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Options to Cease Implementing the Iran Nuclear Agreement

Kenneth Katzman

Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

Paul K. Kerr

Specialist in Nonproliferation

Valerie Heitshusen

Specialist on Congress and the Legislative Process

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Summary

Trump Administration statements, including President Trump’s speech to the U.N. General Assembly on September 19, 2017, assert that the 2015 multilateral nuclear agreement with Iran, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), does not address the full range of potential threats posed by Iran. Administration officials assert that the Administration seeks to renegotiate the JCPOA, or negotiate a separate accord, to address the full range of U.S. concerns on Iran. The other powers that negotiated the accord with Iran—Russia, China, France, Britain, and Germany—assert that the JCPOA is succeeding in its core objectives and that its implementation should not be jeopardized.

This report analyzes some of the options the Administration might use to end or alter U.S. implementation of the JCPOA, if there is a decision to do so. These options, which might involve use of procedures in the JCPOA itself or the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA, P.L. 114-17), are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Some potential implications of Administration decisions on the JCPOA are analyzed as well. For details on the JCPOA and related issues, see CRS Report R43333, *Iran Nuclear Agreement*, by Kenneth Katzman and Paul K. Kerr; and CRS Report RS20871, *Iran Sanctions*, by Kenneth Katzman .

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Overview of the Issue

Press reports in August 2017 indicated that President Trump told his top aides that he might not certify to Congress that Iran is meeting its nuclear obligations under the July 14, 2015, multilateral nuclear agreement (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, JCPOA) when the next certification is due on October 15, 2017.¹ There are several mechanisms or methods the Administration might use to cease implementing the JCPOA or to alter its implementation, if there is a decision to do so. One possible option could use provisions of the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA, P.L. 114-17)—which amended Section 135(d)(6) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2160(e)). It requires that the Administration certify every 90 days that Iran is in compliance. The JCPOA was between Iran and the “P5+1” group of countries (United States, Russia, China, Britain, France, and Germany).

This report bases its analysis primarily on the text of key documents involved in the issue—the JCPOA itself;² U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231 of July 20, 2015,³ which endorsed the JCPOA; and the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA, P.L. 114-17, of May 22, 2015).

Presidential Decision to Cease Implementing the JCPOA

Administration statements assert that the JCPOA does not address the full range of potential threats posed by Iran. On August 1, 2017, Secretary of State Tillerson told a press briefing “The conversation on Iran does not begin and end with the JCPOA, the nuclear agreement, and I think if there’s one thing I hope I can help people understand it’s that agreement dealt with a very small slice of Iran’s threats, and that was their nuclear program.”⁴ On September 5, 2017, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley addressed a Washington, DC, think tank, saying, “The truth is, the Iran deal [JCPOA] has so many flaws that it’s tempting to leave it.”⁵ In his speech to the U.N. General Assembly on September 19, 2017, President Trump said

We cannot let a murderous regime continue these destabilizing activities while building dangerous missiles, and we cannot abide by an agreement if it provides cover for the eventual construction of a nuclear program. The Iran Deal was one of the worst and most one-sided transactions the United States has ever entered into. Frankly, that deal is an embarrassment to the United States, and I don’t think you’ve heard the last of it, believe me.⁶

¹ Gardner Harris. “Trump’s Vow to Scrap Nuclear Deal May Have a Hitch: A Compliant Iran.” *New York Times*, August 28, 2017.

² The text of the JCPOA can be found on the website of the Department of State at <https://www.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/iran/jcpoa/>.

³ The text of Security Council Resolution 2231 is at the following link: http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2231.pdf.

⁴ Department of State. Remarks by Secretary of State Rex Tillerson at a Press Availability, August 1, 2017.

⁵ Ambassador Nikki Haley’s Remarks on Iran and the JCPOA. American Enterprise Institute, September 5, 2017.

⁶ White House Office of the Press Secretary. Remarks by President Trump to the 72nd Session of the United Nations General Assembly. September 19, 2017.

U.S. officials have stated that the United States will continue to fulfill its JCPOA commitments, pending the outcome of the Iran policy review that is under way⁷—the results of which are reportedly to be announced by President Trump on/about October 12, 2017.

