

Civil-Military Cooperation: A Relevant Component of the Lebanese Armed Forces in Today's Operational Environment

A Monograph

by

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Abstract

Civil-Military Cooperation: A Relevant Component of the Lebanese Armed Forces in Today's Operational Environment, by MAJ Jean Dagher, Lebanese Army, 48 pages.

The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) deployment for external and internal missions, in addition to the diverse threats that Lebanon is facing, demonstrate the importance of comprehensive interactions with Lebanese civil society. This monograph argues that the lessons learned from US Civil-Military Operations and Civil Affairs, and NATO Civil-Military Interaction and Civil-Military Cooperation doctrines offer valuable insights that can help the LAF develop its CIMIC doctrine to better address Lebanese national security threats. This research analyzes the LAF CIMIC as a case study, focusing on Civil-Military Relations and Civil Military Interaction, the LAF comprehensive security approach, and the LAF CIMIC components to find new practices for the LAF CIMIC. This monograph suggests that the LAF should introduce the instruments of national power as lines of effort into the CIMIC doctrine, coordinate with the Directorates of Intelligence and Orientation to synchronize Information Operations and Psychologic Operations, and work on emphasizing training by establishing a CIMIC training section.

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Acronyms

AJP	Allied Joint Publication
AO	Area of Operations
CA	Civil Affairs
CE	Civil Environment
CAO	Civil Affairs Operations
CCOE	Civil-Military Cooperation Center of Excellence
CIMIC	Civil-Military Cooperation
CMI	Civil-Military Interaction
CMO	Civil-Military Operations
CMR	Civil-Military Relations
DIME	Diplomatic, Informational, Military, and Economic
FM	Field Manual
HN	Host Nation
JFC	Joint Force Commander
JP	Joint Publication
LAF	Lebanese Armed Forces
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGOs	Nongovernmental Organizations
OE	Operational Environment
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
RCS	Regional CIMIC Section
UN	United Nations
PSYOPs	Psychological Operations
IOs	Information Operations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

Introduction

Over the long term, we cannot kill or capture our way to victory . . . operations should be subordinate to measures that promote better governance, economic programs . . . , and efforts to address grievances among the discontented from which the terrorists recruit.

—Robert M. Gates¹

Lebanon occupies an important strategic, geographical, political, and cultural position in the Middle East. Lebanon resides in the Southeast of the Mediterranean basin; it has borders with Syria in the North and East and Palestine/Israel to the South. With an area of 4,036 square miles, the capital is Beirut.² In 1943, Lebanon gained its independence from the French mandate. The Republic of Lebanon is a parliamentary democracy with a confessional system.³ According to the unwritten ‘National Pact’ in 1943 and then the ‘Taif Agreement’ in 1989, the President is a Christian Maronite; the Prime Minister, head of the Council of Ministers (the Government), is a Muslim Sunni; and the Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies (the Parliament) is a Muslim Shia. The Lebanese Constitution designates the Lebanese President as ‘Commander in Chief’ of the Armed Forces.⁴ There is no consensus on a statistic for the population in Lebanon; numbers vary

¹ Joint Publication (JP) 3-57, *Civil-Military Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2013), IV-1.

² Consulate General of Lebanon, “Geography & Climate,” Consulate General of Lebanon: Los Angeles, last modified 2017, accessed October 30, 2017, <http://www.lebanonconsulatela.org/about-lebanon/geography-climate.html>.

³ Imad Harb, “Lebanon's Confessionalism: Problems and Prospects,” *United States Institute of Peace*, March 30, 2006, accessed August 8, 2017, <https://www.usip.org/publications/2006/03/lebanons-confessionalism-problems-and-prospects>. In 1943, at the time of Lebanon's independence from France, the ‘National Pact,’ a gentlemen's agreement between the country's Christian Maronite President Bishara Al-Khouri and his Muslim Sunni Prime Minister Riyadh Al-Solh, consecrated confessional formula where religious communities’ particular political posts proportionally according to their percentage of the population; New World Encyclopedia, “Taif Agreement,” last modified November 11, 2015, accessed July 28, 2017, http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Taif_Agreement. The ‘Taif Agreement’ of 1989 ended the Lebanese civil war and reasserted this confessional formula.

⁴ Government of Lebanon, “The Lebanese Constitution, Promulgated May 23, 1926, with its Amendments,” last modified 1995, accessed October 15, 2017, <http://www.presidency.gov.lb/English/LebaneseSystem/Documents/Lebanese%20Constitution.pdf>.

from one source to another. Approximately, as of 2017, there are around six million people in Lebanon, of whom almost one-third are refugees (mainly Syrian, Palestinians, and Iraqis).⁵

The current role of Lebanese military is not solely to protect the country's national security. Rather, Lebanese political and military leaders are trying to implement a 'comprehensive' and 'whole-of-government' approach that unites civilian and military bodies in solving security issues by complementing each other's capabilities.⁶ The US Secretary of State, George C. Marshall, first developed this approach in 1947 in the European Recovery Plan, more commonly known as the 'Marshall Plan'.⁷ Marshall highlighted the direct linkages between economic prosperity and political and social security, and the importance of a holistic approach unifying national and local governments, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), private organizations and academia, synchronizing all instruments of national power—diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME)—to solve complex security challenges.⁸ Governments employ these instruments to achieve national strategic objectives. The government's ability to advance its national interests is dependent on the efficient

⁵ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), "Syria Regional Refugee Response," last modified June 30, 2017, accessed July 27, 2017, <http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=122>.

⁶ United Nations, "UN-CMCoord Field Handbook," United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, last modified 2015, 89, accessed October 24, 2017, https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/CMCoord%20Field%20Handbook%20v1.0_Sept2015.pdf. The European Union (EU) and NATO members triggered and developed the comprehensive approach during the Balkans operation. The concept aims to achieve sustainable peace by providing security, humanitarian assistance, reconstruction and development, governance and the rule of law, in a concerted and coordinated manner. At national level, the comprehensive approach becomes a 'whole-of-government' approach addressing all instruments of national power (DIME).

⁷ George C. Marshall Foundation Home Page, "The Marshall Plan," The George C. Marshall Foundation, 2009, 8-9, accessed 25 October 2017, <https://marshallfoundation.org/marshall/the-marshall-plan/history-marshall-plan/>.

⁸ Joint Publication (JP) 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2013), xi, I-11-I-14; Joint Publication (JP) 3-57.1, *Joint Doctrine for Civil Affairs* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2003), GL-9, 10. International Organizations are organizations with global mandates, generally funded by contributions from national governments. They are two main types: International Nongovernmental Organizations and Intergovernmental Organizations, also known as International Governmental Organizations. Nongovernmental Organizations are transnational organizations of private citizens that maintain a consultative status with the Economic and Social Council of the UN.

use of DIME. Currently, the Lebanese government is trying to create a Lebanese ‘Marshall Plan’ based on reforms and developments encompassing all elements of national power in an attempt to address the present challenges that the country is facing.

The 1983 Lebanese National Defense Law assigns the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF)—Land Forces, Air Forces, and Navy Forces—to three missions: “Defense, security, and development.”⁹ The first mission is to defend the nation's borders against any external attack. The security mission is to preserve sovereignty, protect the Constitution, and maintain stability. The development mission is to contribute to providing humanitarian assistance and societal security.¹⁰ The same Law states that “The Armed Forces could be employed in the development and social fields on condition that it does not obstruct its basic missions.”¹¹ The development and humanitarian missions have persisted within the LAF since its establishment. The LAF has played a significant role in building the country's infrastructure and alleviating the suffering of the citizens during crises and catastrophes. In 1991, the Lebanese government entrusted the LAF with the mission of keeping peace and stability in the country's interior, together with the other security forces.¹² Since then, the LAF has deployed its troops across all of the Lebanese territories, with units assigned to each of the five military regions that cover the nation's geography.¹³ After the Israeli war in 2006, the LAF was tasked to cooperate and coordinate with United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon peacekeeping forces in South Lebanon to conduct development and social projects.¹⁴ The LAF Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) and the United

⁹ Directorate of Orientation, “The Mission of the Lebanese Army,” Lebanese Armed Forces Official Website, accessed September 22, 2017, <https://www.lebarmy.gov.lb/en/content/mission-lebanese-army>.

¹⁰ Government of Lebanon, “The Lebanese Constitution.”

¹¹ LAF, *CIMIC Conceptual Framework* (Beirut, Lebanon: Directorate of Orientation, 2017), 1-4.

¹² Directorate of Orientation, “The Mission of the Lebanese Army.”

¹³ Ibid. Lebanon is divided to five Military Regions: North, Mount Lebanon, Beirut, Bekaa, and South.

¹⁴ United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), “United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon,” last modified 2017, accessed September 29, 2017, <https://unifil.unmissions.org>. The UNIFIL

Nations Civil-Military Cooperation collaborate to facilitate the successful accomplishment of each one's mission.¹⁵

This focusing of the LAF toward internal security, working with the Internal Security Forces and the Police, imposes a profound requirement for interaction with Lebanese civil society. Besides this internal security mission, Lebanon is also dealing with diverse threats to its national interests such as continuous Israeli threats, rising terrorism, and possible natural disasters. The Israeli threats to the Lebanese sovereignty represent a significant challenge to the Lebanese national security.¹⁶ Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982 and withdrew from southern Lebanon in 2000 to the borders set by the United Nations (UN). In 2006, the Israel War had killed around thirteen hundred Lebanese (mostly civilians), displaced nearly one million, and severely damaged Lebanese infrastructure. Since then, the situation in south Lebanon has been relatively calm, with minor clashes with the Israeli Defense Forces. However, as not all wars start intentionally, and small conflicts have a way of spiraling into larger engagements, many strategists suggest that while there may be no escaping from another war in Lebanon, it is also not necessarily imminent.¹⁷

deployed in Lebanon since 1978. After the Israeli war in 2006, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon mandate, according to UN Security Council Resolution 1701, becomes to accompany and support the LAF in south Lebanon, including along the Blue Line, and to coordinate its activities with the Lebanese government. LAF, *CIMIC Conceptual Framework*, 6. The South Litani Sector is under the LAF Command to ensure the implementation of UNSCR 1701, according to the LAF command directives, to lead the defense against Israeli aggression, and to maintain security in South Litani Sector. It provides the necessary liaison, coordinates logistic and operational activities between the LAF, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, public and private organizations and assists in relief work and development.

¹⁵ United Nations, "Civil-Military Coordination in UN Integrated Peacekeeping Missions (UN-CIMIC)," United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, last modified October 2010, 2, accessed October 24, 2017, [https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/DPKO%20UN-CIMIC%20\(2010\).pdf](https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/DPKO%20UN-CIMIC%20(2010).pdf). The UN-CIMIC is a military staff function conducted in support of the military mission that contributes to facilitating the interface between military and civilian actors in humanitarian and development missions to support UN mission objectives.

¹⁶ Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), *CIMIC Conceptual Framework*, 4. The Lebanese national interests include security, economic prosperity, internal unity, and Lebanese values.

¹⁷ Jonathan Schanzer, Tony Badran, and David Daoud, "The Third Lebanon War, the Coming Clash between Hezbollah and Israel in the Shadow of the Iran Nuclear Deal," *Foundation for Defense of Democracies*, foreword by Yakov Shaharabani, July 2016, 6-7, accessed August 31, 2017, https://www.defenddemocracy.org/content/uploads/documents/Schanzer_Badran_Daoud_Third_Lebanon_War.pdf.

