

~~SECRET // ORCON // to USA and GBR~~

1.4a

**TACTICAL INTERROGATION REPORT:**

**REPORT NUMBER (U):** 1.4a  
**REPORT DATE (DOI) (U):** 22 APR 07  
**REPORTING UNIT (U):** 1.4a  
**COUNTRY (U):** IRAQ (IZ), IRAN (IR)

**SOURCE PARAGRAPH (~~S//REL to USA and MCFI~~):** 1.4c

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**SUMMARY (~~S//REL to USA and MCFI~~):**

- THE FIFTY-NINTH INTERROGATION OF N1228A
- DETAINEE COULD NOT IDENTIFY COMPUTERS AND FLASH-DRIVES TAKEN FROM THE OBJECTIVE
- IDENTIFIED PICTURE OF ABU MUSTAFA AL-SHAIBNANI.
- GAVE FURTHER DETAILS OF REASON DETAINEE WS IN BASRAH AT THE TIME OF CAPTURE
- INFORMATION ON HEZBOLLAH IN IRAQ
- MUQTADA SADR MADE HIS PARLIAMENTARY MEMBERS PRE-SIGN A RESIGNATION LETTER IN CASE HE WANTED TO GET RID OF THEM DOWN THE ROAD.
- GAVE OTHER ALIASES OF LEBANESE HEZBOLLAH LIAISON TO IRAQ SAYID AL-MUSAWI
- MUQTADA SADR SUPPORTED BUT DID NOT CONTROL THE SPECIAL GROUPS.

**TEXT (~~S//REL to USA and MCFI~~):**

**1. BIOGRAPHICAL DATA (~~S//REL TO USA AND MCFI~~):**

**GIVEN NAME:** QAYIS  
**FATHER'S GIVEN NAME:** HADI  
**GRANDFATHER'S GIVEN NAME:** SA'ID  
**CLAN NAME:** NONE  
**TRIBAL NAME:** AL-KHAZ'ALI  
**ALIAS:** NONE  
**EYE COLOR:** BROWN  
**HAIR COLOR:** BLACK  
**HEIGHT:** 5 FEET EIGHT INCHES  
**WEIGHT:** 160 LBS  
**DISTINGUISHING FEATURES:** IRREGULAR SHAPED PORTWINE BIRTHMARK, LEFT FRONT SHOULDER, ARMPIT AREA.



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**ADDRESS:** AL-SALAH NEIGHBORHOOD, IN THE VICINITY OF AL-SALAH MOSQUE, KUFA, IRAQ.

