

~~SECRET // REL to USA and MCFI~~

1.4a

**TACTICAL INTERROGATION REPORT:**

**REPORT NUMBER (U):** 1.4a  
**REPORT DATE (DOI) (U):** 17 APR 07  
**REPORTING UNIT (U):** 1.4a  
**COUNTRY (U):** IRAQ (IZ), IRAN (IR)

**SOURCE PARAGRAPH (~~S//REL to USA and MCFI~~):** 1.4c

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**~~SUMMARY (S//REL to USA and MCFI):~~**

- THE FIFTY-FIRST INTERROGATION OF N1228A
- DETAINEE PROVIDED FURTHER DETAILED INFORMATION ON WEAPONS SMUGGLING FROM IRAN TO THE SPECIAL GROUPS IN IRAQ AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF THOSE WEAPONS WITHIN IRAQ
- DETAINEE PROVIDED LIMITED INFORMATION ON NARCOTICS SMUGGLING FROM IRAN, THROUGH IRAQ

**~~TEXT (S//REL to USA and MCFI):~~**

**1. BIOGRAPHICAL DATA (~~S//REL TO USA AND MCFI~~):**

**GIVEN NAME:** QAYIS  
**FATHER'S GIVEN NAME:** HADI  
**GRANDFATHER'S GIVEN NAME:** SA'ID  
**CLAN NAME:** NONE  
**TRIBAL NAME:** AL-KHAZ'ALI  
**ALIAS:** NONE  
**EYE COLOR:** BROWN  
**HAIR COLOR:** BLACK  
**HEIGHT:** 5 FEET EIGHT INCHES  
**WEIGHT:** 160 LBS  
**DISTINGUISHING FEATURES:** IRREGULAR SHAPED PORTWINE BIRTHMARK, LEFT FRONT SHOULDER, ARMPIT AREA.  
**ADDRESS:** AL-SALAH NEIGHBORHOOD, IN THE VICINITY OF AL-SALAH MOSQUE, KUFA, IRAQ.  
**PHONE NUMBER:** NONE  
**MOBILE NUMBER:** CLAIMS TO HAVE LOST HIS CELLULAR TELEPHONE SEVERAL DAYS PRIOR TO CAPTURE.  
**POB:** BAGHDAD, IZ  
**DOB:** 24 APRIL 1974  
**MARITAL STATUS:** DIVORCED  
**NATIONALITY:** IRAQI  
**RELIGION:** SHI'A/ISLAM



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**EDUCATION:** ELEMENTARY AND MIDDLE SCHOOL, 1995-PRESENT, THE SHI'A HAWZA RELIGIOUS TRAINING INSTITUTE IN AL-NAJAF, IZ.

**LANGUAGES (PROFICIENCY):** ARABIC (NATIVE), ENGLISH (ABLE TO SPEAK HALTINGLY).

**MOSQUE:** NONE

**IMAM:** NONE

**MILITARY EXPERIENCE:** PAID HIS WAY OUT OF THE IRAQI ARMY IN 1997 FOR 1.5 MILLION IRAQI DINAR.

**SPECIAL SKILLS:** NONE

**OCCUPATION:** POLITICIAN

**MEDICAL (U):** CLEARED FOR DETENTION / INTERROGATION / LAST CHECK UP: 17 APR 07

**DETAINEE NUMBER:** N1228A

**FATHER:** HADI SA'ID AL-KHAZ'ALI

**MOTHER:** WOULD NOT ANSWER (WNA)

**BROTHERS:** WNA

**SISTERS:** WNA

**WIFE:** DIVORCED

**CHILDREN:** 1 BOY, AWAIS (6), 1 GIRL, MAIS (8). BOTH LIVE WITH THEIR MOTHER IN BAGHDAD, IZ.

**2. CIRCUMSTANCES OF CAPTURE:**

**CONOP:** 1.4a

**DTG OF CAPTURE:** 20 MAR 0300C 2007

**PLACE OF CAPTURE:** BASRAH, IZ.

**APPREHENDING UNIT:** 1.4a

**REASON FOR CAPTURE:** DETAINEE IS A SUSPECTED ANTI-IRAQI FORCES (AIF) GROUP LEADER, AND IS ASSOCIATED WITH WEAPONS SMUGGLING FROM IRAN, EXTRA JUDICIAL KILLING (EJK) ACTIVITY, AND INVOLVEMENT WITH THE ATTACK ON THE KARBALA PJCC.

