

~~SECRET // REL TO USA AND MCFI~~

1.4a

TACTICAL INTERROGATION REPORT:

REPORT NUMBER (U): 1.4a

REPORT DATE (DOI) (U): 25 MAR 07

REPORTING UNIT (U): 1.4a

COUNTRY (U): IRAQ (IZ), IRAN (IR)

1.4c

SUMMARY (~~S//REL TO USA AND MCFI~~):

- THE NINTH INTERROGATION OF N1228A
- DETAINEE OFFERED INSIGHT ON THE MONEY DISTRIBUTION FROM IRAN
- GENERAL INFORMATION ON WEAPONS SMUGGLING
- DETAINEE TRIED BROKERING A DEAL FOR OBTAINING AHMAD AL-TAIE OR THE BODY OF AHMAD AL-TAIE

TEXT (~~S//REL TO USA AND MCFI~~):

1. BIOGRAPHICAL DATA (~~S//REL TO USA AND MCFI~~):

GIVEN NAME: QAYIS

FATHER'S GIVEN NAME: HADI

GRANDFATHER'S GIVEN NAME: SA'ID

CLAN NAME: NONE

TRIBAL NAME: AL-KHAZALI

ALIAS: NONE

EYE COLOR: BROWN

HAIR COLOR: BLACK

HEIGHT: 5 FEET EIGHT INCHES

WEIGHT: 160 LBS

DISTINGUISHING FEATURES: IRREGULAR SHAPED PORTWINE BIRTHMARK, LEFT FRONT SHOULDER, ARMPIT AREA.

ADDRESS: AL-SALAH NEIGHBORHOOD, IN THE VICINITY OF AL-SALAH MOSQUE, KUFA, IRAQ.

PHONE NUMBER: NONE

MOBILE NUMBER: CLAIMS TO HAVE LOST HIS CELLULAR TELEPHONE SEVERAL DAYS PRIOR TO CAPTURE.

POB: BAGHDAD, IZ

DOB: 24 APRIL 1974

MARITAL STATUS: DIVORCED

NATIONALITY: IRAQI

RELIGION: SHI'A/ISLAM



~~SECRET // REL TO USA AND MCFI~~

1.4a

EDUCATION: ELEMENTARY AND MIDDLE SCHOOL, 1995-PRESENT, THE SHI'A HAWZA RELIGIOUS TRAINING INSTITUTE IN AL-NAJAF, IZ.

LANGUAGES (PROFICIENCY): ARABIC (NATIVE), ENGLISH (ABLE TO SPEAK HALTINGLY).

MOSQUE: NONE

IMAM: NONE

MILITARY EXPERIENCE: PAID HIS WAY OUT OF THE IRAQI ARMY IN 1997 FOR 1.5 MILLION IRAQI DINAR.

SPECIAL SKILLS: NONE

OCCUPATION: POLITICIAN

MEDICAL (U): CLEARED FOR DETENTION / INTERROGATION / LAST CHECK UP: 25 MAR 07

DETAINEE NUMBER: N1228A

FATHER: HADI SA'ID AL-KHAZALI

MOTHER: DNA

BROTHERS: DNA

SISTERS: DNA

WIFE: DIVORCED

CHILDREN: 1 BOY, AWAIS (6), 1 GIRL, MAIS (8). BOTH LIVE WITH THEIR MOTHER IN BAGHDAD, IZ.

2. CIRCUMSTANCES OF CAPTURE:

CONOP: 1.4a

DTG OF CAPTURE: 20 MAR 0300C 2007

PLACE OF CAPTURE: BASRAH, IZ.

APPREHENDING UNIT: 1.4a

REASON FOR CAPTURE: DETAINEE IS A SUSPECTED AIF GROUP LEADER, AND IS ASSOCIATED WITH WEAPONS SMUGGLING FROM IRAN, EJK ACTIVITY, AND INVOLVEMENT WITH THE ATTACK ON THE KARBALA PJCC.

CURRENT LOCATION: 1.4a

WEAPONS, DOCUMENTS AND EQUIPMENT (~~S//REL TO USA AND MCFI~~):

