

~~SECRET // REL TO USA AND MCFI~~

1.4a

**TACTICAL INTERROGATION REPORT:**

**REPORT NUMBER (U):** 1.4a

**REPORT DATE (DOI) (U):** 26 MAR 07

**REPORTING UNIT (U):** 1.4a

**COUNTRY (U):** IRAQ (IZ), IRAN (IR)

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**SUMMARY (~~S//REL TO USA AND MCFI~~):**

- THE TENTH INTERROGATION OF N1228A
- DETAINEE GAVE FURTHER INSIGHT INTO HIS IDEAS FOR A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION TO THE FIGHTING IN IRAQ
- GAVE FURTHER INFORMATION ON TRAINING IN IRAN TO INCLUDE GENERAL INFORMATION ON EFP TRAINING AND THE REASON IRAN DOES NOT DO SURFACE TO AIR MISSILE TRAINING FOR JAYSH AL MAHDI
- EXPLAINED THE DYNAMICS OF THE KHAMEINI GROUPS IN IRAQ

**TEXT (~~S//REL TO USA AND MCFI~~):**

**1. BIOGRAPHICAL DATA (~~S//REL TO USA AND MCFI~~):**

**GIVEN NAME:** QAYIS

**FATHER'S GIVEN NAME:** HADI

**GRANDFATHER'S GIVEN NAME:** SA'ID

**CLAN NAME:** NONE

**TRIBAL NAME:** AL-KHAZALI

**ALIAS:** NONE

**EYE COLOR:** BROWN

**HAIR COLOR:** BLACK

**HEIGHT:** 5 FEET EIGHT INCHES

**WEIGHT:** 160 LBS

**DISTINGUISHING FEATURES:** IRREGULAR SHAPED PORTWINE BIRTHMARK, LEFT FRONT SHOULDER, ARMPIT AREA.

**ADDRESS:** AL-SALAH NEIGHBORHOOD, IN THE VICINITY OF AL-SALAH MOSQUE, KUFA, IRAQ.

**PHONE NUMBER:** NONE

**MOBILE NUMBER:** CLAIMS TO HAVE LOST HIS CELLULAR TELEPHONE SEVERAL DAYS PRIOR TO CAPTURE.

**POB:** BAGHDAD, IZ



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**DOB:** 24 APRIL 1974  
**MARITAL STATUS:** DIVORCED  
**NATIONALITY:** IRAQI  
**RELIGION:** SHI'A/ISLAM  
**EDUCATION:** ELEMENTARY AND MIDDLE SCHOOL, 1995-PRESENT, THE SHI'A HAWZA RELIGIOUS TRAINING INSTITUTE IN AL-NAJAF, IZ.  
**LANGUAGES (PROFICIENCY):** ARABIC (NATIVE), ENGLISH (ABLE TO SPEAK HALTINGLY).  
**MOSQUE:** NONE  
**IMAM:** NONE  
**MILITARY EXPERIENCE:** PAID HIS WAY OUT OF THE IRAQI ARMY IN 1997 FOR 1.5 MILLION IRAQI DINAR.  
**SPECIAL SKILLS:** NONE  
**OCCUPATION:** POLITICIAN

**MEDICAL (U):** CLEARED FOR DETENTION / INTERROGATION / LAST CHECK UP: 26 MAR 07

**DETAINEE NUMBER:** N1228A

**FATHER:** HADI SA'ID AL-KHAZALI  
**MOTHER:** DNA  
**BROTHERS:** DNA  
**SISTERS:** DNA  
**WIFE:** DIVORCED  
**CHILDREN:** 1 BOY, AWAIS (6), 1 GIRL, MAIS (8). BOTH LIVE WITH THEIR MOTHER IN BAGHDAD, IZ.

