

Requirements for Security Sector Reform Success

A Monograph

by

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Abstract

Requirements for Security Sector Reform Success, by MAJ Lucas J. Yoho, US Army, 50 pages.

This monograph determined that political and economic stability are required for Security Sector Reform (SSR) success over the long term. This monograph studied the efforts of the United States in Kenya and Mali to determine if political and economic stability are necessary requirements for SSR success over the long term. This study suggests that states with stable political and economic institutions will benefit from SSR over a longer duration. Kenya was a success case; the United States conducted SSR activities in a relatively stable state resulting in a state that positively affects local and regional security issues. Mali was a failed case; the United States executed SSR activities in a politically and economically unstable state. This instability resulted in a military coup in 2012 with Mali unable to affect security within its own territory or the region, effectively negating SSR efforts by the United States. This study did not determine a threshold for stability in any particular institution but recommends as a start point, a comparison of state institutions in the region to determine stability relative to the regional environment of the targeted state. This study recommends that operational and strategic planners measure political and economic stability prior to executing SSR activities to suggest the probability of SSR success. If SSR activities are required regardless, planners must take measures to ensure some level of stability in the state or risk failure in SSR.

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Acronyms

ACOTA	African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance
ADP	Army Doctrinal Publication
ADRP	Army Doctrinal Reference Publication
AFRICOM	United States Africa Command
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
ATA	Anti-Terrorism Assistance
BPC	Building Partner Capacity
CEPPS	Consortium for Electoral and Political Processes
DOD	Department of Defense
DOS	Department of State
FI	Freedom Index
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GWOT	Global war on Terrorism
HDI	Human Development Index
ISIS	Islamic State in Iraq and Syria
JP	Joint Publication
MCA	Millennium Challenge Account
MCC	Millennium Challenge Corporation
NDAA	National Defense Authorization Act
NSS	National Security Strategy
PSI	Pan Sahel Initiative
RAND	Research and Development Corporation
SC	Security Cooperation
SSA	Sub-Saharan Africa
SSR	Security Sector Reform

TSCTP	Tran-Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WGI	Worldwide Governance Indicator

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Introduction

We prefer to partner with those fragile states that have a genuine political commitment to establishing legitimate governance and providing for their people.

- President Obama, 2015 United States National Security Strategy

The United States has intervened in Africa at the state and regional level for decades to build the security capacity and capability of our partners, stabilize affected regions and secure United States national interests. More often than not, the United States struggles to build lasting security in regions affected by conflict, poor governance, and weak economic systems. A recent example is Mali, where a significant effort to conduct Security Sector Reform (SSR) was undertaken for over a decade to improve security and stability in Mali and the surrounding area. Despite these efforts, the security situation deteriorated in 2012 resulting in a coup and intervention by French forces in 2013. Although the casual observer might believe that Mali failed as a directed result of a weak security apparatus, poor governance contributed to the coup and subsequent intervention by the French government.¹

This monograph argues that political and economic stability are required for SSR success over the long term. This monograph will demonstrate that political and economic institutions of a state must be stable in order for SSR to be successful and endure over the long term. Absent this stability, the United States must have programs in place to mitigate political and economic instability. To validate the thesis, this monograph will answer five questions. First, what is the US strategy towards Sub-Saharan Africa and do the wider national strategies support regional objectives? Second, what are the causes of conflict in in Sub-Saharan Africa? Third, what are current US policies and activities that support or improve political and economic stability in targeted states? Fourth, what are the metrics that indicate political and economic stability in a

¹ Dona J. Stewart, *What is Next for Mali?: The Roots of Conflict and Challenges to Stability* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College Press, 2013),1-2.

targeted state? Fifth, does political and economic stability contribute to SSR success over the long term?

The 2012 *United States Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa* aims to strengthen democratic institutions, spur economic growth, trade, and investment, advance peace and security, and promote opportunity and development.² This monograph is significant because it will demonstrate that strategic and operational planners need to ensure political and economic institutions are stable in a state prior to executing SSR activities. If these institutions are not stable, then planners should initiate a whole-of-government approach in keeping with US strategy to mitigate the risk of SSR failure.

This monograph will test this hypothesis in five parts: literature review, methodology, qualitative case study, analysis, and conclusion. The literature review will summarize current United States strategies at the national and regional levels to understand the pretense for SSR and Building Partner Capacity (BPC) activities. The author will examine current US Army doctrine to summarize how the US Army executes BPC and SSR to support United States security strategies at the national and regional levels. The author will review literature regarding historical trends in state failure and conflict to identify variables to apply against the qualitative case studies.

This study will use the qualitative case study analysis methodology to identify the different outcomes in the case studies. This study will select two states in Sub-Saharan Africa and apply the variables identified in the literature review to determine their effect on SSR success. These case studies will review the political and economic environments of the selected state, United States efforts to improve political and economic stability, and United States SSR efforts in the selected state. The analysis will determine if political and economic stability are present in the selected state and demonstrate a correlation between political and economic stability and SSR

² Barack Obama, *United States Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa* (Washington, DC: The White House, June 2012), 5.

success. The analysis section will contrast outcomes in each case study to determine if political and economic stability are required for SSR success. The last section of this monograph will conclude the results and provide recommendations for strategic and operational planners.

SSR and BPC are the two primary activities used to describe nation-building activities by the United States. SSR encompasses the wide variety of programs executed by the various agencies of the United States and includes programs that indirectly support security sector reform.³ Department of Defense (DOD), Department of State (DOS), and United States Agency for International Development (USAID) execute SSR programs. BPC is a very broad concept that includes all efforts, including SSR, to build the capacity of partnered states. BPC activities describe those programs that build political and economic institutions that also support SSR. BPC focuses on all government functions, not just the security sector. Using BPC as a framework to build national stability of a targeted nation will ensure that efforts in SSR will endure over the long term.⁴ Joint Publication (JP) 3-07, *Stability Operations*, recognizes that “combining security, governance and rule of law programs into a comprehensive package will prove more successful than individually executed programs.”⁵

Army Doctrinal Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-07, *Stability Operations*, recognizes the importance of engagements with fragile states and the importance of engaging these states as part

³ Joint Publication (JP) 3-07, *Stability Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2011), GL-5. SSR is “a comprehensive set of programs and activities undertaken to improve the way a host nation provides safety, security, and justice.”

⁴ Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-0, *Unified Land Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2011), 3. BPC is “the outcome of comprehensive inter-organizational activities, programs, and engagements that enhance the ability of partners for security, governance, economic development, essential services, rule of law, and other critical government functions.”

⁵ Joint Publication (JP) 3-22, *Foreign Internal Defense* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2010), C-2.

of the whole-of-government approach.⁶ “In peacetime, engagements with fragile states act as preventative measures, as well as reinforcing alliances and support for more stable nations. US forces conduct such engagements as part of a whole-of-government approach involving other instruments of national power.”⁷ Doctrine and our regional strategies highlight the importance of engaging failed and fragile states through a whole-of-government approach to affect political, economic, and security institutions.

Literature Review

The 2015 NSS directs a whole-of-government approach, focusing on politics, the economy, and security institutions, to achieve national security objectives. BPC and SSR are the activities that will achieve in part, NSS objectives. The 2015 *National Security Strategy* (NSS) states:

The nexus of weak governance and widespread grievance allows extremism to take root, violent non-state actors to rise up, and conflict to overtake state structures. To meet these challenges, the United States government will continue to work with partners and through multilateral organizations to address the root causes of conflict before they erupt and to contain and resolve them when they do. The focus of these efforts will be on proven areas of need and impact, such as inclusive politics, enabling effective and equitable service delivery, reforming security and rule of law sectors, combating corruption and organized crime, and promoting economic opportunity.⁸

The 2012 *US Strategy towards Sub-Saharan Africa* contains four pillars to advance national interests. Advancing regional security cooperation and security sector reform is a key task within the Advancing Peace and Security pillar designed to strengthen partnerships and

⁶ ADP 3-0, 5. A failed state is “a country that suffers from institutional weaknesses serious enough to threaten the stability of the central government. Fragile state refers to the broad spectrum of failed, failing, and recovering states.”

⁷ Army Doctrine Publication (ADRP) 3-07, *Stability* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2012), 2-2.

⁸ Barack Obama, *National Security Strategy* (Washington, DC: The White House, February 2015), 10.

secure national interests.⁹ The regional strategy in Sub-Saharan Africa also targets political and economic institutions for reform. This strategy recognizes and reinforces the whole-of-government approach to building stable states and advancing US national security interests.

