Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief

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# Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief

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U.S.-Israel Relations: Key Concerns

Since the Cold War, strong bilateral relations have fueled and reinforced significant U.S.-Israel cooperation in many areas, including regional security. Nonetheless, at various points throughout the relationship, U.S. and Israeli policies have diverged on some important issues.

A number of issues have significant implications for U.S.-Israel relations. They include

- Israeli-Palestinian issues and controversies surrounding them, including President Trump’s December 2017 recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and announced plan to relocate the U.S. embassy in Israel there.
- Regional security issues (including those involving Iran, Hezbollah, and Syria) and U.S.-Israel cooperation.
- Israeli domestic political issues, including an ongoing criminal investigation of Prime Minister Netanyahu.

For background information and analysis on these and other topics, including aid, arms sales, and missile defense cooperation, see CRS Report RL33476, Israel: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti; CRS Report RL33222, U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel, by Jeremy M. Sharp; and CRS Report R44281, Israel and the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) Movement, coordinated by Jim Zanotti.
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Figure 1. Israel: Map and Basic Facts

Israel
Population: 8.74 million
Includes an estimated 391,000 settlers in the West Bank (2016), 201,200 in East Jerusalem (2014), and 22,000 in the Golan Heights (2016)
Jews: 75%; Arabs: 21%; Other: 4% (2015)
Real GDP growth rate/per capita (at PPP): 3.1%/536,250
Unemployment rate: 4.3%
Population below poverty line: 22% (2014)
Inflation rate: 0.2%
Budget deficit as % of GDP: 2.5%
Public debt as % of GDP: 59.6%
Foreign exchange and gold reserves: $119.1 billion
Current account surplus as % of GDP: 4.1%
Export partners: U.S. 29.3%, Hong Kong 7.4%, United Kingdom 6.5%, China 5.5%, Belgium 4.2 (2016)
Import partners: U.S. 12.2%, China 8.9%, Switzerland 6.4%, Germany 6.1%, Belgium 5.9% (2016)

Notes: According to the Department of State: (1) The West Bank is Israeli occupied with current status subject to the 1995 Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement; permanent status to be determined through further negotiation. (2) The status of the Gaza Strip is a final status issue to be resolved through negotiations. (3) The United States recognized Jerusalem as Israel's capital in 2017 without taking a position on the specific boundaries of Israeli sovereignty. (4) Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative. See https://www.state.gov/p/nea/ci/is/.

Sources: Graphic created by CRS. Map boundaries and information generated by Hannah Fischer using Department of State Boundaries (2011); Esri (2013); the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency GeoNames Database (2015); DeLorme (2014). Fact information from CIA, The World Factbook; Economist Intelligence Unit; IMF World Outlook Database; Israel Central Bureau of Statistics. All numbers are estimates and as of 2017 unless specified.
Israeli-Palestinian Issues

Overview

Since President Trump took office, he and officials from his Administration have expressed desires to broker a final-status Israeli-Palestinian agreement. Many of their statements, however, have raised questions about whether and when a new U.S.-backed diplomatic initiative to pursue that goal might surface, as well as broader questions about the U.S. role in the peace process.1 In December, President Trump recognized Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and announced his intention to relocate the U.S. embassy there from Tel Aviv. In response, Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Chairman and Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas publicly rejected U.S. sponsorship of the peace process.2 Many other countries opposed President Trump’s statements on Jerusalem. This opposition was reflected in December action at the United Nations (see “Jerusalem” below). These U.S. steps have changed the context for Israeli and Palestinian discussions on their respective political priorities. These discussions, in turn, have influenced Administration decisions to reduce or delay aid to the Palestinians.

Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and other Israeli officials generally have welcomed Trump Administration actions emphasizing Israel’s connection with Jerusalem. Some commentators assert that such developments may be emboldening various Israeli leaders to expand settlement building in East Jerusalem and the West Bank, and to seek greater Israeli control over areas whose status was previously reserved for negotiation.3 However, some prominent Israeli figures have speculated that the Administration might seek concessions from Israel in return for actions that appear to benefit Israel.4 While Netanyahu may be encouraging Administration rhetoric that threatens to reduce or halt aid to Palestinians under certain conditions,5 other Israelis have expressed concern that sudden or total aid cutoffs to the Palestinians could destabilize the Gaza Strip or the broader region.6 Israeli security officials are supposedly contemplating sending food and medicine to Gaza to prevent the difficult humanitarian situation from “spiraling into violence.”7

PLO Chairman Abbas reportedly has refused to engage with U.S. officials “charged with the political process,”8 and Palestinian leaders are discussing political and diplomatic alternatives.

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1 Before the Jerusalem announcement, some developments raised questions about the viability of a U.S.-brokered peace process. For example, statements by President Trump fueled public speculation about the level of his commitment to a negotiated “two-state solution,” a conflict-ending outcome that U.S. policy has largely advocated since the Israeli-Palestinian peace process began in the 1990s. Additionally, some media reports suggested that Israel was coordinating its West Bank settlement construction plans with U.S. officials. Danny Zaken, “Israel, US coordinated on settlement construction,” Al-Monitor Israel Pulse, October 23, 2017.


4 Derek Stoffel, “Trump’s Jerusalem declaration: a gift to Israel, but price tag may be high,” CBC News, December 12, 2017.


7 “IDF chief said to warn Gaza war likely if humanitarian crisis persists,” Times of Israel, February 4, 2018.

8 "PA ‘Maintains’ Communications with US, Consul ‘Invited’ to PLO Central Council Session,” Al-Hayah Online (translated from Arabic), January 13, 2018, Open Source Enterprise LIW2018011368005965. The President’s advisors on Israeli-Palestinian issues include his senior advisor Jared Kushner (who is also his son-in-law), special envoy Jason (continued...)
Citing alleged U.S. bias favoring Israel, Palestinian leaders are seeking to counteract U.S. influence on the peace process by increasing the involvement of other actors like the European Union and Russia. In a January speech, Abbas accused Israel of “killing” the peace process and advocated greater unity between Hamas-controlled Gaza and the Palestinians over whom Abbas (and his Fatah faction) presides in the West Bank. Abbas also made remarks calling Israel “a colonialist project that is not related to Judaism.” The Palestinian Central Council (a PLO advisory body) recommended that the PLO suspend its recognition of Israel, stop its security coordination with Israel (a suggestion the Council also made in 2015), and struggle “in all forms” against Israeli occupation. To date, Abbas has not suspended recognition of Israel or security cooperation with it. Speculation continues about possible Palestinian international initiatives aimed at pressuring Israel or bolstering global recognition of Palestinian statehood.

In late January, a Pew Research Center poll (see Figure 2) indicated that the U.S. public’s views on Israel may be more polarized along partisan lines than ever before. The poll comes at a time when many commentators and Members of Congress are debating the proper U.S. approach to Israel and the Palestinians, and questioning the Trump Administration’s policies on Israeli-Palestinian issues.

(...continued)

Greenblatt, and U.S. Ambassador to Israel David Friedman.


11 “Palestinian Central Council calls for struggle against Israel ‘in all forms,’” Al Arabiya English, January 16, 2018.


Assessment

The contentious issues described above have made prospects for a relaunch of Israeli-Palestinian talks in 2018 uncertain. The Administration still seeks support from Arab states (such as Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Egypt) for a U.S.-aided peace process.\(^\text{15}\) Following a January ministerial meeting in Jordan, Saudi Foreign Minister Adel bin Ahmed Al Jabir reinforced the joint Arab position opposing the new U.S. stance on Jerusalem, and supporting a Palestinian state with its capital in East Jerusalem.\(^\text{16}\) Despite these Arab states’ negative public reaction to the President’s Jerusalem decision, they are reportedly working discreetly with the United States and Israel to counter Iran’s influence in the region.\(^\text{17}\) The Administration’s National Security Strategy, issued in December 2017, asserts, “Today, the threats from jihadist terrorist organizations and the threat from Iran are creating the realization that Israel is not the cause of the region’s problems. States have increasingly found common interests with Israel in confronting common threats.”\(^\text{18}\)

