

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS CHANGES THAT THE PERUVIAN ARMY
SHOULD IMPLEMENT DURING COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS
AGAINST THE INFORMATIONAL CAMPAIGNS OF SENDERO
LUMINOSO POLITICAL BRANCH SINCE 2000

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
General Studies

by

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Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
2017

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			<i>Form Approved</i> <i>OMB No. 0704-0188</i>		
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.					
1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 9-06-2017		2. REPORT TYPE Master's Thesis		3. DATES COVERED (From - To) AUG 2016 – JUN 2017	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Psychological Operations changes that the Peruvian Army should Implement during Counterinsurgency Operations against the Informational Campaigns of Sendero Luminoso Political Branch since 2000			5a. CONTRACT NUMBER		
			5b. GRANT NUMBER		
			5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER		
6. AUTHOR(S) LTC Luis Ricardo Carpio, Peruvian Army			5d. PROJECT NUMBER		
			5e. TASK NUMBER		
			5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER		
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army Command and General Staff College ATTN: ATZL-SWD-GD Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301			8. PERFORMING ORG REPORT NUMBER		
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)			10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)		
			11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)		
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT The Peruvian Government was involved against terrorist groups from 1980 to 2000. Currently, terrorist military actions have decreased. The Sendero Luminoso (SL) have changed their tactics and procedures, and nowadays SL provides security to the drug cartels. Nonetheless, the political branch of SL continues performing ideological and indoctrination activities in cities and towns. The research question is: what are the Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) changes that the Peruvian Army should implement during counterinsurgency operations against the informational campaigns of the SL political branch since 2000? This is a qualitative research to attempt to understand the doctrine, modalities, techniques, support activities, means and types of communication used by the SL insurgency and the Peruvian Army PSYOPS since 2000. The conclusions address that the Peruvian Army must reformulate its PSYOPS doctrinal framework in terms of Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF-P).					
15. SUBJECT TERMS Terrorism, Insurgency, Sendero Luminoso (SL), MOVADDEF, Psychological Operations (PSYOPS), Information Operations (IO), Informational Campaigns					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT	b. ABSTRACT	c. THIS PAGE			19b. PHONE NUMBER (include area code)
(U)	(U)	(U)	(U)	102	

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39.18

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS CHANGES THAT THE PERUVIAN ARMY SHOULD IMPLEMENT DURING COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS AGAINST THE INFORMATIONAL CAMPAIGNS OF SENDERO LUMINOSO POLITICAL BRANCH SINCE 2000, by LTC Luis Ricardo Carpio, 102 pages.

The Peruvian Government was involved against terrorist groups from 1980 to 2000. Currently, terrorist military actions have decreased. The Sendero Luminoso (SL) have changed their tactics and procedures, and nowadays SL provides security to the drug cartels. Nonetheless, the political branch of SL continues performing ideological and indoctrination activities in cities and towns. The research question is: what are the Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) changes that the Peruvian Army should implement during counterinsurgency operations against the informational campaigns of the SL political branch since 2000? This is a qualitative research to attempt to understand the doctrine, modalities, techniques, support activities, means and types of communication used by the SL insurgency and the Peruvian Army PSYOPS since 2000. The conclusions address that the Peruvian Army must reformulate its PSYOPS doctrinal framework in terms of Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF-P).

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank all the people who contributed in some way to this research. First and foremost, I thank Mr. Alan Lowe for serving as my committee chair and whose encouragement, guidance and support throughout this process enabled me to conclude this endeavor satisfactorily. In addition, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my committee members: Dr. Louis DiMarco and LTC Jon Young for their interest in my study and for the time they spent providing me guidance. I was fortunate to have the chance to learn from them. They patiently taught me and fully supported my efforts with their time, interest, and extensive knowledge. I would like to thank Mr. Edwards Jennings, my Staff Group Advisor for his permanent support and guidance as well.

I would like to show gratitude to my dear friend, Jaime Mannings, who spent several hours helping to me to improve my proficiency in English as a second language. Finally, I want to say thank you to my beautiful wife Ada, and my lovely children, Fabrizio and Alejandra, who have been the strongest mainstay I have ever had during this year. Best regards and blessings to all of you who supported me in any aspect during the completion of this investigation.

