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HEARING  
BEFORE A  
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE  
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS  
UNITED STATES SENATE  
EIGHTY-EIGHTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

MARCH 13, 1963



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# REVIEW OF UNITED STATES PARTICIPATION IN THE UNITED NATIONS

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 13, 1963

UNITED STATES SENATE,  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AFFAIRS,  
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,  
*Washington, D.C.*

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:30 p.m., in room 4221, New Senate Office Building, Senator Frank Church (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senators Fulbright (chairman of the full committee), Sparkman, Humphrey, Gore, Church (presiding), Aiken, Carlson, and Mundt of the committee, and Senator Clark of Pennsylvania.

Senator CHURCH. The Subcommittee on International Organization Affairs, and members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee as a whole, this afternoon take great pleasure in welcoming the distinguished U.S. representative to the United Nations, Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson.

## PURPOSE OF THE HEARING

We have asked Mr. Stevenson both to bring us up to date on U.N. developments since the end of the 87th Congress and to outline current and future major problems and prospects facing the U.N. organization.

The Committee on Foreign Relations normally requests the highest officials of the executive branch agencies basically concerned with foreign policy to give the committee their overall views on the world situation at the beginning of each session of the Congress. Ambassador Stevenson obviously is almost uniquely capable of providing such information.

However, because of various factors, and particularly the delay encountered in organizing the Senate, the committee heretofore has not had an opportunity to invite him to present his views on U.N. affairs. We thus are especially glad to see Mr. Stevenson and have this chance to remedy that involuntary omission.

It is our impression that the major functions and the performance of the United Nations as an organization primarily devoted to keeping the peace have been considerably obscured during the past 2 months because of the furor over incidents involving the U.N. Special Fund and UNESCO.

This subcommittee and the members of the full committee have entirely shared the very legitimate concern of the American people regarding those incidents.

We have held hearings on both subjects and are in the process of making the findings available to the public. We believe fairly detailed and comprehensive material has been developed in the course of these inquiries.

This afternoon we would like to concentrate on the larger and the more important general picture of the United Nations activities over the last 6 months or so and on the developing issues which we will encounter in the months ahead. So I have asked Mr. Stevenson to take this into account in formulating his presentation.

In a word, Mr. Ambassador, we would hope to focus today on the main role and, indeed, the reason for being of the United Nations, its role as a peacekeeper.

I want to say again how glad we are to have you with us today, Mr. Ambassador. I think you have a prepared statement. Please proceed as you care to.

#### STATEMENT OF HON. ADLAI E. STEVENSON, U.S. AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED NATIONS

Mr. STEVENSON. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I welcome this opportunity to report to you again on the work of the United Nations.

##### VARIETY OF FUNCTIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS

As you know, the United Nations is a big subject—one which can be approached from many points of view. From one point of view it is a symbol of the aspirations of most of humanity for peace, for decency, and human dignity. From another point of view it is an institution of 110 members pioneering the arts of parliamentary diplomacy on a near-universal level. From still another, it is a very large operating mechanism performing such varied activities as stopping a war, spraying tropical villages with DDT to combat malaria, and drafting a convention on some aspect of human rights. There is even a point of view—albeit a narrow one—from which the United Nations appears to be the symbol of wicked one-worldliness, a sinister threat to the national sovereignty, and a joint convention of international do-gooders and bobby-soxers.

So like a novelist approaching some universal theme, anyone preparing to say or write something about the United Nations must somehow come to grips with his material, determine his point of view, decide where to focus—what to put in and what to leave out. In the process, many arbitrary choices must be made.

##### STAKE OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE UNITED NATIONS

My arbitrary choice for this occasion—which I hope will meet with the committee's approval—is to focus briefly but sharply on this question: How and to what extent does our membership in the United Nations serve the foreign policy interests of the United States of America? Or, more crudely, Mr. Chairman, what's in it for us? I think this coincides with your assignment.

I make no apology to the most sensitive supporter of the United Nations for phrasing it that way. After all, if the very considerable effort and time and money which we have invested in the United Nations has not been a good investment from the U.S. point of view, then we should say so and behave accordingly—as, I feel sure, every other member does.

I shall try to test this question of what's in it for us against two criteria: first against the record of the 17th General Assembly which had just over 100 items on its agenda; and second, against the roles of the U.N. in two of the greatest crises of recent history—the collapse of the Congo and the discovery of Soviet missile bases in Cuba. These are tough tests: one covers a virtual compendium of the ongoing problems which beset the modern world; the other raises specific issues of peace and war in specific areas at specific times.

But before coming to these two tests of how well or how badly our membership in the U.N. serves the national interest, it is worthwhile to pose a prior test: Is the United Nations relevant to the real world of the second half of the 20th century? For if the United Nations does not reflect the real world, it is unlikely to be able to do anything useful about it.

#### FIVE DOMINANT FACTS OF LIFE IN THE 20TH CENTURY

What then are the dominant factors that make the real world what it is in the second half of the 20th century? I think we can limit ourselves to brief mention of five dominant facts of life in our tumultuous times:

Let me say first is the great confrontation which goes under the name of the East-West conflict or the cold war—and the nuclear arms race which is its most dangerous manifestation. This has brought into conflict two sets of ideas about the value of human dignity which cannot be bridged philosophically. It also has brought into conflict two great and powerful nations whose national differences must be bridged politically if either is to survive. The proceedings of the United Nations consistently reflect both aspects of this so-called East-West confrontation.

The second factor dominating contemporary history is the revolutionary wave of national independence which, in an incredibly short period, has brought political independence to nearly 1 billion people, leaving less than 2 percent of the former colonial peoples in dependent status—an historic convulsion which perhaps offered communism its greatest opportunity to absorb vast areas of the world. The United Nations has itself administered a number of these changes from dependent to independent status and is deeply involved with the difficult and emotional final stages of liquidating the old colonial system and the race problems embedded in it.

The third factor is the so-called revolution of rising expectations, which has put a spotlight on the glaring gap between the material conditions of the rich minority and the poor majority among the world's peoples. Some 85 percent of the entire staffs of the U.N. system is occupied with the first systematic effort at international co-operation in the field of economic and social affairs—certainly one of the great phenomena of contemporary times.

Fourth is the fantastic pace of discovery and invention—which romps ahead oblivious to the political and social consequences and which makes the demands for a decent life for all a practical proposition for the first time in history. The United Nations is concerned increasingly with the complex and little-understood problems of how to transfer effectively science and technology from one cultural setting to another.

Fifth is the fitful emergence of a restless, teeming, volatile, frequently quarrelsome open society of nation-states—a society of enormous diversity of cultures, races, and political, economic, and social systems. The United Nations is, of course, the institutional center of this open international society—partly the cause and partly the result of the forces which impel an interdependent world into more intimate association on an expanding agenda of political and human problems.

If these are the principal factors which mold our times—the cold war, the liquidation of colonialism, the pervasive demand for a better material way of life, the thundering impact of science, and the emergence of a vast, new, open society on the international plane—then we must conclude that the United Nations is indeed relevant to these times—that it is part and parcel of the contemporary scene. And being relevant, it is in a position to be effective.

#### PROBLEMS BEFORE THE U.N. DURING THE 17TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Let us come, then, to the question of how effective from our point of view. What's in it for us? How—as the most recent example—does the record of the 17th General Assembly stand the test?

I said a moment ago that the agenda of the 17th General Assembly was a virtual compendium of the ongoing problems of the modern world.

Listen to this list of trouble spots and sore spots: the Congo, the Gaza Strip, Southern Rhodesia, South-West Africa, the Portuguese African territories, Kashmir, Yemen, West New Guinea, and the Arab refugee camps.

Mark this string of contentious issues: Chinese representation, North Korea, Hungary, colonialism, troika, and sovereignty over natural resources.

Consider, if you will, this list of universal concerns: disarmament, nuclear testing, outer space, world food, world trade, world science, and the training of manpower for economic and social development.

All of these issues, in one form or another, came before the United Nations for some kind of action during the last General Assembly, even if each one did not appear formally on the Assembly's agenda. Many of them are among the most complex, the most intractable, the most ancient troubles of the human race. And many come to the United Nations as a court of last resort—because nobody else has been able to cope with them at all.

Obviously, the United Nations did not “solve” all or even many of these problems; but it worked on them. On a few it took conclusive action; on some it made progress, and on others it did not.

FOREIGN POLICY INTERESTS OF UNITED STATES SERVED BY MEMBERSHIP IN  
THE UNITED NATIONS

We have made full reports on the record of the 17th General Assembly—item by item and vote by vote; I shall not take your time to repeat the record. The point to be made is simply this: the U.S. view was the majority view in over 80 percent of the 40 key votes cast in committees and full Assembly. On several issues we abstained, and on two extreme resolutions recommending sanctions against member States we voted against the majority.

This is the measure of the extent to which our membership in the United Nations served the foreign policy interests of the United States across the spectrum of issues represented by the agenda of the 17th General Assembly.

Meanwhile, the impact of the twin crises in the Caribbean and the Himalayas raised our credit—and our credibility; had the opposite effect on the stock of the Soviet Union; improved Western Hemisphere solidarity; activated the members from NATO; and gave pause to those who tend to equate the bona fides of the United States and the Soviet Union.

Mr. Chairman, I am not saying for one moment that the 17th General Assembly—or any other meeting or organ of the United Nations—was the handmaiden of the Department of State. I am not even saying that there were no disappointments or no cause for apprehension; for example, we expect continuing fireworks over the hard core cases in the remnants of European empires, and we are most gravely concerned at the lack of evidence of financial responsibility on the part of all too many members. But I am saying, most emphatically, that in no case was U.S. interest damaged, in most cases our objectives were furthered in a positive fashion, and in other cases we have reason to hope for a better result on another day. In short, it was very much in our national interest to be there, paying our considerable share of the cost and exercising our considerable share of the leadership.

The political problems before the General Assembly tend to be those anguished issues which have roots in the past and drag on from year to year—so hardy or so virulent that sometimes our best efforts succeed only in keeping them from going from bad to worse.

## POLITICAL CRISES IN THE UNITED NATIONS

But now I should like to discuss two crises which had sudden beginnings, which directly and immediately involved the United Nations, and which now seem to be ended—at least in the form in which they arose. I refer to those most dangerous events which raised the dire threat of great power confrontation—and thus of nuclear war—in the Congo and the Caribbean. The point is to ask in each case whether the role of the United Nations in these crises served the foreign policy interests of the United States.

## THE PROBLEM OF THE CONGO AFFAIR

What were our aims in the Congo affair? Our aims in the Congo are the same as our aims for all of tropical Africa. They are quite simple to state: to help create an area of truly free and independent African states, safe from external aggression or subversion, working out their own destinies in their own way, cooperating with each other and with those who wish to help in their overwhelming task of progressive modernization. In the Congo, as elsewhere, this requires national unity and a reasonable degree of political stability.

