

~~SECRET // REL to USA and MCFI~~

1.4a

**TACTICAL INTERROGATION REPORT:**

**REPORT NUMBER (U):** 1.4a

**REPORT DATE (DOI) (U):** 12 APR 07

**REPORTING UNIT (U):** 1.4a

**COUNTRY (U):** IRAQ (IZ), IRAN (IR)

1.4c

**SUMMARY (~~S//REL to USA and MCFI~~):**

- THE FORTY-FIRST INTERROGATION OF N1228A
- DETAINEE ADMITTED TO PERSONALLY ACCEPTING SUPPORT FROM IRAN
- DETAINEE ADMITTED TO HIS DE FACTO LEADERSHIP OF THE SADR TREND, INCLUDING MILITARILY, FOR OVER TWO YEARS
- DETAINEE PROVIDED ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON MUHAMMAD AL-SA'DI, ONE LEADER FIGURE FOR ALL THE SPECIAL GROUPS
- DETAINEE PROVIDED INFORMATION ON THE LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE OVER ALL SPECIAL GROUPS
- DETAINEE PROVIDED INFORMATION ON THE RELATIONSHIP OF MUQTADA AL-SADR (MAS) AND THE SPECIAL GROUPS AND REPORTING ON SPECIAL GROUPS' ACTIVITIES

**TEXT (~~S//REL to USA and MCFI~~):**

**1. BIOGRAPHICAL DATA (~~S//REL TO USA AND MCFI~~):**

**GIVEN NAME:** QAYIS

**FATHER'S GIVEN NAME:** HADI

**GRANDFATHER'S GIVEN NAME:** SA'ID

**CLAN NAME:** NONE

**TRIBAL NAME:** AL-KHAZ'ALI

**ALIAS:** NONE

**EYE COLOR:** BROWN

**HAIR COLOR:** BLACK

**HEIGHT:** 5 FEET EIGHT INCHES

**WEIGHT:** 160 LBS

**DISTINGUISHING FEATURES:** IRREGULAR SHAPED PORTWINE BIRTHMARK, LEFT FRONT SHOULDER, ARMPIT AREA.

**ADDRESS:** AL-SALAH NEIGHBORHOOD, IN THE VICINITY OF AL-SALAH MOSQUE, KUFA, IRAQ.

**PHONE NUMBER:** NONE



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**MOBILE NUMBER:** CLAIMS TO HAVE LOST HIS CELLULAR TELEPHONE SEVERAL DAYS PRIOR TO CAPTURE.

**POB:** BAGHDAD, IZ

**DOB:** 24 APRIL 1974

**MARITAL STATUS:** DIVORCED

**NATIONALITY:** IRAQI

**RELIGION:** SHI'A/ISLAM

**EDUCATION:** ELEMENTARY AND MIDDLE SCHOOL, 1995-PRESENT, THE SHI'A HAWZA RELIGIOUS TRAINING INSTITUTE IN AL-NAJAF, IZ.

**LANGUAGES (PROFICIENCY):** ARABIC (NATIVE), ENGLISH (ABLE TO SPEAK HALTINGLY).

**MOSQUE:** NONE

**IMAM:** NONE

**MILITARY EXPERIENCE:** PAID HIS WAY OUT OF THE IRAQI ARMY IN 1997 FOR 1.5 MILLION IRAQI DINAR.

**SPECIAL SKILLS:** NONE

**OCCUPATION:** POLITICIAN

**MEDICAL (U):** CLEARED FOR DETENTION / INTERROGATION / LAST CHECK UP: 12 APR 07

**DETAINEE NUMBER:** N1228A

**FATHER:** HADI SA'ID AL-KHAZ'ALI

**MOTHER:** WOULD NOT ANSWER (WNA)

**BROTHERS:** WNA

**SISTERS:** WNA

**WIFE:** DIVORCED

**CHILDREN:** 1 BOY, AWAIS (6), 1 GIRL, MAIS (8). BOTH LIVE WITH THEIR MOTHER IN BAGHDAD, IZ.

## 2. CIRCUMSTANCES OF CAPTURE:

**CONOP:** 1.4a

**DTG OF CAPTURE:** 20 MAR 0300C 2007

**PLACE OF CAPTURE:** BASRAH, IZ.

**APPREHENDING UNIT:** 1.4a

**REASON FOR CAPTURE:** DETAINEE IS A SUSPECTED ANTI-IRAQI FORCES (AIF) GROUP LEADER, AND IS ASSOCIATED WITH WEAPONS SMUGGLING FROM IRAN, EXTRA JUDICIAL KILLING (EJK) ACTIVITY, AND INVOLVEMENT WITH THE ATTACK ON THE KARBALA PJCC.