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ACRONYMS

ALN	<i>Acao Libertadora Nacional</i> [National Liberation Action]
CASEO	<i>Conducta, Actitudes, Sentimientos, Emociones, Opiniones</i>
CP	Counter-propaganda
DE	<i>Division de Ejército</i>
ELN	<i>Ejército de Liberación Nacional</i> [National Liberation Army]
EO	<i>Ejército de Operaciones</i>
EPL	<i>Ejército Popular de Liberación</i> [People's Liberation Army]
ERP	<i>Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo</i> [People's Revolutionary Army]
EZLN	<i>Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional</i> [Zapatista National Liberation Army]
FARC	<i>Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia</i> [Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia]
FUDEPP	Front of Unity and Defense of the Peruvian People
IO	Information Operations
IR	Information Revolution
JCPAF	Joint Command of the Peruvian Armed Forces
MDMP	Military Decision Making Process
ME	<i>Manuel de Ejército</i>
MIR	<i>Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria</i> [Movement of the Revolutionary Left]
MOVADEF	Movement for Amnesty and Fundamental Rights
MPM	<i>Movimiento Peronista Montonero</i> [Montonero Peronista Movement]
MR-8	<i>Movimiento Revolucionario de Octubre 8</i> [October 8 Revolutionary Movement]
OPERSIC	Psychological Operator

ORPA	<i>Organización Revolucionaria del Pueblo en Armas</i> [Revolutionary Organization of the People in Arms]
PA	Psychological Action
PCCh	<i>Partido Comunista de Chile</i> [Communist Party of Chile]
PCR	<i>Partido Comunista Revolucionario</i> [Revolutionary Communist Party]
PGT	<i>Partido Guatemalteco de Trabajo</i> [Guatemalan Labor Party]
PR	Public Relations
PSYOPS	Psychological Operations
PW	Psychological War
SL	<i>Sendero Luminoso</i> [Shining Path]
UNMSM	San Marcos Major National University
VPR	<i>Vanguardia Popular Revolucionario</i> [Revolutionary People's Vanguard]
VRAEM	<i>Valle de los Ríos Apurímac, Ene, y Mantaro</i> [Apurímac, Ene, and Mantaro River Valleys]

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish . . . the kind of war on which they are embarking. . . . This is the first of all strategic questions and the most comprehensive.

—Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*

Research Background

Carlos Ivan Degregori¹ notes that the *Sendero Luminoso* [Shining Path] terrorist organization began its insurgency campaign in the remote areas of the Peruvian Andes in the late 1970s. Their first act of violence took place on May 17, 1980, during the presidential election when they burned ballot boxes in Chuschi, a town in the Ayacucho Region.

From that moment, the SL became involved in assassinations, bombings, and other terrorist acts in many urban and rural areas. The SL gained control of poor urban and rural populations in the southern and central regions of Peru through violence and fear. At the same time, they attracted sympathizers and supporters to their organization.²

Degregori explains that Abimael Guzman Reynoso (also known as Comrade Gonzalo) was the principal founder and leader until September 12, 1992, when the

¹ Carlos Ivan Degregori is professor of anthropology at the *Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos* and director of the *Instituto de Estudios Peruanos*. He received his anthropology degree from the *Universidad Nacional de San Cristobal de Huamanga*, where he was also a faculty member.

² Carlos Ivan Degregori, “The Origins and Logic of Shining Path: Two Views,” in *The Shining Path of Peru*, ed. David S. Palmer (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992), 34.

Peruvian police captured him in a raid and subsequently sentenced him to life imprisonment on terrorism charges. The SL continued to clash with the government throughout the 1990s until July 1999, when Oscar Ramirez Durand (also known as Comrade Feliciano)—the leader after Guzman’s imprisonment, was also captured and sentenced to life imprisonment.³

From that time, with most of the terrorist leaders in prison, the military branch of SL withdrew to the remote areas in the *Valle de los rios Apurimac, Ene, y Mantaro* [Apurimac, Ene, and Mantaro River Valleys or VRAEM] and terrorist military actions decreased. Since then, the SL have changed their tactics and procedures, and currently, they provide security to the drug cartels. However, the political branch of the SL continues performing ideological and indoctrination activities in cities and towns such as Abancay, Puno, Cuzco, Piura, Ayacucho, Apurímac, and Lima among others.