Contrasted to this, the collapse of the Congo in its first week of nationhood offered these sudden prospects: national disunity, political chaos, civil disorder, social disintegration, and external penetration—prospects made to order for Communist exploitation. And because of this, the ultimate prospect for the Congo was for the forces of the nuclear powers to find themselves face to face in the heart of central Africa in the infancy of independence—about as messy and dangerous a state of affairs as one can imagine.

The story of the struggle of the United Nations—with unflagging support from this country—to bring order out of chaos in the Congo is too well known to members of this committee to review it here. I am all too conscious of every bit and every kind of criticism that has been leveled against this operation; and it has been of every kind—from honest doubts about the legal basis for U.N. action to purple propaganda and outrageous lies. I also will state that in this unprecedented, almost fantastic operation in any historical sense, some decisions were not perfectly coordinated, some operations were not fully efficient, some judgments were not later justified, and a few actions were not excusable. My point is neither to tabulate the accomplishments nor to count the mistakes.

My point is, rather, to look at the results and state that, as of today, civil war has been replaced by national unity, political chaos has been replaced by reasonable prospects for political stability, total disorder has been replaced by order, social disintegration has been replaced by an evolving program for social progress, and the scavengers have been sent home packing. None of this is yet guaranteed to be permanent. But this is what has happened in the Congo; this is what the United States wanted to happen in the Congo; and it could not have happened under any other auspices than that of the United Nations, without the certainty or at least the risk of international war.

It, therefore, is difficult—indeed it is impossible—to avoid the conclusion that the foreign policy interests of the United States have been served well by the United Nations performance in the Congo crisis—and this, of course, would have been out of the question without our membership and our full support. I know no way of putting a dollar value on the restoration of peace in central Africa.

The U.N. role in the Congo was, of course, an extremely large operational task, by far the largest it has ever undertaken involving nearly 20,000 troops from 21 nations, supported by a massive airlift, and by hundreds of civilian technicians recruited through a dozen international agencies.

## THE CUBAN CRISIS AND THE U.N.

The U.N. role in the Cuban crisis was entirely different. Actually, the U.N. had three roles in the Cuban crisis—two of which were played out while the third was frustrated but nonetheless useful to us. Because the naval quarantine of Cuba was the first dramatic move in that crisis, and because of the critical part played by the Organization of American States, it is easy to forget how the United Nations fitted into the pattern of these supercharged days when the world stood at the edge of the abyss in late October.

You will remember, of course, that the President called into play at one stroke all the available instruments of diplomatic action—U.S. military power, the Organization of American States, the United Nations, and an appeal to public opinion around the world.

## THE FIRST ROLE OF THE U.N. IN THE CUBAN CRISIS

The first role of the United Nations was to serve as a world forum where the facts could be laid on the table. When the Security Council met in emergency session, I was able to present the U.S. case not only to the members of that Council, but to all other members of the United Nations who crowded that tense room, as well as to the press and the microphones and the cameras which carried our story to our own public and to every corner of the world reached by the mass media of today. Our case was right; our case was thoroughly documented; and our case was vastly strengthened as it unfolded before the bar of world opinion in the Security Council of the U.N.—the only bar of universal public opinion there is. Just how much this revelation of Soviet deceit and recklessness shocked the innocent bystanders in the cold war, I can't guess. Nor, of course, can I estimate how much this blow to confidence in Russia's word and influence among the new nations contributed to Mr. Khrushchev's decision to pull out quickly and make the best of a bad mistake.

## THE SECOND ROLE OF THE U.N. IN THE CUBAN CRISIS

The second role of the United Nations—or, more precisely, of the Secretary General of the United Nations—was that of third party to the issue. At a critical moment—when the nuclear powers seemed to be set on a collision course—the Secretary General's intervention led to the diversion of the Soviet ships headed for Cuba and interception by our Navy. This was an indispensable first step in the peaceful resolution of the Cuban crisis. The mere existence of an impartial office which could perform such a service in the middle of the night at such a time, is no small asset to the human race.

## ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL INSPECTOR PLAYED BY THE U.N. IN CUBA

The third role of the United Nations in the Cuban crisis—the one which could not be played out—was that of an international inspector ready and willing to go at once to Cuba to verify the removal of the missiles. As we all know, Castro refused a United Nations presence

on Cuban soil—U Thant's visit was in vain, and thus Castro prevented a quicker and cleaner liquidation of the crisis. But the fact is that at the height of this most dangerous period of the postwar world, Chairman Khrushchev agreed—even proposed—an international inspection team under United Nations auspices, a proposal to which we could quickly agree and which became part of the formula for disengagement between the United States and Soviet heads of state. And Castro's refusal of U.N. inspection converted a quarrel between the Soviet Union and the United States into a defiance of the United Nations by Cuba.

#### SITE OF MEETINGS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND SOVIET NEGOTIATORS

Finally, and I won't detain you longer on this subject, the United Nations also provided a site where Mr. McCloy and I could meet with Mr. Kuznetsov and the Soviet negotiators for those long weeks to conclude the transaction and bring about the withdrawal of the Soviet bombers.

Mr. Chairman, I should not care to speculate on how or when the Cuban crisis might have been resolved—or whether it could have been resolved—without the United Nations. But I do say that the United Nations played a large part in a complex exercise in diplomatic action which averted the threat of thermonuclear war; and for this I think we can thank our stars.

#### U.N. SERVED THE UNITED STATES WELL

Now, gentlemen, we have put the record of the United Nations at the 17th General Assembly, during the Congo crisis, and during the Cuban crisis, to the test; and we have seen that, in very large measure, the performance of the U.N. served well the foreign policy interests of the United States. There was, indeed, much in it for us.

But I should prefer, in the end, not to read that record as though it were a scoreboard on which victories and defeats are recorded. I prefer to avoid the specious habit of treating the course of human affairs—even the massive conflicts in world affairs—like some sporting event which ends when the timekeeper blows his whistle.

The real world of international politics is, as you know, not that simple. We are dealing with fitful tides of history which ebb and flow. We are wrestling often with problems which, when solved in their immediate forms, promptly give rise to new forms and new problems—as witness the case of the Congo today.

We can, of course, say with assurance that, in this case or that, our policies prevailed and our objectives were gained. We can point to objective proof of progress here and there. We can show that unfriendly moves by X and Y were defeated or diverted—and that in all of these cases the United Nations had a useful part to play.

#### SPECULATION ON A WORLD WITHOUT THE UNITED NATIONS

But to form mature judgments as to the real value of the United Nation to the interests of the United States, it seems to me that we must raise alternatives—that we must ask questions which challenge the imagination to say what might have happened if the United Nations had not been there at all. For example:

Would the Communists have fared better or worse in their efforts to divert the independence movement into a Communist mold—their supreme opportunity to extend power—if the United Nations had not existed?

Would the prospects of peace be better or worse—in Iran, in Greece, in Korea, in Kashmir, in the Middle East, in the Western Pacific, in central Africa—if there had been no United Nations during the past decade and a half?

Would U.S. foreign policy interests, more recently in the Congo and the Caribbean, have been served better or worse without a United Nations during the past few months?

Could the United States put its ideas, its beliefs, its policies before the watching world more—or less—effectively if the United Nations did not exist?

I shall not attempt to speculate on these rather frightening alternatives for, it seems to me, the questions answer themselves.

But I should like to conclude my remarks with a few comments about the position of those who favor the United Nations in principle but want to withdraw or restrict our support on those relatively few occasions when the United States finds itself in a minority position.

#### U.S. POSITION IN THE UNITED NATIONS

The basic point here, of course, is that the United States does not own or control the United Nations. It is not a wing of the State Department. We are no more and no less than the most influential of the 110 members. If we were less we would be failing to exert the influence of freedom's leader; if we were more we would destroy the effectiveness of the U.N., which depends precisely on the fact that it is not an arm of the United States or of any other government, but a truly international organization—no better or worse than the agreements which can be reached by the controlling majorities of its members.

Before such agreements are reached—or not reached—debate and negotiation bare differences and reveal similarities which frequently lead to accommodation and compromise. And I would ask: Is this not the heart of the democratic method? Is this not the parliamentary system in action? Is this not our own idea of how we are most likely to make more wise decisions than foolish ones—how the weak are most likely to be protected from the strong—how the will of the majority and the rights of the minority can both find expression without injustice to either?

The answer to these questions is "Yes." And if we were to pick up our marbles and go home whenever there is a disappointment we would not only destroy the effectiveness of the U.N. but would abandon hope that nations can work out their problems most of the time by the same methods by which conflicting interests get resolved within democratic nations and communities. This would deny on the international level and principles, methods, and techniques which we swear by on the national and local levels.

## U.S. FAITH IN THE UNITED NATIONS JUSTIFIED

Even faith in our kind of institutions would not, however, be enough to justify support for the United Nations if it worked against us. But this dilemma, happily, does not exist, and the record proves it. The fact is that the story of the last General Assembly—when the U.S. position was the majority position better than four times out of five—is the standard story of succeeding Assemblies over the past 17 years. The fact is that in 17 years the Soviet Union has never once, never once, succeeded in building a majority for any proposition of substance against the opposition of the United States. And the fact is that in 17 years the United States has never felt obliged to exercise its veto in the Security Council to protect its interests, and the Soviet Union has used the veto 100 times.

That's the record and there is, of course, a fundamental reason for it. The reason should be recalled frequently—for in this fact lies one of our greatest assets in the world today: the fact that the foreign policy interests of the United States are generally in harmony with the foreign policy interests of all nations which want to see a peaceful community of independent states working together, by free choice, to improve the lot of humanity. And since the majority of the nations of the world share this goal, the majority consistently sides with the United States—or we side with them, depending on your point of view—when the roll is called and the yeas and nays are counted. It's as simple as that.

But let us take a couple of blemishes in the record and the performance of the U.N. and its members—the kind of blemishes that lead some of our people who favor the U.N. in principle to want to restrict it in practice.

## U.S. DISAGREEMENT WITH SPECIAL FUND PROJECT

First, take a case where the United States could not agree with a majority of the decision-making group in a U.N. agency. A recent case, was the one that you referred to in your opening statement, Mr. Chairman, of the decision of the United Nations Special Fund to help finance an agricultural research project in Cuba. We objected to that project and still do. Yet the whole story is that out of 288 projects assisted by that Fund, in the course of its existence, we approved of 287. So we face a choice: should we retaliate by withholding or limiting our support for an agency which we invented, which has allocated 97 percent of its funds to nations which we ourselves are aiding, and which represents an economical way for the United States to contribute to the decade of development because in one instance out of 288 instances we were unable to persuade a majority that our view was the correct one?

CONTRIBUTIONS BY SOVIET UNION NOT MADE TO UNITED NATIONS  
SPECIALIZED AGENCIES

Let me refer also to a situation which seems to agitate some of our people—the fact that the Soviet Union does not make the voluntary contributions which it is well able to make to such programs as technical assistance, the malaria eradication, the world food program,

and so forth. Their delinquency is deplorable but understandable from their point of view. These programs do not serve Communist ends, on the contrary. So it is hardly surprising that the Soviet Union makes little or no voluntary contributions to agencies whose work cuts straight across their own objectives. But should we support these programs less because they fail to win applause from the Kremlin?

