

~~SECRET // REL to USA and MCFI~~

1.4a

TACTICAL INTERROGATION REPORT:

REPORT NUMBER (U): 1.4a

REPORT DATE (DOI) (U): 16 APR 07

REPORTING UNIT (U): 1.4a

COUNTRY (U): IRAQ (IZ), IRAN (IR)

1.4c

SUMMARY (~~S//REL to USA and MCFI~~):

- THE FORTY-NINTH INTERROGATION OF N1228A
- DETAINEE PROVIDED INFORMATION ON THE BADR ORGANIZATION
- DETAINEE DISCUSSED CONFLICTS BETWEEN THE BADR ORGANIZATION AND THE SADR TREND

TEXT (~~S//REL to USA and MCFI~~):

1. BIOGRAPHICAL DATA (~~S//REL TO USA AND MCFI~~):

GIVEN NAME: QAYIS

FATHER'S GIVEN NAME: HADI

GRANDFATHER'S GIVEN NAME: SA'ID

CLAN NAME: NONE

TRIBAL NAME: AL-KHAZ'ALI

ALIAS: NONE

EYE COLOR: BROWN

HAIR COLOR: BLACK

HEIGHT: 5 FEET EIGHT INCHES

WEIGHT: 160 LBS

DISTINGUISHING FEATURES: IRREGULAR SHAPED PORTWINE BIRTHMARK, LEFT FRONT SHOULDER, ARMPIT AREA.

ADDRESS: AL-SALAH NEIGHBORHOOD, IN THE VICINITY OF AL-SALAH MOSQUE, KUFA, IRAQ.

PHONE NUMBER: NONE

MOBILE NUMBER: CLAIMS TO HAVE LOST HIS CELLULAR TELEPHONE SEVERAL DAYS PRIOR TO CAPTURE.

POB: BAGHDAD, IZ

DOB: 24 APRIL 1974

MARITAL STATUS: DIVORCED

NATIONALITY: IRAQI

RELIGION: SHI'A/ISLAM

EDUCATION: ELEMENTARY AND MIDDLE SCHOOL, 1995-PRESENT, THE SHI'A HAWZA RELIGIOUS TRAINING INSTITUTE IN AL-NAJAF, IZ.



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LANGUAGES (PROFICIENCY): ARABIC (NATIVE), ENGLISH (ABLE TO SPEAK HALTINGLY).

MOSQUE: NONE

IMAM: NONE

MILITARY EXPERIENCE: PAID HIS WAY OUT OF THE IRAQI ARMY IN 1997 FOR 1.5 MILLION IRAQI DINAR.

SPECIAL SKILLS: NONE

OCCUPATION: POLITICIAN

MEDICAL (U): CLEARED FOR DETENTION / INTERROGATION / LAST CHECK UP: 16 APR 07

DETAINEE NUMBER: N1228A

FATHER: HADI SA'ID AL-KHAZ'ALI

MOTHER: WOULD NOT ANSWER (WNA)

BROTHERS: WNA

SISTERS: WNA

WIFE: DIVORCED

CHILDREN: 1 BOY, AWAIS (6), 1 GIRL, MAIS (8). BOTH LIVE WITH THEIR MOTHER IN BAGHDAD, IZ.

2. CIRCUMSTANCES OF CAPTURE:

CONOP: 1.4a

DTG OF CAPTURE: 20 MAR 0300C 2007

PLACE OF CAPTURE: BASRAH, IZ.

APPREHENDING UNIT: 1.4a

REASON FOR CAPTURE: DETAINEE IS A SUSPECTED ANTI-IRAQI FORCES (AIF) GROUP LEADER, AND IS ASSOCIATED WITH WEAPONS SMUGGLING FROM IRAN, EXTRA JUDICIAL KILLING (EJK) ACTIVITY, AND INVOLVEMENT WITH THE ATTACK ON THE KARBALA PJCC.