³ Degregori, 34.




Figure 1. Areas where Sendero Luminoso was Active in Peru

Source: Modified from Wikimedia Commons, “File: Sendero Luminoso, Peru,” accessed February 19, 2017, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Sendero_Luminoso_Peru.png.

Sources for attracting the SL sympathizers are young students at public universities and young people in rural and urban zones who are poor. After a long indoctrination period, the SL sympathizers become activists who conduct activities in many regions and sub-regions in the country. Activists hang posters, paint slogans, and are responsible for development of a positive public opinion of the SL.

Gabriella Tarazona-Sevillano mentioned that SL was “further bolstered in Lima by a full array of support organizations.” Those that Tarazona-Sevillano names support

organizations known as SL façade organizations⁴ where sympathizers are assembled together in several subgroups. From the 1990s, all of these façade organizations performed their support activities through different fronts, movements, unions, associations, and all kinds of social organizations.

Tarazona-Sevillano also argues that these groups the SL organized these groups to target and recruit all categories of city residents. Adopting the goals of different subgroups, SL is able to attract and indoctrinate new party members and sympathizers. Once new supporters enlist, their mission is twofold: first, to participate in agitation and propaganda, and second, to provide all possible support to the movement.⁵

After a multiyear effort in 2009, the SL founded the Movement for Amnesty and Fundamental Rights (MOVADef). Since late 2009 and early 2010, the SL is in a reorganization phase, and the MOVADef, which is the SL political branch, performs information operation campaigns, conducts propaganda, lectures, and other actions that allow them to capture adherents and to infiltrate the political and legal system.

In 2011 to 2012, the MOVADef tried to register as a political party; however, the *Jurado Nacional de Elecciones*, which is the national government organization in charge of the registration of Peruvian political parties rejected them because they failed to fulfill

⁴ Gabriela Tarazona-Sevillano, *Sendero Luminoso and the Threat of Narcoterrorism* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1990), 62.

⁵ Ibid.

requirements and their ideology was unable to coexist with Peruvian democratic principles.⁶

SL sympathizers like MOVAREDEF continue to actively use media and social networks, and their presence is more evident day to day. Because they were rejected for registration as a political party, they changed their name to the Front of Unity and Defense of the Peruvian People (FUDEPP), another façade organism.⁷

Concerning PSYOPS and the Peruvian Army, in accordance with the *1993 Constitution of Peru*, one of the Peruvian State fundamental duties is to protect the citizens from threats to their security. The primary purpose of the Peruvian Armed Forces is to guarantee the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of the Republic.⁸

The Peruvian Army has been an active instrument of the Peruvian Government for combating terrorism since 1980. The Peruvian Army participates in counterterrorism mainly with kinetic means. However, the Army doctrine considers other indirect means as well, such as non-lethal fires in the form of PSYOPS.

⁶ *Jurado Nacional de Elecciones*, “ROP Rejects MOVAREDEF Registration,” January 20, 2012, accessed January 20, 2017, <http://portal.jne.gob.pe/prensaypublicaciones/archivonoticias/Paginas/ROPRECHAZAINSCRIPCIONDEMOVAREDEF.aspx>.

⁷ Pedro Yaranga, “FUDEPP: The New Facade of MOVAREDEF in Four Keys,” *El Comercio Newspaper*, September 28, 2016, accessed January 26, 2017, http://elcomercio.pe/politica/actualidad/fudepp-conoce-nueva-fachada-movaredef-cuatro-claves-noticia-1934801?ref=flujo_tags_154741andft=nota_1ande=titulo.

⁸ Congress of the Republic of Peru, *1993 Constitution of Peru*, Republic of Peru, Lima, Peru, December 29, 1993, Title 4, Chapter 12, Article 165, accessed December 10, 2016, <http://www2.congreso.gob.pe/sicr/RelatAgenda/constitucion.nsf/constitucion>.