**PHONE NUMBER:** NONE

**MOBILE NUMBER:** CLAIMS TO HAVE LOST HIS CELLULAR TELEPHONE SEVERAL DAYS PRIOR TO CAPTURE.

**POB:** BAGHDAD, IZ

**DOB:** 24 APRIL 1974

**MARITAL STATUS:** DIVORCED

**NATIONALITY:** IRAQI

**RELIGION:** SHI'A/ISLAM

**EDUCATION:** ELEMENTARY AND MIDDLE SCHOOL, 1995-PRESENT, THE SHI'A HAWZA RELIGIOUS TRAINING INSTITUTE IN AL-NAJAF, IZ.

**LANGUAGES (PROFICIENCY):** ARABIC (NATIVE), ENGLISH (ABLE TO SPEAK HALTINGLY).

**MOSQUE:** NONE

**IMAM:** NONE

**MILITARY EXPERIENCE:** PAID HIS WAY OUT OF THE IRAQI ARMY IN 1997 FOR 1.5 MILLION IRAQI DINAR.

**SPECIAL SKILLS:** NONE

**OCCUPATION:** POLITICIAN

**MEDICAL (U):** CLEARED FOR DETENTION / INTERROGATION / LAST CHECK UP: 22 APR 07

**DETAINEE NUMBER:** N1228A

**FATHER:** HADI SA'ID AL-KHAZ'ALI

**MOTHER:** WOULD NOT ANSWER (WNA)

**BROTHERS:** WNA

**SISTERS:** WNA

**WIFE:** DIVORCED

**CHILDREN:** 1 BOY, AWAIS (6), 1 GIRL, MAIS (8). BOTH LIVE WITH THEIR MOTHER IN BAGHDAD, IZ.

## 2. CIRCUMSTANCES OF CAPTURE:

**CONOP:** 1.4a

**DTG OF CAPTURE:** 20 MAR 0300C 2007

**PLACE OF CAPTURE:** BASRAH, IZ.

**APPREHENDING UNIT:** 1.4a

**REASON FOR CAPTURE:** DETAINEE IS A SUSPECTED ANTI-IRAQI FORCES (AIF) GROUP LEADER, AND IS ASSOCIATED WITH WEAPONS SMUGGLING FROM IRAN, EXTRA JUDICIAL KILLING (EJK) ACTIVITY, AND INVOLVEMENT WITH THE ATTACK ON THE KARBALA PJCC.

**CURRENT LOCATION:** 1.4a

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~~WEAPONS, DOCUMENTS AND EQUIPMENT (S//REL to USA and MCFD):~~

INTERROGATOR: 3.5c

LANGUAGE USED: ARABIC

INTERPRETER (NATIVE DIALECT): 3.5c

~~3. SUMMARY OF INTERROGATION / INTELLIGENCE GAINED (S//REL to USA and MCFD):~~

DETAINEE LOOKED AT THE FOLLOWING PICTURES AND WAS ASKED TO IDENTIFY THE FLASH-DRIVES, HARD-DRIVES, AND COMPUTER. DETAINEE SAID HE DID NOT KNOW WHO OWNED THE FLASH-DRIVES, THE HARD-DRIVES OR THE COMPUTER.



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DETAINEE IDENTIFIED THE PICTURE BELOW AS ABU MUSTAFA AL-SHAIBANI.



DETAINEE DOES NOT KNOW WHO KIDNAPPED THE FOUR AMERICAN CONTRACTORS AND ONE AUSTRIAN CONTRACTOR IN BASRAH BUT HAS HEARD THAT IT WAS SAYID NAJJI WHO DID IT. SAYID NAJJI IS IN U.S. CUSTODY. HE ALSO HEARD THAT MAYBE IT WAS SELAFI OR SUNNIS WHO HAD DONE IT. DETAINEE HAD NO FURTHER INFORMATION (NFI) ON THE ISSUE.

DETAINEE WAS TOLD ABOUT THE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS RESIGNING AND HE SAID THAT THE REASON THEY RESIGNED IS THAT WHEN THEY WERE OFFERED THE POSITION BY THE SADR MOVEMENT THEY WERE FORCED TO PRE-SIGN A LETTER OF RESIGNATION FOR MUQTADA AL SADR TO USE AGAINST THEM IN JUST SUCH A SITUATION. THEY WERE ALSO FORCED TO GIVE A PORTION OF THEIR SALARIES TO CHARITY. THE ONLY ONES WHO DID NOT SIGN THE RESIGNATION LETTER ARE HAJJI SALAM AND HASSAN DUMA. DETAINEE WAS THEN TOLD THAT IT WASN'T PARLIAMENTARY MEMBERS WHO RESIGNED BUT MINISTERS. AND HE SAID THAT WAS DIFFERENT. THAT WAS PROBABLY MORE OF A RESULT OF THE INFLUENCE OF IRAN ON MUQTADA.

