

~~SECRET // REL to USA and MCFI~~

TACTICAL INTERROGATION REPORT:

REPORT NUMBER (U): 1.4a
REPORT DATE (DOI) (U): 15 APR 07
REPORTING UNIT (U): 1.4a
COUNTRY (U): IRAQ (IZ), IRAN (IR)

1.4c

SUMMARY (~~S//REL to USA and MCFI~~):

- THE FORTY- EIGHTH INTERROGATION OF N1228A
- GAVE INFORMATION ON LEBANESE HEZBOLLAH POLITICAL COMMITTEE HEAD SHAYIKH MUHAMMAD AL-KAWTHARANI AND HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH MUSTAFA AL-YAQUBI.
- IRAN IS USING MUQTADA AL-SADR FOR MILITARY MEANS AND GAVE EXAMPLES OF IRANIAN INFLUENCING JAYSH AL-MAHDI STRUCTURE
- CRITIQUED MUQTADA AL-SADR AND GAVE POLITICAL AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON AL-SADR'S POSITION AND ABILITIES.
- HANDED IN A MANIFESTO OF SORTS HE HAS BEEN WORKING ON CONCERNING THE SITUATION IN IRAQ AND HIS IDEAS FOR SOLUTIONS. ORIGINAL COPY ENCLOSED.

TEXT (~~S//REL to USA and MCFI~~):

1. BIOGRAPHICAL DATA (~~S//REL TO USA AND MCFI~~):

GIVEN NAME: QAYIS
FATHER'S GIVEN NAME: HADI
GRANDFATHER'S GIVEN NAME: SA'ID
CLAN NAME: NONE
TRIBAL NAME: AL-KHAZ'ALI
ALIAS: NONE
EYE COLOR: BROWN
HAIR COLOR: BLACK
HEIGHT: 5 FEET EIGHT INCHES
WEIGHT: 160 LBS
DISTINGUISHING FEATURES: IRREGULAR SHAPED PORTWINE BIRTHMARK, LEFT FRONT SHOULDER, ARMPIT AREA.
ADDRESS: AL-SALAH NEIGHBORHOOD, IN THE VICINITY OF AL-SALAH MOSQUE, KUFA, IRAQ.
PHONE NUMBER: NONE



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MOBILE NUMBER: CLAIMS TO HAVE LOST HIS CELLULAR TELEPHONE SEVERAL DAYS PRIOR TO CAPTURE.

POB: BAGHDAD, IZ

DOB: 24 APRIL 1974

MARITAL STATUS: DIVORCED

NATIONALITY: IRAQI

RELIGION: SHI'A/ISLAM

EDUCATION: ELEMENTARY AND MIDDLE SCHOOL, 1995-PRESENT, THE SHI'A HAWZA RELIGIOUS TRAINING INSTITUTE IN AL-NAJAF, IZ.

LANGUAGES (PROFICIENCY): ARABIC (NATIVE), ENGLISH (ABLE TO SPEAK HALTINGLY).

MOSQUE: NONE

IMAM: NONE

MILITARY EXPERIENCE: PAID HIS WAY OUT OF THE IRAQI ARMY IN 1997 FOR 1.5 MILLION IRAQI DINAR.

SPECIAL SKILLS: NONE

OCCUPATION: POLITICIAN

MEDICAL (U): CLEARED FOR DETENTION / INTERROGATION / LAST CHECK UP: 15 APR 07

DETAINEE NUMBER: N1228A

FATHER: HADI SA'ID AL-KHAZ'ALI

MOTHER: WOULD NOT ANSWER (WNA)

BROTHERS: WNA

SISTERS: WNA

WIFE: DIVORCED

CHILDREN: 1 BOY, AWAIS (6), 1 GIRL, MAIS (8). BOTH LIVE WITH THEIR MOTHER IN BAGHDAD, IZ.

2. CIRCUMSTANCES OF CAPTURE:

CONOP: 1.4a

DTG OF CAPTURE: 20 MAR 0300C 2007

PLACE OF CAPTURE: BASRAH, IZ.

