

~~SECRET // REL to USA and MCFI~~

1.4a

**TACTICAL INTERROGATION REPORT:**

**REPORT NUMBER (U):** 1.4a

**REPORT DATE (DOI) (U):** 13 APR 07

**REPORTING UNIT (U):** 1.4a

**COUNTRY (U):** IRAQ (IZ), IRAN (IR)

1.4c

**SUMMARY (~~S//REL to USA and MCFI~~):**

- THE FORTY-SECOND INTERROGATION OF N1228A
- IDENTIFIED PHOTO OF JALIL AL-KABI AND GAVE VERY BRIEF INFORMATION ON HIM.
- GAVE INFORMATION ON THE INNER WORKINGS OF JAM LEADERSHIP DURING THE BATTLE OF NAJAF
- GAVE SOME EXPLANATION ON THE SITUATION IN BASRAH AND WHY IRAN IS SO INTERESTED IN THE AREA.
- LIMITED INFORMATION ON JALIL AL-NURI.

**TEXT (~~S//REL to USA and MCFI~~):**

**1. BIOGRAPHICAL DATA (~~S//REL TO USA AND MCFI~~):**

**GIVEN NAME:** QAYIS

**FATHER'S GIVEN NAME:** HADI

**GRANDFATHER'S GIVEN NAME:** SA'ID

**CLAN NAME:** NONE

**TRIBAL NAME:** AL-KHAZ'ALI

**ALIAS:** NONE

**EYE COLOR:** BROWN

**HAIR COLOR:** BLACK

**HEIGHT:** 5 FEET EIGHT INCHES

**WEIGHT:** 160 LBS

**DISTINGUISHING FEATURES:** IRREGULAR SHAPED PORTWINE BIRTHMARK, LEFT FRONT SHOULDER, ARMPIT AREA.

**ADDRESS:** AL-SALAH NEIGHBORHOOD, IN THE VICINITY OF AL-SALAH MOSQUE, KUFA, IRAQ.

**PHONE NUMBER:** NONE

**MOBILE NUMBER:** CLAIMS TO HAVE LOST HIS CELLULAR TELEPHONE SEVERAL DAYS PRIOR TO CAPTURE.

**POB:** BAGHDAD, IZ

**DOB:** 24 APRIL 1974

**MARITAL STATUS:** DIVORCED



~~SECRET // REL to USA and MCFI~~

1.4a

**NATIONALITY:** IRAQI

**RELIGION:** SHI'A/ISLAM

**EDUCATION:** ELEMENTARY AND MIDDLE SCHOOL, 1995-PRESENT, THE SHI'A HAWZA RELIGIOUS TRAINING INSTITUTE IN AL-NAJAF, IZ.

**LANGUAGES (PROFICIENCY):** ARABIC (NATIVE), ENGLISH (ABLE TO SPEAK HALTINGLY).

**MOSQUE:** NONE

**IMAM:** NONE

**MILITARY EXPERIENCE:** PAID HIS WAY OUT OF THE IRAQI ARMY IN 1997 FOR 1.5 MILLION IRAQI DINAR.

**SPECIAL SKILLS:** NONE

**OCCUPATION:** POLITICIAN

**MEDICAL (U):** CLEARED FOR DETENTION / INTERROGATION / LAST CHECK UP: 13 APR 07

**DETAINEE NUMBER:** N1228A

**FATHER:** HADI SA'ID AL-KHAZ'ALI

**MOTHER:** WOULD NOT ANSWER (WNA)

**BROTHERS:** WNA

**SISTERS:** WNA

**WIFE:** DIVORCED

**CHILDREN:** 1 BOY, AWAIS (6), 1 GIRL, MAIS (8). BOTH LIVE WITH THEIR MOTHER IN BAGHDAD, IZ.

## 2. CIRCUMSTANCES OF CAPTURE:

**CONOP:** 1.4c

**DTG OF CAPTURE:** 20 MAR 0300C 2007

**PLACE OF CAPTURE:** BASRAH, IZ.

**APPREHENDING UNIT:** 1.4a

**REASON FOR CAPTURE:** DETAINEE IS A SUSPECTED ANTI-IRAQI FORCES (AIF) GROUP LEADER, AND IS ASSOCIATED WITH WEAPONS SMUGGLING FROM IRAN, EXTRA JUDICIAL KILLING (EJK) ACTIVITY, AND INVOLVEMENT WITH THE ATTACK ON THE KARBALA PJCC.