**CURRENT LOCATION:** 1.4a

**WEAPONS, DOCUMENTS AND EQUIPMENT ~~(S//REL to USA and MCFI)~~**

**INTERROGATOR:** 3.5c

**LANGUAGE USED:** ARABIC

**INTERPRETER (NATIVE DIALECT):** 3.5c

**3. SUMMARY OF INTERROGATION / INTELLIGENCE GAINED ~~(S//REL to USA and MCFI)~~**

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NEITHER ABU SAJJAD AL-GHARAWI NOR HIS ASSISTANTS USUALLY DISCLOSE, BY TELEPHONE, THE TYPES AND NUMBERS OF WEAPONS THAT WILL BE SENT TO THE SPECIAL GROUPS. INSTEAD, A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SPECIAL GROUPS TRAVELS TO ABU SAJJAD OR ONE OF HIS ASSISTANTS IN IRAN; OR ONE OF ABU SAJJAD'S PERSONNEL TRAVELS TO MEET A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SPECIAL GROUPS IN IRAQ. IN PERSON, THE REPRESENTATIVES DISCUSS WHAT WILL ACTUALLY COMPRISE THE SHIPMENT. THE TRAVEL REQUIRED FOR THESE MEETINGS IS RELATIVELY SHORT.

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1.4c FOR SIMPLE SHIPMENTS, SUCH AS SHIPMENT CONSISTING OF A LIMITED NUMBER OF ONLY ONE TYPE OF WEAPON, THE SHIPMENT MAY BE DISCUSSED BY PHONE. THE CODES USED TO REFER TO WEAPONS MUST BE AGREED TO IN ADVANCE BY THE PARTIES. A VARIETY OF CODES HAVE BEEN USED. EXAMPLES OF CODE WORDS USED INCLUDE FISH, PEPSI, AND BAGS OF CEMENT. MORE COMPLICATED SHIPMENTS ARE NOT DISCUSSED BY PHONE DUE TO THE POTENTIAL FOR CONFUSION IN USING MANY CODE WORDS. THERE IS ALSO AN INCLINATION AGAINST USING PHONES TO DISCUSS WEAPONS SHIPMENTS FOR SECURITY REASONS, IN ORDER TO AVOID AROUSING SUSPICION IF CALLS OR PHONES ARE INTERCEPTED.

AFTER REACHING AHWAZ, IR, WEAPONS ARE MOVED ACROSS THE IRAN-IRAQ BORDER. AHWAZ IS CLOSE TO THE IRAQI BORDER SO THERE ARE MANY POTENTIAL ROUTES THAT MAY BE TAKEN. WEAPONS ARE TYPICALLY TRANSPORTED ACROSS THE BORDER BY WEAPONS SMUGGLERS.

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ALL THE WEAPONS SMUGGLERS INVOLVED IN THE CROSS BORDER TRANSPORTATION OF WEAPONS FROM AHWAZ TO AMARRAH ARE FROM THE ABU AYTA (PHONETIC) SUB-CLAN OF THE AL NAWAFIL (PHONETIC) CLAN OF THE AL-MUHAMMADAWI TRIBE. THE NAWAFIL CLAN HAS A REPUTATION OF TOUGHNESS, COURAGE AND STRENGTH. FOR EXAMPLE, KARIM MAHUD A MEMBER OF THE NAWAFIL CLAN, ALTHOUGH HE DOES NOT BELONG TO THE ABU AYTA SUB-CLAN.

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1.4c ABU AYTA EARNED A REPUTATION DURING SADDAM HUSSEIN'S REGIME AS A GROUP WILLING AND ABLE TO CONDUCT ANY SORT OF SMUGGLING, SUCH AS NARCOTICS OR WEAPONS SMUGGLING. DETAINEE DOUBTS THAT ABU AYTA MEMBERS ACT AS MERCENARIES, AND THEY DO NOT STEAL OR LOOT FROM OTHER TRIBES. ABU AYTA MEMBERS ALWAYS OPPOSED SADDAM HUSSEIN, AND NEVER JOINED THE IRAQI ARMY.