APPREHENDING UNIT: 1.4a

REASON FOR CAPTURE: DETAINEE IS A SUSPECTED ANTI-IRAQI FORCES (AIF) GROUP LEADER, AND IS ASSOCIATED WITH WEAPONS SMUGGLING FROM IRAN, EXTRA JUDICIAL KILLING (EJK) ACTIVITY, AND INVOLVEMENT WITH THE ATTACK ON THE KARBALA PJCC.

CURRENT LOCATION: 1.4a

WEAPONS, DOCUMENTS AND EQUIPMENT (~~S//REL to USA and MCFI~~):

INTERROGATOR: 3.5c

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LANGUAGE USED: ARABIC

INTERPRETER (NATIVE DIALECT):

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3. SUMMARY OF INTERROGATION / INTELLIGENCE GAINED (~~S//REL to USA and MCFI~~):

MEMBERS OF THE SADR MOVEMENT AND SHI'A IN GENERAL HAVE A DEEP RESPECT FOR LEBANESE HEZBOLLAH. THIS IS BECAUSE THEY ARE SHI'A, THEY ARE AGAINST THE OCCUPATION OF ANY COUNTRY, THEY ARE ORGANIZED, AND THEY ARE AGAINST ISRAEL. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN JAYSH AL MAHDI (JAM) AND HEZBOLLAH STARTED RIGHT AFTER THE FALL OF THE SADAM REGIME.

DETAINEE DOES NOT THINK THERE IS A DIRECT MILITARY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN JAM AND THE HEZBOLLAH BUT THERE IS A DIRECT POLITICAL CONNECTION. THE ONLY MILITARY CONNECTION IS THAT HEZBOLLAH SENDS TRAINERS TO IRAN TO TRAIN IRAQI FIGHTERS. POLITICALLY, HEZBOLLAH POLITICAL COMMITTEE HEAD SHAYKH MUHAMMAD AL-KAWTHARANI HAS DIRECT TALKS WITH MUSTAFA AL-YAQUBI. THIS IS A RELATIONSHIP BORN FROM CONNECTIONS KAWTHARANI MADE WHEN HE WAS A STUDENT AT THE NAJAF HAWZA. USUALLY THEY JUST SHARE POLITICAL IDEAS AND OPINIONS AND USUALLY TALK AFTER ANY MAJOR EVENT SUCH AS A BATTLE OR A CHANGE IN POLICY THAT MAY HAVE SOME EFFECT ON THE MOVEMENT. THE IDEA IS THAT KAWTHARANI IS THE VOICE AND EARS OF SECRETARY GENERAL HASAN NASRALLAH AND MUSTAFA AL-YAQUBI IS THE VOICE AND EARS OF MAS. IRAQ IS THE REGION KAWTHARANI IS ASSIGNED TO.

HEZBOLLAH IS NOT ONLY SUPPORTIVE OF THE SHI'A BUT SUNNI GROUPS AS WELL. THEIR GOALS ARE GEARED TOWARDS ISLAM AND NOT JUST THE SHI'A. THEY SUPPORT THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD MOVEMENT, THE IRAQ ISLAMIC PARTY, AND THE MUSLIM ULEMA COUNCIL. AS FAR AS THE SADR MOVEMENT GOES, KAWTHARANI TALKS ONLY WITH YAQUBI AND HAS NO CONTRACT WITH ANYONE ELSE. THE MEMBERS, WHO HAVE BEEN PUSHED OUT OF JAM LIKE DETAINEE, TABTABAN'I, ET AL, HAVE NO CONTACT WITH HIM OR ANY OTHER HEZBOLLAH MEMBERS.

THE POLITICAL GAINS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN HEZBOLLAH AND THE SADR MOVEMENT IS MOSTLY IN THE MORAL SUPPORT EACH OF THEM GAINS FROM THE RELATIONSHIP. THERE WAS A LARGE DEMONSTRATION IN LEBANON TO SUPPORT JAM AND THERE WAS A LARGE DEMONSTRATION IN SADR CITY TO SUPPORT HEZBOLLAH FIGHTERS WHEN THEY WENT TO WAR AGAINST ISRAEL THIS PAST SUMMER.