Arab state positions on a resumption of peace negotiations could depend on a number of factors. Their stances may partly hinge on Arab public opinion regarding Jerusalem, Israeli settlements, and other controversial topics. Arab leaders’ views could also depend on how much they believe that coordination with the United States and Israel against Iran is tied to cooperation on the peace process.\(^\text{19}\) A separate issue is whether Arab state support would convince Palestinian leaders to engage in negotiations despite ongoing political controversies with the United States and Israel,

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difficulties with past peace initiatives, questions regarding Abbas’s continued leadership, and divided rule in the West Bank and Gaza. Palestinians appear to view their national aspirations as being undermined by the prospect of indefinite Israeli control over large swaths of the West Bank, and by Netanyahu’s insistence that whatever sovereignty Palestinians achieve will be limited in scope. Abbas has voiced concern about the possible removal of core issues of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict—namely, Jerusalem’s status and Palestinian refugees’ rights—from the negotiating table. Reportedly, the Administration has suggested addressing the Palestinian demand for a capital in East Jerusalem by having the capital in a West Bank neighborhood (Abu Dis) outside of Jerusalem’s current municipal boundaries.

Jerusalem

New U.S. Stance

On December 6, 2017, President Trump proclaimed “that the United States recognizes Jerusalem as the capital of the State of Israel and that the United States Embassy to Israel will be relocated to Jerusalem as soon as practicable.” A December deadline for presidential action under the Jerusalem Embassy Act of 1995 (P.L. 104-45) precipitated the timing of the President’s decision.

In making his decision, President Trump departed from the decades-long U.S. executive branch practice of not recognizing Israeli sovereignty over Jerusalem or any part of it. The western part of Jerusalem that Israel has controlled since 1948 has served as the seat of its government since shortly after its founding as a state. Israel officially considers Jerusalem (including the eastern part it unilaterally annexed after the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, while also expanding the city’s municipal boundaries) to be its capital. In explaining the President’s decision, Acting Assistant

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20 See CRS In Focus IF10644, The Palestinians: Overview and Key Issues for U.S. Policy, by Jim Zanotti.
22 “Palestinians condemn Israeli plans to annex West Bank,” Al Jazeera, January 1, 2018.
26 White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Presidential Proclamation Recognizing Jerusalem as the Capital of the State of Israel and Relocating the United States Embassy to Jerusalem, December 6, 2017.
27 Under P.L. 104-45, if a U.S. embassy has not officially opened in Jerusalem by the deadline, a 50% limitation on spending from the general “Acquisition and Maintenance of Buildings Abroad” budget would apply in the following fiscal year unless the President signs a waiver asserting a national security interest in preventing the spending limitation. Despite his proclamation on the planned embassy relocation, the President ultimately did sign a waiver in response to the December deadline. Presidential Determination No. 2018-02, December 6, 2017. So long as the embassy has not officially opened in Jerusalem, the waiver is required every six months under P.L. 104-45 to keep the spending limitation from taking effect.
Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs David Satterfield said on December 10, “This step was recognition of simple reality.”29 Many Members of Congress expressed support for President Trump’s decision,30 while others voiced opposition31 or warned about possible negative consequences.32