CURRENT LOCATION: 1.4a

WEAPONS, DOCUMENTS AND EQUIPMENT (~~S//REL to USA and MCFI~~):

INTERROGATOR: 3.5c

LANGUAGE USED: ARABIC

INTERPRETER (NATIVE DIALECT): 3.5c

3. SUMMARY OF INTERROGATION / INTELLIGENCE GAINED (~~S//REL to USA and MCFI~~):

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1.4c DETAINEE DOES NOT HAVE ANY INFORMATION ABOUT THE

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FARTUSI NETWORK. THE ONLY PERSON DETAINEE KNOWS FROM THE FARTUSI TRIBE IS SHAYIKH MUHAMMAD AL-FARTUSI. DETAINEE WAS UNFAMILIAR WITH LTC FARTUSI, OR ANYONE WITH A SIMILAR NAME.

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THE BADR ORGANIZATION, FORMERLY THE BADR CORPS, SERVES AS THE MILITARY ELEMENT OR ARMY OF THE SUPREME COUNCIL FOR ISLAMIC REVOLUTION IN IRAQ (SCIRI). WHEN BADR CORPS PERSONNEL ENTERED IRAQ FROM IRAN AFTER THE FALL OF SADDAM HUSSEIN'S REGIME, THEY DID NOT TRANSFER THEIR WEAPONS TO IRAQ.

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UPON THEIR RETURN TO IRAQ, BADR CORPS PERSONNEL PRIORITIZED INFILTRATING THE IRAQI POLICE FORCE AND THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR.

LESS THAN ONE YEAR AFTER THE FALL OF SADDAM HUSSEIN'S REGIME, THE BADR CORPS CHANGED IT'S NAME AS A RESULT OF DISCUSSIONS TO ELIMINATE NON-GOVERNMENTAL MILITARY GROUPS IN IRAQ, INCLUDING BADR CORPS AND JAYSH AL-MAHDI. THE WORD "CORPS" IN BADR CORPS WAS REGARDED AS A MILITARY NAME, SO IT WAS CHANGED TO "ORGANIZATION" SO THE GROUP WOULD NOT, ON ITS FACE, FALL WITHIN THE CATEGORY OF PROSCRIBED PARAMILITARY ORGANIZATIONS.

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SOME MEMBERS OF SCIRI RESISTED CHANGING THE BADR CORPS' NAME TO THAT OF A CIVILIAN ORGANIZATION, AND THERE WAS SOME ARGUMENT OVER THE ISSUE, BUT THEY ULTIMATELY CHANGED IT.

THE BADR ORGANIZATION IS HEADQUARTERED IN AL-JADIRIYA, BAGHDAD. IT'S HEADQUARTERS ARE AN UP-TO-DATE, TWO STORY BUILDING.

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HADI AL-AMIRI, THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE BADR ORGANIZATION AND A MEMBER OF THE IRAQI PARLIAMENT HAS HIS OFFICE THERE. HADI SERVES ON THE COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL SECURITY IN THE IRAQI PARLIAMENT. AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE BADR ORGANIZATION, HE IS A MEMBER OF THE AL-SHURA COUNCIL WHICH BELONGS TO SCIRI. AS A MEMBER OF THE AL-SHURA COUNCIL, WHICH IS HEADED BY 'ABD-AL-'AZIZ HAKIM, HE RECEIVES BINDING ORDERS FROM 'ABD-AL-'AZIZ. HADI MUST SEEK THE APPROVAL OF 'ABD-AL-'AZIZ ON EVERY IMPORTANT ISSUE. FOR EXAMPLE, WHEN THE BADR ORGANIZATION AND THE SADR TREND HAVE A CONFLICT, IT IS 'ABD-AL-'AZIZ'S DECISION

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WHETHER TO CONTINUE FIGHTING OR DISCONTINUE IT. IN THAT REGARD, 'ABD-AL-'AZIZ IS IN A SIMILAR CATEGORY TO MUQTADA AL-SADR.