The President appears to be attempting to use potential U.S. nonparticipation in the JCPOA as leverage to garner the support of other P5+1 governments for new negotiations on U.S. concerns about Iran, including the expiration of nuclear restrictions of the JCPOA, Iran’s missile program, and Iran’s support for regional armed factions. Administration officials have asserted that, by continuing to test ballistic missiles and to support “destabilizing” activities in the region, Iran is violating the “spirit,” if not necessarily the letter, of the JCPOA. The JCPOA does not address these aspects of Iranian behavior. These actions are subject to restrictions by United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231, which requires that, for a maximum period ending in October 2020, any Iranian importation of specified weapons systems requires explicit approval of the Security Council and exportation of any arms from Iran is banned. For a maximum period ending in October 2023, the Resolution calls on (but does not require) Iran to refrain from developing, including testing, ballistic missiles “designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons.” These restrictions would end, earlier than the maximum deadlines, upon a “Broader Conclusion” by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that all nuclear material in Iran remains in peaceful activities.⁸ And, these provisions of Resolution 2231 have not had significant effect: Iran has engaged in numerous ballistic missile tests since the JCPOA began implementation in January 2016. Both Obama and Trump Administration officials have termed the tests as “defiant of” and “inconsistent with” the Resolution rather than outright violations. Iran continues to openly supply several governments and factions in the Middle East region with arms, appearing to clearly violate Resolution 2231.

The JCPOA does not specifically provide for any party to the agreement to “withdraw.”⁹ Although European and other diplomats argue that Resolution 2231 makes the agreement binding on all parties under the U.N. Charter, officials in the Obama Administration asserted that the JCPOA is a nonbinding political commitment,¹⁰ and Trump Administration officials continue to make that assertion. Based on that assertion, President Trump could announce a cessation of U.S. implementation of the accord and he could reimpose all or some of the U.S. sanctions that were revoked or suspended to implement the deal. He could reinstate those sanctions imposed by Executive Order, decline to continue waiving provisions of sanctions laws, or redesignate for sanctions entities that were “de-listed” from sanctions to implement the JCPOA. It is unlikely that the President would require the approval of Congress for these courses of action.

A decision to reimpose most or all U.S. sanctions would likely encounter criticism from officials of other JCPOA parties, as well as Iran. European Union diplomats view the JCPOA as a binding international commitment. Iranian leaders indicate within the JCPOA how they would expect to react to a unilateral U.S. decision to reimpose those sanctions that were lifted or suspended. Paragraph 26 states: “ ... Iran has stated that it will treat such a reintroduction or reimposition of

⁷ Andrew Schofer. U.S. Statement, Agenda Item 6: Verification and Monitoring in Iran. IAEA Board of Governors Meeting, June 12-16, 2017.

⁸ These restrictions are contained in Annex B of Resolution 2231.

⁹ Some of this section is taken from a legal analysis of this option provided in: CRS Report R44761, *Withdrawal from International Agreements: Legal Framework, the Paris Agreement, and the Iran Nuclear Agreement*, by Stephen P. Mulligan.

¹⁰ Letter from Julia Frifield Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs, to then-Rep. Mike Pompeo, November 19, 2015.

the sanctions specified in Annex II, or such an imposition of new nuclear-related sanctions, as grounds to cease performing its commitments under this JCPOA in whole or in part.”¹¹

Use of JCPOA Provisions

The Administration might seek to use the provisions of the JCPOA itself to cease U.S. implementation of its commitments under the agreement. Paragraph 36 of the JCPOA outlines a complex “Dispute Resolution Mechanism” under which any party to the agreement can assert that another party is violating the accord and seek to resolve the issue. The Trump Administration could conceivably use this mechanism to accuse Iran of violating the letter—or spirit—of the JCPOA. The JCPOA mechanism outlines a process by which Iran can resolve such a dispute but provides that, “if the complaining participant deems the issue to constitute significant nonperformance, then that participant could treat the unresolved issue as grounds to cease performing its commitments under this JCPOA....”¹² The dispute resolution mechanism also provides for the United States to be able to “snap back” all U.N. sanctions that were in place prior to Implementation Day of the JCPOA (January 16, 2016).¹³ The United States is a veto-wielding permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, and the dispute resolution mechanism enables any veto-wielding member to block a U.N. Security Council resolution that would continue the lifting of U.N. sanctions.