While conflict with Israel may not be imminent, the terrorist threat facing Lebanon appears to be on the increase. This is due to a complicated refugee situation. First, the Palestinian refugees' issue, since their expulsion in 1948 from Palestine during the 'Nakba', is still unresolved.¹⁸ The United Nations Refugee Relief and Works Agency statistics states that registered Palestinian refugees in Lebanon in 2017 stand around 455,000.¹⁹ However, the numbers are likely much higher due to the presence of non-registered refugees. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) recognizes twelve Palestinian camps. The 'Cairo Agreement,' signed in 1969 by the Palestinian Liberation Organization and the Lebanese State, regulated the relations between Palestinian camps and the State, endorsed Palestinian self-rule inside the camps, and gave the Palestinians virtual autonomy and the right to run their camps.²⁰ Due to this ambiguous legal status, these camps have become a harbor to terrorists who escaped from justice elsewhere.²¹

Additionally, since the war in Syria started in 2011, Syrian refugees have fled to Lebanon in large numbers. In 2017, according to the UNHCR, the number of Syrian refugees registered in Lebanon has reached 1,001,051, living in 231,530 households.²² This huge influx of Syrian refugees became a burden on the Lebanese government. The situation of Palestinians and Syrian

¹⁸ Rex Brynen, "Building a Better Relationship: Palestinian Refugees, Lebanon, and the Role of the International Community," *The International Development Research Centre*, last modified June 15, 2009, 3, accessed September 12, 2017, https://www.academia.edu/260565/Building_a_Better_Relationship_Palestinian_Refugees_Lebanon_and_the_Role_of_the_International_Community.

¹⁹ UNHCR, "Where we Work," United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, last modified July 1, 2014, accessed September 15, 2017, <https://www.unrwa.org/where-we-work/lebanon>.

²⁰ Brynen, "Building a Better Relationship," 1-3; Helena Cobban, *The Palestinian Liberation Organization: People, Power, and Politics* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 460-462; Perla Issa, "Palestinian Political Factions: an Everyday Perspective," (PhD diss., University of Exeter, 2014), 75, accessed October 18, 2017, https://ore.exeter.ac.uk/repository/bitstream/handle/10871/15031/IssaP_TPC.pdf?sequence=2&isAllowed=y.

²¹ Jean Dagher, "The Lebanese Armed Forces Engaging Nahr Al-Bared Palestinian Refugee Camp Using the Instruments of National Power," *Command and General Staff College*, 2017, 1-10, accessed August 5, 2017, <http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/singleitem/collection/p4013coll2/id/3591/rec/1>.

²² UNHCR, "Syria Regional Refugee Response." On May 6, 2015, a Lebanese instruction suspended the UNHCR new registration that no longer included individuals waiting to be registered.

refugees makes the security environment in Lebanon more complicated. Al-Qaeda and its affiliates—Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant and Al-Nusra Front—are trying to use the social and economic vulnerabilities of these refugees for terrorist recruitment. The Nahr Al-Bared battle in 2007 against the Fath Al-Islam terrorist organization in the eponymous camp, and the almost daily clashes in the Ain El-Hilweh Palestinian camp, serve as illustrations of the security issues that these camps represent.²³ These rising internal terrorist activities highlight the need for a holistic whole-of-government approach, which involves, in addition to military forces, civilian actors.

Finally, many possible natural large-scale disasters might hit Lebanon, such as earthquakes and hurricanes, and the increase in concern over natural disasters has expanded the requirements for security forces. The country has a rich history and a well-established tradition of employing military forces in domestic emergencies and supporting law enforcement in a broad range of homeland security tasks. The LAF—well organized, trained, mobile, equipped, and always available—has acted on many occasions in response to crises when required to do so by national authorities. Thus, the LAF has found itself performing a multitude of tasks required for maintaining readiness to provide a high level of homeland security, while also staying ready to respond to natural and human-made catastrophes. There are many historical examples of how the LAF’s capabilities supported civilian authorities in extraordinary or emergency cases, where the military used its assets to face these challenges and domestic tasks.

The exceptional legal powers granted to LAF by the Lebanese Constitution and the National Defense Law, based on time of peace, disasters, crisis, or war provides a unique context for dealing with civilian leadership.²⁴ Lebanese politicians rely on the LAF to execute these critical operations and coordinate with civilian security institutions. However, these politicians

²³ Dagher, “Nahr Al-Bared,” 19-29.

²⁴ LAF, *CIMIC Conceptual Framework*, 1-4.

are also apprehensive of the LAF gaining too much power, which is one of the reasons why civil-military efforts sometimes lack of adequate financial support.²⁵ Shared identity, values, and norms between military and civilians can ensure a balance in Civil-Military Relations (CMR), with agreement on critical issues serving as the cornerstone for cooperation.²⁶

With the ongoing requirements for Lebanese military activities engaging civilian agencies and entities, the Lebanese military leadership has recognized the importance of establishing an organization that deals with CIMIC. The quality of CIMIC is a significant factor in Lebanese stability and national security, and the Lebanese military leadership is aware of the importance of coordinating civil-military activities to address security threats. In 2015, the LAF established the CIMIC Directorate to support Joint Force Commanders (JFC) and civil authorities in achieving operational objectives and accomplishing their missions. The LAF has recently developed a series of initiatives aimed at increasing its operational effectiveness in the country; among these efforts is, as of the writing of this paper, developing a CIMIC doctrine.

As previously noted, the LAF is under constant challenges. One underlying assumption in this monograph is that the security challenges in Lebanon described above will continue to exist, and that they will continue to demand a civil-military solution. Therefore, this monograph intends to contribute to the LAF development of a national doctrine for CIMIC. This monograph's research starts by exploring the theoretical realm of CMR and reviews the US Civil-Military Operations (CMO) and Civil Affairs (CA), and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Civil-Military Interaction (CMI) and CIMIC doctrines. This monograph argues that the lessons learned from the US CMO and CA and NATO CMI and CIMIC doctrines and experiences offer

²⁵ Aram Nerguizian, "Lebanese Civil-Military Dynamics: Weathering the Regional Storm?" Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, November 21, 2011, accessed August 15, 2017, <http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/?fa=46038>.

²⁶ Florence Gaub, "Civil-Military Relations in the MENA: between Fragility and Resilience," *Chaillot Papers: European Union Institute for Security Studies*, no. 139 (October 2016): 32, accessed October 21, 2017, https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/CP_139_Arab_civil_military_relations.pdf.

valuable insights that can help the LAF CIMIC develop doctrine to address Lebanese national security threats. The research then analyses the effectiveness of the LAF CIMIC doctrine's practices and incorporates lessons learned from its military operations in Lebanon as a case study. By looking at the CMO, CA, CMI, and CIMIC, and examining them from the LAF theoretical lens and historical experiences, the research will derive and develop new practices suitable to the LAF doctrinal approach to CIMIC, and will help the LAF in addressing the rising threats in its Operational Environment (OE). This analysis will contribute to improving the existing efforts between Lebanese civilian and military officials and help those officials achieve mission success. Improving on current CIMIC doctrine will better enable the LAF leaders to attain operational objectives and maintain security and stability. Finally, the author will conclude with some recommendations for the LAF with the aim of improving CIMIC in the country and addressing today's security requirements.

Theory and Doctrine

Existing literature often assumes that the key to consolidating and achieving operational objectives is military cooperation with civilian institutions. NATO Allied Joint Publication (AJP) 3.4.9, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Cooperation*, describes societies in the twenty-first century as ravaged by conflicts, disasters, or humanitarian catastrophes.²⁷ AJP 3.4.9 further explains that sustainable solutions to these serious events, driven by a significant number of “political, economic, ethnic, religious, ideological, and other drivers,” are impossible to achieve by military means alone.²⁸ Similarly, the US TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5-600, *The United States Army's Concept of Operations*, clarifies that the Army must assess the future OE from a holistic approach.²⁹ The pamphlet describes the imminent OE as “volatile, uncertain, complex, and

²⁷ Allied Joint Publication (AJP) 3.4.9, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Cooperation* (Brussels, Belgium: NATO Standardization Agency, 2013).

²⁸ *Ibid.*, vii.

²⁹ Randall L. Mackey, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5-600, *The United States Army's Concept of Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2008).

ambiguous.”³⁰ The NATO Civil-Military Cooperation Center of Excellence (CCOE), in its *CIMIC Field Handbook*, explains that solutions to any event in this complex environment are impossible to achieve by military means alone.³¹ Furthermore, the handbook clarifies that most modern crises are not born militarily; therefore, the military cannot solve these crises by themselves, and traditional military tools cannot alone address the causes of contemporary conflicts.³²

Most of the literature concerning the CMO and CA from US doctrine is in Field Manuals (FMs) and Joint Publications (JPs). CMI and CIMIC from NATO doctrine reside in AJP and CCOE publications. The LAF approach to CIMIC is available on the LAF official website and in its new publication, *CIMIC Conceptual Framework*.³³ The primary sources which informed the doctrinal approach to this monograph are US JP 3-57, NATO AJP 3.4.9, and the LAF *CIMIC Conceptual Framework*, which contains doctrinal and operational information on CA and CIMIC from the US, NATO, and LAF perspectives, respectively. The paper will evaluate and review all of these doctrinal sources in the section below.

Theory

Many theorists inform the modern theory of CMR and CIMIC; these scholars include individuals such as Samuel Huntington, Morris Janowitz, Peter Feaver, Darrell Driver, Franke Volker, Admiral James Stavridis, and Christopher Ankersen. The historical analysis that supports these theorists focuses on the evolution of political and military thought intertwined in the history of military practice.

³⁰ TRADOC, *Concept of Operations*, 11.

³¹ Civil-Military Cooperation Center of Excellence (CCOE), “CIMIC Field Handbook: 4th Edition,” last modified 2016, I-1-1, I-3-1, accessed August 25, 2017, <http://www.cimic-coe.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/CFHB-4-0-CONTENT-1-5-E-Book-2.pdf>.

³² *Ibid.*, I-3-1.

³³ LAF, *CIMIC Conceptual Framework* (Beirut, Lebanon: Directorate of Orientation, 2017).

Samuel Huntington, a founder of modern CMR theory, asserts in his book, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*, that CMR is best understood in terms of subjective and objective ‘civilian control’.³⁴ The concept of civilian control describes the relative amount of power distributed and shared between civilian and military groups.³⁵ The subjective civilian control maximizes the civilian power by minimizing the military influence on policy. The objective civilian control militarizes the military, rendering the military politically neutral. Military professionalism, particularly among the officers’ corps, allows the achievement of the objective form of control.³⁶ Huntington further describes the responsibilities of a military man in three functions. The representative function is where the military represents security claims within the state machinery. The advisory function is to analyze, report, and be alert to the implications of political decisions and state actions from the military point of view. The executive function of the military is to be obedient and submissive to the final decisions of political leaders.³⁷

Morris Janowitz, in a rejoinder to Huntington in his book, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait*, introduces the ‘constabulary’ concept in the use of force that translates to a tightly controlled application of violence, closer links with the society, and a leaning towards international relations rather than traditional military victory.³⁸ He argues that elected political leaders and military elites must understand roles, obligations, and responsibilities shared among them, and adapt to the rapid technological and political changes.³⁹ Janowitz believes that the military men are cooperative civil servants with civilian political control because

³⁴ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1957).

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 80.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 80-85.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 72.

³⁸ Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait* (New York, NY: New York Free Press, 1960[edition, 1971]), 418.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 417.

they recognize that politicians appreciate the responsibilities of the constabulary force, which assures elected leaders of their neutrality.⁴⁰ As Janowitz describes it, the military officer “is amenable to civilian political control because he recognizes that civilians appreciate and understand the tasks and responsibilities of the constabulary force.”⁴¹

Peter Feaver, in his book, *Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations*, developed a new theory of CMR called ‘agency theory’, based on the principal-agent framework, to explain the strategic interaction between the civilian principles and the military leadership.⁴² He suggested that the civil-military challenge is to balance a military strong enough to do anything the civilians demand with a military subordinate enough to do what civilians authorize. Feaver further explains that the military assesses the risk, and the civilian judges and sets its acceptable extent for society. His ‘agency theory’ provides a way of linking Janowitz’s variables, like the difference between civilian and military attitudes, to Huntington’s variables like military obedience.⁴³ Feaver also introduced the concepts of ‘working’ and ‘shirking’, where working is “doing the things the civilians want,” and shirking is “doing things the way those in the military want.” He claims that the military chooses the level of obedience it shows to civilian leaders, and that the military should shirk illegal political orders.⁴⁴

Darrell Driver points out the competing positions of modern militaries in integrating civil-military efforts in his essay, *Pragmatic Approach to Civil-Military Partnership*.⁴⁵ Driver compares NATO’s comprehensive approach to sustainable peace by a whole-of-government

⁴⁰ Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier*, 440, 233.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 440.