DETAINEE NEVER MET 'ABD-AL-'AZIZ AND HOPES THAT HE NEVER MEETS HIM. DETAINEE DOES NOT LIKE OR RESPECT 'ABD-AL-'AZIZ FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS. FIRST, THERE IS A FUNDAMENTAL DISPUTE OVER PRINCIPLES BETWEEN THE SADR TREND AND SCIRI. SCIRI IS NOT A PURE IRAQI ORGANIZATION, BECAUSE ITS SUPPORTERS HAVE STRONG SYMPATHETIC FEELINGS TOWARD IRAN. SCIRI DOES NOT HAVE THE PATRIOTIC ROLE IN IRAQ THAT IS IMPORTANT TO THE SADR TREND. SECOND, BOTH 'ABD-AL-'AZIZ AND HIS BROTHER ALWAYS OPPOSED THE SADR TREND. THEY WERE MAINLY AGAINST THE LATE MUHAMMAD AL-SADR. WHILE MUHAMMAD AL-SADR WORKED HARD IN IRAQ CHALLENGING SADDAM HUSSEIN'S REGIME, 'ABD-AL-'AZIZ, HIS BROTHER AND THE BADR CORPS WERE IN IRAN. THEY CALLED THEMSELVES MUJAHIDIN WHO OPPOSED THE BA'ATH PARTY, BUT THEY DID NOT ACCOMPLISH ANYTHING AS THEY WERE OUTSIDE OF THE COUNTRY AND UNABLE TO INFLUENCE EVENTS IN IRAQ ON A REGULAR BASIS. THEY DID NOT HAVE MUCH IN THE WAY OF SUCCESSFUL ACTIONS, ONLY THE NAME OF MUJAHIDIN, SO THEY HATED MUHAMMAD AL-SADR BECAUSE HE DEMONSTRATED HIS RESISTANCE AND BECAME MUCH MORE POPULAR THAN THEM. THEIR HATRED WAS DRIVEN BY JEALOUSLY. MUHAMMAD AL-SADR BECAME POPULAR IN THE BADR CORPS AS WELL, AND A FEW PROMINENT BADR CORPS PERSONNEL WERE EXPELLED FROM THAT GROUP DUE TO THEIR RESPECT FOR MUHAMMAD AL-SADR. THESE BADR CORPS MEMBERS WANTED TO BE WITH MUHAMMAD AL-SADR, INSTEAD OF ISOLATED IN IRAN. ONE OF THESE PROMINENT INDIVIDUALS (NFI) PERSONALLY EXECUTED AN ATTACK ON ONE OF SADDAM HUSSEIN'S PALACES IN IRAQ. THE BADR CORPS THEN LEAKED INFORMATION TO SADDAM HUSSEIN'S INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SO THAT THIS PERSON WAS CAPTURED AND PUT ON TRIAL. AFTER HIS DEATH, HIS PICTURE WAS POSTED BY THAT OF MUHAMMAD AL-SADR IN SADR CITY.

A RECENT LARGE-SCALE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE BADR ORGANIZATION AND THE SADR TREND AROSE FROM THE ARSON OF THE OLD OFFICE OF MUHAMMAD AL-SADR IN NAJAF. THE GOVERNOR'S OFFICE WANTED TO EXTEND THE PRAYER AREA SURROUNDING A SHRINE THERE DEEMED EXTREMELY IMPORTANT BY THE SADR TREND. SADR TREND MEMBERS PRAYED IN FRONT OF THE SHRINE TO PREVENT THE PRAYER AREA FROM BEING EXPANDED.

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THE GOVERNOR'S OFFICE, THEN RUN BY THE BADR ORGANIZATION, ORCHESTRATED A DEMONSTRATION BY PAYING DEMONSTRATORS 5000 IRAQI DINARS EACH TO PARTICIPATE. THE DEMONSTRATOR'S MARCH, WHICH BEGAN PEACEFULLY, WAS ROUTED TO THE SAME PLACE WHERE SADR TREND MEMBERS WERE PRAYING OUTSIDE THE SHRINE AND THE OLD OFFICE OF THE MARTYR SADR

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(OMS). WHEN THEY REACHED THE SADR TREND MEMBERS, THE DEMONSTRATORS DROPPED THEIR PEACEFUL FAÇADE, AND BEGAN THROWING STONES AT THE WORSHIPPERS. FIGHTING TOOK PLACE, AND POLICE FROM THE GOVERNOR'S OFFICE – ALL ACTING FOR THE BADR ORGANIZATION – INTERVENED. A FEW SADR TREND WORSHIPPERS WERE KILLED BY THE POLICE BULLETS AND MANY WERE WOUNDED. IN ADDITION TO THE POLICE USE OF DEADLY FORCE, SOME OF THE DEMONSTRATORS ARRANGED BY THE BADR ORGANIZATION CARRIED WEAPONS, EVEN THOUGH THIS WAS AN AREA IN WHICH ANYONE OTHER THAN THE AUTHORITIES WERE RESTRICTED FROM CARRYING WEAPONS. IN ADDITION TO ATTACKING SADR TREND MEMBERS, THE DEMONSTRATORS APPROACHED THE OLD OMS AND SET FIRE TO IT.

