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**PUNCHING ABOVE THEIR WEIGHT:
THE HOMELAND SECURITY CONTRIBUTIONS
OF THE U.S. PACIFIC TERRITORIES**

by

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March 2019

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CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE U.S. PACIFIC TERRITORIES**

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ABSTRACT

While the United States' Pacific territories were brought into the U.S. fold in recognition of their importance to national security, today many Americans—including many policy makers—seem to be unfamiliar with the U.S. Pacific territories and their strategic value. This thesis addresses the question, “What is the value of the United States' Pacific territories—Guam, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI), and American Samoa—to the nation's homeland security, and what are the strategic implications of that value?” Secondary sources such as congressional testimony, military doctrine and unclassified plans, and governmental reports were analyzed to answer that question, using the framework of the DIME (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic) instruments of national power to assess the overlap of homeland security missions with national security interests. While the territories contribute to the nation's security, the lack of coordinated and informed management by the federal government to these territories, including homeland security missions that have at times been at odds with U.S. military interests, prevents a full realization of their potential. Recommendations are made for reexamination of legal, process, and funding approaches to the U.S. Pacific territories by the federal government, including homeland security agencies.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

CBP	U.S. Customs and Border Protection
CJMT	CNMI Joint Military Training Project
CNMI	Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands
CNRA	Consolidated Natural Resources Act of 2008
CROP	Council on Regional Organizations of the Pacific
CRS	Congressional Research Service
DHS	U.S. Department of Homeland Security
DIME	diplomatic, informational, military, and economic
DoD	U.S. Department of Defense
DOI	Department of the Interior
DRRA	Disaster Recovery Reform Act of 2018
DSCA	Defense Support of Civil Authorities
D-SNAP	Disaster Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program
EEZs	Exclusive Economic Zones
EPA	U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FSM	Federated States of Micronesia
GAO	Government Accountability Office
GPRA	Government Performance and Results Act
HHS	U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
IGIA	Interagency Group on Insular Areas
MSD	Marine Safety Detachment
NGB	National Guard Bureau
OIA	Office of Insular Affairs
OMSI	Oceania Maritime Security Initiative
PBDC	Pacific Basin Development Council
PDM	pre-disaster mitigation
PICL	Pacific Island Conference of Leaders
PIF	Pacific Islands Forum
PRC	People's Republic of China

RMI	Republic of the Marshall Islands
SPC	Secretariat of the Pacific Community
TSA	Transportation Security Administration
TSA/OLE FAMS	TSA's Office of Law Enforcement/Federal Air Marshal Service
UN	United Nations
USACE	United States Army Corps of Engineers
USAPI	U.S.-Affiliated Pacific Islands
USCG	United States Coast Guard
USCIS	U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

It seems today that little attention is paid to the United States' Pacific territories by those outside the Pacific.¹ Indeed, while the U.S. Caribbean territory of Puerto Rico has received considerable media attention since Hurricane Maria struck, it seems that the United States' Pacific territories—this thesis focuses on Guam, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (or CNMI), and American Samoa, the three U.S. Pacific territories with indigenous populations and governance—are sometimes forgotten. This has been seen recently in the media discussions of North Korea's initial threats to attack Guam with nuclear weapons and previously in incredulous discussions regarding American Samoa's receipt of federal homeland security grant funding.² The United States sought its new territories in the late 19th/early 20th century (in the case of Guam and American Samoa) and at the end of World War II (CNMI) in a clear view that the territories would contribute to the United States' security, and specifically military, interests. Many Americans—including many policy makers—now seem to be unfamiliar with the U.S. Pacific territories and their strategic value. While some would argue that based solely on their status as Americans, the residents of these territories deserve the attention and support of U.S. policy makers, this thesis is intended for those with a more consequentialist (utilitarian) view of homeland security practice. This is intended to answer the question, What is the value of the United States' Pacific territories to the nation's homeland security and what are the strategic implications of that value?

¹ Doug Mack, "Empire State of Mind: It's Time for American to Have a Conversation about its Overseas Territories," *Slate*, March 15, 2018, <https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/03/its-time-for-the-u-s-to-have-a-conversation-about-its-overseas-territories.html>; Susanah Cahalan, "Most Americans Can't Find These U.S. Territories on a Map," *New York Post*, February 12, 2017, <https://nypost.com/2017/02/12/most-americans-cant-find-these-us-territories-on-a-map/>.

² Michelle Ye Hee Lee, "These Are the Answers to All the Questions You Suddenly Have about Guam," *Washington Post*, August 11, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/posteverything/wp/2017/08/11/these-are-the-answers-to-all-the-questions-you-suddenly-have-about-guam/?utm_term=.97d49b5c0d74; Gene Park, "Guam: A Colonized Island Nation Where 160,000 American Lives Are Not Only at Risk but Often Forgotten," *Washington Post*, August 11, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/posteverything/wp/2017/08/11/guam-a-colonized-island-nation-where-160000-american-lives-are-not-only-at-risk-but-often-forgotten/?utm_term=.67b7354ff369; "Our Opinions: One Size Doesn't Fit All," *Atlanta Journal-Constitution*, June 8, 2004, <https://search.proquest.com/docview/337096809?accountid=12702>.

While definitions of the term “homeland security” vary widely, a definition that includes national security underpins the present research. The research was conducted through an analysis of secondary sources, and all sources used in the development of this policy research are Unclassified and open source. This thesis examines the current significance of the U.S. Pacific territories beyond the specific day-to-day challenges encountered by homeland security practitioners, hopefully shedding light on a broader strategic impact that may justify additional investment in a way that simple population numbers may not immediately support.

As the initial intent in gaining the U.S. Pacific territories was for military purposes, their current role in military strategy was examined first. In the Western Pacific, in particular, the U.S. Pacific territories serve as critical infrastructure and logistical bases in a strategically and tactically important area of the world. Both Guam and CNMI are involved in the Guam build-up, which is intended to move military resources from Japan.³ In addition, they provide training grounds for U.S. personnel and constitute barriers to incursion by other Indo-Pacific powers. The importance of American Samoa to the current U.S. military strategy appears much less clear than that of Guam and CNMI; based on the analysis in this thesis, however, it can be argued that this is not because of a lack of importance, but rather because of faulty strategic military planning and an overreliance on Australia and New Zealand to support American positions south of the equator.

National strategies are not executed solely or even predominantly through military actions, however. International Studies expert Joseph S. Nye, Jr., posited that a nation whose culture and ideology are attractive to other nations, especially if it can exert pressure to develop international expectations that are consistent with its own, may be able to

³ Mark E. Gebicke, *Overseas Presence: Issues Involved in Reducing the Impact of the U.S. Military Presence on Okinawa*, GAO/NSIAD-98-66 (Washington, DC: General Accounting Office, 1998), 2, <https://www.gao.gov/assets/160/156100.pdf>; Andrew S. Erickson and Justin D. Mikolay, “A Place and a Base: Guam and the American Presence in East Asia,” in *Reposturing the Force: U.S. Overseas Presence in the Twenty-First Century*, ed. Carnes Lord (Newport, RI: Naval War College, Center for Naval Warfare Studies, 2006), 66, <https://permanent.access.gpo.gov/lps74157/NP26.pdf>; Shirley A. Kan, *Guam: U.S. Defense Deployments*, CRS Report No. RS22570 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2013), 12, <https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=745062>; Special Representatives of the United States and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, *Report to the President on 902 Consultations* (Washington, DC: Department of the Interior, 2017), 32–34, <https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/uploads/902-consultations-report-january-2017.pdf>.

achieve its aims with less exertion of military power.⁴ Consistent with the belief that military strength is not the sole source of a nation's international power, the U.S. has adopted a doctrine that identifies four categories of national power: diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (frequently referred to using the shorthand DIME). This approach has been summarized as requiring these tools to be used in concert by the U.S. government as a whole to effectively work to achieve the nation's strategic objectives.⁵ In other words, a whole of government approach, focusing on the U.S.' diplomatic ties (e.g., alliances, policies, and partnerships), information efforts (e.g., developing and sharing an intentional message with the public, gathering information and intelligence about other actors), and economic impacts (e.g., trade assistance, trade policies) should work together to achieve the nation's overarching national security strategies.⁶

While the importance of coordination between the Department of Defense and the State Department has been noted in numerous contexts, the need for coordination of Department of Homeland Security (DHS) policies with the nation's overarching national security goals has been less examined.⁷ The activities of DHS agencies in the U.S. Pacific territories in the areas of DIME are summarized in Table ES-1, with specific agencies acting in each area identified in Table ES-2. Note that while DHS entities do not implement

⁴ Joseph S. Nye Jr., *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power* (New York: Basic Books, 1990), 32–33; Richard J. Josten, “Strategic Communication: Key Enablers for Elements of National Power,” *IO Sphere* (Summer 2016): 16, http://www.au.af.mil/info-ops/iosphere/iosphere_summer06_josten.pdf.

⁵ “Instruments of National Power,” The Lightning Press, accessed February 18, 2019, <https://www.thelightningpress.com/the-instruments-of-national-power/>.

⁶ Lightning Press; Craig W. Mastapeter, “The Instruments of National Power: Achieving the Strategic Advantage in a Changing World” (master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2008), 106–109, https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/3756/08Dec_Mastapeter.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y; Douglas T. Stuart, *The Pivot to Asia: Can It Serve as the Foundation for American Grand Strategy in the 21st Century?* (Carlise Barracks, PA: United States Army War College, August 2016), 8–14, <https://permanent.access.gpo.gov/gpo72848/pub1326.pdf>; National War College, “A National Security Strategy Primer” (primer, National War College, 2018), 15, <https://nwc.ndu.edu/Portals/71/Documents/Publications/NSS-Primer-Final-Ed.pdf?ver=2018-07-26-140012-980>.

⁷ See, for example, the literature review in Sean P. Lucas, “Integration of Department of Defense and State Department Efforts to Continue the Global Pursuit of Violent Extremist Organizations” (master's thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2012), 10–12, <https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=729806>.

military activities, their mission areas provide coordination and support to military bases and efforts in the identified areas.

Table ES 1. Implications of Homeland Security Policy for National Security Strategy in the Pacific Island Regions

	Diplomatic	Informational	Military	Economic
DHS Agency Roles Impacting DIME Areas	DHS entities engage with Freely Associated States within their mission areas (e.g., FEMA for disaster response and recovery)	Public affairs & communications efforts by all DHS entities	Infrastructure protection	Immigration policy
	USCG engagement in fisheries protection		Cyber and infrastructure protection of vulnerabilities	Infrastructure protection and development (e.g., through grants)
	Training for Indo-Pacific Regional partners in various mission areas (e.g., maritime safety and security, emergency management)		Immigration enforcement (air and sea)	Customs and border protection
			USCG homeland defense mission	USCG engagement in fisheries protection, maritime safety in U.S. Pacific territories and Freely Associated State
				Disaster response and recovery
				Transportation security

Table ES 2. DHS Agencies with Responsibilities That Address National Security Strategy in the Pacific Islands Region

	Diplomatic	Informational	Military	Economic
DHS Agency with Roles Impacting DIME Areas	FEMA	FEMA	NPPD	USCIS
	USCG	USCG	FEMA	NPPD
	USCIS	USCIS	USCIS	CBP
	CBP	CBP	CBP	USCG
		USSS	USCG	FEMA
				TSA
				ICE

While the economies of all the U.S. Pacific territories but American Samoa are currently growing, they remain weak when compared to the U.S. mainland.⁸ The economic development of these small island territories is challenging, due to their somewhat limited resources.⁹ The current lack of a “whole of government” approach to the U.S. Pacific territories results in confusion and a lack of coherency in U.S. national strategy, which can impede both the achievement of U.S. goals and the development of economic strength in the territories.¹⁰ The Governors of the U.S. Pacific territories have, at times, pointed to federal law as impeding their economic development, including such examples as the Jones Act (restricting foreign-built ships from landing in U.S. harbors), cabotage laws (restricting international flights from landing in U.S. destinations in succession), and implementation of the U.S. minimum wage.¹¹ The relevance of this issue for homeland security practitioners is two-fold: first, as homeland security practitioners interpret and implement policy in the Pacific, fragmented approaches by U.S. homeland security practitioners, among others, may have failed to consider how their policies impact the economic and disaster resilience of these jurisdictions. Second, the lack of economic development in the U.S. Pacific territories is a homeland security issue that presents challenges for those working to increase resilience and respond to disasters in this region.

⁸ Pacific Basin Development Council, “2018 U.S. Pacific Islands Comprehensive Economic Development Strategy (Guam, American Samoa, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, and State of Hawaii)” (report, U.S. Economic Development Administration, June 2018), 7, <https://pacificbasindevelopment.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/2018-U.S.-Pacific-Islands-CEDS.pdf>.

⁹ *Territories of Guam, American Samoa, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, and the U.S. Virgin Islands: Hearing before the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources*, Senate, 109th Cong., 2 (March 1, 2006), 34, <https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-109shrg28058/pdf/CHRG-109shrg28058.pdf>.

¹⁰ See, for example, Brian J. Lepore, *High-Level Leadership Needed to Help Guam Address Challenges Caused by DoD-Related Growth*, GAO-090500R (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2009), <https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=33758>; Haidee V. Eugenio, “Guam Contractors: H-2B Visa Denials Forced Congress to Act,” *Pacific Daily News*, January 1, 2018, <https://www.guampdn.com/story/news/2018/01/01/guam-contractors-defense-law-response-uscis-h-2-b-visa-denials-has-forced-unprecedented-congress-act/991986001/>.

¹¹ See, for example, Louella Losinio, “Business, Political Leaders Push for Lifting of Jones Act,” *Guam Daily Post*, October 16, 2017, https://www.postguam.com/news/local/business-political-leaders-push-for-lifting-of-jones-act/article_fa0b3be2-aff7-11e7-97bd-2f7281249fcc.html; Lolo M. Moliga, “Governor Lolo Moliga’s Statement to Honorable Esther Kia’aina, Assistant Secretary for Insular Affairs Interior, Department of the Interior, In preparation for the IGIA Meeting” (official letter, American Samoa Government, January 7, 2015), <https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/migrated/oia/igia/upload/LOLO-Letter-3.pdf>.

The current method for allocating homeland security funding to the territories seems to have been set somewhat arbitrarily. After 9/11, the homeland security grant program established to allow states and territories to take actions needed to increase the nation's homeland security was mocked for allocating funding to American Samoa, in particular, noting funding allocated to this small territory was massive when viewed on a per capita basis.¹² Significant debate followed over whether funding should be based on risk or population, in part because there is no record of the reasoning behind Congress' decision on the matter. While the current base funding levels may be appropriate, it is hard to know, given the apparently minimal consideration that was given to the level of allocation in Congressional discussions.¹³ Similarly, the impacts of isolation and struggling economies do not appear to be considered in the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA's) allocation of pre-disaster mitigation (PDM) funding, nor are they included in FEMA's enabling regulations to implement the Stafford Act, which

¹² *Atlanta Journal-Constitution*, "Our Opinions."

¹³ Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001, Public Law 107-56, *U.S. Statutes at Large* 115 (2001): 272-402, <https://www.congress.gov/107/plaws/publ56/PLAW-107publ56.pdf>; Amanda Ripley, "How We Got Homeland Security Wrong: The Fortification of Wyoming and Other Tales from the New Front Line," CNN, March 22, 2004, <http://www.cnn.com/2004/ALLPOLITICS/03/22/homeseccom.tml>; Shawn Reese, *Risk-Based Funding in Homeland Security Grant Legislation: Analysis of Issues for the 109th Congress*, CRS Report No. RL33050 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2005), <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesecc/RL33050.pdf>; Shawn Reese, *Homeland Security Grant Formulas: A Comparison of Formula Provisions in S.21 and H.R. 1544, 109th Congress*, CRS Report No. RL32892 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2005), <https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=454365>; Shawn Reese, *FY2006 Homeland Security Grant Distribution Formulas: Issues for the 109th Congress*, CRS Report No. RS22349 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2006), www.hsdl.org/?view&did=466037; Shawn Reese, *Distribution of Homeland Security Grants in FY07 and P.L. 110-53, Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act*, CRS Report No. RL34181 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2007), <https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=479051>; *The Need for Grant Reform and the Faster and Smarter Funding for First Responders Act of 2005: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Science, and Technology of the Committee on Homeland Security*, House of Representatives, 109th Cong. 1 (2005), <https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=456227>.

proscribe the process for requesting a Presidential Disaster Declaration and associated funding.¹⁴

The U.S. government's approach to the Pacific territories has changed remarkably little since the 1950s.¹⁵ As described by the Government Accountability Office (GAO), "The Secretary of the Interior has administrative responsibility for coordinating federal policy for the insular areas [which includes the U.S. Pacific territories]."¹⁶ The most significant change since the 1950s was the 2003 creation of the Interagency Group on Insular Areas (IGIA) to improve the internal management processes of the federal government with respect to the territories.¹⁷ However, the GAO has reported that the IGIA was ineffective at addressing the impacts of the military build-up in Guam.¹⁸ There has also been confusion within the U.S. Pacific territories over the Department of the Interior's (DOI's) role and its ability to manage the actions of other federal agencies.

Despite the GAO's finding regarding the current limitations of the federal government's approach to the territories, there seems to be little discussion of whether the current structure is best suited to address the nation's national security interests in the territories, including homeland security. This despite the fact that the United States government already has in place a two-pronged structure for dealing with the U.S.' territories: while the U.S. Pacific territories and the U.S. Virgin Islands are administered by the Office of Insular Affairs (OIA) within the Department of the Interior, the President's Deputy Assistant for Intergovernmental Affairs coordinates responsibility for U.S.

¹⁴ "FY 2018 Pre-disaster Mitigation (PDM) Grant Program," Federal Emergency Management Agency, last modified October 3, 2018, https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1538601697477-5a4a055c7600eaddad89348044fb664a/FY_2018_PDM_Fact_Sheet.pdf; "Pre-disaster Mitigation Grant Program," Federal Emergency Management Agency, last modified December 3, 2018, <https://www.fema.gov/pre-disaster-mitigation-grant-program>; Federal Disaster Assistance, 44 C.F.R. § 206 (2019), <https://www.ecfr.gov/cgi-bin/retrieveECFR?gp=&SID=211b5ec647c9c9b0e3a7f09455bfceb5&mc=true&n=pt44.1.206&r=PART&ty=HTML>.

¹⁵ "Executive Orders and Public Laws," Department of the Interior, accessed March 25, 2018, <https://www.doi.gov/oia/budget/authorities-public-law>.

¹⁶ Lepore, *High-Level Leadership Needed*, 5.

¹⁷ Exec. Order No. 13299, *Federal Register* 68, no. 91 (2003), <https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/uploads/IGIA-Executive-Order-13299-May-8-2003.pdf>; Lepore, *High-Level Leadership Needed*, 5.

¹⁸ Exec. Order No. 13299; Lepore, *High-Level Leadership Needed*.

government Puerto Rico policy, with a President’s Task Force established to coordinate federal support.¹⁹ Little analysis seems to have been performed on whether the approach to governance of Puerto Rico might be more or less effective than the current DOI OIA role for the other territories. Similarly, there seems to be little discussion regarding whether the IGIA should play a more substantive role in coordinating federal strategy in the U.S. Pacific territories.

While homeland security has been viewed by some as different from national security, it is clear from a review of the literature and from an assessment of the GAO’s exhortation of the dangers of fragmented federal policy that the nation’s interests would be best served by a coherent approach to national and homeland security interests.²⁰ GAO has specifically noted homeland security as a crosscutting issue requiring “national focus,” noting that interagency coordination can be hampered by conflicting goals, procedures, and responsibilities, impeding the ability to achieve U.S. national interests.²¹ The need to avoid fragmentation of federal interests is especially true in the small U.S. Pacific territories, where interrelationships are hard to avoid among the impacts of policy decisions.

Table ES-3 provides recommendations for action. The steps recommended herein are intended to be effective enough to make an impact, while small enough to overcome inherent resistance to change.

¹⁹ “Puerto Rico,” Department of the Interior, accessed March 10, 2019, <https://www.doi.gov/oia/islands/puertorico>; Exec. Order No. 13183, *Federal Register* 65, no. 251 (2000), <https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=462819>; “White House Task Force on Puerto Rico,” White House, accessed February 17, 2019, <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/administration/eop/iga/puerto-rico>.

²⁰ Bijan P. Karimi, “Security and Prosperity: Reexamining the Connection between Economic, Homeland and National Security” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2015), https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/47284/15Sep_Karimi_Bijan.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y; Lepore, *High-Level Leadership Needed to Help Guam Address Challenges Caused by DoD-Related Growth*, 4.

²¹ Patricia A. Dalton, *Results-Oriented Government: GPRAs Has Established a Solid Foundation for Achieving Greater Results*, GAO-04-38 (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2004), 9, <https://www.gao.gov/assets/160/157517.pdf>.

Table ES 3. Recommendations

1	<p><i>Reevaluate laws pertaining to the U.S. Pacific territories to update and, where possible, improve clarity and consistency.</i></p> <p>The current hodgepodge of federal laws is confusing and arguably deleterious to homeland security.</p> <p>Action: Congress</p>
2	<p><i>Reevaluate coordination and administration for the U.S. territories.</i></p> <p>The reason for the current two-pronged approach to Puerto Rico vs. the rest of the territories is not clear, and the administration of DOI may not maximize effectiveness of the territories in furthering national interests.</p> <p>Action: White House, supported by Executive Branch departments and agencies with equities in the Pacific Islands Region</p>
3	<p><i>Strengthen interagency coordination of policy towards the U.S. Pacific territories.</i></p> <p>The current coordination mechanism has been found lacking in its ability to further national goals in the territories.</p> <p>Action: Lead for administration of U.S. policy towards the U.S. Pacific territories (currently, DOI OIA)</p>
4	<p><i>Reevaluate the level and allocation process for federal funding in the U.S. Pacific territories.</i></p> <p>This would include the base level of homeland security grant funding, the process for risk-based allocation of homeland security grant funding, and the criteria for declaring a Presidential disaster in the U.S. Pacific territories.</p> <p>Action: Congress and DHS</p>

The steps envisioned in this thesis would require action by multiple parties, including Congress, the White House, the Department of the Interior, and the Department of Homeland Security. While the federal government is a large ship, and turning it is consequently difficult, it can be done when the risks and rewards of the required change are understood.

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Please note that the views in this thesis are expressed by the author alone and do not represent the views of FEMA, DHS, or the United States government.

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. THE U.S. PACIFIC TERRITORIES

At the end of World War II, the military value of the U.S. Pacific territories was clear to American policy makers—so clear, in fact, that the United States worked with the United Nations to gain additional territory through the creation of a Pacific Trust Territory.¹ However, when the United States’ Pacific territories are discussed today by those outside the Pacific, it is largely in terms of explaining that the U.S. does indeed still have territories.² In terms of homeland security, this has been seen most recently in the media discussions of North Korea’s initial threats to attack Guam with nuclear weapons.³ As the last Congressmen with World War II experience with the Pacific have left Congress, the historic role of the U.S. Pacific territories is in danger of being forgotten by policymakers.⁴

In fact, today, many Americans—including many policy makers—seem to be unfamiliar with the U.S. Pacific territories and their strategic value. There are at least two reasons for this: First, the geographic distances that must be traveled to reach them; the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI) and Guam are located 3,700 miles west of Hawaii, which is in turn 2,500 miles west of California, while American Samoa is 2,500 miles south of Hawaii. (Figure 1 shows a map of the U.S. Pacific territories,

¹ Niles Russell Gooding, “The Administration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, 1945–1962” (master’s thesis, American University, 1962), 26–31, <http://hdl.handle.net/10945/11562>; Howard P. Willen and Deanne C. Siemer, *An Honorable Accord: The Covenant between the Northern Mariana Islands and the United States* (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2002).

² Doug Mack, “Empire State of Mind: It’s Time for American to Have a Conversation about its Overseas Territories,” *Slate*, March 15, 2018, <https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/03/its-time-for-the-u-s-to-have-a-conversation-about-its-overseas-territories.html>.

³ Michelle Ye Hee Lee, “These Are the Answers to All the Questions You Suddenly Have about Guam,” *Washington Post*, August 11, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/posteverything/wp/2017/08/11/these-are-the-answers-to-all-the-questions-you-suddenly-have-about-guam/?utm_term=.

⁴ Chris Cillizza and Steve Vogel, “Lautenberg Was the Last World War II Veteran in Senate,” *Washington Post*, June 13, 2013, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/lautenberg-was-the-last-world-war-ii-veteran-in-senate/2013/06/03/df979880-cc82-11e2-9f1a-1a7cdee20287_story.html?utm_term=.f60009e02214; James Hohmann, “The Senate’s Last World War II Veteran,” *POLITICO*, June 3, 2013, <https://www.politico.com/story/2013/06/frank-lautenberg-world-war-ii-092168>.

as well as the U.S.-Affiliated Pacific Islands [independent nations that have chosen to align with the United States through Compacts of Free Association.] Second, they have fairly small populations compared to the mainland states; CNMI and American Samoa each had a population of approximately 55,000 in 2010 while Guam’s population was almost 160,000, compared to the least populous state of Wyoming, with a 2010 population of over 560,000.⁵




Figure 1. U.S. Pacific Territories and Freely Associated States⁶

⁵ Justyna Goworowska and Steven Wilson, *Recent Population Trends for the U.S. Island Areas: 2000 to 2010*, Report Number P23-213 (Washington, DC: U.S. Census Bureau, April 2015), <https://www.census.gov/library/publications/2015/demo/P23-213.html>; and Paul Mackun and Steven Wilson, *Population Distribution and Change: 2000 to 2010*, Report No. C2010BR-01 (Washington, DC: U.S. Census Bureau, March 2011), <https://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-01.pdf>.

⁶ Source: “Map of the U.S. Pacific Islands Region-Updated,” Pacific Islands Regional Climate Assessment, July 20, 2017, <https://pirca.org/2017/07/20/map-of-pacific-islands-region-updated/#prettyPhoto/0/>.