The President stated—in a December 6 speech accompanying his proclamation—that he was not taking a position on “specific boundaries of the Israeli sovereignty in Jerusalem,” and would continue to consider the city’s final status to be subject to Israeli-Palestinian negotiations.33 Palestinians envisage East Jerusalem as the capital of their future state. The President did not explicitly mention Palestinian aspirations regarding Jerusalem. He called on all parties to maintain the “status quo” arrangement at holy sites, most of which are in East Jerusalem’s Old City.34 Echoing past statements,35 the President said that the United States would support a two-state solution if both sides agree to it. In mid-December, a senior Administration official was quoted as saying “we cannot imagine Israel would sign a peace agreement that didn’t include the Western Wall.”36

On January 25, President Trump made additional remarks on Jerusalem while appearing with Prime Minister Netanyahu in Davos, Switzerland. The President said, “We took Jerusalem off the table, so we don’t have to talk about it anymore,” before telling Netanyahu, “You won one point [on Jerusalem], and you’ll give up some points later on the negotiation, if it ever takes place.”37 A few days later, the President’s envoy on the peace process, Jason Greenblatt, said, “When President Trump made his historic decision to recognize Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, he was … absolutely clear that the United States has not prejudged any final status issues, including the specific boundaries of Israeli sovereignty in Jerusalem.”38

Reactions and Policy Implications

Israeli officials welcomed the President’s decision on Jerusalem. In January 2018, the Knesset amended a Basic Law on Jerusalem to require a supermajority vote to transfer any area of Jerusalem to a foreign power. The action is largely symbolic because the law itself can be amended by a simple majority vote.39 As mentioned above, in response to the U.S. decision on

30 White House, Office of the Press Secretary, WTAS: Support For President Trump’s Decision To Recognize Jerusalem As Israel’s Capital, December 7, 2017.
33 White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Statement by President Trump on Jerusalem, December 6, 2017.
34 For information on the “status quo” arrangement, see CRS Report RL33476, Israel: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti.
35 Steve Holland, “Trump likes two-state solution, but says he will leave it up to Israelis, Palestinians,” Reuters, February 23, 2017.
38 “Trump said to mull unveiling peace plan even if Abbas maintains boycott,” Times of Israel, February 2, 2018.
Jerusalem, Palestinian leaders have publicly alleged U.S. bias favoring Israel and have rejected a peace process in which the United States is the sole mediator.

Reactions to the U.S. decision from other international actors—including key Arab and European countries—were mostly negative. Several governments warned that recognizing Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and preparing for an embassy move could lead to the collapse of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and to violence. Some asserted that the decision was “not in line” with U.N. Security Council resolutions. On December 18, 2017, the United States vetoed a draft Security Council resolution that was backed by all other 14 members of the Council. The resolution would have reaffirmed past Security Council resolutions on Jerusalem, nullified actions purporting to alter “the character, status or demographic composition of the Holy City of Jerusalem,” and called upon all states to refrain from establishing diplomatic missions in Jerusalem. On December 21, the U.N. General Assembly adopted a nonbinding resolution (by a vote of 128 for, 9 against, and 35 abstaining) that contained language similar to the draft Security Council resolution.

Past media reports have identified a number of sites owned or leased by the U.S. government in Jerusalem as possible venues for an embassy (see Figure 3). On January 18, 2018, Steven Goldstein, Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, said, “We will not be moving to a new facility … we are going to retrofit a building.” A week later, President Trump anticipated a “small version” of a U.S. embassy opening in Jerusalem in 2019. Converting an existing facility will probably be faster and less expensive than constructing a new embassy. Reports indicate that the State Department is considering a plan to convert the consular building on David Flusser Street in the Arnona neighborhood into an embassy by sometime in 2019. Congress could consider a number of legislative and oversight options with regard to the planned embassy move. These options could focus on funding, timeframe and logistics, progress reports, and security for embassy facilities and staff.

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40 In the initial aftermath, protests occurred in the West Bank and Gaza and other Muslim-majority countries, but did not significantly escalate.

41 Permanent Representatives of Germany, France, Italy, Sweden, and United Kingdom, Joint Declaration following Security Council meeting on Jerusalem (PRs from France, Italy, Germany, Sweden and UK), December 8, 2017. See footnote 42 for information on some past U.N. Security Council resolutions (UNSCRs) pertaining to Jerusalem.


