

~~SECRET // ORCON // REL to USA and GBR~~

1.4a

TACTICAL INTERROGATION REPORT:

REPORT NUMBER (U): 1.4a
REPORT DATE (DOI) (U): 26 APR 07
REPORTING UNIT (U): 1.4a
COUNTRY (U): IRAQ (IZ), IRAN (IR)

SOURCE PARAGRAPH (~~S//REL to USA and MCFI~~): 1.4c

1.4c

SUMMARY (~~S//REL to USA and MCFI~~):

- THE SIXTY-SECOND INTERROGATION OF N1228A
- STATE OF IRAQ IF U.S. PULLS OUT IN REGARDS TO IRANIAN INFLUENCE
- MAS MEETING WITH HEZBOLLAH IN MAY 2006
- ABU HUSAYN (N1230A) DESIGNED THE SPECIAL GROUPS
- KARBALA ATTACK WAS NOT A LARGE COMPLEX OPERATION BUT IT WAS DONE BY SHEIKH AZAR OR ANOTHER GROUP SPECIALLY TRAINED IN IRAN

TEXT (~~S//REL to USA and MCFI~~):

1. BIOGRAPHICAL DATA (~~S//REL TO USA AND MCFI~~):

GIVEN NAME: QAYIS
FATHER'S GIVEN NAME: HADI
GRANDFATHER'S GIVEN NAME: SA'ID
CLAN NAME: NONE
TRIBAL NAME: AL-KHAZ'ALI
ALIAS: NONE
EYE COLOR: BROWN
HAIR COLOR: BLACK
HEIGHT: 5 FEET EIGHT INCHES
WEIGHT: 160 LBS
DISTINGUISHING FEATURES: IRREGULAR SHAPED PORTWINE BIRTHMARK, LEFT FRONT SHOULDER, ARMPIT AREA.
ADDRESS: AL-SALAH NEIGHBORHOOD, IN THE VICINITY OF AL-SALAH MOSQUE, KUFA, IRAQ.
PHONE NUMBER: NONE
MOBILE NUMBER: CLAIMS TO HAVE LOST HIS CELLULAR TELEPHONE SEVERAL DAYS PRIOR TO CAPTURE.
POB: BAGHDAD, IZ
DOB: 24 APRIL 1974
MARITAL STATUS: DIVORCED
NATIONALITY: IRAQI



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RELIGION: SHI'A/ISLAM

EDUCATION: ELEMENTARY AND MIDDLE SCHOOL, 1995-PRESENT, THE SHI'A HAWZA RELIGIOUS TRAINING INSTITUTE IN AL-NAJAF, IZ.

LANGUAGES (PROFICIENCY): ARABIC (NATIVE), ENGLISH (ABLE TO SPEAK HALTINGLY).

MOSQUE: NONE

IMAM: NONE

MILITARY EXPERIENCE: PAID HIS WAY OUT OF THE IRAQI ARMY IN 1997 FOR 1.5 MILLION IRAQI DINAR.

SPECIAL SKILLS: NONE

OCCUPATION: POLITICIAN

MEDICAL (U): CLEARED FOR DETENTION / INTERROGATION / LAST CHECK UP: 26 APR 07

DETAINEE NUMBER: N1228A

FATHER: HADI SA'ID AL-KHAZ'ALI

MOTHER: WOULD NOT ANSWER (WNA)

BROTHERS: WNA

SISTERS: WNA

WIFE: DIVORCED

CHILDREN: 1 BOY, AWAIS (6), 1 GIRL, MAIS (8). BOTH LIVE WITH THEIR MOTHER IN BAGHDAD, IZ.

2. CIRCUMSTANCES OF CAPTURE:

CONOP: 1.4a

DTG OF CAPTURE: 20 MAR 0300C 2007

PLACE OF CAPTURE: BASRAH, IZ.

APPREHENDING UNIT: 1.4a

REASON FOR CAPTURE: DETAINEE IS A SUSPECTED ANTI-IRAQI FORCES (AIF) GROUP LEADER, AND IS ASSOCIATED WITH WEAPONS SMUGGLING FROM IRAN, EXTRA JUDICIAL KILLING (EJK) ACTIVITY, AND INVOLVEMENT WITH THE ATTACK ON THE KARBALA PJCC.