Regardless of cause, the U.S. Pacific territories—this thesis will focus on Guam, the CNMI, and American Samoa, the three U.S. Pacific territories with indigenous populations and governance—fall under a hodgepodge of legal and policy frameworks that negatively affect their resilience and role in homeland security. Some of the reasons for this hodgepodge are legal in nature. In the early 20th century, the Supreme Court issued decisions known as the “Insular Cases,” which essentially determined that the only limitation on the U.S. government’s authority over Americans residing in the territories was that their “fundamental rights” under the Constitution be protected.⁷ Other than these fundamental rights, the Constitution applies to the territories only so far as Congress explicitly provides.⁸ Thus, for example, Americans in the U.S. Pacific territories cannot vote in Presidential general elections, have varying degrees of entitlement to jury trials in criminal cases, and may be U.S. citizens or U.S. nationals depending on where they were born.⁹ Similarly, funding for federal “safety net” programs such as welfare, school lunches, social security disability, and Medicaid is often provided at lower levels to the territories than to the states.¹⁰

In general, Congress, freed from Constitutional limits on federal authorities versus those retained by the states, has been given significant sway to decide how to govern territorial residents and the territories themselves in a manner not permissible within the 50 states.¹¹ With Congress’ control over the territories thus enabled, the law with respect to the U.S. territories has often been set by Congress on a piecemeal basis, with often inconsistent results. For example, Congress has determined by statute that Americans born in Guam and CNMI are U.S. citizens, while those born in American Samoa are U.S.

⁷ Arnold H. Leibowitz, *Defining Status: A Comprehensive Analysis of United States Territorial Relations* (Norwell, MA: Martinus Nijhoff, 2013), 17–29; “American Samoa and the Citizenship Clause: A Study in *Insular Cases* Revisionism,” *Harvard Law Review* 130, no. 6 (April 2017): 1680, <https://harvardlawreview.org/2017/04/american-samoa-and-the-citizenship-clause/>.

⁸ Leibowitz, *Defining Status*, 21–22.

⁹ Maria Murriel, “Millions of Americans Can’t Vote for President Because of Where They Live,” PRI, November 1, 2016, <https://www.pri.org/stories/2016-11-01/millions-americans-cant-vote-president-because-where-they-live>; Leibowitz, *Defining Status*, 26–28.

¹⁰ Leibowitz, *Defining Status*, 29–32.

¹¹ Leibowitz, 21–29.

nationals.¹² Similarly, American Samoa continues to maintain control over its own immigration, while U.S. immigration law is largely in place in Guam and CNMI, though with an additive layer of visas and requirements overlaid on the typical U.S. structure.¹³ For Customs purposes, the U.S. Pacific territories are considered outside the United States.¹⁴ Such a hodgepodge of inconsistent application of U.S. law among the territories impacts numerous other areas affecting homeland security, including the Jones Act, the Buy American Act, the Affordable Care Act, and Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement. Table 1 provides examples of the varying legal status of the U.S. Pacific territories. The lack of clarity of U.S. government policy towards the Pacific can even impact the ability of federal agencies to implement laws that clearly do constrain the territories; for example, the Governor of American Samoa was recently quoted as arguing in the context of a National Flood Insurance Program violation that “the American Samoa Government only takes directions from the U.S. Department of Interior, and no other federal agency, such as the U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).”¹⁵ In such a context of confusion, support for the homeland security mission is challenging.

¹² Heather Brady, “Why Are American Samoans Not U.S. Citizens?,” *National Geographic*, March 30, 2018, <https://news.nationalgeographic.com/2018/03/american-samoa-citizenship-lawsuit-history/>.

¹³ See, for example, “U.S. Immigration Law in the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands,” U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, December 27, 2018, <https://www.uscis.gov/legal-resources/immigration-commonwealth-northern-mariana-islands-cnmi/us-immigration-law-commonwealth-northern-mariana-islands-cnmi>; “American Samoa,” Department of the Interior, accessed February 6, 2019, <https://www.doi.gov/oia/islands/american-samoa>.

¹⁴ *Insular Possessions of the United States Other than Puerto Rico*, 19 CFR § 7.2 (2008), <https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/19/7.2>.

¹⁵ Fili Sagapolutele, “Lolo: ASG Takes Directions Only from DOI—and No Other Agencies,” *Samoa News*, October 16, 2018, <http://www.samoanews.com/local-news/lolo-asg-takes-directions-only-doi-and-no-other-agencies>.

Table 1. Examples of Legal Situation in U.S. Pacific Territories¹⁶

Law/Status	American Samoa	CNMI	Guam
Citizenship	U.S. Nationals	U.S. Citizens	U.S. Citizens
Immigration Law	American Samoan control	Federal control	Federal control
Jones Act	Exempt	Exempt	Applies
Customs	American Samoan control	CNMI control	Guam control
Passport Required	Yes, by American Samoa; not by U.S. government	No	No

Potentially as a result of the U.S. government’s haphazard and inconsistent approach to their integration, the U.S. Pacific territories generally lag behind the continental United States in economic development. In 2009, for example, the U.S. government Accountability Office (GAO) reported that the U.S. Census had previously found that even in Guam, with the lowest percentage of citizens living below the poverty threshold of any of the U.S. territories, poverty rates were still almost twice those found on the mainland.¹⁷ The relative impoverishment of the Pacific territories certainly impacts homeland security practitioners who support them, as their decreased resilience—whether in infrastructure, personnel resources, or capabilities—creates challenges for federal agencies implementing their missions.

Some would argue that based solely on their status as Americans, the residents of these territories deserve the attention and support of U.S. policy makers. For many working

¹⁶ Adapted from Brady, “Why Are American Samoans Not U.S. Citizens?”; Leibowitz, *Defining Status*, 29; U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, “U.S. Immigration Law in the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands”; Department of the Interior, “American Samoa”; “Hawaii Group Moves to Change Shipping Regulations Governed by Jones Act,” *Samoan News*, March 1, 2015, <http://www.samoanews.com/hawaii-group-moves-change-shipping-regulations-governed-jones-act>; “Insular Possessions of the United States other than Puerto Rico,” U.S. Customs and Border Protection, *Code of Federal Regulations*, title 19 (2008), <https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/19/7.2>; “Clearing CBP When Traveling to U.S. Insular Possessions (U.S. Virgin Islands, American Samoa, or Guam), Duty Exemptions,” U.S. Customs and Border Protection, last modified July 28, 2018, https://help.cbp.gov/app/answers/detail/a_id/422/kw/american%20samoa; “Will Travelers from U.S. Territories Need to Present a Passport to Enter the United States,” U.S. Customs and Border Protection, last modified July 10, 2018, https://help.cbp.gov/app/answers/detail/a_id/980/kw/american%20samoa.

¹⁷ David Gootnick, *Poverty Determination in U.S. Insular Areas*, GAO-10-240R (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2009), 1, 23, <https://www.gao.gov/assets/100/96462.pdf>.

in the Pacific, the challenges of the Pacific are moral ones, requiring improved support for our fellow Americans. This thesis, however, is intended for those with a more consequentialist (utilitarian) view of homeland security practice, addressing whether the territories remain important to U.S. national security, and if so, what the implications may be for homeland security practitioners. As the GAO has noted, “fragmentation of federal efforts contributes to difficulties in addressing crosscutting issues... interagency coordination is important for ensuring that crosscutting efforts are mutually reinforcing and efficiently implemented.”¹⁸ Given the crosscutting nature of the homeland security mission, which impacts and is impacted by areas such as critical infrastructure, health care, immigration, and national security, it is important that homeland security practitioners understand the context of the U.S. Pacific jurisdictions, their challenges, and their contributions.

B. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND RESEARCH QUESTION

Each of the U.S. Pacific territories entered into its relationship with the United States in its own way, but they were all brought into the country as a part of military defense and a perceived need for territorial expansion.¹⁹ Do those interests still apply in the early 21st century? Certainly, the Obama Administration’s “pivot to the Pacific” resulted in a great deal of discussion of the military importance of the Pacific and the need to defend against potential threats in the Indo-Pacific region. Similarly, President Trump’s *National Security Strategy* emphasizes the importance of defending the nation against threats to the homeland, including an implied reference to the Pacific in terms of defending against nuclear strikes.²⁰ The 2019 Statement for the Record of the Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community indicates that the U.S. should be wary of Chinese expansive intentions, and specifically cautions that “China is currying favor with numerous

¹⁸ Lepore, *High-Level Leadership Needed*, 4.

¹⁹ Leibowitz, *Defining Status*, 306–307, 397–398, 468–469; Gooding, “Administration of the Trust Territory,” 26–31.

²⁰ Nina Silove, “The Pivot before the Pivot: U.S. Strategy to Preserve the Power Balance in Asia,” *International Security* 40, no. 4 (2016): 45–88, <https://muse.jhu.edu/article/617461>; President of the United States, *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: White House, 2017), <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf>.

Pacific Island nations” in support of its international aims.²¹ However, despite the fact that the Congressional Research Service (CRS) calls the Pacific Islands region, which includes the U.S. Pacific territories, a “strategically important region ... with a diverse array of policy issues,” there appears to have been little thought given to how the U.S. Pacific territories support U.S. homeland security concerns.²²

While the U.S. Pacific territories were first sought in support of the nation’s military aims, this thesis also seeks to examine their full role in American strategic engagement with the world. In the 1990s, the term “soft power” was first used by international studies expert Joseph S. Nye, Jr., who posited that military strength was diminishing as a source of international power, in favor of other factors such as economics and technology.²³ A nation whose culture and ideology are attractive to other nations, especially if it can exert pressure to develop international expectations that are consistent with its own, may be able to achieve its aims with less exertion of military power.²⁴ Consistent with the belief that military strength is not the sole source of a nation’s international power, in *The U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues*, J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr., notes that “U.S. military doctrine recognizes four categories of power available to a nation or strategist: diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (often referred to using the shorthand DIME)” (see Figure 2).²⁵ This approach has been summarized as requiring these tools to be used in concert by the U.S. government as a whole to effectively work towards

²¹ Daniel R. Coats, *Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community* (Washington, DC: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2019), 28, <https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/2019-ATA-SFR---SSCI.pdf>.

²² Thomas Lum and Bruce Vaughn, *The Pacific Islands: Policy Issues*, CRS Report No. R44753 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2017), 1, <https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=798831>.

²³ Ryoa Chung, “Soft Power,” in *Encyclopedia of Global Justice*, ed. Deen K. Chatterjee (Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2011), 696, <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-9160-5>; Joseph S. Nye Jr., *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power* (New York: Basic Books, 1990), 29, 32.

²⁴ Nye, *Bound to Lead*, 32–33; Richard J. Josten, “Strategic Communication: Key Enablers for Elements of National Power,” *IO Sphere* (Summer 2016): 16, http://www.au.af.mil/info-ops/iosphere/iosphere_summer06_josten.pdf.

²⁵ J. Boone Bartholomees Jr., “A Survey of the Theory of Strategy,” in *The U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues: Volume I, Theory of War and Strategy*, ed. J. Boone Bartholomees Jr. (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2010), 18, <http://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pdffiles/pub1004.pdf>; Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, JP 1 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2017), I-1, <https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=802752>.

the nation’s national strategic objectives.²⁶ In other words, a whole of government approach, focusing on the U.S.’ diplomatic ties (e.g., alliances, policies, and partnerships), information efforts (e.g., developing and sharing an intentional message with the public, gathering information and intelligence about other actors), and economic impacts (e.g., trade assistance, trade policies) should work together to towards the nation’s overarching national security strategies.²⁷

Instruments of National Power			
D Diplomatic	I Informational	M Military	E Economic
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Embassies/ Ambassadors ▪ Recognition ▪ Negotiations ▪ Treaties ▪ Policies ▪ International forums 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Military information ▪ Public diplomacy ▪ Public affairs ▪ Communications resources ▪ International forums ▪ Spokespersons, timing, media and venues for announcements 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Military operations ▪ Engagement, Security Coop, Deterrence ▪ Show of force ▪ Military technology ▪ Size, composition of force 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Trade policies ▪ Fiscal and monetary policies ▪ Embargoes ▪ Tariffs ▪ Assistance

Figure 2. The Four Instruments of National Power²⁸

²⁶ “Instruments of National Power,” The Lightning Press, accessed February 18, 2019, <https://www.thelightningpress.com/the-instruments-of-national-power/>.

²⁷ Lightning Press; Craig W. Mastapeter, “The Instruments of National Power: Achieving the Strategic Advantage in a Changing World” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2008), 106–109, [https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/3756/08Dec_Mastapeter.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y](https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/3756/08Dec_Mastapeter.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y;); Douglas T. Stuart, *The Pivot to Asia: Can It Serve as the Foundation for American Grand Strategy in the 21st Century?* (Carlise Barracks, PA: United States Army War College, August 2016), 8–14, <https://permanent.access.gpo.gov/gpo72848/pub1326.pdf>; National War College, “A National Security Strategy Primer” (primer, National War College, 2018), 15, <https://nwc.ndu.edu/Portals/71/Documents/Publications/NSS-Primer-Final-Ed.pdf?ver=2018-07-26-140012-980>.

²⁸ Source: Lightning Press, “Instruments of National Power.”

These instruments were also referenced in the 2017 National Security Strategy, which proclaimed that “The United States will fuse our analysis of information derived from the diplomatic, information, military, and economic domains to compete more effectively on the geopolitical stage.”²⁹ However, little analysis appears to have been performed on the role of the U.S. Pacific territories in support of the nation’s national security aims, and specifically the role that homeland security practitioners play in this effort.

This thesis, therefore, will address the following research question:

What is the value of the United States’ Pacific territories to the nation’s homeland security and what are the strategic implications of that value?

C. LITERATURE REVIEW

Before undertaking this thesis, a literature review was conducted to assess the current status of research into the role of the U.S. Pacific territories in current homeland security academia and policy making. Before an assessment could be made of the role of the territories in homeland security, a key question was the definition of homeland security itself, as the term appears to have different meanings to different practitioners. In addition, the current literature with respect to the U.S. territories was also examined. While Congress and other policy makers rarely discuss the specific contributions of the U.S. Pacific territories, there have been significant Congressional and military discussions of the relationship between the U.S. government and the Freely Associated States, in part because of the ongoing nature of negotiations over funding levels and treaties. With many similarities in their locations and significance, the literature with respect to these Freely Associated States has been reviewed for potential relevance to the U.S. Pacific territories’ contributions and challenges.

²⁹ President of the United States, *National Security Strategy*, 28.

1. What Constitutes Homeland Security?

Previous work has documented the wide-ranging definitions of term “homeland security”; many include national security while others are more focused on the internal workings of the nation.³⁰ Some authors, such as the Gilmore Commission, which issued a series of five annual reports spanning from 1999–2003 designed to assess the nation’s capabilities for responding to terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction, have done notable work in the area without ever precisely defining the term.³¹ Professor Nadav Morag, interestingly, has argued that “homeland security” is a uniquely American invention, largely to deal with the same issues as national security but using different tools as constrained by the Constitution.³²

The relationship between national security and homeland security has been addressed by several authors.³³ In “What’s in a Name? The Meaning of Homeland Security,” Jerome H. Kahan of the U.S. War College argues that there is no one definition of national security, but also notes that “It would take a number of lengthy treatises to capture all the diverse elements of national security, given differing opinions on what it takes to maintain our nation’s values, keep our domestic house in order, and exert the global

³⁰ An excellent examination of the literature on this topic can be found in Bijan P. Karimi, “Security and Prosperity: Reexamining the Connection between Economic, Homeland and National Security” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2015), https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/47284/15Sep_Karimi_Bijan.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y; see also Shawn Reese, *Defining Homeland Security: Analysis and Congressional Considerations*, CRS Report No. R42462 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2012), https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc86623/m1/1/high_res_d/R42462_2012Apr03.pdf; Christine Wormuth and Jeremy White, “Merging the HSC and NSC: Stronger Together,” *Homeland Security Affairs*, 5, no. 1 (2009), <https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/25031/20.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>.

³¹ Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, *Forging America’s New Normalcy: Securing Our Homeland, Protecting Our Liberty* (Arlington, VA: RAND, 2003), <https://www.rand.org/nsrd/terrpanel.html>.

³² Nadav Morag, “Does Homeland Security Exist Outside the United States?” *Homeland Security Affairs* 7, no. 2 (2011), <http://hdl.handle.net/10945/24985>.

³³ Mark Neocleous, “From Social to National Security: On the Fabrication of Economic Order,” *Security Dialogue* 37 no. 3 (2006): 363–84, <http://journals.sagepub.com.libproxy.nps.edu/doi/abs/10.1177/0967010606069061>.

leadership that has become our role in the world.”³⁴ It appears that Professor Kahan would include homeland security as a subset of activities required for national security to be protected.³⁵ This author asserts, however, that national security is a broader topic than homeland security, and that some things may be in fact national security issues without being a homeland security issue.³⁶ Some authors have argued that homeland security is a domestic activity, while national security, on the other hand, is largely at or beyond the country’s borders.³⁷ In many cases, however, authors have concluded that threats to stability domestically can be threats to national security, and vice versa, and that the overlapping nature of threats to both should be taken into account.³⁸

President Obama, on the other hand, equated the terms homeland security and national security, stating that “I believe that Homeland Security is indistinguishable from National Security—conceptually and functionally, they should be thought of together rather than separately. Instead of separating these issues, we must create an integrated, effective, and efficient approach to enhance the national security of the United States.”³⁹ Similarly, the Naval Postgraduate School’s Christopher Bellavita, while recognizing as many as seven definitions of “homeland security,” identifies one that asserts that “Homeland security is an element of national security that works with the other instruments of national power to protect the sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and critical

³⁴ Jerome H. Kahan, “What’s in a Name? The Meaning of Homeland Security,” *Journal of Homeland Security Education* 2 (2013): 2–3, <https://search.proquest.com.libproxy.nps.edu/docview/1465501592/6440FBE57C694243PQ/1?accountid=12702>.

³⁵ Kahan.

³⁶ Kahan.

³⁷ Terrence M. O’Sullivan and Jim Ramsay, “Defining and Distinguishing Homeland from National Security and Climate-Related Environmental Security, in Theory and Practice,” *Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management* 12, no. 1 (October 2014): 43–66, <https://doi.org/10.1515/jhsem-2014-0003>.

³⁸ O’Sullivan and Ramsay; Anthony J. Blinken, “‘Is Anybody Out There Listening?’ Communicating Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era,” in *Economic Strategy and National Security: A Next Generation Approach*, ed. Patrick J. DeSouza (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2000), 79–87.

³⁹ Barack Obama, *Presidential Study Directive 1: Organizing for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism* (Washington, DC: White House, 2009), <https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/psd/psd-1.pdf>.

infrastructure of the United States against threats and aggression.”⁴⁰ National and homeland security were also clearly linked in the current *National Security Strategy*, which does not provide a specific definition of either homeland or national security, but does make it clear that his Administration considers homeland security to be an aspect of national security: “[O]ur fundamental responsibility is to **protect the American people, the homeland, and the American way of life**” (emphasis in original).⁴¹ In fact, his first pillar is to “Protect the American People, the Homeland, and the American Way of Life.”⁴² Activities included in this area include protecting the homeland from potential nuclear missile threats, as well as more commonly expected aspects of homeland security.⁴³

Economic resilience has been linked to homeland security by several authors, as well. For example, Naval Postgraduate School master’s student Bijan Karimi argued that economic insecurity can threaten homeland security.⁴⁴ Similarly, FEMA’s *Strategic Plan for 2018–2022* highlights the relationship between the economic well-being of individuals and an ability to plan for disasters.⁴⁵

2. Homeland Security Role of the U.S. Pacific Territories

Current literature on the role of the U.S. Pacific territories’ in homeland security is fairly limited. There is, however, more analysis of the role of the territories in the area of national security, particularly in military planning. (As noted in the preceding analysis of the literature, many of the definitions of the term “homeland security” include national security while others do not. For the purposes of this thesis, a definition that includes national security will be used.) Most of the literature appears to be historic in nature or

⁴⁰ Christopher Bellavita, “Changing Homeland Security: What is Homeland Security?” *Homeland Security Affairs* 4, no. 2 (2008), <https://www.hsaj.org/articles/118>.

⁴¹ President of the United States, *National Security Strategy*, 4.

⁴² President of the United States, v.

⁴³ President of the United States, 7–16.

⁴⁴ Karimi, “Security and Prosperity.”

⁴⁵ Federal Emergency Management Agency, *2018–2022 Strategic Plan* (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2018), https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1533052524696-b5137201a4614ade5e0129ef01cbf661/strat_plan.pdf.

addresses the U.S. “pivot to the Pacific” or the “Guam buildup” to move U.S. forces from Japan to Guam and, to a lesser extent, the CNMI. There is also information from congressional hearings pertaining to the strategic relationship with the U.S.-Affiliated Pacific Islands (USAPI), which focuses on the relationship with the Freely Associated States of the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI), the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), and the Republic of Palau. While there is a great deal of information on the military’s interests in the USAPI, there is significantly less analysis of current U.S. defense interests in American Samoa. The following discussion summarizes the current literature identified in these areas.

a. *General Importance of the USAPI to National Security*

The ongoing importance of the USAPI to the U.S. military is discussed in a number of sources. Discussions pertaining to specific areas of the Pacific are addressed in subsequent sections. However, some references simply address the USAPI as a whole. Most of these documents have been generated by different components of the U.S. government, with seemingly little interest or analysis available from the academic or nongovernmental communities. One such document is the 2001 Department of Defense’s (DoD’s) *Quadrennial Defense Review*, which recognized the continuing importance to the Bush Administration of the Indo-Pacific region.⁴⁶ Similarly, the CRS has reported on the role of the USAPI (including American Samoa, unlike many of the documents reviewed) and concluded there are ongoing U.S. interests in the area, not only in defense but also in international policy organizations such as the United Nations.⁴⁷ Perhaps because so much of the discussion of this issue comes from U.S. government sources, there is a consensus view that the USAPI continues to be important to U.S. interests; where disagreement exists, it generally pertains to whether current U.S. approaches are effective in fulfilling U.S.

⁴⁶ Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2001), <http://archive.defense.gov/pubs/qdr2001.pdf>.

⁴⁷ Lum and Vaughn, *The Pacific Islands*, 1–4.

goals.⁴⁸ While not specifically mentioning the USAPI, the recently released *National Security Strategy* by the Trump administration does discuss the strategic importance of the “Indo-Pacific” region (previously known as the Asia-Pacific).⁴⁹ One interesting plea from a scholar at the Center for Strategic & International Studies states that

The Pacific Islands are given little attention and rarely make the news unless there has been a natural disaster of some sort. This is a mistake since these islands are of critical importance to any U.S. strategy to counter Chinese adventurism in the Pacific and maintain the peace. Not only are the U.S. affiliated islands an important source of basing for logistic infrastructure (should there be a military conflict with China), but they are also important to U.S. Pacific Command [now the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command] for training, contingency and forward basing, the deployment of potential strike weapons, and deterrence. Any ‘island strategy’ must not be solely a military strategy but include interlacing development, diplomatic, economic, and culture strategies. At a minimum, islands in the Compact of Free Association States (Micronesia, Marshall Islands, Palau), U.S. Territories Guam, American Samoa, and the Marianas (CNMI) should be the target of key investment initiatives in health education, nontraditional security (for example, maritime security and energy security), and economic development in order to strengthen island societies as a whole and as part of a wider, foundational, and sustained U.S. strategic approach.⁵⁰

While not specifically discussing the role of the USAPI, there is a trend in the military literature that contends, despite recent military capability developments, islands continue to be important military assets. Erickson and Wuthnow of the Naval War College and National Defense University, respectively, argue that both China and Japan continue to count on the importance of island chains in military activities in Asia.⁵¹ This view appears to be fairly mainstream, at least within the U.S. military community, as is reflected by another National Defense University scholar, Hammes, who indicates that U.S.

⁴⁸ *U.S. Policy in the Pacific: The Struggle to Maintain Influence, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific of the Committee on Foreign Affairs*, 114th Cong., 2 (June 23, 2016), <https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=7960>.

⁴⁹ President of the United States, *National Security Strategy*.

⁵⁰ David W. Hamon, “Thinking Strategically on the Pacific Islands,” *Habele Blog*, July 27, 2016, <http://habele.blogspot.com/2016/08/hamon-thinking-strategically-on-pacific.html>.

⁵¹ Andrew S. Erickson and Joel Wuthnow, “Why Islands Still Matter in Asia,” *Princeton-Harvard China and the World Program* (blog), February 5, 2016, <https://cwp.princeton.edu/news/why-islands-still-matter-asia-cwp-alumni-erickson-wuthnow>.

relationships with the governments of islands surrounding China can be used to restrict China's potential for advance and protect U.S. interests.⁵²

Some indirect support for the continuing importance of the U.S. Pacific territories can be seen in the discussion of the continuing role of the Freely Associated States—the Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and Palau—to the United States. These island nations are geographically located around the territories of Guam and CNMI and share commonalities in how they came into relationship with the United States. Much of the literature on the importance of the Freely Associated States to the United States falls into two types: historical information describing why the Compacts of Free Association were developed and current congressional hearings regarding the ongoing importance of these relationships. In general, while the tone of the historic analysis may vary—for example, the tone of a master's thesis by Gooding is fawning in its approach while Hanlon is much more anti-colonial in tone—both agree that the U.S. military's interests in the USAPI drove the development of the U.S. relationships with these former Trust territories.⁵³ Similarly, Willen and Siemer provide an overview of how the U.S. military's interests drove the creation and then handling of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands following World War II. Of note in terms of tone and approach, because Willen represented the Marianas Political Status Commission in negotiating the Covenant with the United States, his analysis is predictably positive about the negotiation's impact on the CNMI.⁵⁴ More recent congressional hearings and statements regarding the Compacts of

⁵² T. X. Hammes, *Offshore Control: A Proposed Strategy for an Unlikely Conflict*, Strategic Forum Series No. 278 (Washington, DC: National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies, June 2012), <http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratforum/SF-278.pdf>.