The dispute resolution mechanism generally refers to the ability of any party to complain about potential nonperformance of only those issues that are directly addressed in the JCPOA—and not issues that are not covered by the agreement, such as ballistic missiles development or Iran’s regional activities. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the international body that is charged with monitoring and verifying Iran’s nuclear commitments. A U.S. accusation of Iranian noncompliance—in the absence of supporting evidence from the IAEA—would undoubtedly raise questions among other parties to the JCPOA about the U.S. accusations against Iran. The text of the JCPOA dispute resolution mechanism does not address the ability of any JCPOA party to accuse another of violating non-nuclear aspects of the accord.

¹¹ Paragraph 26 of the JCPOA.

¹² Paragraph 36 of the JCPOA.

¹³ Paragraph 37 of the JCPOA.

Iranian Compliance with the JCPOA

On January 16, 2016, IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano reported to the agency's Board of Governors that Iran had implemented the nuclear measures required for the JCPOA's "Implementation Day." The agency has continued to monitor Iranian compliance with the agreement's nuclear-related requirements; all subsequent reports, the most recent of which Amano issued on August 31, 2017, document Iranian compliance with these obligations.¹⁴ Although the IAEA reports findings of its inspection and monitoring activities and the JCPOA-established Joint Commission monitors the parties' implementation of the agreement, compliance determinations are national decisions. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson certified on July 17, 2017, that Iran had complied with the JCPOA and had "not taken any action, including covert activities, that could significantly advance its nuclear weapons program"—a reiteration of past U.S. assessments.

Although these reports and Tillerson's certification indicate that Iran has not engaged in any JCPOA-prohibited activities, the agreement describes arrangements for agency inspectors to gain access to Iranian sites, including military sites, other than those that Tehran has declared to the agency, "if the IAEA has concerns regarding undeclared nuclear materials or activities, or activities inconsistent with" the JCPOA. Should such concerns arise, the IAEA is to "provide Iran the basis for such concerns and request clarification." The IAEA could request access to the site if Iran's explanation does not sufficiently clarify the matter. The JCPOA provides for a process to resolve the issue in question if Tehran initially declines to provide access to the site. Iran allowed the IAEA to visit the Parchin military site in September 2015 as part of an agreed process for resolving IAEA concerns about possible past Iranian military-related nuclear activities.

Amano's August report states that the IAEA has continued verification and monitoring of the restrictions described in Section T of the JCPOA, which prohibits a number of nuclear-weapons-related activities.¹⁵ The IAEA has not reported whether it has requested access to any Iranian military facilities, but the agency has a number of methods other than inspections, such as analyzing open source information and receiving intelligence briefings from governments, to monitor Iranian compliance with these and other JCPOA commitments.

U.S. officials have expressed concern regarding Iran's accumulation of heavy water. According to the JCPOA, Iran has committed to refrain from accumulating heavy water "beyond Iran's needs"—an amount which the JCPOA specified is 130 metric tons of "nuclear grade heavy water or its equivalent in different enrichments" prior to commissioning the redesigned Arak reactor. Tehran is to "sell any remaining heavy water on the international market for 15 years." Iran's stock of heavy water has exceeded 130 metric tons on two occasions since the JCPOA began implementation. On February 17, 2016, the IAEA verified that Tehran's heavy water stock had exceeded 130 metric tons; on November 8, 2016, the IAEA verified that Iran's stock of heavy water had again exceeded the JCPOA limit. Iran resolved the issue on both occasions by exporting the excess heavy water. Iran has sent this material to Russia and the United States, shipping at least some of it via Oman. The IAEA verified on August 7, 2017, that Iran had 111 metric tons of heavy water.¹⁶

Use of INARA Provisions

The INARA law gives the Administration a number of options to cease or alter U.S. implementation of the JCPOA.

