitution, Article 328 (1999).

anti-imperialist, socialist, and chavist.”²⁹⁴ Statements from multiple Venezuelan Ministers of Defense reflect the pervasive influence of the Bolivarian Revolution and Socialism for the 21st Century on the Venezuelan Military.²⁹⁵ In 2010 General Henry Rangel, Venezuelan Minister of Defense, described the relationship between the military and the Bolivarian Revolution as a marriage.²⁹⁶ The military considered itself part of Chávez’s revolution, freeing the oppressed from colonial and imperial forces. Just before Chávez left to get his final medical treatment in Cuba in 2013, his new Minister of Defense Admiral Diego Molero bid him farewell. “The Armed Forces are united to this Bolivarian and revolutionary sentiment of our commander Hugo Chávez, and we are in solidarity, in body and spirit, unconditionally with that ideology.”²⁹⁷

This loyalty came from Chávez’s personal power, his military experience, and from benefits and employment given to military personnel. Like many other leaders attempting to appease the military, Chávez gave military leaders executive positions in

²⁹⁴ Alberto Molina, “Socialismo Patria o Muerte,” *Desde mi Trincheras*, August 21, 2015, accessed March 10, 2018, <http://www.desdemitrincheras.com/2015/08/21/socialismo-patria-o-muerte/>.

²⁹⁵ Ibid.

²⁹⁶ Ibid.

²⁹⁷ Ibid., 2.

state oil companies.²⁹⁸ In addition, military and ex-military appointees dominated his administration.²⁹⁹ These measures, however, did not make him immune from protest.

On April 11, 2002 military and business leaders, as well as 600,000 protestors, removed Chávez from office.³⁰⁰ A group of Venezuelan Navy senior leaders, led by Admiral Hector Ramirez condemned Chávez's leadership as "anti-democratic."³⁰¹ For months, small numbers of military personnel publicly requested that Chávez resign. Unsatisfied with the developmentalist or professionalist models being adopted, some members of the military chose an arbiter's role by participating in the coup. Rear Admiral Carlos Molina Tamayo was the highest-ranking officer to come forward.³⁰² In an interview, he explained that the armed forces had an institutional responsibility to uphold the constitution.³⁰³ "We do not want a military government or a coup from the far right."³⁰⁴ He related concerns with the expanding role of the military in development

²⁹⁸ Daniel Pardo, ¿Quién es Vladimir Padrino, el military que Maduro nombró de 'superministro'?" *BBC Mundo*, July 12, 2016, accessed May 10, 2018, <http://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-36780599>.

²⁹⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁰⁰ Ludmila Vinogradoff, "Un grupo de generales de Venezuela exige la renuncia de Chavez," *El Pais*, April 12, 2002, accessed March 13, 2018, https://elpais.com/diario/2002/04/12/internacional/1018562412_850215.html.

³⁰¹ *Ibid.*

³⁰² Ludmila Vinogradoff, "Los circulos bolivarianos estan recibiendo armas de los cubanos," *El Pais*, March 3, 2002, accessed November 15, 2017, https://elpais.com/diario/2002/03/03/internacional/1015110023_850215.html.

³⁰³ *Ibid.*

³⁰⁴ *Ibid.*

projects. Many Venezuelan Military members worried that the expanding military role in development projects like Plan Bolívar 200 would decrease morale and negatively impact readiness.³⁰⁵ Business leaders, students, and representatives from all sectors of the country also joined the movement.³⁰⁶ Pedro Carmona the head of Fedecamaras, Venezuela's biggest business association was declared the leader of the transitional government.³⁰⁷

The counter-coup was led by General Raúl Isaías Baduel, Commander of the 42d Airborne Infantry Brigade, an original member of the MBR-200 and Chávez loyalist, who gathered civil and military elements still loyal to Chávez and restored order to Miraflores Palace, the official workplace of the Venezuelan President.³⁰⁸ The Venezuelan Attorney General, Isaías Rodríguez proclaimed the incident a “*golpe de Estado*” or coup on April 12, 2002.³⁰⁹ This ended debate on whether Chávez had formally abandoned the post. This proclamation resulted in condemnation of the planners and executors from the

³⁰⁵ Vinogradoff, “Los círculos bolivarianos están recibiendo armas de los cubanos.”

³⁰⁶ Ibid.

³⁰⁷ Alex Bellos, “Chavez rises from a very peculiar coup,” *The Guardian*, April 15, 2002, accessed March 10, 2018, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/apr/15/venezuela.alexbellos>.

³⁰⁸ Ibid. General Baduel later ran afoul of Hugo Chávez and served a six year jail sentence for corruption. Currently he is reported to be in solitary confinement in La Tumba, a Venezuelan prison in the heart of Caracas.