INTERROGATOR: 3.5c

LANGUAGE USED: ARABIC

INTERPRETER (NATIVE DIALECT): 3.5c

3. SUMMARY OF INTERROGATION / INTELLIGENCE GAINED (~~S//REL TO USA AND MCFI~~):

1.4a

DETAINEE INITIALLY WENT TO IRAN IN 2003 WITH MUQTADA AL SADR, SHEIKH YA'QUBI, AL-SHAIBANI, ABBAS AL-KHUFU, AND MUQTADA AL-SADR (MAS). THEY WERE INVITED TO IRAN BY THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT. THE PURPOSE WAS FOR THE GOVERNMENT TO BECOME FAMILIAR WITH JAYSH AL MAHDI (JAM)/OFFICE OF MARTYR SADR (OMS). THEY HAD A PRIVATE MEETING WITH RAFSANJANI AND MAHMUD AL-HASHIMI WHERE THEY DISCUSSED IRAQ, NAJAF AND SHI'A ISSUES. THE MEETING WAS VERY GENERAL AND THERE WERE NO FINANCIAL OFFERINGS AT THIS TIME. THE GROUP THEN HAD A MORE OPEN AND PUBLIC MEETING WITH AYATOLLAH KHAMANI. THEY ALSO MET WITH IRANIAN REPUBLICAN GUARD CORPS – QUDS FORCE (IRGC-QF) COMMANDER SULIMANI AND GENERAL HAJJI YUSEF WHO TOLD THE JAM/OMS CONTINGENT THAT IGRC-QF WANTED TO FINANCIALLY SUPPORT THEIR OPERATIONS. AT THIS POINT, MAS NEITHER ACCEPTED NOR DECLINED THE OFFER. THEY THEN WENT TO A MEETING WITH QASIM AL-HA'IRI WHERE THEY DISCUSSED WHETHER OR NOT HA'IRI WAS RETURNING TO IRAQ. HA'IRI TOLD THEM THAT HE COULD NOT RETURN AT THAT TIME DUE TO HEALTH AND SECURITY ISSUES. THE TRIP LASTED TEN DAYS DURING WHICH THEY SPENT A LOT OF TIME TRAVELING AROUND IRAN VISITING VARIOUS SHRINES.

AFTER RETURNING FROM THE TRIP, IRGC OFFERED MAS \$750,000 - \$1 MILLION A MONTH IN SUPPORT. MAS WAS VERY CONCERNED ABOUT RETAINING OMS/JAM INDEPENDENCE AND SOVEREIGNTY SO MADE SPECIAL DEMANDS: IF HE TOOK THE MONEY, IT WOULD NOT GIVE IRAN OR THE IRGC ANY INFLUENCE OVER THEIR OPERATIONS NOR COULD IRGC ATTEMPT TO EXERCISE CONTROL OVER THE OPERATIONS OR HOW MAS SPENDS THE MONEY. IRAN AGREED. AT THAT TIME, THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MAS AND IRAN WAS VERY CAUTIOUS.

THERE IS NO SPECIAL BUDGET OR FUND ALLOCATION IN JAM/OMS. BASICALLY THE MONEY WAS GIVEN TO MAS WHO WOULD DECIDE WHICH AREAS WOULD GET HOW MUCH MONEY. DETAINEE ESTIMATED THAT A LITTLE LESS THAN 50% OF THE MONEY RECEIVED FROM IRAN WOULD GO TOWARDS THE MILITARY. HE SPECIFIED THAT THIS WAS FOR EACH FACET OF THE MILITARY AND NOT EXCLUSIVELY FOR OPERATIONS.

JAM TRAINED IN IRAN BUT THERE WEREN'T ANY SPECIFIC ORGANIZATIONS PROVIDING THE TRAINING. IT WAS ALL VERY SECRETIVE AND THERE WAS NEVER ANY DOCUMENTATION. THERE WERE NO SPECIFIC TRAINING TIMES AND ESSENTIALLY, IF JAM WANTED ANY OF THEIR TROOPS TRAINED, THEY WOULD SEND THEM TO IRAN WHERE THEY WOULD RECEIVE TRAINING. DETAINEE SAID EACH GROUP HAD A MIDDLE MAN WHO WOULD SET UP THE TRAINING (NFI). DETAINEE SAID THAT JAM NEVER ASKED SPECIFICALLY FOR IED TRAINING. DETAINEE SAID THAT EVERY GROUP THAT IS FIGHTING IN IRAQ TRAINED IN IRAN, INCLUDING AL QAEDA

1.4c

1.4a

1.4c

SMUGGLING OPERATIONS ARE CARRIED OUT IN THE AREAS THAT ARE CONTROLLED BY TRIBES, ESPECIALLY THE SWAMPS. THE TRIBES MAKE THEIR OWN RULES AND HAVE LITTLE OUTSIDE GOVERNANCE. DETAINEE NAMED THE ABU AL A'YTAH TRIBE AS ONE THAT "LISTENS TO NO ONE." EVEN SADDAM COULD NOT CONTROL THE TRIBES. THESE TRIBES USE SMUGGLING AS ONE OF THEIR PRIMARY SOURCES OF INCOME. TRIBES SMUGGLE EVERYTHING FROM WEAPONS TO PEOPLE. TRIBES HAVE NO LOYALTY TO ANY SPECIFIC GROUP AND ARE COMMITTED TO WHOEVER HAS THE MONEY. THE TRIBES OFTEN FIGHT AMONGST THEMSELVES AND DETAINEE COMMENTED THAT THEY USE MASSIVE FIREPOWER IN THEIR FIGHTS.