⁵³ Gooding, "Administration of the Trust Territory," 26–31; David Hanlon, *Remaking Micronesia: Discourses over Development in a Pacific Territory, 1944–1982* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1998), 219.

⁵⁴ Willen and Siemer, *An Honorable Accord*.

Free Association have outlined the ongoing importance of the Freely Associated States to U.S. defense, as have those of the Trump administration.⁵⁵

b. *The Importance of Guam and the CNMI to National Security*

A multitude of academic and governmental sources discuss the role of the Mariana Islands (both Guam and the CNMI) in support of the Obama administration's "pivot to the Pacific" and the shift of military forces to Guam. Most of these sources, whether governmental or academic, recount how Guam or the CNMI will be used; they do not provide a strategic assessment of whether other locations might be more appropriate, or whether Guam or CNMI would continue to be of value as U.S. territories in the absence of military interest.⁵⁶ *The Washington Post* provided a historical overview for the public of why the island of Guam came to be specifically threatened by North Korea for nuclear attack.⁵⁷ While there has been controversy regarding the potential build-up in both Guam and the CNMI, the CNMI has been particularly concerned over the use of its islands; a particularly authoritative source on its concerns as well as the U.S. military's interest in

⁵⁵ *Compact of Free Association: Hearing before the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, Senate*, 108th Cong., 1 (July 15, 2003), <https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=464008>; *Compacts of Free Association with the Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, and Palau: Joint Oversight Hearing before the Committee on Resources and Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific of the Committee on International Relations*, House of Representatives, 105th Cong., 2 (October 1, 1998), <https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-105hhr51943/pdf/CHRG-105hhr51943.pdf>; David B. Gootnick, *Compact of Free Association: Proposed U.S. Assistance to Palau for Fiscal Years 2016 to 2024: Testimony before the Subcommittee on Indian, Insular, and Alaska Native Affairs, Committee on Natural Resources, House of Representatives*, GAO-16-788T (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2016), <https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=794088>; Maria Cantwell, "We Must Approve the Agreement between the United States and Palau," *Democratic News*, April 5, 2016, <https://www.energy.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2016/4/cantwell-we-must-approve-the-agreement-between-the-united-states-and-palau>; Ryan Zinke, "Secretary Zinke Praises President Trump and Congress for Authorizing Palau Compact Agreement in FY 2018 NDAA," *Targeted News Service*, December 13, 2017, <https://search.proquest.com.libproxy.nps.edu/docview/1977543230?accountid=12702>.

⁵⁶ Russell D. Howard and John P. Duvall, *The Asia Pivot: Implications for U.S. Special Operations Forces* (MacDill Air Force Base, FL: JSOU Press, 2016), <https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=794566>; Mark E. Manyin et al., *Pivot to the Pacific? The Obama Administration's "Rebalancing" toward Asia*, CRS Report No. R42448 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2012), https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc86617/m1/1/high_res_d/R42448_2012Mar28.pdf; Michael A. Schelcher, "The Asia-Pacific Rebalance: Impact on U.S. Naval Strategy" (master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2014), <https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=754050>; Silove, "The Pivot before the Pivot."

⁵⁷ Alex Horton, "Why North Korea Threatened Guam, the Tiny U.S. Territory with Big Military Power," *Washington Post*, August 9, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/08/09/why-north-korea-threatened-guam-the-tiny-u-s-territory-with-big-military-power/?utm_term=.e5749b701d39.

their islands is the report by representatives of the U.S. government and the CNMI from 2017.⁵⁸

c. *The Importance of American Samoa to National Security*

Very little seems to have been written about the current importance (or lack thereof) of American Samoa to the U.S. military. The one CRS report that discusses American Samoa indicates U.S. strategy in the South Pacific includes a goal of “projecting a presence in the region, and cooperating with Australian and regional aid donors” among other economic and sustainability goals.⁵⁹ The CRS’s Lum and Vaughn do not, however, indicate whether or how the Territory of American Samoa contributes to the U.S. goals in the area. A former U.S. congressman from American Samoa, the Honorable Eni Faleomavaega, wrote about the importance of American Samoa’s role and that of the United States in ensuring the stability and security of the Indo-Pacific region, as well as in protecting U.S. security and economic prosperity; however, as the territory’s congressional representative, his view was undoubtedly biased in favor of American Samoa.⁶⁰

d. *Terminology in the Region*

A review of the literature indicates a wide range of applicable terminology, with ranging degrees of specificity and sometimes inconsistent usage. Some of this variety is due to evolutions of U.S. interests in the area, while some may be the result of Western efforts to simplify reference to an area encompassing a huge swath of the world. The inconsistencies in terminology can be confusing, especially when attempting to identify specific contributions and challenges of the U.S. Pacific territories in this vast area.

⁵⁸ Special Representatives of the United States and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, *Report to the President on 902 Consultations* (Washington, DC: Department of the Interior, 2017), <https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/uploads/902-consultations-report-january-2017.pdf>.

⁵⁹ Lum and Vaughn, *The Pacific Islands*, 4.

⁶⁰ Eni Fa’auaa Hunkin Faleomavaega, *Navigating the Future: a Samoan Perspective on U.S.-Pacific Relations* (Suva, Fiji: KIN Publications, 1995), 100–109.

Of late, the term “Indo-Pacific Region” is used to refer to the broad area that encompasses the Pacific Ocean, Indian Ocean, and Asia; it is generally similar in scope to the area previously known as the “Asia-Pacific Region,” but puts additional emphasis on the Indian Ocean.⁶¹ However, in some cases, these terms are used synonymously; for example, the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies’ website refers synonymously to countries of the “Asia-Pacific Region” and the “Indo-Asia-Pacific region.”⁶² The Pacific Basin Development Council (PBDC), a regional not-for-profit organization established by the Governors of the three U.S. Pacific territories and the state of Hawaii, refers to both the “Pacific Islands” and the “U.S. Pacific Islands Region” to represent the area encompassing the four represented jurisdictions.⁶³ The United States Coast Guard (USCG) and others continue to apply the term “Oceania,” which historically referred to the area from Hawaiian Islands (northern limit), to Indonesia (west), Australia and New Zealand (south), and Rapa Nui, also known as Easter Island (east).⁶⁴ In addition, numerous organizations refer to the U.S.-affiliated Pacific Islands (USAPI), which refers to the three U.S. Pacific territories, sometimes including the U.S.’ uninhabited Pacific

⁶¹ For more information on the evolution of the term, which is now used in U.S. national strategy documents and is reflected in the May 2018 name change of the U.S. Pacific Command to the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, see Mercy A. Kuo, “The Origin of ‘Indo-Pacific’ as Geopolitical Construct,” *Diplomat*, January 25, 2018, <https://thediplomat.com/2018/01/the-origin-of-indo-pacific-as-geopolitical-construct/>; Scott Neuman, “In Military Name Change, U.S. Pacific Command Becomes U.S. Indo-Pacific Command,” NPR, May 31, 2018, <https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/05/31/615722120/in-military-name-change-u-s-pacific-command-becomes-u-s-indo-pacific-command>.

⁶² “Countries of the Asia-Pacific Region,” Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, accessed February 4, 2019, <https://apcss.org/about-2/ap-countries/>.

⁶³ Pacific Basin Development Council, “2018 U.S. Pacific Islands Comprehensive Economic Development Strategy (Guam, American Samoa, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, and State of Hawaii)” (report, U.S. Economic Development Administration, June 2018), <https://pacificbasindevelopment.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/2018-U.S.-Pacific-Islands-CEDS.pdf>.

⁶⁴ “Imagery Available: Coast Guard, Navy Complete Joint OMSI Patrol in Pacific Ocean,” U.S. Coast Guard, April 30, 2018, <https://content.govdelivery.com/accounts/USDHSCG/bulletins/1ed2bbb>; Bronwen Douglas, “Introduction: Foreign Bodies in Oceania,” in *Foreign Bodies: Oceania and the Science of Race 1750–1940*, ed. Bronwen Douglas and Chris Ballard, 5 (Canberra, Australia: ANU Press, 2008), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt24h8th.8>.

territories, plus the Freely Associated States of RMI, FSM, and the Republic of Palau.⁶⁵ Finally, the terms “Western Pacific” and “Western Pacific Region” refer to the countries in and around the western Pacific Ocean, including the geographic area of the USAPI.⁶⁶ Each term encompasses an area that expands beyond the area of interest for this thesis, but the literature pertaining to each named area includes and is relevant to the area of concern. Throughout this thesis, the term “U.S. Pacific territories” will specifically refer to the U.S. territories of American Samoa and Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, while other terminology will be used consistent with the geographic area being discussed by the source document. In general, “Indo-Pacific Region” will be used as it is most current, versus the previous “Asia-Pacific Region.”

D. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH

A review of the literature associated with the U.S. Pacific territories has shown that little academic thought has been documented with respect to their importance in the homeland security arena. Thus far, the lack of current information or analysis on the role or importance of the U.S. Pacific territories has been striking; this thesis should bring together the current state of knowledge concerning this issue. Without such an analysis, individual homeland security practitioners are undoubtedly making decisions that impact the U.S. relationship with the territories without understanding the broader impact of those decisions on national security overall. In addition, the overall effectiveness of U.S. policy towards these territories in supporting the nation’s security cannot be assessed without such an understanding. Finally, while significant consideration has been given to the roles of CNMI and Guam in the nation’s security, an assessment of whether the Territory of American Samoa contributes to U.S. security or other goals may be an area of new scholarship.

⁶⁵See, for example, Association of State and Territorial Health Officials, *ASTHO Profile of State Public Health, Volume Three: ASTHO US-Affiliated Pacific Islands* (Arlington, VA: ASTHO, 2014), <http://www.astho.org/Profile/Volume-Three/US-Affiliated-Pacific-Islands/>; “Hawai’i and the US-Affiliated Pacific Islands,” Pacific Islands Regional Climate Assessment, accessed March 15, 2019, <https://pirca.org/about/pacific-islands/>; “National Comprehensive Cancer Control Program (NCCCCP),” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, September 9, 2013, <https://www.cdc.gov/cancer/ncccp/usapi.htm>.

⁶⁶ “Regional Office for the Western Pacific,” World Health Organization, accessed February 13, 2019, <https://www.who.int/about/regions/wpro/en/>.

E. DESIGN

This research project will begin with a review of the roles of the U.S. Pacific territories in national security and international relations; move to an assessment of the implications of their current economic situations on their disaster resilience; and conclude with an assessment of the organizational approach taken by the U.S. government toward the territories. Sources identified thus far have included congressional hearings, GAO and CRS analyses, and political science and Pacific studies papers and books. Military documentation of the role of Guam and CNMI has been fairly ample, largely regarding the importance of the current build-up; however, documentation of the current military role of American Samoa appears sparse, at least in the Unclassified realm. All sources used in the development of this policy research are Unclassified and open source.

The DIME framework introduced in Figure 2 serves as a structure for this analysis. The military aspects of the U.S. Pacific territories' value are assessed first, introducing homeland security practitioners to the historic and current roles the U.S. Pacific territories play or may play in national strategy. The remaining instruments of national power (diplomatic, information, and economic) then provide a framework in Chapter III to allow investigation of other areas of strategic value, and the role that homeland security practitioners, especially in the Department of Homeland Security, may play in either furthering or undermining the nation's goals through their work in these areas. In Chapter IV, the current economic situation in the U.S. Pacific territories is examined, with emphasis on the interrelationships between the economy and homeland security. Finally, the implications of the analysis for the U.S. government's approach to interacting with the U.S. Pacific territories are examined, with recommendations for future action identified in Chapter V.

II. MILITARY VALUE OF THE U.S. PACIFIC TERRITORIES

As noted in Chapter I, homeland security can be defined as “an element of national security that works with the other instruments of national power to protect the sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and critical infrastructure of the United States against threats and aggression.”⁶⁷ National and homeland security were also clearly linked in the current *National Security Strategy*.⁶⁸ Thus, as the relationship between the United States and its Pacific territories began for military purposes, this analysis will begin with an assessment of their current strategic value to national security and the intended military role of each territory.

Throughout this analysis, it is assumed that the exhortation of Captain Wayne Hughes, U.S. Navy (Retired), a Dean Emeritus at the Naval Postgraduate School, is correct: that military tactics must still be considered in the age of nuclear weapons.⁶⁹ Much of the concept of national strategy in the Indo-Pacific Region today continues to prepare for strategic and tactical efforts that fall short of all-encompassing nuclear war. It must also be noted that this analysis was conducted using only Unclassified information; while the U.S. military may have additional information regarding their strategic and tactical planning, it is not available to homeland security practitioners working with and in the U.S. Pacific territories.

A. U.S. MILITARY STANCE IN THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION

The role of the U.S. Pacific territories must be viewed in the context of a broader discussion of the importance of the Indo-Pacific Region. The Obama Administration’s “pivot to the Pacific,” announced in 2011, resulted in a great deal of discussion of the military importance of the Pacific and the need to defend against potential threats in the

⁶⁷ Bellavita, “Changing Homeland Security.”

⁶⁸ President of the United States, *National Security Strategy*, 7–14.

⁶⁹ “Operations Research Faculty: Wayne P. Hughes, Jr.,” Naval Postgraduate School, accessed February 13, 2019, <http://faculty.nps.edu/whughes/hughesph.htm>; Wayne P. Hughes Jr., *Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2000), 186, 212.

Indo-Pacific region.⁷⁰ President Obama’s then-Deputy Secretary of Defense, Ashton Carter, provided an overview of the reasoning behind the Pivot to the Pacific, stating that the U.S. has played a critical role in ensuring peace in the Indo-Pacific Region following World War II, and a shift in military stance was required to ensure continued peace and prosperity in the region.⁷¹ While Deputy Secretary Carter indicated that the North Korean threat was a significant reason for the shift, others have concluded that containing a rising China—and signaling the commitment to that containment to U.S. allies in the Pacific—was an important reason for the effort that was later termed a “rebalance” when the ongoing conflicts in the Middle East prevented the full deployment of the expected shift.⁷²

Certainly, China is believed to be expanding its military capabilities; since the late 1990s, China has been increasing its maritime warfare capabilities to address what has been called by a writer for the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ Pacific Forum its “historic strategic weakness — its vulnerability to military intervention from the sea.”⁷³ In a 2012 Report to Congress, the U.S. Department of Defense reported on their analysis of China’s defense concerns, noting that People’s Republic of China (PRC) “military theorists refer to two ‘island chains’ along China’s maritime perimeter. The First Island Chain includes Taiwan and the Ryuku Islands, the Second Island Chain extends from Japan to Guam” (see Figure 3). The ability to impose superiority within the first chain and to defend itself against threats in the second (including threats against its perceived control of Taiwan) were viewed as the motivation behind numerous military developments in China.⁷⁴ China is assessed by the CRS to be concerned about the U.S. efforts in Guam, noting that “The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy has increased activities in waters

⁷⁰ Silove, “The Pivot before the Pivot,” 45; Angel D. Cruzcruz, “The Strategic Shift to the Asia-Pacific” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2014), <http://hdl.handle.net/10945/43899>.

⁷¹ Ashton B. Carter, “Deputy Secretary of Defense Speech: The U.S. Defense Rebalance to Asia” (speech, Department of Defense, April 8, 2013), <http://archive.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1765>.

⁷² Carter; Cruzcruz, “Strategic Shift to the Asia-Pacific,” 45.

⁷³ Michael McDevitt, “The Evolving Maritime Security Environment in East Asia: Implications for the US-Japan Alliance,” *PacNet* 33 (May 31, 2012), https://www.pacforum.org/sites/default/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/Pac1233.pdf.

⁷⁴ Office of the Secretary of Defense, 7; McDevitt, “Evolving Maritime Security Environment.”

around Guam.... Guam’s role increased in engaging with the PLA.”⁷⁵ Similarly, staff research reports from the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission indicate that PLA modernization efforts have focused in part on the development of weapons systems that could reach Guam, including intermediate-range ballistic missiles, antiship ballistic missiles, air-launched land attack cruise missiles, air-launched antiship cruise missiles, sea-launched land attack cruise missiles, and sea-launched antiship cruise missiles from their destroyers (first commissioned in 2014) and submarines.⁷⁶

⁷⁵ Kan, *Guam*, Summary.

⁷⁶ Jordan Wilson, “China’s Expanding Ability to Conduct Conventional Missile Strikes on Guam” (research report, United States–China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2016), 10, https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/Staff%20Report_China%27s%20Expanding%20Ability%20to%20Conduct%20Conventional%20Missile%20Strikes%20on%20Guam.pdf; “Luyang-III Class/Type 052D Destroyers,” Naval Technology, accessed February 13, 2019, <https://www.naval-technology.com/projects/luyang-052d-destroyers/>.



Figure 3. China’s First and Second Island Chains⁷⁷

The 2017 *National Security Strategy* continues to emphasize the importance of defending the nation against threats to the homeland, noting that “China seeks to displace the United States in the Indo-Pacific region, expand the reaches of its state-driven economic model, and reorder the region in its favor.”⁷⁸ The U.S. Administration has

⁷⁷ Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense, *Annual Report to Congress*, 40.

⁷⁸ President of the United States, *National Security Strategy*, 25.

committed to continued presence in the region, noting that “The United States must marshal the will and capabilities to compete and prevent unfavorable shifts...”⁷⁹ The *National Security Strategy* also commits that “We will maintain a forward military presence capable of deterring and, if necessary, defeating any adversary.”⁸⁰ The 2019 Statement for the Record on the Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community notes that “As China’s global footprint and international investments have grown, its military modernization program has become more focused on investments and infrastructure to support a range of missions beyond China’s periphery, including a growing emphasis on the maritime domains, offensive air operations, and long-distance mobility operations.”⁸¹ A reporter based in Oceania phrases his conclusions more bluntly, stating that China is looking to build “stepping stones” between itself and the U.S.⁸²

B. GUAM

Guam first became a territory of the United States in 1898 at the end of the Spanish-American War.⁸³ At the time, its value to the U.S. was solely military.⁸⁴ The island was initially administered by the U.S. Navy, with the 1905 Naval Governor quoted as saying that “The location of Guam in the center of the Western Pacific, about equally distant from Manila to Yokohama on the direct route from Hawaii to the Philippines and the fact of its possessing a fine harbor make it of great and recognized strategic value to the U.S., as a point to be occupied and held for naval purposes alone.”⁸⁵ Captain Wayne Hughes, who taught fleet tactics at the Naval Postgraduate School, discusses the importance of

⁷⁹ President of the United States, 45.

⁸⁰ President of the United States, 46.

⁸¹ Coats, *Statement for the Record*, 26.

⁸² Kerry K. Gershaneck, “China’s Plan for Conquest of the South Pacific,” *Asia Times*, September 6, 2018, https://www.asiatimes.com/2018/09/article/chinas-plan-for-conquest-of-the-south-pacific/?_=7780397.

⁸³ Andrew S. Erickson and Justin D. Mikolay, “A Place *and* a Base: Guam and the American Presence in East Asia,” in *Reposturing the Force: U.S. Overseas Presence in the Twenty-First Century*, ed. Carnes Lord (Newport, RI: Naval War College, Center for Naval Warfare Studies, 2006), 66, <https://permanent.access.gpo.gov/lps74157/NP26.pdf>.

⁸⁴ Leibowitz, *Defining Status*, 306.

⁸⁵ Leibowitz, 306–7.

controlling the sea space to support ones forces and to prevent the enemy from supporting its own; Guam—and the other U.S. territories—has served a critical role in this regard for the United States.⁸⁶ After Guam was lost and regained from the Japanese during World War II, Guam became a “critical logistics base” in supporting American efforts against the Japanese throughout the Western Pacific.⁸⁷ Guam went on to become a substantial military base, with a large area of Guam being used by the military for support of the war effort.⁸⁸

Guam’s importance as a military base continued to flourish as the political situation in the western Pacific evolved following World War II. At the end of the war, the United States was determined to maintain influence and stability in the Indo-Pacific Region, rendering its presence in Guam a continued value.⁸⁹ As the U.S. concerns about the Soviet Union grew, Guam provided important support for missile bases, communications, and intelligence.⁹⁰ Guam continued under military oversight until 1950, when responsibility was turned over to the U.S. Department of the Interior by Executive Order.⁹¹ However, the role of the military in Guam did not end with the change in agency responsibility. Guam had been rapidly developed into a military base through the end of World War II, with a substantial U.S. Air Force Base and a U.S. Navy harbor complex, communications base, and air and weather stations.⁹² In fact, the U.S. military continues to occupy about a third of the island.⁹³

With the U.S. military continuing to sustain a significant presence in the Indo-Pacific throughout the end of the 20th century and into the 21st, the role of Guam in the nation’s defense continued to gain importance, especially as U.S. bases in the Philippines

⁸⁶ Hughes, *Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat*, 8.

⁸⁷ Erickson and Mikolay, “A Place *and* a Base,” 67.

⁸⁸ Leibowitz, *Defining Status*, 312.

⁸⁹ Gooding, “Administration of the Trust Territory,” 26–31.

⁹⁰ Erickson and Mikolay, “A Place *and* a Base,” 67.

⁹¹ Leibowitz, *Defining Status*, 307; Exec. Order No. 10077, 14 F.R. 5533 (1949), www.archives.gov/federal-register/codification/executive-order/10077.html.

⁹² Leibowitz, *Defining Status*, 335–336.

⁹³ Leibowitz, 336.

and Japan were either closed or moved towards closure based on those nations' demands as sovereign nations.⁹⁴ Some experts have referred to Guam as "the anchor of [the U.S. military's] future force posture in the strategic East Asian region."⁹⁵ Following the 1996 U.S.-Japan agreement that U.S. forces' footprint on Okinawa would be reduced, the importance of Guam in the military's support for the Indo-Pacific increased even more, with the military "build up" of Guam expected to bring additional focus to the island.⁹⁶ In 2013, the CRS noted that the U.S. began increasing its air and naval forces in Guam "to boost U.S. deterrence and power projection in Asia":

Since 2000, the U.S. military has been building up forward-deployed forces on the westernmost U.S. territory of Guam to increase U.S. operational presence, deterrence, and power projection for potential responses to crises and disasters, counterterrorism, and contingencies in support of South Korea, Japan, the Philippines, Taiwan, or elsewhere in Asia. Since 2006, joint exercises based at Guam called "Valiant Shield" have boosted U.S. military readiness in the Pacific.⁹⁷

The original U.S.-Japanese agreement called for a substantial expansion of the U.S. military presence in Guam, described by the GAO in 2008 as follows:

As a part of this initiative, DoD plans to move 8,000 Marines and their estimated 9,000 dependents from Okinawa, Japan, to Guam by the 2014 goal. At the same time, the other military services are also planning to expand their operations and military presence on Guam. For example, the Navy plans to enhance its infrastructure, logistic capabilities, and waterfront facilities; the Air Force plans to develop a global intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance strike hub at Andersen Air Force Base; and the Army plans to place a ballistic missile defense task force on Guam. As a result of these plans and the Marine Corps realignment, the total military buildup on Guam is estimated to cost over \$13 billion and increase Guam's current

⁹⁴ Gebicke, *Overseas Presence*, 2; Erickson and Mikolay, "A Place and a Base," 66; Juliet Eilperin, "U.S., Philippines Reach 10-Year Defense Agreement amid Rising Tensions," *Washington Post*, April 27, 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/us-philippines-to-sign-10-year-defense-agreement-amid-rising-tensions/2014/04/27/a04436c0-cddf-11e3-a75e-463587891b57_story.html?utm_term=.7d1826a30ceb.

⁹⁵ Erickson and Mikolay, "A Place and a Base," 65.

⁹⁶ Gebicke, *Overseas Presence*, 2.

⁹⁷ Kan, *Guam*, Summary.

population of 171,000 by an estimated 25,000 active duty military personnel and dependents (or 14.6 percent) to 196,000.⁹⁸

Over time, based both on the importance of continued presence in Japan based on ongoing threats in the Indo-Pacific, as well as concerns regarding the ability of Guam's infrastructure to support the influx of military requirements, the U.S. scaled back its plans for Guam.⁹⁹ According to another GAO report, the U.S. and Japanese governments agreed in April 2012 to a new plan requiring the Marines to “consolidate bases in southern Okinawa and relocate 4,100 Marines to Guam, 2,700 to Hawaii, 800 to the continental United States, and 1,300 (on a rotational basis) to Australia.”¹⁰⁰ According to the CRS, one specific reason for the increased military presence in Guam is its status as a territory of the United States, which makes it a more reliable partner less subject to negotiation or changes in sovereign desires.¹⁰¹

C. THE COMMONWEALTH OF THE NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS (CNMI)

During World War II, the United States military captured Saipan and Tinian in July and August 1944; as a joint U.S.-CNMI report indicated, “the Northern Mariana Islands [then] continued to play a pivotal role in the war effort including the basing of the Enola Gay and Bock's Car [*sic*] B-29 bombers before their missions to Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japan.”¹⁰² At the end of World War II—despite long-standing U.S. policy that the nation would not gain any territory through the war—there appears to have been widespread agreement among U.S. government representatives that the Western Pacific was vital to the defense posture of the United States.¹⁰³ A 1962 master's thesis cites a U.S. House

⁹⁸ Brian J. Lepore, *Defense Infrastructure: Planning Efforts for the Proposed Military Buildup on Guam Are in Their Initial Stages, with Many Challenges Yet to Be Addressed*, GAO-08-722T (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2008), 1, <https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=486058>.

⁹⁹ Brian J. Lepore, *Marine Corps Asia Pacific Realignment: DoD Should Resolve Capability Deficiencies and Infrastructure Risks and Revise Cost Estimates*, GAO-17-415 (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2017), 1, <https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=800001>.

¹⁰⁰ Lepore, 1.

¹⁰¹ Kan, *Guam*, 7r.

¹⁰² Special Representatives, *Report to the President on 902 Consultation*, 27.

