

~~SECRET // ORCON // NOFORN // X1~~

1.4a

TACTICAL INTERROGATION REPORT:

REPORT NUMBER (U): 1.4a

REPORT DATE (DOI) (U): 24 MAR 07

REPORTING UNIT (U): 1.4a

COUNTRY (U): IRAQ (IZ), IRAN (IR)

1.4c

SUMMARY (~~S//REL TO USA AND MCFI~~):

- THE SEVENTH INTERROGATION OF N1228A
- DETAINEE OFFERED INSIGHT ON THE MONEY DISTRIBUTION FROM IRAN
- TALKED ABOUT HOW INSURGENT GROUPS SPLIT AND SPLINTER INTO NEW GROUPS
- DESCRIBED HIS OWN SPLINTERING AWAY FROM JAM

TEXT (~~S//REL TO USA AND MCFI~~):

1. BIOGRAPHICAL DATA (~~S//REL TO USA AND MCFI~~):

GIVEN NAME: QAYIS

FATHER'S GIVEN NAME: HADI

GRANDFATHER'S GIVEN NAME: SA'ID

CLAN NAME: NONE

TRIBAL NAME: AL-KHAZALI

ALIAS: NONE

EYE COLOR: BROWN

HAIR COLOR: BLACK

HEIGHT: 5 FEET EIGHT INCHES

WEIGHT: 160 LBS

DISTINGUISHING FEATURES: IRREGULAR SHAPED PORTWINE BIRTHMARK, LEFT FRONT SHOULDER, ARMPIT AREA.

ADDRESS: AL-SALAH NEIGHBORHOOD, IN THE VICINITY OF AL-SALAH MOSQUE, KUFA, IRAQ.

PHONE NUMBER: NONE

MOBILE NUMBER: CLAIMS TO HAVE LOST HIS CELLULAR TELEPHONE SEVERAL DAYS PRIOR TO CAPTURE.

POB: BAGHDAD, IZ

DOB: 24 APRIL 1974

MARITAL STATUS: DIVORCED

NATIONALITY: IRAQI

RELIGION: SHI'A/ISLAM



~~SECRET // ORCON // NOFORN // X1~~

1.4a

EDUCATION: ELEMENTARY AND MIDDLE SCHOOL, 1995-PRESENT, THE SHI'A HAWZA RELIGIOUS TRAINING INSTITUTE IN AL-NAJAF, IZ.

LANGUAGES (PROFICIENCY): ARABIC (NATIVE), ENGLISH (ABLE TO SPEAK HALTINGLY).

MOSQUE: NONE

IMAM: NONE

MILITARY EXPERIENCE: PAID HIS WAY OUT OF THE IRAQI ARMY IN 1997 FOR 1.5 MILLION IRAQI DINAR.

SPECIAL SKILLS: NONE

OCCUPATION: POLITICIAN

MEDICAL (U): CLEARED FOR DETENTION / INTERROGATION / LAST CHECK UP: 24 MAR 07

DETAINEE NUMBER: N1228A

FATHER: HADI SA'ID AL-KHAZALI

MOTHER: DNA

BROTHERS: DNA

SISTERS: DNA

WIFE: DIVORCED

CHILDREN: 1 BOY, AWAIS (6), 1 GIRL, MAIS (8). BOTH LIVE WITH THEIR MOTHER IN BAGHDAD, IZ.

2. CIRCUMSTANCES OF CAPTURE:

CONOP: 1.4a

DTG OF CAPTURE: 20 MAR 0300C 2007

PLACE OF CAPTURE: BASRAH, IZ.

APPREHENDING UNIT: 1.4a

REASON FOR CAPTURE: DETAINEE IS A SUSPECTED AIF GROUP LEADER, AND IS ASSOCIATED WITH WEAPONS SMUGGLING FROM IRAN, EJK ACTIVITY, AND INVOLVEMENT WITH THE ATTACK ON THE KARBALA PJCC.

CURRENT LOCATION: 1.4a

WEAPONS, DOCUMENTS AND EQUIPMENT (~~S//REL TO USA AND MCFI~~):

INTERROGATOR: 3.5c

LANGUAGE USED: ARABIC

INTERPRETER (NATIVE DIALECT): 3.5c

3. SUMMARY OF INTERROGATION / INTELLIGENCE GAINED (~~S//REL TO USA AND MCFI~~):

DETAINEE BEGAN BY TALKING ABOUT THE PHILOSOPHICAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN SUNNI AND SHI'A WHICH LED INTO THE CHARACTERISTICS OF

1.4a

MUHAMMAD SADIQ SADR AS COMPARED TO OTHER LEADERS. SADR'S BELIEFS ARE NOT AS FANATICAL AS MOST AND SEEM TO BE THE PERFECT MIX OF RELIGION AND THE REAL WORLD.

