

~~SECRET // REL to USA and MCFI~~

1.4a

TACTICAL INTERROGATION REPORT:

REPORT NUMBER (U): 1.4a
REPORT DATE (DOI) (U): 18 APR 07
REPORTING UNIT (U): 1.4a
COUNTRY (U): IRAQ (IZ), IRAN (IR)

SOURCE PARAGRAPH (~~S//REL to USA and MCFI~~): 1.4c

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SUMMARY (~~S//REL to USA and MCFI~~):

- THE FIFTY-FOURTH INTERROGATION OF N1228A
- DETAINEE DISCUSSED THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN IRAN AND HEZBOLLAH
- DETAINEE DISCUSSED TRAINING THAT HEZBOLLAH IS GIVING TO IRAQI FIGHTERS IN IRAN

TEXT (~~S//REL to USA and MCFI~~):

1. BIOGRAPHICAL DATA (~~S//REL TO USA AND MCFI~~):

GIVEN NAME: QAYIS
FATHER'S GIVEN NAME: HAJI
GRANDFATHER'S GIVEN NAME: SA'ID
CLAN NAME: NONE
TRIBAL NAME: AL-KHAZ'ALI
ALIAS: NONE
EYE COLOR: BROWN
HAIR COLOR: BLACK
HEIGHT: 5 FEET 8 INCHES
WEIGHT: 160 LB



DISTINGUISHING FEATURES: IRREGULAR SHAPED PORTWINE BIRTHMARK, LEFT FRONT SHOULDER, ARMPIT AREA.

ADDRESS: AL-SALAH NEIGHBORHOOD, IN THE VICINITY OF AL-SALAH MOSQUE, KUFA, IRAQ.

PHONE NUMBER: NONE

MOBILE NUMBER: CLAIMS TO HAVE LOST HIS CELLULAR TELEPHONE SEVERAL DAYS PRIOR TO CAPTURE.

POB: BAGHDAD, IZ

DOB: 24 APRIL 1974

MARITAL STATUS: DIVORCED

NATIONALITY: IRAQI

RELIGION: SHI'A/ISLAM

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TIR-TF17-TSF-0704-N1228A-54

EDUCATION: ELEMENTARY AND MIDDLE SCHOOL, 1995-PRESENT, THE SHI'A HAWZA RELIGIOUS TRAINING INSTITUTE IN AL-NAJAF, IZ.

LANGUAGES (PROFICIENCY): ARABIC (NATIVE), ENGLISH (ABLE TO SPEAK HALTINGLY).

MOSQUE: NONE

IMAM: NONE

MILITARY EXPERIENCE: PAID HIS WAY OUT OF THE IRAQI ARMY IN 1997 FOR 1.5 MILLION IRAQI DINAR.

SPECIAL SKILLS: NONE

OCCUPATION: POLITICIAN

MEDICAL (U): CLEARED FOR DETENTION / INTERROGATION / LAST CHECK UP: 18 APR 07

DETAINEE NUMBER: N1228A

FATHER: HADI SA'ID AL-KHAZ'ALI

MOTHER: WOULD NOT ANSWER (WNA)

BROTHERS: WNA

SISTERS: WNA

WIFE: DIVORCED

CHILDREN: 1 BOY, AWAIS (6), 1 GIRL, MAIS (8). BOTH LIVE WITH THEIR MOTHER IN BAGHDAD, IZ.

2. CIRCUMSTANCES OF CAPTURE:

CONOP:

DTG OF CAPTURE: 20 MAR 0300C 2007

PLACE OF CAPTURE: BASRAH, IZ.

APPREHENDING UNIT:

REASON FOR CAPTURE: DETAINEE IS A SUSPECTED ANTI-IRAQI FORCES (AIF) GROUP LEADER, AND IS ASSOCIATED WITH WEAPONS SMUGGLING FROM IRAN, EXTRA JUDICIAL KILLING (EJK) ACTIVITY, AND INVOLVEMENT WITH THE ATTACK ON THE KARBALA PJCC.

CURRENT LOCATION:

WEAPONS, DOCUMENTS AND EQUIPMENT ~~(S//REL to USA and MCFI)~~

INTERROGATOR:

LANGUAGE USED: ARABIC

INTERPRETER (NATIVE DIALECT):

3. SUMMARY OF INTERROGATION / INTELLIGENCE GAINED ~~(S//REL to USA and MCFI)~~

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SALAH AL-UBAYDI IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF THE SADR MOVEMENT. AT THE END OF THE HEZBOLLAH 30-DAY WAR THIS SUMMER, AL-UBAYDI TOOK A SMALL CONTINGENT OF MEN TO LEBANON TO CONGRATULATE HASSAN NASRULLAH ON THE OUTCOME OF THE WAR. AHMAD AL-MUTARI, SHAYIKH ABD-AL-ZAHRAH AL-SUWAY'IDI, AND ONE OTHER PERSON JOINED AL-UBAYDI ON THE TRIP. DETAINEE DID NOT KNOW OF ANY OTHER REASON FOR THE TRIP OUTSIDE OF GOOD WILL AND AS A RELATIONSHIP BUILDER.