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MAS WAS IN LEBANON TO TALK TO HEZBOLLAH LEADERS APPROXIMATELY ONE YEAR AGO. WHILE ON HAJJ, MAS WAS INVITED TO MANY COUNTRIES SO HE WENT ON A TOUR WHEN HAJJ WAS FINISHED. HE WENT TO SYRIA, IRAN KUWAIT, LEBANON, AND JORDAN BUT HIS TRIP WAS CUT SHORT BY THE FIGHTING IN SAMMARAH. MAS WENT TO THESE COUNTRIES TO SHOW HIS SUPPORT AS WELL AS TO SEEK SUPPORT FROM THEM. IT WAS A HIGHLY PUBLICIZED TRIP DESIGNED TO SHOW THE UNITY OF THE ARABIC COUNTRIES. HE DID NOT ASK FOR WEAPONS OR FINANCIAL SUPPORT AS MOST OF THESE COUNTRIES WERE SUNNI COUNTRIES AND WOULD NOT BE INCLINED TO LEND SUCH SUPPORT. DETAINEE SAID THAT MAS SHOWED HOW MUCH HIS PERSONALITY WAFFLES AS HE WOULD SAY SOMETHING DIFFERENT IN EVERY COUNTRY AND BY THE TIME HE WAS FINISHED WITH THE TOUR, HE HAD NO IDEA WHAT HE HAD SAID TO ANY OF THEM. HE WOULD USUALLY SPEAK OUT AGAINST THE UNITED STATES EXCEPT TO JORDAN, SAUDI ARABIA AND KUWAIT SINCE THESE COUNTRIES SUPPORT THE U.S. HE GAINED A REPUTATION FOR TELLING EACH COUNTRY WHATEVER IT WAS THEY WANTED TO HEAR.

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DETAINEE QUOTED A U.S. ANALYST FROM NEW YORK WHO SAID ABOUT MAS "HIS OPINION IS VERY MALLEABLE WHICH CAN BE GOOD AND BAD. IT MEANS IF HE IS AGAINST YOU, YOU CAN EASILY SWAY HIM TO YOUR SIDE BUT IF HE IS ON YOUR SIDE, HE CAN EASILY BE PERSUADED TO WORK AGAINST YOU." THIS IS ONE OF THE REASONS THE DETAINEE CITED FOR THE FACT THAT PEOPLE ARE LEAVING THE SADR MOVEMENT.

THE SECURITY SITUATION IS THE NUMBER ONE REASON THAT PEOPLE JOIN JAM. IT IS WHILE THEY ARE IN JAM THAT THEY EITHER DEVELOP A LOVE OF MAS OR DECIDE THAT THEY DON'T WANT TO FOLLOW HIM. DETAINEE BELIEVES THE MAHDI ARMY WILL FALL APART IF THERE IS PEACE. HE SAID JAM IS READY FOR A LEADER WHO IS WISE AND NOT STRONG.

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DETAINEE SAID THAT MAS WANTS TO BE THE LEADER OF IRAQ BUT HE DOES NOT KNOW HOW TO ACHIEVE THAT GOAL. MAS ALSO WANTS TO BE THE LEADER OF THE ARAB WORLD BUT DOES NOT KNOW HOW TO ACHIEVE THAT EITHER. HE IS NOT A SMART PERSON AND DOES NOT KNOW HOW TO MAKE USE OF THE SITUATION FACING HIM TO HIS BENEFIT. DESPITE THIS, THERE ARE ASPECTS OF THE SITUATION IN IRAQ THAT HAVE SERVED HIM WELL. MAINLY THE U.S. WAR AGAINST HIM (IN NAJAF IN 2004) AS THIS IS THE BASIC CAUSE OF MAS'S STRENGTH. MAS DOES NOT HAVE THE ABILITY FOR POLITICAL THOUGHT OR TO GIVE SPEECHES LIKE IBRAHIM AL-JA'FARI. SOCIALLY MAS IS A FAILURE BECAUSE HE IS NERVOUS, ANGRY QUICKLY, AND DOES NOT SPEAK WELL. HE BECAME PROMINENT FOR MILITARY REASONS BECAUSE OF THE BATTLE OF NAJAF AND IS THE

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ONLY SHI'A IRAQI FIGURE TO HAVE BEEN IN DIRECT MILITARY CONFRONTATION WITH US FORCES. IF THE SITUATION IN IRAQ IMPROVES THEN HIS INFLUENCE WILL DIMINISH.