As a matter of fact, Mr. Chairman, I rather suspect that the Soviet Union and other Communist countries will tend to participate—and contribute—somewhat more in the work of these agencies in the years to come. There is some evidence of that already. And I think that the reason is clear. The policy of self-ostracism from the specialized agencies has not worked well for the Soviet Union, even though it has made life with them a bit easier for us.

If this in fact happens, it will raise some day-to-day problems for us but, in my view, it also will raise problems for them and opportunities for us. For while the so-called Communist states operate more or less closed societies at home, once they step out into a United Nations forum they enter an open society.

In an open forum, over a period of time, ideology becomes transparent, dogma wears thin and becomes tiresome, and the myth of the magical solution evaporates slowly in the free air of a marketplace of ideas. There is contention in all this; there is frustration and the stuff of headlines; there is danger that the fearful and the insecure will want to withdraw from the free interplay of conflicting ideas and concepts and terminology—especially if, now and again, things do not go exactly the way we would like them to.

Yet it is we who do best in the open forum—for this is our natural habitat. And if we have the nerve to go ahead—if we have the stomach for the test of the open society—if we have the courage to build even that which is not perfect from our point of view—I can foresee nothing but a more meaningful dialogue coming out of it, a gradual erosion of tension, and finally the dominance of a set of ideas which are better—and better able also to stand the test—than the Marxist ideas as revealed to his successors.

All this would require, on our part, a degree of responsibility, of restraint, of maturity, and of political sophistication which never before has been demanded of a democratic public and its elected representatives. It will not be easy and it will not be without temporary disappointments; and I, for one, have no doubt of the outcome—for this, too, would serve and serve well the foreign policy interests of the United States of America.

#### AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION ABOUT THE U.N.

Senator CHURCH. Governor, let me commend you on a very eloquent and impressive statement which this committee is used to hearing when you come to testify. We appreciate the statement very much.

You have postulated the question to what degree does the United Nations conform with the foreign policy interests of the United States, or in the vernacular, what's in it for us? That certainly is a question that many Americans ask themselves. Judging from the mail that

we are getting up here on the Hill, it is a question that is very much on the minds of the American people.

In your statement, you have well observed that this question ought to answer itself. It really should. I, for one, wonder why so many people have it on their minds.

#### PROTESTATIONS AGAINST U.S. MEMBERSHIP IN THE U.N.

Yet there is a rising chorus of protestation against the United Nations. Some of it seems to be strident and irrational, but it is there. Some of it seems to be more tempered and more rational, and needs careful consideration.

In your statement you have rebutted the major arguments that are most frequently raised against the United Nations. But, I think, for purposes of emphasis we would do well here to restate them in terms that are better known to the people; more often used by those groups who are adamantly opposed to the United Nations.

I should like to start, Governor, with a most extreme kind of anti-U.N. sentiment that so often comes to us in letters and other communications from our own constituents.

There seems to be a strong suspicion, and I gather that it arises from the fact that some 10 percent of the total membership of the United Nations is composed of Communist countries, that the United Nations is, therefore, somehow the instrument of Communist manipulations and Communist design. This leads to the cry that "We ought to get the United States out of the United Nations and the United Nations out of the United States."

In your experience as our Ambassador to the United Nations, and your close knowledge of its affairs, have you detected any factual basis for this feeling or any basis on which you might conclude that the influence of the Communist membership in the United Nations and the extent to which the Communist members may direct the decisions and policies of the United Nations exceeds the actual numbers of Communist governments present in the General Assembly?

In a word, is there any plausibility to the argument that the Communists exercise undue influence over the decisions of the United Nations?

#### LACK OF COMMUNIST INFLUENCE OVER U.N. DECISIONS

Mr. STEVENSON. I adverted to this in my prepared statement, Mr. Chairman, and I can repeat that in the last General Assembly, of the 40 issues, the 40 key votes, that were cast in plenary session or in committees, 80 percent of them coincided with the U.S. position. That would hardly sound like Communist domination.

Over the 17-year history of the United Nations, its entire existence, 75 percent of all votes taken in the General Assembly have been with the United States voting for them, that is, it coincided with our views; 13 percent against, over our opposition, and of the remaining 12 percent, we have abstained.

This, I consider to be not only a good record but an extraordinary record, particularly in a body composed of representatives of sovereign and widely divergent nations, and one which I think should be borne in mind when criticisms of this kind are made.

We also point out that it wasn't very long ago, hardly a year, that we were hearing confident and grave predictions of all the defeats that the U.S. interests were about to suffer, defeats in Africa, defeats in Asia, defeats in the Middle East.

The United Nations frustrated Communist designs to penetrate central Africa, as we know. In Asia, the Chinese have acutely embarrassed Moscow by attacking India, and instead of taking over the Middle East, the Communists are now fleeing headlong from Iraq, and much of the Communist investment there is now down the drain.

I would say both on the world scene and within the halls of the United Nations that the Communist influence has not only not dominated the organization, but has almost no influence.

In not one case of any consequence has the Communist position prevailed over the United States. There have been many cases were they have exercised a veto, where they have frustrated positions, in which we believe, in the Security Council.

I think most of this anxiety about Communist influence probably arises, and is probably somewhat confused with colonialism, with the high emotional content of colonialism, to ex-colonial countries, and the fact that the colonial issue has been exploited by the Soviet Union for many years, and will continue to be as long as it endures as an issue.

This is not so much a consequence of Soviet manipulation or influence as it is the Soviet enjoying the benefit of a conflict between the colonial, the newly emerging countries, and the ex-colonial countries.

#### POSSIBLE CONTROL BY THE AFRO-ASIAN BLOC

Senator CHURCH. Another side of this same argument that is often offered is not that the Communists exert undue influence, but that with the growing membership in the United Nations there is an Afro-Asian bloc; and that this bloc, by virtue of its numbers, can control the decisions of the United Nations in a way that would be adverse to the Western community and to the United States. Would you comment on that argument?

Mr. STEVENSON. There is an Afro-Asian majority in the United Nations. As far as its influence is concerned, it has only coincidental identification with the Soviet Union's position, and that is mostly in the colonial cases where you could better say that the Soviet is voting with them as that they are voting with the Soviet.

Actually among the Afro-Asian powers, 12 of them are former members of the French West African, French Equatorial Africa.

These states even changed in the last session from abstaining from voting on the admission of Red China, to voting against. This would hardly be a Communist victory.

As to six or eight, they are states which are definitely aligned with the West, such as Pakistan. Many of them are nonaligned or neutral. But there is no pattern of solidarity in the Afro-Asian or Middle Eastern states on any issue except one issue, of colonialism, which finds virtually all ex-colonial people in a high degree of solidarity.

So my answer to your question is, no, the Afro-Asians don't vote as a bloc, have never voted as a bloc, except in the one case of colonialism, and I see no evidence that they will. Disparities and differences that exist among them are too numerous.

As far as the Communist influence is concerned, if it ever existed, it has diminished perceptively in the last year, both as a result of the Communist attack on India, the leader of the Afro-Asian bloc, so to speak, and also because of the confrontation in the Security Council in the Cuban case and the revelation of Communist deceit and perfidy.

#### ROLE OF THE U.N. IN A DIRECT CONFRONTATION OF WORLD POWERS

Senator CHURCH. The third argument I should like to mention, Mr. Ambassador, certainly comes from a more moderate group. It is often stated in a very well-reasoned way: that although the United Nations can be helpful in avoiding peripheral wars that involve smaller countries, the U.N. cannot play a significant role in any kind of crisis that involves a direct confrontation between the United States, say, and the Soviet Union; that here the U.N. cannot be particularly useful and that, therefore, in the broad design of American foreign policy it must be destined to play a secondary role.

Now, in view of the U.N. involvement in the Cuban crisis and the experience that we have had in recent months, what is your assessment of this argument, and what is your feeling as to the kind of role the U.N. might well play in crises that do involve such mortal threats as nuclear war and such confrontations as the kind that occurred last October over Cuba?

Mr. STEVENSON. You have asked me a question that relates to the greatest weakness and deficiency and defect in the United Nations, that is to say, it cannot impose its will on any great power. This is true.

At the time of San Francisco when this charter was written, I had the privilege of being present. It was contemplated that the five great powers who were the permanent members of the Security Council would be charged with the responsibility for keeping the peace.

Immediately they fell apart and at the Foreign Ministers Conference, where I was also present, in the autumn of 1945, hence the sequel has been nothing except the hardening of the cold war.

The provision in the charter for members supplying national military contingents was never implemented. However, granted that this is true, because the U.N. has no divisions, the fact remains, and we saw an eloquent illustration of it in the case of Cuba this fall, that the force of public opinion, together with the marshaling of the United Nations, together with firmness and resolve on the part of any great power can have an effect, a peaceful effect, in solving dangerous issues.

The point I am attempting to make is that while it is not in the immediate prospect that the United Nations will ever exert greater power than one of the great powers and, therefore, cannot impose its will on one of the great powers because the world is divided, what is true is that the United Nations can summon a very powerful force in world opinion, and world opinion itself is a weapon of vast significance, especially in a world fragmented as this one is, with so many new and small states whose only security rests in the United Nations.

There is another point, that so long as the United Nations can bring great powers together, it can sometimes keep them apart by intervening, by interposing, the counsels of mediation and conciliation and world opinion.

Senator CHURCH. This was, in fact, the role the U.N. played in the Cuban crisis, was it not?

Mr. STEVENSON. Yes.

#### POSSIBILITY OF A PERMANENT U.N. POLICE FORCE

Senator CHURCH. I just have one further question and then I will turn the matter over to the other Senators here.

In the course of your last statement, you made reference to the fact that the U.N. has no divisions. It certainly does not. Is there any possibility that in the years ahead the U.N. might be equipped with some kind of permanent standby police forces that it could readily call upon to snuff out brush fire crises of the kind we have experienced at Suez and in the Congo?

Mr. STEVENSON. Well, there have been many of us who had hoped that the United Nations might have some forces at its own disposition. Thus far, as you know, we have had strenuously difficult times even financing the voluntary forces provided, as in the case of the Congo.

I do not exclude the possibility that the world may come to realize the necessity of the advisability of having some force at hand or on call by the United Nations which could be useful in the smaller or brush fire instances.

I cannot predict with any confidence whether this will come to pass or not, or whether it will continue as we are now—which is soliciting by voluntary contribution forces—as we did in the case of the Middle East emergency force at Suez, and as we have done latterly in the case of the Congo. I rather think it will be in the latter way for some time to come.

Senator CHURCH. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator. I am sorry I did not get to hear all of the Ambassador's statement, but I shall read it with much interest.

#### COST OF U.S. PARTICIPATION IN THE UNITED NATIONS

Mr. Ambassador, in an effort to try to make this perspective perhaps a little clearer, could you indicate what the average cost of the United Nations—because this complaint about the cost arises from time to time—has been to the United States during the past 5 years?