¹⁰³ Gooding, “Administration of the Trust Territory,” 26–31.

report: “in the interest of the security of the United States, the Western Hemisphere, and the peace of the Pacific,” the U.S. government should maintain control over these islands.¹⁰⁴ In fact, in 1945 and throughout territorial negotiations following the end of World War II, numerous military officials maintained that this area (including what are now the CNMI, the Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and the Republic of Palau) needed to be maintained under U.S. control.¹⁰⁵ In 1945, the Secretary of Defense reportedly stated that these islands should not be viewed as colonies but as “outposts” required for the defense of the U.S. and the region as a whole.¹⁰⁶ A statement was apparently issued in 1945 by the then-Assistant Secretary of the Navy that required that, at a minimum, Guam, Saipan, and Tinian had to be available for bases.¹⁰⁷ As a result, following the end of World War II, the U.S. Congress approved a trusteeship agreement making the United States responsible to the United Nations (U.N.) for administration of the Pacific Trust Territory (see outlined areas of Figure 4).¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁴ Gooding, 26–31.

¹⁰⁵ Gooding, 26–31.

¹⁰⁶ Gooding, 27.

¹⁰⁷ Gooding, 31.

¹⁰⁸ David Gootnick and Oliver Richard, *Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands: Implementation of Federal Minimum Wage and Immigration Laws*, GAO-17-437 (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2017), 6, <https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/684778.pdf>.




Figure 4. Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands in Context with the Components of the Disbanded Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands¹⁰⁹

In 1976, the Mariana Islands joined the United States through a Covenant that established the CNMI as a self-governing commonwealth, though the nature and terms of that self-governance have evolved over time.¹¹⁰ The Covenant established certain expectations of the military’s use of the CNMI, most notably providing that “17,799 acres on the island of Tinian and the waters immediately adjacent thereto, 177 acres on the island of Saipan, and the entire [uninhabited] island of Farallon de Medinilla will be made available to the United States for lease ‘to carry out its defense responsibilities.’”¹¹¹ The

¹⁰⁹ Source: “Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands,” Global Security, accessed October 8, 2017, <https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/cnmi.htm>.

¹¹⁰ Gootnick and Richard, “Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands,” 6–7; Leibowitz, *Defining Status*, 518–45.

¹¹¹ Special Representatives, *Report to the President on 902 Consultation*, 28.

Covenant included an agreement by the U.S. government “to recognize and respect the scarcity and special importance of land in the Northern Mariana Islands.”¹¹² While the U.S. government originally proposed building a base on Tinian and leasing the San Jose harbor on that island, by the time the Covenant was signed those plans had changed to a much more limited footprint, with military buildup focused on Guam.¹¹³ Farallon de Medinilla, on the other hand, has been and continues to be used as a live-fire bombing range to allow training activities; the Department of Defense has indicated that it expects to use the island for that purpose for the full extent of the initial 50-year lease (originating in 1983), and to exercise the additional option for another 50 years.¹¹⁴

As noted previously, President Obama’s “pivot” or “rebalance” to the Pacific increased interest in U.S. military presence in the Western Pacific. The CRS stated that a 2010 report by the U.S. military indicated that CNMI’s support would be required as part of the Guam build up, as Guam could not support all the training requirements of the incoming Marines.¹¹⁵ As part of that initiative, the Department of Defense proposed four new projects for the CNMI: construction of four live-fire ranges on Tinian as part of the relocation of forces from Okinawa; a Mariana Islands Training and Testing Project, which would continue ongoing military readiness activities at sea in CNMI waters; a Divert Airfield Activities and Exercises Project, which would support aircraft diversion requirements with equipment and personnel; and a CNMI Joint Military Training Project, which would provide additional live-fire training opportunities on Tinian and Pagan.¹¹⁶ CNMI has the same benefits with respect to location as previously noted for Guam; in addition, unlike Guam, there are numerous uninhabited or lightly inhabited islands on which activities such as live fire are viewed by the military as supportable, leading to the

¹¹² Leibowitz, *Defining Status*, 338–41; Special Representatives, *Report to the President on 902 Consultation*, 28.

¹¹³ Special Representatives, *Report to the President on 902 Consultation*, 30–31.

¹¹⁴ Special Representatives, 40.

¹¹⁵ Kan, *Guam*, 12.

¹¹⁶ Special Representatives, *Report to the President on 902 Consultation*, 32–34.

proposal of CNMI for these activities.¹¹⁷ Certainly the military’s ongoing planning and negotiating for training and support activities in the CNMI argue for its ongoing importance to military strategy and tactics.

D. AMERICAN SAMOA

The United States first became interested in American Samoa in 1839 as the Navy searched for coaling stations for its fleet in the Pacific, primarily engaged by the possibilities presented by the deep-water port of Pago Pago.¹¹⁸ In 1872, the U.S. negotiated exclusive rights to use of the harbor in return for its protection, but that agreement was declined by an internally focused U.S. Senate, which did not ratify it.¹¹⁹ From that time through the end of the century, Pacific powers—notably the U.S., Great Britain, and Germany—threatened Samoa.¹²⁰ The leaders of the islands that became American Samoa decided to align themselves with the U.S. government to seek protection, which the latter sometimes provided depending on its interests.¹²¹ In 1899, Germany and Great Britain ceded claims to what is now American Samoa to the United States; this was followed by placement of the territory under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy in 1900, and cessation of various islands of American Samoa to the U.S. between 1900 and 1904.¹²² The final island of American Samoa, Swains Island, became part of the territory in 1925.¹²³ (See Figure 5 for a map of American Samoa.)

¹¹⁷ Special Representatives, 32–34; Department of the Navy Naval Facilities Engineering Command, Pacific, *Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands Joint Military Training Unconstrained Training Concept for Tinian and Pagan*, version 1 (Honolulu, HI: AECOM Technical Services, 2014), <https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=791980>.

¹¹⁸ Leibowitz, *Defining Status*, 396.

¹¹⁹ Leibowitz, 396.

¹²⁰ Leibowitz, 396–97.

¹²¹ Leibowitz, 396–97.

¹²² Leibowitz, 398–99.

¹²³ Leibowitz, 399.




Figure 5. Islands of American Samoa¹²⁴

While the ongoing military importance of Guam and CNMI seems clear, the case for American Samoa's role is less obvious. David Chappell, a history professor at the University of Hawaii, has stated that:

Ironically, even at the time [that American Samoa became a U.S. territory] critics pointed out that American strategic interests lay mainly in the northern Pacific, whereas Pago Pago was on the shipping route to Australia. No U.S. warship had called there for twelve years. The harbor did get some use in World War II, although other bases across the region, in allied colonies, were just as important. The closure of the naval station in 1951, as the Cold War was turning the northern Pacific into a key strategic zone, demonstrates that the acquisition of Pago Pago was almost anachronistic when it happened.¹²⁵

¹²⁴ Source: "Political Map of American Samoa," OnTheWorldMap, accessed February 17, 2019, <http://ontheworldmap.com/american-samoa/political-map-of-american-samoa.html>.

¹²⁵ David A. Chappell, "The Forgotten Mau: Anti-Navy Protest in American Samoa, 1920–1935," *Pacific Historical Review* 69, no. 2 (May 2000): 217–60, www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/3641439.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A084e1e01c60eeb4f634d6f05cb7190a,222n15.

Similarly, a legal expert has written that, while the Navy was in control of American Samoa until 1951, that appears not to have been related to military import. As he noted, “While originally U.S. interest in Tutuila Island was to permit the Navy to use Pago Pago as a coaling station, the technology of shipping rapidly made the military position of Samoa less significant.”¹²⁶ During the 1930s, however, in response to the Japanese military build-up prior to World War II, the U.S. did establish a training and staging area for the U.S. Marine Corps at and around the port.¹²⁷ When the war ended, so did the U.S. engagement in American Samoa; that same legal expert notes that “In 1945, the Marine camps closed and the large U.S. military presence precipitously disappeared.”¹²⁸ Currently, the U.S. Army Reserves maintain a facility and 390 soldiers in American Samoa, with a 2015 National Guard Bureau (NGB) report arguing that American Samoa could not support a larger presence.¹²⁹ A permanent \$2 million, 150-member Army Reserve Center was built in 1987, later upgraded to a \$20 million center to include a training facility and additional support services.¹³⁰ Interestingly, that same 2015 NGB report states that American Samoa plays an important role in the U.S. pivot to the Pacific, without specifying how.¹³¹ In potential contradiction of that claim, the report also indicates that the Department of Defense is committed to the defense of American Samoa and that the main role of Reserve forces therein may be to provide Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA), or support for “domestic incidents, natural disasters, security issues, and maritime incursions.”¹³² In

¹²⁶ Leibowitz, *Defining Status*, 400.

¹²⁷ Leibowitz, 400.

¹²⁸ Leibowitz, 400.

¹²⁹ National Guard Bureau, *Report on the Feasibility of Establishing National Guard Units in American Samoa and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2015), 3, <https://sablan.house.gov/sites/sablan.house.gov/files/documents/NGBfeasibility-8-24-2015.pdf>.

¹³⁰ H. Res 5936, 100th Cong., 1 (May 5, 1987), <https://congressional.proquest.com/congressional/docview/t17.d18.9e89402632a31601?accountid=12702>; Historical Record of U.S. Army Reserve Facility in American Samoa, 113th Cong., 1 (December 3, 2014), <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CREC-2014-12-03/html/CREC-2014-12-03-pt1-PgE1726-2.htm>; “U.S. Army Reserve Training Center, American Samoa,” Black Construction Corporation, accessed February 18, 2019, <http://www.blackconstructionguam.com/uncategorized/u-s-army-reserve-training-center-american-samoa/>.

¹³¹ National Guard Bureau, *Feasibility of Establishing National Guard Units*, 3.

¹³² National Guard Bureau, 12.

fact, support for this role was seen in the response to the February 2018 Tropical Cyclone Gita, which swept across American Samoa; the U.S. Army Reserve forces in American Samoa were some of the first to respond.¹³³ In addition to ferrying personnel and supplies to the territory to support the response effort, the Reserve facility served as a staging area for federal resources.¹³⁴

Some regional experts have argued that the lack of current military attention to American Samoa does not indicate its lack of importance, but rather, the lack of a developed strategy for engagement in the South Pacific.¹³⁵ One who opined in this area was the former U.S. congressman from American Samoa, the Honorable Eni Faleomavaega, who wrote about the importance of American Samoa's role and that of the United States in ensuring the stability and security of the Indo-Pacific region, as well as in protecting U.S. security and economic prosperity; however, as the territory's congressional representative, his view was undoubtedly biased in favor of American Samoa.¹³⁶ Perhaps a less biased indication comes from the CRS's assertion in a 2017 report that "The United States has relied upon Australia, and to a lesser extent New Zealand, to help advance shared strategic interests, maintain regional stability, and promote economic development in the Southwest Pacific."¹³⁷ However, the U.S. alliance with Australia is not foreordained to remain inviolate; recently, with the election of President Trump, questions have been raised about the continuing partnership.¹³⁸ In particular, an Australian academic suggested that:

President Trump's posture of challenging Chinese sovereign control over its man-made islands in the South China Sea has increased Australian

¹³³ 9th Mission Support Command Public Affairs, "Army Reserve Answers First Call for Disaster Support Relief in American Samoa," U.S. Army, February 16, 2018, https://www.army.mil/article/200798/army_reserve_answers_first_call_for_disaster_support_relief_in_american_samoa.

¹³⁴ 9th Mission Support Command.

¹³⁵ Faleomavaega, *Navigating the Future*, 100.

¹³⁶ Faleomavaega, 100–109.

¹³⁷ Lum and Vaughn, *The Pacific Islands*, 16.

¹³⁸ See, for example, William T. Tow, "President Trump and the Implications for the Australia-US Alliance and Australia's Role in Southeast Asia," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 39, no.1 (2017): 50–57, http://bellschool.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/publications/attachments/2017-04/tow_trump_article_2017.pdf; Ramesh Thakur Faiia, "The Trump Effect and Australia," *Australian Outlook*, December 7, 2016, <https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/the-trump-effect-and-australia/>.

concerns that it could soon face the nightmare of being compelled to “choose” between its largest trading partner—China—and its long-term security ally—the United States—if the two Great Powers were to clash militarily in Southeast Asia’s critical maritime littorals.¹³⁹

The United States has similarly relied on the close partnerships in the area between New Zealand and Samoa (an independent nation, previously known as Western Samoa, shown in Figure 5 to the west of American Samoa). Unlike American Samoa, Samoa became independent in 1962 after being a trustee of New Zealand, and Samoa and New Zealand entered into an enduring Treaty of Friendship that has continued close ties between the two nations, including military defense.¹⁴⁰

Captain Hughes has written that modern means of achieving naval influence include “the protection of military reinforcements and resupply” and “the protection of economic sea lines of communication.”¹⁴¹ American Samoa is currently the sole U.S. territory south of the equator.¹⁴² Given the increasing reliance of South Pacific partners on China as a trading partner, any consideration of the role of American Samoa in supporting the U.S. military posture should incorporate the potential for a decreased ability to rely on the nation’s traditional partners.

One aspect of this view would be to examine China’s current efforts to gain territory. Some have argued that China’s investments into the Indo-Pacific Region, which will be discussed in greater detail in the following chapter, are not just diplomatic in nature, but can be seen as gaining “springboards” for military action, just as the Japanese and Americans have done before them.¹⁴³ As previously noted, the 2019 Intelligence Community report indicates that they concur that Chinese economic investments are related to their military program.¹⁴⁴ It is worthy of note that China has invested heavily in

¹³⁹ Tow, “President Trump,” 50–51.

¹⁴⁰ “Samoa,” New Zealand Foreign Affairs & Trade, accessed February 18, 2019, <https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/countries-and-regions/pacific/samoa/>.

¹⁴¹ Hughes, *Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat*, 35.

¹⁴² Pacific Basin Development Council, “2018 Pacific Economic Strategy,” 9.

¹⁴³ Erickson and Wuthnow, “Why Islands Still Matter in Asia.”

¹⁴⁴ Coats, *Statement for the Record*, 26.

Samoa, American Samoa's nearest neighbor, with Samoa owing over a third of its national debt in 2017 to China.¹⁴⁵

In that light, continued U.S. presence in American Samoa not only protects sea lanes in the South Pacific, but also may block China from exerting itself more thoroughly in the area in the event that the United States' traditional allies in the area succumb to China's regional initiatives. As discussed elsewhere in this chapter, the U.S. positions in Guam and the Philippines were easily overrun by attackers in World War II due to Congressional unwillingness to invest in fortifying the U.S. position in what were then both U.S. territories; the strength, or lack thereof, of the military situation in American Samoa today is arguably similar, with a limited U.S. presence in a far-flung but strategically located territory.

E. THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING AMERICAN

While the preceding sections of this chapter have investigated the role of the territories in the U.S.' strategic and tactical military plans due to their geographic locations and characteristics, it is also worthwhile to examine the importance to the United States that these territories are, in fact, American. As noted previously, both the Freely Associated States, which continue in partnership with the United States, and the Philippines were previously United States territories. The U.S. military experience with these former territories may provide insights relevant to an assessment of the importance of the U.S. territories.

Like American Samoa and Guam, the Republic of the Philippines was acquired by the United States around the end of the 19th century (when it was called the Philippine Islands); however, unlike the remaining territories, its people expressed a desire to be independent, free from colonial ties, from the beginning of the U.S.'s relationship with the Philippines.¹⁴⁶ Like Guam, the Philippines was easily overwhelmed in 1941 at the outset

¹⁴⁵ See, for example, Stewart Firth, "China, Samoa and Debt-for-Equity Swaps," *East Asia Forum*, January 1, 2019, <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2019/01/01/china-samoa-and-debt-for-equity-swaps/>.

¹⁴⁶ Thomas J. Garcia, "The Potential Role of the Philippines in U.S. Naval Forward Presence" (master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2001), 7, <https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=438769>.

of World War II.¹⁴⁷ After a series of negotiations, and the end of World War II, the Philippines became an independent nation in 1946, although in the 1947 U.S.-Philippines Military Base Agreement the Philippines agreed to allow the United States to maintain bases there for another 99 years.¹⁴⁸ During the Vietnam War, U.S. forces relied on its Philippines bases for logistical support and for rest and relaxation for its forces.¹⁴⁹ However, the agreement was shortened over time; when it ended in 1991, the U.S. was unable to negotiate a continued presence, in part due to increased desire for full sovereignty, and the U.S. withdrew in 1992.¹⁵⁰

In 2012, the CRS noted that, despite general agreement on the importance of the relationship, conflicts and tension have continued to arise between the U.S. and the Philippines.¹⁵¹ The Brookings Institute cites three reasons for this tension, several of which could—even if not necessarily active today—impact the U.S.’ relationships with its current territories and allies:¹⁵²

The first is a long-standing concern about American neocolonialism and the potential for American power—particularly American military might manifested in the form of bases on Philippine soil—to infringe on the sovereignty of the Philippine republic; despite generally positive feelings about the United States among the Philippine public, this dynamic has sometimes produced significant opposition to American activities in the archipelago. The second is the attractiveness of economic ties with China, and particularly China as a potential source of investment and infrastructure development, which has led some previous Philippine politicians—most recently the Arroyo administration—to downplay security tensions with Beijing in order to reap the benefits of economic cooperation with the PRC. The third factor is the ongoing salience of domestic security challenges, to

¹⁴⁷ Garcia, 10.

¹⁴⁸ Garcia, 7.

¹⁴⁹ Garcia, 10.

¹⁵⁰ Stephen Shalom, “Securing the U.S.-Philippine Military Bases Agreement of 1947,” *Critical Asian Studies* 22, no. 4 (October 1990): 12, <https://www.wpunj.edu/dotAsset/209673.pdf>; Garcia, “Potential Role of the Philippines,” 11.

¹⁵¹ Thomas Lum, *The Republic of the Philippines and U.S. Interests*, CRS Report No. RL33233 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2012), 1, <https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=705852>.

¹⁵² Sheena Chestnut Greitens, *The US-Philippine Alliance in a Year of Transition: Challenges & Opportunities* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, May 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/fp_20160713_philippines_alliance.pdf.

a degree that is relatively unusual among America’s treaty allies and security partners in Asia.¹⁵³

Concern about reliance on foreign bases led in part to the military’s increased reliance on Guam in the U.S. stance in the Indo-Pacific region, as sovereign U.S. bases were viewed as more reliable than outposts on foreign soil.¹⁵⁴

The U.S. continues to rely on its relationship with the Freely Associated States for military defense purposes; the Compacts of Free Association provide the United States the right to “strategic denial” of their vast waters to nations outside the U.S.¹⁵⁵ The Marshall Islands, in particular, are leased by the U.S. for military use; as noted by the then-American Samoa Delegate to the United States Congress, Rep. Faleomavaega, the RMI’s “Kwajalein Atoll is one of only two U.S. strategic missile defense test sites authorized under the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. Moreover, as a buffer between Hawaii and Asia, Kwajalein Atoll acts as a U.S. intermediary to potential political, economic, and military adversaries such as China and the Pacific region. Kwajalein Atoll also serves U.S. interests by providing a NASA tracking center and satellite launching sites.”¹⁵⁶ With the current U.S. funding support for the Compacts of Free Association scheduled to end in 2023, there are significant ongoing negotiations regarding the ongoing relationship between the U.S. and these nations.¹⁵⁷ Some parties have raised fears that, given the substantial economic investment by China in the Freely Associated States, the U.S.’ agreements with these critical nations may not be guaranteed to continue past the end of the current Compacts of Free Association.¹⁵⁸ It also appears that U.S. partners in the Pacific have also learned that China can be used to leverage additional benefits from the United States. While the

¹⁵³ Greitens, 3.

¹⁵⁴ Erickson and Mikolay, “A Place *and* a Base,” 66.

¹⁵⁵ *Compacts of Free Association*, 13, 15, 28–29, 37.

¹⁵⁶ *Compacts*, 6–7.

¹⁵⁷ “Compacts of Free Association,” Department of the Interior, accessed February 18, 2019, <https://www.doi.gov/oia/compacts-of-free-association>.

¹⁵⁸ Ethan Meick, Michelle Ker, and Han May Chan, *China’s Engagement in the Pacific Islands: Implications for the United States* (Washington, DC: U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2018), 18, <https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/China-Pacific%20Islands%20Staff%20Report.pdf>.

Republic of the Marshall Islands will receive ongoing monetary support from the U.S. following the end of the current Compact of Free Association in 2024, due to the ongoing leasing of Kwajalein Atoll through 2086, the Federated States of Micronesia are in a more perilous economic position.¹⁵⁹ As such, the 2017 State visit by the President of the FSM to China may signal to the United States that the FSM's allegiance should not be assumed should the federal assistance provisions of the Compact end in 2023.¹⁶⁰ Following the President's visits, his comments certainly could be seen as putting pressure on the United States to continue to value its role as a partner: "I think that those people who are worried about our relationship with China should be more worried about some executive order that may try to cancel [the relationship with the U.S.]."¹⁶¹

Finally, no discussion of the role of the military in the U.S. Pacific would be complete without a note of the high U.S. military enlistment rates in the Pacific territories. Frequently noted in American Samoa is that its local U.S. Army Recruiting Station topped the world's recruiting stations and centers under the United States Army Recruiting Command in both 2014 and 2017.¹⁶² Citizens of the Freely Associated States, who are able under the Compact of Free Association to enlist, also enlist at higher rates than in most U.S. states.¹⁶³ While some would argue these high enlistment rates are the result of lack of opportunity, rather than patriotism, these strong connections may indicate that the U.S. reliance on the Freely Associated States for military bases may be relied upon for some time to come.¹⁶⁴

¹⁵⁹ Meick, Ker, and Chan, 18.

¹⁶⁰ Bill Jaynes, "FSM President Opens up about Official Visit to China," *Pacific Islands Report*, April 25, 2017, <http://www.pireport.org/articles/2017/04/25/fsm-president-opens-about-official-visit-china>.

¹⁶¹ Jaynes.

¹⁶² Blue Chen-Fruean, "American Samoa Army Recruiting Station Again Ranked #1 Worldwide," *Pacific Islands Report*, July 17, 2017, <http://www.pireport.org/articles/2017/07/17/american-samoa-army-recruiting-station-again-ranked-1-worldwide>.

¹⁶³ Danny Russel, "Intro: The Freely Associated States—Building Partnerships in Palau, FSM, and RMI," *State Magazine*, no. 610 (April 2016), <https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/257235.pdf>.

¹⁶⁴ Tony Azios, "Uncle Sam Wants Micronesians for U.S. Military," *Christian Science Monitor*, May 5, 2010, <https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-Pacific/2010/0505/Uncle-Sam-wants-Micronesians-for-US-military>.

F. CONCLUSION

This chapter has addressed the importance of U.S. Pacific territories' significance to U.S. military strategy. In the Western Pacific, in particular, the U.S. Pacific territories serve as critical infrastructure and logistical bases in a strategically and tactically important area of the world. In addition, they provide training grounds for U.S. personnel and present barriers to incursions by other Indo-Pacific powers. The importance of American Samoa to the current U.S. military strategy appears much less clear than that of Guam and CNMI; it can be argued, however, that this is not because of a lack of importance, but rather because of a fault of strategic military planning and an overreliance on Australia and New Zealand to support American positions in the South Pacific. While not available in the current literature, a cost/benefit analysis would seem beneficial to examine the expenditures and gains associated with strengthening the U.S. presence south of the equator.

While this chapter has focused on military strategy and power in the Indo-Pacific Region, it has begun to examine the relationship between military and other approaches to the protection and exertion of national security strategy. Chapter III will focus further on non-military U.S. presence in the Indo-Pacific Region, and whether and what role the U.S. Pacific territories may play in that arena.

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III. SOFT POWER STRATEGIC VALUE OF THE U.S. PACIFIC TERRITORIES

As noted in Chapter I, “soft power” can be even more important than military strength in allowing a nation to achieve its strategic aims.¹⁶⁵ While Chapter II discussed the role of the U.S. Pacific territories in assisting in implementing the military aspects of U.S. security, the other tools of power described in the DIME framework introduced in Figure 2—diplomatic, informational, and economic—may present greater opportunity and challenge for homeland security practitioners. A whole of government approach, focusing on the U.S.’ diplomatic ties, information efforts, and economic impacts should work together to towards the nation’s overarching national security strategies.¹⁶⁶ This chapter will address the territories’ role in supporting the other instruments of national power, and the role that homeland security practitioners can play in either reinforcing or undermining these goals.

A. U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY CONCERNS IN THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION

At the end of World War II and for some time after, the U.S. benefitted from substantial goodwill throughout the Pacific.¹⁶⁷ However, the U.S. government’s approach to this critically important region since then has been judged by the CRS to be a policy of “benign neglect.”¹⁶⁸ This policy began to change in 2007, when the Bush Administration called for a “Year of the Pacific.”¹⁶⁹

¹⁶⁵ Nye, *Bound to Lead*, 32–33; Josten, “Strategic Communication.”

¹⁶⁶ Lightning Press, “Instruments of National Power”; Mastapeter, “Instruments of National Power,” 106–9; Stuart, *The Pivot to Asia*, 8–14; National War College, “A National Security Strategy Primer,” 15.

¹⁶⁷ *U.S. Policy in the Pacific: The Struggle to Maintain Influence*, House of Representatives, 114th Cong., 2 (June 23, 2016), 4–5, <https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=796058>; Faleomavaega, *Navigating the Future*, 103.

¹⁶⁸ Thomas Lum and Bruce Vaughn, *The Southwest Pacific: U.S. Interests and China’s Growing Influence*, CRS Report No. RL34086 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2007), 1, <https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=476659>.

¹⁶⁹ Lum and Vaughn, 1.