The mission of the DOS and USAID is to “advance freedom for the benefit of the American people and the international community by helping to build and sustain a more democratic, secure, and prosperous world composed of well-governed states that respond to the needs of their people, reduce widespread poverty, and act responsibly within the international system.”¹⁰ The department of State and USAID are the primary agencies that will enable good governance and economic growth in partnered nations that require external assistance to achieve those goals. These organizations work with other government agencies to achieve governance and economic goals in other states that are critical to national security.

The NSS, the DOS and USAID strategy, and the Sub-Saharan Africa strategy provide the authority to conduct SSR and BPC using a whole-of-government approach. The analysis will demonstrate that a whole-of-government approach is necessary to ensure effects of SSR and BPC are enduring. The NSS, the DOS and USAID, and Sub-Saharan Africa strategies recognize and support a whole-of-government approach to achieve national security objectives.

The United States must initiate SSR and BPC programs at the appropriate time and location to increase the probability of SSR success over the long term. Army Doctrinal Publication (ADP) 3-0 uses the term “weak institutions” and “unstable government” to define the characteristics of a failed or failing state. States with weak governing institutions eventually destabilize the government to the point where conflict will erupt in an attempt to bring about change. These states are ideal locations for violent extremist organizations to operate with

⁹ Obama, *United States Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa*, 4-5.

¹⁰ Condoleezza Rice and Henrietta H. Fore, *Strategic Plan: Fiscal Years 2007-2012*, (Washington, DC: US Department of State, May 7, 2007), 9.

impunity because the government is unable to provide security and rule-of-law. Fragile or failing states affect the security of the United States so it is in the best interest of the United States to ensure the stability of internationally recognized states in areas susceptible to violent extremist organizations. Every strategy document from the national level to the regional level highlights the need for stabilized partnered states.

Colonization of Africa by European states and the subsequent de-colonization to independent states is a contributing factor of many of the problems in Africa. Many of these problems still exist today and contribute to the fragility of African states. Jeffrey Herbst states that African leaders contend with three problems when building states: “cost of expanding the domestic power infrastructure, the nature of national boundaries, and the design of the state system.”¹¹ Herbst argues, “States are only viable if they are able to control the territory defined by their borders. Control is assured by developing an infrastructure to broadcast power and by gaining the loyalty of citizens.”¹²

The cost of extending the domestic power infrastructure is a significant issue in Africa for those states with small populations dispersed across a vast territory. European states that colonized areas of Africa positioned infrastructure to control trade not populations. European powers were uninterested in the administration of territory because of the cost and likewise were unwilling to go to war with other powers for territory.¹³ As a result, newly independent African states often inherited domestic power infrastructure that did not effectively control the population. Herbst demonstrates that this is a problem for a small group of states, not the whole of Africa.¹⁴

¹¹ Jeffrey Ira Herbst, *States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), 13.

¹² *Ibid.*, 3.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 66-70.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 25.

Those states with a poor political geography – dispersed populations away from government centers of power – often struggle to control their small populations and protect against internal and external threats. States with consolidated population centers, regardless of the size, have tended to fare better in terms of control than states with dispersed populations. The size of an African state and its population density also affects the nature of conflicts. There are no guarantees on the outcome of these conflicts, but a state's ability to access and control the population will affect the course and duration of the conflict.¹⁵

The continuance of the colonial state system in Africa following de-colonization and independence made control and legitimacy in domestic affairs problematic. Many new African leaders turned their backs on the pre-colonial system of rule and continued the European state system of governance.¹⁶ This led to significant inter-state stability in Africa as a whole, but caused significant intra-state instability. This instability inside states is due to the personalization of authority, disaffection of elites from the government, and underdevelopment of political, economic, and security institutions. African states are economically weak with few exports that are highly vulnerable to economic downturns or uncontrollable factors such as weather. Militaries act more like political establishments with rampant corruption with leadership based on personal relationship to political and ethnic leaders.¹⁷

Economic boundaries and population boundaries also play a significant role in control and legitimacy in African states. Political manipulation of money supplies and the overvaluation of local currency weakened economic boundaries in many African states. This affected the legitimacy and control of rural or dispersed populations in many African states resulting in

¹⁵ Herbst, *States and Power in Africa*, 158-159.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 99.

¹⁷ Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, "Why Africa's Weak States Persist: The Empirical and the Juridical in Statehood," *World Politics* 35, no. 1 (1982): 7-11.

weakened institutions, legitimacy and control.¹⁸ Citizenship laws are another type of boundary that affects the stability of African states. Many African states maintain citizenship laws from the colonial period that adversely affect their legitimacy and control of the population. African states risk political and economic stability by maintaining antiquated citizenship laws when their respective territorial boundaries and population dispersion necessitates a change for the better.¹⁹

With the survey of the theory and history of state development in Africa complete, a review of literature that identifies causes of conflict – specifically civil war – is in order. Herge and Sambanis in *Sensitivity Analysis of Empirical Results on Civil War Onset* conclude that large populations, low per capita income, recent political instability, inconsistent democratic institutions, small militaries, rough terrain, war-prone and un-democratic regions, and low economic growth all contribute significantly to civil war onset.²⁰ Herge and Sambanis also concluded that ethnic fractionalization – diversity – was not a significant contributor to civil war onset.²¹ Fearon and Laitin in *Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War* conclude that low per capita income, political instability, large populations, and weak governments that are partially democratic and autocratic – anocracies – all contribute significantly to the onset of civil war or insurgencies.²² Fearon and Laitin concluded that ethnic or religious diversity and ethnic or political grievances did not significantly contribute to civil war onset.²³ In *Greed and Grievance in Civil War*, Collier and Hoeffler concluded that low Gross

¹⁸ Herbst, *States and Power in Africa*, 226.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 246.

²⁰ Herge, *Sensitivity Analysis of Empirical Results on Civil War Onset*, 531.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 529.

²² James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War," *American Political Science Review* 97, no. 1 (2003): 81-85.

²³ *Ibid.*, 75.

Domestic Product (GDP) per capita, low growth, and large populations among other factors contributed significantly to civil war onset.²⁴ Collier and Hoeffler find no significant correlation of political or social variable and the onset of civil war.²⁵

When States Implode: Africa's Civil Wars, Errol Henderson concluded that lack of development increases the probability of civil war in Africa. He also concluded that increased spending on security functions increased the probability of civil war.²⁶ African states with significant internal security issues, regardless of the source, will reduce budget allocations to social programs to pay for their security apparatus, resulting in the discontent of the population.²⁷

What Works Best When Building Partner Capacity and Under What Circumstances seeks to answer the question, "What can the history of US BPC efforts tell us about which approaches to capacity building are likely to be more or less effective under different circumstances?"²⁸ Relevant to this monograph, the study found that states with a healthy economy and good governance contribute to the success of BPC. Based on this finding, the study recommends that selected partnered states should have healthy economies and good governance.²⁹ This study uses the definition of BPC from *Building Partner Capacity: QDR Execution Roadmap* and defines BPC as "targeted efforts to improve the collective capabilities and performance of the

²⁴ Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "Greed and Grievance in Civil War," *Oxford Economic Papers* 56, no. 4 (2004): 587-589.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 563.

²⁶ Alfred G. Nhema and Tiyambe Zeleza, *The Roots of African Conflicts: The Causes & Costs* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2008), 63.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 58.

²⁸ Christopher Paul et al, *What Works Best when Building Partner Capacity and Under what Circumstances?* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2013), xiii.

²⁹ Paul, *What Works Best When Building Partner Capacity and Under What Circumstances*, xvii.

Department of Defense and its partners.”³⁰ Research and Development Corporation (RAND) published this article in 2013 but is using a definition from a document published in 2006. The current definition of BPC in ADP 3-0 accounts for efforts to build capacity across all essential state functions such as security, governance, essential services, and the rule of law.³¹ The study does recognize the contribution of agencies outside the DOD that contribute to security sector reform but it does not account for the contribution of capacity building in other areas that can directly or indirectly affect security sector reform. This study recognizes the importance of political and economic stability in its findings and recommendations but only recommends selecting partner states that exhibit political and economic stability.³² The study does not recommend action to stabilize these areas prior to or during security sector reform efforts. This study does recommend further research in executing security sector reform with less-than-ideal partners.³³ This monograph will attempt to fill some of this void.