Mr. STEVENSON. To the United States?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. What is our cost? In other words, has it cost us \$100 million or \$200 million a year?

Mr. STEVENSON. I think I can best answer it this way, because I do not have the figures at hand, Senator Fulbright, but the American contribution for the past 5 years to the regular budget I think has averaged less than \$30 million a year. U.S. total contributions have been vastly increased by the U.S. contribution to the Congo forces.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. I think it would be interesting, for various reasons. I think people translate these things, and get them out of proportion.

Would you say, on the average, during the past 5 years all special assessments on the part of the U.N. would be more than an additional \$70 million annually?

In other words, would you say that \$150 million would cover all of the costs of the U.N. to the United States per year during the past 5 years? Is that a good estimate? I do not want it down to the dollar. I was trying to make a comparison here to some other costs that we had.

Senator GORE. It may not be that much.

The CHAIRMAN. I am trying to be generous about it.

Then I want to try to keep some of the costs in this field in proper relation.

#### U.S. CONTRIBUTION TO REGULAR U.N. BUDGET AND ASSESSMENTS LAST YEAR

Mr. STEVENSON. The U.S. contribution, not the regular budget of the U.N., but the U.S. contribution to the regular budget of the U.N. has been running around \$30 million a year, that is to say, one-third of the total, something less than one-third of the total budget between—

The CHAIRMAN. \$30 million?

Mr. STEVENSON. Now, latterly our total contribution to all activities of the United Nations, including all of the specialized agencies, plus the peacekeeping agencies, plus the regular budget, has run to about \$200 million a year in this past year.

The CHAIRMAN. That is in 1 year. That is more than the average, isn't it, considerably?

Mr. STEVENSON. Yes. That is due to the Congo.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, and you are lumping in 1 year there a very large assessment, are you not?

Mr. STEVENSON. That is right.

#### REQUEST FOR AMOUNT OF CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE U.N. IN AN AVERAGE YEAR

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to have supplied for the record the cost to the United States of an average year, not an unusual, exceptional year.

My point is simply this: It might appeal to some of the people who are critical of the cost of the U.N. When you compare this to our own domestic budget for armaments and space, what percentage is it? Is it one-tenth of 1 percent or one-hundredth of 1 percent?

Mr. STEVENSON. You would have to be a mathematician in diminutives to do it.

Senator CHURCH. One-thirtieth of 1 percent.

The CHAIRMAN. My colleague says one-thirtieth of 1 percent. However, we get all this complaint, particularly from certain areas of the country, and it seems to me it is misleading because the American people ought to keep in proper perspective what the United States is contributing to, what our purpose is; and it is, after all, allied with the purpose of our defense; that is, to prevent war, and to create conditions which would make war unlikely. Is that not correct?

Mr. STEVENSON. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. So if you compare these kinds of costs, it seems to me it would make the people who are complaining look a little ridiculous.

Mr. STEVENSON. We would be very happy to supply for the record. I am embarrassed that I did not have them here at my fingertips—precise figures on the total contribution to the regular budget, to the operating or peacekeeping budget, and to all activities of the United Nations for the past 5 years, an average, and the percentage which that represents to the total defense budget for those relative years.

(The information referred to follows:)

*U.S. contributions to U.N., specialized agencies, UNEF, UNOC and voluntary programs*

	<i>In millions of dollars</i>
Fiscal year 1958.....	\$105,619
Fiscal year 1959.....	97,719
Fiscal year 1960.....	118,318
Fiscal year 1961.....	226,033
Fiscal year 1962.....	242,718
Total.....	790,407

Annual average of \$158,081,000 as a percentage of the Department of Defense budget:

	Department of Defense budget	Percent- age
Fiscal year 1958.....	\$38,500,000,000	0.41
Fiscal year 1959.....	39,145,000,000	.40
Fiscal year 1960.....	40,850,000,000	.39
Fiscal year 1961.....	42,577,000,000	.37
Fiscal year 1962.....	43,640,345,000	.36

COMPARISON BETWEEN U.S. CONTRIBUTION TO THE U.N. AND THE DEFENSE BUDGET

The CHAIRMAN. We read much in the paper today about the one plane for which a contract for \$6 billion has recently been signed. How long do you think it would take the U.N. to use up that much money in its operations? That is one plane which probably will be obsolete by the time it is actually produced. Don't you guess it will be obsolete?

Mr. STEVENSON. Well, I think you are a better historian on these things than I am.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be approaching obsolescence, is the way they put it, by the time it is produced.

Mr. STEVENSON. I think the actual figures we should have given you are that the cost of U.S. participation in the United Nations, all inclusive, represents less than one-third of 1 percent of our defense budget.

Senator CHURCH. One-third—it takes a calculating machine to figure it out, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Those figures are available. I know the Ambassador did not expect this. The reason I asked this kind of question is, I think, very unsophisticated people like Senators from the South and Arkansas and others can understand it if you will put it in simple terms. Don't you think we might be more likely to understand it?

Mr. STEVENSON. I might be likely to understand it. I think you do already.

## PERIOD AFTER WORLD WAR I COMPARED TO PERIOD AFTER WORLD WAR II

The CHAIRMAN. There is another comparison I think you could make that I think is meaningful. It has now been 18 years since World War II, hasn't it?

Mr. STEVENSON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. How would you compare the state of the world, and particularly our relations to it, the prospect of peace, and so on, with 18 years after World War I when you didn't have a United Nations? Can you make a comparison that means anything to us?

Mr. STEVENSON. Eighteen years after World War I we were in World War II; we were on the verge of it.

The CHAIRMAN. We were almost on the verge in 1936. But there was very little prospect at that time of communications or negotiations among the nations of the world. They were all going their own way, weren't they? We had a Neutrality Act, didn't we?

Mr. STEVENSON. We also had a League of Nations which had disintegrated largely for the reasons you know very well, for failure of the United States to support it.

The CHAIRMAN. It seems to me this is of some significance. If we look back and see what happened under conditions at a period after World War I, and if we understand how that war came about, under conditions (quite different from those represented by the United Nations) in which there was virtually no communication among the great nations of Europe or with this country, it seems to me that also is encouraging. We are far better off. We have many more strings to our bow now than existed in 1936 or 1937 or before World War I; don't you agree?

Mr. STEVENSON. I do, sir. I think that it is very apparent now that diplomacy and foreign relations have to be conducted on three levels in the future, in this world, as a result of the progress of invention and discovery. That is, through a bilateral basis, as we have conducted diplomacy traditionally in the past, also on a regional basis as we have come in later years to practice it in organizations such as the Organization of American States or NATO, and now we are practicing it on a third level, which is the universal level, and this is becoming more and more important to more and more countries.

Large countries, can, as we have said here, defend themselves. The small countries cannot. Their only security lies in their collective action through this organization, or virtually their only security.

This will become more and more the case as time goes on and, therefore, their dependence on this organization and, therefore, the opportunity for influence, assuming that our motives are always good, and just, and right, will increase.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador.

Senator CHURCH. Senator Aiken.

## ROLE OF THE U.N. IN THE CUBAN CRISIS

Senator AIKEN. I would just like a little background material, Mr. Ambassador, relative to what happened in the U.N. at the time of the Cuban crisis.

I will quote from your statement :

But the fact is that at the height of this most dangerous period of the postwar world, Chairman Khrushchev agreed—even proposed—an international inspection team under United Nations auspices, a proposal to which we could quickly agree and which became part of the formula for disengagement between the United States and Soviet heads of state. And Castro's refusal of U.N. inspection converted a quarrel between the Soviet Union and the United States into a defiance of the United Nations by Cuba.

I do not want to go into all that has been said about that situation, but the fact that there was no inspection has given rise to a barrage of charges and countercharges both against the United States and the United Nations, and the charge that missiles were not all removed, and so on and so forth.

If this inspection had been carried out, there would have been no grounds for the charges and recriminations that have taken place up to today.

#### REFUSAL OF CUBA TO PERMIT INSPECTION

What I want to ask is, What reason did Cuba give—Cuba, a member of the U.N., a Cuba that is largely dependent on the U.N. today—for objecting to an inspection team of the United Nations certifying that these Russian missiles had been removed?

Mr. STEVENSON. Cuba took the position, Senator Aiken, that they would tolerate inspection on their soil only if there was—if it was mutual, if there was inspection on our soil, and on the surrounding periphery of the Caribbean.

Senator AIKEN. Would you consider that the situation was analogous?

Mr. STEVENSON. No, sir.

Senator AIKEN. No, because no foreign country was placing missiles on our soil at all.

Mr. STEVENSON. Yes.

#### REASONS FOR FAILURE TO INSIST ON INSPECTION IN CUBAN CRISIS

Senator AIKEN. Why did the U.S.S.R. and the U.N. and the United States recede from their insistence on an inspection team at that time? Why did you abandon a solution which would have reassured the world and forestalled much of this suspicion which exists today? How was it that Russia made the proposal, backed down, the United States backed down, and the United Nations backed down? What reason was there for this?

Mr. STEVENSON. Because there was no means of enforcing the recommendation, the agreement of Khrushchev and President Kennedy with respect to Cuba, except by force.

Senator AIKEN. The United Nations had no means of enforcing it?

Mr. STEVENSON. No; no means of enforcing it.

Senator AIKEN. I thought they had the means in Korea, the Congo.

Mr. STEVENSON. If they had been willing to launch an invasion.

Senator AIKEN. Would Russia have backed away from their proposal had the United Nations undertaken to use force?

Mr. STEVENSON. It would be hard for me to answer that question, sir.

## ORIGIN OF PROPOSAL TO WITHDRAW INSISTENCE ON INSPECTION

Senator AIKEN. Did you, representing the United States, propose that the United States recede from its position?

Mr. STEVENSON. No, we never receded from our position. We had taken the position right up until now that we were entitled to, under the agreement with Khrushchev, an agreement, unfortunately, which Castro didn't enter into.

Senator AIKEN. Who did insist on receding from the position?

Mr. STEVENSON. Well, as a practical matter we had to get the weapons out of there, and the only means that we could devise to inspect their removal was by sea.

Senator AIKEN. But who first proposed receding, backing down, from insistence on inspection?

Mr. STEVENSON. Well, as I say, we have never backed down. We have—

Senator AIKEN. That is right.

Mr. STEVENSON. We have never fulfilled the agreement.

Senator AIKEN. Somebody else must have proposed that the U.N. back down.

Mr. STEVENSON. No, I don't know that there was ever any—

Senator AIKEN. But they did back down. I am just wondering who proposed it. Whose idea was it to recede from the position which, if adhered to, would have done away with all of the suspicion which existed there?

Mr. STEVENSON. The only thing that happened, Senator Aiken, was that Cuba refused to accept U.N. inspection forces on its soil and given this fact, we had to devise other means of doing it. There was no backing down from it.

Senator AIKEN. You mean that when the United States and Russia insisted on inspection that Cuba could have walloped both the United States and Russia put together and the rest of the United Nations?

Mr. STEVENSON. If you are speaking about the use of force, no, of course not.