As discussed in Chapter II, the growing influence of China in international relations in the Indo-Pacific region is a source of concern and debate; the CRS has noted that China “aims to promote its interests in a way that potentially displaces the influence of traditional actors in the region such as the United States, Australia, and New Zealand.”¹⁷⁰ Vice President Mike Pence has stated that the United States’ position in the Indo-Pacific relies on “three broad pillars,” “prosperity,” “security, which is the foundation of prosperity,” and “transparent and responsive government, the rule of law and the protection of individual rights, including religious freedom.”¹⁷¹ In an editorial in the *Washington Post*, the Vice President stated that

The United States’ commitment to the Indo-Pacific is steadfast and enduring. We seek an Indo-Pacific—from the United States to India, from Japan to Australia, and everywhere in between—where sovereignty is respected, where commerce flows unhindered and where independent nations are masters of their own destinies. This region, which includes more than half of Earth’s surface and population, has experienced great progress when these principles have been respected. While some nations now seek to undermine this foundation, the United States is taking decisive action to protect our interests and promote the Indo-Pacific’s shared success.¹⁷²

In underscoring the importance of this region and the United States’ commitment to it, the Vice President noted that the U.S.’ “total regional investment in the Indo-Pacific is nearly \$1 trillion—[which is] more than China, Japan and South Korea’s investment combined.”¹⁷³

While the Pacific Island nations are small in land mass (see Figure 6), their votes in the international fora and their large Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) make them

¹⁷⁰ Lum and Vaughn, 13.

¹⁷¹ Mike Pence, “Mike Pence: The United States Seeks Collaboration, Not Control, in the Indo-Pacific,” *Washington Post*, November 9, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/mike-pence-the-united-states-seeks-collaboration-not-control-in-the-indo-pacific/2018/11/09/1a0c330a-e45a-11e8-b759-3d88a5ce9e19_story.html?utm_term=.94d3fab38705.

¹⁷² Pence.

¹⁷³ Pence.

outsized partners for the U.S.¹⁷⁴ For example, the Pacific Island countries, despite their small populations, have the same voting power as any of the other nations represented in the United Nations' General Assembly.¹⁷⁵ The importance of the Pacific Islands nations in particular was noted in a 2016 Congressional hearing by Mr. Matthew J. Matthews, then-deputy assistant secretary for Australia, New Zealand, and the Pacific Islands for the U.S. Department of State, who commented that

Our partnerships and engagement in the region matter very greatly. Today, we partner together on a number of issues of global importance from standing together for human rights in the U.N. and contributing to global security through peacekeeping operations to combating climate change and illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing.

The Pacific Islanders punch above their weight, and the United States must continue to encourage them through our support for their sustainable and inclusive development. However, it is equally important that we do not take Pacific goodwill for granted. Our relationship with our Pacific partners are unfolding against the back-drop of a shifting strategic environment where emerging powers in Asia and elsewhere seek to exert a greater influence in the Pacific region through development and economic aid, people-to-people contacts and security cooperation.¹⁷⁶

¹⁷⁴ Meick, Ker, and Chan, *China's Engagement in the Pacific Islands*, 2–3; Sophie Foster and Francis James West, "Pacific Islands Region, Pacific Ocean," *Encyclopedia Britannica*, accessed February 18, 2019, <https://www.britannica.com/place/Pacific-Islands>.

¹⁷⁵ Meick, Ker, and Chan, *China's Engagement in the Pacific Islands*, 3.

¹⁷⁶ *U.S. Policy in the Pacific*, 5.




Figure 6. Pacific Island Nations¹⁷⁷

B. U.S. PACIFIC TERRITORIES IN DIPLOMACY: INTERNATIONAL AMBASSADORS

As U.S. attention to the Indo-Pacific Region waxed and waned in the years that followed World War II, the U.S. territories were the main U.S. presence in Pacific diplomacy efforts. At times, in fact, the U.S. territories went beyond their authority to fill that leadership vacuum, and actually entered into agreements with independent Pacific nations prior to State Department approval.¹⁷⁸ However, the U.S. House recognized that the U.S. territories had the authority to engage with foreign nations in some subject areas without State Department approval, including such topics as “trade promotions, sporting, and cultural exchanges,” with benefits accruing to both the territories and to the U.S. as a

¹⁷⁷ Source: Foster and West, “Pacific Islands Region, Pacific Ocean.”

¹⁷⁸ *International Role of the U.S. Insular Areas: Hearing before the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs*, House of Representatives, 99th Cong., 2 (July 17, 1985), 37, <https://congressional-proquest-com.libproxy.nps.edu/congressional/docview/t29.d30.hrg-1986-ia-0037?accountid=12702>.

whole.¹⁷⁹ The U.S. government, in fact, recognized that the territories have close relationships with their neighbors, and have been asked to represent the United States at functions or to carry messages from the United States to international bodies.¹⁸⁰ The role of the U.S. Pacific territories within this evolving context has been recognized by the U.S. only to a limited degree, however. As noted by Richard Montoya, then-assistant secretary of the interior for Territorial and International Affairs, “the American image abroad is often enhanced by the dealings of the territories with their foreign neighbors... I feel that the territories and the commonwealths of the United States play a valuable role as a window through which a number of foreign nations see the United States...”¹⁸¹

In a 1986 House Committee hearing on the role of the U.S. territories in international relations, Rep. Lagomarsino noted that

There are numerous instances where the insular areas have contributed in a positive way to the U.S. foreign policy. All of the territories and commonwealths have participated in some international organization or activity with distinction and credit to the United States.¹⁸²

A number of regional organizations have been developed to allow regional diplomatic and economic development efforts; these include the Pacific Island Conference of Leaders (PICL), the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), the Council on Regional Organizations of the Pacific (CROP), the Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC)—of which the U.S. is a founding member—and the newest organization, the Pacific Islands Development Forum.¹⁸³ While U.S. national governmental representation at the meetings of these bodies has been somewhat sporadic, the U.S. Pacific territories have had ongoing representation at several of them.¹⁸⁴ For example, American Samoa, Guam, and the CNMI are all

¹⁷⁹ *International Role of the U.S. Insular Areas*, 38.

¹⁸⁰ *International Role of the U.S. Insular Areas*, 40.

¹⁸¹ *International Role of the U.S. Insular Areas*, 30.

¹⁸² *International Role of the U.S. Insular Areas*, 2.

¹⁸³ Hamon, “Thinking Strategically on the Pacific Islands.”

¹⁸⁴ Joanne Wallis, *Crowded and Complex: The Changing Geopolitics of the South Pacific* (Barton: The Australian Strategic Policy Institute Limited, 2017), 9–10, https://s3-ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/ad-aspi/import/SR103_South-Pacific.pdf?nRFKLRaA7Sk8eiUHEljRf6efYSho5QYo.

recognized observers of the Pacific Islands Forum, arguably the most influential of the organizations; FSM and RMI are member states.¹⁸⁵ All of the U.S. Pacific territories and FASs are members of the SPC, as is the United States.¹⁸⁶ With numerous issues in common with their neighbors, the U.S. Pacific territories' representatives have an opportunity to influence their neighbors, as well as gaining information regarding other nations' efforts to influence their neighbors.

This section has helped to highlight the role that experts in U.S. international interests have recognized regarding the importance that the U.S. territories either have played or currently play in encouraging support for U.S. interests by the independent nations of the Pacific. As noted, the U.S. Pacific territories at times have served as the sole U.S. diplomatic representatives during a period of "benign neglect" at the national level. The danger of this approach is that the U.S. Pacific territories may engage in efforts that are not aligned with U.S. national aims. Thus, it is critical that the U.S. government work closely with the U.S. Pacific territories' leadership to align their efforts with national goals.

C. CHINESE OUTREACH IN THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION: DIPLOMATIC AND ECONOMIC PERIL

In the context of the role of the U.S. Pacific territories, a November 2018 commentary from the Center for Strategic and International Studies is compelling:¹⁸⁷

[I]t is important to understand China's endgame—to be the Indo-Pacific's paramount political, military, and economic power.

Essentially, China seeks to ease the United States out of the door, deadbolt it, and make sure it doesn't come back. To this end, China is utilizing all the tools in the statecraft toolkit. It deploys anti-ship and surface-to-air missile systems on its artificial islands, bullies the United States and allied

¹⁸⁵ "Profile: Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat," Council of Regional Organisations of the Pacific - Information and Communications Technology, accessed February 18, 2019, <https://cropict.usp.ac.fj/index.php/profile-pacific-islands-forum-secretariat>.

¹⁸⁶ "SPC Members," Pacific Community, accessed February 18, 2019, <https://www.spc.int/our-members/>.

¹⁸⁷ Patrick Gerard Buchan, "Rethinking U.S. Strategy in the Pacific Islands," Center for Strategic & International Studies, November 2, 2018, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/rethinking-us-strategy-pacific-islands>.

ships on the high seas, splashes around cheap money, and dictates to foreign airlines how they should refer to Taiwan.

Across much of the Indo-Pacific, China currently sets the tone of the game. Critically, the United States does not. Washington needs a win. Accordingly, the United States should look to the Pacific Islands as a strategic opportunity to push back.

The Pacific Islands certainly doesn't top China's strategic agenda. But China does view the Pacific Islands as a test of U.S. resolve in its quest to displace the broader regional U.S.-led rules-based order.

China established a “peaceful rise” strategy in the 1990s, which later became known as “peaceful development,” designed to reassure its regional neighbors that it did not intend to threaten their sovereignty through its own economic and military development.¹⁸⁸ Over time, however, China's strategy has appeared to be threatening to many of its neighbors, and to the U.S. and its allies.¹⁸⁹ In fact, the CRS has noted that some observers have made the case that China's main goals in the Pacific are to remove Taiwan's support from the area and to replace the United States as the regional power.¹⁹⁰ Numerous reports and theses have been written about the threat China poses to U.S. interests in the Pacific.¹⁹¹ The growing use of “dollar diplomacy” (i.e., providing grants or loans) is seen to threaten the long-term collaboration of the Region with the U.S. and its allies.¹⁹² A staff report from the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission used more negative terminology for China's efforts, referring to a pattern of “engagement, coercion, and

¹⁸⁸ Kristien Bergerson, *China's Efforts to Counter U.S. Forward Presence in the Asia Pacific* (Washington, DC: U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2016), 5, <https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/USCC%20Staff%20Report%20on%20China%20Countering%20US%20Military%20Presence%20in%20Asia.pdf>.

¹⁸⁹ Bergerson, 5; Wallis, *Crowded and Complex*, 10.

¹⁹⁰ Lum and Vaughn, *The Southwest Pacific*, CRS-17.

¹⁹¹ See, for example, Bergerson, *China's Efforts*; Wallis, *Crowded and Complex*; Lum and Vaughn, *The Pacific Islands*; Cruzcruz, “Strategic Shift to the Asia-Pacific”; Meick, Ker, and Chan, *China's Engagement in the Pacific Islands*; Lum and Vaughn, *The Southwest Pacific*; Nicholas D. Sigler, “A New Great Game: US-China Competition in Guam and the CNMI” (master's thesis, Air University, 2017), <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1042092.pdf>.

¹⁹² Lum and Vaughn, *The Southwest Pacific*, CRS-14- 15.

alliance splitting” in the Pacific.¹⁹³ According to a 2018 staff report by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, “Over the last five years, Beijing has significantly bolstered its economic ties with the Pacific Islands. An examination of trade, investment, development assistance, and tourism data shows China has become one of the major players in the region, well ahead of the United States in most areas.”¹⁹⁴ Some have argued that China’s efforts are already paying off, as its Pacific partners are using their votes in the U.N. to support China’s efforts to advance its interests.¹⁹⁵

China is attempting to leverage its money into impacts in the region in various ways that could impact the United States’ interests. With respect to Taiwan, a key U.S. partner in the area, China has been using its money to try to part Taiwan from the six (of 14) countries in the region with which it has diplomatic relationships.¹⁹⁶ China has been accused of making its significant aid funding (including ports, government offices, and other infrastructure development projects) contingent on support for China’s policy interests.¹⁹⁷ In the short-term, this has included pressure for funding recipients to reject Taiwan’s international standing in favor of China’s “One China” policy.¹⁹⁸ Admiral Phil Davidson, Commander of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, has referred to China’s “debt trap diplomacy,” indicating that the United States “does not believe in using loans as coercion or development as a weapon.”¹⁹⁹ Some recipients of funding in the Indo-Pacific Region have begun to identify this as a problem, with Tonga’s Prime Minister Pohiva referring to the “China debt trap” model and calling for the leaders of the Pacific Island nations to call on China to release them from their debt responsibilities.²⁰⁰ In addition,

¹⁹³ Bergerson, *China’s Efforts*, 5.

¹⁹⁴ Meick, Ker, and Chan, *China’s Engagement in the Pacific Islands*, 1.

¹⁹⁵ Meick, Ker, and Chan, 19.

¹⁹⁶ Meick, Ker, and Chan, 3.

¹⁹⁷ Meick, Ker, and Chan, 19.

¹⁹⁸ Meick, Ker, and Chan, 19.

¹⁹⁹ Phil Davidson, “Introduction to Indo-Pacific Security Challenges,” Facebook video, posted by U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, November 17, 2018, 9:46, 14:10, <https://www.facebook.com/indopacom/videos/halifax-international-security-forum-2018/2212703275721160/>.

²⁰⁰ Gershaneck, “China’s Plan for Conquest of the South Pacific.”

some have argued that China is trying to weaken U.S. presence in the Pacific in order to damage U.S. military strength in the area and create an opening for its own military.²⁰¹ One example of Chinese efforts in a U.S. jurisdiction helps to tell the tale.

In the CNMI, a weak economy reliant on tourism has made the territory, located in China's Second Island Chain (see Figure 3), vulnerable to Chinese influence and intelligence activities.²⁰² The CNMI economy, which had essentially collapsed prior to 2011 after the failure of its garment industry, has begun a period of rapid expansion based on tourism.²⁰³ Much of that tourism has been funded by Chinese companies, including casinos built or being built in Saipan and Tinian.²⁰⁴ These Chinese investment firms, given the lack of a robust construction or service workforce in the CNMI, then hire foreign (frequently Chinese) workers to bring in additional (frequently Chinese) tourists.²⁰⁵ The CNMI government reports that visitors from China and Hong Kong have increased from 86,596 in 2012 to 208,248 in 2016, which represents a change from 21% to 41% of the total tourism population over the same period that population grew by approx. 25%.²⁰⁶ This tourism and construction boom has been simultaneous with U.S. efforts to obtain CNMI approval for the military projects discussed in Chapter II associated with the Guam build-up.²⁰⁷ It has been alleged that fear of losing Chinese tourism and investment money is driving opposition by CNMI government and executives to DoD's proposals.²⁰⁸ Certainly the CNMI raised the concern to the U.S. government that the CNMI Joint Military Training Project (CJMT) is

²⁰¹ Meick, Ker, and Chan, *China's Engagement in the Pacific Islands*, 1.

²⁰² Sigler, "A New Great Game," 43–48; Meick, Ker, and Chan, *China's Engagement in the Pacific Islands*, 19.

²⁰³ Gootnick and Richard, *Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands*, 15; Meick, Ker, and Chan, *China's Engagement in the Pacific Islands*, 19.

²⁰⁴ Sigler, "A New Great Game," 44–45.

²⁰⁵ Sigler, 44–48.

²⁰⁶ "SY2017 Table 8.1 Visitor Entries by Country of Origin, CNMI: 2010 to 2016," CNMI Department of Commerce, accessed October 12, 2018, <http://commerce.gov.mp/sy-2017-table-8-1-visitor-entries-by-country-of-origin-cnmi-2010-to-2016/>.

²⁰⁷ Sigler, "A New Great Game," 44–49.

²⁰⁸ Meick, Ker, and Chan, *China's Engagement in the Pacific Islands*, 19.

simply not compatible with sustainable economic development in the CNMI. The CNMI has explained that tourism is the primary economic engine of the Commonwealth and that most tourists who visit the CNMI are drawn by its natural and cultural resources; the CNMI argues that the CJMT will close off access to many of those resources during training and that the CJMT will fundamentally change the peaceful character of the CNMI.²⁰⁹

A lawsuit brought by Earth Justice against various parties in the U.S. government on behalf of parties opposed to the expansion projects is ongoing.²¹⁰ The U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission quoted Lieutenant General Wallace “Chip” Gregson (ret.), former commander of the U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific, as saying that, “The Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands and Guam are critical to our position in the Pacific. China seeks to control our access and limit our military presence through influence operations based on suspect casino operations.”²¹¹ Thus, the economic vulnerability of the CNMI may be leading to challenges of the U.S.’ national security interests in the area.

D. IS U.S. HOMELAND SECURITY POLICY SUPPORTIVE OF NATIONAL SECURITY IN THE PACIFIC?

While the importance of coordination between the Department of Defense and the State Department has been noted in numerous contexts, the need for coordination of Department of Homeland Security (DHS) policies with the nation’s overarching national security goals has been less examined.²¹² Thus far, Chapters II and III have outlined the contributions that the U.S. Pacific territories make towards the development and support for those aims in the Indo-Pacific Region. The remainder of this chapter will discuss aspects of U.S. homeland security policy in the Pacific through the framework of the DIME instruments of power introduced in Figure 2. The Department of Defense's Joint Operations

²⁰⁹ Special Representatives, *Report to the President on 902 Consultation*, 38.

²¹⁰ Steve Limtiaco, “Opponents Say Military Training in CNMI Was Integral Part of Guam Realignment,” AZCentral, July 8, 2018, <https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/2018/07/09/opponents-say-military-training-cnmi-integral-part-guam-realignment/767011002/>.

²¹¹ Meick, Ker, and Chan, *China’s Engagement in the Pacific Islands*, 19.

²¹² See, for example, the literature review in Lucas, “Integration of Department of Defense and State Department Efforts,” 10–12.

Information Center notes that “any USG agency can create a strategic level effect, whether intentionally or unintentionally”; this chapter will examine the role DHS activities in the U.S. Pacific territories may play in furthering our national interests.²¹³

Many aspects of homeland security policy impact the “economic” aspect of the territories, which in turn impacts their role in diplomacy. Certainly, one aspect of why the people of the CNMI chose to break with the other members of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands and join the United States at the end of World War II was in seeking the economic growth being experienced by Guam as a U.S. territory.²¹⁴ As noted previously, however, the current economic status of the U.S. Pacific territories is substantially impoverished compared to the U.S. mainland states. The reality is that all aspects of U.S. policy impact each other in these small island jurisdictions, as implied by the DIME model.

To examine the impact of homeland security policy on national strategy in the Indo-Pacific Region, a few examples from the Department of Homeland Security will be examined. Figure 7 shows DHS’ organizational chart as of November 19, 2018.

²¹³ Josten, “Strategic Communication,” 16.

²¹⁴ Willen and Siemer, *An Honorable Accord*, 7.

U.S. Department of Homeland Security




Figure 7. Organization Chart, Department of Homeland Security²¹⁵

Examining a few of these agencies’ impacts on the Pacific territories will help clarify the relationship between homeland security and the U.S.’s overarching national security goals.

²¹⁵ Source: “U.S. Department of Homeland Security Organizational Chart,” November 19, 2018, https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/18_0519_DHS_Organizational_Chart.pdf. Since this organizational chart was issued, DHS’ National Protection and Programs Directorate was renamed the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency under the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Agency Act of 2018, PL 115–278. See “DHS Cyber, Infrastructure Security Programs Reorganized,” Federal Manager’s Daily Report, November 23, 2018, <https://www.fedweek.com/federal-managers-daily-report/dhs-cyber-infrastructure-security-programs-reorganized/> for more information on the impacts to NPPD.

1. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services

The U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) oversees lawful immigration to the United States.²¹⁶ As part of that role, they have been asked to adjudicate an issue of critical importance to the economy of the CNMI: the ability of foreign workers to enter and work in the jurisdiction.

Between 1978 and 2009, the CNMI administered its own immigration.²¹⁷ By the late 1990s and early 2000s, an increasing number of concerns were raised in the U.S. Congress regarding both the numbers of foreign workers being granted entry into the CNMI and accusations of human rights abuses occurring among the foreign worker community.²¹⁸ In May 2008, the United States enacted the Consolidated Natural Resources Act of 2008 (CNRA), which amended the Covenant to establish U.S. governmental control of CNMI immigration beginning in 2009.²¹⁹ Under the CNRA, while Congress established the overarching requirements, USCIS was responsible for ensuring that the transition was implemented effectively and in a manner that did not impede the CNMI's economic development. Thus, in accordance with the CNRA's goal that the transition to U.S. immigration law be implemented with minimum disruption of the economy, in September 2011, USCIS created a CW-1 program that allows employers needing foreign workers to obtain nonimmigrant CW-1 visas to work in the CNMI.²²⁰ The GAO found that the CW-1 program was critical to ensuring the re-development of the CNMI's economy, which is highly reliant on foreign workers.²²¹ Previous discussions

²¹⁶ "About Us," U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, last modified March 6, 2018, <https://www.uscis.gov/aboutus>.

²¹⁷ David Gootnick, *Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands: Preliminary Observations on the Implementation of Federal Immigration Laws*, GAO-10-553T (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2017), 2, <https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=800543>.

²¹⁸ Gootnick, 2-3; "With Rep. Delay, Republican Lobbyist Abramoff Out, Chance for Long Stalled Marianas Reform Bill Grows," *Federal News Service*, June 7, 2006, <https://search.proquest.com.libproxy.nps.edu/docview/472561058?accountid=12702>.

²¹⁹ David Gootnick, *Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands: DHS Should Conclude Negotiations and Finalize Regulations to Implement Federal Immigration Law*, GAO-10-671T (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2010), 2, <https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=24639>.

²²⁰ Gootnick and Richard, *Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands*, 10.

²²¹ Gootnick and Richard, GAO Highlights.

have already highlighted the interaction between the CNMI's economic development and their role in supporting the military's renewed interests in the CNMI as part of the Guam build-up.

Another area of USCIS activity, this time in Guam, puts the overlap of U.S. national military and USCIS interests into focus. Guam's immigration is also under the purview of USCIS. The Government and community of Guam have claimed that a clampdown by USCIS on H-2B visas for temporary visas for construction workers beginning in 2015 devastated the ability of its construction industry to perform the work required for the Guam build-up.²²² In 2018, as part of the 2018 National Defense Authorization Act, Congress directed the USCIS to allow the entry of up to 4,000 workers to support the military build-up in Guam.²²³ However, Guam's government continues to claim that USCIS implementation of the H-2B program has unduly limited its construction industry, and members of the community are suing the federal government for relief.²²⁴

American Samoa is the only U.S. territory that retains control over its own borders.²²⁵ As such, USCIS does not regulate immigration into American Samoa. The GAO found in 2010 that, while U.S. government officials had indicated that they had some concerns that American Samoa's immigration program may pose threats both within American Samoa and to the mainland United States (primarily by easing illegal

²²² Haidee V. Eugenio, "First Batch of New H-2B Workers Arrives on Guam after Nearly 3 Years," *Pacific Daily News*, June 14, 2018, <https://www.guampdn.com/story/news/2018/06/13/first-batch-new-h-2-b-workers-arrives-guam-after-nearly-3-years/697020002/>; Haidee V. Eugenio, "Guam Contractors: H-2B Visa Denials Forced Congress to Act," *Pacific Daily News*, January 1, 2018, <https://www.guampdn.com/story/news/2018/01/01/guam-contractors-defense-law-response-uscis-h-2-b-visa-denials-has-forced-unprecedented-congress-act/991986001/>.

²²³ U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, "Implementing the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 (NDAA) and the Exemption to the Temporary Need Requirement for H-2B Workers on Guam" (official memorandum, Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, February 15, 2018), <https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Laws/Memoranda/2018/2018-02-15-PM-602-0156-H-2B-Policy-Memorandum-to-Interpret-Guam-NDAA.pdf>.

²²⁴ Eugenio, "First Batch of New H-2B Workers"; Kevin Kerrigan, "Guam Contractors Seek Contempt Order against USCIS," *Guam Daily Post*, November 3, 2018, https://www.postguam.com/news/local/guam-contractors-seek-contempt-order-against-uscis/article_2e84bcf0-de4f-11e8-9893-0f64dcd34ccb.html.

²²⁵ "Important Immigration Information for Travelers to American Samoa," American Samoa Government, accessed February 19, 2019, <https://www.americansamoa.gov/immigration-info>.

immigration), no risk assessment had been performed that would support or disprove these allegations.²²⁶

2. U.S. Customs and Border Protection

The mission of U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is “to safeguard America’s borders thereby protecting the public from dangerous people and materials while enhancing the Nation’s global economic competitiveness by enabling legitimate trade and travel.”²²⁷ As noted previously, the U.S. Pacific territories are considered to be outside the customs territory of the United States.²²⁸ However, as an entry and exit point to the U.S., CBP has persons stationed in Guam and CNMI to implement their mission to protect the U.S., including screening international arrivals.²²⁹ (CBP does not perform these actions in American Samoa, having determined there is no risk to the nation’s commerce from goods transiting American Samoa’s customs program, and with American Samoa having control over its own immigration.)²³⁰ CBP also has a role in implementing the CNRA for immigration, which extended an existing Guam Visa Program under CBP’s purview to the CNMI.²³¹ This included a decision about whether to allow visitors from Russia and China, which would have significant economic impacts on the CNMI.²³² CBP described the law’s requirements under its interim final rule, issued on January 16, 2009:

²²⁶ Stephen L. Caldwell, *American Samoa: Performing a Risk Assessment Would Better Inform U.S. Agencies of the Risks Related to Acceptance of Certificates of Identity*, GAO-10-638 (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2010), 24, <https://www.gao.gov/assets/310/305411.pdf>.

²²⁷ U.S. Customs and Border Protection, *Vision and Strategy 2020: U.S. Customs and Border Protection Strategic Plan*, CBP Publication No. 0215–0315 (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2015), 7, <https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/CBP-Vision-Strategy-2020.pdf>.

²²⁸ Insular Possessions of the United States Other than Puerto Rico.