In *Overcoming Obstacles to Peace: Local Factors in Nation-Building*, James Dobbins et al. identified local factors that cause conflicts and determined if external actors were able to work around these factors to ensure an enduring peace. This study examined six case studies to determine the presence of local factors that cause conflict, how interveners reacted to these local factors, and the degree of success they achieved. This study organized the case studies into five broad categories: geopolitical and geographical, social and cultural, economic, political, and institutional. This study widened its scope and reviewed 20 countries with nation-building

³⁰ US Department of Defense, *Building Partnership Capacity: QDR Execution Roadmap*, (Washington, DC: US Department of Defense, May 22, 2006), para. 1.3.1.

³¹ ADP 3-0, 3.

³² Paul, *What Works Best When Building Partner Capacity and Under What Circumstances*, xix.

³³ *Ibid.*, 92.

interventions to measure the degree of success in nation building.³⁴ The study concluded with recommendations to establish realistic expectations when conducting nation-building interventions.³⁵

The analysis revealed that the most influential factors that contributed to the onset of conflict and the resulting peace were geopolitics and patronage networks.³⁶ Based on the works examined, it is easy to see how the effects of geopolitics can affect conflict. In each of the six cases studied, the regional and global situation contributed significantly to the onset, sustainment, and termination of conflict.³⁷

The fact the patronage networks played a significant role in conflict is not so obvious but an important aspect in African affairs. The interaction of patronage networks and the state in Africa originated during the colonial period when western powers occupied Africa and used the African tribe to assist in the administration of the country.³⁸ Following the period of independence, many of these patronage networks remained as a source of power for fledging governments that attempted to turn a western colonial state into an independent nation-state. These patronage networks are entrenched in state political and economic institutions to extract wealth and remain relevant in the affairs of the state. Most modern state leaders will recognize publically that these networks are bad for the state, but also understand privately that these networks are a base of power and will continue to maintain them.³⁹ These patronage networks are

³⁴ James Dobbins et al., *Overcoming Obstacles to Peace: Local Factors in Nation-Building* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2013), 7-8.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 243.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, xx.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 237.

³⁸ Bruce J. Berman, "Ethnicity, Patronage and the African State: The Politics of Uncivil Nationalism," *African Affairs* 97, no. 388 (1998): 315-316.

³⁹ Berman, *Ethnicity, Patronage and the African State*, 306.

still prevalent in African states today and remain entrenched in political and economic institutions of the state.⁴⁰ The use of patronage networks by modern leaders today is a necessity if there state contains a dispersed rural population and the cost of extending state authority is prohibitive. These modern leaders attempt to balance the need for state legitimacy and power with traditional (tribal) authorities. State leaders acquiesce some power to traditional authorities to maintain state power and legitimacy writ large.⁴¹ The study concluded that in the six cases studied, African Leaders achieved some success by co-opting patronage networks, but these networks refused to support any institutional reforms that would limit their access to power and reduce their legitimacy.⁴²

This monograph contends that political and economic stability are requirements for SSR success. The easiest method to ensure SSR success is to choose states that are economically and politically stable before executing any SSR activities. National security objectives often force the United States to execute SSR activities in states that are economically and politically unstable. The United States attempts to build political and economic stability by executing a wide range of programs across the full spectrum of US agencies in a whole-of-government approach. If the United States executes this approach in conjunction with SSR, there is an increased probability that SSR efforts will be successful in the long term. The stability of each institution – political, economic, and security – relies on the stability of the other two institutions. Improving political,

⁴⁰ Dobbins, *Overcoming Obstacles to Peace: Local Factors in Nation-Building*, xxii.

⁴¹ Herbst, *States and Power in Africa*, 177-178.

⁴² Dobbins, *Overcoming Obstacles to Peace: Local Factors in Nation-Building*, 234-239. The study concludes further that states who were better off institutionally and economically before intervention were better off than those states that had significantly more issues at the start of intervention. This study also suggests that in their detailed case studies, some interveners did not make an effort to correct or mitigate factors that led to the conflict in the first place.

economic, and security institution in a targeted state amounts to nation building to prevent state failure.⁴³

Metrics of SSR success are notably absent in joint doctrine. *JP 3-07, Stability Operations*, does not provide metrics for SSR success but merely suggests that leaders evaluate SSR programs to ensure they deliver sustainable results.⁴⁴ The African Union published the *Policy Framework on Security Sector Reform* and did not publish any metrics on evaluating the success of SSR other than to say that leaders should evaluate SSR programs for progress.⁴⁵ Given the lack of metrics in United States doctrine and other works on SSR, leaders need to infer metrics of success from the purpose of SSR programs. The purpose of SSR, according to JP 3-07, is to improve the safety, security, and justice of the targeted state.⁴⁶ The purpose of SSR according to the African Union *Policy Framework on Security Sector Reform* is to “formulate or re-orient the policies, structures, and capacities of institutions and groups engaged in the security sector, in order to make them more effective, efficient, and responsive to democratic control, and to the security and justice needs of the people.”⁴⁷ Success in SSR is, therefore, determined when a targeted state’s security institutions are more effective, efficient, and responsive, and that those attributes improve the safety, security, and justice of people and property in the targeted state.

DOS and USAID execute policies and programs to improve the governance of targeted states and achieve national security objectives.⁴⁸ The objective of good governance is to promote

⁴³ Watson, *Nation-Building and Stability Operations*, 124; ADP 3-07, 11.

⁴⁴ JP 3-07, C-22.

⁴⁵ African Union Commission, *Policy Framework on Security Sector Reform* (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: African Union Commission), 21, accessed March 6, 2016, <http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/au-policy-framework-on-security-sector-reform-ae-ssr.pdf>.

⁴⁶ JP 3-07, GL-5.

⁴⁷ African Union Commission, *Policy Framework on Security Sector Reform*, 6.

⁴⁸ Rice, *Strategic Plan: Fiscal Years 2007-2012*, 10.

democratic institutions that are effective, responsive, sustainable, and accountable to the people.⁴⁹

The Department of State and USAID will accomplish this goal through the strengthening of legislative and legal processes, and working to reduce corruption. The Department of State and USAID will reduce corruption by employing programs such as the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), the Global Forum on Fighting Corruption, and the United Nations Convention Against Corruption. The Department of State and USAID will strengthen legislative and legal processes by training partnered states in these functions.⁵⁰

The Department of State and USAID executes policies and programs to promote economic growth and prosperity in a targeted state. Strengthening these states are vital to achieving national security objectives. The United States benefits from a stable and growing global economy and strengthening a partnered state's economy will decrease the probability of conflict and further United States interests in the targeted state. The United States will accomplish these economic goals by strengthening private markets and increasing trade and investment.⁵¹

The United States will strengthen private markets by improving the investment environment for public and private investors. This is done through the good governance initiatives explained above, again focusing on reducing corruption not only in governance, but ensuring that resource extraction corruption is reduced and increasing the transparency of state business practices. The Department of State and USAID will work through organizations such as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, the Anti-Bribery Convention of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.⁵²

⁴⁹ Rice, *Strategic Plan: Fiscal Years 2007-2012*, 17.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 19-20.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 26-27.

⁵² Rice, *Strategic Plan: Fiscal Years 2007-2012*, 27.

The Department of State and USAID also maintain a strategic goal of achieving peace and security. Achieving this goal and national security objectives requires diplomacy and foreign assistance across all state institutions to shape the security environment.⁵³ The Department of State and USAID understands that peace and security is at risk when a state is politically and economically unstable and there is rampant corruption in state institutions.⁵⁴

This monograph will measure political and economic stability from 2000-2014 to indicate the level of economic and political stability of a particular state. The variables that indicate political stability are the Freedom Houses Freedom Index (FI), and World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI). The variables that indicate economic stability are United Nations Development Program's Human Development Index (HDI), and World Bank's Gross Domestic Product (GDP). A positive trend in these variables will indicate a state's political and economic stability and a decrease in the likelihood of conflict. Economic and political stability will suggest that SSR will be successful over the long term. Dobbins et al. uses similar variables to estimate the probability of conflict following a nation-building intervention.⁵⁵ The analysis will attempt to identify current trends in political and economic stability to determine the long-term success of SSR. Dobbins et al. have indicated in their conclusion that the less a state needs assistance the better affect the assistance will have, in this case SSR.⁵⁶

Methodology

This monograph will use a qualitative methodology to validate the thesis. Qualitative research can follow quantitative research to explain linkages and relationships not readily apparent in quantitative research. Qualitative research is no less rigorous than other methods and

⁵³ Rice, *Strategic Plan: Fiscal Years 2007-2012*, 12.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 17.