47 Mark Landler, “Trump Administration Presses to Relocate Embassy to Jerusalem by 2019,” New York Times, January 19, 2018: “Scouting a site, commissioning a design and building the embassy compound could take up to six years, according to State Department officials, and cost $600 million to $1 billion.”
Regional Security Issues

Israel relies on the following strengths to manage potential threats to its security and existence:

- overwhelming regional conventional military superiority;
- undeclared but universally presumed nuclear weapons capability; and
- de jure or de facto arrangements with the authoritarian leaders of its Arab state neighbors aimed at preventing regional conflict.

Another Israeli strength is the support it receives from the United States. Israeli officials closely consult with U.S. counterparts in an effort to influence U.S. decisionmaking on key regional issues. Israel’s leaders and supporters routinely make the case to U.S. officials that Israel’s security and the broader stability of the region remain critically important for U.S. interests. They also argue that Israel has multifaceted worth as a U.S. ally and that the Israeli and American peoples share core values.

U.S. decisionmakers’ views could influence the type and level of support that the United States might provide to address threats Israel perceives. These views could also influence how Israel might continue its stated policy of “defending itself, by itself” while also receiving external

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48 Israel is not a party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and maintains a policy of “nuclear opacity” or ammut. A 2014 report examining data from a number of sources through the years estimated that Israel possesses an arsenal of around 80 nuclear weapons. Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “Israeli nuclear weapons, 2014,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 70(6), 2014, pp. 97-115. The United States has countenanced Israel’s nuclear ambiguity since 1969, when Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir and U.S. President Richard Nixon reportedly reached an accord whereby both sides agreed never to acknowledge Israel’s nuclear arsenal in public. Eli Lake, “Secret U.S.-Israel Nuclear Accord in Jeopardy,” Washington Times, May 6, 2009. No other Middle Eastern country is generally thought to possess nuclear weapons.

assistance. They also could influence the extent to which the United States places conditions on the support it provides to Israel.

Iran and Its Allies

Iran remains of primary concern to Israeli officials largely because of (1) Iran’s antipathy toward Israel, (2) Iran’s broad regional influence, and (3) the possibility that Iran will not face nuclear program constraints in the future. As mentioned above, in recent years Israel and Arab Gulf states have discreetly cultivated closer relations with one another in efforts to counter Iran.50 Prime Minister Netanyahu remains publicly skeptical of the 2015 international agreement on Iran’s nuclear program, calling in a September 2017 speech before the U.N. General Assembly for the agreement’s signatories to “fix it or nix it.”51 Many other Israeli officials have accepted the nuclear agreement, and some have characterized it in positive terms.

Netanyahu welcomed President Trump’s decision in October 2017 to refrain from certifying Iran’s compliance with the nuclear accord (under the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015, P.L. 114-17). The President asserted that he could not certify that the suspension of sanctions on Iran in relation to the 2015 agreement was “appropriate and proportionate” to the measures taken by Iran to terminate its illicit nuclear program.52 Israeli officials are closely following U.S. deliberations with European countries in response to the President’s January statement that if these countries cannot agree to “fix flaws” in the deal, “the United States will not again waive sanctions.”53

Netanyahu and his supporters in government reportedly favor the prospect of a toughened U.S. and international sanctions regime on matters not directly connected to Iran’s nuclear program, such as Iran’s development of ballistic missiles and its sponsorship of terrorist groups.54 Media reports indicate that many current and former officials from Israel’s military and security establishment may favor the preservation of the nuclear deal because of doubts about achieving international consensus regarding stricter limits on Iran’s conduct.55

Lebanon-Syria Border Area and Hezbollah

Since 2017, Israeli officials have increasingly expressed concerns about Iranian influence near Israel’s northern borders with Lebanon and Syria. The government of Bashar al Asad regained control of large portions of Syria’s territory, with assistance from Iran, various Iran-backed militias, and Russia.56 Israel has alleged that Iran aspires to establish territorial corridors to the