Material Breach Report

INARA authorizes the President to provide Congress with "credible and accurate information relating to a potentially significant breach or compliance incident by Iran ..." and, within 30 days of submitting such information, to determine whether the Iranian breach "constitutes a material

¹⁴ *Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015)*, GOV/INF/2016/1, January 16, 2016, and *Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015)*. Report by the Director General, International Atomic Energy Agency, GOV/2017/35, August 31, 2017.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid.

breach” and whether Iran has “cured such material breach.”¹⁷ Under INARA, an Administration confirmation of an uncured material breach of the JCPOA by Iran would trigger expedited procedures for congressional consideration of legislation that would reimpose those U.S. sanctions that have been waived to implement the JCPOA—and prevent further such waivers. A summary of the expedited procedures is provided in the text box at the end of this report.

An Administration report to Congress of a material breach by Iran would almost certainly prompt other P5+1 parties to question whether U.S. assertions are corroborated by similar findings by the IAEA. The INARA material breach report does not appear to provide for the Administration to accuse Iran of an uncured breach on any grounds other than compliance with the nuclear commitments of the JCPOA. Other P5+1 parties might also question whether the United States has provided information on any potential Iranian breach to the IAEA for further investigation under the dispute resolution mechanism discussed above. If the Administration has not provided such information to the IAEA for investigation, its not doing so would likely raise questions about the credibility of the information or the motives of the Administration in reporting such accusations to Congress separately.¹⁸

Compliance Report

INARA requires the Administration to certify, every 90 days, that all of four main conditions of Iranian compliance have been met. The four points are that (1) Iran is verifiably and fully implementing the JCPOA; (2) Iran has not committed an uncured material breach; (3) Iran has not taken any action that could advance a nuclear weapons program; and (4) continued suspension of sanctions (including issuance of waivers of applicable sanctions laws) is vital to the national security interests of the United States. These provisions raise the possibility of several courses of action.

Certification Renewed and U.S. Sanctions Waivers Continued

The Administration might decide to implement the JCPOA as it has been doing by certifying that all four INARA compliance conditions are met and by renewing the waivers of the several secondary sanctions provisions that were issued to implement the JCPOA. Such waiver renewals must be separately transmitted to Congress to comport with the requirements of the sanctions laws that were waived to implement the JCPOA.¹⁹ The waivers for those laws that were suspended are due for renewal in mid-January 2018, as discussed in CRS Report RS20871, *Iran Sanctions*, by Kenneth Katzman.

¹⁷ Text of INARA.

¹⁸ Richard Nephew. “Will Trump Recertify Iran? Much Hangs in the Balance.” *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, August 23, 2017.

¹⁹ The latest such waiver notification was transmitted to Congress on July 17, 2017, simultaneous with an Administration certification of Iranian compliance. Letter from Charles Faulkner of the State Dept. Bureau of Legislative Affairs to Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Bob Corker. July 17, 2017. The waivers required are for the following provisions: Section 1244(i), 1245(g), 1246(e), and 1247(f) of the Iran Freedom and Counter Proliferation Act of 2012 (P.L. 112-239) – every 180 days; Section 1245(d) of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2012 (P.L. 112-81), every 120 days; Sections 212(d)(1) and 213(b)(1) of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (P.L. 112-158), every six months; and the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-172), every six months.

Certification Withheld and Some or All U.S. Sanctions Reimposed

The Administration may withhold certification of Iranian compliance on any of the grounds stipulated by INARA. The Administration might potentially argue that Iran has not complied with the “spirit” of the agreement and that continuing to waive U.S. sanctions is therefore not vital to the national security interests of the United States. Congress might subsequently act on legislation to reimpose U.S. sanctions under the expedited procedures prescribed in INARA. INARA contains a provision under which sanctions reimposed by the INARA process cannot be waived or otherwise not implemented by the President.

If U.S. sanctions are reimposed, Iran might potentially use the justification in Paragraph 26 of the JCPOA to cease performing its nuclear commitments. Iran’s reaction might depend on whether other parties to the JCPOA, and companies in those countries, reimpose sanctions or exit the Iran market in response to the reimposition of U.S. sanctions.

Redesignating “De-Listed” Entities for Sanctions

As an alternative to reimposing those sanctions provisions that have been waived or revoked, the Administration could instead restore the “Specially Designated National” (SDN) designation to some of the many entities that were “de-listed” to implement the JCPOA. The entities that were de-listed are those that involve Iran’s civilian economy, such as banks, shipping firms, insurance entities, civilian manufacturers, and energy-related entities. Redesignating such entities would resume the application of some U.S. secondary sanctions to those entities, including provisions of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (CISADA, P.L. 111-195) that close the U.S. financial sector to third-country financial institutions that conduct transactions with Iran-related SDNs.