**CURRENT LOCATION:** 1.4a

**WEAPONS, DOCUMENTS AND EQUIPMENT (~~S//REL to USA and MCFI~~):**

**INTERROGATOR:** 3.5c

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**LANGUAGE USED:** ARABIC

**INTERPRETER (NATIVE DIALECT):** 3.5c

**3. SUMMARY OF INTERROGATION / INTELLIGENCE GAINED (~~S//REL to USA and MCFI~~):**

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1. DETAINEE WAS THE DE FACTO LEADER OF THE SADR TREND FOR TWO TO TWO AND A HALF YEARS – NOT MUQTADA AL-SADR (MAS). WHATEVER ACTIONS WERE TAKEN DURING THAT PERIOD WERE INFUSED WITH HIS IDEAS AND PLANS, INCLUDING THE MANY ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN AGAINST AMERICAN FORCES. DETAINEE DIRECTED WHAT WAS TO BE DONE. MANY ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE SADR TREND WERE DETAINEE’S RESPONSIBILITY, THOUGH HE HAD THE BACKUP AND SUPPORT TO DO IT. 1.4c

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1.4c DETAINEE HAS INFLUENCE, RELATIONS, AND RESPECT THAT ARE COLLECTIVELY VAST. HE HAS TIES TO THE HIGHEST DIGNITARIES. DESPITE HIS HIGH POSITION, DETAINEE LIVED VERY HUMBLY DURING THAT PERIOD. HE DID NOT USE HIS POSITION AND POWER TO PURCHASE A HOME OR A PERSONAL CAR. HE SOUGHT NOTHING BUT PROSPERITY FOR HIS PEOPLE, WHO ARE HIS TOP PRIORITY.

2. DETAINEE ENGAGES IN DIRECT RELATIONS WITH THE IRANIANS. 1.4c

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1.4c DETAINEE SOUGHT AND RECEIVED SUPPORT FROM IRAN BECAUSE HE HAD NOWHERE ELSE TO GO. 1.4c

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1.4c DETAINEE BELIEVES HIS RELATIONS WITH IRAN WERE FOR THE BENEFIT OF IRAQ. THOUGH DETAINEE WORKED WITH THE IRANIANS, HE WAS NOT THEIR SERVANT. 1.4c

1.4c THE MAJORITY OF SADR TREND MEMBERS SHARE THE SAME IDEA AS DETAINEE THAT THEY WILL NEVER BE PUPPETS OF ANY OTHER COUNTRY. DETAINEE PLEDGES THAT HE WILL NOT WORK WITH THE IRANIANS AGAIN. 1.4c

1.4c DETAINEE IS A MEMBER OF THE SADR TREND WHO NEVER LOVED THE IRANIANS, BUT NEVER HATED THEM; HE MERELY DISLIKES THEM. SOME OTHER PEOPLE IN THE SADR TREND, INCLUDING HIS BROTHER LAYITH AL-KHAZ’ALI (N1229A), DO HATE THE IRANIANS.

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DETAINEE RESISTED PROVIDING DETAILS REGARDING HIS COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY IN THE SADR TREND AND HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE IRANIANS. DETAINEE HAS ONLY CONFESSED ONCE IN HIS LIFE – TO THE LATE MUHAMMAD AL-SADR – BUT NEVER EVEN HIS WRONGS TO HIS OWN FATHER.