52 For information on President Trump’s decision, see CRS Report R44942, Options to Cease Implementing the Iran Nuclear Agreement, by Kenneth Katzman, Paul K. Kerr, and Valerie Heitshusen.
Mediterranean coast, and to have some kind of military presence along those corridors. In his September 2017 address before the U.N. General Assembly, Prime Minister Netanyahu said

We will act to prevent Iran from establishing permanent military bases in Syria for its air, sea and ground forces. We will act to prevent Iran from producing deadly weapons in Syria or in Lebanon for use against us. And we will act to prevent Iran from opening new terror fronts against Israel along our northern border.

In this context, U.S. National Security Advisor Lt. Gen. H.R. McMaster publicly warned in December of the prospect of Iran having a “proxy army on the borders of Israel.”

Accordingly, Israel reportedly has

- continued airstrikes on targets inside Syria to prevent weapons transfers to Hezbollah in Lebanon, and increased warnings about threats from Hezbollah;
- carried out airstrikes aimed at discouraging Iran from constructing and operating bases or advanced weapons manufacturing facilities in Syria; and
- sought to influence agreements among Russia, the United States, and Jordan on de-escalation zones in southern Syria, especially by seeking Russian help in keeping Hezbollah and other Iranian allies as far as possible from the Israeli border.

To date, Russia has apparently tolerated some Israeli military operations in or near Syrian airspace. Russia’s maintenance of advanced air defense systems and its other interests in Syria could affect future Israeli operations.

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**February 2018 Cross-Border Incident Raises Tensions**

On February 10, 2018, a cross-border incident involving Israeli, Iranian, and Syrian forces raised regional tensions. After an Israeli helicopter reportedly downed an Iranian drone that was allegedly in Israeli airspace, Israeli forces launched a reprisal attack against targets in Syria. Under fire from Russian-origin Syrian air defense systems, an Israeli F-16 was reportedly hit. It crashed in Israeli territory, with the two occupants ejecting (one was hospitalized). Israel then launched another attack against what Israeli officials described as multiple Syrian air defense positions and Iranian military sites inside Syria. The Israel Air Force called it “the biggest and most significant attack” it has conducted against Syrian air defenses since the 1982 Lebanon war. Although the incident’s implications are unclear, a number of key actors have made statements in the aftermath.

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60 “Israel said to have hit Hezbollah convoys dozens of times,” *Times of Israel*, August 17, 2017.
62 According to one source, in connection with a November 2017 “Memorandum of Principles” between the United States, Russia, and Jordan, “Israel’s demand for a 40-km-wide buffer zone in the Golan was rejected by Russia and the distance envisaged in the memorandum between Israeli and Hizbullah forces varies between 5 and 15 km.” Jonathan Spyer and Nicholas Blanford, “UPDATE: Israel raises alarm over advances by Hizbullah and Iran,” *Jane’s Intelligence Review*, January 11, 2018.
64 Gross, op. cit.
Israeli officials warned Iran that it would not tolerate an Iranian military foothold at its doorstep, while also stating that Israel does not seek to escalate conflict. Secretary of Defense James Mattis characterized Israel's actions as self-defense and expressed full U.S. support for them. Fueling speculation that the Israeli attacks may have come close to areas where Russian personnel are stationed, Russia’s foreign ministry called for restraint and said that it is “absolutely unacceptable to create threats to the lives and security of Russian soldiers.” Observers speculate about how the incident will affect these actors’ calculations going forward.