³⁰⁹ Heinz Dieterich, “Quién hizo fracasar el golpe militar contra Hugo Chávez?” *Rebellion.org*, April 17, 2006, accessed March 30, 2018, <http://rebellion.org/>.

regional and international community. Millions poured into the streets to welcome Chávez back to power.³¹⁰

The president basked in the victory and used the opportunity to consolidate his power by arresting, isolating, and firing opposition members while promoting loyal military officials.³¹¹ Coup participants sought asylum elsewhere or served jail sentences for treason.³¹²

The biggest impact of the radicalization of Venezuela on the military is the increased politicization of the military and the military's increased involvement in development projects. The damage of the *Caracazo* was largely repaired with the innovation of the civil-military alliance. As part of the alliance, the military worked directly with the Venezuelan citizenry to improve quality of life and protect the nation from abuses of power or imperial threats from outsiders. The Venezuelan Military went from years of fairly stable constitutional or professionalist models in support of civilian governments to a highly politicized force fully committed to a developmentalist or professionalist role.

Armed with the history of civil-military relations in Ecuador and Venezuela, conscious of the complexity of each environment, and appreciative of the unique nature of each country, the following will present a comparison of the role of the military in the

³¹⁰ Dieterich, "Quien hizo fracasar el golpe military contra Hugo Chavez?"

³¹¹ Ibid.

³¹² The Economist, "After the Coup, the Reckoning."

radicalization of Ecuador and Venezuela. By comparing and contrasting these case studies the research provides lessons learned for application in the future.

Similarities

Common History

Ecuador and Venezuela share common roots. Both countries developed from colonies to fragile independence thanks largely to the influence of Simon Bolívar. They have a shared cultural memory of the hope that was the Great Fatherland, a combined state of Venezuela, Ecuador, and Colombia. *Caudillos* and various strong men filled the power vacuum left by Spain until elections became a reality. Ecuador and Venezuela have both experienced military governments and civilian leaders, with differing degrees of stability and success. Weak civilian institutions in each country have resulted in frequent military interventions. The advent of the professional military and the establishment of military academies began roughly at the same time in the early 20th Century. Their common history offers the researcher a starting point, or point of comparison.

Broad Constitutional Mandates

The constitutions in both Ecuador and Venezuela provides a broad, ill-defined mission for the armed forces. For example, according to Article 328 the Venezuelan National Army shall “guarantee the sovereignty and independence of the Nation.”³¹³ The

³¹³ Venezuelan Constitution, 2000, Article 328.

military in Ecuador is charged with “the conservation of the national sovereignty.”³¹⁴ The terms used in both constitutions are nebulous and subject to interpretation. In some cases ambiguity is empowering and beneficial for flexibility. In others ambiguity leads to confusion, abuse, and arrogation of considerable powers. The latter has certainly been the case in both Ecuador and Venezuela, with frequent military interventions always justified by the broad constitutional goals set out for the armed forces. Ecuador and Venezuela have seen significant tumult regarding the role of the military partially due to each country’s constitution.

Ideologies

Ecuador and Venezuela have been shaped by Bolívarianism and Socialism for the 21st Century. Though not identical, these ideological movements are closely related. Both movements emphasize anti-imperialism, anti-colonialism, independence, and regional integration. Both countries form an integral part of the growth of organizations like the Forum of São Paulo and the ALBA. Venezuela’s civil-military alliance is a more corporatist model, but each case stresses delegation of power to the people. These ideologies have had an enormous impact on the armed forces in both countries.

Differences

Leadership

A major difference in the role of the military in the radicalization of Ecuador and Venezuela is leadership. Hugo Chávez and Rafael Correa were both successful at

³¹⁴ Ecuadorian Constitution, 1999, Article 183.

championing change. The role of the military differed significantly because of the relationship between each president and his respective military. A technocrat, Correa never served in the military and remained very much an outsider in his relationship with the armed forces. After initially endearing himself to the military, Correa's multiple attempts to undermine and corrupt the armed forces produced an insurmountable enmity.

Hugo Chávez enjoyed widespread support from the Venezuelan Military thanks to his storied career, institutional influence, and powerful personality. Many leaders in the Venezuelan Military already understood his vision of the Bolivarian Revolution based on his work with the MBR-200. The loyalty and shared vision between Chávez and the Venezuelan Military made Venezuela's transformation to the civil-military alliance an easy one. Thus, the Venezuelan Military played a central role in the radicalization of the country.

Self-Identity

Another difference between Ecuador and Venezuela is the way in which each nation's military views its role. In Ecuador, the military identifies with the nation.³¹⁵ This reality is reflected in the relatively passive role the armed forces played in times of political transition. The pattern in Ecuador has been military intervention until civilian authorities can stabilize the government. The armed forces have not sought to consolidate power, nor have they pledged allegiance to an ideology or political party. While no organization is a monolith and some portions of the military have been corrupted or politicized, the Ecuadorian military has built a solid reputation for disciplined

³¹⁵ Hernández, "La batalla sospechosa de Correa contra los militares."

commitment to the nation. This focus makes the Ecuadorian armed forces the most trusted institution in the nation.³¹⁶

General Vladimir Padrino López, one of the most powerful military leaders in Venezuela today, made a recent statement that the military exists to protect the gains of the Bolivarian Revolution.³¹⁷ General López was one of the loyalist company grade commanders that fought to restore Chávez to power during the April 2002 coup. The Venezuela Military views itself as part of the “civil-alliance.” Indeed, the very motto used to salute one another and the name of the organization itself-the National Bolivarian Armed Forces-make clear that the military is an extension of the Bolivarian Revolution.