WHEN DETAINEE ARRIVED IN BASRAH THE DAY BEFORE HE WAS CAPTURED HE MET JASIM AL-SA'IDI. DETAINEE WAS TIRED FROM THE TRIP SO THERE WERE NO DETAILED DISCUSSIONS HELD THAT NIGHT. THAT WAS THE NIGHT THEY WERE DETAINED. THE MAIN PURPOSE OF THE VISIT TO BASRAH WAS TO ATTEND THE CONDOLENCE WAKE FOR THE DEATH OF SALAM AL-MALIKI'S FATHER. ONE WEEK PRIOR TO THIS DETAINEE HAD GONE TO SEE ABU FIRAS AL-MUTAYYIRI IN BAGHDAD TO PASS ON HIS CONDOLENCES ON THE DEATH OF TWO OF ABU FIRAS' SISTERS AND THE SISTERS' TWO CHILDREN. DETAINEE SAID THAT THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ABU FIRAS AL-MUTAYYIRI AND SALAM AL-MALIKI WAS NOT GOOD, BUT THAT NIGHT HE

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HAD CONVINCED ABU FIRAS AND HIS BROTHER AHMAD AL-MUTAYYIRI TO TRAVEL TO BASRAH TO ATTEND THE WAKE FOR AL-MALIKI'S FATHER. DETAINEE SAID THAT THE BAD RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ABU FIRAS AND AL-MALIKI STARTED BECAUSE WALID AL-ZAMILI HATED SALAM AL-MALIKI, AND ABU FIRAS REPORTED DIRECTLY TO WALID AL-ZAMILI. IN ADDITION ABU FIRAS WAS A PROUD MAN, WHO WANTED TO BE RESPECTED AND FLATTERED, AND SALAM AL-MALIKI HAD NOT FLATTERED HIM.

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DETAINEE SAID THAT THAT HAMID MUHAMMAD JABUR AL-LAMI (N1230A) ALSO USED THE NAMES SAYID ABU HUSAYN AL-MUSAWI, SAYID HUSAYN AND ABU YASIR.

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THERE WAS A POLITICAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN HEZBOLLAH AND THE OMS AND THIS HAD BEEN CONDUCTED THROUGH MUHAMMAD AL-KAWTHARANI AND MUSTAFA AL-YA'QUBI. THIS RELATIONSHIP HAD STARTED AROUND THE TIME OF THE BATTLE OF NAJAF IN 2004. DETAINEE WAS CERTAIN THAT LEBANESE HEZBOLLAH ALSO HAD A RELATIONSHIP WITH OTHER GROUPS IN IRAQ, SUCH AS THE BADR CORPS, SCIRI AND THE OFFICE OF GRAND AYATALLAH 'ALI AL-SISTANI, AS WELL AS SUNNI GROUPS THROUGH THE HEZBOLLAH CONNECTION TO THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD.

THE MILITARY RELATIONSHIP WAS BETWEEN HEZBOLLAH AND THE SPECIAL GROUPS AND NOT WITH THE OMS. DETAINEE SAID THAT THE MILITARY RELATIONSHIP WITH HEZBOLLAH STARTED ONE YEAR AGO. IN THE BEGINNING SAYID HUSAYN HAD SHOWN THEM AN IRANIAN PASSPORT AND HAD SPOKEN FARSI. SAYID HUSAYN DID NOT WANT THE NEWS TO SPREAD THAT HE WAS FROM HEZBOLLAH. DETAINEE DID NOT KNOW OF OTHERS INVOLVED FROM HEZBOLLAH AND WOULD NOT HAVE RECOGNIZED THEM ANYWAY AS THEY WOULD HAVE SPOKEN FARSI ALSO. ANYTHING THE IRANIANS ASKED OF HEZBOLLAH THEY WOULD GET AS THEY CONSIDERED HEZBOLLAH A PRODUCT OF THE IRGC. DETAINEE SAID THAT THE ROLE OF

