

~~SECRET // REL to USA and MCFI~~

1.4a

**TACTICAL INTERROGATION REPORT:**

**REPORT NUMBER (U):** 1.4a

**REPORT DATE (DOI) (U):** 6 MAY 07

**REPORTING UNIT (U):** 1.4a

**COUNTRY (U):** IRAQ (IZ), IRAN (IR)

**SOURCE PARAGRAPH (~~S//REL to USA and MCFI~~):** 1.4c

1.4c

**SUMMARY (~~S//REL to USA and MCFI~~):**

- THE SEVENTIETH INTERROGATION OF N1228A
- DETAINEE DID NOT PROVIDE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON HIS FRIENDS WHO REPORTEDLY SERVE IN HIS SPECIAL GROUP
- DETAINEE PROVIDED INFORMATION ON DR. QUSAY, A MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT THAT DETAINEE HAS OCCASIONAL RELATIONS WITH
- DETAINEE PROVIDED INFORMATION ON HIS INFLUENCE AND RELATIONS WITH THE SADR TREND'S MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT

**TEXT (~~S//REL to USA and MCFI~~):**

**1. BIOGRAPHICAL DATA (~~S//REL TO USA AND MCFI~~):**

**GIVEN NAME:** QAYIS

**FATHER'S GIVEN NAME:** HADI

**GRANDFATHER'S GIVEN NAME:** SA'ID

**CLAN NAME:** NONE

**TRIBAL NAME:** AL-KHAZ'ALI

**ALIAS:** NONE

**EYE COLOR:** BROWN

**HAIR COLOR:** BLACK

**HEIGHT:** 5 FEET EIGHT INCHES

**WEIGHT:** 160 LBS

**DISTINGUISHING FEATURES:** IRREGULAR SHAPED PORTWINE BIRTHMARK, LEFT FRONT SHOULDER, ARMPIT AREA.

**ADDRESS:** AL-SALAH NEIGHBORHOOD, IN THE VICINITY OF AL-SALAH MOSQUE, KUFA, IRAQ.

**PHONE NUMBER:** NONE

**MOBILE NUMBER:** CLAIMS TO HAVE LOST HIS CELLULAR TELEPHONE SEVERAL DAYS PRIOR TO CAPTURE.

**POB:** BAGHDAD, IZ

**DOB:** 24 APRIL 1974

**MARITAL STATUS:** DIVORCED

**NATIONALITY:** IRAQI



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**RELIGION:** SHI'A/ISLAM

**EDUCATION:** ELEMENTARY AND MIDDLE SCHOOL, 1995-PRESENT, THE SHI'A HAWZA RELIGIOUS TRAINING INSTITUTE IN AL-NAJAF, IZ.

**LANGUAGES (PROFICIENCY):** ARABIC (NATIVE), ENGLISH (ABLE TO SPEAK HALTINGLY).

**MOSQUE:** NONE

**IMAM:** NONE

**MILITARY EXPERIENCE:** PAID HIS WAY OUT OF THE IRAQI ARMY IN 1997 FOR 1.5 MILLION IRAQI DINAR.

**SPECIAL SKILLS:** NONE

**OCCUPATION:** POLITICIAN

**MEDICAL (U):** CLEARED FOR DETENTION / INTERROGATION / LAST CHECK UP: 6 MAY 07

**DETAINEE NUMBER:** N1228A

**FATHER:** HADI SA'ID AL-KHAZ'ALI

**MOTHER:** WOULD NOT ANSWER (WNA)

**BROTHERS:** WNA

**SISTERS:** WNA

**WIFE:** DIVORCED

**CHILDREN:** 1 BOY, AWAIS (6), 1 GIRL, MAIS (8). BOTH LIVE WITH THEIR MOTHER IN BAGHDAD, IZ.

## 2. CIRCUMSTANCES OF CAPTURE:

**CONOP:** 1.4a

**DTG OF CAPTURE:** 20 MAR 0300C 2007

**PLACE OF CAPTURE:** BASRAH, IZ.

**APPREHENDING UNIT:** 1.4a

**REASON FOR CAPTURE:** DETAINEE IS A SUSPECTED ANTI-IRAQI FORCES (AIF) GROUP LEADER, AND IS ASSOCIATED WITH WEAPONS SMUGGLING FROM IRAN, EXTRA JUDICIAL KILLING (EJK) ACTIVITY, AND INVOLVEMENT WITH THE ATTACK ON THE KARBALA PJCC.