SADR TREND MEMBERS WHO WERE PRESENT IN NAJAF KNOW THE PEOPLE WHO CARRIED OUT THE ARSON BY NAME. TWO OF THE MOST IMPORTANT PEOPLE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ATTACK WERE 'ABD-AL-HUSAYN APPTAN (PHONETIC), A PROMINENT COMMANDER OF THE BADR ORGANIZATION WHO WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THAT ORGANIZATION IN NAJAF AND CONTINUES TO BE UP UNTIL TODAY, AND AL-KUBANJI, A MEMBER OF THE AL-ASHURA COUNCIL. 'ABD-AL-HUSAYN IS THE SON-IN-LAW OF 'ABD-AL-AZIZ HAKIM. HE WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE POLICE FOR AT THAT TIME, AND ACTUALLY GAVE THE ORDERS WITH REGARD TO THE INCIDENT. [REDACTED] 1.4c

[REDACTED] 1.4c IT WAS HIS RESPONSIBILITY TO ENFORCE THE RESTRICTION ON CARRYING WEAPONS IN TO THE PRAYER AREA. THE SADR TREND STUDIED THE INCIDENT VERY CAREFULLY AND CONCLUDED THAT NO ONE COULD HAVE PROPERLY ENTERED THE AREA WITH WEAPONS BECAUSE OF CHECKPOINTS ESTABLISHED TO SEARCH PEOPLE ENTERING THE VICINITY OF THE PRAYER AREA. THOSE CHECK POINTS WERE RUN BY MEMBERS OF THE BADR ORGANIZATION, WHO MUST HAVE ALLOWED THE LARGE NUMBER OF DEMONSTRATORS CARRYING WEAPONS TO PASS.

AL-KUBANJI ORCHESTRATED THE DEMONSTRATION. HE HAD ORGANIZED SIMILAR EVENTS IN THE PAST. FOR EXAMPLE, AFTER THE BATTLE OF NAJAF BETWEEN THE SADR TREND AND AMERICAN FORCES, AL-KUBANJI PAID DEMONSTRATORS TO SWEAR AND INSULT SADR TEND WORSHIPPERS. THIS DEMONSTRATION MARKED A CHANGE, DUE TO THE EXTRAORDINARY VIOLENCE.

THE SADR TREND DID NOT COMPLAIN TO THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT ABOUT THE CLASH BECAUSE THE PRIME MINISTER ESTABLISHED A COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE INCIDENT ALMOST IMMEDIATELY. DURING THE INVESTIGATION, A NUMBER OF PEOPLE WERE ARRESTED, SOME WHERE DETAINED, BUT A NUMBER OF RESPONSIBLE PERSONS WERE NOT

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EVEN TOUCHED AND THE INVESTIGATION WAS NEVER COMPLETED – IT STOPPED AND WAS FORGOTTEN ABOUT.

IN RETALIATION FOR THE DESTRUCTION OF THE OLD OMS, SADR TREND SUPPORTERS BURNED DOWN ALL OF THE BADR ORGANIZATION OFFICES BETWEEN BAGHDAD AND BASRAH. AFTER THE OFFICES WERE DESTROYED, AND CLASHES ASSOCIATED WITH THOSE ATTACKS PLAYED OUT, OPEN HOSTILITIES BETWEEN THE BADR ORGANIZATION AND THE SADR TREND COOLED BY THEMSELVES. THE BADR ORGANIZATION DID NOT REQUEST ANY COMPENSATION FOR ITS OFFICES DESTROYED BY THE SADR TREND BECAUSE THE BADR ORGANIZATION LIKELY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE TROUBLES WERE CAUSED BY ITS OWN MISTAKE AND THAT THE SADR TREND WOULD NOT PAY TEM.