DETAINEE DOES NOT HAVE DIRECT CONTACT WITH ABU AYTA. DIRECT CONTACT WITH ABU AYTA MEMBERS WAS CONDUCTED BY THE SPECIAL GROUPS THROUGH ABU SAJJAD AL-GHARAWI AND HIS ASSISTANTS, AND BY SELECT SPECIAL GROUP MEMBERS. OTHER IRAQIS WHO WERE IN EXILE IN IRAN DURING SADDAM HUSSEIN'S REGIME, SUCH AS MUJAHIDIN AND BADR CORPS MEMBERS, LIKELY HAVE CONTACT WITH ABU AYTA FOR SUCH SMUGGLING ACTIVITIES.

THE REASON ABU SAJJAD USES ABU AYTA IS BECAUSE MANY AREAS TO CROSS THE BORDER FROM IRAN TO IRAQ NEAR AMARRAH ARE UNDER THE CONTROL OF ABU AYTA.

1.4c IF ANOTHER GROUP TRIES TO CROSS THE BORDER THROUGH ABU AYTA'S TERRITORY, AT A VERY EARLY STAGE ABU AYTA WILL ASK WHAT THAT OTHER GROUP IS DOING AND WARN THEM NOT TO TRESPASS. THE NEXT TIME A TRANSGRESSION TAKES PLACE THERE WILL BE SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES, AS ABU AYTA MEMBERS HAVE A REPUTATION FOR SETTLING DISPUTES BY ATTACKING THE OTHER PARTIES WITH MORTARS. AS WEAPONS SMUGGLERS, ABU AYTA ARE EXTREMELY WELL ARMED - THEY HAVE ACCESS TO WHATEVER WEAPONS THEY WANT AND A NEED TO BEAR THEM.

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THE MARSHLANDS ARE VERY DIFFICULT TO NAVIGATE. THEY ARE A MAZE OF WATER, LAND, AND MIXED TERRAIN, THAT EXTEND FROM TWO SIDES OF THE CITY OF AHWAZ, IR, ALL THE WAY TO AMARRAH AND BEYOND IN IRAQ. THERE IS ABUNDANT MARSH WITHOUT ROADS OR OTHER ROUTES FOR TRAFFIC. ABU AYTA USES SHALLOW WOODEN BOATS IN ORDER TO CROSS THE MARSH WITH WEAPONS.

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SADDAM HUSSEIN, WITH A FIERCE MILITARY FORCE, TRIED TO CONTROL THE MARSHLANDS DURING THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR, BUT FAILED. HE TRIED TO HAVE THE MARSHLANDS DRAINED, BUT FAILED IN THAT AS WELL. ONE GROUP THAT TRIED TO ASSASSINATE SADDAM HUSSEIN WENT INTO HIDING IN THE MARSHES, AND DESPITE TREMENDOUS EFFORTS, INCLUDING SEARCHES BY AIRCRAFT, THE GOVERNMENT COULD NOT FIND AND DEFEAT THEM.

ON THE IRANIAN SIDE OF THE BORDER, WHERE ABU AYTA LOADS THEIR WOODEN BOATS WITH WEAPONS IN AHWAZ, THERE IS A GROUP CALLED THE ARAB AHWAZ, WHO SPEAK TYPICAL IRAQI DIALECT. 1.4c

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1.4c THE ARAB AHWAZ CARRY OUT SOME WORK IN SMUGGLING, COMMERCE, AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR. DETAINEE DOES NOT KNOW WHAT RELATIONSHIP THEY HAVE IN WORKING WITH ABU AYTA, IF ANY.