**CURRENT LOCATION:** 1.4a

## WEAPONS, DOCUMENTS AND EQUIPMENT ~~(S//REL to USA and MCFI):~~

**INTERROGATOR:** 3.5c

**LANGUAGE USED:** ARABIC

**INTERPRETER (NATIVE DIALECT):** 3.5c

## 3. SUMMARY OF INTERROGATION / INTELLIGENCE GAINED ~~(S//REL to USA and MCFI):~~

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1.4c DETAINEE REFUSED TO PROVIDE INFORMATION ABOUT A VARIETY OF FRIENDS AND ASSOCIATES FOR THE REASONS HE HAS SET FORTH PREVIOUSLY. 1.4c

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1.4c IN ADDITION, BY PROVIDING INFORMATION ON THEM, DETAINEE MAY ENDANGER THEIR LIVES. AKRAM AL-KA'BI IS A CLOSE FRIEND WHO WORKED WITH DETAINEE. DETAINEE KNOWS ABU SALAM WELL, AND DOES NOT WANT TO PUT HIS LIFE IN DANGER. SHAYIKH KARAR AND ABU MUSTAFA ALSO WORKED CLOSELY WITH DETAINEE, AND HE DOES NOT WISH TO ENDANGER THEIR LIVES EITHER. DETAINEE ALSO REFUSED TO PROVIDE INFORMATION ON ABU DHAR, WHO HE WORKS WITH.

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1.4c DR. QUSAY WAS ELECTED TO PUBLIC OFFICE AT THE TIME THAT DETAINEE WAS A LEADING SUPPORTER OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ELECTION. DETAINEE SUPPORTED DR. QUSAY AND APPROXIMATELY TWENTY OTHER CANDIDATES, INCLUDING HAJJI SALAM, BAHA AL-A'RAJI, FALLAH SHANSHIL (PHONETIC), DR. ASMA (PHONETIC), AND DR. BASAMA (PHONETIC). 1.4c  
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DETAINEE DEVELOPED GOOD RELATIONS WITH ALL OF THE FOREGOING INDIVIDUALS BECAUSE THEY WERE PART OF A JOINT INITIATIVE. DETAINEE LED THE GROUP BECAUSE HE WAS THE RIGHT ARM OF MUQTADA AL-SADR (MAS) AT THE TIME, AND WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR ALL POLITICAL ISSUES OF THE SADR TREND. DETAINEE PROPOSED THAT THE SADR TREND PARTICIPATE IN ELECTIONS BUT MAS INITIALLY OPPOSED IT. 1.4c

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1.4c ALTHOUGH MAS INITIALLY OPPOSED PARTICIPATION, DETAINEE BELIEVED THEN, AS HE DOES NOW, THAT POLITICS ARE ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT ASPECTS OF MODERN LIFE. UNLIKE A MILITARY REGIME, AN OPEN POLITICAL PROCESS PROVIDES PEOPLE AN OPPORTUNITY TO VOICE CRITICISMS AND ASK FOR THEIR RIGHTS. IF MEMBERS OF THE SADR TREND ARE IGNORANT OF POLITICS, THEY WILL LOSE THEIR RIGHTS. DETAINEE FELT THAT MAS'S OPPOSITION TO PARTICIPATION WAS UNFOUNDED, BECAUSE NEITHER THE INVADERS NOR THE INVASION STOPPED THE SADR TREND FROM HOLDING POLITICAL OFFICES.

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DETAINEE TOLD MAS THAT DETAINEE WOULD ACCEPT WHATEVER NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES AROSE FROM THE ELECTION. IF SOMETHING POSITIVE CAME FROM IT, MAS WOULD GET ALL THE CREDIT. IF SOMETHING NEGATIVE CAME FROM IT, DETAINEE WOULD ACCEPT ALL OF THE BLAME. ALTHOUGH MAS DID TAKE THE CREDIT FOR THE SADR TREND'S SUCCESS IN ELECTIONS, ALL THE SADR TREND SUPPORTERS FROM THE NAJAF AL-HAWZA KNOW THAT DETAINEE WAS BEING THE SUCCESS IN THE ELECTION.

