

Special Events Working Aid

The security footprint for a special event extends past the perimeters of event venues and could have cascading effects on surrounding areas and critical infrastructure. It is important that law enforcement, fire, emergency medical services (EMS), and private sector partners plan, train, and work together whenever possible to ensure preparedness and effective response. By taking into consideration a wide variety of potential terrorist tactics, techniques, and procedures and then planning, coordinating, and exercising against them, stakeholders will be better able to prevent, respond to, and mitigate the effects of terrorist attacks.

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS:

- **SECURITY BARRIERS:** Rings of concentric security are typically established. Events may have barriers making entry into the outer perimeter of the event hard for responding officers. Event planners should consider pre-deploying assets to handle issues inside zones such as multi-agency joint hazard assessment or mass decontamination teams.
- **COMMUNICATIONS:** Pre-event plans must establish primary and alternate methods of communication for first responders. Ensure first responders have access to security and close-circuit television. Establish unified command and communications capabilities, ensuring interoperability across all stakeholders.
- **TRANSPORTATION:** Consider establishing dedicated routes for EMS transport, as both pedestrian and vehicular traffic could become overwhelming due to a large transient population.
- **PERSONNEL VETTING:** It is important to perform thorough background checks of employees, contractors, and support staff during the application and hiring process, and periodically vet them, as they may have access to potentially sensitive areas.

COORDINATION: Development of an appropriate security presence for rapid and comprehensive emergency response is contingent upon close interagency coordination and private sector partnerships. While developing a comprehensive plan, current terrorist tactics and trends must be taken into account. Joint training can greatly enhance preparedness and increase early incident stabilization.

- **PLANNING:** Understanding current and evolving trends in terrorist tactics, techniques and procedures will facilitate the development of adaptive security measures, increasing the chances of attack detection and disruption. Planning should also include transition from emergency response to investigation, as well as maintaining core local and regional emergency services.
- **IDENTIFYING STAKEHOLDERS:** It is critical to identify key venue staff, facility, and security personnel, and include them in event plans and preparations, as they will potentially assist and advise first responders during a crisis.
- **DEFINING ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES:** Provide specific operational considerations and requirements to security personnel and first responders so that all stakeholders are best positioned to identify, prevent, or effectively respond to a terrorist attack.
- **MANAGEMENT:** The overlapping authorities of numerous stakeholders could complicate response. Unify the various stakeholders by conducting joint meetings leading up to an event to improve relationships, and establish a shared understanding of the operating environment and threat picture.
- **INFORMATION SHARING:** Effective information sharing between government, public, and private sector stakeholders will create a common understanding of the threat environment and facilitate recognition of suspicious activities by providing context which otherwise might go unnoticed. Protocols must be established pre-event for threat information and situational awareness messaging at both command and tactical levels.

VENUES: The security focus during a large special event should include not only the venue and its immediate surroundings, but also neighboring jurisdictions, which may be considered soft and therefore more attractive targets.

- Emergency response plans should identify key venue staff members to assist and advise first responders, as well as highlight their roles and responsibilities during a crisis.
- Interior and exterior building or venue control points may limit responder access and affect the rapid deployment of emergency response tools and equipment.

- Ensure first responder access, including combinations, master keys, or swipe cards to provide full access and/or entry into restricted areas.
- Exterior building features and security measures may affect the placement of response vehicles or the ability to ventilate the building and rescue victims.
- Ensure a risk analysis is performed and shared with all security stakeholders to effectively allocate finite resources to those areas and events with the highest associated risk.

MEDICAL: A mass incident can rapidly deplete local and regional resources, stress even robust incident command structures, and overwhelm emergency medical services, including local hospitals requiring continual coordination of bed capacity, consumables, and specialty, burn, and surgical services. Establish a mass casualty incident plan which includes medical response triage by:

- Mapping out the nearest trauma centers and hospitals;
- Planning for special needs victims, including children, the elderly, the physically disabled, and those with other special needs;
- Coordinating closely with law enforcement to prevent the triage response from complicating evidentiary and forensic collection;
- Addressing on-scene capabilities such as ambulance routes and casualty collection points, and;
- Reviewing and coordinating mutual aid agreements and medical staging locations, especially taking into account expected attendance loads.

EVACUATION: Planning for an evacuation requires close coordination, communication, and cooperation between all stakeholders. Evacuation of crowds requires comprehensive planning and must address:

- Venue location, traffic patterns, and egress points from the premises and surrounding areas;
- Activation, staging, and mobilization of specified areas and personnel;



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- Sectional evacuation plans;
- Primary and alternate evacuation routes for both pedestrian and vehicular traffic;
- Collection and relocation points for special needs population;
- Surrounding transportation infrastructures;
- Family reunification;
- Designated emergency response routes;
- Public address of the premises and surrounding areas, and;
- Personal items left behind, which may need to be cleared by bomb squad personnel.