**2. CIRCUMSTANCES OF CAPTURE:**

**CONOP:** 1.4a  
**DTG OF CAPTURE:** 20 MAR 0300C 2007  
**PLACE OF CAPTURE:** BASRAH, IZ.  
**APPREHENDING UNIT:** 1.4a  
**REASON FOR CAPTURE:** DETAINEE IS A SUSPECTED AIF GROUP LEADER, AND IS ASSOCIATED WITH WEAPONS SMUGGLING FROM IRAN, EJK ACTIVITY, AND INVOLVEMENT WITH THE ATTACK ON THE KARBALA PJCC.  
**CURRENT LOCATION:** 1.4a

**WEAPONS, DOCUMENTS AND EQUIPMENT (~~S//REL TO USA AND MCFI~~):**

**INTERROGATOR:** 3.5c  
**LANGUAGE USED:** ARABIC  
**INTERPRETER (NATIVE DIALECT):** 3.5c

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**3. SUMMARY OF INTERROGATION / INTELLIGENCE GAINED (~~S//REL TO USA AND MCFI~~):**

DETAINEE WAS REMINDED OF THE POSSIBLE OF A U.S. TROOP PULL-OUT IN MARCH OF 2008. THIS SPARKED CONVERSATION ON WHAT NEEDS TO HAPPEN BEFORE THAT TO MAKE SURE THERE IS A SUCCESSFUL TRANSITION WHILE GIVING THE MOST OPPORTUNITY FOR A CONTINUED PEACE IN IRAQ. ACCORDING TO DETAINEE, THE INSURGENT GROUPS NEED TO BE DEALT WITH FIRST. THE GROUPS NEED TO BE FOUND AND THE LIFE SQUEEZED OUT OF THEM BEFORE WE CAN BE ENSURED THAT PEACE WILL PROSPER. THE GROUPS THAT NEED TO BE ELIMINATED ARE SALAFI AND AQIZ, FROM THE SUNNI SIDE AND ANY GROUP THAT PROFITS FROM KIDNAPPING OR ANY OTHER ILLEGAL ACTIVITY FROM THE SHI'A SIDE. PROBLEMS WITH GROUPS LIKE JAYSH AL MAHDI (JAM) AND BADR CORPS CAN BE RESOLVED DIPLOMATICALLY.

WHEN ASKED WHAT WOULD PREVENT SECTARIAN VIOLENCE AND CIVIL WAR AFTER WE PULL OUT, DETAINEE SAID THAT SHI'A WILL TAKE CARE OF SHI'A ISSUES AND SUNNI WILL TAKE CARE OF SUNNI ISSUES AND IF ANY OF THE INSURGENT GROUPS ACT AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT AND A PEACEFUL ACCORD, IT " IS THE DUTY OF THE SHI'A" TO ELIMINATE THAT GROUP AND LIKEWISE FOR THE SUNNI. THIS POLICY WILL ALSO HELP ELIMINATE ATTACKS ON U.S. TROOPS BEFORE WE LEAVE AND ALLOW THE GOVERNMENT TO CONCENTRATE ON OTHER ISSUES SUCH AS INFRASTRUCTURE PROBLEMS. DETAINEE COMPARED THIS SOLUTION TO SHEIKH SITAR ABU RISHA AND THE COUNCIL TO SAVE ANBAR WHERE THEY ARE USING GOOD INSURGENTS

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TO FIGHT BAD INSURGENTS LIKE IS BEING DONE IN ANBAR PROVINCE.

DETAINEE SAID THE U.S. MUST NEGOTIATE WITH THE GOOD GROUPS FROM BOTH THE SUNNI AND THE SHI'A SIDE IN A PUBLIC MANNER THAT SHOWS COOPERATION FROM ALL SIDES TO ACHIEVE PEACE IN IRAQ. IF IT IS NOT DONE IN PUBLIC, OTHER INSURGENT GROUPS WILL MAKE CLAIMS THAT THE U.S. LEFT BECAUSE THAT PARTICULAR INSURGENT GROUP DROVE THEM OUT OF THE COUNTRY. THE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD START WITH POLITICIANS FROM BOTH SIDES OF THE INSURGENCY. FROM THE SUNNI SIDE, DETAINEE SUGGESTED WE SPEAK WITH ANANI DILAYMI, TARIQ AL-HASHIMI, AND KHALIL AL ALYAN WHO HAVE TIES TO SUNNI INSURGENT ORGANIZATIONS AND FOR THE SHI'A, THERE WILL BE TWO SIDES. THE SADR SIDE WILL COME FROM THE DAWA PARTY AND THE BEST PERSON TO NEGOTIATE WITH WOULD BE IBRAHIM JAFARI OR HAJJI SALIM AND FROM THE NON-SADR OR SCIRI SIDE, IT WOULD BE HADI AL-HAMRI AND AMMAR AL-HAKIM.