⁵⁵ Dobbins, *Overcoming Obstacles to Peace: Local Factors in Nation-Building*, 247.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 234.

takes into consideration many casual relationships that may not be apparent in other forms of research.⁵⁷

The dependent variable in this study will be SSR success. The independent variables will be political and economic stability. The independent variables are the study variables. World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) and Freedom House's Freedom Index measure political stability. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and the United Nations Development Program's Human Development Index (HDI) measure economic stability in the selected cases. The author will survey the selected case studies history to identify events that promote political and economic stability or instability to determine a trend. These data points combined will suggest the political and economic stability of the selected case studies. This monograph will examine SSR activities in the selected case studies and identify the depth of SSR activities in the case studies and the effect on internal and regional security.

This monograph will use the case study technique with controlled comparison, method of differences to determine the effects of the study variables (political and economic stability) on the dependent variable (SSR success). Controlled comparison will determine if values of the independent variables (political and economic stability) are congruent or incongruent with the thesis and the method of difference will determine the effects of the study variables (political and economic stability) on the dependent variable (SSR success) by comparing values across cases.⁵⁸ This study will use table one to summarize each case study and then draw conclusions in relation to the thesis that political and economic stability are determinants of SSR success over the long term.

⁵⁷ John W. Creswell, *Qualitative Inquiry & Research Design: Choosing among Five Approaches*, 3rd ed. (Los Angeles, CA: Sage Publications, 2013), 40.

⁵⁸ Stephen Van Evera, *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), 56-57.

Table 1. Example Case Study Summary Table

Independent Variable	Trend
Political Stability	Positive/Negative
Economic Stability	Positive/Negative
Dependent Variable	Trend
SSR Activities	Positive/Negative

Source. The Author

To select cases for this study, each state must have had significant SSR support from the United States and have demonstrable political and economic stability or instability prior to and during SSR activities conducted by the United States. The author will select states where the United States initiated SSR activities within the last ten years. This characteristic will ensure the analysis is relevant and in the current context that the United States conducts SSR activities. The author will select one state where SSR was successful and one state where SSR was unsuccessful.

There is a wide range of states to select as case studies across Sub-Saharan Africa. Sub-Saharan Africa is a diverse region that can be further sub-divided give the wide disparity in environmental, political, social, security, and economic conditions that make-up this vast region. The United States is involved in, to varying degrees, many of the states in Sub-Saharan Africa. This study will examine political, economic, and security issues in the selected case studies; the involvement by the United States and the issues, either positive or negative, need to be significant to validate the thesis. A common security issue in the selected case studies will highlight the success or failures in each case study. Initial cursory research suggested that Nigeria, Mali, Chad, Niger, Ethiopia, and Kenya are all viable candidates for this study. These states all meet, to varying degrees, the requirements to validate the thesis.

Of the initial set of states selected for this study, further research suggests that Mali and Kenya provide the most distinct conditions and characteristics to validate the thesis. Mali had received significant SSR support from the United States but halted those efforts in 2012 due to a rebel uprising and Coup. Mali is currently contending with a rebel uprising that has support from

international terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Kenya is a significantly more stable state and has profited from SSR activities of the United States. Kenya provides a great deal of support to the situation in Somalia, which is critical to US national interests in the region. This monograph will use these two states to make the correlation of political and economic stability to the increase in the probability of SSR success over the long term.

Case Studies

This study examines the condition variables to indicate a level of stability in each case study from 2000-2014 or as data is available. Second, this section examines actions taken by the United States government to increase political and economic stability in each case study. Third, a review of the most recent SSR activities by the United States and others in the case study. Fourth, a summation and correlation between political and economic stability and the probability of SSR success. This study will capture case study conclusions in table format for comparison across case studies to draw conclusions and make recommendations.

Case Study – Kenya

Political Environment

Kenya gained independence from British rule in December 1963. Kenya's first president was Jomo Kenyatta. Kenyatta ruled a one-party government for the preponderance of his tenure until his death in 1978. He worked towards national reconciliation with the white colonist population, as he understood the importance of that relationship and the relationship with Western states. Kenyatta also understood the importance of a strong economy and worked to develop ties with the outside world.⁵⁹

⁵⁹ Guy Arnold, *Africa: A Modern History* (London: Atlantic, 2005), 265-268.

Jomo Kenyatta died in office in 1978 and Daniel Moi, Kenya's Vice-president, succeeded him as president. Daniel Moi continued the autocratic, one-party system of government during most of his tenure as president.⁶⁰ He continued many of the corrupt practices of his predecessor and garnered a significant human rights record by 1982. His government survived a 1982 coup attempt and he consolidated presidential powers decreasing the independence of the other branches.⁶¹ International aid donors stopped over one billion dollars in aid in November 1991 to force Moi to accept a multi-party system of government and national elections. He won this election in 1992 by dividing the opposition parties. He was unable to divide the opposition in 2002 and the people of Kenya voted him out of office after twenty-four years of rule.⁶²

Mwai Kibaki became the third ruler of Kenya in 39 years. The opposition parties were a representation of the general population, finally united against the political elite ruling party. Unfortunately, Mwai Kibaki continued along the path of his predecessor and continued excessively corrupt practices. Some estimates of the corruption go as high as \$750 million before it was exposed.⁶³ The December 2007 elections were blatantly fraudulent, but Kibaki declared himself the winner despite evidence to the contrary. Violence erupted across the country as a result. Raila Odinga, the true winner, and Mwai Odinga reached a compromise where Odinga would become prime minister of a coalition government Kibaki remained president. The leaders of the country, the political elite and the opposition, continued to pilfer the country with estimates in 2010 at four billion dollars per year.⁶⁴ The government was able to continue this pattern

⁶⁰ Guy Arnold, *Africa: A Modern History*, 366-367.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 692.

⁶² *Ibid.*, 814.

⁶³ Martin Meredith, *The Fate of Africa: A History of the Continent since Independence*, 2nd ed. (New York: Public Affairs, 2011), 702.

⁶⁴ Meredith, *The Fate of Africa*, 703-704.

because they would promise reform to international donors to keep aid money flowing into the country, and then never follow through with the promised reform measures.⁶⁵

The political history of Kenya after its independence in 1963 has been relatively stable under an extremely autocratic one party system of government. There was only one coup attempt and four changes in the presidency in the fifty-three years since Kenya's independence. Unfortunately, there has been significant corruption within the government that has stifled the prosperity of the population and the country. The autocratic one party system of government consolidated most of the power with the presidency that enabled corruption to run rampant throughout the government. International aid was the only mechanism that influenced the government to move away from autocracy and to a multi-party and democratic system of governance. Even then, corruption practices were so well entrenched that these practices continued after the establishment of a more democratic form of government.

A significant turning point in the government came in 2010 when Kenya adopted a democratic constitution. The constitution reduced the powers of the president and the legislative branch, giving these powers to local governance.⁶⁶ This study uses the World Wide Governance Indicators from the World Bank Database to determine the trend in political stability of Kenya and the Sub-Saharan region.⁶⁷ Figure one represents levels of corruption, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, voice and accountability, and political stability in Kenya from 2000 – 2014 as a percentile rank among all countries in the world. Given the totality of all the data represented, Kenya's government is better than the average of forty-nine governments in the Sub-Saharan region and there is a positive trend upward.

⁶⁵ Arnold, *Africa: A Modern History*, 693.

⁶⁶ John W. Harbeson, "Kenya's 2013 Elections," *African Studies Review* 57, no. 1 (2014): 199-202.

⁶⁷ "World DataBank," The World Bank, accessed January 27, 2016, <http://databank.worldbank.org/data/home.aspx>.




Figure 1. Kenya Governance Rank, 2000-2014.

Source. Data from The World Bank, “Explore Databases,” accessed February 18, 2016, <http://databank.worldbank.org/data/databases.aspx>.

From 2006 – 2009, Kenya maintained a downward trend in governance and this correlates to the period of high turbulence within the government, namely the disputed 2007 presidential election. Following the adoption of a new constitution in 2010, the trend reverses towards the positive. In all cases, Kenya’s government outperforms the other 49 governments in Sub-Saharan Africa during these two periods.

Freedom House’s Freedom Index (FI) of Kenya from 2000-2014 assessed that Kenya is partly-free based on the perceived rights and freedoms of the population. Kenya’s population perceives itself to have better rights and freedoms than do populations of other states in Sub-Saharan Africa. Figure two demonstrates a positive trend (downward) in the perception of rights and freedoms compared to other states in Sub-Saharan Africa. A positive trend in this indicator supports the positive trends of the Worldwide Governance Indicators.




Figure 2. Kenya’s Freedom Index, 2000-2014.