FROM AHWAZ, ABU AYTA MOVES THE WEAPONS THROUGH THE MARSHES. THE TRAVEL MAY TAKE PLACE AT ANY TIME OF DAY. DUE TO THE LACK OF CONTROL BY ANY GOVERNMENT FORCE IN THAT REGION, THERE IS NO NEED TO TRAVEL AT NIGHT. DETAINEE DOES NOT KNOW HOW MANY BOATS ARE USED FOR SHIPMENTS, BUT ASSUMES IT DEPENDS ON THE NUMBER AND TYPE OF WEAPONS SHIPPED.

SHIPMENTS ARE DROPPED OFF ON A SHORE AREA OF THE MARSHLAND NEAR AMARRAH, WHERE THEY ARE RECEIVED BY MEMBERS OF THE SPECIAL GROUP FOR AMARRAH. THE MARSHLANDS BORDER A DRY AREA WHERE A TRUCK WILL BE WAITING. BEFORE PICKING UP A SHIPMENT, SPECIAL GROUP MEMBERS BUY COMMODITIES TO PLACE IN THE TRUCK THAT WILL SERVE TO DISGUISE THE WEAPONS DURING THEIR TRANSIT. MONEY TO PURCHASE THE COMMODITIES COMES FROM A SPECIAL GROUP FINANCIER. 1.4c

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1.4c THE COMMODITY OR COMMODITIES PURCHASED DEPENDS ON THE DEMAND IN THE CITY THAT THE WEAPONS WILL BE DROPPED OFF IN. COMMODITIES USED PREVIOUSLY ON DIFFERENT SHIPMENTS HAVE INCLUDED SCRAP METAL, TOMATO PASTE AND PEPSI.

ABU AYTA WILL UNLOAD THE SMALL BOATS. SPECIAL GROUP MEMBERS WILL THEN UNPACK, THOROUGHLY INSPECT, AND INVENTORY ALL OF THE WEAPONS. ONE OF THE SPECIAL GROUP MEMBERS WILL THEN SIGN PAPERWORK REFLECTING HOW MANY PIECES WERE DELIVERED. 1.4c

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SMUGGLERS OPERATE ON THE BASIS OF CREDIBILITY. ABU AYTA HAS SMUGGLED HUNDREDS OF SHIPMENTS, AND RELY UPON TRUST TO CONTINUE THEIR BUSINESS. THE SMUGGLERS PROVIDE THE SIGNED PAPERWORK TO ABU SAJJAD AL-GHARAWI OR ONE OF HIS ASSISTANTS. THE SMUGGLERS ARE PAID BY ABU SAJJAD, NOT BY THE SPECIAL GROUP.

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THE WEAPONS ARE LOADED INTO TRUCKS ALREADY STOCKED WITH COMMODITIES. HOW WEAPONS ARE LOADED, CONCEALED, AND DROPPED OFF ARE WITHIN THE DISCRETION OF THE SPECIAL GROUP. THEY ARE NOT ISSUES HANDLED BY DETAINEE.

THE SPECIAL GROUPS HAVE NEVER EXPERIENCED A PROBLEM WITH THE AUTHORITIES INTERCEPTING A WEAPONS SHIPMENT. IT IS VERY EASY TO TRANSPORT WEAPONS TO BAGHDAD, BECAUSE THERE ARE LARGE FLEETS OF TRUCKS TRAVELING FROM AMARRAH TO THE CAPITAL. ALTHOUGH THE TRUCKS ARE STOPPED FOR INSPECTIONS AT CHECKPOINTS, EACH INSPECTOR ONLY TAKES A BRIEF LOOK AT THE CARGO THEN SIGNS A PAPER TO LET THE TRUCK PROCEED. MOST CHECKPOINTS ARE MANNED BY THE IRAQI NATIONAL GUARD.