DETAINEE ADVISED THAT IF THE U.S. KEPT TALKING ABOUT MAS AND HOW TERRIBLE HE IS THEN THIS WOULD ALLOW HIM TO KEEP HIS POSITION AS THE KEY SHI'A RESISTANCE FIGURE. BAD WORDS FROM AN ENEMY BUILDS A REPUTATION IN THE ARAB WORLD. BUT IF WE IGNORE MAS AND SAY THAT WE HAD NO PROBLEM WITH HIM, AND THAT HE COULD RETURN TO IRAQ ANYTIME AND SPEAK HIS MIND AS HE WISHED, THEN THIS WOULD BE ENOUGH TO SOLVE THE MAS PROBLEM AS HIS OWN IGNORANCE WOULD LEAD TO HIS DOWNFALL. WHAT WOULD BE LEFT AFTER THIS WOULD BE THE SADRIST BLOC. DETAINEE ADVISED THAT THE SADRISTS BLOC WAS A STRONG BLOC BUT THAT THE DETENTIONS AND RAIDS AGAINST SADRISTS HAD CONVINCED MANY TO GO TO IRAN, AND IF THESE DETENTIONS CONTINUED OTHERS WOULD GO. WHEN THESE PEOPLE GO TO IRAN, THEY ARE SUBJECT TO IRANIAN INFLUENCE AND THIS WILL INCREASE THE RESISTANCE TO U.S. INTENTIONS IN IRAQ. WE NEED TO OFFER SECURITY GUARANTEES TO ENCOURAGE SOME OF THESE PEOPLE, SUCH AS MUSTAFA AL-YA'QUBI TO RETURN.

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DETAINEE WAS CLEAR THE IRANIANS WOULD SEEK TO MAKE USE OF MAS IN EVERY WAY THEY COULD. ON THE MILITARY SIDE, IRAN WANTS TO CREATE STRONG-POINTS OF POWER FOR ITSELF IN IRAQ OPPOSED TO THE U.S. IRAN WOULD BE CONVINCING MAS THAT HE WOULD BE THE NEXT HASSAN NASRALLAH, THAT HE WAS A GREAT LEADER, AND THAT HE WAS THE MAIN RESISTANCE AGAINST THE U.S. THIS WOULD BE TO CONVINCING MAS THAT HIS POPULARITY AND POSITION COMES FROM HIS OPPOSITION TO THE U.S. THE IRANIAN OBJECTIVE IS TO TURN ALL OF MAINSTREAM JAM INTO SPECIAL GROUPS FIGHTING THE COALITION FORCES (CF)

DETAINEE ADVISED THAT THIS IRANIAN PLAN APPEARED TO ALREADY BE IN MOTION. IF WE SAW NEW GROUPS CONDUCTING VIOLENT ATTACKS SUCH AS THE SAYID MU'AMMAL GROUPS, SAYID MUQTADA GROUPS AND SAYID MUHAMMAD BAKR GROUPS, THEN THIS MEANT THAT SOME OF THESE COMPANIES WERE RECEIVING SPECIAL FUNDS FROM IRAN. DETAINEE ALSO SAW PROOF OF THIS IRANIAN ACTIVITY IN A CHANGE OF TONE IN MUQTADA STATEMENTS. UNTIL GOING TO IRAN HE HAD ALWAYS SPOKEN OF PEACE AND POLITICS. NOW HE REFERRED TO PEACE FOR THE INSURGENTS (SALAAM ALA AL-MUQAWIMIN).