Source. Data from the Freedom House, “Freedom in the World Comparative and Historical Data,” accessed January 18, 2016, <https://freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world>.

The United States executes several programs in Kenya to promote good governance. The DOS and USAID are the lead agencies that execute these programs. The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) works with nations that demonstrate the desire to promote good governance and invest in its people.⁶⁸ Kenya received a twelve million dollar grant to improve the Kenyan health care procurement process system.⁶⁹ This program demonstrates a step by the Kenya government to improve systems that benefit its population. It also illustrates the United States commitment to improve governance and the economy in Kenya as a whole-of-government approach to stability in Kenya. The MCC uses the Freedom House and World Bank metrics to measure governance and the economy to determine eligibility for this program.

⁶⁸ “Who We Fund,” Millennium Challenge Corporation, accessed January 31, 2016, <https://www.mcc.gov/who-we-fund>.

⁶⁹ “Kenya Threshold Program,” Millennium Challenge Corporation, accessed January 31, 2016, <https://www.mcc.gov/where-we-work/program/kenya-threshold-program>.

Following the establishment of the 2010 constitution and the devolution of government power, the United States has continued significant support to the government of Kenya. From 2011-2014, the United States has spent sixty-seven million dollars on improving democracy and governance in Kenya.⁷⁰ From 2011-2014, the *Strengthening Institutions of Governance and Service Delivery to Entrench Transparency and Accountability Program* worked to advance Kenya's anti-corruption reforms outlined in the new constitution.⁷¹ The United States initiated the *Kenya Election and Political Process-Strengthening Program* to assist Kenya in improving the election process so that free and fair elections could take place. This program trained hundreds of government employees in the voting process and enabled the electoral commission to register over fourteen million citizens to vote in a thirty-day period.⁷²

An examination of the history of Kenya's political system and the stability of its political institution demonstrates that the Kenyan government has made great strides in becoming a stable democratic government. The data presented indicates that Kenya's progress is on par with the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa and metrics used to evaluate Kenya's political institution are trending upwards.

Economic Environment

Jomo Kenyatta recognized the importance of western support following the independence of Kenya. He adopted capitalist policies and invited private and foreign aid to bolster his

⁷⁰ "Kenya Dollars to Results," United States Agency for International Development, accessed January 31, 2016, <https://results.usaid.gov/kenya#fy2011>.

⁷¹ "Strengthening Institutions of Governance and Service Delivery to Entrench Transparency and Accountability," United States Agency for International Development, accessed January 31, 2016, <https://www.usaid.gov/kenya/fact-sheets/strengthening-institutions-governance-and-service-delivery-entrench>.

⁷² "Kenya Election and Political Process Strengthening Program," United States Agency for International Development, accessed January 31, 2016, <https://www.usaid.gov/kenya/fact-sheets/kenya-election-and-political-process-strengthening>.

fledgling economy. He fostered a positive relationship with western leaders and returned much of Kenya's agricultural land back to the people of Kenya by the 1970's. Kenya's economy is largely agricultural, amounting to just over a five percent annual growth per year in the 1970's. During the 1960's, Kenyatta managed an average GDP growth rate of six percent in the 1960's and six and a half percent in the 1970's. This is an impressive rate of growth for a newly independent Kenya in a region marred by economic difficulties. Kenyatta's western views on economic strategy and his complete control of the government contributed to Kenya's early economic success. The side effect of his autocratic one-party system of government is that it separated the political elite from the rural and poor population and making those in positions of power richer and the poor, poorer.⁷³

The Kenyan economy thrived in the 1960's and 1970's because of Kenyatta's efforts but it came at a high cost of corruption and disenchantment of the working class citizen. With the transition to Daniel Moi as president, the practice of corruption continued. Daniel Moi and others used financial aid to continue to operate the economy in a fraudulent manner with aid grants amounting to three percent of GDP by 1990.⁷⁴ Daniel Moi made very little attempts at economic reform, just enough to continue the flow of aid into the Kenyan economy and ultimately their own pockets. By 1992, aid accounted for thirty percent of government expenditures.⁷⁵

An examination of Kenya's economic history showed great potential in the early decades since independence with strong autocratic leaders as the driving force. Weak leadership in Kenya following Kenyatta's rule created conditions for corrupt practices to affect economic stability. The weakening of the economy through corrupt practices also led to a rift between leaders and the general population.

⁷³ Meredith, *The Fate of Africa*, 265-266.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 373.

⁷⁵ Meredith, *The Fate of Africa*, 402.

The *World Bank Kenya Country Partnership Strategy FY2014-2018* reports that Kenya’s new constitution can have a positive impact on prosperity. The new constitution will bring the government closer to the people and increase local-level accountability if properly implemented.⁷⁶ The most pressing economic issue in Kenya is poverty, estimated at 39% in 2012, down from 47% in 2002.




Figure 3. Kenya’s GDP per Capita, 2000-2014.

Source. Data from The World Bank, “Explore Databases,” accessed February 18, 2016, <http://databank.worldbank.org/data/databases.aspx>.

The average annual growth rate of Kenya’s GDP per capita from 2000-2014 is 1.69 percent. The Sub-Saharan region maintained an average annual GDP per capita growth rate of 1.86 percent during the period from 2001-2013. Kenya is underperforming its peers in Sub-Saharan Africa but its economic growth does display a positive trend since 2000 as shown in figure three. Figure three demonstrates that Kenya has the ability to grow its economy, but it does

⁷⁶ Diarietou Gaye and Oumar Seydi Cheikh, *Kenya Country Partnership Strategy for Kenya, FY 2014-2018*, (The World Bank, June 2014), 12, accessed February 1, 2016, http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2014/06/25/000442464_20140625105403/Rendered/PDF/889400CAS0P1440Kenya0CPS000Volume02.pdf.

so inconsistently, usually interrupted by events that would not impede growth in a more robust economy. The World Bank states that Kenya needs uninterrupted growth to reduce poverty and improve prosperity.⁷⁷

The Human Development Index (HDI) measures the standard of living, health, and education of the population. Figure four shows that Kenya's HDI is slightly better than the Sub-Saharan region, indicating a better standard of living. This rating correlates with GDP growth represented in figure four and the governance indicators in figure one.

The United States executes economic programs in Kenya to assist in strengthening the economy as part of a whole-of-government approach. The United States, through USAID, spent over 135 million dollars towards economic development projects through Kenya from 2011-2014. These programs focused on agriculture, a primary sector in Kenya, private sector competitiveness programs, and economic opportunity programs.⁷⁸

Kenya's economy is relatively stable given the conditions in Kenya and in the Sub-Saharan region. It does underperform but has the potential to succeed given the right conditions. Kenya's 2010 constitution provides the economy the best opportunity to remain stable and perform consistently if government leaders implement the constitution correctly. The United States executed economic programs across Kenya to strengthen institutions and provide opportunities in the private sector.

⁷⁷ Ibid., 2-16.

⁷⁸ "Dollars to Results, Economic Opportunity in Kenya," United States Agency for International Development, accessed February 1, 2016, <https://results.usaid.gov/kenya/economic-development/economic-opportunity#fy2011>.

Security Sector Reform Activities

The 1998 US embassy bombings in Kenya, the attacks in New York on September 11, 2001, and the 2002 terrorist attacks in Mombasa, Kenya were all catalysts for the United States to increase SSR efforts in Kenya. In the last 15 years, Kenya has become a significant partner in United States efforts to combat terrorism in East Africa. This section is a selective review of those efforts to highlight the depth of support provided by the United States to Kenya.




Figure 4. Kenya's Human Development Index, 2000-2014.

Source. Data from the United Nations Development Programme, "Table 2: Trends in the Human Development Index, 1990-2014," accessed February 18, 2016, <http://hdr.undp.org>.