Iran’s reaction to redesignation of listed entities would likely depend on how the Administration implemented this option. Redesignation of a few entities that are marginal to Iran’s economy might not cause Iran to cease implementing its commitments. However, redesignation of entities that are crucial to Iran’s economy, such as the Central Bank of Iran, the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL), Iran Air, or the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) could cause Iran to assert that the United States has breached the agreement.

Certification Withheld but Sanctions Are not Reimposed

If the Administration withholds certification of Iranian compliance, Congress might not act to reimpose sanctions under INARA. INARA does not require the Administration to reimpose U.S. sanctions if there is no certification of compliance, and the Administration might renew the waivers of U.S. sanctions laws and otherwise decline to reimpose any sanctions that were suspended to implement the JCPOA. The use of this option would signal Administration dissatisfaction with the JCPOA and perhaps suggest the Administration wants it renegotiated, but without necessarily causing the JCPOA to collapse. Press reports in early October indicate that the Administration plans to exercise this option,²⁰ including possibly encouraging Congress not to act to reimpose those sanctions that have been suspended.

If sanctions are not reimposed, Iran is likely to continue to implement its commitments under the agreement. Iranian leaders would undoubtedly challenge a withholding of U.S. compliance

²⁰ “Trump Plans to Declare that Iran Nuclear Deal is Not in the National Interest.” *Washington Post*, October 5, 2017.

certification, but Iran likely would continue to implement the agreement as long as sanctions are not reimposed and its economy is, therefore, not damaged by them.

Expedited Congressional Procedures

In the absence of the required certification, or after a presidential determination of noncompliance or an uncured breach, a House or Senate party floor leader may introduce, within 60 calendar days, a bill (with stipulated text) to reinstate sanctions. The bill is subject to expedited congressional procedures (though each chamber could choose to use its existing procedures instead). Committees that are referred the bill are automatically discharged if it has not been reported after 10 legislative days (House) or session days (Senate).

In the House, on or after the third legislative day after reporting/discharge, a majority could agree to a nondebatable motion to bring up the bill. In the Senate, after reporting/discharge, a majority could agree to a nondebatable motion to bring up the bill; no cloture process, with its associated three-fifths vote threshold, is necessary for the Senate to do so.

House floor consideration is limited to two hours. The Senate limit on floor consideration is 10 hours; thus, a numerical majority could pass the bill without the need for three-fifths to first invoke cloture. (A majority could also agree to a nondebatable motion to spend less time on the bill.) Floor amendments are precluded in both chambers. Other procedures would expedite second-chamber consideration of a bill received from the other house.

A bill agreed to by both chambers is subject to presidential veto, which can be overridden by two-thirds vote in both chambers. (Senate consideration of the veto message is limited to 10 hours; no cloture process would be required to reach the override vote.) For more information, see “Legislation to Reinstate Sanctions” in CRS Report R44085, *Procedures for Congressional Action in Relation to a Nuclear Agreement with Iran: In Brief*, by Valerie Heitshusen and Richard S. Beth.

Source: INARA congressional review provisions, 42 U.S.C. 2160(e)

Possible Implications of U.S. Withdrawal

The possible implications of a U.S. decision to cease implementing the JCPOA by reimposing U.S. sanctions on Iran are varied and extensive, and in many ways dependent on the reactions of Iran and of U.S. allies and partners to that decision. Some possible implications are as follows:

- The European Union countries as well as Russia, China, and other major Iran trading partners might continue implementing their JCPOA commitments. In a statement following a September 20, 2017, meeting of the Joint Commission that oversees the JCPOA, EU High Representative Federica Mogherina stated that “... the international community cannot afford dismantling an agreement that is working and delivering.” The EU and other countries could attempt to shield their firms from any U.S. penalties—through such actions as blocking regulations or the World Trade Organization complaint process—for conducting transactions with Iran that violate reimposed U.S. sanctions. Should major international firms remain in the Iran market and Iran’s economy not be significantly damaged, it might be possible to sustain the JCPOA without U.S. participation. Yet, Iran’s reaction might depend not only on the economic impact of the reimposition of U.S. sanctions, but also on the extent to which Iranian JCPOA supporters, particularly President Hassan Rouhani, can maintain domestic support for the agreement.
- It is possible that governmental efforts to sustain the JCPOA without U.S. participation would fail. Major international firms, when threatened with U.S. penalties or being shut out of the large U.S. market, might exit the Iran market and cause Iran’s economy to resume its pre-JCPOA deterioration. Iranian leaders might subsequently conclude that Iran is no longer benefitting from complying