Peruvian Army *Manual de Ejército* (ME) 40-11, *Psychological Operations*,⁹ states that PSYOPS are psychological activities planned in peace, crisis, and war directed to enemy audiences, friends, and neutrals to influence attitudes and behavior affecting the achievement of political and military objectives. The Peruvian Army PSYOPS has two general branches: Psychological War (PW) and Psychological Action (PA).

On the one hand, PW is required to arm the nation psychologically against adversaries' dissociation trends, elevate and strengthen the morale of the civilian population and the armed forces, and gain the sympathy and friendship of allies and neutrals. On the other hand, the PA is the defensive aspect of psychological operations. It is the planning and implementation of methods, means, and techniques designed to inform public opinion to influence their behavior, attitude, feelings, emotions, and opinions. PA must be conducted in all military operations and military actions.

Together, these branches of psychological struggles are PSYOPS, which are prudent examples of all resources and psychological resources of the nation in support of the general state policy for achieving national objectives.

The Peruvian Army PSYOPS doctrine states a set of modalities, techniques, and means. Modalities are information, education, propaganda and CP, public relations (PR), agitation, troop information, population relationship, civic action. Nevertheless, civic action is the most common modality used by the Army in the framework of counterterrorism activities, leaving the others aside.

⁹ Minister of Defense Peruvian Army, ME 40-11, *Psychological Operations* (Lima, Peru: Minister of Defense Peruvian Army, 2012), 1-4.

Currently, the Peruvian Army performs civic actions mainly at the VRAEM, which is the area of operations of the SL military branch. In contrast, the SL political branch makes proselytizing efforts in other cities and towns where the Army does not perform any other modality of PSYOPS.

The Peruvian Army assumes that civic actions are adequate to neutralize these insurgent activities (political and military), create in the population a favorable image of the legally constituted government, destroy willingness toward the subversive as product of emotional tendencies, and separate the subversive forces of their support sources which are within the civilian population.¹⁰ The goal of this qualitative study is to describe changes in modalities, means, techniques, functions, audiences, and procedures in their activities that should be implemented by the Peruvian Army and the SL since 2000.

The issue is that since 2000, the has SL lost their military power and most of their terrorist leaders. The SL reduced its military actions against the Peruvian Government and its Armed Forces. Instead of military operations, the SL began a reorganization phase of its movement performing a set of activities to reinforce its political, financial, and social structure and support, recruiting people through some façade organizations as a political branch.

However, the Peruvian Army, despite knowing what the SL is doing, has not adapted its doctrine, has mainly focused its PSYOPS at the VRAEM region neglecting other aspects such as the ideological struggles supported by the psychological operations in different places across the country where this terrorist group is gaining followers.

¹⁰ Minister of Defense Peruvian Army, ME 40-11, 2-5.

In other words, the Peruvian Army holds a reactive attitude instead of a proactive one. The SL is waiting to reorganize and empower its movement to resume what they call *lucha armada*—armed struggle. Reemergence of armed struggle is a significant threat to the Peruvian State rule of law, democracy, and stability at a time when the Peruvian State has begun an era of development.

Research Question

Primary Question

What are the PSYOPS changes that the Peruvian Army should implement during counterinsurgency operations against the informational campaigns of the SL political branch since 2000?

Secondary Questions

1. What are the doctrine, modalities, support activities, means and types of communication that the SL insurgent organization has used since 2000?
2. Have the Peruvian Army PSYOPS doctrine, modalities, techniques, support activities, means and types of communication been effective against informational campaigns of the SL political branch since 2000?

Assumptions

One assumption of this study was that the Peruvian Army will continue performing civic actions as a primary modality of PSYOPS focused at the VRAEM (which is the region where the SL primarily performs drug trafficking activities) instead of performing other modalities of PSYOPS such as information, education, propaganda and CP, PR, agitation, and population relationship. Another assumption was that the SL

will continue proselytizing actions; recruiting experts, organizational activists continue hanging posters, painting slogans, and developing activities for a positive public opinion regarding themselves. The final assumption was that the Peruvian Army will not change PSYOPS doctrinal framework or policies against the SL.