DETAINEE DID NOT KNOW DR. QUSAY BEFORE SELECTING HIM AS A CANDIDATE FOR THE SADR TREND. DETAINEE DID NOT PROPOSE ANYONE OR SUBMIT ANY NAMES SO THAT NO ONE COULD ACCUSE DETAINEE OF IMPROPER CONDUCT. DETAINEE DID NOT HAVE CLOSE RELATIONS WITH ANYONE THAT HE ULTIMATELY SELECTED FOR THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY. DETAINEE WAS PERCEIVED AS VERY NEUTRAL IN THE SELECTION OF SUCH CANDIDATES. THE CANDIDATES WERE PROPOSED BY HAZIM AL-A'RAJI, JASIM AL-SA'IDI, AKRAM AL-KA'BI, AND WALID AL-ZAMILI. EACH OF THEM PROPOSED A FEW NAMES. DETAINEE THEN LOOKED AT THE BACKGROUND, ACCOMPLISHMENTS, ROLES IN AND OUT OF IRAQ, AND WHAT THE CANDIDATES DID UNDER SADDAM HUSSEIN'S REGIME. BASED ON SUCH INFORMATION, DETAINEE PERSONALLY SELECTED THE CANDIDATES. DETAINEE FELT DR. QUSAY HAD THE FOLLOWING QUALIFICATIONS: HE HAS A PH.D., HE IS A VERY RELIGIOUS PERSON, HE IS A MEMBER OF THE SADR TREND, HE HAS A VERY CLEAN REPUTATION, HE IS NOT A FORMER BA'ATH MEMBER, HE WAS NEVER INVOLVED IN EMBEZZLEMENT OR CORRUPTION, AND HE IS FROM A VERY WELL KNOWN FAMILY.

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ELECTION, SHAYIKH 'ABBAS AL-RUBAY'I SELECTED THE SADR TREND'S CANDIDATES, BUT DID NOT TAKE THE INITIATIVE TO DO SO WITHOUT DETAINEE'S PERSONAL HELP, DUE TO DETAINEE'S CONSIDERABLE EXPERIENCE WITH THIS ISSUE. UNLIKE DETAINEE'S NEUTRAL ROLE IN THE SELECTION OF CANDIDATES, 'ABBAS PROPOSED HIS BROTHER-IN-LAW AS A MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT, WHICH CAUSED PUBLIC DISCUSSION ABOUT HIS CONFLICT OF INTEREST.

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DETAINEE MET WITH DR. QUSAY TWO TO THREE TIMES WITHIN THE FIRST YEAR DR. QUSAY BELONGED TO THE GOVERNMENT. THESE MEETINGS WERE WITH THE SADR TREND'S POLITICAL REPRESENTATIVES AS A WHOLE, NOT JUST DR. QUSAY. THE FIRST MEETING WAS TO RESOLVE PERSONAL DISPUTES AMONG THE SADR TREND'S REPRESENTATIVES.

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THE SECOND MEETING CONCERNED WHICH OF THEM WOULD SERVE AS THE LEADER OF THE SADR TREND IN PARLIAMENT. THIS WAS NOT A POSITION SOUGHT BY DR. QUSAY. DETAINEE ACTED AS A MEDIATOR TO RESOLVE THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN MEMBERS AND COME TO AN AGREEMENT. A THIRD MEETING ALSO TOOK PLACE TO RESOLVE DISPUTES AMONG MEMBERS.