THERE IS A VERY STRONG RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN IRAN AND HEZBOLLAH. IRAN SUPPLIES HEZBOLLAH WITH EVERYTHING AND HEZBOLLAH PROBABLY WOULD NOT EXIST WITHOUT IRAN. AT THE BEGINNING, HEZBOLLAH WAS WEAK AND IRAN WAS VERY STRONG. SINCE THEN, HEZBOLLAH HAS BECOME VERY ADEPT AT FIGHTING URBAN WARFARE AND INSURGENT ACTIVITIES. THIS HAS LED IRAN TO DEPEND ON HEZBOLLAH FOR THE TRAINING OF THEIR PEOPLE AND THE IRAQIS IN URBAN WARFARE. IRAN IS STILL THE BEST AT FIGHTING A CONVENTIONAL WAR.

THE TRAINING THAT HEZBOLLAH IS GIVING TO IRAQI FIGHTERS IN IRAN IS TRAINING ON EFPS, RPGS (SA-7S), MORTARS (120MM, 81MM, AND 60MM), AND SMALL ARMS TRAINING. DETAINEE DID NOT KNOW WHAT KIND OF TACTICAL TRAINING THEY WERE RECEIVING IN IRAN NOR DID HE SAY THERE WAS ANY SORT OF ATTACK PLANNING OR LEADERS' IP TRAINING. THE TRAINING LASTS APPROXIMATELY ONE MONTH AND IF A GROUP OR AN INDIVIDUAL WANTS MORE SPECIALIZED TRAINING IN AN AREA SUCH AS MORTARS OR EFPS, DETAINEE THINKS THAT GROUP OR INDIVIDUAL CAN GO BACK LATER FOR ANOTHER MONTH AND GET THAT TRAINING.

THE SADR GROUPS THAT RECEIVE TRAINING FROM HEZBOLLAH ARE THE SPECIAL GROUPS AND THE JAYSH AL MAHDI (JAM) GROUPS THAT FIGHT THE COALITION FORCES (CF). THE GROUPS DEDICATED TO FIGHTING SALAFI AND THE BA'ATHISTS ARE NOT TRAINED BY HEZBOLLAH.

DETAINEE WAS ASKED WHO JAM MEMBERS LIKED FIGHTING BETTER, THE COALITION FORCES OR THE SALAFIS. HE SAID THEY LIKED FIGHTING THE COALITION FORCES OR "OCCUPIERS" BETTER BECAUSE AN OCCUPATION OF THEIR COUNTRY WAS MORE OF A TRAVESTY THAN WHAT THE SALAFIS ARE DOING. HE SAID THAT THE SALAFIS ARE MORE DANGEROUS THOUGH SINCE THEY ARE IDEALISTICALLY COMMITTED TO DYING AND KILLING FOR THEIR CAUSE. HE SAID THE WORST PART ABOUT THE SALAFI IS THAT THEY DON'T DIFFERENTIATE BETWEEN CIVILIANS AND THE MILITARY WHEN IT COMES TO KILLING. THEY HAVE NO PROBLEM WITH DRIVING A CARLOAD OF EXPLOSIVES AND INDISCRIMINATELY KILLING ANYONE WHO IS NEAR THEM AND THIS IS WHAT SCARES THE SHI'AS MOST ABOUT THE SALAFIS.

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THE REST OF THE SESSION WAS SPENT CONTINUING THE APPROACH WORK DESIGNED TO GET DETAINEE TO TALK IN DEPTH ABOUT HAMID AND THE HEZBOLLAH INFLUENCE ON IRAQ.

INTERROGATION APPROACH / TECHNIQUES (~~S//REL to USA and MCFI~~):

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4. COMMENTS (~~S//REL to USA and MCFI~~):

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SENIOR INTERROGATOR COMMENTS: NONE

5. POINTS OF CONTACT (U):

3.5c

NOTE: ALL ARABIC SPELLINGS ARE IAW DI POLICY NO. 033, "SPELLING NAMES OF FOREIGN PERSONS IN DI PRODUCTS," DATED 02 DEC 03 AND DDCICM DIRECTIVE, "INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STANDARD FOR THE TRANSLITERATION OF ARABIC NAMES IN FINAL WRITTEN REPORTS AND PRODUCTS," DATED 04 JUN 03, IN COMPLIANCE WITH SECTION 352 OF THE INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT OF 2003.

PREP (U): 3.5c

AQC (U): BAGHDAD, IRAQ (2007/04/18)

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ENCL (U): NONE

DISSEM (U): FIELD – NONE

WARNING (U): REPORT CLASSIFIED ~~SECRET // REL to USA and MCPI~~

DRV FROM (U): MNF-IMNC-I SGC VERSION 3, 27 MAY 04.

DECL ON: X1

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