EARLY INTO THE CONDUCT OF WEAPONS SHIPMENT ACTIVITIES, THE SPECIAL GROUPS HIRED TRUCKS AND TRUCK DRIVERS TO MOVE THEIR WEAPONS. THE SPECIAL GROUPS WOULD HIRE TRUCKS AND DRIVERS EITHER IN BAGHDAD AND AMARRAH, DEPENDING ON WHO THEY COULD TRUST SUFFICIENTLY. THE SPECIAL GROUPS HAD TO TRUST THE DRIVERS BECAUSE THEY LET THEM KNOW WHAT THEY WERE TRANSPORTING. THESE DRIVERS OF THE HIRED TRUCKS WERE NOT SPECIAL GROUP MEMBERS. SOME OF THE HIRED DRIVERS WERE PAID EXTRA MONEY BUT OTHERS RECEIVED WHAT THEY NORMALLY WOULD FOR A NORMAL SHIPMENT OF GOODS. THE DRIVERS THAT DID NOT RECEIVE A PREMIUM ACCEPTED THE WORK BECAUSE THEY AGREED WITH THE CAUSE PURSUED BY THE SPECIAL GROUPS.

RATHER THAN RELY ON HIRED DRIVERS, SOME PEOPLE FROM THE SPECIAL GROUPS INVOLVED IN TRANSPORTING WEAPONS SUGGESTED THAT THE SPECIAL GROUPS OBTAIN SOME OF THEIR OWN TRUCKS. BECAUSE OF THE CONSIDERABLE EXPENSE INVOLVED, DETAINEE AUTHORIZED THE PURCHASE OF TRUCKS, ONE AT A TIME, UNTIL THE SPECIAL GROUPS OWNED THREE.

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EACH TRUCK COST APPROXIMATELY \$60,000. THE TRUCKS WERE PURCHASED FROM CAR DEALERS IN EITHER THE HABABIA, BAYA, OR AL-NAHDA AREAS OF BAGHDAD. THE DETAINEE DID NOT ALLOW THE TRUCKS TO BE PURCHASED FROM A PRIVATE PERSON, BECAUSE THE TRUCK MIGHT HAVE BEEN STOLEN OR NOT REGISTERED PROPERLY. DETAINEE DID NOT WANT PROBLEMS WITH THE AUTHORITIES SO THE SPECIAL GROUPS WENT



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THROUGH A REPUTABLE DEALERSHIP. DETAINEE IS UNABLE TO DESCRIBE THESE VEHICLES. THE DRIVERS OF THE SPECIAL GROUPS' VEHICLES ARE MEMBERS OF THE SPECIAL GROUPS. EACH DRIVER TAKES THE TRUCK TO HIS HOME AND PARKS IT CLOSE BY UNTIL IT IS USED AGAIN FOR A WEAPONS SHIPMENT. THE SPECIAL GROUPS' TRUCKS ARE NOT RENTED OUT TO OTHER PEOPLE OR USED FOR OTHER PURPOSES. THEY NEED TO STAND BY IN ORDER TO TRAVEL IN TIME TO PICK UP THE NEXT SHIPMENT, WHENEVER THAT MAY BE. THE TRUCKS ARE DIVIDED BETWEEN BAGHDAD AND AMARRAH, WITH AT LEAST ONE TRUCK IN EACH CITY AND THE THIRD ROTATING BETWEEN THE TWO CITIES. THIS SYSTEM FOR SHIPPING WEAPONS RELIES ON THE EXISTENCE OF A GREAT DEAL OF TRUST IN THE SPECIAL GROUP MEMBERS WHO ARE DRIVING THE TRUCKS, BUT DETAINEE IS NOT AWARE OF ANY DISPUTE ARISING FROM ONE OF THEM NOT DELIVERING EACH PIECE OF WEAPONRY THE SHOULD HAVE. THE SPECIAL GROUPS STRIVE TO MOVE WEAPONS IN THEIR OWN TRUCKS, BUT IF THE SIZE OF A SHIPMENT EXCEEDS THEIR AVAILABLE CAPACITY THEN THEY WILL HIRE ANOTHER TRUCK IN THE SAME WAY THEY DID EARLY ON.