⁴² Peter D. Feaver, *Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), 1.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 2, 6, 10.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 57, 60, 68, 301.

⁴⁵ Darrell Driver, “Pragmatic Approach to Civil-Military Partnership,” *Per Concordiam: Journal of European Defense and Security Issues* 1, no. 4 (2011): 13-17, accessed August 29, 2017, http://www.marshallcenter.org/mcpublicweb/mcdocs/files/College/F_Publications/perConcordiam/pC_V1N4_en.pdf.

approach to the US integrated reconstruction and stabilization methodology.⁴⁶ He reveals a disagreement on the right relationship, responsibilities, and roles between military and civilian security instruments, and uses Huntington and Janowitz's theories to describe the dilemma.⁴⁷ Darrell clarifies Huntington's articulation of the military purists' approach, who suggests that a clear separation and distinction between traditional combat functions and private security practitioners breed effectiveness and obedience.⁴⁸ He further explains that the opposing approach of military pragmatists, best outlined by Janowitz, provide a role for military forces in non-traditional security and development as a constabulary force, requiring a sound integration with civilian actors.⁴⁹

Where CMR is a political-military process, CIMIC is a military organization that facilitates cooperation between the military and civilians. Christopher Ankersen, in his book, *The Politics of Civil-Military Cooperation*, tries to focus on CIMIC from the military point of view, contrary to most literature that tends to examine it regarding its effect on private actors.⁵⁰ He examines CIMIC not merely as an idea, theory, or doctrine, but instead as a practice, helping to understand its full dimensions.⁵¹ Ankersen explains that CMR is an appropriate body of theory to use in examining, and adequate for purposes of explaining, CIMIC.⁵² He claims that a sound military approach involves coordination and engagement with civilian entities. Furthermore, CIMIC appears for him as highly differentiated across national strategies and variable across the

⁴⁶ NATO defines comprehensive approach as "the synergy of all actors and actions of the international community through the coordination and de-conflicting of political, development, and security capabilities to face today's challenges." CCOE, "CIMIC Field Handbook," I-2-1.

⁴⁷ Driver, "Civil-Military Partnership."

⁴⁸ Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, 80-97.

⁴⁹ Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier*, 418.

⁵⁰ Christopher Ankersen, *The Politics of Civil-Military Cooperation* (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 7.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 4, 5.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 27.

geographies in which it deploys. Ankersen states that no one single master narrative motivates CIMIC; it is instead a reflection of the people who carry it out. He also asserts that CIMIC is based on specific norms that inform actions and relations, values, and expectations, passed on in the form of powerful narratives or myths, which are meaningful to those particular civilians and military actors who are concerned with it.⁵³

In response to the growing complexity and requirements of the OE, countries are increasingly recognizing the rising need for a constructive relationship between military and civilian actors. Militaries are working on developing CIMIC doctrines to address this. In his research, *The Peacebuilding Dilemma: Civil-Military Cooperation in Stability Operations*, Franke Volker explained that the nature of complex missions increasingly forces military and civilian actors to operate together.⁵⁴ Cooperation between these two elements involves integrating traditional military capabilities into a collective response to human need.⁵⁵

In the twenty-first century, military activities have very often shifted from traditional warfare to stability operations. Despite the military forces' role in maintaining security, the civil agencies, international organizations, and NGOs' share became more crucial. Winning the 'hearts and minds' of the local population and working shoulder-to-shoulder with all civil partners became more relevant for military forces to accomplish the mission than seizing territories.⁵⁶ CIMIC has become a necessary tool for military commanders to interact with the numerous civilian entities in their area of operations (AO) and affecting the overall effectiveness of military operations.⁵⁷ Today's global war on terror revealed an urgent need for a strategic CMI, unified

⁵³ Ankersen, *Civil-Military Cooperation*, 4, 5, 51-70.

⁵⁴ Franke Volker, "The Peacebuilding Dilemma: Civil-Military Cooperation in Stability Operations," *International Journal of Peace Studies* 11, no. 2 (Autumn/Winter 2006): 8, accessed August 25, 2017, https://www.gmu.edu/programs/icar/ijps/vol11_2/11n2FRANKE.pdf.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 5, 7.

⁵⁶ AJP 3.4.9, *Civil-Military Cooperation*, 2-1.

⁵⁷ CCOE, "CIMIC Field Handbook," I-1-3.

efforts, and partnership between military forces and civilian actors to combat violent extremism and hinder their recruiting propaganda.⁵⁸

United States Admiral James Stavridis notes that history teaches the need to embrace partners from across government, throughout the international community, and even in the private sector.⁵⁹ Additionally, Stavridis points out that militaries are very capable, agile, and seldom the only organizations ready to respond immediately to unexpected crises. At the same time, these crisis events might require the unique equipment, personnel, and training resident mainly in militaries.⁶⁰ Therefore, he argues that early investment in civil-military efforts pays future dividends in military actions.

In sum, mutual trust and shared understanding between political elites and military leaders are essential factors in the civilian-military process.⁶¹ Civilians and the military can share the goal of a country's national security and work together through a sound CMR to achieve national interests and objectives.⁶² The conceptual framework of comprehensive approach is important in describing interactions between civil and military actors. The approach represents a mindset of CMI to implement reconstruction and development using CIMIC. Through CIMIC, military commanders tie into civilian organizations, integrating the political security, development, economic, and humanitarian dimensions of an operation.⁶³ However, each CIMIC

⁵⁸ Per Concordiam, "Beijing to London by Rail: China proposes transcontinental train network," *Journal of European Security and Defense Issues* 1, no. 4 (2011): 43, accessed August 29, 2017, http://www.marshallcenter.org/mcpublicweb/mcdocs/files/College/F_Publications/perConcordiam/pC_V1N4_en.pdf.

⁵⁹ James G. Stavridis, "Building Strategic Connections," Per Concordiam: *Journal of European Security and Defense Issues* 1, no. 4 (2011): 9, accessed August 29, 2017, http://www.marshallcenter.org/mcpublicweb/mcdocs/files/College/F_Publications/perConcordiam/pC_V1N4_en.pdf.

⁶⁰ James G. Stavridis, "Strengthening the Bridge: Building Partnership Capacity," *US Army*, February 26, 2010, accessed September 17, 2017, https://www.army.mil/article/35028/Strengthening_the_Bridge_Building_Partnership_Capacity.

⁶¹ Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier*, 440, 19.

⁶² Feaver, *Armed Servants*, 65.

⁶³ CCOE, "CIMIC Field Handbook," I-1-7, 8-9.

is a reflection of its people's norms, culture, relations, values, and expectations of civilian and military actors, so CIMIC will be situation and context dependent.⁶⁴

Doctrine

The discussion of the interaction between military and civilian spheres originates from the US Army CA units during World War II and the British military in the 1950s.⁶⁵ However, it took until 2003 before NATO issued its first publication addressing CIMIC, AJP 9, *NATO Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC) Doctrine*.⁶⁶ The publication argues that CIMIC is as old as warfare itself, but as a formal doctrine, it is historically speaking a new concept, which dates to the 1990s. NATO's contribution to the field of CIMIC in military operations started in the Bosnian war in the mid-1990s. Since then, NATO has progressed further into the civilian sphere, making CIMIC a vital part of its activities and missions.⁶⁷ Following a series of complex humanitarian emergencies and more involvements in peacekeeping and crisis management operations in Afghanistan, NATO recognized the need to develop a CIMIC doctrine that addressed relations with the local populace, to facilitate cooperation between its military units and relief organizations.⁶⁸

In late 2004, the experience of NATO in Kosovo and Afghanistan led to the development of the 'comprehensive approach'. This approach is a concept, philosophy, and a conceptual framework that describes CMI, but is not a documented process or capability.⁶⁹ NATO uses this

⁶⁴ Ankensen, *The Politics of Civil-Military Cooperation*, 4, 5, 51-70.

⁶⁵ Stijn Pz. Van Weezel, "NATO's Comprehensive Approach: CIMIC branch focuses on civilian-military cooperation," *Per Concordiam: Journal of European Defense and Security Issues* 1, no. 4 (2011): 62, accessed August 29, 2017, http://www.marshallcenter.org/mcpublicweb/mcdocs/files/College/F_Publications/perConcordiam/pC_VIN4_en.pdf.

⁶⁶ Allied Joint Publication (AJP) 9, *NATO Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC) Doctrine* (Brussels, Belgium: NATO Standardization Agency, 2003).

⁶⁷ Stijn Pz. Van Weezel, "NATO's Comprehensive Approach," 62-63.

⁶⁸ AJP 9, *NATO CIMIC Doctrine*, 1-1.

⁶⁹ CCOE, "CIMIC Field Handbook," I-3-2.

term to stress the need for a link to the civil environment (CE) with the CIMIC as the primary military tool and one of the military facilitators, essential in implementation.⁷⁰ In other words, the approach represents a mindset to implement reconstruction and development, whereas CIMIC is the method that executes these efforts.⁷¹ With the growing economic, financial and national budgets challenges facing the US and the NATO, political and military leaders are searching for the best ways to integrate militaries into non-traditional military missions, without losing critical military capabilities. This comprehensive approach implies maximization of interagency cooperation, a combination of civilian and military capabilities, and the gaining of efficiencies within existing organizations.⁷²

Before beginning a historical analysis of the LAF CIMIC doctrine, it is important to clarify the differences, similarities, and relationships between CMO, CA, CMI, and CIMIC, as used in US and NATO doctrine. Authors often use these terms interchangeably as there is much overlap behind their meaning, though there are nuanced differences.

Civil-Military Operations and Civil Affairs

FM 3-05.401, *Civil Affairs Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures* best explains the relation between the two concepts of CMO and CA in its definition of CA.⁷³ The manual defines CA as designated US Army active and reserve forces and units organized, trained, and equipped specially to conduct CA operations and to support the commander in planning and conducting CMO.⁷⁴

JP 3-57, *Civil-Military Operations*, the core document of CMO, defines it as “the activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military

⁷⁰ AJP 3.4.9, *Civil-Military cooperation*, vii.

⁷¹ Stijn Pz. Van Weezel, “NATO’s Comprehensive Approach,” 63.

⁷² *Ibid.*, 13.

⁷³ Field Manual (FM) 3-05.401, *Civil Affairs Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures* (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2007).

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 1-1.

forces, international organizations, NGOs, civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian population in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area.”⁷⁵ JP 3-57.1, *Joint Doctrine for Civil Affairs*, and FM 3-05-40, *Civil Affairs Operations*, explains that CMO activities involve the interaction of military forces with the civilian populace with a purpose of facilitating military operations and consolidating operational objectives.⁷⁶ FM 1-02, *Operational Terms and Graphics*, further clarifies that these activities may occur before, during, or after other military actions.⁷⁷

Effective CMO reduces friction between civilian and military and generates a supportive civilian populace, which provides resources, information, and facilitates military operations.⁷⁸ CMO, using military capabilities, aims to establish, maintain, or exploit relationships between military and civilian dimensions to facilitate the reestablishment or maintenance of stability within a region or Host Nation (HN). In addition, cooperation and coordination with international organizations, NGOs, and other civilian institutions may be necessary to consolidate or achieve operational objectives. JP 3-57 also explains that CMO may include functions, executed by designated CA elements, which are usually the responsibility of local government. Conventional troops may also routinely conduct CMO.⁷⁹

JP 3-57 clarifies that, during all military operations CMO is essential to the military instrument of national power, to coordinate the integration of all the elements of national power in support of military operations.⁸⁰ CMO synchronizes DIME to produce greater efficiency, faster

⁷⁵ JP 3-57, *Civil-Military Operations*, I-3.