## POWER WIELDED BY CUBA

Senator AIKEN. Do you think Cuba would have declared war against both the United States and Russia and any other countries that undertook to carry out United Nations decisions?

Mr. STEVENSON. I don't—there was no United Nations decision. There was never a resolution adopted by the Security Council at any time during the Cuban crisis. There was an agreement between President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev.

Senator AIKEN. But you say this proposal to have an international inspection team under United Nations auspices became part of the formula.

Mr. STEVENSON. This was a suggestion by the Secretary General to the Russian Ambassador.

Senator AIKEN. You mean a formula as agreed to simply by the United States and Russia?

Mr. STEVENSON. Yes, sir.

Senator AIKEN. And then Cuba told the United States and Russia where to go?

Mr. STEVENSON. Yes.

Senator AIKEN. And nobody dared to do anything about it; is that right?

Mr. STEVENSON. Yes.

Senator AIKEN. Do you consider the Castro government of Cuba a government of the Cuban people?

Mr. STEVENSON. No. I think it is a minority government like virtually all Communist governments are. I don't have any special information on that, but I should suspect that it represented a relatively small minority of the Cuban people.

Senator AIKEN. A small minority of Cubans?

Mr. STEVENSON. A minority of Cubans, yes.

#### INFLUENCE OF THE SOVIET UNION OVER THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT

Senator AIKEN. What influence do you think Russia has over the Cuban Government today?

Mr. STEVENSON. I think it has a considerable influence, especially in military affairs and defense, and obviously its economy is now almost wholly dependent upon the Soviet Union. So I would suppose it had a very considerable influence over the Cuban Government. But there is some reason to think that its influence is diminishing. Mikoyan, as you know, spent a month in Cuba trying to induce the Cubans to accept the agreement entered into by Khrushchev and was unsuccessful. It is hard for me to speculate, I am just not competent to tell you, to what extent Russian influence in Cuba has diminished.

Senator AIKEN. Wouldn't you say that Russia virtually holds the life and death power over the Cuban Government today?

Mr. STEVENSON. Certainly over its economy. Whether it holds it over its Government I do not know.

Senator AIKEN. You would not say it held it militarily?

Mr. STEVENSON. Oh, militarily, I would think so.

Senator AIKEN. And economically and politically?

Mr. STEVENSON. Economically certainly.

Senator AIKEN. But not politically?

Mr. STEVENSON. I just do not know. I am not informed.

Senator AIKEN. Well, it is still a mystery to me why Cuba can defy the United States, U.S.S.R., and the United Nations and make them all back down, and thus create a situation, an atmosphere, which is charged and surcharged with suspicion when if, as you say, Chairman Khrushchev agreed and even proposed this inspection. Yet all together were powerless to enforce the formula.

Mr. STEVENSON. Maybe Chairman Khrushchev doesn't exercise as much influence over Cuba as we suspected.

Senator AIKEN. I think Chairman Khrushchev has his troubles, too. But in the meantime he officially represents the U.S.S.R. as head of state.

Those are all the questions I have, Mr. Chairman.

Senator CHURCH. Thank you, Senator.

Senator AIKEN. I wish we had gone ahead with inspection.

Mr. STEVENSON. I wish we could have.

## REFUSAL OF INSPECTIONS BY CUBA

Senator CHURCH. On this question of inspection, may I just ask this, Mr. Ambassador: I take it from your testimony that had we attempted to force onsite inspection against Castro's resistance it would have required an invasion of Cuba or the definite intention and use of force?

Mr. STEVENSON. I would suppose so, if a country refuses to accept a proposal.

Senator CHURCH. Do you know of any case where any country heretofore has been invaded on the basis of its refusal to permit onsite inspection inside its territory?

Mr. STEVENSON. I don't think there ever has been any such case.

The most interesting thing about inspection here was the proposal that came from the Secretary General to the Soviet Union, and it accepted for itself. It could not accept it for Cuba, and then it tried to persuade Cuba to accept it, too. They declined and made a counterproposal which was that there be reciprocal inspection, and this was, of course, intolerable to us.

So we made another counterproposal which was if there is any reciprocity that—if there was reciprocity by inspection of the United States, we should also inspect their source and this, of course, was in Soviet territory, and this, of course, was rejected by the Soviets.

Senator CHURCH. So in the end we had to balance whatever the risk might be in foregoing onsite inspection in Cuba against what the cost might be to the United States of its position in Latin America and in the world. It had to be a general assessment of a general balance of interests. Is that not correct?

Mr. STEVENSON. That is correct, plus the fact that we had an alternative method of inspection. The reason for the inspection was security for the United States at sea, which, while it was not as satisfactory as territorial onsite inspection, it was still very effective.

Senator CHURCH. Senator Sparkman?

## INSPECTION AGREEMENT A BILATERAL ONE

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Ambassador, Cuba was never a part of these negotiations, was it?

Mr. STEVENSON. Never.

Senator SPARKMAN. Therefore, any agreement between the United States and Russia was simply an agreement between those two powers in the hope that Cuba might be persuaded to permit the onsite inspection?

Mr. STEVENSON. That is correct, Senator.

Senator SPARKMAN. What we actually did was to avoid the use of force rather than to insist upon the onsite inspection?

Mr. STEVENSON. Correct.

Senator SPARKMAN. And to rely on the other types of inspection as you have mentioned.

Mr. STEVENSON. Yes, sir; at sea.

Senator SPARKMAN. I want to compliment you upon a very fine statement which you have given. I want to ask you just a couple of questions.

## FAILURE OF SOME NATIONS TO KEEP UP THEIR FINANCIAL ASSESSMENTS

You said something about the financial standing and, you mentioned particularly, the failure of Russia to participate in some of these activities. Of course, there has been a great deal of concern over the country, and it has been reflected in the Congress, as you know, with reference to the failure of a good many nations to keep up with their payments.

Now, you believe, do you not, that the International Court decision was helpful to this situation?

Mr. STEVENSON. It was very helpful, Senator, because this is the first time we have ever had any interpretation of the charter with respect to the assessments for peacekeeping operations and whether or not they were subject to the penalties provided in the charter for assessments for the regular budget.

Senator SPARKMAN. By the way, the General Assembly approved that decision overwhelmingly, did it not?

Mr. STEVENSON. I think it was 76 to 17; yes, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. Seventy-six to seventeen. So it stands as the policy of the United Nations generally?

Mr. STEVENSON. Yes, sir.

## APPOINTMENT OF EUGENE BLACK AS CONSULTANT TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL ON FISCAL AFFAIRS

Senator SPARKMAN. By the way, I think another encouraging thing which has been done has been the action recently taken of securing the services of Mr. Eugene Black as financial consultant or adviser or whatever his title may be.

Mr. STEVENSON. Yes. He has very generously agreed, after negotiations which we opened last summer, to act as consultant to the Secretary General on fiscal affairs, and especially with reference to the future financing problem, and also the embarrassment caused by the accumulation of arrearages for nonpayment.

Senator SPARKMAN. In other words, he is going to do what he can to collect the arrearages?

Mr. STEVENSON. Yes. I think it would be perhaps a mistake to try to label his position as finance minister, but you could certainly label it as senior financial adviser of the organization.

## U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE CONGO

Senator SPARKMAN. I want to ask just a question or two about the Congo. You gave a very fine treatment of that, but I want to clarify my own thinking on this.

First of all, our policy with reference to the Congo was decided 2 or 3 years ago, was it not?

Mr. STEVENSON. Our policy was decided in July 1960.

Senator SPARKMAN. In July 1960. And this administration simply followed the policy established by the preceding administration?

Mr. STEVENSON. That is correct.

Senator SPARKMAN. Isn't it true that the decision made in 1960 followed a solemn agreement that had been entered into at the Brussels Conference in which both contending factions participated?

## ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CONGO AS A STATE

Mr. STEVENSON. Yes. If you are referring to Katanga, the representatives at the Brussels Conference in January 1960, which adopted the proposed Loi Fundamentale, under which Belgium relinquished sovereignty over the Congo, and the new state was created, was signed by Mr. Tshombe as representative of the Province of Katanga.

Senator SPARKMAN. And signed as well by representatives of the other parts of the Congo?

Mr. STEVENSON. All the other provincial leaders.

Senator SPARKMAN. Then, following that, was not a government set up in keeping with that agreement?

Mr. STEVENSON. Yes, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. And wasn't Mr. Adoula duly elected according to the procedures outlined in that agreement?

Mr. STEVENSON. Yes; but not at first.

Senator SPARKMAN. I realize he was not at first, but most of the trouble arose after he had been elected, I believe.

Mr. STEVENSON. The trouble started a little bit earlier than Mr. Adoula and his election.

Senator SPARKMAN. But it started in connection with a government that had been duly established in accordance with the agreement arrived at in Brussels, when Belgium, the former ruling power, and the representatives of the Congo areas had reached agreement?

Mr. STEVENSON. That is correct.

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Tshombe, who was dominant in Katanga, participated?

Mr. STEVENSON. I think Provincial President was his title at the time of the Brussels Conference in January.

## U.S. SUPPORT OF THE GOVERNMENT ESTABLISHED IN THE CONGO

Senator SPARKMAN. What the United States did, even early in 1960, was to go along with the U.N. decision to support a duly established government in the Congo, and to try to unify the country.

Mr. STEVENSON. Restore law and order after the mutinies had broken out.

Senator SPARKMAN. In your opinion, was the undertaking successful?

Mr. STEVENSON. I have tried to indicate here this afternoon that I think it is, perhaps, the most remarkable historic case of collective responsibility by the world community in restoring peace and order to a region of the world, especially one this large.

Senator SPARKMAN. Do you believe that our contribution to that movement, that action, constituted a tremendous contribution to world peace?

Mr. STEVENSON. I do indeed. It wouldn't have been possible without the United States support.

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes.

I believe that is all, Mr. Chairman.

Senator CHURCH. Thank you, Senator.

Senator Carlson?

## U.N. ROLE IN THE CUBAN CRISIS

Senator CARLSON. Mr. Ambassador, I want to get into the financial problems a little bit, but I was intrigued by one sentence in your statement, and I think it needs clarification—at least as far as I am concerned. It reads this way:

I should not care to speculate on how or when the Cuban crisis might have been resolved or whether it could have been resolved without the United Nations.

Am I to take that statement to mean that as far as the United Nations is concerned the Cuban situation has been resolved?

Mr. STEVENSON. I was referring to the threat created by the existence of the missiles in Cuba, the crisis we confronted last October.

Senator CARLSON. Do you think we have a crisis in Cuba now?

Mr. STEVENSON. We have a crisis in Cuba insofar as we have a crisis in all the Communist areas of the world who are pledged to destroy our system. We don't have the same threat to our peace and our security that we had at the time these missiles were targeted on American bases.

Senator CARLSON. Are we not continuing to fly planes over Cuba daily in order to get what inspection we can because we think the problem is serious enough to endanger our situation in this hemisphere?

Mr. STEVENSON. I hope we are flying them; I assume we are still doing it.