TWO MEETINGS TOOK PLACE BETWEEN REPRESENTATIVES OF THE BADR ORGANIZATION AND THE SADR TREND IN THE MONTH OF RAMADAN AFTER THE CLASHES. THE MAIN PURPOSE OF THE MEETINGS WAS TO SHOW THE MEDIA THAT TENSIONS BETWEEN THE GROUPS HAD EASED, THEY HAD REACHED SOME SORT OF UNDERSTANDING, AND THAT THEY WERE NO LONGER FIGHTING EACH OTHER. THE BADR ORGANIZATION BROUGHT THE AL-FURAT SATELLITE CHANNEL TO VIDEOTAPE THE MEETINGS. DETAINEE CHARACTERIZED THE MEETINGS AS A COVER-UP, SINCE SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE GROUPS REMAINED. BUT AS FAR AS THE PUBLIC WAS CONCERNED, THE MEETINGS WERE INTENDED AS AN EXCHANGE OF VISITS FOR BOTH SIDES TO IMPROVE THEIR RELATIONS AND PREVENT CONFLICTS BETWEEN THE GROUPS FROM ESCALATING IN THE FUTURE.

THE MEETINGS WERE INITIATED BY DETAINEE, WHO INVITED BADR ORGANIZATION REPRESENTATIVES TO A FEAST OF RAMADAN AT THE OFFICE OF MARTYR SADR (OMS) IN KUDIMIYAH. DETAINEE CHOSE THE KUDIMIYAH SITE BECAUSE EMOTIONS IN SADR CITY WERE RUNNING TOO HIGH TO ENSURE THAT THE PUBLIC WOULD NOT GET OUT OF CONTROL. BADR ORGANIZATION REPRESENTATIVES WHO ATTENDED THE FEAST INCLUDED HADI AL-AMIRI, ABU AHMAD, QASIM (NFI). ABU AHAD (NFI) SERVES IN A HIGH POSITION AT THE BADR ORGANIZATION, BECAUSE HE IS ALWAYS NEXT TO HADI AT MEETINGS. THE SADR TREND WAS REPRESENTED BY THE FOLLOWING: DETAINEE, WHO AT THE TIME WAS UNOFFICIALLY MAS'S SECOND IN COMMAND; HAZIM AL-A'RAJI, WHO WAS THE DIRECTOR OF THE AL-KADIMIYA OMS; SALAH AL-'UBAYDI, DIRECTOR OF THE OMS POLITICAL COMMITTEE; SHAYIKH SUHAYL, THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE OMS POLITICAL COMMITTEE; AND THREE TO FOUR OTHER SADR TREND REPRESENTATIVES. THE MEETING WAS ALSO ATTENDED BY THE SECURITY ESCORTS FOR BOTH SIDES, SO THERE WERE APPROXIMATELY 50 PEOPLE AT THE FIRST MEETING. AT THE DINNER, THE PARTIES DISCUSSED THEIR DESIRE THAT SUCH AN INCIDENT SHOULD NOT HAPPEN AGAIN, AND THEY SHOULD

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WORK TOGETHER AS BROTHERS OF ISLAM. THEY STRESSED RESPECT FOR EACH OTHER, AND AGREED TO ESTABLISH A COMMITTEE TO COORDINATE BETWEEN THEIR ORGANIZATIONS WHICH WOULD PROVIDE A MEANS TO DEFUSE FUTURE CONFLICTS. A COMMITTEE WAS CREATED, WITH HAZIM AL-A'RAJI TO SERVE AS THE SADR TREND'S PRINCIPAL REPRESENTATIVE AND ABU AHAD TO SERVE AS THE PRINCIPAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE BADR ORGANIZATION. THE COMMITTEE NEVER MET.