CHEMICAL ATTACK INDICATORS:

- Explosion with little or no structural damage;
- Reports of a device that dispersed a mist or vapor;
- Multiple casualties exhibiting similar, non-trauma related symptoms;
- Reports of unusual odors, liquids, spray devices, or cylinders;
- Dead animals;
- Discarded personal protective equipment;
- Suspicious/unexplained packages, vehicles, or containers, and/or;
- Unexplained burns or injuries.

SECONDARY ATTACKS: After an initial attack, terrorists may try to target first responders and onlookers by detonating a second explosive device in or around the anticipated safe area or evacuation locations.

- Terrorists may conduct secondary attacks by infiltrating suicide bombers into crowds of bystanders or by detonating preset bombs remotely through the use of timers, remote triggers, or motion sensors.
- Explosive devices may be concealed in innocuous items of various sizes, such as vehicles, backpacks, garbage cans, mail boxes, and planters.

- Successful secondary attacks will likely lead to further casualties and complications to a response by depleting resources and disrupting response plans.

IMPERSONATION: Use of commandeered or fake emergency services identification, uniforms, and equipment could be used to:

- Gain access to secure sites;
- Conduct a secondary attack to create more victims, including first responders already on scene;
- Affect response times and delay genuine emergency responders, and/or;
- Allow access for individuals to conduct surveillance or collect information.

STOLEN, CLONED, OR REPURPOSED OFFICIAL VEHICLES:

Official or official-looking vehicles may be used to conduct surveillance, or to gain access to a venue to conduct an attack. Indicators include:

- Destination and origin are inconsistent with the company or service being represented;
- Driver is not knowledgeable about the company or its service;
- No uniform or uniform is inconsistent with the vehicle's advertised business;
- Vehicle registration and insurance are in named individual instead of company;
- Vehicle make, model, and year may not match company's current fleet;
- Multiple or conflicting corporate names and logos appear on the same vehicle;
- Visible identifiers, such as phone numbers, license plates, or call numbers that are inconsistent with the vehicle's operating area or mission, and/or;
- The vehicle appears to be heavily loaded, possibly beyond capacity.

DECEPTION:

- **LURING** is creating a disturbance, false alarm, or preliminary attack intended to lure first responders to a particular location or area for the purpose of conducting a direct attack against arriving personnel.
- **DIVERSION** draws security forces and first responders away from the intended primary target and may be used as part of a complex or multipronged attack. This tactic delays the response, provision of medical care to victims, and depletes first responder resources.
- **SWATTING** is reporting false emergencies using technology that makes calls difficult to trace, which can lead dispatchers to deploy substantial resources in response to nonexistent emergencies.

REPORTING SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY: It is critical for all stakeholders and the public to know how and to whom to report suspicious activity, which may include:

- **MATERIALS ACQUISITION/STORAGE:** Storage of material inconsistent with the occupancy.
- **OBSERVATION/SURVEILLANCE:** Response patterns that are being observed or recorded.
- **BREACH/ATTEMPTED INTRUSION:** Presence of unauthorized individuals or vehicles in a restricted area or location.
- **TESTING OF SECURITY:** Evidence of tampering or disabling facility security cameras, locks, gates, fences, and other security mechanisms.
- **ELICITATION:** Inquiries about emergency response procedures by individuals with no valid need to know.
- **MISREPRESENTATION:** Cloned emergency vehicles or personnel uniforms with forged or incorrect insignia.
- **ACQUISITION OF EXPERTISE:** Maps, plans, blueprints, or drawings that may indicate unusual interest.



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PRODUCT FEEDBACK FORM

(U) JCAT MISSION: To improve information sharing and enhance public safety. In coordination with the FBI and DHS, collaborate with other members of the IC to research, produce, and disseminate counterterrorism (CT) intelligence products for federal, state, local, tribal and territorial government agencies and the private sector. Advocate for the CT intelligence requirements and needs of these partners throughout the IC.

NAME AND/OR ORGANIZATION:

ORGANIZATION: LAW ENFORCEMENT FIRE HEALTH ANALYSIS PRIVATE SECTOR

DATE:

FEEDBACK

01 PLEASE RATE THE FOLLOWING PRODUCT:

EXCELLENT GOOD FAIR POOR

02 PLEASE CHECK ONE ANSWER FOR EACH OF THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS.

<i>THIS PRODUCT:</i>	<i>STRONGLY DISAGREE</i>	<i>DISAGREE</i>	<i>NEUTRAL</i>	<i>AGREE</i>	<i>STRONGLY AGREE</i>
<i>INCREASED KNOWLEDGE/AWARENESS OF AN ISSUE OR TOPIC</i>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<i>IS RELEVANT</i>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<i>IS TIMELY</i>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<i>IS RESPONSIVE TO MY INFORMATION NEEDS</i>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

03 ADDITIONAL COMMENTS, SUGGESTIONS, OR QUESTIONS:

04 WHAT TOPICS WOULD YOU RECOMMEND IN THE FUTURE?

SUBMIT