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ON THE POLITICAL SIDE IRAN WOULD ENCOURAGE MAS TO USE THE 30 SADRIST MPs FOR IT'S BENEFIT. BUT THE POLITICAL AIMS WERE SECONDARY FOR IRAN, THE ABOVE MILITARY OBJECTIVE WAS THE PRIMARY GOAL.

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DETAINEE SAID THAT MAS WAS A STUBBORN PERSON AND DIFFICULT TO COMMUNICATE WITH. DETAINEE WAS NOT CERTAIN WHAT THE CURRENT CHANNELS FOR COMMUNICATION WERE BETWEEN MAS IN IRAN AND WITH GOI BUT DETAINEE ASSUMED THEY MUST BE THROUGH MUSTAFA AL-YA'QUBI. DETAINEE SAID THAT SOMEONE HAD WHISPERED IN HIS EAR THAT THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT HAD SUGGESTED TO MAS THAT HE WITHDRAW THE SADRIST MINISTERS FROM THE GOVERNMENT SO THAT THE SADRISTS COULD STAND IN OPPOSITION FROM INSIDE THE PARLIAMENT (COR).

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DETAINEE SAID THAT IRAQI PM NURI AL-MALI KI BELIEVED THAT DETAINEE WAS A PERSON WITH INFLUENCE AND ABILITIES, AND ABLE TO CONVINC E THE SADRISTS TO TAKE A PARTICULAR COURSE OF ACTION. NURI AL-MALI KI WANTED A BALANCE TO MAS AND WANTED TO BALANCE MAS'S STUBBORNNESS WITH REASON AND DIALOGUE (THE LATTER TWO QUALITIES REFERRING TO WHAT THE DETAINEE WAS ABLE TO BRING TO THE TABLE). DETAINEE SAID THAT THIS WAS ONE OF THE REASONS HE HAD BEEN CONVINCED THAT NURI AL-MALI KI WOULD NOT HAVE APPROVED DETAINEE'S DETENTION. DETAINEE'S DETENTION MEANT THAT THE FIELD WAS NOW FREE FOR MAS TO ACT AND DO AS HE PLEASED WITHOUT FEAR OF LOSING HIS FOLLOWERS TO A MORE REASONABLE LEADER.

DETAINEE EXPLAINED THAT HE WOULD NOT HAVE BEN ABLE TO BALANCE MAS ALONE. BUT THERE WOULD HAVE BEEN HELP FROM OTHERS SUCH AS THE STUDENTS IN THE HAWZA. ONE PERSON STANDING AGAINST MAS WOULD NOT WORK, BUT AS A GROUP SUCCESS WAS POSSIBLE. DETAINEE WOULD FOR EXAMPLE HAVE HARNESS ED MUHAMMAD TABTABAN'I'S POPULARITY IN THE HAWZA, AND JASIM AL-SA'IDI'S EDUCATION. SOME OF THE DETAINEE'S FRIENDS TOLD DETAINEE THAT HE HAD A PHD IN UNDERSTANDING MAS. DETAINEE SAID THAT THERE WERE MANY INDIVIDUALS WHO DISAGREED WITH MAS BUT THEY HAD NO COURAGE TO

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STAND UP TO MAS. DETAINEE WAS THE ONLY ONE WILLING TO STAND UP TO HIM.

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1.4c DETAINEE SAID THAT THE DIALOGUE HAD BEGUN WHEN HE HAD PUT FORWARD AN IDEA FOR HOW TO SOLVE THE SECTARIAN VIOLENCE IN IRAQ. DETAINEE'S PROPOSAL WAS THAT THE SUNNIS SHOULD BE USED TO PUT PRESSURE ON SUNNI INSURGENT GROUPS TO HALT THE VIOLENCE, AND SHI'A SHOULD PUT PRESSURE ON SHI'A GROUPS TO STOP THE VIOLENCE. 1.4c