**CURRENT LOCATION:** 1.4a

## WEAPONS, DOCUMENTS AND EQUIPMENT (S//REL to USA and MCFI):

**INTERROGATOR:** 3.5c

**LANGUAGE USED:** ARABIC

**INTERPRETER (NATIVE DIALECT):** 3.5c

## 3. SUMMARY OF INTERROGATION / INTELLIGENCE GAINED (S//REL to USA and MCFI):

1.4a

DETAINEE IDENTIFIED THE PICTURE BELOW AS JALIL AL-KABI AKA ABU ADNAN. HE IS A JAM COMMANDER IN SADR CITY AND IS NOT AN EVIL PERSON BUT IS HIGHLY UNORGANIZED. JALIL AL-KABI DOES THINGS HAPHAZARDLY.



DETAINEE TALKED ABOUT ONE OF THE SUBTLE NUANCES IN THE LANGUAGE THAT WILL BE IMPORTANT WHEN WE EXPLAIN TO PEOPLE ABOUT OUR PLAN TO LEAVE IRAQ. RATHER THAN SAYING WE WILL STAY UNTIL WE FEEL THE PLACE IS SECURE, WE SHOULD SAY THAT WE WILL STAY UNTIL THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT FEELS THE PLACE IS SECURE AND ASKS US TO LEAVE. THIS WILL PUT THE BURDEN OF OUR EXISTENCE ON THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT AND ALLEVIATE THE PERCEPTION THAT WE ARE HERE BY CHOICE RATHER THAN INVITATION.

MURTADA AL HAJJAJ WAS DETAINED TWO WEEKS BEFORE DETAINEE WAS. HE IS A STUDENT IN THE HAWZA IN BASRAH AND WORKS IN THE SOCIAL COMMITTEE IN THE BASRAH OFFICE. DETAINEE DOES NOT KNOW WHY AL-HAJJAJ HAS HAJI YUSIF'S NUMBER IN HIS PHONE AND HAS NO IDEA IF AL-HAJJAJ KNOWS YUSIF.

DETAINEE WAS ASKED ABOUT TRAINING FACILITIES IN IRAN AND HE GAVE THE SAME INFORMATION THAT HE HAS GIVEN IN PAST INTERROGATIONS ON THE TRAINING LOCATIONS WHICH IS NOT VERY MUCH. DETAINEE SAID THAT HE HAS NEVER BEEN TO THE CAMPS HIMSELF.

DURING THE FIGHTING IN NAJAF, DETAINEE WAS A SPOKESMAN FOR AL-SADR AND WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR ISSUING PRESS RELEASES AND ATTENDING DIPLOMATIC MEETINGS BETWEEN THE FIGHTING GROUPS. THE FIGHTING ITSELF WAS NOTHING BUT CHAOS AND THERE WERE NO MILITARY TACTICS USED AT ALL. ABBAS AL-KUFI WAS IN CHARGE OF THE MILITARY AND HE



DIDN'T HAVE ANY MILITARY KNOWLEDGE THEN AND HE DOESN'T HAVE ANY MILITARY KNOWLEDGE NOW. DETAINEE SAID THAT MUQTADA AL-SADR (MAS) DID NOT FOLD UNDER THE PRESSURE OF THE BATTLE LIKE SOME PEOPLE HAVE ASSESSED BUT DETAINEE DID ADMIT THAT MAS MADE MANY MISTAKES. THE BATTLE WAS A COMPLETE LOSS FOR THE SADR MOVEMENT AS THEY DID NOT HAVE THE PLAN, THE POWER, OR THE WEAPONS TO SUSTAIN A FIGHT. THE ONLY THING THAT CAME OUT OF THE BATTLE WAS THAT DETAINEE LEARNED HOW TO USE THE POLITICAL SYSTEM TO SOLVE SOME PROBLEMS.