Role

According to Fitch’s model, the Ecuadorian Armed Forces played a blended role of the constitutionalist (developmentalist) in the face of Socialism for the 21st Century. The constitutionalist model views the military in fixed, relatively well-defined terms. Despite attacks on its reputation, its missions, and its personnel, the Ecuadorian Military voiced concerns and stayed its course as an apolitical guardian of the nation. That said, Correa’s 2008 Constitution provided the Ecuadorian Military a developmentalist role by

³¹⁶ Ministry of National Defense, “Cedatos afirman que Fuerzas Armadas tiene el %80.6 de confianza ciudadana,” May 9, 2018, accessed May 22, 2018, <https://www.defensa.gob.ec/cedatos-afirma-que-fuerzas-armadas-tiene-el-80-6-de-confianza-ciudadana/>.

³¹⁷ Ministry of National Defense, “FANB ratifica compromiso con la Constitución y rechaza pretensiones golpistas de la derecha,” January 7, 2017, accessed May 22, 2018, <http://www.portalalba.org/index.php/areas/fuerzas-armadas-seguridad-y-defensa/11456-fanb-ratifica-compromiso-con-la-constitucion-y-rechaza-pretensiones-golpistas>.

prioritizing preservation of natural resources and participatory democracy. Correa also dedicated the armed forces to development projects.

The Venezuelan Military played a developmentalist role in radicalization. As a professionalist organization, the Venezuelan Armed Forces is dedicated to the constituted order but it does not meet Professor Fitch’s professionalist definition because it is highly politicized.³¹⁸ The developmentalist nature of the armed forces is made manifest in the military’s devotion to socioeconomic development and the civil-military alliance. In Venezuela, the military is a central part of the Bolivarian Revolution and continues to view itself in those terms. The chart below provides a comparison of the role of the military in the radicalization of Ecuador and Venezuela.




Figure 3. Role Comparison of Ecuadorian and Venezuelan Military in Radicalization

Source: Created by author.

³¹⁸ Fitch, *The Military Coup d’Etat as a Political Process*, 129.

Conclusion

This chapter answered the primary research question what is the role of the military in the radicalization of Ecuador and Venezuela? In addition, the secondary questions relating to the role of the military in Ecuador and Venezuela, training and education of the military in each country, and the impact of Bolívarianism and Socialism for the 21st Century in Ecuador and Venezuela were also discussed. Chapter 5 will offer suggestions for additional research or areas of inquiry and relevant conclusions.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Introduction

The role of the military in the radicalization in Ecuador and Venezuela is a multi-faceted topic. The dynamic, complex nature of civil-military relations in Latin America makes it difficult to identify clear trends. Radicalization tends to add to the unpredictability endemic to the region. This topic is rich with potential for further research. Accordingly, some recommendations for future study are included below. The chapter ends with some relevant conclusions and a brief discussion of the current state of the military in Ecuador and Venezuela.

Recommendations

1. Based on the delimitations on this thesis, an interesting follow-on research project would be an analysis of the impact of anti-imperialist military training on Latin American militaries.
2. Professor Fitch completed quantitative and qualitative analysis on how Ecuadorian officers chose whether to join coups from 1948 to 1966. A similar study applied to the coups that have occurred after 1966 would be instructive, particularly because the constitutional mandates for the military have changed significantly since Professor Fitch's period of study.
3. This thesis involved application of the Fitch officer model but time did not allow analysis and critique of the model itself. A follow-on analysis of the strengths and

weaknesses of the Fitch model might conclude with a proposed alternate model or models.

4. Given the civil-military challenges in Latin America, an examination of current Latin American civilian and military training on civil-military relations would be interesting. A potential recommendation using the doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities framework would be useful.

Conclusion

The role of the military in the radicalization of Ecuador and Venezuela varies. Professor Fitch's four formal role definitions—professionalist, arbiter, constitutionalist, and developmentalist—provide a sampling of professional responses to the political winds of change. While military personnel can self-identify as one particular role, as they did in Professor Fitch's study, many times the role forced upon them due to exigent circumstances and politics.

The role of the military in Ecuador and Venezuela must be viewed in the larger context of Latin American civil-military relations. The development of the armed forces in both countries was shaped by colonial norms, emphasizing powerful *caudillos*. Simón Bolívar' legacy of anti-imperialism, independence, and regional cooperation impacted the formation and role of the military as a bastion of order and strength. Corporatism molded the military in both Ecuador and Venezuela as guarantors of civic rights and national values. Historically weak civilian institutions, marred by corruption and instability, compelled the military in both Ecuador and Venezuela to periodically establish order. These historical realities inform the role of the military in the radicalization of Ecuador and Venezuela.