Definition of Terms

Apurimac, Ene, and Mantaro River Valleys: “This area is located in the departments of Junín, Apurimac, Ayacucho, Cusco, and Huancavelica in the jungle of Peru. It is a militarized zone where illegal coca crops occupy thousands of hectares. To eliminate this threat, the Peruvian Government provides social programs, and the Peruvian military fights against the coca producers linked to the SL.”¹¹

Joint Command of the Peruvian Armed Forces (JCPAF): The Peruvian agency that performs the planning, preparation, coordination, and execution of military actions and operations of the Peruvian Armed Forces.¹²

Proselytizing: Actions performed in a political or ideological field to attempt to persuade someone to join one’s own political party or to espouse one’s doctrine.¹³

¹¹ *Radioprogramas del Peru*, “VRAEM,” RPP, accessed March 29, 2014, http://www.rpp.com.pe/vraem-tema_384203.html, in Edgar Concha, “An Analysis of the Doctrinal Changes that the Peruvian Army Implemented Fighting Counterinsurgency Operations against the Sendero Luminoso Insurgency since 2001” (Master’s thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 2014), 16.

¹² Joint Command of the Peruvian Armed Forces, “Mission,” accessed November 14, 2016, <http://www.ccffaa.mil.pe/ccffaa/mision/>.

¹³ The Free Dictionary, “Proselytizing,” accessed November 14, 2016, <http://www.thefreedictionary.com/proselytizing>.

Sendero Luminoso: It is the Communist Party of Peru. The SL is a subversive and terrorist organization that since May 1980 has triggered an armed conflict against the Peruvian State and society.¹⁴

Limitations

The most significant limitation of this study was the lack of access to Peruvian Army classified documentation and intelligence notes that report current Peruvian Army PSYOPS plans and the SL military and political actions. To overcome these limitations, the research design considered using multiple data collection methods. The purpose of using multiple method research was “to gain information about different aspects of the phenomena that is being studied, or about different phenomena.”¹⁵ Moreover, it was required to turn to reliable specialized sources from authors who had enough scholarly credentials.

Scope and Delimitations

This proposed qualitative research combined two theoretical considerations discussed in chapter 2 providing a better conceptualization of PSYOPS. This approach intended to cover:

¹⁴ Communication and Public Impact Office, Truth and Reconciliation Commission, “Final Report,” Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 28 August 2003, accessed November 11, 2016, <http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/peru/libros/cv/ii/ori.html>.

¹⁵ Joseph A. Maxwell, *Qualitative Research Design: An Interactive Approach*, 3rd ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2013), 102.

1. This research shows the concept of PSYOPS from different broad views, different definitions of PSYOPS from diverse experts and specialists and military personnel who participated in PSYOPS in different contexts.
2. Theoretical arguments such as Peruvian Army PSYOPS doctrine and SL proselytizing actions provided the basis and solid foundations toward extending tenets regarding different perspectives.
3. The inferences from the above theories and literature indicated that the PSYOPS doctrine and proselytizing actions seek the same objectives for Peruvian Army audiences and those of the SL.
4. The term PSYOPS has had considerable attention not only in public affairs, but also in other fields such as information operations (IO). This research focused only on modalities, means, techniques, functions, audiences, and procedures on activities the Peruvian Army and the SL terrorist organization implemented since 2000.
5. Cross-sectional data from 2000 to 2016 has been collected from domestic and foreign open sources. Cross-sectional data is a type of data collected through the observation of several different subjects that include organizations, regions, individuals, and countries. A researcher observed subjects in the same period regardless of any distinctions in the time. Analysis of this type of data mostly included the comparison between different subjects.¹⁶ Cross-

¹⁶ Write A Writing, "Understanding Cross-Sectional Data With Examples," accessed March 2, 2017, <http://www.writeawriting.com/research/understanding-cross-sectional-data/>.

sectional data, dealt with information about different subjects at the same point of time or during the same period.¹⁷

6. This study described the application of PSYOPS from the perspective of the Peruvian Army and the SL in the VRAEM and the Peruvian capital of Lima.
7. Finally, this study provides suggestions to modify current Peruvian Army PSYOPS. The author assumed that this study result in recommended doctrinal changes and approaches to counter SL. This study also addresses measures of effectiveness as part of its analysis.