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1.4c MUHAMMAD AL-SA'DI HAS THE RESPECT OF MANY PEOPLE IN IRAQ, BUT HE ONLY HAS INFLUENCE IN THE SADR TREND. DESPITE HIS POSITION AT THE HEAD OF THE LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE WITH RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE SPECIAL GROUPS, HE DOES NOT PLAY AN ACTIVE ROLE OR TAKE MUCH INITIATIVE. HE IS LAZY AND DULL. IF HE WAS MORE ACTIVE, HE WOULD DEMOTE JAYSH AL-MAHDI REGIMENT COMMANDERS WHEN APPROPRIATE. BECAUSE HE DOES NOT TAKE SUCH ACTIONS THEY FALL TO JABIR AL-KHAFAJI OR 'ABBAS AL-KUFI, WHO TYPICALLY MAKES SUCH DECISIONS. MUHAMMAD AL-SA'DI'S APPARENT LAZINESS IS A PRODUCT OF HIS OLDER AGE. 1.4c

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1.4c WHILE MUHAMMAD IS ONLY IN HIS FORTIES, HE BEHAVES AS IF HE WAS MUCH OLDER THAN THAT. 1.4c

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DETAINEE ONCE ASKED MUHAMMAD WHY HE WAS INVOLVED IN A LEADERSHIP POSITION, GIVEN HIS APPARENT DISINTEREST IN THAT RESPONSIBILITY. MUHAMMAD TOLD DETAINEE THAT MUQTADA AL-SADR (MAS) ASKED HIM TO SERVE AND HE WAS TOO EMBARRASSED TO SAY NO. MAS SELECTED MUHAMMAD BECAUSE OF HIS AGE, RELIGIOUS KNOWLEDGE, AND APPARENT RESPECTABILITY; NOT BECAUSE MUHAMMAD WAS QUALIFIED TO DO THE JOB. MAS RARELY SELECTS PROMINENT PEOPLE WITH THE TALENT TO CARRY OUT A TASK TO THE BEST OF THEIR ABILITY. THE AL-HAWZA STUDENTS CLOSE TO DETAINEE DO NOT WANT TO BE AMONG MAS'S AIDES BECAUSE THEY DO NOT AGREE WITH THE WAY HE IS HANDLING THE SADR TREND'S AFFAIRS. MAS MAKES DECISIONS WITHOUT THE INPUT OF HAWZA STUDENTS BECAUSE HE DOES NOT WANT THEM TO EXPAND THEIR POWER, BECAUSE IT MAY PUT THEM IN A POSITION WHERE THEY COULD TAKE HIS PLACE IN THE FUTURE. BECAUSE 'ABBAS AL-KUFI IS NOT A

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RELIGIOUS LEADER, THERE IS NO WAY THAT HE COULD EVER TAKE MAS'S POSITION. AS SUCH, 'ABBAS IS MAS'S CLOSEST CONFIDANT.

MUHAMMAD AL-SA'DI ATTEMPTS TO RESOLVE DISPUTES WITHIN THE SADR TREND IN A PEACEFUL WAY. HE ATTEMPTS TO AVOID CLASHES WITH OTHERS.

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1.4c ON THE INFREQUENT OCCASION THAT MUHAMMAD DOES ACT, HE TRIES TO PROTECT HIMSELF FROM BLAME BY USING OTHERS, SUCH AS 'ABBAS AL-KUFI, TO CARRY OUT A POTENTIALLY CONTROVERSIAL ACTION.

MUHAMMAD'S POSITION ON THE LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE OVER THE SPECIAL GROUPS DOES NOT INVOLVE DIFFICULT TASKS AND DOES NOT REQUIRE MUCH OF HIS ATTENTION. THE COMMITTEE DOES NOT HAVE A SIGNIFICANT IMPACT AND ONE DOES NOT HAVE TO BE AT THE HEIGHT OF HIS INTELLECTUAL FACULTIES TO HANDLE THE POSITION.

C. THE LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE ENSURES THAT JAYSH AL-MAHDI (JAM) AND THE SPECIAL GROUPS DO NOT VIOLATE CERTAIN RULES GOVERNED BY THE SHA'ARA.

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1.4c WHEN THE COMMITTEE WAS CREATED, NOTHING CAME IN WRITING FROM MAS REGARDING ITS SPECIFIC RESPONSIBILITIES. WITH REGARD TO DECISIONS ABOUT JAM, MAS SOMETIMES LOOKS ON THE COMMITTEE AND INSISTS THAT HE MUST GIVE AUTHORIZATION OR APPROVAL ACCORDING TO THE SHA'ARA. MAS OFTEN DOES NOT ALLOW THE COMMITTEE TO MAKE A DECISION WITHOUT HIS APPROVAL.