²²⁹ “U.S. Customs and Border Patrol Jobs in Guam,” BorderPatrolEdu.org, accessed March 16, 2019, <https://www.borderpatroledu.org/guam/>; “Customs and Border Protection Hiring 5 Guam-Based Officers,” *Guam Daily Post*, September 6, 2018, https://www.postguam.com/news/local/customs-and-border-protection-hiring-guam-based-officers/article_983ef77c-b0f6-11e8-b539-ff666758ffb4.html; Bea Cabrera, “CBP Announces Job Vacancies,” *Saipan Tribune*, September 6, 2018, <https://www.saipantribune.com/index.php/cbp-announces-job-vacancies/>.

²³⁰ Caldwell, *American Samoa*, 24.

²³¹ Department of Homeland Security, “Guam-CNMI Visa Waiver Program,” last modified October 4, 2016, <https://www.dhs.gov/guam-cnmi-visa-waiver-program>.

²³² Gootnick, *DHS Should Conclude Negotiations*, 3.

Section 702(b) of the CNRA requires the Secretary to include in the list of participating countries, a list of those countries from which the CNMI has received a “significant economic benefit” from the number of visitors for pleasure within the one-year period preceding the date of enactment of the CNRA. However, if the Secretary determines that such a country’s inclusion represents a threat to the welfare, safety, or security of the United States, or determines that such country is not eligible based on other factors the Secretary deems relevant, then that country will not qualify as an eligible country.²³³

Initially, CPB found that, while visitors from both Russia and the PRC had provided “a significant economic benefit to the CNMI,” those countries would not be included in the program due to “political, security, and law enforcement concerns.”²³⁴ However, by October of that same year, DHS announced that Russian and Chinese citizens would indeed be able to travel to the CNMI without acquiring visas; similarly, in 2012, it was decided that Russian citizens could travel to Guam without visas.²³⁵ A 2016 thesis by a student at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, while recognizing that this visa-free travel met the economic requirements established under the law, found that it poses a threat to national security, and recommends additional coordination between DHS agencies, the State Department, and DoD to periodically re-evaluate the decision and its impacts.²³⁶

Because the U.S. Pacific territories are outside the customs territory of the United States, U.S. citizens traveling to the territories must clear Customs and Border Protection (CBP) requirements.²³⁷ However, citizens and legal residents traveling to the territories are not required by CBP to show a passport, as long as they travel without stopping in a

²³³ U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, “Establishing U.S. Ports of Entry in the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI) and Implementing the Guam-CNMI Visa Waiver Program,” 74 *Federal Register* 2824 (January 16, 2009), <https://www.uscis.gov/ilink/docView/FR/HTML/FR/0-0-0-1/0-0-0-186558/0-0-0-196236/0-0-0-198112.html>.

²³⁴ U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services.

²³⁵ Kelly M. Partin, “An Examination of Visa Free Travel for Russian and Chinese Citizens to U.S. Territories in the Pacific (Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas)” (master’s thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2016), 10–11, <https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=799035>.

²³⁶ Partin, 73, 75.

²³⁷ “Insular Possessions of the United States other than Puerto Rico,” U.S. Customs and Border Protection, *Code of Federal Regulations*, title 19 (2008), <https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/19/7.2>; U.S. Customs and Border Protection, “Clearing CBP.”

foreign country, as the U.S. Pacific territories are viewed as part of the U.S. for this purpose.²³⁸ (As noted previously, however, American Samoa retains control over its borders for immigration as well as customs; thus, it is worthy of note for potential travelers, that American Samoa does still require a passport for travelers from elsewhere in the U.S.²³⁹ American Samoans and others re-entering the U.S. without traveling to a foreign port are not required by the U.S. government to show U.S. passports, however.²⁴⁰)

3. Federal Emergency Management Agency

FEMA’s mission is “helping people before, during, and after disasters.”²⁴¹ Generally this means that FEMA coordinates federal disaster preparedness, response, and recovery activities, largely under the statutory authority of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, Public Law 100–707.²⁴² However, when supporting the U.S. Pacific territories, economic and legal influences can impact FEMA’s ability to support the territories.

For example, an interpretation of the eligibility requirements for FEMA’s Individual Assistance program, which helps individuals recover from disasters, has limited the ability of FEMA to support those who have legally traveled to the U.S. under the Compacts of Free Association. Under the Compacts, citizens of FSM, RMI, and Palau have permission to travel to the United States and its territories without the usual limitations for requirements for immigration or foreign employment.²⁴³ While the U.S. government provides funding to Guam, Hawaii, the CNMI, and American Samoa to offset their costs of supporting the “Compact migrants,” these jurisdictions have consistently claimed that

²³⁸ U.S. Customs and Border Protection, “Travelers from U.S. Territories.”

²³⁹ American Samoa Government, “Important Immigration Information.”

²⁴⁰ U.S. Customs and Border Protection, “Travelers from U.S. Territories.”

²⁴¹ “About the Agency,” Federal Emergency Management Agency, last modified January 30, 2019, <https://www.fema.gov/about-agency>.

²⁴² Federal Emergency Management Agency.

²⁴³ David Gootnick, *Compacts of Free Association: Issues Associated with Implementation in Palau, Micronesia, and the Marshall Islands*, GAO-16-550T (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2016), 6, <https://www.gao.gov/assets/680/676338.pdf>.

the support does not come close to meeting their actual costs as thousands of migrants have moved to their jurisdictions.²⁴⁴ FEMA has found that the Compact migrants are eligible for emergency assistance (including “search and rescue, medical care, shelter, food, water, hazard clearance, and reducing threats to life, property, and public health or safety”), disaster legal services, crisis counseling, and disaster food stamps (also known as Disaster Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, or D-SNAP), but they are not eligible for FEMA’s long-term assistance programs.²⁴⁵

The Governors of Guam and the CNMI have expressed concern following multiple disasters regarding the lack of assistance for the legally present Compact migrants.²⁴⁶ Following 2015’s Typhoon Dolphin, the Office of Insular Affairs (OIA) within the Department of the Interior (DOI) was able to provide a grant to Guam for \$250,000 to offset the costs of supporting the recovery of ineligible Compact migrants.²⁴⁷ However, following 2018’s Typhoon Mangkhut impacts to Guam, Governor Eddie Calvo of Guam sent a letter to the FSM President requesting financial assistance.²⁴⁸ The Government of Guam stated that “A majority of the 52 families requiring shelter in the aftermath of Typhoon Mangkhut are members of the Federated States of Micronesia. Governor Calvo has started the ball rolling in helping ALL of the families currently seeking shelter...but is

²⁴⁴ Gootnick, 6; “Interior Announces \$4M in Discretionary Compact Impact Funding for Hawaii, Territories,” *Marianas Variety*, September 20, 2018, <http://www.mvariety.com/cnmi/cnmi-news/local/107627-interior-announces-4m-in-discretionary-compact-impact-funding-for-hawaii-territories/>; “Compact Impact Relief Bill Re-Introduced in Congress,” *Saipan Tribune*, January 16, 2018, <https://www.saipantribune.com/index.php/compact-impact-relief-bill-re-introduced-congress/>.

²⁴⁵ Federal Emergency Management Agency, *Disaster Operations Legal Reference*, version 2.0 (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2013), 6-12-6-15, <https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=748034>.

²⁴⁶ See, for example, “JIC Release No. 33—Plans in Place for Residents That Are Displaced; No Family Left Behind,” Guam Homeland Security, September 17, 2018, <https://ghs.guam.gov/jic-release-no-33-plans-place-residents-are-displaced-no-family-left-behind>; Clynt Ridgell, “Governor Calvo Says Feds Need to Support Compact Migrants,” PNC News First, June 15, 2015, <https://pacificnewscenter.com/governor-calvo-says-feds-need-to-support-compact-migrants/>.

²⁴⁷ Janela Carrera, “Guam to Get \$250K DOI Grant for Typhoon Aid,” PNC News First, May 25, 2015, <https://pacificnewscenter.com/guam-to-get-250k-doi-grant-for-typhoon-aid/>.

²⁴⁸ Vanessa Judicpa, “News: Calvo Asks Sec. Zinke, FSM President Christian for Help with FSM Citizens Displaced by Typhoon,” Government of Guam, September 13, 2018, http://governor.guam.gov/press_release/news-calvo-asks-sec-zinke-fsm-president-christian-for-help-with-fsm-citizens-displaced-by-typhoon/.

asking the U.S. and FSM government to assist as well.”²⁴⁹ A territorial governor seeking assistance from the President of FSM to offset Compact impact seems inconsistent with the U.S.’s national interests in establishing the Compacts, which include “financial support is to assist the freely associated states ‘in their efforts to advance the economic self-sufficiency of their peoples,’” according to the DOI.²⁵⁰ Chapter IV will address in greater detail how the lack of a “whole of government” strategy may decrease the territories’ role in supporting U.S. national interests and, as in this case, potentially cause the territories to act at odds with national power aims.

4. Transportation Security Administration

In general, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) provides typical aviation security support for airports (e.g., passenger screening) in the U.S. Pacific territories, with some exceptions for smaller airports. For example, while the Rota International Airport was federalized in 2006, the Tinian International Airport is designated for small aircraft only (single engine, up to 9 passengers) and is exempt from TSA passenger screening requirements.²⁵¹ TSA’s Office of Law Enforcement/Federal Air Marshal Service (TSA/OLE FAMS) also provides security personnel coverage on U.S. air carriers to locations including on domestic and international flights to and from Guam.²⁵² In addition, TSA/OLE FAMS provides reimbursement for law enforcement personnel support at the airports in Pago Pago, American Samoa; Guam’s Antonio B. Won Pat International Airport; and the Saipan and Rota airports in the CNMI.²⁵³

²⁴⁹ Judicpa.

²⁵⁰ Department of the Interior, “Compacts of Free Association.”

²⁵¹ “TSA Federalizes Rota International Airport, Northern Marianas,” Transportation Security Administration, May 15, 2006, <https://www.tsa.gov/news/releases/2006/05/15/tsa-federalizes-rota-international-airport-northern-marianas>; “Tinian Carrier Starts Rota-Guam Service,” Radio New Zealand, October 13, 2015, <https://www.radionz.co.nz/international/pacific-news/286830/tinian-carrier-starts-rota-guam-service>; “Tinian International Airport,” Commonwealth Ports Authority, accessed February 19, 2019, <http://www.cpa.gov.mp/tinapt.asp>.

²⁵² Transportation Security Administration, “Homeland Security—Transportation Security Administration” (briefing paper, Department of Homeland Security, February 2013), <https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/migrated/oia/igia/2013/upload/28-Homeland-Security-DHS-Transportation-Security-Administration.pdf>.

²⁵³ Transportation Security Administration.

5. United States Coast Guard

The USCG District 14 office in Honolulu, Hawaii, has responsibility for an area that covers 14 million square miles, including the U.S. Pacific territories.²⁵⁴ The USCG mission set is expansive, and perhaps best described by themselves; the following is taken from the U.S. Coast Guard's Pacific Area, which encompasses District 14 as well as an area reaching from the U.S. West Coast to the Arctic and Antarctica:

The Coast Guard has 11 statutory missions that preserve the global supply chain, protect our fragile marine ecosystems, ensure U.S. sovereignty in the Polar regions, combat transnational organized crime, support global humanitarian response operations and preserve the U.S. as a free and enduring nation. We categorize these missions into Areas of Emphasis that provide our personnel space, authority and resources to act at the scene to execute the mission, save lives, enforce the law or defend the homeland.²⁵⁵

While the USCG is part of the Department of Homeland Security, it is also one of the nation's five military services and a part of the U.S. Armed Forces under U.S. law.²⁵⁶ Thus, DoD and USCG have entered into numerous joint initiatives impacting the U.S. Pacific territories. For example, the USCG Pacific Area has a role in "Maritime Homeland Defense" operations either independently or through a Memorandum of Agreement between DoD and DHS, and the U.S. Navy supports the USCG's homeland security efforts under a reciprocal agreement.²⁵⁷ The USCG and DoD have jointly created an Oceania Maritime Security Initiative (OMSI) that uses DoD and USCG assets in the Pacific to patrol remote EEZs, enforce fisheries agreements, and fight transnational crime.²⁵⁸ OMSI

²⁵⁴ "History of the Fourteenth District," U.S. Coast Guard, accessed February 19, 2019, <https://www.pacificarea.uscg.mil/Our-Organization/District-14/>.

²⁵⁵ "United States Coast Guard Pacific Area," accessed February 19, 2019, <https://www.pacificarea.uscg.mil/Portals/8/Documents/Final-Fact-Sheet-PAC-092.pdf?ver=2017-07-18-170152-950>.

²⁵⁶ U.S. Coast, *United States Coast Guard Pacific Area Strategic Intent Fiscal Years 2015–2019* (Alameda, CA: U.S. Coast Guard Pacific Area, 2016), 3, <https://www.pacificarea.uscg.mil/Portals/8/Documents/PACAREA%20Strategic%20Intent%20-%202016%20-%20final%20for%20release.pdf?ver=2017-07-18-160946-617>.

²⁵⁷ U.S. Coast Guard, ii.

²⁵⁸ U.S. Coast Guard, 4.

initiatives regularly include foreign nations in joint boardings of suspect vessels, which both assists in implementing USCG's mission and provides training to U.S. allies.²⁵⁹

To assist in performing its missions, the District has established Sector Offices that are responsible for mission implementation in their assigned areas. USCG Sector Honolulu's Area of Responsibility, which encompasses American Samoa as well as Hawaii, is shown in Figure 8.




Figure 8. USCG Sector Honolulu's Area of Responsibility²⁶⁰

²⁵⁹ "Coast Guard, Navy Complete Joint Oceania Maritime Security Initiative Patrol in Pacific Ocean," U.S. Coast Guard District 14 Hawaii Pacific, May 1, 2018, <http://www.pacom.mil/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/1509299/coast-guard-navy-complete-joint-oceania-maritime-security-initiative-patrol-in/>.

²⁶⁰ Source: "Sector Honolulu Area of Responsibility," U.S. Coast Guard, accessed February 19, 2019, <https://www.pacificarea.uscg.mil/Our-Organization/District-14/D14-Units/Sector-Honolulu/Sector-Honolulu-AOR/>.

Within that area, the Sector is responsible for performing its various mission sets, including search and rescue, oil and hazardous materials response, maritime security, and marine inspections.²⁶¹ In addition to its Sector Office in Honolulu and stations on other Hawaiian Islands, Sector Honolulu maintains a small Marine Safety Detachment (MSD) in American Samoa.²⁶²

District 14's Sector Guam has similar responsibilities, except that its Area of Responsibility, which includes Guam, the CNMI, and the Freely Associated States, includes foreign nations.²⁶³ Like Sector Honolulu, Sector Guam augments its Guam-based stations with a marine safety detachment in Saipan.²⁶⁴

The small contingents represented in Marine Safety Detachments typically focus on a more limited set of duties than the Sector Offices that support them, while representing the USCG day-to-day in whatever way is required. For example, the American Samoa MSD consists of 4 people focusing on issues of maritime safety.²⁶⁵ Additional support comes from the Sector offices and elsewhere throughout USCG when required.²⁶⁶

6. Overview of Homeland Security Overlap with DIME Instruments of Power

As noted in the preceding examples, DHS entities are involved in a number of decisions and actions that have impacts on the role of the U.S. Pacific territories in

²⁶¹ U.S. Coast Guard.

²⁶² "Sector Honolulu Units," U.S. Coast Guard, accessed February 19, 2019, <https://www.pacificarea.uscg.mil/Our-Organization/District-14/D14-Units/Sector-Honolulu/Sector-Honolulu-Units/>; Tara Molle, "The Coast Guard, 14 Degrees South of the Equator," *Coast Guard Compass* (blog), March 27, 2018, <http://coastguard.dodlive.mil/2018/03/the-coast-guard-14-degrees-south-of-the-equator/>.

²⁶³ "Sector Guam," U.S. Coast Guard, accessed February 19, 2019, <https://www.pacificarea.uscg.mil/Our-Organization/District-14/D14-Units/Sector-Guam/>.

²⁶⁴ "Sector Guam Units," U.S. Coast Guard, accessed February 19, 2019, <https://www.pacificarea.uscg.mil/Our-Organization/District-14/D14-Units/Sector-Guam/Sector-Guam-Units/>.

²⁶⁵ Molle, "The Coast Guard."

²⁶⁶ See, for example, "Coast Guard, Partners Respond to Report of Grounded Fishing Vessel in American Samoa," U.S. Coast Guard District 14, February 8, 2018, <http://www.pacom.mil/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/1436058/coast-guard-partners-respond-to-report-of-grounded-fishing-vessel-in-american-s/>; David A. Cox, "USCG Aids in Saipan Disaster Relief," U.S. Navy, August 15, 2015, <https://www.public.navy.mil/surfor/cpr11/Pages/USCG-aids-in-Saipan-disaster-relief.aspx>.

implementing U.S. strategic goals in the Indo-Pacific Region. Other DHS entities, such as the National Protection and Programs Directorate—which includes the Office of Cyber and Infrastructure Analysis and the Office of Infrastructure Protection, among others—also have ongoing homeland security missions in the territories.²⁶⁷ Table 2 provides an author-developed overview of the DHS mission areas and how they relate to the DIME instruments of national power to support U.S. strategy in the Pacific Islands Region. As noted previously in Chapter II, investment initiatives in the Freely Associated States and U.S. Pacific territories in such non-traditionally national security areas as education, maritime security, energy security, and economic development are a fundamental part of increasing the U.S.’ ability to counter Chinese incursions into the region.²⁶⁸ In addition, while DHS entities do not implement military activities, their mission areas provide coordination and support to military bases and efforts in the identified areas.

²⁶⁷ “NPPD at a Glance,” Department of Homeland Security, February 13, 2018, <https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/nppd-at-a-glance-bifold-02132018-508.pdf>.

²⁶⁸ Hamon, “Thinking Strategically on the Pacific Islands.”

Table 2. Implications of Homeland Security Policy for National Security Strategy in the Pacific Islands Region

	Diplomatic	Informational	Military	Economic
DHS Agency Roles Impacting DIME Areas	DHS entities engage with Freely Associated States within their mission areas (e.g., FEMA for disaster response and recovery)	Public affairs & communications efforts by all DHS entities	Infrastructure protection	Immigration policy
	USCG engagement in fisheries protection		Cyber and infrastructure protection of vulnerabilities	Infrastructure protection and development (e.g., through grants)
	Training for Indo-Pacific Regional partners in various mission areas (e.g., maritime safety and security, emergency management)		Immigration enforcement (air and sea)	Customs and border protection
			USCG homeland defense mission	USCG engagement in fisheries protection, maritime safety in U.S. Pacific territories and Freely Associated State
				Disaster response and recovery
				Transportation security

Table 3 presents similar information as Table 2 in a different manner, noting which DHS agencies have responsibility for the DIME areas identified in Table 2.

Table 3. DHS Agencies with Responsibilities That Address National Security Strategy in the Pacific Islands Region

DHS Agency with Roles Impacting DIME Areas	Diplomatic	Informational	Military	Economic
	FEMA	FEMA	NPPD	USCIS
	USCG	USCG	FEMA	NPPD
	USCIS	USCIS	USCIS	CBP
	CBP	CBP	CBP	USCG
		USSS	USCG	FEMA
				TSA
				ICE

E. CONCLUSION

This chapter, as well as the preceding chapter, has focused on the benefits that the territories bring to the United States in supporting the U.S.’ national security efforts in the Indo-Pacific Region. As noted in Chapter III, the Pacific Islands Region is viewed by China as an indicator of whether the U.S. is willing to defend its international interests.²⁶⁹ The very real threat to U.S. interests posed by China is impacting and potentially impacted by homeland security activities in the Indo-Pacific Region. The U.S. government needs to ensure that it is seen in the U.S. Pacific territories as supporting their economic development. Currently, Chinese investment, rather than U.S. investors, are seen as the CNMI’s best option for economic growth, which may present challenges to U.S. interests in the region.

As was shown in the example pitting USCIS immigration implementation against military interests, lack of coordination among federal agencies can lead to impediments to achieving national interests. These chapters have laid clear the need for a coherent federal strategy for the Indo-Pacific Region that first includes the U.S. Pacific territories and homeland security agencies’ role. In the absence of such a strategy, the U.S. seems poorly positioned to counter Chinese interests in the area.

²⁶⁹ Buchan, “Rethinking U.S. Strategy in the Pacific Islands.”

The next chapter will shift to focus on the situation inside the territories themselves and its impact on homeland security practitioners, as well as how federal investments in ensuring development in the territories can improve fundamental public safety and security capabilities. It will also examine the current mechanisms that exist to develop a “whole of government” approach to U.S. policy development and implementation in the Pacific in support of U.S. national interests.

IV. IMPACT OF CURRENT RESILIENCE ISSUES IN THE PACIFIC TERRITORIES ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY

In 2017, Americans were given a wake-up call about the importance of resilience to a community's ability to withstand the impacts of disaster when the U.S. (Caribbean) territory of Puerto Rico was devastated by Hurricane Maria. The problematic recovery from 2017's Hurricane Maria in Puerto Rico has underscored the homeland security threats associated with underperforming economies and aging infrastructure in an island environment. With power outages continuing for up to 11 months after the storm hit the island, and numerous complaints regarding the slow speed of delivery of support, FEMA has acknowledged failures in its response for the residents of Puerto Rico.²⁷⁰ Many of these news media discussions of the event, including tweets from President Trump, have stated that the economic woes of the territory have impeded disaster response.²⁷¹ Similarly, the FEMA's *Strategic Plan for 2018–2022* highlights the relationship between the economic well-being of individuals and an ability to plan for disasters.²⁷² Similar to the situation in the Caribbean territories, the U.S. Pacific territories generally lag behind the continental United States in economic development, which endangers their resilience. The lack of economic development in the U.S. Pacific territories is a homeland security issue that presents challenges for those working to increase resilience and respond to disasters in

²⁷⁰ Leyla Santiago and Natalie Gallón, "Puerto Rico Says Power Restoration after Hurricane Maria Is Complete, but That's Not Quite Right," CNN, August 14, 2018, <https://www.cnn.com/2018/08/14/us/puerto-rico-power-restored/index.html>; Laura Sullivan and Emma Schwartz, "FEMA Report Acknowledges Failures in Puerto Rico Disaster Response," NPR, July 13, 2018, <https://www.npr.org/2018/07/13/628861808/fema-report-acknowledges-failures-in-puerto-rico-disaster-response>; Federal Emergency Management Agency, *2017 Hurricane Season FEMA After-Action Report* (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2018), <https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1533643262195-6d1398339449ca85942538a1249d2ae9/2017FEMAHurricaneAARv20180730.pdf>.

²⁷¹ See, for example, Daniella Diaz, "Trump: We Cannot Aid Puerto Rico 'Forever,'" CNN, October 12, 2017, <http://www.cnn.com/2017/10/12/politics/donald-trump-puerto-rico-tweets/index.html>; Lee Fang, "After Hurricane Maria, Key Republican Compares Puerto Rico to 'The Alcoholic Who Hits Rock Bottom,'" *The Intercept*, November 14, 2017, <https://theintercept.com/2017/11/14/puerto-rico-hurricane-maria-promesa-andrew-biggs/>; Lucinda Shen, "Puerto Rico's Economy Was a Mess before Hurricane Maria. It Will Only Make the Recovery Harder," *Forbes*, September 22, 2017, <http://fortune.com/2017/09/22/puerto-rico-hurricane-maria-help-recovery/>.

²⁷² Federal Emergency Management Agency, *2018–2022 Strategic Plan*.

this region. This chapter will discuss the current state of resilience among the territories and examine the impacts to the nation’s homeland security as a result. It will also examine the current approach to ensuring a “whole of government” approach to the territories.

A. HOMELAND SECURITY IMPACTS OF ECONOMIC ISSUES

As noted previously, FEMA’s *Strategic Plan for 2018–2022* highlights the relationship between economic well-being and disaster resilience.²⁷³ The following discussion highlights the economic constraints faced by the U.S. Pacific territories and provides specific examples of related impacts to disaster resilience, a key aspect of homeland security.

1. Territorial Economic Constraints

The economies of all the U.S. Pacific territories but American Samoa are growing.²⁷⁴ However, they remain weak when compared to the U.S. mainland. In 2009, for example, GAO reported that the U.S. Census had previously found that even in Guam, with the lowest percentage of citizens living below the poverty threshold of any of the U.S. territories, poverty rates were still almost twice those found on the mainland.²⁷⁵ In American Samoa, with the highest rates of poverty among the insular areas, that rate was over 2.5 times greater than in Guam, with 61 percent of the population living below the poverty line.²⁷⁶ Some of these challenges are inherent to small island populations trying to achieve a non-subsistence lifestyle with limited local resources; the Pacific Islands Forum and Pacific Islands Development Forum were created by its member states at least in part in recognition that existing models of development have been insufficient to bring the islands to their desired level of economic capacity.²⁷⁷ While the level of economic

²⁷³ Federal Emergency Management Agency.

²⁷⁴ Pacific Basin Development Council, “2018 Pacific Economic Strategy,” 7.

²⁷⁵ Gootnick, *Poverty Determination in U.S. Insular Areas*, 1, 23.

²⁷⁶ Gootnick, 23.

²⁷⁷ “Smaller Island States,” Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, accessed February 19, 2019, <https://www.forumsec.org/smaller-island-states/>; “Why PIDF?,” Pacific Islands Development Forum, accessed February 19, 2019, <http://pacificidf.org/why-pidf/>.

development of the member jurisdictions continues to be a concern, the member states have had some success in creating a sense of community and a common approach to common challenges.²⁷⁸ The relative success of Guam’s economy is based on its tourism industry and on investments by the Department of Defense, with the latter discussed in Chapter II.²⁷⁹

The 2006 testimony of then-Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Interior for Insular Affairs David Cohen provides a detailed explanation of the challenges faced by the small U.S. Pacific territories:

Although the four territories [including the Virgin Islands in the Caribbean] are distinct from one another, they share important characteristics. Each has very limited land and resources. Each has a small population, and a limited pool of expertise to address the community’s critical needs. Each is located in an area that is highly prone to destructive typhoons, cyclones, or hurricanes. Each is relatively new to self-government.