ABBAS AL-KUFI WAS NOT A TRAINED MILITARY MAN AS THE RELATIONSHIP WITH IRAN WAS IN ITS INFANCY AT THE TIME OF THE BATTLE. AT THAT TIME, NOBODY IN JAM HAD RECEIVED TRAINING IN IRAN. DETAINEE WAS ASKED WHY MAS WOULD HAVE SOMEBODY INCOMPETENT IN CHARGE OF THE MILITARY. HE SAID THAT MAS IS FAMOUS FOR GETTING RID OF HIS LEADERS AS SOON AS THEY START TO SHOW A SHRED OF COMPETENCE. THIS IS BECAUSE MAS IS AFRAID IF SOMEBODY GAINS A FOLLOWING OR SHOWS COMPETENCE, THEY WILL BECOME A THREAT TO HIS POWER OR START A NEW GROUP AND LURE HIS MEMBERS AWAY FROM THE MOVEMENT. TO AVOID THIS, MAS MERELY PUSHES SUPERIOR THINKERS OUT OF THE MOVEMENT. THIS MAINTAINS A CERTAIN LEVEL OF INCOMPETENCE IN THE LEADERSHIP OF THE SADR MOVEMENT.

DETAINEE SAID THE INTELLECTUALS WHO HAVE BEEN PUSHED OUT OF THE MOVEMENT, LIKE HIMSELF, SHEIKH JASIM SADI, SHEIKH MUAYAD, SHEIKH ABBAS RUBAYI AND MUHAMMAD TABATABAN'I, HAVE REMAINED IN CONTACT AFTER THEY WERE EXPELLED. HE CLAIMS THEY NEVER GOT TOGETHER OR PURSUED THE IDEA OF STARTING THEIR OWN GROUPS. THIS WAS BECAUSE ALTHOUGH THEY MAY NOT HAVE HAD A TREMENDOUS AMOUNT OF RESPECT FOR MAS, THEY STILL BELIEVED VERY MUCH IN THE SADR MOVEMENT AND DID NOT WANT TO UNDERMINE IT.

DETAINEE EXPLAINED THAT IRAN HAS A VERY VESTED INTEREST IN BASRAH AND THAT IS THE REASON THEY LEND SO MUCH SUPPORT TO THE DIFFERENT INSURGENT GROUPS THERE. THE REASONS ARE THE SAME REASONS THAT MADE BASRAH SUCH A HOT SPOT DURING THE IRAN/IRAQ WAR. BASRAH IS THE ONLY PROVINCE THAT BORDERS BOTH IRAN AND KUWAIT, IT IS THE ONLY PORT FOR IRAQ, IT HAS THE SECOND MOST IMPORTANT AIRPORT, AND IS VERY OIL RICH. THESE QUALITIES MAKE IT A STRATEGICALLY IMPORTANT PLACE FOR IRAN AS WELL AS U.S. FORCES AND IT MAKES IT EASY TO CREATE THE CHAOS THAT IS BEING CREATED THERE. IRANIAN INFLUENCE IS VERY DEEPLY EMBEDDED IN BASRAH.

DETAINEE AGREED THAT IRAN IS USING BOTH THE U.S. AND THE IRAQIS TO KEEP EACH OTHER BUSY THROUGH FIGHTING WHILE IRAN PURSUES THEIR

1.4a

OWN AGENDA AND MOST IMPORTANTLY, NUCLEAR AMBITIONS. THEY ARE GIVING THE IRAQIS ENOUGH WEAPONS AND SUPPORT TO SUSTAIN THE FIGHTING IN IRAQ BUT NOT ENOUGH TO WIN. IRAN WILL NOT COMMIT TO A WAR WITH AMERICA DIRECTLY BECAUSE IRAN KNOWS THEY WOULD LOSE THAT WAR. IT MAY BE AN ATTEMPT TO LET IRAQ MAKE THE SACRIFICES TO WEAR DOWN U.S. FORCES BEFORE IRAN IS FORCED TO DEAL WITH U.S. FORCES DIRECTLY. EVEN IF SOME SORT OF AN AGREEMENT HAPPENS THAT WILL STOP THE FIGHTING BETWEEN THE AMERICANS AND THE IRAQIS, IRAN WILL STILL TRY TO INSTIGATE FIGHTING IN IRAQ. THE ULTIMATE GOAL OF IRAN IS TO DESTROY THE AMERICANS. DETAINEE WILL ADDRESS THE ISSUE OF HOW TO DEAL WITH IRAN IN WRITINGS HE IS CURRENTLY WORKING ON.