## CUBAN TRAINING OF REPRESENTATIVES FROM LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES

Senator CARLSON. Does not the United Nations have any interest in the fact that it has been brought to light recently that 1,500 representatives of Latin American countries were in Cuba for training in order to go home and spread the Communist doctrine?

Mr. STEVENSON. I cannot speak for the United Nations on that. But, of course, this is a source of grave concern to the United States and to the Western Hemisphere.

I think, in my own judgment, it is of much greater concern to me than the existence of some Russian forces in Cuba.

Senator CARLSON. I might agree with you on that. I am greatly concerned about it personally, and I was a little fearful of this statement here that the United Nations—and maybe that was a feeling of our representative in the United Nations—has no problem in Cuba at the present time.

Mr. STEVENSON. I do not have that quote right in front of me, sir. Could you tell me where it was?

## IMPORTANCE OF U.N. IN CUBAN CRISIS

Senator CARLSON. It says that the crisis might not have been resolved without the United Nations, and I gathered that it was resolved as far as they were concerned.

Mr. STEVENSON. Well, I think, perhaps, maybe my language is not apt.

What I was attempting to say was that the crisis that was created last fall by the clandestine introduction of offensive weapons into Cuba was resolved by their removal; that this would have been pos-

sible without collision and the risk of war, without the intervention of the United Nations, I am not prepared to say. Perhaps it would have been.

This is all I was saying here. But that the United Nations contributed to that peaceful conclusion, this is unquestionable.

Senator CARLSON. I shall not disagree with you, Mr. Ambassador, on that phase of it. I wanted the record clear that, so far as one member of this committee is concerned, the situation in Cuba has not been resolved as far as the United States is concerned.

Mr. STEVENSON. Perhaps I should have said "the crisis of October."

Senator CARLSON. I would have accepted that.

#### PERCENTAGE OF U.S. CONTRIBUTIONS TO TOTAL COST OF U.N. OPERATIONS

I did want to get into a little discussion on the financial operations of the United Nations. The Senator from Arkansas started asking some questions about it. What percentage of the total cost of the operations of the United Nations does the United States contribute?

Mr. STEVENSON. We have that statutory maximum which was laid down by Congress of not to exceed 33 $\frac{1}{3}$  percent of the budget of the United Nations. Actually we are contributing now 32.02 percent.

Senator CARLSON. I notice now that the figure of \$94 million was voted by the General Assembly for the 1963 regular budget. That is an increase, as I see it, of \$7 million beyond the estimates for the 1963 period made when the Assembly began its last session. If we should grant this increase, how much would the percentage share be of the United States?

Mr. STEVENSON. It would be the same percentage on which we are proceeding now, which would be 32.02.

#### CONTRIBUTION OF UNITED STATES TO U.N. PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

Senator CARLSON. What percentage have we been contributing to the operation for the Congo and for the United Nations Emergency Force?

Mr. STEVENSON. For those two activities of the Congo and the Middle East emergency force, our contribution is approximately 47, between 47 and 48 percent.

Senator CARLSON. In other words, we are contributing about one-half of the cost of the operations in the Congo and the Middle East?

Mr. STEVENSON. Yes, sir.

Senator CARLSON. How about the contributions from other countries?

Mr. STEVENSON. Those, you understand, are not assessed. Those are voluntary.

Senator CARLSON. That is true. But they are contributions, however.

Mr. STEVENSON. Yes, sir.

## CONTRIBUTIONS OF OTHER COUNTRIES TO THE U.N. REGULAR BUDGET

Senator CARLSON. Returning now to the regular operating funds, how about the payments of other countries. Are they all contributing their full share?

Mr. STEVENSON. On the regular budget for the regular operations of the U.N., the record is quite good. I think we could give you a number of states that are delinquent and in what amounts very readily. I do not have them readily at hand, but I could give them to you for the record. But the record is very good and it has been on regular assessments. The trouble has all arisen over these peacekeeping operations.

## CONTRIBUTIONS OF OTHER COUNTRIES TO U.N. PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

Senator CARLSON. How well have other countries been contributing to the United Nations Emergency Force, and the Congo operations?

Mr. STEVENSON. That is much worse.

Senator CARLSON. How much worse?

Mr. STEVENSON. Twenty-five U.N. members have paid nothing on their Middle East assessments, and 48 members have paid nothing on their bills for the Congo. What that amounts to in percentages of total cost I do not have.

None of the Soviet states, none of the Communist bloc, have contributed to the Congo, nor has France, nor has Belgium. Many of the small, very small states are likewise in arrears.

Senator CARLSON. Could you have a total there?

Mr. STEVENSON. Likewise China, Nationalist China, has not contributed, nor have the Arab States to the Middle East because of their conflict with Israel.

## GRANTING OF REDUCTIONS IN ASSESSMENTS

Senator CARLSON. I read somewhere that some of these nations have been granted reductions of 50 to 80 percent of their assessments. Who grants those reductions?

Mr. STEVENSON. The first resolution providing for reductions for very small states who have difficulty in meeting their assessments was started in 1957. That practice has been followed subsequently. Many of the smaller states, especially Latin American States, have taken the position that the peacekeeping, the keeping of the peace of the world, was intended at San Francisco to be the responsibility of the great powers, and have insisted they do not have responsibility for it.

## ARREARAGES OF COUNTRIES GRANTED A REDUCTION IN ASSESSMENTS

Senator CARLSON. Would you submit for the record the arrearages of these countries who have been granted this special compensation from 1957 on to the present time?

Mr. STEVENSON. Yes, we could do that, sir.

SENATOR CARLSON. How much do you think it might be?

MR. STEVENSON. I could give it to you not going back to 1957. I think I could give it to you with reference to the Congo—it is about the order of \$9,462,000 for the small states for the Congo operation.

SENATOR CARLSON. I am speaking now of all arrearages since 1957 of the member states who have been granted 50- to 80-percent reduction of their assessments.

MR. STEVENSON. I am afraid we will have to supply that for the record, sir.

(The information referred to follows:)

ARREARAGES OF MEMBER STATES RECEIVING REDUCTIONS ON UNEF AND UNOC

(Excludes 10 new members admitted in 1961 and 1962)

Balance due, 1962 and prior years, January 31, 1963

Country	Regular budget	United Nations Emergency Force	UNOC	Balance due 1962 and prior years
Afghanistan		\$39,323	\$34,365	\$73,688
Albania	\$15,648	34,108	33,664	83,420
Argentina	1,254,177	856,376	649,372	2,759,925
Bolivia	48,684	38,059	33,664	120,407
Brazil	2,391		410,943	413,334
Bulgaria	87,088	129,306	141,055	357,449
Burma				
Cambodia	24,746		27,298	52,044
Cameroon				
Canada				
Central African Republics				
Ceylon				
Chad		777	13,036	13,813
Chile	160,340	91,802	160,247	412,389
China	5,923,775	4,189,837	5,751,743	15,865,355
Colombia				
Congo (Brazzaville)	26,369	8,745	16,452	51,566
Congo (Leopoldville)	17,670	1,362	11,196	30,228
Costa Rica	9,231	7,628	23,978	40,837
Cuba	199,464	191,001	205,598	596,063
Cyprus				
Dahomey	19,936	1,159	6,246	27,341
Dominican Republic		10,275	42,079	52,354
Ecuador	3,312		8,656	11,968
El Salvador		5,377	16,263	21,640
Ethiopia		65,085	34,365	99,450
Federation of Malaya				
Gabon				
Ghana	63,574	1,676	14,341	79,591
Greece	29,273	160,116	137,869	327,258
Guatemala	61,074	18,053	29,971	109,098
Guinea	25,682	8,219	33,664	67,565
Haiti	69,634	14,470	23,978	108,082
Honduras	71,014	8,408	23,978	103,400
Iceland				
India	140,000			140,000
Indonesia				
Iran				
Iraq			99,281	99,281
Ireland		76,598	75,744	152,342
Israel				
Italy	95,548			95,548
Ivory Coast				
Japan				
Jordan				
Laos	24,746	34,108	33,664	67,772
Lebanon		3,722	17,612	46,860
Liberia		19,845	12,108	31,953
Libya				
Luxembourg		34,108		34,108
Madagascar			7,949	7,949
Mali			17,330	17,330
Mexico		15	14,321	14,336
Morocco		527,028	602,331	1,129,359
Nepal	2,291	20,451	117,823	147,274
Nicaragua	28,789	26,340	23,977	52,614
		3,697	23,978	56,464

## Balance due, 1962 and prior years, January 31, 1963—Continued

Country	Regular budget	United Nations Emergency Force	UNOC	Balance due 1962 and prior years
Niger.....	\$40,100	\$4,983	\$15,386	\$60,469
Nigeria.....				
Pakistan.....	140,000			140,000
Panama.....		28,241	23,977	52,218
Paraguay.....	55,058	30,346	23,978	109,382
Peru.....		94,408	64,337	158,745
Philippines.....		485		485
Poland.....	184,920	1,269,004	1,852,915	3,306,839
Portugal.....			161,919	161,919
Saudi Arabia.....	45,715	55,309	52,066	153,119
Senegal.....	32,717	971	7,994	41,682
Somalia.....			7,507	7,507
Spain.....		867,164	771,483	1,638,647
Sudan.....	2,392	71,118		73,510
Thailand.....		2,940	25,465	28,405
Togo.....		4,983	15,387	20,370
Tunisia.....				
Turkey.....				
United Arab Republic.....	342,672	317,409	266,110	926,191
Upper Volta.....	25,744	8,745	16,452	50,941
Uruguay.....	125,655	24,983	70,332	220,970
Venezuela.....			302,917	302,917
Yemen.....	26,885	34,108	33,664	94,657
Yugoslavia.....			299,358	299,358
Totals.....	9,426,314	9,451,277	12,941,415	31,819,006

Senator CARLSON. If I quoted your distinguished colleague there, Richard Gardner, would you object?

Mr. STEVENSON. No, sir.

Senator CARLSON. Well, I notice in a statement he made yesterday that the arrearages total \$121,604,114 of debt. Would that be correct?

Mr. STEVENSON. That is correct. That, of course, includes not only the small states but the large as well.

Senator CARLSON. That is correct. I was trying to get the total figure.

## LOSS OF VOTE BY COUNTRIES IN ARREARS

Do these countries that are in arrears lose their votes?

Mr. STEVENSON. The charter provides that after a state has been in arrears for 2 years, after a state has been in arrears, in an amount that equals the last 2 years' assessments, then it loses its vote in the General Assembly. This, however, was originally interpreted as regular assessments. Now we have a ruling of the International Court of Justice that extends that doctrine to special assessments for peace-keeping operations. That has not been tested.

Senator CARLSON. I was going to ask you, has that yet been enforced?

Mr. STEVENSON. It has not, no. It has not arisen yet.

Senator CARLSON. If it has arisen, do you know whether it has been used in UNESCO?

Mr. STEVENSON. Mr. Gardner tells me that in some of the specialized agencies it has arisen and has been enforced specifically in the case of the Food and Agriculture Organization.