CURRENT LOCATION: 1.4a

~~WEAPONS, DOCUMENTS AND EQUIPMENT (S//REL to USA and MCFI):~~

INTERROGATOR: 3.5c

LANGUAGE USED: ARABIC

INTERPRETER (NATIVE DIALECT): 3.5c

~~3. SUMMARY OF INTERROGATION / INTELLIGENCE GAINED (S//REL to USA and MCFI):~~

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IF THE UNITED STATES PULLS OUT OF IRAQ, IRAN WILL TRY TO IMPOSE THEIR INFLUENCE ON IRAQ IN TWO WAYS. 1) THROUGH EMPLACING POLITICIANS WHO HAVE AN IRANIAN AGENDA IN OFFICE AND 2) BY CONVINCING THE PUBLIC THROUGH TRIBAL LEADERS THAT IRANIAN INFLUENCE IN IRAQ IS A GOOD THING. BECAUSE OF THIS, THE UNITED STATES MUST EXERT THEIR INFLUENCE IN THE AREA TO PREVENT IRAN FROM TAKING OVER. THIS HAS TO BE AN INTELLECTUAL BATTLE. DETAINEE DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT IRAN WILL EVER TRY TO TAKE OVER IRAQ MILITARILY. THROUGH THIS INTELLECTUAL INFLUENCE THEY WILL DRAW THE SHI'A POPULATION TOWARDS QOM AS THE CENTER FOR SHI'A RELIGIOUS STUDIES. THEY WANT TO SPREAD THE WORD OF THE AYATOLLAH KHAMEINI. THEY WILL TRY TO PUSH THE PERSIAN CULTURE AND TRY TO FIGHT AGAINST THE ARABIC CULTURE. DETAINEE FEELS THAT THE BASIC METHOD FOR FIGHTING THIS WILL BE THROUGH THE HAWZA.

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DETAINEE SAID IF WE HANDLE IT CORRECTLY WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO MAINTAIN OUR POLITICAL CONNECTION TO IRAQ AND HELP THWART TOO MUCH IRANIAN INFLUENCE. (NFI)

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THE HEZBOLLAH REPUTATION IS THAT OF RESISTANCE AND THEY ARE VERY GOOD AT FIGHTING A RESISTANCE. IRAN WILL TRY TO USE THAT GOOD REPUTATION TO HELP PERSUADE THE MIND OF THE IRAQIS TO SUPPORT IRANIAN IDEOLOGY.

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HEZBOLLAH IS LOCALIZED. THEY ARE NOT AN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AND SINCE THEY ARE ONLY IN ONE COUNTRY (LEBANON) THEY DON'T REALLY NEED MUCH THAT THEY AREN'T ALREADY GETTING FROM IRAN. THEY REALLY STAND TO BENEFIT VERY LITTLE FROM IRAN GAINING INFLUENCE EXCEPT FOR THE FACT THAT THEY GET MOST OF THEIR SUPPORT FROM IRAN. HEZBOLLAH WILL DEFINITELY GIVE MUCH MORE THAN THEY WILL RECEIVE THOUGH.

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DETAINEE HAD HEARD THE RUMOR BUT DID NOT KNOW IF THERE WAS A MEETING OR NOT. HE SAID IF THERE WAS A MEETING AND IT WAS WITH MAS AND HEZBOLLAH THEN IT WAS PURELY A POLITICAL MEETING AND WAS PROBABLY NOTHING MORE THAN A CONFIRMATION OF SUPPORT FOR EACH OTHER. BUT IF ABBAS AL-KHUPI WAS AT THE MEETING OR IF AL-KHUPI HAD A SEPARATE MEETING WITH HEZBOLLAH, THEN THE MEETING WAS DESIGNED PURELY TO GET HEZBOLLAH MILITARY SUPPORT

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FOR THE REGULAR JAYSH AL MAHDI (JAM) ARMY. ALSO, IF IT WAS KAWTHRANI THAT THEY WERE MEETING WITH, IT WAS A POLITICAL MEETING BUT DID NOT THINK MUHAMMAD KAWTHRANI WOULD COME TO IRAQ. DETAINEE DOES NOT KNOW WHO WOULD BE SENT IN HIS STEAD.

WHEN ASKED IF THIS HAD ANY EFFECT ON MAS'S PLANS TO MERGE THE SPECIAL GROUPS AND REGULAR JAM, DETAINEE SAID NO. THE PURPOSE OF THE MERGE WAS NOT TO MERGE THE PERSONNEL OF THE DIFFERENT UNITS BUT TO MERGE THE LEADERSHIP. MAS WANTED TO PUT EVERYONE UNDER THE CONTROL OF ABBAS AL-KHUFUFI. MAS WAS TOLD THIS WAS BAD IDEA AS IT WOULD CREATE INTERFERENCE BETWEEN THE TWO GROUPS. THEY THEN CAME UP WITH THE PLAN TO HAVE A COMMITTEE OVERSEE THE SPECIAL GROUPS WHICH WAS THE COMMITTEE CONSISTING OF AL-KHAFAJI AND AL-SADI. THIS COMMITTEE TOOK OVER THE OPERATIONS OF THE SPECIAL GROUPS BUT REALLY ONLY SERVES IN A RELIGIOUS SENSE. THE OPERATIONS ARE ACTUALLY RAN BY KARAR, ADNAN, AND ABU MUSTAFA.