⁷⁶ JP 3-57.1, *Joint Doctrine for Civil Affairs*, 1-1; Field Manual (FM) 3-05-40, *Civil Affairs Operations* (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2006), 1-1.

⁷⁷ Field Manual (FM) 1-02, *Operational Terms and Graphics* (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2004), 1-30.

⁷⁸ Field Manual (FM) 3-57, *Civil Affairs Operations* (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2011), 1-1.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, I-6, ix.

⁸⁰ JP 1, *Armed Forces of the United States*, xi.

responses, and more sustainable operations. CMO is inherently strategic in nature and key to achieving national security objectives. CMO focus on long-term issues, such as those that may be a part of a global campaign, a government reconstruction, an economic development initiative, or a stability operation. CMO also operates at the operational and tactical levels of war. At the operational level, CMO integrates and synchronizes interagency, international organizations, and NGOs' activities with joint force operations. At the tactical level, a Civil-Military Operations Center facilitates CMO among the local populace.⁸¹

Where efforts at each level may focus on different objectives, activities should mutually support each other.⁸² CMO planning improves the transition to civilian control from the start of operations. CMO includes Information Operations (IOs) to shape commander's OE by influencing key leaders and decision makers, and Psychological Operations (PSYOPs) that publicize the CMO activities to generate positive perceptions.⁸³

According to US Department of Defense Directive 2000.13, *Civil Affairs*, CA assists commanders at all levels to establish and maintain a supportive relationship with the populace and the government.⁸⁴ CA contributes heavily to conducting CMO across the range of military operations. JP 3-57.1 explains that CA activities refer primarily to the support of the civilian environment and to the connection of military forces to civil authorities and the general population. The publication clarifies that CA bridges the gap between the military units and the HN military and civilian authorities. For example, Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), used in recent US military operations overseas, are one of the most important assets designed to link

⁸¹ JP 3-57, *Civil-Military Operations*, I-5.

⁸² Ibid., I-2, I-1, I-5.

⁸³ JP 3-57.1, *Joint Doctrine for Civil Affairs*, II-14.

⁸⁴ DOD Directive 2000.13, *Civil Affairs* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2014), 1-3; Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-0, *Unified Land Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2012), 1-6. The range of military operations extends from military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence in time of relative peace, to crisis response and limited contingency operations, up through large-scale combat operations in war.

CA elements through all the levels of operations.⁸⁵ CA is not a substitute for military forces, but it is a force multiplier in conventional operations by maximizing the use of international organizations, NGOs, and the HN government; this allows the commander to focus on accomplishing the operational mission and minimize the magnitude and duration of military involvement in functions that are primarily civil in nature. CA is population-oriented rather than focused on enemy combatants. CA units and personnel operate in areas that are usually the responsibility of civilian government. They are language-qualified, culturally attuned, and experienced in providing civil governance assistance.⁸⁶

CA also supports Special Operations, especially in IOs and PSYOPs. IOs doctrine notes that CA specialists help the commander shape his military information environment by collecting information, disseminating selected themes to key leaders and decision-makers, and delivering messages to the local population. CA and PSYOPs are jointly supportive within CMO.⁸⁷ While CA advises commanders on the adequate military support to security and developmental programs, PSYOPs promote these efforts and publicizes the successes of these CMO activities to generate a positive perception of conducted actions.⁸⁸

CA forces conduct Civil Affairs Operations (CAO) to achieve commander's objectives and accomplish their CMO responsibilities.⁸⁹ Military leaders use CAO to carry out the integration of the military in support of stability, counterinsurgency, and other operations. JP 3-57 defines the CAO as “actions to coordinate with the HN military and civilian agencies, other government departments and agencies, international organizations, or NGOs to support US policy

⁸⁵ JP 3-57, *Civil-Military Operations*, II-31; FM 3-05.130, *Army Special Operations Forces Unconventional Warfare* (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2008), 7-4.

⁸⁶ JP 3-57.1, *Joint Doctrine for Civil Affairs*, viii, I-2, I-3, I-6, I-7, II-13, II-14.

⁸⁷ FM 3-13, *Information Operations* (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2016), 1-1, 1-4.

⁸⁸ FM 3-05.301, *Psychological Operations: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures* (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2003), 1-1.; JP 3-57.1, *Joint Doctrine for Civil Affairs*, II-5-9, II-14.

⁸⁹ JP 3-57, *Civil-Military Operations*, IV-1.

or the commander's assigned mission.”⁹⁰ FM 3-05.401 states that the CA methodology describes how CA soldiers, elements, and units approach all CAO and CMO. CA soldiers equally apply the CA methodology at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. At each level, this approach supports the commander's ability to visualize, describe, and direct operations to achieve desired effects in the OE.⁹¹

In sum, CMO, CAO, and CA are, within the broad context, unified actions that include coordination, integration, and synchronization of the governmental and nongovernmental activities with military operations to achieve unity of effort.⁹² Lykke describes military objectives as the ends, military strategic concepts as the ways, and military resources as the means. Using Lykke's construct, CMO is the desired conditions—ends, and CAO and CA elements are the methods and the resources respectively—ways and means.⁹³ CA and CAO are under the umbrella of CMO. CA units form the nucleus of any CMO; they assist commanders by conducting CAO actively to shape the battlespace by focusing on the civil dimension.⁹⁴ While CA and CAO activities support CMO, they are a distinct element within CMO.⁹⁵

Civil-Military Interaction and Civil-Military Cooperation

NATO's doctrine strongly associates CIMIC with the CMI involvement of other military functions and disciplines. According to CCOE, *CIMIC Field Handbook*, CIMIC is “a joint function comprising a set of capabilities integral to supporting the achievement of mission

⁹⁰ JP 3-57, *Civil-Military Operations*, xii.

⁹¹ FM 3-05.401, *Civil Affairs*, 2-1.

⁹² JP 3-57, *Civil-Military Operations*, ix, x.

⁹³ Arthur F. Lykke Jr, “Toward an Understanding of Military Strategy,” *US Army War College Guide to Strategy*, ed. Joseph R. Cerami and James F. Holcomb, Jr, February 2001, 179-184, accessed October 1, 2017. <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ssi/00354.pdf>.

⁹⁴ FM 3-05.401, *Civil Affairs*, 2-1.

⁹⁵ JP 3-57.1, *Joint Doctrine for Civil Affairs*, vii; JP 3-57, *Civil-Military Operations*, I-16, I-17.

objectives and enabling NATO commands to participate effectively in a broad spectrum of CMI with diverse non-military actors.”⁹⁶

CCOE defines CMI as “a group of activities, founded on communication, planning, and coordination, that all NATO military bodies share and conduct with international and local non-military actors ... which mutually increases the effectiveness and efficiency of their respective actions in response to crises.” CMI tasks all levels of command to participate, and involves all warfighting functions and disciplines.⁹⁷ CMI is a complex process, linking, facilitating, and balancing military and civilian contribution and resources within a comprehensive approach and cohesive actions, to achieve mission goals successfully.⁹⁸ NATO Allied Command Transformation formulated the approach to CMI in its *Future Comprehensive Civil-Military Interaction Concept*.⁹⁹ This approach relies on enhanced integration amongst civilian and military actors, before, during, and after engagements. ACT established ways to develop enhanced interaction by formalizing CMI mechanisms, building common concepts and doctrines through education and training, unifying efforts and purpose, and encouraging comprehensive planning and close working-level relationships at all levels.¹⁰⁰

The synergetic relation amongst all military and civilian actors shared through CMI supports them in facing challenges and minimizing conflict.¹⁰¹ Marco Paulino Serronha defines

⁹⁶ Civil-Military Cooperation Center of Excellence (CCOE), “CIMIC Field Handbook: 4th Edition,” last modified 2016, accessed August 25, 2017, <http://www.cimic-coe.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/CFHB-4-0-CONTENT-1-5-E-Book-2.pdf>.

⁹⁷ Ibid., I-2-1.

⁹⁸ Ibid., I-2-2.

⁹⁹ Allied Command Transformation 2007, “Future Comprehensive Civil-Military Interaction Concept V1.1,” last modified 2007, accessed September 16, 2017, http://www.google.pt/url?sa=t&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CCIQFjAA&url=https:%2F%2Ftransnet.act.nato.int%2FWISE%2FEnhancedCi%2FDocuments%2Fcopy_of_FCCMIC&rct=j&q=Future%20Comprehensive%20Civil-Military%20Interaction%20Concept%20&ei=vw39TbirC8TusgbktLHxDQ&usg=AFQjCNF7fp72zUeeckKqJZ6MeCVzGJJJeu&sig2=2JTChSDhsA7pDMkGdvRUfA.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., 1.

¹⁰¹ CCOE, “CIMIC Field Handbook,” I-1-5, I-2-1, I-3-3.

synergy as a “combined or cooperative action of two or more agents, either groups or parts that together increase each other's effectiveness and produce sustainable results.” He further explains actions and procedures to enhance the synergetic relation of CMI.¹⁰² Serronha argues that cooperation (will), coordination of actions (work), and shared purpose (end state) are the three critical elements for a synergetic CMI.¹⁰³ The latest version of NATO doctrine, AJP 3.4.9, displays the relevant factors for effective and efficient CMI within NATO's contribution to a comprehensive approach and explains that CMI fosters the development of CIMIC activities, introducing all necessary principles, planning factors, and training requirements.¹⁰⁴

AJP 3.4.9 defines CIMIC as “the coordination and cooperation, in support of the mission, between the NATO commander and civil actors, including national population and local authorities, as well as international, national, and nongovernmental organizations and agencies.”¹⁰⁵ The publication explains that the three core functions of CIMIC include civil-military liaison with civilian agencies; support to the military forces in planning and execution; and physical support to civil actors and their environment on behalf of the military commander to accomplish the mission.¹⁰⁶ The principal advantage of CIMIC is the economy of forces; its chief strength is providing commanders with many solutions helping focusing resources on military aspects of the operations.¹⁰⁷ Graham Longhurst, in *The Evolution of Canadian Civil-Military Cooperation*, explains that one of the most challenging tasks for CIMIC is to create a

¹⁰² Marco Paulino Serronha, “Optimization of Civil-Military Synergies in the Field of Crisis Management,” *Nação e Defesa*, no. 129 (2011): 131, accessed September 15, 2017, https://comum.rcaap.pt/bitstream/10400.26/7614/1/NeD129_MarcoPaulinoSerronha.pdf. Brigadier General Marco Paulino Serronha was the Portuguese Army Deputy Commander of the Kosovo Force from 2013 to 2016.

¹⁰³ Serronha, “Civil-Military Synergies,” 137.

¹⁰⁴ AJP 3.4.9, *Civil-Military Cooperation*, ix, 1-5, 2-1, 3-3, 3-6.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, 2-1.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 2-3, 2-4, 2-5.

¹⁰⁷ JP 3-57.1, *Joint Doctrine for Civil Affairs*, IV-11.

collaborative environment among the local populace; he believes that building trust supports achieving CIMIC's intent.¹⁰⁸

CIMIC differs according to the geographic environment in which forces conduct their activities. In the domestic environment, CIMIC measures include coordination of activities between military commanders and local civil authorities. CIMIC in an international environment comprises arrangements between commanders and foreign bodies, military, and civil populations.¹⁰⁹ NATO doctrine mainly presents CIMIC in three aspects: a tool, an organization, and a function. Longhurst describes CIMIC as a tool that allows the commander to influence the community, family, and individual in his AO.¹¹⁰ CCOE describes CIMIC as an operational support tool that integrates the political security, development, economic, legal, and humanitarian dimensions.¹¹¹ AJP 3.4.9 states that CIMIC is one of the commander's tools for establishing, maintaining, and expanding relationships within the AO.¹¹² As a military organization, CIMIC facilitates linkages between military and civil contributions within cohesive actions to win the 'hearts and minds' and gain acceptance of the local population and help stabilize societies through CIMIC projects.¹¹³ CIMIC staff personnel, units, and elements provide direct support to the commander. In addition, CIMIC offers other military units staff augmentation in planning, analysis, and liaison. Furthermore, NATO doctrine describes CIMIC as a non-combat, military, and joint function. As a non-combat function, military assets conduct CIMIC within a

¹⁰⁸ Graham M. Longhurst, "The Evolution of Canadian Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC)," *Canadian Military Journal* (Winter 2006-2007): 61, accessed August 17, 2017, <http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vo7/no4/doc/longhurst-eng.pdf>.