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THE OTHER RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE ARE FINANCE AND OVERSIGHT. FOR FINANCIAL MATTERS, THE COMMITTEE MAKES SURE THAT THE SPECIAL GROUPS RECEIVE THEIR SALARIES IN A TIMELY FASHION. MUSTAFA AL-YAQUBI ULTIMATELY CONTROLS THE FUNDS. HE TRANSFERS MONEY, BY TELEPHONE, USING HAWALLAHS. FUNDS USED TO BE TRANSFERRED AND DISSEMINATED THROUGH A FINANCIAL CONTROLLER, ABU AYAH, BUT THERE ARE PROBABLY SEVERAL OTHER PERSONS FULFILLING THAT RESPONSIBILITY IN ADDITION TO ABU AYAH. THE COMMITTEE'S FINAL RESPONSIBILITY IS TO FOLLOW UP ON AND OVERSEE THE DAILY ACTIVITIES OF THE SPECIAL GROUPS. THIS IS NOT A DUTY THAT MUHAMMAD AL-SA'DI AND JABIR AL-KHAFAJI FULFILLED. HE PREFERRED TO BE IGNORANT OF WHAT WAS HAPPENING, SO HE DID NOT

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INVOLVE HIMSELF IN THE DAY TO DAY ACTIVITIES OF THE SPECIAL GROUPS.

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THE EXISTING LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE TRIES TO BE CAUTIOUS IN MAKING ITS LIMITED DECISIONS.

D. MAS DOES NOT GENERALLY INTERFERE WITH THE SPECIAL GROUPS. MAS USUALLY TRIES TO DISASSOCIATE HIMSELF FROM THOSE GROUPS' ATTACKS AGAINST THE AMERICANS. ALTHOUGH MAS WANTS TO TAKE CREDIT FOR SUCCESSES, AND PRIVATELY SAYS THAT HE CREATED THE SPECIAL GROUPS WHEN THERE WAS A SUCCESS; FOR THE SAKE OF THE AMERICANS' PERCEPTION, HE DID NOT WANT TO TAKE RESPONSIBILITY FOR MILITARY ACTION.

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MAS DOES NOT RECEIVE WRITTEN REPORTS OF THE SPECIAL GROUPS ACTIVITIES, BUT DOES KNOW THE RESULTS OF CERTAIN ACTIVITIES OR MISSIONS FROM THE MEDIA OR TELEVISION. THERE IS ALSO A CONNECTION BETWEEN JAM AND THE SPECIAL GROUPS THAT PERMITS THE TRANSMISSION OF INFORMATION ABOUT SPECIAL GROUPS' SUCCESSES. MAS DOES NOT RECEIVE WRITTEN REPORTS BECAUSE HE DOES NOT WANT TO GET INVOLVED WITH A PAPER TRAIL THAT SHOWS HIS INVOLVEMENT. ON ONE OCCASION, WHEN MOST OF THE SPECIAL GROUPS WANTED TO MEET WITH MAS, MAS CONVEYED THAT HE LOVED WHAT THE SPECIAL GROUPS WERE DOING BUT DECLINED A MEETING DUE TO THE SECURITY SITUATION.

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DETAINEE INITIALLY INDICATED IT IS POSSIBLE THAT REPORTS WOULD BE PREPARED AFTER A MISSION BY A SPECIAL GROUP, BUT THAT SUCH REPORTS WOULD FALL UNDER THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE PROVINCE'S COMMANDER. THE REPORTS WOULD SET FORTH WHAT KIND OF MISSIONS WERE TAKEN AND WHETHER THEY SUCCEEDED. DETAINEE LATER INDICATED THAT THE HEADS OF THE SPECIAL GROUPS AT THE PROVINCE LEVEL ARE SUPPOSED TO RELAY REPORTS TO THE LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE. THE LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE DOES NOT INTERFERE OR TAKE ANY KIND OF RESPONSIBILITY. THEY JUST LEAVE THE REPORT AS THEY ARE. LATER THE DETAINEE CLAIMED THE LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE DID NOT RECEIVE OR REQUEST REPORTS.