1.4c

1.4c

AL QAEDA ARE KILLING FELLOW SUNNIS RIGHT NOW AND ACCORDING TO DETAINEE, THAT IS SOMETHING THE U.S. NEEDS TO EXPLOIT IN ORDER TO HELP DRIVE AL QAEDA OUT OF IRAQ. IF U.S. FORCES COULD CONVINCE THE IRAQI SUNNI POPULATION OF THIS, THE IRAQI SUNNIS WILL TAKE CARE OF GETTING AL QAEDA OUT OF IRAQ.

MUQTADA SADR BELIEVES THAT HIS MOVEMENT NEEDS TO BE CENTRALIZED. DETAINEE BELIEVES PEOPLE LIKE HIMSELF AND ABU DURA NEED TO BE FREE TO DO WHAT THEY WANT. DETAINEE ADMITTED THIS HURTS THE OVERALL MOVEMENT AND PROBABLY IMPEDES THE PROCESS OF ACHIEVING THE GOALS OF THE SHI'A BUT HE SAID IT DOES NOT HURT SHI'A MUSLIMS SINCE ONE SHI'A WOULD NEVER KILL ANOTHER SHI'A INTENTIONALLY. BUT THE SADR MOVEMENT IS LIKE ANYTHING ELSE, WHEN SOMETHING GETS TOO BIG, IT HAS TO SPLIT AND THIS WAS THE CASE FOR THE MAHDI ARMY. IT HAD GOTTEN TO A POINT WHERE THE DETAINEE HAD TO SPLIT OFF AND START HIS OWN GROUP. THE IMPETUS FOR THE BREAK OF A GROUP FROM THE SADR MOVEMENT IS USUALLY THAT A TEACHER SUCH AS MUQTADA SADR WILL GROW AWAY FROM HIS OLDER STUDENTS (SOMEONE SUCH AS DETAINEE) AND START SPENDING MORE ENERGY ON THE YOUNGER STUDENTS. THIS USUALLY SPARKS A SORT OF JEALOUSY IN THE OLDER STUDENTS AND AFFECTS THE IDEOLOGY OF THE OLDER STUDENT. THIS WIDENS THE GAP BETWEEN THE TEACHER AND THE OLDER STUDENT UNTIL THE OLDER STUDENT STARTS HIS OWN GROUP AND BECOMES THE TEACHER CONTINUING THE CYCLE.

WHEN IT BECAME EVIDENT THAT DETAINEE WAS POSSIBLY BREAKING AWAY FROM THE MAHDI ARMY, MUQTADA SADR TOOK THE DETAINEE'S AUTHORITY AWAY FROM HIM. AT THAT TIME, THE DETAINEE WAS IN CHARGE OF EVERY ASPECT OF THE SADR ARMY. ABBAS AL KHUFI AND ALA AL-LAMI CAME TO THE DETAINEE AND TOLD HIM THEY WERE NOW IN CHARGE. AT THAT POINT THEY CREATED A COMMITTEE WHICH TOOK OVER ALL OF DETAINEE'S DUTIES. SHEIKH MUHAMMAD SA'ADI WAS THE HEAD OF THE COMMITTEE. THIS WAS TWO YEARS AGO AND THE DETAINEE BECAME NOTHING MORE THAN A MORAL SUPPORTER OF THE OPERATIONS OF THE MAHDI ARMY.

1.4c

1.4c

1.4a

1.4c

DETAINEE WAS ASKED IF ANY OF THE SPLITS AWAY FROM THE GROUP WERE FOR FINANCIAL REASONS SUCH AS CREATING DIRECT FUNDING FOR THE NEW GROUP FROM IRANIAN SOURCES. DETAINEE SAID TEMPORARY SPLITS ARE FOR FINANCIAL REASONS BUT PERMANENT SPLITS ARE USUALLY IDEOLOGICAL. ABU DURA AND MUHAMMAD SHAKIR PROBABLY SPLIT FOR FINANCIAL REASONS. DETAINEE SAID THE EXTRA MONEY ONE RECIEVES FROM BREAKIG AWAY FROM A GROUP DOES NOT COME FROM IRAN BUT INSTEAD COMES FROM CRIMES USUALLY NOT PERMITTED IN LARGER GROUPS SUCH AS STEALING AND KIDNAPPING. THE REASON DETAINEE DOES NOT THINK THAT DURA AND SHAKIR ARE GAINING FINANCIALLY FROM IRAN IS THAT IRAN IS VERY CONSCIOUS OF THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SADR MOVEMENT AND DO NOT WANT TO DO ANYTHING TO DISRUPT THAT. SINCE THE SADR MOVEMENT DESIRES TO HAVE A CENTRALIZED EFFORT, IRAN SUPPORTS THIS BY ONLY GIVING MONEY DIRECTLY TO THE SADR MOVEMENT AND LETTING THEM DOLE THE MONEY OUT TO WHATEVER SPLINTER GROUPS MUQTADA AL SADR FEELS LIKE SUPPORTING.