¹⁰⁹ B-GG-005-004/AF-023, *Civil-Military Cooperation in Peace, Emergencies, Crisis and War*, (Canada: Canadian National Defence, 1999), chap 4, 5.

¹¹⁰ Longhurst, "Canadian CIMIC," 58-59.

¹¹¹ CCOE, "CIMIC Field Handbook," I-1-6.

¹¹² AJP 3.4.9, *Civil-Military Cooperation*, 2-2, 4-1.

¹¹³ CCOE, "CIMIC Field Handbook," I-1-6.

comprehensive approach in coordination with civilian organizations.¹¹⁴ CIMIC, as a military function, focuses on the CE, coordinates with all parties responding to a conflict or disaster, and facilitates mutual support between civilian and military capabilities and resources. As a joint function, CIMIC comprises a set of capabilities integral to support the achievement of mission objectives and to enable military leaders to efficiently participate in a broad spectrum of CMI with diverse non-military actors.¹¹⁵

US doctrine also describes CIMIC. JP 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, defines CIMIC operations as a “group of planned activities in support of military operations” that enhance the relationship between the military forces, civilian authorities, and population.¹¹⁶ These relationships promote the development of favorable emotions, attitudes, or behavior in neutral, friendly, or hostile groups.¹¹⁷ JP 3-57.1 clarifies that CIMIC is a NATO doctrine aiming to create and sustain conditions that will support the attainment of a lasting solution to a crisis.¹¹⁸

CMI and CIMIC emphasize an approach using non-military capability to assist military commanders in attaining their military objectives. CIMIC personnel and units provide the necessary interaction to facilitate and support the planning and conduct of coherent, and, where appropriate, integrated activity. Using Lykke's model, CIMIC elements are the resources—means, their actions are the ways that interact with civilian sectors on the ground, and CMI is the desired objective—ends.¹¹⁹ CIMIC personnel are the subject matter experts in the field of CMI,

¹¹⁴ CCOE, “CIMIC Field Handbook,” I-1-7, I-1-8, I-1-9.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, I-1-1, I-1-2, I-1-3.

¹¹⁶ Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1994), 78.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁸ JP 3-57.1, *Joint Doctrine for Civil Affairs*, IV-10.

¹¹⁹ Lykke, “Understanding Military Strategy,” 179-184.

closing the gap between military and civilian actors.¹²⁰ The CMI of the CIMIC elements ensure that all actors work to a common goal and that supporting activities are harmonized and coherent.¹²¹ While CIMIC is a military function that connects military organizations to civilian actors, CMI is a comprehensive approach open to all interested responders, civilian and military, whose activities increase the effectiveness and efficiency of military operations.¹²²

In sum, although there is a clear doctrinal distinction in describing the terms CIMIC as a tool for CMI, and CA as a mean for CMO, the two approaches refer to activities that often overlap on the ground and share sufficient common ground to be compatible. Thomas Mockaitis identifies CIMIC as the military side, and therefore a part of CMO's broad range of activities.¹²³ James Landon believes that NATO considers CIMIC as an observation, interposition, and transition assistance, while the US recognizes CIMIC as force protection, liaison, and limited direct support.¹²⁴ JP 3-57.1 explains that CIMIC and CA share similar interaction with civilian actors where the only difference is in focus; CIMIC focuses on humanitarian need, CA focuses on military requirements.¹²⁵ CIMIC constitutes a part of overall operations plans and military strategy in NATO doctrines. Meanwhile, the US doctrine does not confine CMO to the military strategy; it is a part of US overall national strategy integrated with strategic, operational, and tactical-level plans and operations.¹²⁶ JP 3-57 suggests that NATO doctrine uses CIMIC to describe CMO and that CIMIC element provides mostly the same functions as CA elements.¹²⁷

¹²⁰ AJP 3.4.9, *Civil-Military Cooperation*, 2-1, 3-3.

¹²¹ CCOE, "CIMIC Field Handbook," I-3-2, I-5-4, II-1-1.

¹²² Ibid., I-2-1, I-2-2.

¹²³ Thomas R. Mockaitis, "Civil-Military Cooperation in Peace Operations: the Case of KOSOVO," Strategic Studies Institute, October 2004, 2, 21, accessed July 25, 2017, <http://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pdf/files/pub583.pdf>.

¹²⁴ James J. Landon, *CIMIC: Civil Military Cooperation, in Lessons from Bosnia: The IFOR Experience*, ed. Larry Wentz (El Paso, TX: CCRP, 1998), 119.

¹²⁵ JP 3-57.1, *Joint Doctrine for Civil Affairs*, I-2.

¹²⁶ JP 3-57, *Civil-Military Operations*, I-5.

¹²⁷ JP 3-57, *Civil-Military Operations*, II-8, II-9, II-23.

CIMIC and CA both reduce duplication of efforts between civilian and military and increase operations' efficiency.¹²⁸

Theory Development

This monograph argues that the lessons learned from the US CMO, CA, NATO CMI, and CIMIC doctrines offer valuable insights that can help the LAF CIMIC develop doctrine to address Lebanese national security threats. There is an overlap among principles existing in NATO and US doctrines. Both CIMIC and CA are the means that the military commander utilizes to conduct CMI and CMO, respectively. CIMIC and CA are force multipliers that maximize the use of civilian entities to minimize the magnitude and duration of military operations. Together, they generate cohesive actions to win the ‘hearts and minds’ of the local population.

When analyzing the LAF doctrinal approach to CIMIC, it is important to remember that doctrines generated by each country vary, due to cultural, demographic, geographical, and mission-centric differences. CIMIC is a reflection of the people who carry it out and rely on the norms, values, and expectations of this particular population.¹²⁹ Unlike NATO and US, the LAF possesses a distinct approach to CIMIC, by applying CIMIC only within the domestic environment, but with missions that span military operations, stability, internal security, peace, emergencies, and crisis management. CIMIC represents the resources and arrangements, which support the relationship between LAF and the local population across the Lebanese territory.¹³⁰ The LAF seeks to attain a long-term purpose for CIMIC by creating and sustaining conditions that support the achievement of operational objectives. Many of the CIMIC perceptions in

¹²⁸ Volker, “The Peacebuilding Dilemma,” 8.

¹²⁹ Ankersen, *The Politics of Civil-Military Cooperation*, 4, 5, 51-70.

¹³⁰ B-GG-005-004/AF-023, *Civil-Military Cooperation*, 2-1.

Lebanon reflect similar NATO and US ideas. However, LAF CIMIC has slightly different definitions for CIMIC linked to its mission of internal stability.

NATO doctrine mainly presents CIMIC in three aspects: a tool for establishing, maintaining, and expanding relationships; an organization that facilitates linkages; and a non-combat, military, and joint function between military and civil contributions. Similarly, within the context of the LAF, CIMIC describes the three aspects mentioned above. However, given the specific context of the CE that the LAF operates in, these three aspects can point the way toward potential improvements in LAF CIMIC operations. This monograph argues that the LAF CIMIC should do three things in order to become more effective. First, the LAF CIMIC should revise its links with the society and the CE, reflected by the LAF's interaction with the civilian leadership to reach better agreement on military roles, obligations, and responsibilities. Second, the LAF CIMIC should review the integration of its decisive military capabilities with the different ministries of the government efforts within the concept of the LAF comprehensive security approach to better advance security and stability. Third, the LAF CIMIC should assess its organic assets and components and identify the existing shortages to enhance its collaboration with between civil actors in the Lebanese CE.

This monograph will analyze the LAF CIMIC doctrine as a case study, and discuss the effective and ineffective practices, with the incorporation of lessons learned from the CIMIC/CA doctrine to achieve operational objectives. This monograph intends to contribute to that doctrine with an aim to derive and develop new practices, possible modifications, and recommendations that will help the LAF CIMIC in addressing the rising challenges in its OE. This study will conclude with recommendations for LAF to address today's security requirements.

Case Study: LAF Theoretical and Doctrinal Approach to CIMIC

The LAF acts as an expeditionary force in its own country, performing missions within its homeland instead of in a foreign country. The LAF's deployment along the Lebanese borders is to defend Lebanon against any external attack, and the deployment across all Lebanese territory

is to maintain internal security and stability. This focus on domestic as well as foreign security is due to the diverse national security threats Lebanon is facing, such as Israeli threats, rising terrorism, and possible natural disasters. In this context, the LAF finds itself performing a multitude of homeland security tasks and border security missions that require maintaining a high level of responsiveness to support law enforcement, while staying ready to respond to other external threats and emergencies.¹³¹ The variety of missions shows the importance of a more profound interaction with the civil society in dealing with these security concerns.

The establishment of the CIMIC Directorate in 2015 shows the awareness of the Lebanese military leadership of the importance of coordinating civil-military activities to address national threats. The *CIMIC Conceptual Framework* published by the LAF in 2017 describes the LAF's approach of 'Homeland CIMIC' for the domestic environment instead of for international environments. The Lebanese domestic CE includes the Lebanese population, civil authorities, commercial sectors, international organizations, governmental organisations (ministries and local municipalities), NGOs, and religious organizations. Religious diversity, refugees' issue, and internal and external threats are significant characteristics that give Lebanon its distinct approach to CIMIC.¹³² In this 'homeland' context, CIMIC is a joint capability that enables LAF, through cooperation and coordination, to effectively conduct a broad spectrum of activity with diverse civil actors in support of its mission of protecting and advancing Lebanese national interests."¹³³ The *CIMIC Conceptual Framework* focuses on CIMIC as an enabler, enhancing LAF effectiveness by strengthening the relationship with the civilian realm in order to achieve its mission. LAF CIMIC's primary goal is to "enhance Lebanon's resilience by strengthening the strategic relationship between LAF and the population."¹³⁴ This bridging mechanism between the

¹³¹ Government of Lebanon, "The Lebanese Constitution."

¹³² LAF, *CIMIC Conceptual Framework*, 9, 11.

¹³³ *Ibid.*, 1, 2.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, 1, 2.

military forces on one side and the civil institutions on the other makes it possible for a significantly smaller military to have the same or greater effect than a larger one.

The LAF CIMIC contributes to the LAF missions in three different aspects: CIMIC in combat operations, CIMIC in homeland security operations—counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and stability operations—and CIMIC in crisis management operations.¹³⁵ The aim is to provide sustained support to the military and to cement the support of the civil population. These sustaining conditions contribute to the achievement of tactical missions, support the attainment of operational objectives, and facilitate reaching the strategic end state.¹³⁶ CIMIC is one of the ways that enable the LAF to accomplish its missions on the internal scene and presents a significant means of assisting the LAF in facing the various threats to Lebanese national security.¹³⁷

In the following sections, the author will analyze the LAF CIMIC doctrinal approach in the following aspects: CMR and CMI, the LAF comprehensive security approach, and the CIMIC components. The analysis will compare each of these features to the theoretical and doctrinal NATO and US approaches.

Civil-Military Relations and Civil-Military Interaction

The LAF leadership is comfortable with traditional civilian authority over the military and executes the overall orders of the government and the President—the “Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces.”¹³⁸ The Lebanese government decides on the defense and security policy, and supervises its implementation by the LAF through the Ministry of National Defense—the Supreme Council for Defense.¹³⁹ In using Lykke’s construct, this policy is the desired conditions

¹³⁵ LAF, *CIMIC Conceptual Framework*, 13-17.

¹³⁶ AJP 3.4.9, *Civil-Military Cooperation*, 1-8.