In Ecuador, the military is viewed as an honest broker. The Ecuadorian Armed Forces is an institution that infrequently strays from its fixed, limited role in society. It is largely constitutionalist in nature. The 1941 loss to Peru led to an identity crisis in the Ecuadorian Military that was remedied by a long period of apolitical, internal focus on readiness. This professionalist period led to success in the 1995 Cenepa War and a concomitant increase in institutional credibility. The Ecuadorian Military has been a historically judicious arbiter, choosing to avoid involvement in political shifts or regime change in some situations and quick to avoid military control of civilian affairs.

Though radicalization and Socialism for the 21st Century pushed Ecuador to the left, the Ecuadorian Armed Forces adhered to its conservative, apolitical role. Despite Rafael Correa's attempts to divide and weaken the institution, the Ecuadorian Military remained steadfast and loyal to its core values. Though the military's mission shifted to a developmentalist ideal with Correa's constitutional changes in 2008, the Ecuadorian Military clung to its apolitical, constitutionalist role despite the country's radicalization.

In Venezuela, the role of the military changed significantly with Hugo Chávez's Bolivarian Revolution. The civil-military relationship in Venezuela, especially after the transition to civilian rule in 1958 was professionalist. The military's apolitical commitment to the established order was shaken in the 1989 *Caracazo* when military personnel found themselves forced to target the civilian population at the behest of embattled civilian leaders. So began the shift to a developmentalist model in Venezuela. From the military perspective, the Bolivarian Revolution began when Chávez and other officers formed MBR-200. The developmentalist transformation was partially codified in the 1999 Venezuelan Constitution when name of the Venezuelan Armed Forces changed

from the National Armed Forces to the National Bolivarian Armed Forces. Thus, the Venezuelan Military became enormously politicized, acting as an extension of the Bolivarian Revolution made manifest in the civil-military alliance where the military stands in solidarity with the people.

Professor Fitch's four models of military officer provide a useful lens to view the role of the military given the vagaries of political change and radicalization in Ecuador and Venezuela. No label completely captures the role of the military, but each construct offers useful characteristics to apply. The role of the Ecuadorian Military in radicalization is consitutionalist despite its developmentalist role and function. The deeply politicized, developmentalist Venezuelan Military was a central feature of the Bolivarian Revolution.

Epilogue

Rafael Correa and Hugo Chávez are no longer leading their respective countries, but Socialism for the 21st Century and Bolivarianismo continue. These ideologies permeate government institutions and, to differing degrees, each country's military. Just this month world leaders called upon the Venezuelan Military to act as arbiter again, vocalizing international support for a *coup d'état*.³¹⁹ Professor Fitch used the four models examined in this study to explore how military officers answer such invitations. Venezuelan Military leaders like General Vladimir Padrino López, recently appointed by President Nicolás Maduro to oversee the distribution of food in the country, have the power to act but do not seem to have the inclination. The civil-military alliance and its

³¹⁹ Brian Fonseca, "The Perils of a Putsch in Venezuela," *Foreign Policy*, May 4, 2018, accessed May 11, 2018, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2018/05/04/the-perils-of-a-putsch-in-venezuela/>.

developmentalist approach is so deeply engrained in the culture that the military has become one with the Bolivarian Revolution. It seems the developmentalist shift that slowly began in the 1980s has undermined the institutional independence of the Venezuelan Military.

Current Ecuadorian President Lenín Moreno has enjoyed a much better relationship with the military than his predecessor. President Moreno is much more conciliatory of the military and military affairs than Rafael Correa.³²⁰ A recent organized crime attack on military personnel that left three soldiers dead provided a moment of national unity and pride in the Ecuadorian Military.³²¹ It also sparked debate over the proper role of military forces. Developmentalist ideals and missions linked to Socialism for the 21st Century are slowly giving way to the operational necessity to focus on readiness in core military competencies: the defense of the nation and internal security.

If history is any indication, the role of the military in Ecuador and Venezuela will undoubtedly change. At any moment, a shift can occur from constitutionalist to professionalist to developmentalist to arbiter. The study of civil-military relations in each country is critical to understanding the dynamics of such change. As David Pion-Berlin suggests, the role of the military in Ecuador and Venezuela is a consequence of pragmatism. The armed forces are often faced with political and cultural realities that

³²⁰ El Universo, “Militares reconocen labor de Lenín Moreno,” February 19, 2018, accessed March 6, 2018, <https://www.eluniverso.com/noticias/2018/02/20/nota/6631912/militares-reconocen-labor-moreno>.