Kenya has built and maintained a large transit infrastructure making it key terrain for United States efforts in East Africa. Kenya has large international airports connected to a significant rail and road network. Kenya also maintains a large seaport located in Mombasa. These and other facilities are vital for not only the United States, but also other international and regional partners. The United States has long-standing military access rights with Kenya and uses

these rights to conduct military and humanitarian operations throughout Africa and the Middle East region.⁷⁹

Following the attacks in New York in 2001 and Mombasa in 2002, the United States put significant pressure on Kenya and others to take action against terrorist organizations in East Africa. The United States offered East African nations a substantial aid package to conduct training and equipping of counterterrorism units. Kenya responded to the call and began significant, although questionable counterterrorism operations in East Africa that continue to the present.⁸⁰

Kenya has benefited from military aid for most of its existence, but more so in the period from 2000-2014. Figure five shows the amount of military aid received by Kenya from 2000-2014. In these programs alone, Kenya has received over \$540 million from 2000-2014. Beginning in 2002, Kenya and other nations around the globe have benefited from several programs under overseas contingency operations to counter terrorism and other threats. The United States developed the East African Counterterrorism Initiative and pledged \$100 million to East African states to combat terrorism. Of this, Kenya received eighty-eight million dollars. Kenya received an additional seventeen million dollars from 2006-2007 to combat terrorism.⁸¹ In 2008, the United States developed a “Ranger Strike Force” for the Kenyan military to counter armed groups and provided equipment and training for the Kenyan Maritime Police Unit.⁸²

⁷⁹Joel Barkan and Jennifer Cooke, “U.S. Policy Toward Kenya in the Wake of September 11: Can New Antiterrorist Imperatives Be Reconciled with Enduring U.S. Foreign Policy Goals?” *Africa Notes*, no. 4 (December 2001): 1, accessed February 1, 2016, http://csis.org/files/media/isis/pubs/anotes_0112.pdf.

⁸⁰ Jeremy Prestholdt, "Kenya, the United States, and Counterterrorism," *Africa Today* 57, no. 4 (2011): 10.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 10-11.

⁸² Prestholdt, *Kenya, The United States, and Counterterrorism*, 11.




Figure 5. United States Military Aid Received by Kenya, 2000-2014.

Source. Data from Security Assistance Monitor, "Data," accessed February 18, 2016, <http://www.securityassistance.org/data>.

Kenya maintained a non-interventionist policy in East Africa since its independence in 1963. This changed in October 2011 when Kenya crossed the Somali border to defend Kenya against terrorist attacks and establish a protected area for Somali refugees to return to Somalia.⁸³ Kenya acted unilaterally during this operation but worked closely with the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). The United Nations (UN) authorized the integration of Kenyan forces into the AMISOM force in July 2012 where they remain active today.⁸⁴

Kenya profited from this intervention with a continued stream of aid and training from the United States to bolster Kenya's security sector. As an example, The Partnership for Regional East African Counterterrorism (PREACT) provided Kenya over ten million dollars from 2009-2013 and the FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) obligated eight million

⁸³ Lauren Blanchard, "Kenya: Current Issues and U.S. Policy," *Current Politics and Economics of Africa* 6, no. 1 (2013): 84; Helge-Mari Loubser and Hussein Solomon, "Responding to State Failure in Somalia," *Africa Review* 6, no. 1 (2014): 9.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 84.

dollars in 2012 for AMISOM related operations.⁸⁵ The United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) trains Kenyan forces participating in AMISOM through the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance program (ACOTA).⁸⁶ AFRICOM also provides specialized training and logistical support to Kenyan forces participating in AMISOM.⁸⁷ In 2011 and 2012, Kenya received over eight million dollars through the DOS Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) program, focused on border and coastal security and law enforcement programs.⁸⁸ These programs demonstrate the United States effort to reform and improve the Kenyan security sector as they combat internal and regional security threats.

Kenya received substantial support from the United States in terms of training and equipping a wide array of security forces in Kenya. This level of support speaks to the confidence that the United States government has in Kenyan officials to counter violent extremist organizations in East Africa. Initially focused on domestic terrorism, Kenya's expansion as a regional security provider is an indicator of Kenya's capability and the confidence that the United States has in Kenya to prosecute counterterrorism operations in East Africa.

Kenya is a significant partner of the United States in Sub-Saharan Africa. Kenya contributes military power to the security of the region by combating violent extremist organizations inside Kenya and has a sizable presence in Somalia. The United States spends considerable resources to equip and train Kenyan forces. These efforts have enabled Kenya to suppress terrorist activity in East Africa with considerable success.

⁸⁵ Blanchard, *Kenya: Current Issues and U.S. Policy*, 90.

⁸⁶ *Statement of General David M. Rodriguez, Commander United States Africa Command: Hearing before the Sub-Committee on Defense, 113th Cong., April 23, 2013*, 14.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 19.

⁸⁸ Blanchard, *Kenya: Current Issues and U.S. Policy*, 90.

Kenya maintains a relatively stable political institution compared to other states in Sub-Saharan Africa. The recent enactment of a new constitution has increased political stability in Kenya. The government maintains a multi-party democratic system that has been successfully in recent years. It does need to make significant strides in the prevention of corruption and the reduction of poverty to become a trusted agent of the Kenyan people. The government peacefully transferred the presidency through relatively free and fair elections in 2013.

Kenya is one of the largest economies in Africa. It is relatively stable but under-performing economy. Kenya’s economy has the potential for positive and sustained growth if the government can enforce the 2010 constitution. Kenya is politically and economically stable and SSR activities by the United States have increased the capacity and capability of the Kenyan security sector to suppress violent extremist organizations. Table two is a summary of this case study.

Table 2. Kenya Case Study Summary

Independent Variable	Trend
Political Stability	Positive
Economic Stability	Positive
Dependent Variable	Trend
SSR Activities	Positive

Source. The Author

Case Study – Mali

Political Environment

Kenya gained its independence from France in June 1960. Modibo Keita was the first president of Mali and attempted to establish a socialist state, leaving the franc zone and western democracy behind. Mali was a fragile, sparsely populated, and landlocked country, conditions not favorable to socialism. This new state did not have any developed resources or significant sources of revenue at independence and quickly struggled economically. The poor economic situation forced Mali to re-enter the franc zone and as a result, was subject to French supervision of the

economy and a significant devaluation of its currency. This, along with his oppressive policies, led to a military coup in 1968.⁸⁹

A military commission appointed Moussa Traore as the new president of Mali.⁹⁰ Like many coups and resulting leadership changes in Africa, the same oppressive policies remained despite the original reason for the coup, that is, to establish a new and improved government. Moussa Traore ended socialist policies, established better relations with France, but maintained a relationship with the United Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) throughout the 1970's. He maintained a one-party system of government and prohibited any opposition to his government. Mali struggled financially and combined with the oppressive form of government President Traore contended with several unsuccessful coups during his tenure. He was unable to maintain support with the military, civil service, or Keita loyalists. As a result, he could not make many reforms or attract foreign investments to Mali.⁹¹

The military executed another coup attempt in March of 1991 and successfully deposed President Traore after over twenty-one years at the head of Mali. This coup was successful because the World Bank and International Monetary Fund forced Traore to allow greater political freedom in exchange for economic support. This resulting political freedom sparked demonstrations and violent opposition by Traore loyalists. These events enabled the military to execute a successful coup. An interim government was established and the Malian citizens elected Alpha Konare in the first democratic elections since independence.⁹² Alpha Konare was

⁸⁹ Arnold, *Africa: A Modern History*, 121.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 364.

⁹² *Ibid.*, 686.

president for a full two terms in accordance with the constitution and left office peacefully in 2002 after the election of Anadou Toure.⁹³

Anadou Toure was president from 2002-2012, but the military deposed him through a successful coup just prior to the elections that would have identified his replacement. The military was unhappy with the government's poor response to the Tuareg violence in Northern Mali and its failure to properly equip the Malian Army to respond to the violence.⁹⁴ Up until the coup of 2012, most observers in Africa hailed Mali as a model for democracy in Africa with many pointing to the recent democratic elections, establishment of political and religious freedom, and the decentralization of government power, now in the hands of local governments as the primary reasons for Mali's success.⁹⁵

As early as 2006, middle-class citizens understood that in the past, power and corruption was centralized, but in 2006 everyone was corrupt to one degree or another.⁹⁶ Following the 1991 coup and democratization of Mali, the state appeared to be a model of democracy in Africa. By 2006 however, that model began to fail under the burden of corruption that was now present at every level of government. There were many signs that the Malian government was doing the right things in 2006: poverty was down eight percent from 2001, primary school enrollment was up twenty-four percent from 2001, road infrastructure was improved, and motorcycle and cell phone ownership was on the rise. By 2006, President Toure had co-opted political parties within the government, suppressed all opposition, and slowly consolidated executive powers. Without

⁹³ Stewart, *What is Next for Mali*, 24.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 37.