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DETAINEE SAID THAT SUNNI AND SHI'A ARE READY TO GET ALONG AND ARE TIRED OF THE FIGHTING THEMSELVES AND THINKS THAT A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION WOULD WORK.

DETAINEE SAID THAT SURFACE TO AIR MISSILE (SAM) TRAINING WAS NOT AVAILABLE TO ANY GROUPS OTHER THAN KHAMEINI GROUPS (GROUPS LOYAL TO AYATOLLAH KHAMEINI) DUE TO THE FACT THAT SAMS WERE VERY EXPENSIVE BUT MORE IMPORTANTLY, IRAN DID NOT TRUST THE OTHER GROUPS WITH THE KNOWLEDGE OF SAMS. THERE IS AN ON-GOING TENSION BETWEEN THE SADR LOYALISTS AND THE KHAMEINI LOYALISTS AND SHOULD THAT TENSION EVER TURN INTO ACTUAL FIGHTING, IRAN DOES NOT WANT SADR LOYALISTS TO KNOW HOW TO USE SAM WEAPONS. 1.4c

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1.4c BEING A MEMBER OF A KHAMEINI GROUP SUCH AS BADR CORPS IS PROOF THAT THE INDIVIDUAL IS LOYAL AND CAN BE TRUSTED WITH SAM TRAINING.

EXPLOSIVELY FORMED PROJECTILE (EFP) TRAINING IS ANOTHER STORY HOWEVER. DETAINEE SAID THAT ANYONE CAN RECEIVE EFP TRAINING AND IRAN DOES NOT CARE WHO GETS IT. THIS IS BECAUSE OF THE AVAILABILITY AND LOW COST OF EFPS. NORMAL JAM UNITS DID NOT RECEIVE EFP TRAINING BUT ALL OF THE SPECIAL GROUPS DID. AT FIRST, VERY FEW PEOPLE WENT THROUGH THE EFP TRAINING BUT AFTER EFPS BECAME SO EFFECTIVE AND THE EFP EXPERTS BECAME FAMOUS, EVERYBODY WANTED TO LEARN HOW TO MAKE THEM. NOW, EVERY JAM GROUP HAS AN EFP CELL. RA'AD AL SHUWILI WAS USED AS AN EXAMPLE AS A MAN WHO WAS AN EFP EXPERT IN JAM. DETAINEE DID NOT DENY THIS. DETAINEE EXPLAINED THAT A PERSON LIKE SHUWILI RECEIVED THE TRAINING BY GOING THROUGH A MIDDLE MAN AND TELLING HIM THAT HE WANTED EFP TRAINING SPECIFICALLY. 1.4c

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IT WAS DETAINEE'S OPINION THAT THERE ARE SEPARATE TRAINING CAMPS FOR BUILDING AND EMPLACING EFPS 1.4c

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, 1.4c IN THE ACTUAL UNIT THERE IS ALWAYS A BUILDER AND AN EMPLACER SO ASSUMES THEY GO TO DIFFERENT TRAINING PROGRAMS.

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EFPS STILL COME SOLELY FROM IRAN AND THERE IS CURRENTLY NOBODY IN IRAQ MANUFACTURING THE COMPONENTS OF AN EFP. EFP COMPONENTS CAN BE OBTAINED OR SMUGGLED FROM IRAN BY THE SAME SMUGGLERS THAT GET SMALL ARMS

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DETAINEE WAS ASKED ABOUT RPG-29'S. DETAINEE SAID HE HAS HEARD OF THEM BUT THEY ARE NOT VERY COMMON RIGHT NOW. THE GROUPS THAT USE RPG-29'S RIGHT NOW ARE PROBABLY JUST THE KHAMEINI GROUPS. THE RPG-29'S ARE NOT AVAILABLE THROUGH NORMAL SMUGGLING CHANNELS YET OR ON THE NORMAL WEAPONS MARKET.