³²¹ El Universo, “Lenín Moreno condena ataque que dejó 3 soldados muertos en Mataje,” March 20, 2018, accessed April 1, 2018, <https://www.eluniverso.com/noticias/2018/03/20/nota/6676387/lenin-moreno-condena-ataque-que-dejo-3-soldados-muertos-mataje>.

demand military involvement. A thorough understanding of the costs and benefits of each role and its consequences can help military leaders in each country weigh their options.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Adams, Jerome. *Liberators and Patriots of Latin America Biographies of 23 Leaders*. Jefferson, NC: McFarland and Company, 1991.
- Agencia EFE. “Una jueza de Ecuador ordena capacitar a soldados sobre obediencia a la autoridad civil.” September 13, 2016. Accessed March 10, 2018. <https://www.efe.com/efe/america/portada/una-jueza-de-ecuador-ordena-capacitar-a-soldados-sobre-obediencia-la-autoridad-civil/20000064-3038257>.
- Arana, Marie. “Latin America’s Go-To Hero.” *The New York Times*, April 17, 2013. Accessed October 11, 2017. <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/18/opinion/arana-latin-americas-go-to-hero.html>.
- Aznarez, Juan Jesús. “Un comandante desafía a Chávez.” *El Pais*, May 2, 2000. Accessed November 16, 2017. https://elpais.com/diario/2000/05/02/internacional/957218419_850215.html.
- Barany, Zoltan. *The Soldier and the Changing State: Building Democratic Armies in Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Americas*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012.
- BBC News. “Profile: MERCOSUR—Common Market of the South.” February 15, 2012. Accessed April 11, 2018. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/5195834.stm>.
- Becker, Marc. “The Correa Coup.” *Latin American Perspectives*, April 15, 2015. Accessed April 20, 2018. <http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0094582X15579897>.
- Bellos, Alex. “Chavez Rises from a Very Peculiar Coup.” *The Guardian*, April 15, 2002. Accessed March 10, 2018. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/apr/15/venezuela.alexbellos>.
- Bruneau, Thomas C. “Civil-Military Relations in Latin America: The Hedgehog and the Fox Revisited.” *Revista Fuerzas Armadas y Sociedad Año 19*, no. 1 (2005): 111-131. Accessed October 15, 2017. <https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/43105>.
- Camacho, Carlos E.P. “Civil Military Operations in Ecuador.” Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 2003. Accessed September 15, 2017. <https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/1132>.
- Cardero, Jorge Petia Lopez. “Simon Bolívar y Socialismo del Siglo XXI.” Monografias.com. November 2011. Accessed October 06, 2017. <http://www.monografias.com/trabajos89/simon-Bolívar-y-socialismo-del-siglo-xxi/simon-Bolívar-y-socialismo-del-siglo-xxi.shtml>.

- Celi, Pablo. "La seguridad y la defensa en una nueva perspectiva." In *Ecuadorian Constitutional Analysis*, edited by Raúl Borja. Ecuador: Revista la Tendencia, 2008. Accessed September 16, 2017. <http://www.flacsoandes.edu.ec/libros/109102-opac>.
- CNN World News. "Crisis in Ecuador as 3 Claim Presidency." February 7, 1997. Accessed October 2, 2017. <http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/9702/07/ecuador/>.
- Cohen, Eliot A. "The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil- Military Relations; The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait." *Foreign Affairs* (September/October 1997). Accessed September 20, 2017. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/capsule-review/1997-09-01/soldier-and-state-theory-and-politics-civil-military-relations>.
- Corporacion de Estudios y Publicaciones. *Constitucion Politica de la Republica del Ecuador*. Quito, Ecuador: Corporacion de Estudios y Publicaciones, 1999.
- . *Constitucion Politica de la Republica del Ecuador*. Quito, Ecuador: Corporacion de Estudios y Publicaciones, 2008. Accessed August 15, 2007. https://www.oas.org/juridico/pdfs/.mesicic4_ecu_const.pdf.
- Council on Hemispheric Affairs. "An Armed Forces Anomaly - Key Ingredients to Ecuador's Democratic Consistency." August 4, 2010. Accessed November 2, 2017. <http://www.coha.org/an-armed-forces-anomaly-key-ingredients-to-ecuador's-democratic-consistency/#>.
- de la Torre, Carlos. "El bolivarianismo." *El Pais*. September 25, 2015. Accessed October 2, 2017. https://elpais.com/internacional/2015/09/25/actualidad/1443142773_008162.html.
- Dieterich, Heinz. *La Cuarta Via al Poder: El 21 de enero desde una perspectiva latinoamericana*. Quito, Ecuador: Abaya Yala, November 2000.
- . "Quien hizo fracasar el golpe military contra Hugo Chavez?" *Rebellion.org*, April 17, 2006. Accessed March 30, 2018. <http://rebellion.org/>.
- Diamond, Larry, and Marc F. Plattner, eds. *Civil-Military Relations and Democracy*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996.
- Dumbrell, John. *President Lyndon Johnson and Soviet Communism*. New York: Manchester University Press, 2004.
- El Telegrafo. "Las FF.AA son militares y militantes del buen vivir." March 25, 2013. Accessed April 16, 2018. <https://www.defensa.gob.ec/las-ff-aa-son-militares-y-militantes-del-buen-vivir/>.