Hezbollah has challenged Israel’s security near the Lebanese border for decades. In recent years, Israeli officials have sought to draw attention to Hezbollah’s weapons buildup—including reported upgrades to the range and precision of its projectiles—and its alleged use of Lebanese civilian areas as strongholds. During Syria’s civil war, Israel reportedly has provided various means of support to rebel groups in the vicinity of the Syria-Israel border in order to prevent Hezbollah or other Iran-linked groups from controlling the area. Speculation persists about future conflict between Israel and Hezbollah and potential consequences for Lebanon, Israel, Syria, and others. One January 2018 analysis stated that the “balance of deterrence” between Israel and Hezbollah remains strong and “weighs against either side deliberately launching a war,” while the “risk of miscalculation” has grown “as various actors in Syria seek to consolidate influence.”

**Domestic Israeli Developments**

A number of contentious domestic developments are taking place in Israel. Several of the government’s opponents and critics have voiced warnings about government initiatives depicted as targeting dissent or undermining the independence of key Israeli institutions such as the media, the judiciary, and the military. Controversial Knesset legislation may be forthcoming to define Israel as the national homeland of the Jewish people in a basic law, and limit the Supreme Court’s power of judicial review over legislation. Key government figures are seeking to have legislation increasingly apply to Israeli settlements in the West Bank.

Some on the right side of the political spectrum have joined the criticism, expressing concerns about the future of democracy in Israel. A November 2017 media article characterized the split on the Israeli right as being between a past generation (including Israeli President Reuven Rivlin)

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65 See, e.g., “Minister: Iran will need ‘time to digest’ how Israel hit covert military sites,” *Times of Israel*, February 11, 2018.
73 Spyer and Blanford, op. cit.
74 See, e.g., Lahav Harkov, “Government says it will push Jewish nation-state bill for first vote soon,” jpost.com, December 18, 2017. Although the basic law’s direct effect would be largely symbolic, some observers are concerned that the bill might further undermine the place of Arabs in Israeli society.
75 See, e.g., “Jewish Home unveils draft of bill to weaken High Court,” *Times of Israel*, December 19, 2017.
that “were sticklers for defending minority rights and the rule of law” and “a newer, more populist and partisan politics epitomized by Mr. Netanyahu’s government.” Early elections (legally, elections are required by 2019) may heighten contention surrounding these issues if the governing coalition splits over an ongoing criminal investigation into Prime Minister Netanyahu’s conduct or some other issue.

Police are investigating Netanyahu for alleged corruption. Some observers speculate that the investigation could threaten his term of office. Netanyahu has dismissed the allegations.

There are two specific investigations:

Case 1000 revolves around gifts [Netanyahu] received from businessmen, including cigars and champagne. Netanyahu’s lawyers say they were simply presents from long-time friends, with no quid pro quo.

Case 2000 focuses on suspicions Netanyahu negotiated with the publisher of Israel’s best-selling newspaper for better coverage in return for curbs on the competition. The prime minister’s lawyers say Netanyahu never seriously considered any such deal.

Two of Netanyahu’s closest associates and attorneys were arrested in November 2017. Reports in early February 2018 suggest that the police may soon present recommendations to state prosecutors about whether to indict Netanyahu. Israel’s attorney general could then decide in the coming months whether to press charges. Legally, Netanyahu could continue in office if indicted, but a December 2017 poll suggested that most Israelis believe that he should resign if the police recommend charges. Israel’s previous prime minister, Ehud Olmert, announced his decision to resign in July 2008 amid corruption-related allegations, two months before the police recommended charges against him.

If elections take place in the near future, Netanyahu (if he runs) could face challenges from figures on the right of the political spectrum (including Education Minister Naftali Bennett, Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman, former minister Gideon Saar, and the previous defense minister Moshe Ya’alon), or nearer the center or left (former finance minister Yair Lapid, current finance minister Moshe Kahlon, and new Labor Party leader Avi Gabbay).

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81 Michael Bachner, “PM proclaims innocence as police said ‘unanimous’ on proposing bribery charges,” Times of Israel, February 8, 2018.
82 “Poll: Most Israelis want Netanyahu to resign if police recommend indictment,” Times of Israel, December 24, 2017.
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