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SAYID HUSAYN WAS NOT TO PLAN OR HELP CARRY OUT OPERATIONS OR ATTACKS, BUT TO EVALUATE THE TRAINING NEEDS OF THE SPECIAL GROUPS AND ADVISE THEM ON COURSES, WEAPONS EFFECTIVENESS ETC. SAYID HUSAYN CAME TO IRAQ FOR SHORT PERIODS ONLY. DETAINEE DID NOT KNOW HOW SAYID HUSAYN TRAVELED FROM LEBANON TO IRAN. DETAINEE SAID THAT SAYID HUSAYN ENTERED IRAQ FROM IRAN VIA THE MARSHLAND SMUGGLER ROUTES AND WAS BROUGHT IN BY ABU MUSTAFA AL-GHARAWI. DETAINEE CONFIRMED THAT MUQTADA AL-SADR KNEW ABOUT THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN HEZBOLLAH AND THE SPECIAL GROUPS AND HAD NOT ACTED TO PREVENT THE RELATIONSHIP. DETAINEE HAD MET MUQTADA TWICE IN THE LAST YEAR. DETAINEE DID NOT WANT TO SAY HOW AL-SADR KNEW ABOUT THIS RELATIONSHIP.

DETAINEE DID NOT THINK THAT THERE WAS A RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN HEZBOLLAH AND MAINSTREAM JAM LEAD BY ABBAS AL-KHUFI. IN PART THIS WAS BECAUSE ABBAS AL-KHUFI WAS DISORGANIZED AND IRAN AND HEZBOLLAH DID NOT WISH TO WORK WITH HIM. DETAINEE SAID THAT MUQTADA AL-SADR WAS NOT UPSET THAT HEZBOLLAH AND IRAN WERE WORKING WITH THE SPECIAL GROUPS. AL-SADR KNEW OF HEZBOLLAH SUPPORT FOR THE SPECIAL GROUPS AND CONSIDERED THESE SPECIAL GROUPS TO BELONG TO HIM.

DETAINEE ELABORATED THAT MUQTADA AL-SADR BELIEVED THAT THE SPECIAL GROUPS WERE UNDER HIS CONTROL. THE MAJORITY OF SADRISTS INCLUDING THE SPECIAL GROUPS RESPECTED MUQTADA AL-SADR, AND AL-SADR LIKED TO BELIEVE THAT HE WAS LEADER OF THE RESISTANCE. DETAINEE DENIED THAT MUQTADA AL-SADR HAD ISSUED ANY ORDERS FOR JAM AND THE SPECIAL GROUPS NOT TO ENGAGE IN VIOLENCE AGAINST MNF(I). [REDACTED] 1.4c

[REDACTED] 1.4c DETAINEE SAID THAT AL-SADR HAD SENT A COMMITTEE TO SADR CITY TO FOLLOW UP THE WORK OF THE GROUPS. THE COMMITTEE HAD SAID THAT AL-SADR DID NOT APPROVE ATTACKS AGAINST SUNNIS, BUT HAD SAID NO SUCH THING ABOUT ATTACKS AGAINST THE COALITION FORCES (CF). AL-SADR COULD NEVER ISSUE AN ORDER TO STOP VIOLENCE AGAINST THE CF AS HE WOULD LOSE CREDIBILITY. DETAINEE SAID THAT AS HE HAD EXPLAINED PREVIOUSLY, THE SPECIAL GROUPS HAD ALWAYS EXISTED ALONGSIDE JAYSH AL-MAHDI. ONLY A SMALL NUMBER COULD CONSIDER THEMSELVES SPECIAL GROUPS. JALIL AL-NURI, ABU DURA, ALL OF THEM HAD THEIR OWN SPECIAL GROUP BUT AL-SADR CONSIDERED HIMSELF THE RULER OF THE SADRISTS AND HEAD OF THESE GROUPS. [REDACTED] 1.4c

[REDACTED] 1.4c DETAINEE SAID THAT AL-SADR SOUGHT NOT TO INTERFERE. AL-SADR WANTED ALL THE BENEFITS THAT WOULD ACCRUE FROM THE VIOLENCE BUT HE DID NOT WANT THE HARM ASSOCIATED WITH