THE TRUCKS MAY MAKE A DELIVERY TO MORE THAN ONE SPECIAL GROUP. FOR EXAMPLE, A TRUCK MAY STOP AT KUT TO MAKE A DELIVERY TO A SPECIAL GROUP BEFORE DROPPING OFF THE BALANCE OF THE SHIPMENT IN BAGHDAD. THE ACTUAL MEANS OF DELIVERING THE SHIPMENT IS LEFT TO THE DISCRETION OF THE PERSON IN CHARGE OF THE SPECIAL GROUP RECEIVING THE SHIPMENT. AMONG THE SPECIAL GROUPS IN IRAQ, ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE DELIVERY OF WEAPONS SHIPMENTS ARE COORDINATED BY PHONE. AFTER THE WEAPONS ARE DELIVERED, THE COMMODITIES ON THE TRUCK WILL BE SOLD AT A MARKET. THE INTENT IS TO MAKE A PROFIT OR TO MINIMIZE THE LOSS IN ORDER TO RECOUP EXPENSES ASSOCIATED WITH PURCHASING THE COMMODITY. THE SALE OF COMMODITIES IS ALSO INTENDED TO COVER UP THE SPECIAL GROUP'S REAL ACTIVITY.

DETAINEE NEVER HAD TO INTERFERE TO RESOLVE A DISPUTE ARISING FROM MAKING DECISIONS ABOUT THE SPECIAL GROUPS' WEAPONS SMUGGLING ACTIVITIES. DETAINEE DID NOT DEAL PERSONALLY WITH SMUGGLERS. THAT WAS DELEGATED TO THE SPECIAL GROUP IN AMARRAH.

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1.4c ABU AYTA, THE GROUP THAT SMUGGLES WEAPONS TO THE SPECIAL GROUPS, ALSO HAS A REPUTATION FOR NARCOTICS SMUGGLING. THOUGH NARCOTICS ARE LIKELY SMUGGLED BY SMALL GROUPS OF INDIVIDUALS AS WELL, ABU AYTA IS THE TOP NARCOTICS SMUGGLING GROUP IN IRAQ. THE GENERAL ROUTE RELATED TO IRAQ THAT NARCOTICS TRAVEL ON RUNS FROM AFGHANISTAN, TO IRAN, TO AMARRAH,

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TO SAMAWAH, TO SAUDI ARABIA, AND ON TO THE GULF STATES. NARCOTICS ALSO ENTER IRAQ THROUGH BASRAH. NARCOTICS SMUGGLING IS ESPECIALLY POPULAR IN SAMAWAH AT THIS TIME.

JAM PERSONNEL ARE NOT PERMITTED TO PARTICIPATE IN NARCOTICS SMUGGLING OR USE. A JAM MEMBER INVOLVED IN SUCH AN ACTIVITY WOULD BE EXPELLED. IF THE SADR TREND CONDUCTED AN INVESTIGATION THAT PROVES THE PERSON WAS INVOLVED, AND HE WAS EITHER CAUGHT RED-HANDED OR THERE WERE WITNESSES AGAINST HIM, A PUNISHMENT COMMITTEE WOULD TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION. OTHERWISE THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT WOULD HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO DEAL WITH THE MATTER.

C. DETAINEE FAILED TO POSITIVELY IDENTIFY A PHOTOGRAPH OF WISAM ABU QADIR.

**INTERROGATION APPROACH / TECHNIQUES (~~S//REL to USA and MCFI~~):**

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**4. COMMENTS (~~S//REL to USA and MCFI~~):**

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**SENIOR INTERROGATOR COMMENTS: NONE**

**5. POINTS OF CONTACT (U):**

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**NOTE: ALL ARABIC SPELLINGS ARE IAW DI POLICY NO. 033, "SPELLING NAMES OF FOREIGN PERSONS IN DI PRODUCTS," DATED 02 DEC 03 AND DDCICM DIRECTIVE, "INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STANDARD FOR THE TRANSLITERATION OF ARABIC NAMES IN FINAL WRITTEN REPORTS AND PRODUCTS," DATED 04 JUN 03, IN COMPLIANCE WITH SECTION 352 OF THE INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT OF 2003.**



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**PREP (U):** 3.5c

**AQC (U):** BAGHDAD, IRAQ (2007/04/17)

**ENCL (U):** NONE

**DISSEM (U):** FIELD – NONE

**WARNING (U):** REPORT CLASSIFIED ~~SECRET // REL to USA and MCFI~~

**DRV FROM (U):** MNF-IMNC-I SGC VERSION 3, 27 MAY 04.

**DECL ON:** X1

Approved for Release