¹³⁷ Directorate of Orientation, “The Mission of the Lebanese Army.”

¹³⁸ Dagher, “Nahr Al-Bared,” 43.

¹³⁹ Government of Lebanon, “The Lebanese Constitution.”

(ends), the Ministry of National Defense sets the necessary measures (ways), and the LAF implements the resources (means).¹⁴⁰ The Lebanese Constitution and the National Defense Law gives the LAF flexible legal powers that become exceptional when the government declares a state of emergency or in the event of the country, part of its territory, its public sector, or group of its population's exposure to danger.¹⁴¹

The relationship between military command and civilian authorities presents a problematic perspective. While Lebanese politicians count on the LAF to conduct critical missions and coordinate with civilian security institutions, they are also apprehensive of the extended power of the LAF that might threaten their control.¹⁴² From the perspective of the Huntington model, the Lebanese military is more liable to a subjective civilian control than an objective one.¹⁴³ The LAF possesses a coercive power used to protect and maintain both the internal and external security of the country.¹⁴⁴ The balance between civilian and military leadership in Lebanon comes from an agreement on key issues that do not have to follow normative rules. The mutual understanding of a common vision of defense between both sides reflects Feaver's 'agency theory'.¹⁴⁵ However, shared identity, values, and norms between military and the civilian population—rather than the civilian leadership—imply that the Lebanese

¹⁴⁰ Thomas Collelo, "Lebanon: A Country Study," *Headquarters: Department of the Army*, 1987, accessed November 13, 2017, <https://cdn.loc.gov/master/frd/frdcstdy/le/lebanoncountryst00coll/lebanoncountryst00coll.pdf>, ed. John C. Rolland, *Lebanon: Current Issues and Background* (Hauppauge, New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2003), 182. The Lebanese Supreme Defense Council consists of the President of the republic as chair, the Prime Minister as vice chair, and the Deputy Prime Minister and the Ministers of National Defense, Foreign Affairs, Interior, and Finance as members. The LAF commander attends the Council meetings in an advisory capacity.

¹⁴¹ LAF, *CIMIC Conceptual Framework*, 1-4.

¹⁴² Nerguizian, "Lebanese Civil-Military Dynamics."

¹⁴³ Gaub, "Civil-Military Relations in the MENA," 32.

¹⁴⁴ Arjana Olldashi, "Civil Military Relations in Emerging Democracies as Found in the Articles of Armed Forces & Society" (Master's thesis, Southwest Texas State University, 2002), 29, accessed August 27, 2017, <https://digital.library.txstate.edu/bitstream/handle/10877/3733/fulltext.pdf>.

¹⁴⁵ Gaub, "Civil-Military Relations in the MENA," 27.

military will obey orders because it agrees with them on a common vision.¹⁴⁶ On several occasions, when LAF leadership felt there was internal disagreement or political divisions, and the political decision given would undermine the stability of Lebanon or the unity of the LAF as a fighting force, the LAF has refused to obey the political leadership and rejected orders to intervene to quell domestic unrest. In contrast, when the LAF leadership feels an imminent threat is menacing Lebanese security or stability, it takes an autonomous response and deploys its forces to respond adequately and safeguard its parliamentary democracy.¹⁴⁷

Serronha explain CMI within a synergetic relation theory of cooperation (will), coordination of actions (work), and standard purpose (end state), to develop military interaction with the civil community. CMI, from the Lebanese military perspective, encompasses military activities performed by LAF that help to establish, maintain, influence, or manage relations between military forces and the CE.¹⁴⁸ Janowitz's 'constabulary' concept of a controlled application of violence and closer links with the society is reflected the LAF's interaction between civilian and military spheres and the agreement on roles, obligations, and responsibilities in Lebanon.¹⁴⁹ NATO CMI's activities rely on communication, planning, and coordination between military, international, and local non-military actors on all levels.¹⁵⁰ The LAF CMI increases the effectiveness and efficiency of all parties in response to crises, thereby enhancing the resilience of the nation. CMI enables the LAF to establish and enhance good CMR, which

¹⁴⁶ LAF, *CIMIC Conceptual Framework*, 32.

¹⁴⁷ Aram Nerguizian, "The Lebanese Armed Forces, Challenges and Opportunities in Post-Syria Lebanon," *Center for Strategic and International Studies*, February 10, 2009, 10, accessed October 15, 2017, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/090210_lafsecurity3.pdf. There are cases in the past where politicians sought to use the military to quell domestic unrest, ranging from President Bishara al-Khoury in 1952 to Camille Chamoun in 1958, or indeed Emile Lahoud in 2005 – but in each case, the armed forces refused to intervene. Dagher, "Nahr Al-Bared," 9. The LAF, on some occasions in contrarily, took an autonomous response when felt the morale of its soldiers is jeopardized. In 2007, and after Fath Al-Islam terrorist organization attacked LAF barracks around Nahr Al-Bared Palestinian camp and assassinated its soldiers, the LAF invaded the Camp before asking for a political cover from the Lebanese government.

¹⁴⁸ LAF, *CIMIC Conceptual Framework*, 7.

¹⁴⁹ Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier*, 417.

¹⁵⁰ CCOE, "CIMIC Field Handbook," I-2-1.

improves freedom of maneuver, supports the ability of citizens to resist internal and external threats, and raises levels of national readiness to face any emergency.

The differences between NATO and LAF CMI are in the focus of their activities. CMI from the NATO perspective emphasizes the transition to civil ownership of governance as early as possible. By pursuing an interim aim, NATO CMI improves security temporarily allowing its forces to provide essential services on behalf of the HN government. Unlike NATO, the LAF CMI seeks to attain a long-standing goal, seeking to enhance the security resilience of the nation and its quick response capabilities. While NATO and LAF CMI both focus on transitioning military governance over to civil control as soon as possible, NATO appears to prioritize the speed of the handoff while the LAF prioritizes long-term stability. This monograph suggests that the LAF should strive for mutual understanding on defense strategy with civilian leadership, which may allow for earlier transitions to civilian responsibility without hindering Lebanese national security resilience. This would increase the LAF CIMIC efficiency in all levels of military operations, encourage the achievement of unity of effort, and enhance LAF CIMIC's contribution to the LAF comprehensive national security strategy.

The LAF Comprehensive Security Approach

The LAF executes its mission within a 'comprehensive national security strategy' that aims to advance Lebanese national interests through coordinated and joint planning that combines the Lebanese instruments of power.¹⁵¹ An effective Lebanese national security system relies on the government's ability to apply all instruments of national power to advance its national interests.¹⁵² JP 3-57 clarifies how CMO contributes to the military instrument of national power, coordinates the integration of all DIME in support of military operations, and synchronizes them

¹⁵¹ LAF, *CIMIC Conceptual Framework*, 7.

¹⁵² JP 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces*, xi, I-11-I-14.

to achieve national security objectives.¹⁵³ Through cooperation with diverse civil actors, CIMIC as a joint capability is comparable to CMO. It enables LAF to participate efficiently in a broad spectrum of activities, within a national approach. This approach represents the end-state of the Lebanese security policy and emphasizes the need for active cooperation, synchronization, coordination, and integration between the military institution and all actors in the CE to face security threats.¹⁵⁴ This approach includes shared situational understanding, commonly agreed-upon procedures, and recognition that non-military actors may support the military and conversely are essential in establishing this LAF ‘comprehensive security approach.’¹⁵⁵

When comparing the NATO comprehensive approach and the LAF comprehensive security approach, some contrasting features are apparent. The former emphasizes reconstruction and development as a basic premise. The role of military in achieving the desired outcome is not decisive; instead, it enables and supports the achievement of the desired outcome by others.¹⁵⁶ This comprehensive approach implies maximization of interagency cooperation, a combination of civilian and military capabilities, and the gaining of efficiencies within existing organizations.¹⁵⁷ This allows military integration into non-traditional military missions while maintaining the critical combat capabilities required conducting military missions. On the other hand, the LAF comprehensive security approach is within the concept of a comprehensive defense approach to advance security and stability.¹⁵⁸ It stresses the decisive military role that leads directly to the achievement of the desired outcome. Economic, diplomatic, and informational elements of national power are supporting efforts, used to maximize military efficiency in achieving the

¹⁵³ JP 3-57, *Civil-Military Operation*.

¹⁵⁴ LAF, *CIMIC Conceptual Framework*, 8.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 9; AJP 3.4.9, *Civil-Military Cooperation*, 1-6.

¹⁵⁶ AJP 3.4.9, *Civil-Military cooperation*, 1-7.

¹⁵⁷ Darrell Driver, “Pragmatic Approach to Civil-Military Partnership,” 13.

¹⁵⁸ LAF, *CIMIC Conceptual Framework*, 10.

security and stability of Lebanon. The LAF's role in this approach is critical, and through the efforts of the Ministry of National Defense, the LAF's integration of its military capabilities within the different ministries of the government enables the achievement of the country's desired security outcome.¹⁵⁹

The *CIMIC Conceptual Framework* points out that CIMIC contributes to this holistic approach through CMI to enhance social ties and gain the tacit support of the Lebanese population. The goal is to strengthen the Lebanese state by encouraging a spirit of national unity among the diverse groups of citizens. This unity serves to increase situational awareness and enhances collaboration and the sharing of vital information between military and non-military actors in rapidly evolving crisis.¹⁶⁰ Additionally, the encouragement of a unifying nationalist spirit and patriotism among Lebanese citizens, which links citizens to their government, prevents the creation of a power vacuum that encourages lawlessness. Specifically, such power vacuums are a threat in specific areas where non-citizen or refugees cluster. These non-citizens, who have no sense of national belonging, might otherwise be influenced from outside sources. Therefore, this development of patriotism enhances Lebanese state resilience, and fosters preparedness and earlier, more efficient responses to unexpected crises.

The collaborative incorporation of all Lebanese Ministries' capabilities for a common purpose allows the achievement of unity of effort and enhances the government's ability to advance a 'whole-of-government' approach.¹⁶¹ The government assigns national defense tasks to relevant ministries and state agencies, giving necessary directions and instructions and overseeing their implementation.¹⁶² Within this context, every Lebanese Minister is responsible for the implementation of defense and security tasks and necessary related measures assigned to his

¹⁵⁹ LAF, *CIMIC Conceptual Framework*, 10.

¹⁶⁰ AJP 3.4.9, *Civil-Military Cooperation*, 1-4.

¹⁶¹ LAF, *CIMIC Conceptual Framework*, 10.

¹⁶² Lykke, "Understanding Military Strategy," 179-184.

Ministry.¹⁶³ The LAF carries out tasks, which are usually the responsibility of a delegated civil organization, to assist the civilian sector executing their missions. The LAF CIMIC operates under specified principles guiding these activities and allowing the organization to execute its mission. These principles are very similar to the NATO ones. They include knowing the intent of both military command and civil actors; understanding the environment by taking into consideration the operational variables and civil considerations in the AO; operating within the Lebanese and international humanitarian laws; and gaining the respect and trust of civilian actors.¹⁶⁴ Additional principles include respecting private ownership and early transition, integrating assessment and planning with all actors, and efficiently communicating to increase shared understanding.¹⁶⁵

The LAF Directorates of Intelligence and Orientation also contribute through IOs and PSYOPs, respectively, to this comprehensive security approach through gaining the OE population's support for military objectives.¹⁶⁶ JFC's IOs and PSYOPs contribute directly to tactical, operational, and strategic success. However, the LAF *CIMIC Conceptual Framework* has not included any synchronization of IOs and PSYOPs measures with CIMIC activities. In homeland security operations, IOs and PSYOPs help to maintain warm relations with civilians

¹⁶³ LAF, *CIMIC Conceptual Framework*, 3. A Lebanese Minister is equivalent to a Secretary in the US Government.

¹⁶⁴ ADRP 3-0, *Unified Land Operations*, 1-2. The PMESII-PT represents the interrelated operational variables: political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time; Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 5-0, *The Operations Process* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2012), 1-9. Civil considerations comprise six characteristics (ASCOPE): areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events.