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IT. DETAINEE WAS ASKED WHETHER THIS WAS POSSIBLE AS AL-SADR LIKED TO CONTROL EVERYTHING. DETAINEE MAINTAINED THAT AL-SADR DID NOT INTERFERE IN THE DETAILS SO THAT HE WAS NOT AFFECTED POLITICALLY. DETAINEE SAID THAT AL-SADR HAD EXPELLED HIM FROM THE SADR TREND WHEN HE SAW THAT DETAINEE COULD BECOME AS STRONG AS AL-SADR. AL-SADR HAD ALSO EXPELLED ABU DURA FOR CREATING PROBLEMS BETWEEN THE SADRISTS AND THE SUNNIS.

DETAINEE EXPLAINED THAT AL-SADR DID NOT WISH TO MICROMANAGE, BUT RATHER TO CONTROL EVERYTHING AS HE WAS AFRAID OF ANOTHER PERSON BECOMING PROMINENT. THE WAY AL-SADR WAS ACHIEVING THIS CONTROL WAS BY REMOVING STRONG PERSONALITIES FROM PROMINENT POSITIONS. HE WOULD REPLACE THEM WITH INDIVIDUALS WHO MIGHT NOT BE AS INTELLIGENT, BUT WHOM HE COULD BE CERTAIN WOULD BE LOYAL TO HIM. AL-SADR'S FEAR OF HAVING STRONG PEOPLE AROUND HIM WAS STRONGER THAN HIS WILL TO ORGANIZE. THIS WAS WHY AL-SADR HAD EXPELLED SO MANY PROMINENT PERSONS FROM POSITIONS IN THE SADRIST LEADERSHIP.

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DETAINEE SAID THAT THE ORDER MUST BE ISSUED FOR LOGICAL REASONS. FOR EXAMPLE THAT THERE WOULD BE A WITHDRAWAL FROM THE CENTRE AND SOUTH OF IRAQ AND THAT JOB OPPORTUNITIES WOULD BE CREATED. DETAINEE BELIEVED THAT HE WOULD BE ABLE TO INFLUENCE THE MOST IMPORTANT FIGURES. HE WOULD GATHER A GROUP OF 25 OR 50 IN A DISCUSSION, THIS GROUPS WOULD THEN CONVINCED OTHERS. DETAINEE EXPLAINED THAT AL-SADR COULD NOT BE CONVINCING AND HIS POPULARITY WAS AMONGST THE SIMPLE PEOPLE. BUT THAT DETAINEE COULD INFLUENCE THE WELL EDUCATED SADRISTS.

**INTERROGATION APPROACH / TECHNIQUES ~~(S//REL to USA and MCFI):~~**

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**4. COMMENTS ~~(S//REL to USA and MCFI):~~**

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SENIOR INTERROGATOR COMMENTS: NONE

**5. POINTS OF CONTACT (U):**

3.5c

**NOTE: ALL ARABIC SPELLINGS ARE IAW DI POLICY NO. 033, "SPELLING NAMES OF FOREIGN PERSONS IN DI PRODUCTS," DATED 02 DEC 03 AND DDCICM DIRECTIVE, "INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STANDARD FOR THE TRANSLITERATION OF ARABIC NAMES IN FINAL WRITTEN REPORTS AND PRODUCTS," DATED 04 JUN 03, IN COMPLIANCE WITH SECTION 352 OF THE INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT OF 2003.**

**PREP (U):** 2-A2475

**AQC (U):** BAGHDAD, IRAQ (2007/04/22)

**ENCL (U):** NONE

**DISSEM (U):** FIELD – NONE

**WARNING (U):** REPORT CLASSIFIED ~~SECRET // REL to USA and MCFI~~

**DRV FROM (U):** MNF-IMNC-I SGC VERSION 3, 27 MAY 04.

**DECL ON:** X1