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DETAINEE HAD NOT BEEN WILING TO NAME WHO HAD ACTED AS INTERMEDIARY TO BEGIN THE DIALOGUE WITH GOI, BUT HE SAID THAT SAMI AL-ASKIRI HAD ASKED DETAINEE HOW DETAINEE COULD ACHIEVE THIS. DETAINEE HAD SAID THAT WITH HIS PERSONALITY HE COULD PUT PRESSURE ON GROUPS WHICH RESPECTED AND FEARED HIM. DETAINEE SAID THAT HE COULD STOP ALL MILITARY ACTION (VIOLENCE, SHELLING, ATTACKS, MORTARS, EVEN ASSASSINATIONS) FOR ONE MONTH. DETAINEE WAS ABLE TO DELIVER THIS ONE MONTH HIATUS IN VIOLENT ACTIVITY IN BAGHDAD. HE SAID THAT SOLVING THE PROBLEMS IN BAGHDAD WAS THE MOST IMPORTANT ISSUE. IF THE PROBLEMS IN BAGHDAD COULD BE SOLVED THE REST OF THE COUNTRY WOULD FOLLOW. DETAINEE SAID HE DID NOT REMEMBER WHICH MONTH HE HAD DELIVERED THIS CEASEFIRE. HE ADVISED THAT SAMI AL-ASKIRI AND NURI AL-MALIKI KNEW WHICH MONTH IT WAS.

DETAINEE HAD DELIVERED ON HIS PROMISE AND DETAINEE SAID THAT NURI AL-MALIKI HAD BEEN SURPRISED THAT THE SHELLING AND KILLING ON THE PART OF THE SHI'A HAD STOPPED FOR A MONTH. SAMI AL-ASKIRI HAD PASSED DETAINEE A MESSAGE OF THANKS FROM NURI AL-MALIKI, THANKING DETAINEE FOR HIS EFFORTS. 1.4c

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1.4c DETAINEE SAID THAT AS HE IS A RELIGIOUS MAN AND HE WOULD NOT ACCEPT A POLITICAL POSITION. BUT IT WAS CLEAR TO THE DETAINEE THAT THE PRIME MINISTER HAD STARTED TO BELIEVE THE DETAINEE'S WORDS AND TO LOOK AT DETAINEE WITH RESPECT. DETAINEE FELT THAT NURI AL-MALIKI WANTED DETAINEE TO HAVE MORE POWER AND PRIVILEGES INSIDE THE SADRISTS. DETAINEE SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN OFFERED IMMUNITY FOR HIMSELF BUT CONSIDERING HIS CURRENT DISPOSITION, IT APPEARED THE IMMUNITY WAS NOT REALLY THERE.

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DETAINEE AGREED THAT THE GOI WAS PROBABLY CONCERNED THAT DIALOGUE WITH HIM WOULD HARM THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH MAS.

DETAINEE WAS ASKED WHY HE DIDN'T GO TO IRAN WITH ALL OF THE OTHER JAM LEADERSHIP FOR SAFETY. HE GAVE THE ANSWER "AS A FOLLOWER OF SADR, I DON'T LEAVE MY COUNTRY UNLESS MY THROAT HAS ALREADY BEEN SLIT."

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4. COMMENTS (~~S//REL to USA and MCFI~~):

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SENIOR INTERROGATOR COMMENTS: NONE

5. POINTS OF CONTACT (U):

SIPR EMAIL

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NOTE: ALL ARABIC SPELLINGS ARE IAW DI POLICY NO. 033, "SPELLING NAMES OF FOREIGN PERSONS IN DI PRODUCTS," DATED 02 DEC 03 AND DDCICM DIRECTIVE, "INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STANDARD FOR THE TRANSLITERATION OF ARABIC NAMES IN FINAL WRITTEN REPORTS AND PRODUCTS," DATED 04 JUN 03, IN COMPLIANCE WITH SECTION 352 OF THE INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT OF 2003.

PREP (U): 3.5c

AQC (U): BAGHDAD, IRAQ (2007/04/15)

ENCL (U): NONE

DISSEM (U): FIELD – NONE

WARNING (U): REPORT CLASSIFIED ~~SECRET // REL to USA and MCFI~~

DRV FROM (U): MNF-IMNC-I SGC VERSION 3, 27 MAY 04.

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DECL ON: X1

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