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THERE IS NO AVAILABLE TRAINING ON THE RPG-29 THAT THE DETAINEE KNOWS ABOUT AND IT IS NOT A PART OF THE NORMAL COMBAT TRAINING.

THERE ARE NO "TRAIN THE TRAINER" PROGRAMS AVAILABLE IN IRAN BUT MOST OF THE PEOPLE WHO RETURN FROM THE TRAINING SHARE THEIR KNOWLEDGE WITH THE REST OF THE UNIT.

THE KHAMEINI GROUPS IN IRAQ ARE LED BY ABU MUSTAFA AL SHAIBANI AND ALTHOUGH THERE ARE MANY GROUPS UNDER HIM, DETAINEE DOES NOT KNOW THE NAMES OF THE GROUPS, THE NUMBER OF GROUPS, OR ANY OF THE LEADERS OF THE GROUPS. THIS IS DUE TO THE SECRETIVENESS OF THE KHAMEINI GROUPS. MEMBERS OF THE KHAMEINI GROUP ARE VERY LOYAL TO THEIR LEADER AYATOLLAH KHAMEINI. THE HEIRARCHY OF THEIR LOYALTY GOES DOWN FROM KHAMEINI, TO SHI'A, TO ISLAM, TO COUNTRY. ALL OF THE PROVINCES THAT BORDER IRAN ARE CONTROLLED BY BADR CORPS AND THIS CAUSES SOME TROUBLES WITH OTHER GROUPS IN THE AREA. BADR CORPS IS MORE MILITARILY ORIENTED THAN THE OTHER GROUPS AND GENERALLY TARGET U.S. FORCES. THEY ARE BETTER EQUIPPED THAN THE OTHER GROUPS AND HAVE SUPERIOR WEAPONS SUCH AS SAM AND RPG-29S. IN GENERAL, THE BADR CORPS ARE FEWER IN NUMBERS BUT MORE EFFECTIVE THAN OTHER GROUPS.

**INTERROGATION APPROACH / TECHNIQUES (~~S//REL TO USA AND MCFI~~):**

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**4. COMMENTS (~~S//REL TO USA AND MCFI~~):**

**INTERROGATOR COMMENTS (~~S//REL TO USA AND MCFI~~):** DETAINEE IS GETTING SICK OF INTERROGATIONS AND IS ANXIOUS TO GET ROLLING IN THE DIRECTION OF BARTERING FOR HIS RELEASE. HE DID NOT WANT TO TALK

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TODAY BUT WAS QUICKLY MOTIVATED BY TALKING ABOUT THE AMERICAN WITHDRAWAL AND WHAT WE SHOULD DO TO MAKE IT SUCCESSFUL.

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SENIOR INTERROGATOR COMMENTS: NONE

5. POINTS OF CONTACT (U):

SIPR EMAIL

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NOTE: ALL ARABIC SPELLINGS ARE IAW DI POLICY NO. 033, "SPELLING NAMES OF FOREIGN PERSONS IN DI PRODUCTS," DATED 02 DEC 03 AND DDCICM DIRECTIVE, "INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STANDARD FOR THE TRANSLITERATION OF ARABIC NAMES IN FINAL WRITTEN REPORTS AND PRODUCTS," DATED 04 JUN 03, IN COMPLIANCE WITH SECTION 352 OF THE INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT OF 2003.

PREP (U): 1.4a, 1.4c, 3.5c

AQC (U): BAGHDAD, IRAQ (2007/03/26)

ENCL (U): NONE

DISSEM (U): FIELD – NONE

WARNING (U): REPORT CLASSIFIED ~~SECRET // REL TO USA AND MCFI~~

DRV FROM (U): MNF-IMNC-I SGC VERSION 3, 27 MAY 04.

DECL ON: X1