ACCORDING TO THE DETAINEE, THE SELAFIS ARE THE ONLY GROUP THAT WOULD ATTACK AMERICA ON AMERICAN SOIL. THEY HAVE THE MENTALITY THAT SUPPORTS THAT THEORY IN THAT THEY ARE THE ONLY GROUP THAT FEELS JUSTIFIED IN KILLING PEOPLE SOLELY FOR THEM NOT AGREEING WITH SELAFI RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY. EVEN MODERATE SUNNIS DON'T LIKE THE SELAFIS. THE SHI'A WOULD NEVER ATTACK A GROUP UNLESS IT WAS IN THE CAUSE OF DEFENSIVE JIHAD. THE SHI'A ARE STRICT ADHERERS TO ISLAMIC LAW WHICH PROHIBITS THE ATTACK OF ANYBODY. DETAINEE FURTHER EXPLAINED THAT EVERY AYATOLLAH IS REQUIRED TO ISSUE A BOOK OF OPINIONS ON SUCH MATTERS. THESE BOOKS EXTENSIVELY COVER THE RULES OF OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE JIHAD. DETAINEE FEELS THAT READING THESE BOOKS WOULD GIVE BETTER INSIGHT INTO THE MIND OF THE SHI'A DURING A WAR.

JALIL AL-NURI USED TO BE A FRIEND OF DETAINEES BUT HE HAS "GONE DOWN THE WRONG WAY". DETAINEE DOES NOT AGREE WITH THE TACTICS JALIL IS USING AND DOES NOT CONDONE HIS ACTIONS. [REDACTED] 1.4c

[REDACTED] 1.4c

[REDACTED] 1.4c

DETAINEE TRIED TO COME UP WITH WAYS FOR US TO ELIMINATE THE PROBLEM OF JALIL ATTACKING FROM RESIDENTIAL AREAS AND CAUSING CIVILIAN CASUALTIES. HE SUGGESTED GETTING ABBAS RUBAYI OR SAID A'ASUN TO TALK TO HIM. THESE GUYS ARE OLD HAWZA STUDENTS AND DETAINEE FEELS THEY MAY BE ABLE TO GET THROUGH TO JALIL. IF DETAINEE COULD TALK TO RUBAYI OR A'ASUN, HE COULD PERSUADE THEM TO TALK TO JALIL. DETAINEE DID NOT KNOW WHERE JALIL MIGHT BE HIDING OR HOW TO TRACK HIM DOWN. [REDACTED] 1.4c

[REDACTED] 1.4c

[REDACTED] 1.4c

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**4. COMMENTS (~~S//REL to USA and MCFI~~):**

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**SENIOR INTERROGATOR COMMENTS: NONE**

**5. POINTS OF CONTACT (U):**

SIPR EMAIL

3.5c

**NOTE: ALL ARABIC SPELLINGS ARE IAW DI POLICY NO. 033, "SPELLING NAMES OF FOREIGN PERSONS IN DI PRODUCTS," DATED 02 DEC 03 AND DDCICM DIRECTIVE, "INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STANDARD FOR THE transliteration of ARABIC NAMES IN FINAL WRITTEN REPORTS AND PRODUCTS," DATED 04 JUN 03, IN COMPLIANCE WITH SECTION 352 OF THE INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT OF 2003.**

**PREP (U):** 3.5c

**AQC (U):** BAGHDAD, IRAQ (2007/04/13)

**ENCL (U):** NONE

**DISSEM (U):** FIELD - NONE

**WARNING (U):** REPORT CLASSIFIED ~~SECRET // REL to USA and MCFI~~

**DRV FROM (U):** MNF-IMNC-I SGC VERSION 3, 27 MAY 04.

**DECL ON:** X1