¹⁶⁵ LAF, *CIMIC Conceptual Framework*, 18-20.

¹⁶⁶ Directorate of Orientation, "The Directorate of Intelligence," Lebanese Armed Forces Official Website, accessed November 12, 2017, <https://www.learmy.gov.lb/en/content/directorate-intelligence>. The Directorate of Intelligence is the intelligence branch of the LAF. Its primary mission is to provide tactical, operational, and strategic intelligence and electronic warfare. Directorate of Orientation, "The Directorate of Orientation," Lebanese Armed Forces Official Website, accessed November 12, 2017, <https://www.learmy.gov.lb/en/content/directorate-orientation>. The Directorate of Orientation is the voice of the LAF to the troops and the local population. Its primary mission is to ensure the media coverage of the LAF Commander's activities and the different missions conducted by the Army, and to guarantee interaction with the local and foreign media outlets as well as civil society organizations.

and to facilitate the establishment of a favorable CE that supports the LAF mission. IOs shape the commander's OE by disseminating selected themes and creating effects to influence enemy's ideology and information-related capabilities that provide commanders decisive advantage.¹⁶⁷ PSYOPs promote these efforts and publicize the successes of CIMIC activities to generate a positive perception of conducted actions to influence "emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately, the behavior."¹⁶⁸ These operations, within the CIMIC process, maintain a coherent CIMIC approach, accomplish operational objectives, and achieve desired outcomes.

The main difference between the NATO and LAF comprehensive approaches is in the role of the military to achieve national power. The first emphasizes development and economic assistance, utilizing military contribution simply as an enabler to attain HN reconstruction by other means.¹⁶⁹ In contrast, LAF's approach puts the military as a decisive element leading directly to the achievement of the desired outcome. All other DIME elements assist the LAF in achieving the country's national security strategy. This paper suggests that the LAF should implement NATO's 'whole-of-government' comprehensive approach to sustainable governance, addressing all instruments of national power. This would allow the LAF CIMIC to better achieve unity of effort, and enhance its contribution to the LAF comprehensive national security strategy.

CIMIC Components

To conduct its activities and execute its mission effectively, CIMIC needs educated experts and trained specialists who facilitate mutual collaboration between civil actors and military personnel. These CIMIC assets vary with the mission and depend on the level of operations (strategic, operational, or tactical level) that the LAF is engaging. CIMIC activities extend along the full range of military operations, ranging from large-scale combat operations to

¹⁶⁷ FM 3-13, *Information Operations* (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2016), 1-1, 1-4.

¹⁶⁸ FM 3-05.301, *Psychological Operations: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures* (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2003), 1-1.

¹⁶⁹ AJP 3.4.9, *Civil-Military Cooperation*, 1-7.

responses to humanitarian emergencies.¹⁷⁰ The LAF CIMIC is comparable to NATO's four components (policy, doctrine, and concepts; understanding, will, and capacity; CIMIC assets; and appropriate logistic support). However, the LAF CIMIC combines them into three: conceptual, physical, and moral components that, combined, produce the capability of CIMIC.¹⁷¹ The conceptual component encompasses policies, doctrine, concepts, principles, and procedures applied in CIMIC activities. The physical component includes, in addition to the CIMIC assets in the form of selected, trained, and competent personnel and joint elements (land, maritime, and air), the resources required to execute CIMIC activities and ensure operability, such as logistic support and financial resources. The moral component requires will, commitment, dedication, and knowledge acquired through training and education.¹⁷²

NATO doctrine explains that the physical composition of CIMIC assets cannot be prescriptive. Every situation has its unique characteristics; as a result, CIMIC staff must populate all LAF units' headquarters as appropriate for a given circumstance.¹⁷³ The LAF CIMIC organic assets are currently limited to the CIMIC Directorate and three Regional CIMIC Sections (RCSs) deployed in the North, Bekaa, and South regions. The CIMIC Directorate performs the RCSs tasks in the two remaining military regions (Beirut and North Lebanon).¹⁷⁴ The Directorate includes a follow-up and communication section, studies and evaluation section, administration and logistics section, and Information Technology office. There is no distinct training section responsible for CIMIC education and training. The CIMIC Directorate is a part of the LAF-J3, responsible for providing advice and planning support to the LAF leadership in decision making while directing and supervising RCSs CIMIC activities. The RCSs coordinate and collaborate

¹⁷⁰ ADRP 3-0, *Unified Land Operations*, 1-6.

¹⁷¹ AJP 3.4.9, *Civil-Military Cooperation*, 2-5. 2-6.

¹⁷² LAF, *CIMIC Conceptual Framework*, 17-18.

¹⁷³ AJP 3.4.9, *Civil-Military Cooperation*, 2-5.

¹⁷⁴ Each military region represents the respective RCS's AO.

with the respective military region’s leaderships to facilitate accomplishment of CIMIC missions.¹⁷⁵ Non-organic assets that the CIMIC could benefit from in order to multiply its capabilities are staff officers in units—normally operations officers—helping in planning, and soldiers from various military entities in each geographic region assisting in execution. The CIMIC Directorate also uses specialist civilian volunteers to provide subject matter expertise for help in planning and executing CIMIC activities.¹⁷⁶

The RCSs support the military mission by coordinating with all the actors of the CE in their AO. Their activities are comparable to the US PRTs that operated in Afghanistan and Iraq during Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom respectively. The RCSs and PRTs both act in a designated AO represented by a region, province, or district, helping shape the CE through combining DIME capabilities.¹⁷⁷ The difference between the two organizations is that PRTs usually operate following open hostilities to stabilize and secure the AO, while the RCSs have a homeland focus and operate in peacetime more often than during open conflict, with the aim of maintaining stability and security.¹⁷⁸ The PRTs pursue a short-term aim by taking the role of local government in delivering essential services, enforcing the rule of law, and attaining economic development with the intent to improve security and stability in a given area.¹⁷⁹ On the contrary, RCSs pursue a long-term aim to strengthen the relationship between the LAF and the population combining military and civil efforts enhancing self-sustaining security structures.¹⁸⁰ In

¹⁷⁵ LAF, *CIMIC Conceptual Framework*, 21-23.

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 21-23.

¹⁷⁷ JP 3-57, *Civil-Military Operations*, II-31.

¹⁷⁸ Center for Army Lessons Learned, “PRT Playbook: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures,” last modified September 2007, 1, accessed October 23, 2017, <http://usacac.army.mil/sites/default/files/publications/07-34.pdf>, 1; LAF, *CIMIC Conceptual Framework*.

¹⁷⁹ JP 3-57, *Civil-Military Operations*, GL-7.

¹⁸⁰ LAF, *CIMIC Conceptual Framework*, 1, 2.

times of conflicts, both PRTs and RCSs emphasize the continuing responsibility of the civil authorities and the transition back to civil ownership of governance as early as possible.¹⁸¹

Training is extremely important to maintain, enhance, and sustain the three components that produce the LAF CIMIC capability. According to the *CIMIC Conceptual Framework*, training programs can be individual or collective, in addition to normal military education.¹⁸² The individual training includes a series of courses with the CIMIC mobile education training team from the Multinational CIMIC Group organized by the Italian Military Bilateral Mission in Lebanon.¹⁸³ The collective training aims to support the LAF in planning and conducting combat, homeland security, and crisis management operations with various international organizations, NGOs, in addition to joint drills with specialized crews. In addition, The LAF CIMIC conducts education on CIMIC through national and international seminars, workshops, and conferences.¹⁸⁴

The key difference between the US PRTs and the LAF RCSs is the sustainability of their activities' outcome. The PRTs pursue a short-term aim, enforcing security and stability temporarily, in order to deliver essential services on behalf of the civil authorities. On the contrary, the RCSs pursue a long-term target focusing on durable conditions for resilient security and stability solutions by maintaining ongoing presence. However, given the LAF CIMIC's focus on peacetime operations, the LAF CIMIC should study the PRT's experiences in enforcing the rule of law following open hostilities. This would give the LAF CIMIC more tools to train with to stabilize and secure its AO, which could then be added to its doctrine.

¹⁸¹ Ibid., 20; Center for Army Lessons Learned, "PRT Playbook," 38, 42.

¹⁸² LAF, *CIMIC Conceptual Framework*, 30-32.

¹⁸³ Motta di Livenza, "MIBIL: Training of Lebanese Armed Forces on the Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) Sector," *CIMIC Group*, August 18, 2017, accessed September 29, 2017, http://www.cimicgroup.org/news_archives/full_news/afghanistan_italian_soldiers_donated_school_equipment_copia_9e99727e436d135_copia_4f445d402369d51/.

¹⁸⁴ LAF, *CIMIC Conceptual Framework*, 18.

Conclusion

In sum, the LAF's deployment for both external and internal missions, in addition to the diverse threats that Lebanon is facing, shows the importance of a more profound interaction with the civil society and led to the development of a distinct LAF approach to CIMIC—the 'Homeland CIMIC.' Analyzing this approach and comparing it to US and NATO's concepts, the author found some distinctions in scope. These differences are in the focus of CMI activities, the role of military in the comprehensive approach, and the sustainability of the PRTs and RCSs activities' outcome. First, while CMI from the NATO perspective improves security temporarily to allow rapid transition to HN authorities, the LAF CMI seeks to attain a long-standing goal of enhancing the security resilience of the nation. Second, in NATO's comprehensive approach, the military represents an enabler to attain HN reconstruction; in the LAF comprehensive security approach, the military possesses the decisive role, which leads directly to the achievement of the country's national security strategy. Finally, the US PRTs pursue a short-term aim and enforce security and stability temporarily. In contrast, the LAF RCSs pursue a long-term target and implement self-sustained security and stability solutions.

Analysis and Recommendations

Because of Lebanon's particularity, the context in which the LAF employs CIMIC may be unique. While there are many points of similarities between LAF CIMIC and US and NATO CIMIC doctrine, there are also some differences. The LAF's approach of 'Homeland CIMIC' for the domestic environment supports JFC and civil authorities in achieving operational objectives and accomplishing their missions. Within this specific situation of Lebanon, the LAF employs CIMIC in three scenarios: CIMIC in combat operations, CIMIC in homeland security operations, and CIMIC in crisis management. In addition, the LAF CIMIC's pursuit of its long-term aim of seeking to improve the nation's development and governance, suggests a focus on establishing

self-sustaining structures for security and processes for stability in the country, to achieve LAF missions and enhance Lebanon's resilience.

This monograph argues that, in order to address this LAF unique context, the LAF CIMIC should pursue the following refinements and ramifications to allow the LAF accomplish its missions. First, the LAF should introduce the instruments of national power as lines of effort to the CIMIC doctrine. This would help allow the LAF to achieve unity of effort and address the complex security challenges that the country is facing through a holistic approach based on mutual trust and shared understanding between military and civilian actors. Second, the LAF should synchronize IOs actions and PSYOPs measures within the CIMIC activities. This synergetic relation would focus efforts, facilitate military operations, and improve LAF CIMIC's efficiency in conducting operations. Third, the LAF should work on reevaluating training and establishing a CIMIC training section within the CIMIC Directorate training CIMIC staff and forces at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. This will permit the sustainability and independence of LAF CIMIC training, independent from the international communities who currently dominate the CIMIC training. The following paragraphs provide detailed recommendations to the LAF in these areas.

Introducing the Instruments of National Power as Lines of Effort to the CIMIC Doctrine

To address the complex security challenges (Israeli threats, rising terrorism, and possible natural disasters) that Lebanon is facing, the LAF needs to achieve unity of effort through the sound integration of all instruments of national power in the LAF CIMIC lines of effort. The country's political division and the complicated and intricate political situation that governs the LAF's relationship with the Lebanese government demands the implementation of a holistic approach based on mutual trust and shared understanding between military and civilian actors. The holistic comprehensive application of the DIME concept as lines of effort by the LAF in

CIMIC is a necessary framework to improve the LAF CIMIC's efficiency in addressing the country's security challenges and future operations.