- El Universo. “Lenín Moreno condena ataque que dejó 3 soldados muertos en Mataje.” March 20, 2018. Accessed April 1, 2018. <https://www.eluniverso.com/noticias/2018/03/20/nota/6676387/lenin-moreno-condena-ataque-que-dejo-3-soldados-muertos-mataje>.
- . “Militares reconocen labor de Lenín Moreno.” February 19, 2018. Accessed March 6, 2018. <https://www.eluniverso.com/noticias/2018/02/20/nota/6631912/militares-reconocen-labor-moreno>.
- Esclusa, Alejandro Pena. *El Foro de São Paulo contra Alvaro Uribe*. Bogota, Colombia: Random House Mandadori, August 2008.
- Fitch, John Samuel. *The Military Coup D’etat as a Political Process*. Baltimore, MD: The John Hopkins University Press, 1977.
- Flores, Thalía. “Rafael Correa llama a los soldados del Ejército ecuatoriano a rebelarse.” *ABC International*, September 14, 2016. Accessed May 1, 2018. http://www.abc.es/internacional/abci-rafael-correa-llama-soldados-ejercito-ecuatoriano-rebelarse-201609131620_noticia.html.
- Fonseca, Brian. “The Perils of a Putsch in Venezuela.” *Foreign Policy*, May 4, 2018. Accessed May 11, 2018. <http://foreignpolicy.com/2018/05/04/the-perils-of-a-putsch-in-venezuela/>.
- Forster, Anthony. “New Civil-Military Relations and its Research Agendas.” *The Quarterly Journal* (April 2002). Accessed September 13, 2017. <https://globalnetplatform.org/system/files/1/New%20CivilMilitary%20Relations%20and%20its%20Research%20Agendas>.
- Fox News. “Bolivian Military Officers must Take Anti-Imperialist Training to Counter U.S. Influence.” August 18, 2016, accessed April 12, 2018, <http://www.foxnews.com/world/2016/08/18/bolivian-military-officers-must-take-anti-imperialist-training-to-counter-us.html>.
- Gailliguillos, Nibaldo H. “In Search of a New Paradigm in Civil-Military Relations in Latin America: The Chilean Case.” Accessed October 5, 2017. <http://lasa.international.pitt.edu/LASA98/Gailliguillos.pdf>.
- Guillaudat, Patrick, and Pierre Mounterde. “Lessons Learned from Correa’s presidency.” *International Viewpoint*. August 1, 2016. Accessed May 3, 2018. <http://internationalviewpoint.org/spip.php?article4634>.
- Hartnecker, Marta. “The Venezuelan Military: The Making of an Anomaly.” *Monthly Review*, September 2003. Accessed May 5, 2018. <https://venezuelanalysis.com/print/175>.

- Hernández, José. “La batalla sospechosa de Correa contra los militares.” *Cuatro Pelagatos*. February 16, 2016. Accessed May 5, 2018. <http://4pelagatos.com/2016/02/26/la-batalla-sospechosa-de-correa-contra-los-militares/>.
- Hirst, Joel. “A Guide to ALBA.” *Americas Quarterly*. Accessed March 26, 2018. <http://www.americasquarter.org/hirst/article>.
- Huntington, Samuel P. *The Soldier and the State*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985.
- Hurtado, Hector Armando Groscors. “Cambios y persistencias de la identidad política “chavista”: Aproximación al proceso político venezolano reciente, 1999-2007.” Thesis, SEDE Académico de México, 2015. Accessed March 9, 2018. <https://flacso.repositorioinstitucional.mx/jspui/handle/1026/12>.
- Isaacs, Anita. *Military Rule and Transition in Ecuador, 1972-92*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1993.
- Jaskoski, Maia. *Military Politics and Democracy in the Andes*. Baltimore, MD: The John Hopkins University Press, 2013.
- Lautaro, Julián. “Participación de la población en nuevos esquemas defensivos de Brasil y Venezuela en el siglo XXI.” Portal ALBA. July 22, 2015. Accessed April 8, 2018. <http://www.portalalba.org/index.php/articulos/f-armadas-seguridad-y-defensa/5475-participacion-de-la-poblacion-en-nuevos-esquemas-defensivos-de-brasil-y-venezuela>.
- Loveman, Brian. *For la Patria: Politics and the Armed Forces in Latin America*. Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1999.
- Marulanda, José. “Will A Military Coup Oust Ecuadorian President Correa.” *Panam Post*, March 11, 2016. Accessed April 20, 2018. <https://panampost.com/jose-marulanda/2016/03/11/will-a-military-coup-oust-ecuadorian-president-correa/>.
- Miami Diario. “Los militares controlan el poder en Venezuela?” June 11, 2017. Accessed March 28, 2018. <http://www.miamidiario.com/general/venezuela/protestas/militares-venezolanos/fanb/crisis-venezolana/vladimir-padrino-lopez/crisi-venezolana/pedro-pablo-penaloz/poder-en-venezuela/375837>.
- Ministry of National Defense. “Cedatos afirman que Fuerzas Armadas tiene el %80.6 de confianza ciudadana.” May 9, 2018. Accessed May 22, 2018. <https://www.defensa.gob.ec/cedatos-afirma-que-fuerzas-armadas-tiene-el-80-6-de-confianza-ciudadana/>.