⁹⁵ Robert Pringle, "Mali's Unlikely Democracy," *The Wilson Quarterly* (1976-) 30, no. 2 (2006): 32.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 36.

opposition or dissent, the democratic government did not debate issues or policy and approval of presidential policies became essentially automatic.⁹⁷

The World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators for Mali from 2000-2014 is represented in figure six. The graph also compares the data for the 50 states in Sub-Saharan Africa with Mali. It is clear that the perception of governance in Mali is excellent compared to the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa until 2007 when there is a significant drop-off in the effectiveness of the Malian government. Mali decreased its effectiveness rank by 13.7 percentage points from 2000-2014. Sub-Saharan Africa decreased its effectiveness rank by only .16 percentage points over the same period.




Figure 6. Mali’s Governance Rank, 2000-2014.

Source. Data from The World Bank, “Explore Databases,” accessed February 18, 2016, <http://databank.worldbank.org/data/databases.aspx>.

The perceived inability of the government to act on the rising Tuareg rebellion in Northern Mali led the Malian Army to execute a coup and remove President Toure from power.

⁹⁷ Bruce Whitehouse, "A Festival of Brigands": In Search of Democracy and Political Legitimacy in Mali," *Strategic Review for Southern Africa* 35, no. 2 (2013): 38-39.

Under international pressure, Captain Amadou Sanago, the coup leader, established an interim government under the parliamentary leader Dioncounda Traore.⁹⁸ Mali conducted elections in 2013, electing Ibrahim Keita as the head of government. The government of Mali was unable to contain the Tuareg rebellion in the North and France intervened to prevent Tuareg rebels from taking over Mali.

The Freedom Index measures the perception of freedom by the population. This data correlates with the perception of governance indicated in figure six. The perceived level of freedom is directly attributable to the perception of governance. Figure seven is a comparison of Mali's perception of freedom against the Sub-Saharan Africa region. A lower number indicates a perception of increased freedom in the surveyed state. Mali's perception of freedom is higher than Sub-Saharan Africa up until 2012 where it decreases significantly. This drop coincides with the coup in 2012 and increase conflict with the Northern Tuareg population.

The United States attempted to improve political and economic stability in Mali through USAID. The United States provided over \$1.7 billion from 2001-2014 through USAID programs to improve a wide range of non-security related institutions in Mali.⁹⁹ Figure eight depicts the expenditures by USAID from 2000-2014. The United States allowed some aid in Mali following the coup to prevent human suffering, but there was a significant decrease in funding for 2013. The United States briefly suspended aid following the 2012 coup but has since lifted these restrictions following the 2013 democratic elections.¹⁰⁰ USAID provides governance assistance

⁹⁸ Stewart, *What is Next for Mali*, 25.

⁹⁹ "Foreign Aid Explorer," United States Agency for International Development, accessed February 25, 2016, <https://explorer.usaid.gov>.

¹⁰⁰ *Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance Assessment of Mali*, (United States Agency for International Development, June 2014), 38, accessed February 25, 2016, https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1860/Mali_2014DRG%20Assessment_public_FINAL.pdf.

through the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) by promoting good governance, rule of law, and political stability.

The United States assisted with elections in 2013 through the Consortium for Electoral and Political Processes (CEPPS) and assists with building local governance in the *Programme de Gouvernance Partagee*.¹⁰¹ The United States has worked to build governance in Mali and reduce




Figure 7. Mali’s Freedom Index, 2000-2014.

Source. Data from the Freedom House, “Freedom in the World Comparative and Historical Data,” accessed January 18, 2016, <https://freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world>.

the drivers of political instability. Mali’s political institutions remain unstable and sensitive to actions that might further destabilize the government. Mali’s political history and the perception of government effectiveness from 2000-2014 suggests that Mali is far from politically stable. The decisive coup and insurgent conflict quickly refuted the notion that Mali is a model democracy in Africa. Mali’s effectiveness rating is below all of Sub-Saharan Africa and that trend will continue unless Mali takes steps to reverse that course.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., 39.




Figure 8. United States Non-military Aid to Mali, 2001-2014.

Source. Data from the United States Agency for International Development, “Foreign Aid Explorer,” accessed February 28, 2016, <https://explorer.usaid.gov>.

Economic Environment

After independence, Mali’s government left the protection of the economic franc zone and pursued socialist economic practices that ultimately failed. Mali attempted to control most aspects of the Malian economy. As an example, Mali set up twenty-three state enterprises, everything from garages to bookshops, all failing to produce revenue.¹⁰² By 1967, Mali returned to the franc zone and the French penalized Mali with a devaluation of their currency and strict supervision of the economy by French administrators.¹⁰³ Subsistence agriculture defines much of Mali’s economy and with little arable land, the state struggled to develop a stable economy early in its independence.

¹⁰² Meredith, *The Fate of Africa*, 278.

¹⁰³ Arnold, *Africa: A Modern History*, 121.

In the 1970's, Mali suffered a severe drought, losing forty percent of its food production and forty percent of its cattle in 1972.¹⁰⁴ By one account in 1981, the Malian government paid rice farmers sixty-three francs for a kilo of rice that cost eighty francs to produce. The effect of poor governance due to corruption and mismanagement influenced the economic stability of Mali. The president of Mali was unable to reform their state enterprises due to a lack of popular support in civil service. Foreign investors at this point were unwilling to invest in Mali.¹⁰⁵ Poor governance, a disenfranchised population, and a weak economy is a vicious cycle that Mali cannot seem to break.




Figure 9. Mali's GDP per Capita Growth, 2000-2014.

Source. Data from The World Bank, "Explore Databases," accessed February 18, 2016, <http://databank.worldbank.org/data/databases.aspx>.

Between 1991 and 2012, the international community perceived Mali as a model democracy and Mali received significant international aid in an attempt bolster its weak economy.

¹⁰⁴ Meredith, *The Fate of Africa*, 276.

¹⁰⁵ Arnold, *Africa: A Modern History*, 364.

Even today, Mali’s economy remains heavily dependent on the agriculture and gold sectors, which is also subject to significant changes in the environment and commodity prices.¹⁰⁶ Mali’s economy has rebounded slightly as of 2014, but the systemic poor governance will likely hamper any sustainable growth. Figure nine is the annual growth of Mali’s Gross Domestic Product per capita from 2000-2014.




Figure 10. Mali’s Human Development Index, 2000-2014.

Source. Data from the United Nations Development Programme, “Table 2: Trends in the Human Development Index, 1990-2014,” accessed February 18, 2016, <http://hdr.undp.org>.

Mali’s HDI is significantly lower than the regional average. Although not a direct measurement of economic growth and stability, Mali’s weak subsistence economy affects the HDI. Figure ten compares the HDI in Mali against the remainder of Sub-Saharan Africa.

The United States, along with a multitude of international actors, have attempted to improve Mali’s economy through several programs and funding streams in the last two decades. The Millennium Challenge Corporation signed a \$461 million agreement with Mali in 2006 to

¹⁰⁶ Denise Youngblood-Coleman, *2015 Country Review: Mali*. (Houston, TX: CountryWatch Publications, 2015), 127-128, accessed February 15, 2016, <http://www.countrywatch.com/Content/pdfs/reviews/B3MZ6M58.01c.pdf>.

reduce poverty and improve economic growth. The United States briefly suspended the agreement in 2012 because of a coup, but the United States had already spent \$436 million.¹⁰⁷ USAID has dispersed over \$1.7 billion in economic aid to Mali from 2001-2014.¹⁰⁸ Although the economy is small and highly dependent on uncontrollable conditions such as weather, the investment should have at least stabilized the economy and made it more predictable. The other condition that affects the economy is the level of good governance, which the data presented suggests is poor.

Security Sector Reform Activities

West Africa had little strategic interest in Africa prior to the World Trade Center attacks on September 11, 2001. Under the hospice of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), the United States developed and implemented several programs to counter any transnational terrorist organizations. Mali was a benefactor of these programs, receiving millions of dollars in counterterrorism funds and training by the United States military.¹⁰⁹

The United States developed the Pan Sahel Initiative (PSI) and later the Trans Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) in 2002 and 2005 respectively to counter violent extremism by strengthening counterterrorism capabilities of regional states, promoting good governance, and cooperation between security and intelligence organizations within the Sahel region.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁷ “Mali Bilateral Assistance Fact Sheet,” Embassy of the United States, accessed February 25, 2016, <http://mali.usembassy.gov/embassy-news/cooperation-fact.html>.

¹⁰⁸ “Foreign Aid Explorer,” United States Agency for International Development, accessed February 25, 2016, <https://explorer.usaid.gov>.

¹⁰⁹ Stewart, *What is Next for Mali*, 46.

¹¹⁰ “Programs and Initiatives,” United States Department of State, accessed February 26, 2016, <http://www.state.gov/j/ct/programs/>.