Senator CARLSON. I have, and I am sure the chairman is familiar with this, heard testimony from witnesses on UNESCO that concerned me a little on this voting.

As I understand it, they waived these arrearages on three countries and permitted them to have a vote.

It seems to me that establishes a precedent that might be harmful in future considerations when it comes before the United Nations, and I wanted to just mention that for the record.

That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Senator CHURCH. I must say I share this concern. I know this is a matter you have not dealt with, Mr. Ambassador, at all. But I share the concern of the Senator with respect to UNESCO, and it won't be of help to us when the matter comes up afresh in the General Assembly this year.

Senator HUMPHREY.

First, Mr. Ambassador, I want to commend you on a remarkable statement. I hope it will be well read and studied by not only members of this committee but by the general public.

#### U.S. SUPPORT FOR U.N. PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

I should like to ask a few questions in reference to the peacekeeping operations of the United Nations.

Did we vote for the peacekeeping operations in reference to the Middle East?

Mr. STEVENSON. Yes, sir.

Senator HUMPHREY. When did we vote for that peacekeeping operation?

Mr. STEVENSON. 1956.

Senator HUMPHREY. Do you recall the Middle East emergency aid program in the same period of time?

Mr. STEVENSON. Was that the bilateral program of the United States?

Senator HUMPHREY. The request that was then made by the then President of the United States to the Congress of the United States for \$300 million.

Mr. STEVENSON. Yes.

#### TOTAL COST OF U.N. PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

Senator HUMPHREY. Do you have any idea how much the peacekeeping operation of the United Nations has totaled throughout the years in the Middle East as compared to the special grant of \$300 million?

Mr. STEVENSON. It has run, I think, at the rate of about \$10-\$20 million a year, which would be since 1956, that would be for 6 years, about \$120 million against \$300 million the United States contributed at that time.

(The information referred to follows:)

#### *Total cost to United Nations of United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East*

1957	-----	\$29,909,000	1961	-----	\$19,000,000
1958	-----	23,914,000	1962	-----	19,500,000
1959	-----	18,949,000			
1960	-----	19,096,000	Total	-----	130,368,000

## COST TO UNITED STATES OF LANDING THE MARINES IN LEBANON

Senator HUMPHREY. Do you have any idea how much it cost to land the Marines in Lebanon in the Lebanon crisis?

Mr. STEVENSON. No, but I can imagine it was a very considerable figure.

Senator HUMPHREY. I think it would be very interesting to get that figure. As I recall, it was somewhere around \$50 to \$60 million. But we could look that figure up, and I would like to have it put in the record. That did not include, of course, the use of the ships and the fact that the manpower was at sea.

(The information referred to follows:)

The following information was furnished by the Department of Defense on the cost of the Lebanon operation:

"The total cost of the Lebanon operation was \$120 million. Of this figure \$66 million was for operations and maintenance. The remainder, which would be \$54 million, consisted of military personnel cost and surface transport."

## COST TO THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICAN TROOPS IN WEST GERMANY

Do you have any idea how much it costs to keep one division of American troops without equipment in West Germany per year?

Mr. STEVENSON. I don't have that figure at hand.

Senator HUMPHREY. \$120 million. I just asked the staff to get me this information.

Mr. STEVENSON. Per division.

Senator HUMPHREY. Per division. That is exclusive of equipment.

## NUMBER OF U.N. TROOPS IN THE CONGO

How many men does the United Nations have in its peacekeeping operations in the Congo? What did you say in your statement?

Mr. STEVENSON. It has been up to 21,000. It is down to between 17,000 and 18,000 now, and it is now phasing out, and now declining very rapidly since the termination of the military phase in Katanga.

Senator HUMPHREY. How many U.S. citizens are members of the combat forces of the United Nations troops in the Congo?

Mr. STEVENSON. Not one.

Senator HUMPHREY. How many U.S. citizens have perished in battle in the Congo?

Mr. STEVENSON. Not one.

## U.S. MONETARY CONTRIBUTIONS TO U.N. PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

Senator HUMPHREY. I have here the report of the 87th Congress, 2d Session, House Document No. 460, "U.S. Contributions to International Organizations," and the estimated cost in 1962 of our contribution to all "peacekeeping operations" was \$96,677,000.

Mr. STEVENSON. That sounds just about right.

Senator HUMPHREY. Yes. It was \$76,122,000 in 1961; \$39,963,000 in 1960, and so on back.

Now, as I recall your statement, you indicated that it was in our national interest, according to this administration and the previous administration, to support a unified Congo; is that correct?

Mr. STEVENSON. Yes; that is correct.

Senator HUMPHREY. Do I recall correctly that it was in 1960 that the resolution was adopted for the peacekeeping operations in the Congo?

Mr. STEVENSON. The resolution by which the United Nations entered the Congo was adopted, I think, in July 1960, July 13, 1960.

Senator HUMPHREY. 1960.

#### U.S. CONTRIBUTION OF TROOPS TO U.N. PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

Have we ever been asked for a contribution of troops to the Congo?

Mr. STEVENSON. No. Dag Hammarskjold, the then Secretary General, laid down a principle at the time that the great powers would not participate in the peacekeeping operations with military forces. This was to obviously avoid confrontation between Russian and American or British forces.

Senator HUMPHREY. Have the Soviets supported the peacekeeping operations?

Mr. STEVENSON. It has not supported them since the very first days when there was some, I gather, hope that Lumumba would emerge as the leader of the Congo.

Senator HUMPHREY. Has the present Congolese Central Government indicated that it was pro-Soviet?

Mr. STEVENSON. In no way whatsoever that we have ever detected.

#### U.S. SUPPORT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS IN THE CONGO

Senator HUMPHREY. Therefore it is a fact, is it not, that two administrations and two separate Secretaries of State and two separate Secretaries of Defense and two or three representatives in the United Nations—I believe Mr. Lodge and Mr. Wadsworth both served as the representatives—have agreed that it was in our national interest to have peacekeeping operations in the Congo; is that correct?

Mr. STEVENSON. That is correct, sir.

Senator HUMPHREY. And it was understood we would make a financial contribution?

Mr. STEVENSON. Yes. I think—I can't tell you the exact sequence of events as to when we decided or how much was—when we made our first voluntary contribution, but from the very start the United States has made it emphatically clear that it proposed to support the Congo operation and has done so consistently ever since July 1960.

I think, Senator Humphrey, the first request for voluntary contributions to meet the accruals from the forces that were put into the Congo by neutral states, for the most part, probably came in the autumn of 1960.

Senator HUMPHREY. That is correct.

Mr. STEVENSON. And we have been contributing regularly something like 47, between 47 and 48 percent.

Senator HUMPHREY. Let us say 47, 48 percent of that total cost.

Mr. STEVENSON. That is correct.

Senator HUMPHREY. But the record is clear, no U.S. nationals, no U.S. national casualties were involved, nor were there requests made for U.S. nationals.

Mr. STEVENSON. That is correct.

Senator HUMPHREY. And yet the record is also clear that this was a national security policy of the Government of the United States; is that correct?

Mr. STEVENSON. Yes.

Senator HUMPHREY. Presidential national security policy?

Mr. STEVENSON. Yes.

#### U.S. SUPPORT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Senator HUMPHREY. It is also clear, is it not, that we, the Government of the United States, regardless of who occupied the Office of President, supported the Middle East peace efforts following the Suez crisis; is that correct?

Mr. STEVENSON. Yes. That commenced in November 1956.

Senator HUMPHREY. We are still supporting that, are we not?

Mr. STEVENSON. We are still supporting it.

Senator HUMPHREY. This again was a policy of the U.S. Government arrived at through the mechanism of our Government, the National Security Council, and the President; was it not?

Mr. STEVENSON. And the President, after the United Nations Force was established.

Senator HUMPHREY. Exactly. We voted for the establishment of the U.N. Force, did we not?

Mr. STEVENSON. Yes. I think we proposed the resolution.

Senator HUMPHREY. As I recall, I was there at the time it was done. In other words, the Ambassador to the U.N. does not make these proposals on his own, does he?

Mr. STEVENSON. No.

Senator HUMPHREY. You generally get instructions; is that correct?

Mr. STEVENSON. I generally get quite a lot of help.

#### TOTAL COST OF U.N. PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

Senator HUMPHREY. Yes. I thought we just might put down what the total peacekeeping costs have been of the U.N. since its inception in 1945, with the first session of 1946. The total costs for peacekeeping operations of the U.N. have been \$430,368,000. That includes every operation of the United Nations peacekeeping operations, exclusive of the war in Korea.

Mr. STEVENSON. Except the war in Korea.

Senator HUMPHREY. Except the war in Korea.

I also noted, just to give some idea of what comparisons are, the cost of the nuclear carrier *Enterprise* was something over \$400 million; our latest conventional aircraft carrier cost \$305 million; insofar as the Government of the United States was concerned, the peacekeeping operations in the Congo and the Middle East, last year cost \$96,677,000.

The point I seek to make is that it appears to me these were all decisions that were in the national interest, according to the President and the Government of the United States.

Mr. STEVENSON. I am sure that is the case and, as it happens, at least three Presidents have been involved in these decisions commencing in 1946.

## COST OF U.S. OPERATION IN VIETNAM

Senator HUMPHREY. The cost of our operations in Vietnam would be interesting. This is a very vital area of the world where we are confronted with the forces of communism of an aggressive nature which are seeking to overthrow a friendly government and take over an entire area.

Do you have any idea what the cost in dollars per year is of our operation in Vietnam? We will talk about manpower a little later. It is over \$300 million.

Mr. STEVENSON. Yes.

Senator HUMPHREY. And the total amount we poured into that one country since 1954 is approximately \$2 billion.

Mr. STEVENSON. To include north Vietnam and south Vietnam, \$2 billion?

Senator HUMPHREY. \$2 billion. Do we get any help in the peacekeeping there?

Mr. STEVENSON. No. The United Nations has never been involved in Vietnam.

## U.S. RESPONSIBILITY FOR KEEPING WORLD PEACE

Senator HUMPHREY. Mr. Ambassador, isn't it about time that we recognized who really has the responsibility for keeping the peace? If we say we are a leader in the free world, isn't it about time that we recognize who really has the responsibility for keeping the peace?

Mr. STEVENSON. Emphatically I agree.

Senator HUMPHREY. We are in a contest for our lives with these Communists. They do not want to keep the peace. It is to their advantage not to have it. It seems to me we ought to be quite grateful for any help we get in keeping the peace.

Mr. STEVENSON. I should have thought so.

Senator HUMPHREY. It would dawn on me somewhere along the line that it should be something for which we have some appreciation. Possibly it would not make quite as much difference to Uruguay, if the Congo had been overrun and taken over by the Communists. In fact, if this had happened we perhaps might have given a little bit more aid under the Alliance for Progress, wouldn't we?

Mr. STEVENSON. I wouldn't be a bit surprised if we would have to enlarge our aid and military assistance, perhaps, in many places in the world.