1.4c

1.4c

TRIBES WILL OFTEN BUY WEAPONS IN IRAN AND BRING THEM OVER TO IRAQ AND SELL THEM ON THE MARKET IN BASRAH AND AMMAR OR THEY WILL TAKE ORDERS AND GO OVER AND GET THE WEAPONS, BRINGING THEM TO WHATEVER GROUP REQUESTED THEM. DETAINEE DESCRIBED SMUGGLING OPERATIONS AS BEING VERY UNORGANIZED BUT VERY EFFECTIVE AND THEY ARE ABLE TO GET MASSIVE AMOUNTS OF WEAPONS ACROSS THE BORDER. DETAINEE SAID THERE IS NO WAY TO STOP THE WEAPONS SMUGGLING CITING THAT SADDAM HAD A MILLION MEN ALONG THE BORDER AND EVEN THAT DID NOT SLOW DOWN THE WEAPONS SMUGGLERS.

DETAINEE ASKED ABOUT HIS BROTHER FAIQ WHO WAS KIDNAPPED THIS PAST SUMMER. DETAINEE'S REQUEST ABOUT HIS BROTHER WAS TURNED INTO A REQUEST FOR INFORMATION BY THE INTERROGATOR ABOUT SGT AHMAD AL-TAIE. DETAINEE SAID AGAIN THAT HIS BROTHER LAYITH IS THE MAN WHO COULD GET AL-TAIE BACK. DETAINEE WOULD NOT GIVE ANY FURTHER INFORMATION ON AL-TAIE'S WHEREABOUTS BUT HE WAS SURE THAT DEAD OR ALIVE, HIS BROTHER LAYITH COULD GET AL-TAIE TO US AND ASKED IF THAT WOULD HELP ENSURE HIS FREEDOM.

1.4c

1.4c

1.4c

AFTER A PAUSE OF DEEP THOUGHT, DETAINEE ASKED HOW THINGS WERE GOING WITH RA'IL

1.4a

1.4a

HE WAS TOLD THINGS WERE GOING WELL AND DETAINEE ASKED IF RA'IL WOULD BE GOING HOME WHEN WE DON'T FIND ANYTHING ON HIM. HE WAS TOLD YES. DETAINEE THEN RECONFIRMED THAT RA'IL WAS INNOCENT AND HAS ONLY BEEN THE DRIVER FOR DETAINEE FOR TWO MONTHS BEFORE

1.4a

PROCEEDING TO SAY THAT RA'IL MAY BE ABLE TO GET AL-TAIE BACK BUT ONLY IF HE WAS ARMED WITH LAYITH'S CONNECTIONS. DETAINEE SAID THERE WAS A VERY SLIGHT CHANCE THAT RA'IL COULD PULL IT OFF AND THAT LAYITH COULD DO IT MUCH EASIER BUT IF RA'IL WAS THE ONLY CHANCE, THEY WOULD TRY IT. DETAINEE WAS ASKED WHY ONE OF THE OTHER DETAINEE'S COULDN'T DO IT AND HE SAID HE DID NOT KNOW THE OTHER DETAINEES WELL AND THEY WERE NOT FROM BAGHDAD SO WOULD NOT HAVE THE ABILITY TO GET AROUND LIKE RA'IL OR LAYITH COULD.

DETAINEE WAS ASKED AGAIN ABOUT THE PJCC KILLINGS. DETAINEE SAID THAT HE DID NOT GIVE THE ORDER TO KILL, JUST TO KIDNAP.

INTERROGATION APPROACH / TECHNIQUES (~~S//REL TO USA AND MCFI~~):

1.4c

4. COMMENTS (~~S//REL TO USA AND MCFI~~):

INTERROGATOR COMMENTS (~~S//REL TO USA AND MCFI~~): 1.4c

1.4c

1.4c

SENIOR INTERROGATOR COMMENTS: NONE

5. POINTS OF CONTACT (U):

SIPR EMAIL

3.5c

NOTE: ALL ARABIC SPELLINGS ARE IAW DI POLICY NO. 033, "SPELLING NAMES OF FOREIGN PERSONS IN DI PRODUCTS," DATED 02 DEC 03 AND DDCICM DIRECTIVE, "INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STANDARD FOR THE TRANSLITERATION OF ARABIC NAMES IN FINAL WRITTEN REPORTS AND PRODUCTS," DATED 04 JUN 03, IN COMPLIANCE WITH SECTION 352 OF THE INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT OF 2003.

PREP (U): 3.5c

AQC (U): BAGHDAD, IRAQ (2007/03/25)

ENCL (U): NONE

1.4a

DISSEM (U): FIELD – NONE

WARNING (U): REPORT CLASSIFIED ~~SECRET // REL TO USA AND MCFI~~

DRV FROM (U): MNF-IMNC-I SGC VERSION 3, 27 MAY 04.

DECL ON: X1

Approved for Release