Significance of Study

This research is significant for a number of reasons. However, this section discusses only the importance of the study from the doctrinal, social, and practical perspectives.

First, from the doctrinal aspect this study addresses some of the doctrinal gaps of Peruvian Army PSYOPS doctrine. This contribution is valuable because its conclusions are results of the application of the systematic work based on foundations of the scientific research methodology.

The social significance is the fact that this study faces one of the potential existential threats against the Peruvian citizens, and will provide some suggestions to mitigate the influence of the SL over some specific audiences such as the youth of Lima.

Finally, the conclusions of this study could assist all the elements of the Peruvian Army Information System to reorient its efforts, procedures, modalities, and plans against

¹⁷ Wikipedia, "Cross-sectional Data," Wikipedia Foundation, January 13, 2017, accessed May 11, 2017, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cross-sectional_data.

SL proselytizing actions. At the same time, and in full view of Peruvian society, it could empower the Peruvian Army's image as an institution, which is committed to its national defense and security.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Biologist Bernd Heinrich and his associates once spent a summer conducting detailed, systematic research on ant lions, small insects that trap ants in pits they have dug. Returning to the university in the fall, Heinrich was surprised to discover that his results were quite different from those published by other researchers. Redoing his experiments the following summer to try to understand these discrepancies, Heinrich found that he and his fellow researchers had been led astray by an unexamined assumption they had made about the ant lions' time frame: their observations hadn't been long enough to detect some key aspects of these insects' behavior. As he concluded, "Even carefully collected results can be misleading if the underlying context of assumptions is wrong." For this reason, the conceptual framework of your study—the system of concepts, assumptions, expectations, beliefs, and theories that support and informs your research—is a key part of your design.

— Joseph A. Maxwell, *Qualitative Research Design: An Interactive Approach*

Research Background

There is ample knowledge of PSYOPS and terrorism research. These studies have been conducted in different Latin American, European, Asian, African countries, and Peru as well. This background research describes topics associated with the Peruvian case.

Ron Schleifer¹⁸ stated, "before and during any war, the government going to war must address three primary target audiences: home, the enemy (both military and civilians) and neutrals. For democracies, the most important audience is the home

¹⁸ Ron Schleifer is member of the Department of Political Science of the Bar Ilan University, Ramat Gan, Israel. He is a senior lecturer at the Ariel University Center in Israel and Head of the Ariel Research Center for Defense and Communications. For the past twenty-five years, he has been researching the psychological warfare perspective of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Sussex Academic Press, "Middle East Studies: Ron Schleifer: About the Author," accessed January 19, 2017, http://www.sussex-academic.com/sa/titles/middle_east_studies/Schlieffer.htm.

audience.”¹⁹ He explains that when the State accepts that danger is coming, the government has to persuade its citizens that the danger is imminent and therefore they must alter their personal and societal priorities. He also mentioned that a government that fails to explain to their citizens why they fight will find it very challenging to win the war.

Schleifer argues that PSYOPS are the initial non-violent persuasion performed at a strategic level; this term has grown popular in the current communication-centric world, where access to means of message dissemination has become vastly easier than it has ever been. He remarks that insurgent groups, who engage in military actions against the State, are skillful in the use of PSYOPS.

Usually, insurgent groups employ PSYOPS more willingly than democratic countries since they do not have the same compunctions as democracies regarding its use. They are more creative and innovative, usually displaying greater organizational flexibility. Possessing these qualities, they can cause democracies considerable damage.²⁰

The core of Schleifer’s article is that he discusses the vulnerabilities of democracies to PSYOPS. It also advocates promoting PSYOPS, namely, the use of information and non-violent persuasive measures as a means to aid democracies in defending themselves more efficiently.

¹⁹ Ron Schleifer, “Democracies, Limited War and Psychological Operations,” *Review of International Affairs* 2, no. 3 (2003): 41-53, accessed September 14, 2016, EBSCOhost.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 41.