- . “FANB ratifica compromiso con la Constitución y rechaza pretensiones golpistas de la derecha.” January 7, 2017. Accessed May 22, 2018. <http://www.portalalba.org/index.php/areas/fuerzas-armadas-seguridad-y-defensa/11456-fanb-ratifica-compromiso-con-la-constitucion-y-rechaza-pretensiones-golpistas>.
- Ministerio de Defensa Nacional de Ecuador. Resolución Ministerial No. 004, *Plan Estratégico Institucional*. Quito, Ecuador: Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, January 11, 2017. Accessed March 18, 2018. <http://www.oficial.ec/ministerio-defensa-nacional>.
- Molina, Alberto. “Socialismo Patria o Muerte.” *Desde Mi Trincheras*. August 21, 2015. Accessed May 13, 2018. <http://www.desdemitrincheras.com/2015/08/21/socialismo-patria-o-muerte/>.
- NBC News. “Is Latin America’s Military Making a Comeback?” July 28, 2014. Accessed November 19, 2017. <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/latin-americas-military-making-comeback-n166846>.
- Newman, Alex. “Resurgent Communism in Latin America.” *The New American*. March 16, 2010. Accessed December 12, 2017. <https://www.thenewamerican.com/world-news/south-america/item/10497-resurgent-communism-in-latin-america>.
- . “U.S. Ambassador Outs Powerful Totalitarian Cabal in Latin America.” *The New American*. October 24, 2013. Accessed November 12, 2017. <https://www.thenewamerican.com/world-news/south-america/item/16804-u-s-ambassador-outs-powerful-totalitarian-cabal-in-latin-america?tmpl=component&print=1>.
- Norden, Deborah. “Civilian Authority without Civilian Dominance? Assessing Venezuelan Political-Military Relations under Chávez.” *Nueva Sociedad* no. 213 (2008): 1-18. Accessed April 3, 2018. <https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=wcUrnN4AAAAJ&hl=en>.
- North, James. “Why Ecuador’s Rafael Correa Is One of Latin America’s Most Popular Leaders.” *The Nation*. June 4, 2015. Accessed April 8, 2018. <https://www.thenation.com/article/why-ecuadors-rafael-correa-one-latin-americas-most-popular-leaders/>.
- Nunn, Frederick M. *The Time of the Generals: Latin American Professional Militarism in World Perspective*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1992.
- Organization of American States. “Who We Are.” Accessed May 28, 2018. http://www.oas.org/en/about/who_we_are.asp.

- Pardo, Daniel. "Venezuela: ¿quién es Vladimir Padrino, el militar que Maduro nombró de 'superministro'?" *BBC Mundo*, July 12, 2016. Accessed May 10, 2018. <http://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-36780599>.
- Pion-Berlin, David. "A New Civil-Military Pragmatism in Latin America." RESDAL Red de Seguridad y Defensa de América Latina. October 30, 2003. Accessed March 20, 2018. http://www.fes-seguridadregional.org/images/stories/docs/0888-001_g.pdf.
- Portal ALBA. "FANB ratifica compromiso con la Constitución y rechaza pretensiones golpistas de la derecha." Portal ALBA. January 7, 2017. Accessed March 13, 2018. <http://www.portalalba.org/index.php/areas/fuerzas-armadas-seguridad-y-defensa/11456-fanb-ratifica-compromiso-con-la-constitucion-y-rechaza-pretensiones-golpista>.
- Redaccion Plan V. "La batalla de Correa contra Las Fuerzas Armadas." August 29, 2016. Accessed April 10, 2018. <http://www.planv.com.ec/historias/politica/la-batalla-correa-contra-fuerzas-armadas>.
- Rapp, William E. "Civil-Military Relations: The Role of Military Leaders in Strategy Making." *Parameters* 45, no. 3 (Autumn 2015): 13-26. Accessed September 17, 2017. https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/parameters/issues/Autumn_2015/5_rapp.pdf.
- Rebellion.org. "Bariloche: la lucha por la hegemonía militar en América del Sur." 2009. Accessed November 19, 2007. <http://www.rebellion.org/docs.pdf>.
- . "Socialismo del Siglo XXI." 1996. Accessed September 13, 2017. <http://www.rebellion.org/docs/121968.pdf>.
- Resilience.org. "Ecuador—Oil Companies' Links with Military Revealed." June 18, 2005. Accessed March 30, 2018. <https://resilience.org/stories/2005-06-18/ecuador-oil-companies'-links-military-revealed/>.
- Reuters. "El Ejército venezolano estrena saludo: Patria, socialismo o muerte." *El País*, May 12, 2007. Accessed April 6, 2018. https://elpais.com/diario/2007/05/12/internacional/1178920814_850215.html.
- Robertson, Ewan. "Venezuela Marks 25 Years Since 'Caracazo' Uprising Against Neoliberalism." *Venezuelanalysis.com*. February 28, 2014. Accessed April 12, 2018. <https://venezuelanalysis.com/print/10431>.
- Rohter, Larry. "With New Chief, Uruguay Veers Left, in a Latin Pattern," *New York Times*, March 1, 2005. Accessed May 22, 2018. <https://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/01/world/americas/with-new-chief-uruguay-veers-left-in-a-latin-pattern.html>.