The United States only spent thirty-seven million dollars on Mali's security sector in the last fourteen years.¹¹¹ The United States focused on counterterrorism capabilities in Mali and did not spend any appreciable time or effort on building security institutions. This focus may have exacerbated the weak political situation in Mali by focusing on military capability and not the overall security or political institution.¹¹²

The Malian Army executed a coup in 2012 because of grievances with the government's inability to combat Tuareg aggression in Northern Mali. The United States spent \$400 million in the five years before the coup on civil assistance projects and over one billion dollars after the coup to assist France in restoring order.¹¹³ Mali's political history has been rife with corruption, coup attempts, and perceived ineffectiveness throughout its history. A successful coup and unchecked insurgent conflict in 2012-2013 suggests an unstable Malian government despite its democratic system of government. These events brought serious inquiry to the idea that Mali was a model for democracy. These inquiries highlighted serious issues with corruption and poor governance that a democratic multi-party system of government should have mitigated. Mali struggled to improve or at least maintain its economy throughout its history. The United States and others contributed a significant amount of money to improve Mali's economy, with little return on their investment. The data suggests that United States efforts in Mali did not have the effect of bringing stability to Mali or Western Africa. Despite the international community's efforts to assist, Mali's economy remains unstable. Poor governance also attributed to the instability of the economy despite a period of democracy. The Malian government was unable to

¹¹¹ Security Assistance Monitor, "Data," accessed February 18, 2016, <http://www.securityassistance.org/data>.

¹¹² Stewart, *What is Next for Mali*, 49-50.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, 66.

check Tuareg rebel attacks in Northern Mali and as a result, the Malian Army executed a coup in protest of the government's inaction against the Tuareg rebels.

The United States has executed SSR in Mali since 2002 to prevent West Africa from becoming a sanctuary for transnational terrorism. The United States focused on tactical level counterterrorism training and failed to make substantive investments in security institutions. It is possible that this training and development at the tactical level contributed to the military executed coup in 2012. Mali has not proven itself as a politically or economically stable state despite the efforts by the United States and others that provided time, money, and resources to improve the political, economic, and security institutions in Mali. The United States focused its SSR activities on tactical level counterterrorism and failed to build institutional capacity and capability. Table three is a summary of the findings of this case study.

Table 3. Mali Case Study Summary

Independent Variable	Trend
Political Stability	Negative
Economic Stability	Positive
Dependent Variable	Trend
SSR Activities	Negative

Source. The Author.

Analysis

The data sets, time-periods, and dependent variables differ slightly in each study. This study concludes that taken collectively, political stability, economic stability, and military strength contribute to the onset of civil war. Caution must always be taken when making inferences from any analysis, as there are no doubt many other factors that contribute to the onset of civil war when analyzing a specific state or region.¹¹⁴ The use of statistically significant data

¹¹⁴ Dobbins, *Overcoming Obstacles to Peace: Local Factors in Nation-Building*, 25.

combined with a comparison of non-statistical data will provide a more complete conclusion as to the determinants of the onset of civil war.

Research suggested that Kenya was a politically and economically stable state that has benefited from SSR for a long period. Research suggested that Mali is a politically and economically unstable state that has not benefited from SSR activities. Multiple coups, negative economic events, corruption, and population disenfranchisement created political and economic instability. This instability led to the latest coup in 2012 despite the significant SSR effort by the United States. Research even suggests that the SSR provided may have contributed to the political instability of the state.

The Kenya case study suggests that it is politically and economically stable and SSR activities are having a positive effect in Kenya and the surrounding region. Kenya currently outperforms the region in the perception of governance effectiveness as shown in figure 1. Kenya's political history was autocratic for the first four decades but has transitioned to a multi-party democracy in the last two decades. This form of government was not optimal and much work remains to be done in terms of legitimacy, but the government has been predictable for its entire history.

This consistent political stability has contributed to Kenya's economic stability. The economy has demonstrated a positive trend from 2000-2014 and the data suggest that this trend will continue as show in figure three. The United States has provided a significant funding stream to Kenya since 2001. Kenya has become a regional security force that has become a committed partner in countering terrorism in east Africa. SSR efforts by the United States have facilitated a wide range of improvements across Kenya's security apparatus. Kenya's efforts in Somalia is the testament to successful efforts by the United States to build partner capacity across institutions. The data suggests that SSR efforts in Kenya will continue to be successful over the long term. There is no denying that Kenya has much to improve on in terms of corruption, rule of law, and

human rights. The Freedom Index and the Human Development Index points to improvements Kenya needs to make even though Kenya is trending above the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa as indicated in figures two and four.

The data in this study suggests that Mali is politically and economically unstable. Mali has been subject to a turbulent political history rife with coups, civil unrest, and civil disobedience. This pattern continues despite a movement to a democratic system of government in the early 1990's. The WGI for Mali from 2000-2014 initially outperforms Sub-Saharan Africa but takes a sharp downward turn beginning in 2007. The inability of the government and the depth of corruption throughout all layers of government created a disenfranchised population that was not supportive of the government. The Malian Army executed a coup in 2012 due to the government's inability to defeat a rebellion in Northern Mali. Mali's economy is high susceptible to conditions that are outside the governments control. Changing climate conditions have adversely affected the agriculturally based economy several times during Mali's short history as an independent state. Combined with Mali's poor governance, the economic growth is erratic.

The United States began an extensive SSR activities focused on counterterrorism after 2001. The United States has focused on tactical level capability and failed to build any appreciable security institutions. The coup in 2012 forced the United States to suspend all aid to Mali. The United States lifted aid restrictions in 2012 but SSR progress had already taken a step backwards because of poor governance.

Table 4. Case Study Summary

	Kenya Trend	Mali Trend
Independent Variable		
Political Stability	Positive	Negative
Economic Stability	Positive	Positive
Dependent Variable		
SSR Activities	Positive	Negative

Source. The Author.

Conclusion

The purpose of this monograph was to prove that political and economic stability are required for SSR success. The monograph used a qualitative case study technique with controlled comparisons, method of differences to determine the effects of political and economic stability on the probability of SSR success. The author selected Mali and Kenya for the case studies based on the cursory research conducted to select cases. Research suggested that Mali and Kenya met the necessary conditions prescribed in the methodology section. Both states received significant support from the United States in the political, economic, and security sectors over a long period.

This study suggests that political and economic stability are significant determinants in increasing the probability of SSR success over the long term. Contrasting the two case studies, Kenya is considerably more stable politically and economically, whereas Mali struggles politically and economically. SSR activities have been successful in Kenya to the point where they are influencing regional security. Contrasting the two case studies suggests that the less a state needs assistance, the more the state will benefit from it.¹¹⁵ Kenya has benefited from SSR activities more so than Mali. Studies have suggested that SSR activities executed in Mali may have contributed to the coup due in large part to the political instability already present. The United States executed SSR activities in Mali, albeit at a lower level of resourcing and focus, and witnessed their efforts negated with a coup executed by a United States trained army captain. Building partnered capacity in the political, economic, and security institutions in Mali at a suitable rate could have mitigated conditions that led to the 2012 coup. Mali was unable to check a rebellion in Northern Mali and was forced to accept French intervention to prevent the government from being overthrown by Tuareg rebels.

Army doctrine characterizes a failed or failing state as one with weak institutions and an unstable government. SSR activities are those programs and activities that improve that way a

¹¹⁵ Dobbins, *Overcoming Obstacles to Peace: Local Factors in Nation-Building*, 234.

host nation provides safety, security, and justice and BPC activities enhance the capability of host states to provide, in part, security, governance, and economic development for their respective states. The United States conducts BPC and SSR activities in states throughout Africa to build the capacity of political, economic, and security institutions to enhance the stability of partnered states and mitigate threats to the United States and our partners. Improving these institutions is part of our national and regional strategies.

This study recommends that future SSR planning take into account the political and economic stability of the targeted state as a prerequisite for committing resources in improving the targeted states security institution. This study did not determine a threshold for stability in any particular institution but recommends as a start point, a comparison of institutions in the region to determine stability relative to the operational environment of the targeted state. National and regional strategies espouse the use of a whole-of-government approach for good reason. The Mali case study suggests that the United States did not embrace this approach and as vigorously as needed, as it could have prevented the 2012 coup. Kenya clearly represents a success case and Mali a failed case. This study recommends that operational and strategic planners measure political and economic stability executing SSR activities to determine the probability of SSR success. If SSR activities are required regardless, planners must take measures to ensure some level of stability in the state or risk failure in SSR.

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