Because of remoteness and a lack of resources, each territory faces high transportation costs to import the basic necessities. Each territory is heavily reliant on air links to the outside world, but these links are often characterized by a lack of competition, high prices, and unreliable service. With the exception of Guam, each of the territories has the challenge of providing a full range of government services that cover multiple islands. These services must be provided with a very limited pool of trained and experienced personnel. Each territory has a fairly limited private sector that is dominated by one or two major industries. Minimum wage rates are high in comparison to the low-wage regions of the world in which they are located. As a result of all of these factors combined, each of the territories has a standard of living that is lower than that of any state—in most cases significantly so.

These challenges are exacerbated by the generally poor quality of critical infra- structure in the territories. Guam and the U.S. Virgin Islands are both subject to consent decrees that require improvements in their drinking water and wastewater systems. Saipan, the largest island in the CNMI and its

²⁷⁸ Eric Shibuya, “The Problems and Potential of the Pacific Islands,” in *The Asia-Pacific: A Region in Transition*, ed. Jim Rolfe (Honolulu, HI: Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, 2004), 104–107, 113–115, <https://apcss.org/Publications/Edited%20Volumes/RegionalFinal%20chapters/Chapter7Shibuya.pdf>.

²⁷⁹ Department of Commerce, *2016–2021 Comprehensive Economic Development Strategy* (Saipan: U.S. Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, 2017), 4, <http://i2io42u7ucg3bwn5b3l0fquc.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/CNMI-2016-2021-Comprehensive-Economic-Development-Strategy-Public-Comments.pdf>.

civic, business, and government center, is the only community of its size in the United States that does not have 24-hour access to potable water. Each territory faces serious solid waste disposal issues. Guam is under a Federal consent decree to shut down its current landfill and build a replacement.

Most of the power grids and generating systems in the territories are old, inefficient and vulnerable to the tropical cyclones that regularly occur in the Caribbean and the Pacific. The territories depend, almost entirely, on imported fossil fuels for their energy needs. Increases in the price of oil have added significantly to the financial burdens all the territories must endure. Fuel costs, in addition to problems with maintenance and financial management, have led to rolling blackouts on Saipan.²⁸⁰

As noted previously, Guam and the CNMI are heavily reliant on tourism and, especially in Guam's case, the military for economic development. American Samoa, on the other hand, has limited expectations that even a fully developed tourism industry would have the impact on their economy that CNMI and Guam have been able to develop; instead, they are hopeful that the fishing industry and relative advantages versus the other islands in the South Pacific will allow them to develop a more robust economy.²⁸¹ American Samoa's economic development, in fact, has been a bit of a conundrum since it became a U.S. territory. When the Naval Station closed and federal responsibility for American Samoa's development was transferred to DOI in 1951, DOI tried to encourage tourism and oil sales as the basis for economic growth.²⁸² However, early failures and the unexpected economic impact of the closure of the Naval Base led the first civilian Governor (a mainlander appointed by the Secretary of the Interior after a series of Naval Governors) to seek additional federal funding to run the government.²⁸³ Although oil storage and sales never became a successful industry for American Samoa, the later discovery of a large tuna

²⁸⁰ *Territories of Guam, American Samoa, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, and the U.S. Virgin Islands: Hearing before the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, Senate, 109th Cong., 2 (March 1, 2006), 34, <https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-109shrg28058/pdf/CHRG-109shrg28058.pdf>.*

²⁸¹ Moliga, "Governor Lolo Moliga's Statement to Honorable Esther Kia'aina," 3.

²⁸² J.A.C. Gray, *Amerika Samoa: A History of American Samoa and its United States Naval Administration* (Annapolis, MD: United States Naval Institute, 1960), 260; "Cultural History of American Samoa," American Samoa Historic Preservation Office, accessed February 19, 2019, www.ashpo.org/index.php/history.html.

²⁸³ Gray, *Amerika Samoa*, 261; American Samoa Historic Preservation Office, "Cultural History of American Samoa."

supply led to the opening of a cannery in 1954; today, the fishing industry and canneries continue as the economic base for American Samoa.²⁸⁴

The early seeking of additional federal funding to support the American Samoa government may have been a prelude to the territory's future difficulties and expectations. In a 1978 report to Congress, the Comptroller General stated that

American Samoa is largely dependent on Federal funds as the base for its economy. Well-conceived goals and priorities for its development do not exist.... The Department of the Interior has been responsible for the administration of the Government of American Samoa since 1951, but has not been effective in helping American Samoa [which beginning in 1977 was led by an elected American Samoa Governor rather than an appointed U.S. government representative] progress toward becoming a self-supporting territory.²⁸⁵

At that time, the GAO found that about 82 percent of American Samoa's revenues were generated from federal funding.²⁸⁶

Over time, the economic situation in American Samoa has not appreciably improved. In a 2007 analysis, Mansel Blackford, a former professor of business history, stated that American Samoa has become a prime example of what is known in Pacific island economies as a "MIRAB" economy—for migration (MI), remittance (R) and foreign aid (A) and the public bureaucracy (B) —"dependent on the migration of its people abroad and their remittances home, as well as on congressional appropriations."²⁸⁷ While the fisheries continue to employ some residents, he stated that the American Samoa

²⁸⁴ Gray, *Amerika Samoa*, 264; American Samoa Historic Preservation Office, "Cultural History of American Samoa"; Pacific Basin Development Council, "2018 Pacific Economic Strategy," 22.

²⁸⁵ Elmer B. Staats, *American Samoa Needs Effective Aid to Improve Government Operations and Become a Self-Supporting Territory*, CES-78-154 (Washington, DC: General Accounting Office, 1978), document resume, <http://archive.gao.gov/f0902a/107133.pdf>.

²⁸⁶ Staats, ii.

²⁸⁷ Mansel G. Blackford, *Pathways to the Present: U. S. Development and Its Consequences in the Pacific* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2007), 198, <http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ebook-nps/detail.action?docID=3413272>; Clem Tisdell, "The MIRAB Model of Small Island Economies in the Pacific and their Security Issues: Revised Version," Social Economics, Policy and Development Working Papers 165087 (working paper, University of Queensland, 2014), Abstract, <https://ideas.repec.org/p/ags/uqse/165087.html>.

government itself employs a third of the labor force.²⁸⁸ Professor Blackford noted “the massive involvement of American Samoans in the Pacific diaspora,” which continues today.²⁸⁹ The *2018 U.S. Pacific Islands Comprehensive Economic Development Strategy*, issued by PBDC on behalf of the Governors of Hawaii, CNMI, American Samoa, and Guam, cites potential economic opportunities in the areas of tourism, agriculture, information technology, light manufacturing, and telecommunications, but notes its potential is largely “untapped.”²⁹⁰

The Governors of the U.S. Pacific territories have, at times, pointed to federal law as impeding their economic development. Numerous examples of such concerns can be pointed to, including the Jones Act (restricting foreign-built ships from landing in U.S. harbors), cabotage laws (restricting international flights from landing in U.S. destinations in succession), and implementation of the U.S. minimum wage.²⁹¹

2. Impact of Economic Challenges on Disaster Resiliency

CNMI is a good example of the economic interests and needs of the territories, and how they can impact homeland security and specifically disaster resiliency. Economic interests, and a need for foreign labor to increase economic opportunity, were a part of the negotiations between the U.S. government and the representatives of the Marianas from the very beginning.²⁹² The CNMI’s interest in becoming a U.S. territory, versus seeking independence along with the rest of the Pacific Trust Territory, was generated at least in part by their understanding of the positive economic benefits that Guam had accrued from

²⁸⁸ Blackford, *Pathways to the Present*, 198.

²⁸⁹ Blackford, 199; Pacific Basin Development Council, “2018 Pacific Economic Strategy,” 23.

²⁹⁰ Pacific Basin Development Council, “2018 Pacific Economic Strategy,” 10.

²⁹¹ See, for example, Louella Losinio, “Business, Political Leaders Push for Lifting of Jones Act,” *Guam Daily Post*, October 16, 2017, https://www.postguam.com/news/local/business-political-leaders-push-for-lifting-of-jones-act/article_fa0b3be2-aff7-11e7-97bd-2f7281249fcc.html; Lolo M. Moliga, “Governor Lolo Moliga’s Statement to Honorable Esther Kia’aina, Assistant Secretary for Insular Affairs Interior, Department of the Interior, In preparation for the IGIA Meeting” (official letter, American Samoa Government, January 7, 2015), <https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/migrated/oia/igia/upload/LOLO-Letter-3.pdf>.

²⁹² Willen and Siemer, *An Honorable Accord*, 15, 123.

their integration into the U.S. and support for the U.S. military.²⁹³ However, the CNMI understood that assistance would be needed to achieve their desired level of economic development.²⁹⁴

Later, in negotiating status for themselves, the CNMI representatives “objected to the American emphasis on self-sufficiency, pointing out that the Marianas people for hundreds of years were self-sufficient at a subsistence level,” and indicated a desire to attain a standard of living similar to that of all U.S. citizens.²⁹⁵ (The Governor of American Samoa more recently expressed a similar interest, stating that “the key sectors of island society must be developed to a level comparable to that of the United States. These key sectors are the economy, education, health, and infrastructure—and all are interdependent, cross-cutting and they encompass other smaller sectors.”²⁹⁶)

In speaking to a Congressional subcommittee in 2016, the current Governor of the CNMI laid out his view of the economic situation in the CNMI:

To better understand our overall circumstances, please consider that in the last census, 51% of our population were found to live beneath the poverty line and approximately 34% of our population lives without health insurance. These are percentages far greater than any state in the Union. We have one economic driver and that is tourism which is only just now picking up again following the initiation of our integrated resort development plans. In sum, we are not a rich member of the American community and it is not easy to provide the basic public services such as safe drinking water, adequate healthcare facilities and safe roads that will ensure for the public safety and welfare of our people.

Accordingly, we need continued economic growth and we need to refine our long-term economic strategies of development in order to bring our

²⁹³ Willens and Siemer, 7–9.

²⁹⁴ Willens and Siemer, 15.

²⁹⁵ Willens and Siemer, 123.

²⁹⁶ Moliga, “Governor Lolo Moliga’s Statement to Honorable Esther Kia’aina,” 1.

standards of living and the qualities of public services we provide closer to that of our fellow Americans.²⁹⁷

The potential vulnerability of the CNMI to infiltration by Chinese interests due to its high reliance on tourism and need for outside investment has already been addressed in Chapter III, as have the relationship between CNMI's economy and the immigration controls imposed by Congress and implemented by USCIS. In the context of disaster resilience, however, the Governor's recognition of the impact that the previous economic woes of the territory had on its infrastructure is significant. As stated by the CNMI government itself:

The CNMI's physical infrastructure is widely considered to be a source of weakness. With seaports, airports, power generation and water distribution systems operating with aging facilities, government revenues have long been diverted from infrastructure upgrades and improvements to address other community needs. Operating with aging facilities and equipment, critical infrastructure components have recognized issues of capacity when contending with an increased demand premised on the CNMI's economic upswing. While federal revenues are often seen as a source of relief for agencies tasked with infrastructure upkeep, there has been no effort to overhaul and modernize critical infrastructure systems to meet current and forecasted demands through other revenue sources.²⁹⁸

The relative weakness of the CNMI's infrastructure increased the territory's vulnerability to disaster, as was seen when Typhoon Soudelor hit in 2015.²⁹⁹ This disaster, which bears striking similarities to the recovery from Hurricane Maria, received significantly less attention in the mainland U.S. but shows that the same issues with infrastructure weakness and isolation threaten the territories in the absence of resilient building. The CNMI was just beginning its economic recovery when its main island,

²⁹⁷ *Reviewing the Economic Impacts for the Commonwealth-only Worker Program in the Northern Mariana Islands under Public Law 110–229: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Indian, Insular and Alaska Native Affairs*, House of Representatives, 114th Cong., 2 (September 16, 2016) (statement of Ralph DLG Torres, Governor, Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands).

²⁹⁸ Department of Commerce, *2016–2021 Comprehensive Economic Development Strategy*, 10.

²⁹⁹ Keone Kali, "CNMI Consultation Highlights Need for Hardened Communications Infrastructure in Remote Areas," *FirstNet* (blog), February 24, 2016, <https://firstnet.gov/newsroom/blog/cnmi-consultation-highlights-need-hardened-communications-infrastructure-remote-areas>.

Saipan, was struck by the Category 3 storm, which did significant damage.³⁰⁰ The scope of the damage was widespread, with one Hawaii news station reporting that “Residents of Saipan were without water and electricity and were rationing gasoline four days after Typhoon Soudelor hit the most populated island in the U.S. territory of the Northern Marianas.”³⁰¹ FEMA coordinated a disaster response under a Presidential Disaster Declaration from the President, providing over \$60 million in recovery support, with over \$32 million of that total going to government infrastructure recovery.³⁰² One month after the typhoon, FEMA noted that it had called upon numerous federal entities to support the needs of the CNMI, including telecommunications assets, power and debris experts and assets (e.g., generators), FEMA commodities (water, meals, cots, and tarps to cover damaged roofs), Guam Power Authority experts and assets, and representatives from the U.S. Assistant Secretary of Preparedness, Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), USCG, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE).³⁰³ This massive response still could not quickly overcome the damage done to the CNMI due to the storm combined with the CNMI’s pre-existing vulnerabilities. The vulnerability of the CNMI’s electrical infrastructure, for example, led to almost complete system failure. Reports indicated that, following the storm, “all 14,622 electric customers on Saipan were without grid power and later visual inspections confirmed nearly 800 power poles and 600 transformers were damaged.”³⁰⁴ It was not

³⁰⁰ Frauline S. Villanueva-Dizon, “Soudelor Damage Consistent with a Category 3 Typhoon,” *Saipan Tribune*, August 14, 2015, <https://www.saipantribune.com/index.php/soudelor-damage-consistent-with-a-category-3-typhoon/>; Gaynor Dumat-ol Daleno, “Saipan in ‘State of Disaster’ after Typhoon Soudelor Direct Hit,” *Pacific Daily News*, August 3, 2015, <http://www.guampdn.com/story/news/2015/08/03/fema-cnmi-state-disaster-after-typhoon-soudelor-direct-hit/31042799/>.

³⁰¹ “Typhoon Soudelor Leaves Saipan with No Electricity, Water,” ABC7, August 6, 2015, <https://abc7.com/weather/typhoon-soudelor-leaves-saipan-with-no-electricity-water/907042/>.

³⁰² “Northern Mariana Islands Typhoon Soudelor (DR-4235),” Federal Emergency Management Agency, last modified August 6, 2015, <https://www.fema.gov/node/325834>.

³⁰³ “One Month after the Typhoon,” Federal Emergency Management Agency, September 4, 2015, <https://www.fema.gov/news-release/2015/09/04/one-month-after-typhoon>.

³⁰⁴ Dino W. Buchanan, “Delta Company Linemen Power Restoration of Electricity on Saipan,” *Saipan Tribune*, September 8, 2015, <https://www.saipantribune.com/index.php/delta-company-linemen-power-restoration-of-electricity-on-saipan/>.

until November, three months after the storm, that all power was restored.³⁰⁵ In 2018, the CNMI was struck again by a massive typhoon, Typhoon Yutu, again causing substantial infrastructure damage and requiring a significant amount of federal support.³⁰⁶ FEMA's response to Typhoon Yutu has received some criticism from CNMI elected officials, despite the more than 1,300 federal workers deployed in support of the territory, for delays and ineffectiveness.³⁰⁷

FEMA and the Mitigation community are aware of the cost savings available through investing in resilience prior to disasters, rather than waiting until damage is done to pay for response and recovery efforts. FEMA announced that a 2017 study by the National Institute of Building Sciences showed that federal mitigation grant expenditures save an average of \$6 for every \$1 spent.³⁰⁸ Thus, in addition to direct recovery funding, FEMA also provides funding for communities recovering from disasters to improve their resilience to future disasters through mitigation. Following Soudelor, FEMA provided an additional \$4,518,008 for the CNMI to purchase generators to provide emergency back-up power for the territory's water wells so that in future disasters water service could continue in the absence of system power.³⁰⁹ Similarly, FEMA funded an over \$7M project to replace wooden power poles, which were vulnerable to high winds, with more robust

³⁰⁵ Frauline S. Villanueva-Dizon, "100% of Power Lines Restored on Typhoon Damaged Saipan," *Saipan Tribune*, November 19, 2015, <http://www.pireport.org/articles/2015/11/19/100-power-lines-restored-typhoon-damaged-saipan>.

³⁰⁶ Kevin Kerrigan, "After Yutu, CNMI Faces a Long Road to Recovery," *Guam Daily Post*, October 27, 2018, https://www.postguam.com/news/local/after-yutu-cnmi-faces-a-long-road-to-recovery/article_55ec4f32-d8e2-11e8-ad59-37c9736b0137.html.

³⁰⁷ "CNMI Delegate Criticises FEMA's Yutu Response," *Radio New Zealand*, December 3, 2018, <https://www.radionz.co.nz/international/pacific-news/377366/cnmi-delegate-criticises-fema-s-yutu-response>.

³⁰⁸ Federal Emergency Management Agency, "Natural Hazard Mitigation Saves Interim Report" (report, Department of Homeland Security, June 2018), 1, https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1528732098546-c3116b4c12a0167c31b46ba09d02edfa/FEMA_MitSaves-Factsheet_508.pdf.

³⁰⁹ "CNMI Receives Another \$4.5 Million for Typhoon Soudelor Recovery," *Pacific Islands Report*, July 12, 2017, <http://www.pireport.org/articles/2017/07/12/cnmi-receives-another-45-million-typhoon-soudelor-recovery>.

concrete power poles, a project that was ongoing in 2018.³¹⁰ Recent changes implemented through the Disaster Recovery Reform Act of 2018 (DRRA) are expected to allow greater investment of FEMA funding in pre-disaster mitigation activities, rather than the previous approach which focused on post-disaster investment.³¹¹

The lack of a strong workforce in a community can also impact FEMA's support for disaster response. Following the disaster, FEMA provided eligible individuals whose homes had been impacted by the storm with funding to support their recovery; however, with the economy booming and many private-sector construction projects going on, even residents who had been given FEMA funding and financial assistance from the American Red Cross were unable to find contractors or skilled labor to make the repairs they needed.³¹² As a result, FEMA agreed to provide funding in support of a program that brings skilled volunteers from the mainland to the CNMI to help survivors rebuild or repair storm-damaged homes.³¹³ The volunteers are construction workers, carpenters, masons and others who are members of one of several not-for-profits that specialize in rebuilding efforts. FEMA is paying for the airfare and transportation expenses of the volunteers while the CNMI government identifies and, if necessary, pays for their accommodations. The Director of a local not-for-profit supporting the victims of Soudelor has indicated that the value of FEMA's support for the Rebuild and Repair effort could exceed \$1.5 million over two years.³¹⁴ This unusual FEMA support was required due to the limited construction

³¹⁰ "Power Outage on Feb. 17," *Saipan Tribune*, February 15, 2018, <https://www.saipantribune.com/index.php/power-outage-feb-17/>; Jon Perez, "CUC Only Has 24 Wooden Poles Left to Replace," *Saipan Tribune*, September 6, 2018, <https://www.saipantribune.com/index.php/cuc-only-has-24-wooden-poles-left-to-replace/>.

³¹¹ "Disaster Recovery Reform Act of 2018 Transforms Field of Emergency Management," Federal Emergency Management Agency, October 5, 2018, <https://www.fema.gov/news-release/2018/10/05/disaster-recovery-reform-act-2018-transforms-field-emergency-management>.

³¹² Raquel C. Bagnol, "Skilled U.S. Volunteers to Rebuild Homes of CNMI Typhoon Victims," *Marianas Variety*, August 8, 2016, <http://www.pireport.org/articles/2016/08/07/skilled-us-volunteers-rebuild-homes-cnmi-typhoon-victims>; Jon Perez, "Torres Administration, CARE Prioritize Rebuild," *Saipan Tribune*, August 2, 2016, <https://www.saipantribune.com/index.php/torres-administration-care-prioritize-rebuild/>.

³¹³ Bagnol, "Skilled U.S. Volunteers"; Perez, "Torres Administration."

³¹⁴ Bagnol, "Skilled U.S. Volunteers."

capability available to support Typhoon survivors, which led FEMA to provide additional assistance in light of the needs of the CNMI.

Lest CNMI be considered an outlier in terms of Federal disaster funding, it should be noted that FEMA spent over \$300 million in Guam in the first 100 days following the 2002 Super Typhoon Pongsona and a total of \$24 million on similar mitigation projects.³¹⁵ Following American Samoa's 2009 tsunami, FEMA provided nearly \$100 million in such funding.³¹⁶ In fact, the general consensus among FEMA responders has been that the substantial investment in hardening Guam following Pongsona and other super typhoons in the early 2000s has led to the much more successful weathering of more recent typhoons such as Dolphin and Mangkhut.

B. FEDERAL APPROACH TO A “WHOLE OF GOVERNMENT” STRATEGY TOWARD THE U.S. PACIFIC TERRITORIES

The preceding discussion has highlighted the role that economic and infrastructure strength, with required governance and leadership, can have on the resilience of communities to disasters, as well as the significant reliance that the Pacific territories' disaster response and recovery has had on federal funding. This section will provide examples of how federal homeland security funding is provided to the U.S. Pacific territories and examine how the lack of a “whole of government” approach to the jurisdictions has created confusion and potentially competing goals.

³¹⁵ “Super Typhoon Pongsona: The First 100 Days Over \$300 Million in Disaster Relief and Assistance,” Federal Emergency Management Agency, March 12, 2003, <https://www.fema.gov/news-release/2003/03/12/super-typhoon-pongsona-first-100-days-over-300-million-disaster-relief-and>; “FEMA to Provide More than \$24 Million to Guam for Mitigation,” Federal Emergency Management Agency, November 19, 2004, <https://www.fema.gov/news-release/2004/11/19/fema-provide-more-24-million-guam-mitigation>.

³¹⁶ “FEMA Invests \$100 Million in Post-Tsunami Disaster Relief, Emergency Preparedness Improvements for American Samoa,” Federal Emergency Management Agency, September 27, 2012, <https://www.fema.gov/news-release/2012/09/27/fema-invests-100-million-post-tsunami-disaster-relief-emergency-preparedness>.

1. Allocation of Federal Homeland Security and Disaster Funding to the U.S. Pacific Territories

The role that federal funding provided to the territories can play in homeland security may be underappreciated by those outside the U.S. Pacific territories. Following 9/11, the media and those in Congress questioned whether the amount of funding that the U.S. Pacific territories received from the homeland security grant program was excessive, responding to reports regarding the per capita funding allocated to the territories.³¹⁷ While there was significant debate over the level of funding to be provided based on either risk or population, no record could be found of the reasoning behind the decision following 9/11 to provide first 0.25% of the total funding to each territory, followed by a 2005 decision to decrease that percentage to 0.08%.³¹⁸ (These numbers can be compared with the 0.75% and later 0.25% that was allocated to each state, with the remainder of the funding allocated on the basis of a risk formulation implemented by the Department of Homeland Security.³¹⁹) While the current funding levels may be appropriate, it is hard to know given the apparently minimal consideration that was given to the level of allocation

³¹⁷ “Our Opinions: One Size Doesn’t Fit All,” *Atlanta Journal-Constitution*, June 8, 2004, <https://search.proquest.com/docview/337096809?accountid=12702>; “Homeland Security: Who Gets What and How,” *State Legislatures* 30, no. 10 (December 2004); “Spreading the Loot Around,” *U.S. News & World Report* 138, no. 21 (May 30, 2005): 26, <https://search-proquest-com.libproxy.nps.edu/docview/198450939?OpenUrlRefId=info:xri/sid:primo&accountid=12702>; Amelia Gruber, “Terrorism Risk vs. Reward,” *Government Executive* 36, no. 21 (December 2004): 25, https://search-proquest-com.libproxy.nps.edu/docview/204308881?rfr_id=info%3Axri%2Fsid%3Aprimo.

³¹⁸ Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001, Public Law 107–56, *U.S. Statutes at Large* 115 (2001): 272–402, <https://www.congress.gov/107/plaws/publ56/PLAW-107publ56.pdf>; Amanda Ripley, “How We Got Homeland Security Wrong: The Fortification of Wyoming and Other Tales from the New Front Line,” CNN, March 22, 2004, <http://www.cnn.com/2004/ALLPOLITICS/03/22/homsec.tm/>; Shawn Reese, *Risk-Based Funding in Homeland Security Grant Legislation: Analysis of Issues for the 109th Congress*, CRS Report No. RL33050 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2005), <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homsec/RL33050.pdf>; Shawn Reese, *Homeland Security Grant Formulas: A Comparison of Formula Provisions in S.21 and H.R. 1544, 109th Congress*, CRS Report No. RL32892 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2005), <https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=454365>; Shawn Reese, *FY2006 Homeland Security Grant Distribution Formulas: Issues for the 109th Congress*, CRS Report No. RS22349 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2006), www.hsdl.org/?view&did=466037; Shawn Reese, *Distribution of Homeland Security Grants in FY07 and P.L. 110–53, Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act*, CRS Report No. RL34181 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2007), <https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=479051>; *The Need for Grant Reform and the Faster and Smarter Funding for First Responders Act of 2005: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Science, and Technology of the Committee on Homeland Security*, House of Representatives, 109th Cong. 1 (2005), <https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=456227>.

³¹⁹ Reese, *Risk-Based Funding*.

in Congressional discussions. In addition, the territories (anecdotally) have argued that the calculations performed by DHS to allocate the risk-based portion of the grant funding, using a formula largely set by Congress, do not allow them to compete effectively for funding for their homeland security projects, regardless of their level of risk or the effectiveness of the proposed projects in reducing that risk.³²⁰

Despite their generally small size, the nation's tribes do not seem to have come under the same critical scrutiny as the territories for their receipt of homeland security grant funding. In fact, the same public law that reduced the territories' allocation to 0.08% established a set-aside for a Tribal Homeland Security Grant Program.³²¹ According to then-FEMA Administrator W. Craig Fugate, this funding was allocated by Congress after realizing that the tribes were struggling to receive funding through the states, as had previously been expected; while Congress provided a minimum of \$2M for the tribal program, then-DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano increase the amount to \$10M, "having recognized unique challenges that Tribal government has in homeland security," although those unique challenges were not defined.³²² It does not appear that the unique challenges facing the territories have been similarly considered.