Schleifer argues that democracies are vulnerable to PSYOPS in the duration of the conflict—time element; the psychological transformation toward war—mix of values; the population’s state of mind—uncertainty; and the domestic political arena.

For those reasons, Schleifer argues, “democracies are not always cognizant of the dangers entailed in the insurgents’ PSYOPS.”²¹ Moreover, the population often fails to note that the methods of PSYOPS are quite unchanging.

Finally, after his analysis, Schleifer concluded first, that democracies should learn PSYOPS techniques, adapt them and use them against their opponents, and aid themselves in the struggle against insurgencies. Second, PSYOPS has little cost in terms of resources and it is moral since it saves lives. Third, the processes against insurgent groups require much more intra-state marketing effort because a crucial step is to find a new terminology for persuasion. In addition, and foremost, democracies that fight insurgencies should educate their population that limited war is of long duration and detail the moves and messages the insurgents are likely to use.

In his article, “Psychological Operations and Counterterrorism,” Jerrold Post²² states, “terrorism is a vicious species of psychological warfare waged through the media. It is a war for hearts and minds.”²³ He mentioned his research on the effects of retaliation

²¹ Schleifer, “Democracies, Limited War and Psychological Operations,” 51.

²² Jerrold M. Post is professor of psychiatry, political psychology, and international affairs and director of the Political Psychology Program at George Washington University. He is the author of *Political Paranoia: The Psychopolitics of Hatred*.

²³ Jerrold M. Post, “Psychological Operations and Counterterrorism,” *Joint Force Quarterly*, no. 37 (Spring 2005): 105-110, accessed September 14, 2016, EBSCOhost.

on terrorist behavior, which confirmed, “the major goal of retaliation against terrorism was conveying to the public that the government was strongly defending them.”²⁴

Multi National Division-Baghdad Information Operations (IO) Staff Officer, Carmine Cicalese,²⁵ mentioned that as part of his experience, “The communication LOO informs and influences key audiences through public affairs, select IO (mostly PSYOPS) . . . PSYOPS is an important part of shaping the information environment and then exploiting critical events.”²⁶ However, he also stated, “the PSYOPS and public affairs communities have not reached a consensus in support of IO or of the importance of the communications approach.”²⁷

One of Post’s conclusions is the fact that terrorism is an intrinsically psychological phenomenon, so “it should stand to reason that PSYOPS would and should be a primary method of attack or defense at the planning level.”²⁸ He also remarks:

since terrorism is less a shooting war involving guns, boats, or planes than a psychological war involving ideas, images, ideologies, information, and intentions. The first and most essential condition is to shape or prepare the psychological battlespace in a manner favorable to our purposes, an effort to which PSYOPS is integral.²⁹

²⁴ Post, 106.

²⁵ LTC Carmine Cicalese, USA, Assistant Chief of Staff, G7, MultiNational Division-Baghdad (MND-B), Iraq.

²⁶ Carmine Cicalese, “Army IO is PSYOPS,” *Military Review* 87, no. 4 (July 2007): 119-120, accessed September 14, 2016, EBSCOhost.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 120.

²⁸ Curtis D. Boyd, “Army IO is PSYOPS Influencing More with Less,” *Military Review* 87, no. 3 (2007): 71, accessed September 14, 2016, EBSCOhost.

²⁹ *Ibid.*

Curtis Boyd³⁰ wrote a paper explaining the fractures of Army IO and the dysfunctional friction between IO and other Army agents of influence, especially PSYOPS and PA.³¹ In his article, Boyd mentions that Post, who is a highly regarded scholar of the psychology of terrorism, argues, “There has been little attention to the potential of strategic PSYOPS in undermining the enemy to prepare the battlefield . . . PSYOPS should be the primary weapon in the war against terrorism.”³²

Alfred Paddock³³ wrote an article that recalls the employment of PSYOPS since 1622 as both a means and a way. He also argues that in different stages of the PSYOPS development, it has been misunderstood, not only by the politics, but also by military commanders.³⁴

PSYOPS are “The planned use of communications to influence human attitudes and behaviors of audiences.”³⁵ PSYOPS have been characterized as toxic,

³⁰ Boyd. COL Curtis Boyd, USA, Assistant Chief of Staff, G3 at the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command. He earned a B.A. from Norwich University and has an M.A. in National Security Affairs from the Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict Curriculum at the Naval Postgraduate School. A former fellow at Harvard’s JFK School of Government and a graduate of the Joint Forces Staff College, he has served in a variety of command and staff positions in the infantry, information operations, and psychological operations.