- Rouquie, Alain. *The Military and the State in Latin America*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987.
- Saumeth, Eric. "Ecuador y la modernización de sus Fuerzas Armadas." Infodefensa.com. May 1, 2016. Accessed November 1, 2017. <http://www.infodefensa.com/latam/2016/01/05/opinion-ecuador-modernizacion-fuerzas-armadas.php>.
- Shifter, Michael. "Civil-Military Relations Sour as Correa Amasses Power in Ecuador." *World Politics Review*, March 3, 2016. Accessed April 16, 2018. <https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/18103/civil-military-relations-sour-as-correa-amasses-power-in-ecuador>.
- Steffan, Heinz Dieterich. "Socialismo del Siglo XXI." *Rebelión.org*. Accessed September 13, 2017. <http://www.rebellion.org/docs/121968.pdf>.
- Stepan, Alfred, ed., *Americas New Interpretive Essays*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992.
- Stronen, Iselin Asedotter. "'A Civil-Military Alliance': The Venezuelan Armed Forces before and during the Chávez era." Christian Michelsen Institute, 2016. Accessed September 13, 2017. <https://www.cmi.no/publications/5808-a-civil-military-alliance>.
- TeleSur English. "Ecuador President Rafael Correa Changes Military Command Again." December 10, 2016. Accessed March 4, 2018. <https://www.telesurtv.net/english/news/Ecuador-President-Rafael-Correa-Changes-Military-Command-Again-20161210-0022.html>.
- . "São Paulo Forum, Meeting of Latin America's Left, Defends Venezuela." July 19, 2017. Accessed May 1, 2018. <https://www.telesurtv.net/english/news/São-Paulo-Forum-Meeting-of-Latin-Americas-Left-Defends-Venezuela-20170719-0012.html>.
- . "Venezuela to Send Troops to Train at Bolivia's 'Anti-Imperialist' Military Academy." June 6, 2017. Accessed April 12, 2018. <https://www.telesurtv.net/english/news/Venezuela-to-Send-Troops-to-Train-at-Bolivias-Anti-Imperialist-Military-Academy-20170606-0009.html>.
- The Economist. "A Coup by Congress and the Street." April 25, 2005. Accessed April 28, 2018. <https://www.economist.com/node/3893731>.
- . "After the Coup, the Reckoning." *The Economist*, April 8, 2002. Accessed March 14, 2018. <https://www.economist.com/node/1090110>.

- Trikunas, Harold A. "The Crisis in Venezuelan Civil-Military Relations: From Punto Fijo to the Fifth Republic." *Latin American Research Review* 37 no. 1 (2002): 41-76. Accessed November 1, 2017. <http://lasa2.univ.pitt.edu/LARR/prot/search/retrieve/?Vol=37&Num=1&Start=41>.
- Valdez, Carlos. "Anti-Imperialism School Now a Must for Bolivian Officers." The Associated Press, August 17, 2016. Accessed April 10, 2018. <https://www.apnews.com/5b9624aaef484935854d513f1d4ee18f>.
- Vinogradoff, Ludmila. "Los circulos bolivarianos estan recibiendo armas de los cubanos." *El Pais*, March 3, 2002. Accessed November 15, 2017. https://elpais.com/diario/2002/03/03/internacional/1015110023_850215.html.
- . "Un grupo de generales de Venezuela exige la renuncia de Chavez." *El Pais*, April 12, 2002. Accessed March 13, 2018. https://elpais.com/diario/2002/04/12/internacional/1018562412_850215.html.
- Whitt, Preston J. "The Changing Face of Socialism in the 21st Century." CETRI. October 13, 2010. Accessed May 5, 2018. <https://www.cetri.be/The-Changing-Face-of-Socialism-in?lang=fr>.
- Wiarda, Howard J. *The Soul of Latin America*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001.
- Woody, Christopher. "Venezuela's military is on edge, and it could be the wildcard in the country's deepening crisis." *Business Insider*, August 9, 2017. Accessed March 12, 2018. <http://www.businessinsider.com/venezuela-military-role-in-political-crisis-and-violence-2017-8>.