## FOREIGN AID RECEIVED BY COUNTRIES IN ARREARS

Senator HUMPHREY. Is it not true that many of the countries that have had a reduction in their assessments, many of them, not all, are also people who have been recipients of U.S. foreign aid?

Mr. STEVENSON. I think the large majority have received such aid.

Senator HUMPHREY. A substantial number anyway.

Mr. STEVENSON. A large majority.

## IMPORTANCE OF BERLIN

Senator HUMPHREY. We are attempting to keep the peace in Berlin, are we not?

Mr. STEVENSON. Yes.

Senator HUMPHREY. Berlin is considered just as vital an area to the United States as is the Congo and as is the Middle East; is that not a fact?

Mr. STEVENSON. That is correct.

Senator HUMPHREY. Has it not been said by the top leadership in this country in years gone by and presently that the Middle East is a powder keg that could explode and involve the world in a war?

Mr. STEVENSON. Yes; and, of course, that situation is even further aggravated right now.

Senator HUMPHREY. Therefore, peacekeeping in the Middle East is to our national interest; is it not?

Mr. STEVENSON. Of course.

Senator HUMPHREY. We are getting a pretty good bargain it seems to me.

Mr. STEVENSON. I would have thought we were getting an extremely good bargain. We also get the further advantage of the participation of many other countries who are equally involved and equally committed and equally concerned.

Senator HUMPHREY. I am sure a large number of young Americans would think it was to their advantage to have the Norwegians and the Swedes and a few others there.

Mr. STEVENSON. Yes.

Senator HUMPHREY. It is considered to be an area of vital interest to the United States. Berlin is considered to be an area of vital interest to the United States.

Mr. STEVENSON. So is the Middle East.

Senator HUMPHREY. And yet last year, or 2 years ago, we increased the defense budget, because of Berlin, \$6 billion. I mention this because I am deeply concerned over what I consider to be the overwhelming concern about the cost of the operations of the United Nations when, in fact, the operations of the United Nations, as I see them, in these strategic areas that you have mentioned in your testimony, Mr. Ambassador, are operations that are conducive to our national interests or that surely support our national interests. Is that not the burden of your testimony?

Mr. STEVENSON. That is the burden of my testimony and your conclusion, I think, is correct also, Senator. It seems to me a relatively simple thing. Peace is important and the alternatives are very disturbing, and the cost is incalculable of the alternatives.

TOTAL COST OF THE UNITED NATIONS TO THE UNITED STATES  
SINCE INCEPTION

Senator HUMPHREY. Now, the total cost of the operations of the United Nations to the United States, Mr. Ambassador, so we might complete the record, since 1946, including the cost of all refugee programs, the International Refugee Organization, the Palestinian refugee program, the refugees in Hong Kong and elsewhere, has been

\$1,864,218,000 for 17 years. This is slightly over \$100 million per year.

That is one-fourth the cost of the *Enterprise* carrier; that is less than the cost of the maintenance of one division of troops in West Germany, troops without equipment or not having been delivered, just arrived.

Of this amount, \$171,450,000 has been for regular technical assistance. Would you say we have gotten our money's worth out of the \$171 million over 17 years for technical assistance?

Mr. STEVENSON. I would have thought the technical assistance programs had been very well administered by the United Nations.

Senator HUMPHREY. The refugee program in the Middle East has been supported by the Congress, \$289,668,000.

Would you consider the Children's Fund a rather wholesome enterprise, Mr. Ambassador?

Mr. STEVENSON. To me it has been one of the—the word is well chosen.

Senator HUMPHREY. Well, we have contributed \$192,231,000 in 17 years to that; and over-all to the International Refugee Organization \$237,117,000.

#### COST PER U.S. PERSON OF U.N.

In other words, Mr. Ambassador, there has been a total cost for 17 years to the Government of the United States and the people of this country of \$1,864,218,000. That is approximately 75 cents per man, woman, and child per year for the entire operations of the United Nations for 17 years.

I consider that a rather good bargain even with the mistakes it has made.

What would be your evaluation?

Mr. STEVENSON. My impression is that I am just as Scotch as you are.

Senator HUMPHREY. Thank you. May I say you may be a little more so.

Well, Mr. Ambassador, I am very pleased with the splendid testimony you have given, and again I want to say that the only answer to the distortion is the fact, and I believe the facts for the U.N. speak rather well, providing we put these facts in proper perspective.

#### UNITED NATIONS—A ONE-WORLD ORGANIZATION?

Do you claim that the U.N. is a one-world organization?

Mr. STEVENSON. Unhappily there isn't one world, Senator. There are at least two worlds. I do not know what is going to happen between China and the Soviet Union, but there may be several worlds.

Senator HUMPHREY. Do you consider it a world government, Mr. Ambassador?

Mr. STEVENSON. No, it is a long way from that.

#### U.S. RIGHT TO EXERCISE VETO

Senator HUMPHREY. Do we have the right to exercise the veto in case our national interests are violated by any action of the U.N.?

Mr. STEVENSON. We did in the Security Council, and we have never had to exercise it yet. Our interests have never been imperiled.

Senator HUMPHREY. Have you found any instance that our national security interests have been violated or seriously affected by a vote of the General Assembly?

Mr. STEVENSON. There have been some cases in which we have voted against the majority in the General Assembly. They have not been cases which we thought were of first consequence.

Senator HUMPHREY. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador.

Senator CHURCH. Senator, I want to express my appreciation for your efforts, and questions, in bringing into some perspective the kind of money that we are spending for furnishing Mars with his armor as compared to what we are spending in our effort to promote peace.

I suppose this is the time when the innkeeper is and has been Mars, and there is very little room at the inn for the U.N.

Mr. STEVENSON. I hope very much that we can have a transcript of Senator Humphrey's questions and answers.

Senator HUMPHREY. You have been very helpful, Mr. Ambassador. By the way, Mr. Chairman, I hope we can have a transcript of this whole hearing to be rather widely circulated.

Senator CHURCH. A transcript is being made during the process of this hearing. We will have an official transcript and, of course, that will be published in regular form.

#### RECOGNITION OF OTHERS PRESENT AT HEARING

It is now 4:30, Mr. Ambassador, and you have been here for 2 hours, and I do not want to prolong this very much longer. Before I ask the concluding questions, I do want to recognize the presence here, as I should have done earlier, of some very distinguished people: your colleague at the United Nations and an outstanding member of our diplomatic corps, Ambassador Francis Plimpton, who has been with you at the table throughout the afternoon; also the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Mr. Richard Gardner, who sat at your elbow. I notice that just a few minutes ago the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, Harlan Cleveland, came in. I want to recognize his presence.

I want to say that Senator Gore was here and unable to participate. He had to leave. I am sorry about that because I know what it is to sit down at that end of the table where I normally sit, in fact, beneath Senator Gore. I am sorry that he could not participate because he was part of the American delegation at the United Nations at the 17th General Assembly, and I know he would have something very meaningful to contribute.

Mr. STEVENSON. I would like to say, if I can interrupt, Mr. Chairman, that both Senator Gore and Senator Allott, who served on the delegation this fall, not only provided us with invaluable service and useful counsel, but also, I believe, have filed a report to the Senate on their experiences in the United Nations and the last General Assembly which we have found very enlightening, and I, for one, would like to express, I am sure, the gratitude of our mission in New York for their services.

Senator CHURCH. Thank you very much.

Senator Clark has joined us at the table, and I am wondering, Senator, if you have any questions you would like to ask the Ambassador?

Senator CLARK. I do not.

Senator CHURCH. I want to express appreciation to you for your coming.

Senator CLARK. I certainly appreciate your inviting me here. I was interested in Senator Humphrey's questions about the cost of the U.N. program. As a result of the public hearing we had in a Subcommittee on Manpower and Employment which I chaired just the other day Secretary of Labor Wirtz, speaking of the cost of Senator Humphrey's youth conservation bill on which we were holding hearings, where the authorization requested was \$100 million, pointed out that we had spent more money than that since 6 o'clock last night on the defense program.

Senator CHURCH. Thank you very much, Senator.

#### UNITED NATIONS STRENGTH AS PEACEKEEPER

Now, I have these concluding questions, Mr. Ambassador. In your opinion, is the United Nations sufficiently strong to accomplish its principal mission, given the conditions of the world today—that of keeper of the peace?

Mr. STEVENSON. I think the record over the past 17 years speaks for itself. Virtually all of the cases of so-called peacekeeping operations in which it has been involved, the record is extremely good and, on the whole, satisfactory to us.

There is the built-in defect that in a divided world, with the great powers at the extremities of a polarization of power within and throughout the world, that we do have the difficulty of ever-imposing collective views or judgment of the world organization on any such great power except by its acquiescence.

Given that one infirmity, which is inherent in the situation that persists in the world, I think the United Nations is strong enough to accomplish its principal mission and has accomplished its principal mission.

#### POSSIBLE REVIEW OF U.N. CHARTER

Senator CHURCH. Is there a likelihood of any meaningful review of the United Nations Charter in the foreseeable future?

Mr. STEVENSON. I do not see any immediate prospect for one. There are many who would, indeed, say that if we didn't have the United Nations already it might be impossible now to create it.

#### PROBLEM OF ARREARAGES

Senator CHURCH. Do you think that section 19 will work as a sufficient inducement to clear up the problem of arrearages with respect to the General Fund of the United Nations?

Mr. STEVENSON. The advisory opinion of the World Court was so emphatic last fall that we have felt very much encouraged that it would have this influence on governments.

Senator CHURCH. Do you think there will be a test case in the coming General Assembly?

Mr. STEVENSON. I think there will be one after the first of January 1964, which will be after, presumably after, the adjournment of the next General Assembly, when the Soviet Union becomes delinquent under the terms of the charter.

There are already some 10 countries delinquent. We had two last year who paid up at the last moment. I think these 10 that are presently delinquent will probably remedy their delinquency, but we cannot tell about the test which may come in the case of the Soviet Union.

Senator CHURCH. Senator Carlson, do you have any further questions?

Senator CARLSON. No.

#### COMMENDATION FOR WORK OF AMBASSADOR STEVENSON

Senator CHURCH. Do any other Senators want to ask any final questions? If not, just let me express on behalf of the committee our appreciation for your coming, Mr. Ambassador.

I remember being in New York briefly during those grim days of the crisis last October when the tension was very great. It was right after the dramatic sessions in the Security Council which were televised and watched by the American people; when your own performance was so very forthright and effective that I found people in New York on the streets and at the magazine counters when they didn't get what they wanted and were a little bit anxious to get the response that they were looking for saying, "Never mind the translation, just answer yes or no."

I think, perhaps, you have added a new colloquialism to the language. But during those days, we were very proud indeed to have you at the U.N. to be our spokesman, and in your continuing mission there, I am sure that I express the wishes of all members of this committee in wishing you Godspeed and the best of luck in every way. Thank you so much, Mr. Ambassador.

Mr. STEVENSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate that very much.

(Whereupon, at 4:40 o'clock p.m. the subcommittee was recessed.)

CHAPTER I  
THE DISCOVERY OF AMERICA

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