THE SECOND MEETING, FOLLOWING THE SADR TREND'S INITIATIVE, WAS HOSTED BY THE BADR ORGANIZATION AT ITS HEADQUARTERS IN JADIRIYA. THE SADR TREND WAS REPRESENTED BY DETAINEE, 'ABBAS AL-RUBAY'I, 'ABD-AL-HADI AL-DARRAJI, HAZIM AL-A'RAJI, AND SOME MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT FROM THE SADR TREND INCLUDING MR. BAH, FALLAH SHANSHAL (PHONETIC) AND A FEW OTHERS. BECAUSE THE MEETING WAS AT THE BADR ORGANIZATION'S HEADQUARTERS, THERE WERE MANY PEOPLE THERE FROM THAT ORGANIZATION AS WELL AS SCIRI PERSONNEL, MEMBERS OF THE GOVERNOR'S COUNCIL AND MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT. THE AL-FURAT SATELLITE TELEVISION STATION WAS ALSO PRESENT. THERE WERE APPROXIMATELY 200 PEOPLE IN TOTAL. IT WAS A VERY POLITICAL MEETING, WITH VERY LITTLE OF SUBSTANCE DISCUSSED. THERE WAS A GREAT DEAL OF DISCUSSION ABOUT HOW EVENTS LIKE THIS SHOULD BE HELD IN THE FUTURE, BUT THERE WERE NO FUTURE MEETINGS.

BEFORE THE BURNING OF THE OLD OMS OFFICE, THERE WAS A MEETING BETWEEN THE BADR ORGANIZATION AND THE SADR TREND IN PREPARATION FOR NATIONAL ELECTIONS. AT THE TIME, DETAINEE WAS THE DIRECTOR OF THE OMS IN BAGHDAD. HE MET ALONE AT THE BADR ORGANIZATION'S HEADQUARTERS WITH ABU AHAD AND QASIM. QAYIS'S SECURITY ESCORT ACCOMPANIED HIM TO THE BUILDING, BUT DID NOT ATTEND THE MEETING. AT THE MEETING THEY DISCUSSED COLLABORATIVE EFFORTS IN THE ELECTION. THE BADR ORGANIZATION WOULD PROVIDE PROPAGANDA AND ADVERTISEMENTS THAT WOULD BENEFIT THE SADR TREND ON ITS SATELLITE TELEVISION CHANNEL. THE SADR TREND AGREED TO DISCUSS THE ELECTIONS IN A MANNER THAT WOULD BENEFIT THE BADR ORGANIZATION DURING FRIDAY PRAYERS. THE BADR ORGANIZATION AND SADR TREND HAVE NOT COLLABORATED IN THIS WAY SINCE THAT PREVIOUS ELECTION. THEY ALSO DISCUSSED STRATEGY FOR WINNING A LARGER NUMBER OF SEATS IN PARLIAMENT, AND THE BADR ORGANIZATION'S DESIRE FOR A LARGER NUMBER OF SEATS FOR ITSELF.

SINCE THE LAST MEETING HE ATTENDED AT THE BADR ORGANIZATION HEADQUARTERS, DETAINEE HAS ONLY SPOKEN TO THEIR REPRESENTATIVES A FEW TIMES. THERE WERE DISCUSSIONS TO TRY TO ARRANGE A COORDINATION MEETING OF SOME SORT, IN ORDER TO NOTIFY EACH OTHER

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OF THEIR ACTIVITIES AND FIND SOME COMMON GROUND. NO SUCH MEETINGS WERE EVER HELD.

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4. COMMENTS (~~S//REL to USA and MCFI~~):

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SENIOR INTERROGATOR COMMENTS: NONE

5. POINTS OF CONTACT (U):

SIPR EMAIL

3.5c

NOTE: ALL ARABIC SPELLINGS ARE IAW DI POLICY NO. 033, "SPELLING NAMES OF FOREIGN PERSONS IN DI PRODUCTS," DATED 02 DEC 03 AND DDCICM DIRECTIVE, "INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STANDARD FOR THE TRANSLITERATION OF ARABIC NAMES IN FINAL WRITTEN REPORTS AND PRODUCTS," DATED 04 JUN 03, IN COMPLIANCE WITH SECTION 352 OF THE INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT OF 2003.

PREP (U): 3.5c

AQC (U): BAGHDAD, IRAQ (2007/04/16)

ENCL (U): NONE

DISSEM (U): FIELD – NONE

WARNING (U): REPORT CLASSIFIED ~~SECRET // REL to USA and MCFI~~

DRV FROM (U): MNF-IMNC-I SGC VERSION 3, 27 MAY 04.

DECL ON: X1