E. PRIOR TO APPOINTING 'ABBAS AL-KUFI AS THE PERSON RESPONSIBLE FOR JAM, MAS SAID THAT NO ONE HAS THE RIGHT OR AUTHORITY TO FIRE A JAM

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REGIMENT COMMANDER. THAT WAS THE CASE EVEN WHEN DETAINEE WAS IN CHARGE OF ALL OF JAM. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MAS AND 'ABBAS IS VERY CLOSE, WITH MAS PLACING MUCH TRUST IN 'ABBAS, SO MAS GAVE 'ABBAS THE AUTHORITY TO FIRE ANY JAM LEADER. MUHAMMAD AL-SA'DI AND JABIR AL-KHAFAJI WOULD BE HESITANT TO MAKE A DECISION LIKE THAT.

MOST PEOPLE WHO LEAVE A POSITION OF COMMAND OVER A JAYSH AL-MAHDI REGIMENT DO SO VOLUNTARILY. COMMANDERS SIMPLY LOSE THE WILL TO REMAIN IN COMMAND. FIRING A JAM REGIMENT COMMANDER IS TYPICALLY OUT OF THE QUESTION, BUT DEMOTIONS DO TAKE PLACE. IF A COMMANDER OF A REGIMENT HAS A CLASH WITH A FRIEND OF 'ABBAS AL-KUFI'S FRIEND, OR 'ABBAS AL-KUFI, 'ABBAS WILL DEMOTE HIM. REMOVING A COMMANDER FROM JAM ENTIRELY IS A HARSH STEP THAT WILL NEGATIVELY IMPACT THAT PERSON'S WELFARE AND CREATE DISSENSION WITHIN THE REGIMENT. SADR TREND MEMBERS WOULD LOOK ON A PERSON REMOVED COMPLETELY FROM JAM AS SOMEONE WHO DID SOMETHING VERY BAD OR WHO HAD A SERIOUS CONFLICT THAT LED TO HIS EXPULSION. COMPLETE EXPULSION FROM JAM IS HUMILIATING TO THE MEMBER.

F. FOLLOWING THE SAMARRAH MOSQUE INCIDENT, MAS CREATED A NEW LAW THAT REQUIRED THE HEADS OF ALL THESE COMMITTEES TO MEET AND ESTABLISH A NEW COMMITTEE TO CONTROL JAM, THAT WOULD BE BEAR THE EXCLUSIVE RESPONSIBILITY FOR JAM ACTIVITIES. THE MEMBERS OF THE NEW COMMITTEE WERE HIGHLY CAPABLE, PROMINENT PERSONS IN CHARGE AT THAT TIME. MAS TOLD DETAINEE THAT THE GROUP HAD OPEN AUTHORITY AND THAT 'ABBAS AL-KUFI LACKED THE POWER TO OPPOSE THE GROUP'S DECISIONS. THE GROUP DECIDED TO ELIMINATE JAM LEADERS IN CERTAIN AREAS AND TO INCREASE THE NUMBER OF REGIMENTS IN THE KARKH AREA OF BAGHDAD FROM ONE TO THREE. 'ABBAS TOLD THE COMMITTEE THAT THEY LACKED ANY RIGHT TO ACT ON THESE MATTERS AND HAD THE COMMITTEE DISSOLVED.

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**4. COMMENTS (~~S//REL to USA and MCFI~~):**

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SENIOR INTERROGATOR COMMENTS: NONE

**5. POINTS OF CONTACT (U):**

SIPR EMAIL

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**NOTE: ALL ARABIC SPELLINGS ARE IAW DI POLICY NO. 033, "SPELLING NAMES OF FOREIGN PERSONS IN DI PRODUCTS," DATED 02 DEC 03 AND DDICM DIRECTIVE, "INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STANDARD FOR THE TRANSLITERATION OF ARABIC NAMES IN FINAL WRITTEN REPORTS AND PRODUCTS," DATED 04 JUN 03, IN COMPLIANCE WITH SECTION 352 OF THE INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT OF 2003.**

PREP (U): 3.5c

AQC (U): BAGHDAD, IRAQ (2007/04/12)

ENCL (U): NONE

DISSEM (U): FIELD – NONE

WARNING (U): REPORT CLASSIFIED ~~SECRET // REL to USA and MCFI~~

DRV FROM (U): MNF-IMNC-I SGC VERSION 3, 27 MAY 04.

DECL ON: X1

Approved for Release