AFTER THAT FIRST YEAR, DETAINEE SAW DR. QUSAY TWO TO THREE MORE TIMES IN PERSON AT MEETINGS. THE PEOPLE WHO ATTENDED ONE MEETING INCLUDED DR. QUSAY, BAHA, FALLAH SHANSHIL (PHONETIC), ABU FIRAS AL-MUTAYIRI, AND DR. NASIR AL-RUBAY'I. ANOTHER MEETING WAS ATTENDED BY HAJJI SALAM, DR. QUSAY AND DETAINEE. THEIR DISCUSSIONS WERE MAINLY ABOUT THE DISPUTES AND PROBLEMS OF THE SADR TREND. THE SADR TREND WAS NOT WELL ORGANIZED. IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO MEET WITH MAS TO DISCERN HIS INTENTIONS. THE SADR TREND DID NOT HAVE A SET PROGRAM TO TAKE PART IN POLITICS. DETAINEE AND THE POLITICAL REPRESENTATIVES RECEIVED MANY CALLS FROM THE OFFICE OF MARTYR SADR (OMS) INSTRUCTING THEM WHAT TO DO, BUT THEY DID NOT EVEN KNOW WHETHER THESE ACTIONS WERE AUTHORIZED. A MAJOR PROBLEM WAS WHO THE SADR TREND SHOULD PROPOSE TO BE ELECTED FOR MINISTRIES OF GOVERNMENT. MOST PEOPLE PROPOSED FOR SUCH POSITIONS WERE BASED ON PERSONAL CONTACTS AND CONFLICTS OF INTEREST.

THERE WERE A FEW TELEPHONE CALLS BETWEEN DETAINEE AND DR. QUSAY. DETAINEE AND DR. QUSAY DISCUSSED WHO SHOULD SERVE AS MINISTERS. DR. QUSAY ASKED DETAINEE TO INTERFERE AND SELECT THE RIGHT MINISTERS TO SERVE ON BEHALF OF THE SADR TREND.

DETAINEE RECENTLY SPOKE TO DR. QUSAY ABOUT WHAT HAPPENED IN RELATION TO A LETTER THAT DETAINEE WROTE THAT DR. QUSAY TOOK TO THE PRIME MINISTER. DETAINEE ADDRESSED A LETTER TO THE PRIME MINISTER REGARDING 1000 OR LESS NAMES OF POLICE TO BE APPOINTED IN SADR CITY. DR. QUSAY DID NOT KNOW OF THE CONTENTS AT THE TIME HE DELIVERED THE LETTER. WHEN WALID AL-ZAMILI AND ABU FIRAS AL-MUTAYIRI FOUND OUT ABOUT THE LETTER, THEY USED THE ISSUE AGAINST DETAINEE. THEY TOLD DR. QUSAY THAT HE SHOULD NOT WORK WITH DETAINEE.

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DR. QUSAY TOLD THEM THAT HE DID NOT KNOW ABOUT THE CONTENT OF THE LETTER, AND THAT DETAINEE IS ONE OF THE MOST PROMINENT AND INFLUENTIAL PERSONS AT THE SADR TREND.

DETAINEE RECENTLY DISCUSSED THE NEW BAGHDAD SECURITY PLAN WITH DR. QUSAY. THE PLAN WAS WIDELY DISCUSSED BY MEMBERS OF THE SADR TREND. THE SPECIFIC DETAILS OF THE PLAN WERE UNAVAILABLE, BUT THE

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GENERAL POINTS AND RUMORS REGARDING THE PLAN WERE DISCUSSED. THE AMERICANS WIDELY DISSEMINATED INFORMATION ABOUT THE SECURITY PLAN BEFORE IT WAS ACTUALLY IMPLEMENTED, SO MUCH OF THE INFORMATION DETAINEE AND DR. QUSAY RELIED ON WAS SPREAD BY THE AMERICANS. DETAINEE DISCUSSED AT LEAST SOME OF THE FOLLOWING POINTS WITH DR. QUSAY. FIRST, MANY MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT DID NOT AGREE WITH THE SECURITY PLAN BEING IMPOSED WITHOUT THEIR APPROVAL. DR. QUSAY DID NOT BELIEVE A SECURITY PLAN SHOULD BE SUBJECT TO PARLIAMENTARY APPROVAL, BUT WAS INTERESTED IN SOME FORM OF PARLIAMENTARY RESOLUTION TO ADDRESS VEHICLE BORNE EXPLOSIVE ATTACKS. SECOND, THE SECURITY PLAN WAS TO INVOLVE THE ARREST OF SADR TREND MILITIA. THERE WERE SUPPOSEDLY 2000 NAMES OF MEMBERS OF JAYSH AL-MAHDI PERSONNEL, ALONG WITH PHOTOGRAPHS, THAT WOULD BE LOOKED FOR AT CHECKPOINTS. THIRD, ONE RUMOR WAS THAT KURDISH MILITARY FORCES WOULD SECURE THE CITY OF BAGHDAD IN CONJUNCTION WITH AMERICAN FORCES.