In the same way, the impacts of isolation and struggling economies do not appear to be considered in FEMA's allocation of pre-disaster mitigation (PDM) funding. The mitigation funding that was previously reported following disasters impacted the territories under the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program, which provides mitigation funding up to 15 percent of the total of grant awards provided by FEMA under a Presidential Disaster Declaration.³²³ The funding available under FEMA's Pre-Disaster Mitigation program,

³²⁰ Homeland Security Act of 2002, as amended through P.L. 112-265 (2013), https://grants.nhisac.org/BackgroundData/2002_HSA_Homeland_Security_Act.PDF.

³²¹ Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, Public Law 110-53, *U.S. Statutes at Large* 121 (2007): 266-549, <https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=478863>.

³²² *Facing Floods and Fires: Emergency Preparedness for National Disasters in Native Communities: Hearing before the Committee on Indian Affairs*, 112th Cong., 1st (July 11, 2011) (statement of W. Craig Fugate, Administrator, Federal Emergency Management Agency), <https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=724716>.

³²³ "Hazard Mitigation Grant Program Frequently Asked Questions," Federal Emergency Management Agency, last modified June 11, 2018, <https://www.fema.gov/hmgp-faqs>.

however, is available based on Congressional appropriations and varies each year. In FY2018, the funding available under PDM is slightly above \$235M.³²⁴ For reasons that again do not appear to have been made public, in this case FEMA allocates the same amount as a set-aside for each state and territory, \$575K in FY2018, with the remainder allocated through what FEMA terms “a highly competitive grant program.”³²⁵ As previously noted, the DRRRA provided a mechanism for more reliable federal funding for efforts to build critical infrastructure resilience; while the Agency is still developing the program to implement this law, it will be important to incorporate the costs of responding to isolated communities such as those in the U.S. Pacific territories into a cost/benefit analysis of proposals for the new funding.

A final example of an apparent lack of consideration for the unique challenges of the territories might be found in FEMA’s enabling regulations to implement the Stafford Act, which proscribe the process for requesting a Presidential Disaster Declaration and associated funding. Under the public assistance program, the criteria established at 44 CFR 206.48, “Factors considered when evaluating a Governor’s request for a major disaster declaration,” the first—and arguably deciding—factor is the cost of assistance.³²⁶ FEMA indicates that they evaluate the total estimated cost of eligible damages against the statewide population to give a measure of the per capita impact within the State. However, the Agency set a minimum threshold of \$1M “in the belief that we can reasonably expect even the lowest population States to cover this level of public assistance damage.”³²⁷ While the definition of the term “State” under the Stafford Act includes the territories, it is

³²⁴ “FY 2018 Pre-disaster Mitigation (PDM) Grant Program,” Federal Emergency Management Agency, accessed February 19, 2019, https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1538601697477-5a4a055c7600eaddad89348044fb664a/FY_2018_PDM_Fact_Sheet.pdf.

³²⁵ Federal Emergency Management Agency; “Pre-disaster Mitigation Grant Program,” Federal Emergency Management Agency, last modified December 3, 2018, <https://www.fema.gov/pre-disaster-mitigation-grant-program>.

³²⁶ Factors Considered When Evaluating a Governor’s Request for a Major Disaster Declaration, 44 C.F.R. § 206.48, <https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/44/206.48>; Daniel C. Vock and Jim Malewitz, “Disaster Declaration Denials Exasperate Governors,” Pew Stateline, August 23, 2013, <https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2013/08/23/disaster-declaration-denials-exasperate-governors>.

³²⁷ Factors Considered When Evaluating a Governor’s Request.

not clear whether FEMA considered the potential ability of the Pacific territories, with their small populations—the 2010 Census identified Wyoming as the least-populous state with 563,626 people, vs. Guam (159,358), American Samoa (55,519) or the CNMI (53,883).³²⁸ Given the economic challenges facing the Pacific territories, as well as the much smaller sizes of their populations, it is perhaps surprising that FEMA did not choose to examine them for a separate threshold. Interestingly, when implementing the Sandy Recovery Improvement Act of 2013, which amended the Stafford Act to provide federally recognized Indian tribal governments (tribal governments) the option to request a Presidential emergency or major disaster declaration under their own authority, independent of a state, FEMA chose to set a lower threshold for public assistance damage, at \$250,000. In describing the reason behind the lower threshold, Alex Amparo, then FEMA’s Assistant Administrator for Recovery, was quoted as saying that “Part of the reason we went down to \$250,000 is that the tribes vary in capacity... If you have a tribal nation with a population of fewer than 1,000 people, \$250,000 is a major disaster for them.”³²⁹ Of course, the same threshold applies to the Navajo and Cherokee tribal nations, with over 300,000 enrolled members each.³³⁰ It does not appear that any similar examination has been performed to determine whether the \$1 million threshold is the appropriate level for the U.S. Pacific territories, given their small size and economic constraints.

³²⁸ Paul Mackun and Steven Wilson, “Population Distribution and Change: 2000 to 2010,” United States Census, March 2011, <https://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-01.pdf>; “Guam—2010 Census Results: Total Population by Municipality,” United States Census Bureau, accessed March 9, 2019, https://www.census.gov/2010census/news/pdf/cb11cn179_ia_guam_totalpop_2010map.pdf; “U.S. Census Bureau Releases 2010 Census Population Counts for American Samoa,” United State Census, August 24, 2011, https://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/2010_census/cb11-cn177.html; “Northern Mariana Islands—2010 Census Results: Total Population by Election District,” United States Census Bureau, accessed March 9, 2019, https://www.census.gov/2010census/news/pdf/cb11cn178_ia_cnmi_totalpop_2010map.pdf.

³²⁹ Adam Stone, “New Emergency Recovery Options for Tribes: FEMA Offers Guidelines for Tribes Seeking Disaster Relief,” Emergency Management, April 17, 2017, <http://www.govtech.com/em/disaster/EM-Mag-New-Options-for-Tribes.html>.

³³⁰ “Navajo Population Profile 2010 U.S. Census,” Navajo Division of Health and Navajo Epidemiology Center, December 2013, <http://www.nec.navajo-nsn.gov/Portals/0/Reports/NN2010PopulationProfile.pdf>; “About the Nation,” Cherokee Nation, accessed March 9, 2019, <http://webtest2.cherokee.org/About-The-Nation>.

2. Federal Coordination with the Territories

The U.S. government’s approach to the Pacific territories has changed remarkably little since the 1950s.³³¹ As described by the GAO, “The Secretary of the Interior has administrative responsibility for coordinating federal policy for the insular areas [which includes the U.S. Pacific territories].”³³² It appears that the 1950s-era transition to DOI’s role as a civilian entity administering the territories was largely seen as an antidote to military administration, which had not provided sufficient focus on the development of the territories themselves.³³³ At that time, it appears that the shift was intended to focus on the territories as part of the nation’s internal affairs, which were seen as the purview of the Department of the Interior.³³⁴ DOI appropriately notes that its varying responsibilities all “in one way or another...had to do with the internal development of the Nation or the welfare of its people.”³³⁵ However, their own website also refers to the Department as the “Department of Everything Else,” a jocular appellation that nonetheless underscores the lack of appreciation for the important role that the territories play in national security.³³⁶ DOI’s Office of Insular Affairs also manages discretionary grant funding for the U.S. Pacific territories, for both infrastructure and operational purposes, to assist in their development.³³⁷

The most significant change since the 1950s has been the 2003 creation of the Interagency Group on Insular Areas (IGIA) to improve the internal management processes

³³¹ “Executive Orders and Public Laws,” Department of the Interior, accessed March 25, 2018, <https://www.doi.gov/oia/budget/authorities-public-law>.

³³² Lepore, *High-Level Leadership Needed*, 5.

³³³ See, for example, Willens and Siemer, *An Honorable Accord*, 356–357; Exec. Order No. 10077, 14 F.R. 5533 (1949), <https://www.archives.gov/federal-register/codification/executive-order/10077.html>.

³³⁴ “History of the Interior,” Department of the Interior, accessed March 11, 2019, <https://www.doi.gov/whoweare/history/>.

³³⁵ Department of the Interior.

³³⁶ Department of the Interior.

³³⁷ “Discretionary Financial Assistance to the U.S. Territories and Freely Associated States,” Department of the Interior, accessed February 7, 2019, <https://www.doi.gov/oia/financial-assistance>.

of the federal government with respect to the territories.³³⁸ President Bush established the IGIA under Executive Order 13299 to improve the internal management processes of the federal government with respect to the territories.³³⁹ However, the GAO has reported that the IGIA was ineffective at addressing the impacts of the military build-up in Guam.³⁴⁰ More recently, as noted in Chapter I, the Governor of American Samoa has argued that the Department of the Interior has sole responsibility for administering the relationship between the U.S. government and that of American Samoa, and that the American Samoa government's operations cannot be "dictated" by any other federal agency.³⁴¹ DOI's Interior Assistant Secretary for Insular and International Affairs has responded that DOI does not have authority to direct another federal agency's evaluation of the territory's compliance with federal laws under that agency's purview.³⁴² While refuted, the Governor's claim certainly indicates a remaining lack of clarity with respect to the federal agencies' roles and the territory's responsibilities to implement federal homeland security requirements.

Despite the GAO's finding regarding the current limitations of the federal government's approach to the territories, there seems to be little discussion of whether the current structure is best suited to address the nation's national security interests in the territories, including homeland security. This despite the fact that the United States government already has in place a two-pronged structure for dealing with the U.S.' territories: while the U.S. Pacific territories and the U.S. Virgin Islands are administered by the Office of Insular Affairs within the Department of the Interior, the President's Deputy Assistant for Intergovernmental Affairs coordinates responsibility for U.S. government Puerto Rico policy, with a President's Task Force established to coordinate

³³⁸ Exec. Order No. 13299, F.R. 68, no. 91 (2003), <https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/uploads/IGIA-Executive-Order-13299-May-8-2003.pdf>; Lepore, *High-Level Leadership Needed*, 5.

³³⁹ Exec. Order No. 13299; Lepore, *High-Level Leadership Needed*, 5.

³⁴⁰ Exec. Order No. 13299; Lepore, *High-Level Leadership Needed*.

³⁴¹ Sagapolutele, "Lolo."

³⁴² Fili Sagapolutele, "If FEMA Suspends Flood Insurance, CIP Funds Will Also Be Held," *Samoa News*, December 12, 2018, <http://www.samoanews.com/local-news/if-fema-suspends-flood-insurance-cip-funds-will-also-be-held>.

federal support.³⁴³ (The President’s Task Force was initially established in 2000 to address questions of Puerto Rico’s status as a territory, but its role was later expanded in 2009 to coordinate federal support for “job creation, education, health care, clean energy, and economic development.”³⁴⁴) Little analysis seems to have been performed on whether the approach to governance of Puerto Rico might be more or less effective than the current DOI OIA role for the other territories. Similarly, there seems to be little discussion regarding whether the IGIA should play a more substantive role in coordinating federal strategy for the U.S. Pacific territories.

C. CONCLUSION

This chapter has shown how the lack of economic resilience in the U.S. Pacific territories leads to vulnerability to disaster impacts. As resilience against disasters is a key aspect of homeland security, this is an area of concern for homeland security practitioners. In addition, the lack of a “whole of government” approach to the U.S. Pacific territories has been shown, along with the resulting confusion and lack of cohesion in U.S. national strategy. The current approach to these jurisdictions has been shown to have many flaws; Chapter V will provide recommendations for improvements at the federal level.

³⁴³ “Puerto Rico,” Department of the Interior, accessed March 10, 2019, <https://www.doi.gov/oia/islands/puertorico>; Exec. Order No. 13183, *Federal Register* 65, no. 251 (2000), <https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=462819>; “White House Task Force on Puerto Rico,” White House, accessed February 17, 2019, <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/administration/eop/iga/puerto-rico>.

³⁴⁴ Exec. Order No. 13183; White House, “White House Task Force on Puerto Rico”; Barack Obama, “Executive Order 13517 Amending Executive Orders 13183 and 13494,” The White House, October 30, 2009, <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/executive-order-amending-executive-orders-13183-and-13494>.

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V. CONCLUSIONS

While homeland security has been viewed by some as a field independent from national security interests, it is clear from a review of the literature and from an assessment of the GAO's exhortation of the dangers of fragmented federal policy that the nation's interests would be best served by a coherent approach to national and homeland security interests.³⁴⁵ GAO has specifically identified homeland security as a crosscutting issue requiring "national focus," noting that interagency coordination can be hampered by conflicting goals, procedures, and responsibilities, impeding the ability to achieve U.S. national interests.³⁴⁶ This thesis has provided numerous examples of how overlapping mission sets can detract from the national goal. One example is the USCIS implementation of the H-2B visa program for temporary construction workers, which Guam—and Congress, eventually—found impeded the progress of the Guam military build-up by limiting the availability of construction personnel just as significant construction work was needed.

The need to avoid fragmentation of federal interests is especially true in the small U.S. Pacific territories, where interrelationships are hard to avoid among the impacts of policy decisions. This thesis has analyzed the contributions that the U.S. Pacific territories make to the achievement of national security interests in the Pacific, through the framework of the DIME model, as well as the potential impediments that the current lack of economic resiliency in these territories presents to both homeland security in the territories themselves and to the U.S.' larger interests in the region. While the U.S. Pacific territories might sometimes be considered small players on the global scale, they represent U.S. interests in a critical maritime area in which China is working to exert its own interests. By developing economies and infrastructure, and increasing the military hardening of these U.S. Pacific territories, U.S. national security interests in the area can be strengthened. And

³⁴⁵ Karimi, "Security and Prosperity," 4.

³⁴⁶ Patricia A. Dalton, *Results-Oriented Government: GPRAs Have Established a Solid Foundation for Achieving Greater Results*, GAO-04-38 (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2004), 9, <https://www.gao.gov/assets/160/157517.pdf>.

U.S. homeland security practitioners can be part of that effort, through strategic implementation of their agencies' programs and efforts in the Pacific.

A. RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the analysis performed in this thesis, this chapter will present recommendations for consideration by policy makers in better integrating federal approach to the jurisdictions, in order to maximize their impact on U.S. interests and increase their resiliency.

1. Legal Approach to the Territories

Recommendation 1: Reevaluate laws pertaining to the U.S. Pacific territories to update and, where possible, improve clarity and consistency. The impact of the current hodgepodge of federal laws on homeland security practitioners in the U.S. Pacific is inarguable. As noted in Chapter I, Congress essentially makes decisions on a territory-by-territory basis, sometimes choosing to include the territories in a law's purview, sometimes not. While these decisions are sometimes made on a rational basis—for example, American Samoa's government has argued against birthright citizenship's application to those born in that territory, for fear its implementation would require greater limitations on the traditional cultural communal land practices in the territory—others appear almost haphazard in their applicability.³⁴⁷ For example, the Jones Act, which limits the ability of foreign-built vessels to transit between U.S. ports, applies to Guam, but not American Samoa or the CNMI.³⁴⁸ During disasters, there are frequently calls for—and sometimes implementation of—waivers of the Jones Act in light of the constraints it imposes on effective emergency response and the increased costs it is seen to impose on disaster

³⁴⁷ Secretariat, Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, "American Samoa" (working paper, United Nations General Assembly, February 2017), 1, 5–6, <http://www.undocs.org/A/ac.109/2017/1>.

³⁴⁸ Losinio, "Business, Political Leaders Push for Lifting of Jones Act"; Michael Hansen, "Territory Free of Jones Act, Matson Extends its Pacific Service," *Hawai'i Free Press*, April 20, 2018, <http://www.hawaiifreepress.com/ArticlesMain/tabid/56/ID/21538/Territory-Free-of-Jones-Act-Matson-extends-its-South-Pacific-service.aspx>.

survivor for goods that must be transported in.³⁴⁹ This is just one example of a statute that is inconsistently implemented in the U.S. Pacific territories. Others identified in this thesis include immigration and customs laws implemented by DHS.

While clarifying the territorial status of the territories appears fraught with potential hazards, without providing a clear benefit, an effort to streamline the implementation of federal law in the territories could have an immediate impact on homeland and national security in these jurisdictions. In fact, the territories themselves have individually made frequent calls for such a re-evaluation, especially with specific requirements such as the Jones Act and cabotage laws, which they believe have impeded their economic development.³⁵⁰ Homeland security practitioners should encourage and participate in a reevaluation of the applicability of federal statutes to the U.S. Pacific territories, with a goal of developing a coherent, well-reasoned approach that supports the nation's security interests.

2. Federal Organization with Respect to the U.S. Pacific Territories

Recommendation 2: Reevaluate coordination and administration for the U.S. Pacific territories. Currently, the Pacific territories and U.S. Virgin Islands are administered much differently than Puerto Rico. U.S. Pacific territories and the U.S. Virgin Islands are administered by the Office of Insular Affairs within the Department of the Interior, while the President's Deputy Assistant for Intergovernmental Affairs coordinates responsibility for U.S. government Puerto Rico policy, with a President's Task Force established to coordinate federal support.³⁵¹ Little analysis seems to have been performed

³⁴⁹ Losinio, "Business, Political Leaders Push for Lifting of Jones Act"; Teresa Carey, "The Jones Act, Explained (and What it Means Puerto Rico)," PBS, September 29, 2017, <https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/jones-act-explained-waiving-means-puerto-rico>; Niraj Chokshi, "Trump Waives Jones Act for Puerto Rico, Easing Hurricane Aid Shipments," *New York Times*, September 28, 2017, <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/28/us/jones-act-waived.html>.

³⁵⁰ See, for example, Losinio, "Business, Political Leaders Push for Lifting of Jones Act"; Moliga, "Governor Lolo Moliga's Statement to Honorable Esther Kia'aina"; Eloy S. Inos, letter to Assistant Secretary for Insular Affairs Esther P. Kia'aina, February 20, 2015, <https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/uploads/INOS-Letter.pdf>.

³⁵¹ Department of the Interior, "Puerto Rico"; Exec. Order No. 13183; White House, "White House Task Force on Puerto Rico."

on whether the approach to governance of Puerto Rico might be more or less effective than the current DOI OIA role for the other territories. It must be admitted that the current economic status of Puerto Rico is hardly an argument for the success of the White House/Task Force leadership model. However, it would certainly appear that elevating consideration of the U.S. Pacific territories to the President’s advisors would help to underscore the importance of their national security concerns, as opposed to their current “ownership” by the Department of the Interior. The White House should create a term-limited task force to consider whether the current DOI home is the appropriate mechanism for coordination of national policy towards the U.S. Pacific territories. DHS, DoD, the State Department, the Department of Health and Human Services, the Environmental Protection Agency, and other departments and agencies with significant equities in the Indo-Pacific Region and more specifically in the Pacific Islands Region, should be included in the discussions.

Recommendation 3: Strengthen interagency coordination of policy towards the U.S. Pacific territories. As discussed, the ability of the IGIA to bring about coherent federal policy, and the role of the DOI in administering policy across the Federal family, has been limited.³⁵² Regardless of where the responsibility for administering the territories lies, a strengthened interagency coordination body is recommended to ensure coherent federal policy towards the territories. It is remarkable that, even after the GAO reported in 2009 that the IGIA had been ineffective in addressing the arguably single-most important issue in U.S.-Guam relations, little to no analysis appears to have been performed on methods to improve that coordination.³⁵³ The DOI’s response to the GAO report was limited to a single page, noting that “I concur that the Department’s Office of Insular Affairs does not have the authority to direct other federal agencies to provide resources to defense-affected communities or ensure that Guam’s budget requests related to the military buildup become

³⁵² Exec. Order No. 13299, *Federal Register* 68, no. 91 (2003), <https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/uploads/IGIA-Executive-Order-13299-May-8-2003.pdf>; Lepore, *High-Level Leadership Needed*.

³⁵³ Lepore, *High-Level Leadership Needed*.

a priority across the federal government.”³⁵⁴ Hardly a ringing endorsement of the ability of the current structure to effectively support U.S. interests and goals in the territories.

Several potential models exist for improved coordination. One model, as discussed, would be to move the interagency coordination of national strategy towards the Pacific to the White House, as has been done for Puerto Rico. GAO has also reported that the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) of 1993, which requires agencies to develop strategic plans and specific metrics to be used in assessing progress, has been somewhat less than successful in addressing cross-agency efforts, largely because limitations in interagency plan development to achieve these cross-cutting goals.³⁵⁵ The development of a coordinated inter-agency strategy for federal efforts in the U.S. Pacific territories would likely help to encourage both greater understanding of cross-cutting issues and a consistent emphasis from the federal government towards its interests in the territories.

3. Allocation of Federal Funding

Recommendation 4: Reevaluate the level and allocation process for federal homeland security funding in the U.S. Pacific territories. The last area addressed by the preceding discussion highlighted the role that federal funding can have on the resilience of communities to disasters, as well as the significant reliance that the Pacific territories’ disaster response and recovery has had on federal funding. As noted in Chapter IV, little reason could be identified for the current level of federal homeland security funding for the territories, which is set at 0.08% of the total amount available for such grants each year.³⁵⁶ While the current base funding levels may be appropriate, it is hard to know given the apparently minimal consideration that was given to the level of allocation. As a result,

³⁵⁴ Lepore, 19.

³⁵⁵ Dalton, *Results-Oriented Government*, 3, 5, 9; J. Christopher Mihm, *Managing for Results: Implementation of GPRA Modernization Act Has Yielded Mixed Progress in Addressing Pressing Governance Challenges*, GAO-15-819 (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2015), Highlights, <https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-15-819>.

³⁵⁶ Homeland Security Act of 2002, as amended through P.L. 112–265 (2013), https://grants.nhisac.org/BackgroundData/2002_HSA_Homeland_Security_Act.PDF.

Congress and the Department of Homeland Security should re-evaluate the current level of funding for the territories, as well as whether the current risk factors identified in the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as amended through P.L. 112–265 (2013), are appropriate to ensuring effective protection of the nation’s security interests in the territories. Alternatively, it may be appropriate to consider a set-aside for a Territorial Homeland Security Grant Program, similar to the Tribal Homeland Security Grant Program set-aside that currently exists.³⁵⁷ This would recognize the unique challenges facing the isolated territories, as well as recognizing their contributions to national security.

Similarly, other FEMA programs, including those for mitigation and the criteria for declaration, should be re-assessed with a clearer understanding of the constraints, challenges, and contributions of the territories. Since the costs and logistical difficulties of emergency response to the isolated territories are vastly increased over the mainland, FEMA should consider whether to incorporate the potential costs of response into the assessment of whether to allocate competitive funding to projects in the territories, and whether the current economic status of the territories should be recognized by lower Presidential Disaster Declaration criteria, as was recently established for the Tribes.

B. IMPLEMENTATION

Table 4 provides a tabular overview of the recommendations provided for action. These recommendations are intentionally small-scale in nature, recognizing that a wholesale reorganization of the federal government—such as the integration of the Department of Defense and Homeland Security, and the creation of a Department of Prosperity, recommended by former NPS master’s student Bijan P. Karimi—are unlikely to be implemented in support of the small U.S. Pacific territories, no matter how critical to U.S. national security.³⁵⁸ The steps recommended herein are intended to be effective enough to make an impact, while small enough to overcome inherent resistance to change.

³⁵⁷ Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007..

³⁵⁸ Karimi, “Security and Prosperity,” 98–99.

Table 4. Recommendations

1	<p><i>Reevaluate laws pertaining to the U.S. Pacific territories to update and, where possible, improve clarity and consistency.</i></p> <p>The current hodgepodge of federal laws is confusing and arguably deleterious to homeland security.</p> <p>Action: Congress</p>
2	<p><i>Reevaluate coordination and administration for the U.S. territories.</i></p> <p>The reason for the current two-pronged approach to Puerto Rico vs. the rest of the territories is not clear, and the administration of DOI may not maximize effectiveness of the territories in furthering national interests.</p> <p>Action: White House, supported by Executive Branch departments and agencies with equities in the Pacific Islands Region</p>
3	<p><i>Strengthen interagency coordination of policy towards the U.S. Pacific territories.</i></p> <p>The current coordination mechanism has been found lacking in its ability to further national goals in the territories.</p> <p>Action: Lead for administration of U.S. policy towards the U.S. Pacific territories (currently, DOI OIA)</p>
4	<p><i>Reevaluate the level and allocation process for federal funding in the U.S. Pacific territories.</i></p> <p>This would include the base level of homeland security grant funding, the process for risk-based allocation of homeland security grant funding, and the criteria for declaring a Presidential disaster in the U.S. Pacific territories.</p> <p>Action: Congress and DHS</p>

The steps envisioned in this thesis would require action by multiple parties, including Congress, the White House, the Department of the Interior, and the Department of Homeland Security. While it can be difficult to gain attention for issues impacting small, isolated territories, it is not impossible. For example, despite the CNMI’s lack of a voting delegate in Congress, the potential economic catastrophe posed by the planned 2019 end

of the CW-1 visa program led Congress to extend the program through 2029 under the Northern Mariana Islands U.S. Workforce Act of 2018.³⁵⁹ While the federal government is a large ship, and turning it is consequently difficult, it can be done when the risks and rewards of the required change are understood. This thesis, in identifying the national security and homeland security contributions and challenges associated with the U.S. Pacific territories, can encourage the needed recognition and, as a result, bring about action.

³⁵⁹ “CW-1: CNMI-Only Transitional Worker,” U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, last modified August 3, 2018, <https://www.uscis.gov/working-united-states/temporary-workers/cw-1-cnmi-only-transitional-worker>.

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