DETAINEE EXPLAINED THAT IRAN SUPPORTS MANY GROUPS IN IRAQ AND NOT JUST SHI'A GROUPS. [REDACTED]

1.4c

1.4c

[REDACTED] THEY SUPPORT SHI'A, SUNNI, KURDISH, BADR, SCIRI, AND MANY MORE. DETAINEE CLAIMS THAT IRAN WOULD NOT SUPPORT HIS GROUP UNLESS IT WAS APPROVED BY SADR. DETAINEE ALSO SAID THAT IF IRAN STARTS SUPPORTING A NEW GROUP, IT DOES NOT AFFECT THE MONEY GOING TO OTHER GROUPS. DETAINEE MADE THE POINT THAT WE SPEND BILLIONS ON THE WAR WHILE IRAN SPENDS MILLIONS. AND EVEN THOUGH WE SPEND SO MUCH MORE, IRAN IS ABLE TO BE MUCH MORE EFFECTIVE.

DETAINEE WAS ASKED IF HE WAS STILL INTERESTED IN THE RECONCILIATION PROCESS AND HE SAID HE WAS BUT WANTED TO KNOW THE CONDITIONS AGAIN. AFTER BEING TOLD THAT HE WOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR RECONCILIATION AFTER WE WERE COMFORTABLE WITH HOW MUCH INFORMATION HE PROVIDED HE SAID THAT NO MATTER WHAT, HE COULD NOT GIVE INFORMATION TO AMERICANS THAT WOULD INCRIMINATE HIS FRIENDS. DETAINEE WAS ASKED IF HE COULD GIVE THE INFORMATION TO ANOTHER MUSLIM AND HE SAID HE WOULD NOT GIVE THE INFORMATION TO ANYONE NOT EVEN SADR HIMSELF. DETAINEE CLAIMED THIS WAS HIS MORAL PRINCIPLE AND IT CANNOT BE BROKEN.

DETAINEE WENT FURTHER INTO THE REASONS FOR HIS HATRED OF AMERICANS. HE SAID WHEN U.S. FORCES FIRST CAME TO IRAQ AND REMOVED SADDAM, HE LOVED US, JUST LIKE EVERY OTHER IRAQI. BUT

1.4a

WHEN PAUL BREMMYR SAID "WE (U.S.) ARE OCCUPIERS" THAT CHANGED EVERYTHING AND HE, LIKE MOST PEOPLE, BECAME MILITANT AGAINST US. WHEN ASKED IF HE WOULD FEEL THE SAME IF IT WAS IRAN OCCUPYING HIS COUNTRY HE SAID YES.

1.4c

DETAINEE SAID EVEN IF WE KEEP HIM IN JAIL, THERE WILL BE MANY MORE AS BAD AS HIM THAT WILL PICK UP WHERE HE LEFT OFF. DETAINEE CLAIMS THE ONLY VIABLE SOLUTION IS FOR US TO PROMISE AND MAKE THE PEOPLE BELIEVE THAT IF THEY STOP FIGHTING, WE WILL LEAVE THEIR COUNTRY. IF WE COULD DO THAT, PEOPLE LIKE HIM AND AL-SHAIBANI WOULD BE ABLE TO CONVINCE PEOPLE TO STOP FIGHTING. DETAINEE SAID WITHOUT IT, THE WAR WILL NEVER END STATING THAT EVEN IF WE KILL HIM, THERE WILL BE ANOTHER PERSON JUST LIKE HIM OR MAYBE WORSE TO TAKE HIS PLACE.

~~INTERROGATION APPROACH / TECHNIQUES (S//REL TO USA AND MCFI):~~

1.4c

~~4. COMMENTS (S//REL TO USA AND MCFI):~~

~~INTERROGATOR COMMENTS (S//REL TO USA AND MCFI):~~ 1.4c

1.4c

1.4c

SENIOR INTERROGATOR COMMENTS: NONE

~~5. POINTS OF CONTACT (U):~~

SIPR EMAIL

3.5c

NOTE: ALL ARABIC SPELLINGS ARE IAW DI POLICY NO. 033, "SPELLING NAMES OF FOREIGN PERSONS IN DI PRODUCTS," DATED 02 DEC 03 AND DDCICM DIRECTIVE, "INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STANDARD FOR THE TRANSLITERATION OF ARABIC NAMES IN FINAL WRITTEN REPORTS AND PRODUCTS," DATED 04 JUN 03, IN COMPLIANCE WITH SECTION 352 OF THE INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT OF 2003.

1.4a

PREP (U):

3.5c

AQC (U): BAGHDAD, IRAQ (2007/03/24)

ENCL (U): NONE

DISSEM (U): FIELD – NONE

WARNING (U): REPORT CLASSIFIED ~~SECRET // REL TO USA AND MCFI~~

DRV FROM (U): MNF-IMNC-I SGC VERSION 3, 27 MAY 04.

DECL ON: X1

Approved for Release