with the JCPOA and then resume those nuclear activities that are restricted under the accord. Iran never complied with major provisions of U.N. Security Council resolutions while sanctions imposed by those resolutions were in place. Whether and to what extent any post-JCPOA sanctions could induce different Iranian behavior is unclear.

- If the JCPOA does collapse, Iran could resume all or portions of its JCPOA-limited nuclear program by, for example, reinstalling centrifuges, increasing centrifuge production, or producing enriched uranium containing more than the JCPOA-permitted amount of uranium-235. Iran could also undertake new undeclared nuclear activities and/or resume its nuclear weapons program.²¹ Whether Tehran would be able to do so un-detected would depend on both the nature of the activities, whether and to what extent Iran would disallow IAEA monitoring, and the capabilities of various governments' intelligence services. It is worth noting that, even if Iran were to stop implementing its JCPOA obligations, the government would still be bound by its IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreement and the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
- There is potential for Iran to react to a U.S. pullout from the JCPOA in ways having little to do with the substance of the agreement itself. Iran could, for example, increase the scope and pace of its ballistic missile tests, perhaps in part to demonstrate that reimposed sanctions do not affect that strategic capability. Iran might also try to expand its support to regional armed factions and groups to enhance Iran's regional reach. However, Iran's regional influence is arguably subject to a wide range of factors other than those related to its financial resources and sanctions relief. Iran would not necessarily be able to widen its regional writ based solely on a decision by Iran's leaders to do so.
- It is possible that a U.S. withdrawal, or the threat of such withdrawal, could produce international support to try to compel Iran to renegotiate the JCPOA or to negotiate a separate agreement. On September 19, 2017, Secretary of State Tillerson indicated that a new negotiation should address U.S. concerns particularly about the expiration of the primary nuclear restrictions of the JCPOA, as well as about Iran's missile program and its "destabilizing" actions in the region.²² During the U.N. General Assembly meetings in September 2017, one P5+1 leader, French President Emmanuel Macron, responded to U.S. criticism of the JCPOA by indicating some support for a new negotiation that might produce a new accord or amended JCPOA that addresses U.S. concerns.²³ Macron, however, did not express support for U.S. nonparticipation in the JCPOA. Some press reports indicate that some Iranian officials have expressed in diplomatic meetings a willingness to potentially negotiate new restrictions on Iran's missile program, for example on allowed ranges of such missiles.²⁴

²¹ Iran ended its nuclear weapons program in late 2003 and never completed some steps necessary for building such a weapon; CRS is not aware of any public official evidence of a bureaucratic apparatus for developing nuclear weapons. For more information, see CRS Report RL34544, *Iran's Nuclear Program: Status*, by Paul K. Kerr.

²² "Iran Nuclear Deal Must Change, Says Tillerson." *Asia Times*, September 20, 2017.

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-nuclear-usa-irgc/iran-hardliners-pragmatists-show-unity-in-response-to-trump-idUSKBN1CF0R0>.

- Should Congress not enact legislation to reimpose pre-JCPOA sanctions, it is possible that Congress might act on new legislation that might address the weaknesses of the JCPOA. As an example, Congress might act on H.R. 1698, which adds sanctions on entities that help Iran’s ballistic missile program and on persons or governments that provide Iran with conventional arms or receive Iranian arms. The House Foreign Affairs Committee is scheduled to mark up that bill on October 12.

Author Contact Information

Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
kkatzman@crs.loc.gov, 7-7612

Valerie Heitshusen
Specialist on Congress and the Legislative Process
vheitshusen@crs.loc.gov, 7-8635

Paul K. Kerr
Specialist in Nonproliferation
pkerr@crs.loc.gov, 7-8693