DETAINEE SAID THE DESIGNER OF THE SPECIAL GROUPS WAS ABU HUSAYN (N1230A). THE GROUPS EXISTED BEFORE HE GOT THERE BUT HE WAS THE ONE WHO REVAMPED THEM AND MADE THEM MORE EFFICIENT. ABU HUSAYN BROUGHT SPECIALIZATION TO THE SPECIAL GROUPS CREATING EFP CELLS, MORTAR CELLS, KIDNAPPING CELLS, ETC. HE ALSO CALLED FOR INCREASED NUMBERS IN EACH GROUP. DETAINEE DOES NOT KNOW IF ABU HUSAYN CHANGED THE WAY ANY ATTACKS WERE CONDUCTED OR IF THERE WAS CHANGE IN THE FREQUENCY IN ATTACKS BUT HE DOES KNOW THAT THERE WAS A GREAT INCREASE IN EFFICIENCY AND FREQUENCY DUE TO THE CHANGES THAT HUSAYN MADE. THEY COULD NOT QUANTIFY THE EFFICIENCY F THE ATTACKS WITH NUMBER OF AMERICANS KILLED AS THEY DID NOT GET THOSE NUMBERS, BUT IT WAS CLEAR BY THE SHEAR NUMBERS OF ATTACKS THAT MORE PEOPLE WERE BEING KILLED.

DETAINEE, AT THIS POINT, WAS NOT INVOLVED VERY MUCH IN THE DAY TO DAY OPERATIONAL DECISIONS AND SAID HE SERVED ONLY TO APPROVE CHANGES MADE AND TO COORDINATE MEETINGS. AT THE TIME THEY WERE CAPTURED, ACCORDING TO DETAINEE, THEY WERE NOT IN BASRAH FOR A MEETING AND WERE DOWN THERE FOR THE SAKE OF SALAM AL-MALIKI'S FATHER'S FUNERAL. IT JUST SO HAPPENED THAT ABU HUSAYN WAS THERE AT THE SAME TIME.

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THE NIGHT THEY WERE CAPTURED, DETAINEE WAS VERY TIRED AND DID NOT HAVE THE CAPACITY TO SPEAK MUCH WITH ABU HUSAYN BUT ABU HUSAYN DID TELL HIM THAT HE HAD THINGS HE WANTED TO TALK ABOUT. DETAINEE

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CLAIMED HE DID NOT KNOW WHAT IT WAS THAT ABU HUSAYN WANTED TO TALK ABOUT.

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1.4c DETAINEE DID NOT KNOW IF THE SPECIAL GROUPS WERE STRUCTURED AFTER ANY OTHER GROUP OR NOT. HE CLAIMED TO NOT KNOW THE STRUCTURE OF THE HEZBOLLAH GROUPS. THE GROUPS CURRENT STRUCTURE WAS THE BRAIN CHILD OF ABU HUSAYN AND HAJJI YUSIF. HE SAID THE GROUPS WERE CUSTOM TAILORED TO THE CURRENT SITUATION IN IRAQ.

THE KARBALA ATTACK WAS NOT A SPECIAL ATTACK. IT WAS JUST A NORMAL OPERATION AND DETAINEE SAID WE MAKE A BIGGER DEAL OUT OF IT THAN IT WAS MEANT TO BE. HE STILL MAINTAINS THAT IT WAS SHEIKH AZHAR WHO DID THE ATTACK

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DETAINEE CLAIMS TO BE OUT OF THE LOOP OF THE DETAILS FOR THE PAST YEAR OR SO. HE SAID HE HAS ONLY SERVED IN A SUPERVISORY CAPACITY. ABU HUSAYN WAS TAKING CARE OF ALMOST EVERYTHING. DETAINEE KNEW THERE WAS A WEAPONS FLOW, HE KNEW THERE WAS TRAINING TAKING PLACE IN IRAN, BUT HE DID NOT GET INTO THE DETAILS OF WHAT WAS HAPPENING. DETAINEE SAID THAT ABU HUSAYN WAS FULL-TIME DOING THIS AND HE WOULD KNOW ALL OF THE DETAILS.

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4. COMMENTS ~~(S//REL to USA and MCFI):~~

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SENIOR INTERROGATOR COMMENTS: NONE

5. POINTS OF CONTACT (U):

3.5c

NOTE: ALL ARABIC SPELLINGS ARE IAW DI POLICY NO. 033, "SPELLING NAMES OF FOREIGN PERSONS IN DI PRODUCTS," DATED 02 DEC 03 AND DDICM DIRECTIVE, "INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STANDARD FOR THE TRANSLITERATION OF ARABIC NAMES IN FINAL WRITTEN REPORTS AND PRODUCTS," DATED 04 JUN 03, IN COMPLIANCE WITH SECTION 352 OF THE INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT OF 2003.

PREP (U): 3.5c

AQC (U): BAGHDAD, IRAQ (2007/04/25)

ENCL (U): NONE

DISSEM (U): FIELD – NONE

WARNING (U): REPORT CLASSIFIED ~~SECRET // REL to USA and MCFI~~

DRV FROM (U): MNF-IMNC-I SGC VERSION 3, 27 MAY 04.

DECL ON: X1

Approved for Release