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FOURTH, DETAINEE UNDERSTOOD THE MAIN OBJECTIVE OF THE SECURITY PLAN WAS TO PREVENT VEHICLE BORNE IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES FROM GETTING INTO BAGHDAD. FIFTH, THERE WERE TO BE CHECKPOINTS AT EVERY MAIN ROAD, WHERE THEY WOULD CHECK EVERY ID WITH A NEW TECHNOLOGY THAT WOULD SCAN AND DETECT EACH FAKE ID. SIXTH, NO ONE WOULD HAVE A RIGHT TO CARRY A WEAPON INTO BAGHDAD, EVEN IF IT IS PROPERLY LICENSED. SEVENTH, ALL OFFICIAL VEHICLES WOULD BE STOPPED AT CHECKPOINTS, AND THE RESPONSIBLE MINISTRY WOULD BE CONTACTED TO ASCERTAIN WHY THE VEHICLE IS ENTERING BAGHDAD. FINALLY, CERTAIN AREAS WERE TO BE COMPLETELY SURROUNDED BY MILITARY FORCES, AND THEN EACH HOUSE WOULD BE SEARCHED.

DR. QUSAY IS A NATIVE OF BASRAH. HE RESIDES THERE. DETAINEE DOES NOT HAVE ANY INFORMATION ON THE LOCATION OF DR. QUSAY'S HOME IN BASRAH. DETAINEE HAS NEVER BEEN TO HIS HOME. WHEN DR. QUSAY IS IN BAGHDAD FOR PARLIAMENTARY SESSIONS, HE SHOULD BE STAYING IN A HOUSE OR APARTMENT PROVIDED BY THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT IN THE GREEN ZONE. THE GOVERNMENT PROVIDES THOSE FOR MEMBERS WHO RESIDE FAR AWAY FROM BAGHDAD.

DR. QUSAY HAS GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE. DR. QUSAY IS A WELL EDUCATED, PROMINENT PERSON WHO REPRESENTS THE SADR TREND IN COMMITTEES OF PARLIAMENT. HE MAY BE A MEMBER OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL. DR. QUSAY ALSO HAS GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE KURDS BECAUSE OF A FAMILY MARRIAGE TO SOMEONE IN THE FAMILY OF KURDISH LEADER AL-TALABANI.

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DR. QUSAY DOES NOT HAVE ANY RELATIONS WITH JAYSH AL-MAHDI (JAM). IT IS ABSOLUTELY FORBIDDEN FOR ANY MEMBER OF JAM TO CONTACT MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT DIRECTLY. TO MAKE CONTACT, A JAM LEADER WOULD HAVE TO SUBMIT A WRITTEN REQUEST TO THE NAJAF OMS, AND THE OMS WOULD THEN PROPOSE THAT THE SADR TREND'S POLITICAL COMMITTEE TAKE THE INITIATIVE TO REACH A MEMBER OR PARLIAMENT.

**INTERROGATION APPROACH / TECHNIQUES** ~~(S//REL to USA and MCFI):~~

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**4. COMMENTS** ~~(S//REL to USA and MCFI):~~

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SENIOR INTERROGATOR COMMENTS: NONE

**5. POINTS OF CONTACT (U):**

3.5c

**NOTE: ALL ARABIC SPELLINGS ARE IAW DI POLICY NO. 033, "SPELLING NAMES OF FOREIGN PERSONS IN DI PRODUCTS," DATED 02 DEC 03 AND DDCICM DIRECTIVE, "INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STANDARD FOR THE TRANSLITERATION OF ARABIC NAMES IN FINAL WRITTEN REPORTS AND PRODUCTS," DATED 04 JUN 03, IN COMPLIANCE WITH SECTION 352 OF THE INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT OF 2003.**

PREP (U): 3.5c

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**AQC (U):** BAGHDAD, IRAQ (2007/05/06)

**ENCL (U):** NONE

**DISSEM (U):** FIELD – NONE

**WARNING (U):** REPORT CLASSIFIED ~~SECRET // REL to USA and MCFI~~

**DRV FROM (U):** MNF-IMNC-I SGC VERSION 3, 27 MAY 04.

**DECL ON:** X1

Approved for Release