Currently, DIME is not part of the LAF's doctrine; this monograph argues that the LAF CIMIC should incorporate this terminology and principles, and then coordinate and synchronize the integration of DIME in support of military operations, to better achieve national security objectives. The LAF CIMIC, as a joint capability, should integrate these efforts and structure them in their plans along four lines of effort: diplomatic measures, informational activities, military capabilities, and economic actions. The LAF CIMIC can implement these lines of effort as reforms and developments related to the overall national goal of defending the homeland. The LAF CIMIC should implement this holistic approach, unifying Lebanese ministries with the CE, to better attain unity of effort in addressing the complex security challenges that Lebanon is facing.

The LAF CIMIC should strive for a synergetic relation between the LAF and all of the civilian actors' actions through the coordination and de-conflicting of the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic capabilities to overcome the obstacles posed by the complex OE. The adoption of the DIME construct is an important milestone, crucial in achieving the LAF's missions. First, the LAF CIMIC Directorate should seek, through the diplomatic measures, to overcome the problematic weaknesses and divisions in the Lebanese political situation. To do so, the LAF CIMIC should strive to develop appropriate mechanisms to contribute effectively at community, municipality, regional, and national levels. Additionally, the LAF CIMIC should manage the informational campaign by maintaining a counterpoint to its adversaries' biased and disruptive propaganda. The LAF CIMIC should work on attracting media interests to publicize CIMIC activities effectively through daily reports. Third, early planning-phases of military operations should integrate the CIMIC and its unique capabilities, which will assist the LAF in adequately projecting military forces, supporting the military mission, gaining military efficiency, and possibly facilitating reaching the end-state faster. Last, the LAF CIMIC

must not rely solely on international donors like the United States and others for its funding. It should seek financial support for CIMIC activities from domestic sponsors and NGOs, as such funding will give the organization more independence and long-term sustainability.

Synchronizing IOs Actions and PSYOPs Measures within the CIMIC Activities

Clausewitz stated, “All military action is intertwined with psychological forces and effects.”¹⁸⁵ The common ground between CIMIC, IOs, and PSYOPs is information. CIMIC activities, IOs actions, and PSYOPs measures produce intelligence on the enemy’s ideology and actions and help the JFC shape the military information environment. Winning the ‘hearts and minds’ of the local population is a shared responsibility and a common objective to CIMIC, IOs, and PSYOPs. Identifying that common objective leads to focused efforts and the effective use of force against the enemy. The LAF CIMIC Directorate should coordinate and synchronize CIMIC efforts with the Directorate of Intelligence IOs actions and the Directorate of Orientation PSYOPs measures, respectively, to facilitate military operations, achieve desired outcomes, and support the nation’s comprehensive security approach. This synchronized mutual support between CIMIC, IOs, and PSYOPs helps enhance relations with civilians in the CE, supporting the LAF mission and contributing directly to tactical, operational, and strategic success.

IOs shape the CIMIC's OE by disseminating selected themes and creating effects to influence friendly key leaders and decision makers, in addition to combating enemy information-related capabilities. Successful IOs provide the JFC with a decisive relative advantage in the CE, while simultaneously protecting the JFC’s own information assets and decision-making processes. The LAF Directorate of Intelligence should develop its IOs strategies in coordination with the LAF CIMIC in order to achieve unity of effort. Through this coordination process, IOs can create synergy among military and civilian efforts in support of LAF CIMIC strategic,

¹⁸⁵ Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), 136.

operational, and tactical objectives. Additionally, LAF CIMIC RCSs support IOs by providing the JFC with timely access to necessary, relevant, and accurate information on the state of the CE within each military region, which contributes to timely and effective decision-making. IOs can be developed around the information RCSs provide to the JFC on assistance programs and reconstruction or rehabilitation projects in their AO. CIMIC also supports IOs through its ability to influence positively the attitudes and perceptions of CE key actors within the AO. Accordingly, CIMIC planning and activities should be coordinated and integrated with IOs to ensure that CIMIC contributes to the realization of IOs objectives.¹⁸⁶

PSYOPs use information to attempt a change in a population's perceptions, opinions, beliefs, attitudes, and behavior to gain its support for civil tasks and programs. The LAF conducts PSYOPs through the Directorate of Orientation's media assets and information generating facilities, the LAF's voice to the soldiers and the local population, in order to address, communicate, and gain popular support. The LAF CIMIC must coordinate with the Directorate of Orientation on PSYOPs to promote RCSs' CIMIC efforts and publicize the successes of its activities, with the goal of generating a positive perception and influencing the targeted populace's behavior. In addition, CIMIC RCSs support PSYOPs through establishing good relations with the local community in each AO, which helps to produce sound intelligence and to gain the OE's support for military objectives. The LAF CIMIC's role is to address both military and civilian actors' concerns about compromising sources, the release of classified information, and neutrality. LAF CIMIC must explain to both sides the importance and the common interest of sharing unclassified, but nonetheless valuable, information with others. These operations, within the CIMIC process, help maintain a coherent CIMIC approach, accomplish JFC's operational objectives, and achieve LAF desired outcomes. Therefore, this paper suggests that the LAF

¹⁸⁶ B-GL-355-001/FP-001, *Civil-military Cooperation Tactics, Techniques and Procedures* (Canada: Canadian Land Forces, 2006), 6-7.

CIMIC Directorate should synchronize and plan PSYOPs campaigns at the strategic level. Meanwhile, within their AOs, the RCSs should control their activities at the operational level, and execute their actions at the tactical level. While efforts at each level may focus on different objectives, activities should mutually support each other. Mutual planning including LAF CIMIC, IOs, and PSYOPs improves the LAF's efficiency in conducting operations.

Reevaluating Training and Establishing a CIMIC Training Section within the CIMIC Directorate

Because of the limited LAF military expenditures, and the apprehension across the country's political spectrum, the development and training of the LAF CIMIC is currently confined to that which is provided by international militaries. While this training is effective, it is also dependent upon an external source not controlled by the LAF. In addition, current Lebanese civil-military efforts remain lacking in adequate financial support for military development, budgeting, or the organization of future CIMIC needs. Therefore, the LAF should work to establish a training section within the CIMIC that can educate and instruct LAF CIMIC and other military personnel.

Because "CIMIC is every soldier's job," the goal of the CIMIC training section should be, at a minimum, to teach every soldier in the LAF the CIMIC basic awareness course.¹⁸⁷ Given the Lebanese security situation, each of these troops might be conducting CIMIC activities in cooperation with CIMIC personnel or RCSs in their unit's AO. The CIMIC training section should synchronize its activities with the LAF *CIMIC Conceptual Framework* training guidance, aiming to enhance and sustain the conceptual, physical, and moral components of CIMIC capability. The CIMIC training section should utilize the 'train-the-trainer' concept, applying the individual training that the LAF CIMIC is conducting to transform CIMIC students into instructors for the course.

¹⁸⁷ Mockaitis, "Civil-Military Cooperation," 24.

The CIMIC training section should also conduct collective training to support the LAF in planning and conducting its missions. This training should encompass courses for combat operations, homeland security operations, and crisis management operations. In combat operations, the focus should be on assisting in the preparation of operational plans in order to decrease the interference of civilian population with the military forces on the battlefield, and to provide accurate and timely advice and assessments of the CE. In homeland security operations, the focus should be on IOs and PSYOPSs to influence the targeted audience in order to gain the continuous support of the populace, which in turn will increase situational awareness and help enhance collaboration in rapidly evolving situations, such as the sharing of vital information between military and non-military actors. Last, in crisis management operations, the focus should be on establishing new, and enhancing existing, relationships between military forces and the CE. CIMIC should conduct this collective training in joint drills with various international organizations, NGOs, and specialized institutions such as the Lebanese Red Cross, the International Federation of Red Cross, the UNHCR, and others. This would enhance cooperation and coordination between these organizations and the LAF, permitting LAF units to replicate, if necessary, the role of the CIMIC in working with these organizations during any of the above-mentioned missions. This joint planning, training, and education would ensure greater integration in military operations and mitigate misunderstanding between military units and civilian actors in the AO.

The CIMIC training section should also focus on education conducted at the national and international level through seminars and conferences. These workshops should support the LAF CIMIC non-combat, military, and joint functions. The LAF needs to train the CIMIC staff, personnel, and forces within the military structure to draw together all these aspects of CIMIC at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. The LAF CIMIC training section also needs to address organizational cultural differences between the military and the CE in its training and education. Finally, the LAF lacks CIMIC personnel in the larger LAF deployed units. At least one

staff officer, assigned to each level of headquarters (down to battalion level in Brigades and staff in Regiments), should be included in the CIMIC training cycle. These trained personnel may, in some cases, plan and conduct CIMIC activities, taking the role of the RCS in the unit's AO, if authorized by the JFC.

In sum, the analysis of the LAF's approach of 'Homeland CIMIC' and the lessons learned from US and NATO CIMIC doctrines reveal the need for establishing self-sustaining CIMIC structures for security and stability in Lebanon, which will assist the LAF in achieving its missions. The LAF should introduce the instruments of national power as lines of effort to the CIMIC doctrine, synchronize IOs actions and PSYOPs measures within the CIMIC activities, and work on establishing a CIMIC training section within the CIMIC Directorate. These measures would enable the LAF CIMIC to more effectively achieve its missions within the LAF's intent.

Conclusion

The LAF's deployment for both external and internal missions across all of Lebanese territory, in addition to the diverse threats that Lebanon is facing, highlights the importance of profound interactions with Lebanese civil society. The complicated Lebanese demographic situation, due to the presence of Palestinian refugees bearing arms in refugee camps, and the rising terrorism threat among Syrian refugees, adds more risk and complexity to Lebanese national security issues. The LAF is required to maintain a high level of responsiveness to support law enforcement while staying ready to respond to other external threats. To achieve common national objectives, cooperation with civilian actors in the CE is critical for the planning and execution of LAF missions.

In Lebanon, an agreement on crucial issues ensures the civil-military leadership balance. The experiences from recent military operations in Lebanon show that the close cooperation between civil actors and military leaders is a relevant part of military operations, and is critical in achieving stability, military objectives, and ultimately the political-military end state. The LAF comprehensive security approach is a holistic undertaking that seeks to unify Lebanese

government institutions with the CE and to synchronize all instruments of national power (DIME). This whole-of-government approach can help to solve the complex security challenges that Lebanon is facing.

The LAF CIMIC contributes to the unity of effort of this national strategy through a coordinated and joint planning and execution process. The LAF CIMIC seeks to attain long-term objectives by enhancing the security resilience of the nation; the quick response capabilities, linked with its mission in the domestic environment, are both needed for creating and sustaining conditions that support the CE across Lebanon. The LAF CIMIC activities support military objectives, enhance the resilience of the country, and are vital to the success of LAF in future missions. The LAF CIMIC organic assets are limited to the CIMIC Directorate and the RCSs; these assets support the military mission by coordinating with all the actors in the CE. The RCSs' activities are comparable to the PRTs' roles and missions; but they pursue a longer-term goal, and focus on implementing self-sustained and resilient security and stability solutions.

By examining the US and NATO CIMIC doctrines, this monograph intends to contribute to the development of a LAF CIMIC doctrine. This paper argues that the LAF could implement measures that would better enable CIMIC to achieve its missions. This monograph suggests that the LAF should introduce the instruments of national power as lines of effort to the CIMIC doctrine, which would enable unity of effort. In addition, the LAF CIMIC Directorate should coordinate with the Directorates of Intelligence and Orientation to synchronize IOs actions and PSYOPs measures within the CIMIC activities to optimize military operations. Last, the LAF should work on reevaluating training and establishing a CIMIC training section within the CIMIC Directorate that become responsible for conducting training and education for CIMIC and other LAF military personnel. In sum, by revising its links with the society and the CE, reviewing the integration of its capabilities with government efforts, and assessing its organic assets and existing shortages, the LAF CIMIC would be enabled to become more effective in its approach to facing the country's national security issues.

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