³¹ Boyd, 67-75.

³² Ibid., 71.

³³ Alfred H. Paddock, Jr., was on active duty in the U.S. Army from 1957 to 1988 and served three combat tours in Laos and Vietnam with Special Forces. He was also Director for Psychological Operations in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

³⁴ Alfred H. Paddock, Jr., “Legitimizing Army Psychological Operations,” *Joint Force Quarterly* no. 56 (1st Quarter 2010): 89-93, accessed September 14, 2016, EBSCOhost.

³⁵ Ibid., 89.

disinformation, and unsavory among other terms. For that criticism, the PSYOPS units' ability to support military forces and interact with other executive branch agencies has been inhibited.

An article titled, "Need for Closure and the Social Response to Terrorism," several authors³⁶ write that "terrorism is considered a form of psychological warfare that aims to advance political objectives through the spreading of fear."³⁷ They also mentioned that some classic ideologues of terrorism have argued, "Terrorism destabilizes the state and unmasks its impotence, paving the way to the political alternative that the terrorists offer."³⁸

The authors focused their research on "the uncertainty component of insecurity, with the prediction that the threat of terrorism leads to elevated levels of the need for cognitive closure,³⁹ defined as the aversion toward uncertainty and ambiguity, with a preference for firmness and stability in beliefs and expectations."⁴⁰

³⁶ Edward Orehek is a professor at the University of Groningen, Department of Social and Organizational Psychology.

³⁷ Edward Orehek, Shira Fishman, Mark Dechesne, Bertjan Doosje, Arie W. Kruglanski, Angela P. Cole, Billie Saddler, and Tarra Jackson, "Need for Closure and the Social Response to Terrorism," *Basic and Applied Social Psychology* 32, no. 4 (October 2010): 279, accessed September 14, 2016, EBSCOhost.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Arie Kruglanski and Donna Webster define closure or need for closure (used interchangeably with need for cognitive closure) as psychological terms that describe an individual's desire for a firm answer to a question and an aversion toward ambiguity. The term need denotes a motivated tendency to seek out information. Arie W. Kruglanski and Donna M. Webster, "Motivated Closing of the Mind: 'Seizing' and 'Freezing'," *Psychological Review* 103, no. 2 (April 1996): 263-283; Wikipedia, "Closure (Psychology)," Wikipedia Foundation, last updated March 3, 2017, accessed March 17, 2017, [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Closure_\(psychology\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Closure_(psychology)). Another need for closure definition refers to the desire or motivation to have a definite answer or knowledge

The authors explained that terrorism seems to lead to increased group cohesion and feelings of aggressiveness toward threatening outgroups. The objective of their five case studies was to explore the relationship between a potential surge in need for closure reacting to the threat of terrorism and the following social psychological response based on that need.

Finally, investigators concluded that their data suggested, “The psychological variable of the need for closure may play a significant role in the psychological processes stimulated by the threat of terrorism . . . individuals increase group identification concerns and are more supportive of actions designed to protect the in-group.”⁴¹ Therefore, investigators found that the threat of terrorism leads to increased need for closure.

Edgar Concha is currently an active duty lieutenant colonel in the Peruvian Army and a former U.S. Army Command and General Staff College student. Concha wrote an investigation with the purpose to analyze the counterinsurgency doctrinal changes that the Peruvian Army learned from the SL insurgency from 2001 to 2013.⁴² As part of the conclusions, he mentioned:

instead of uncertainty or doubt. The need for closure is resolved by any answer, and the answer is accepted simply because it is available. Psychology, “Need for Closure,” accessed March 17, 2017, <https://psychology.iresearchnet.com/social-psychology/personality/need-for-closure/>.

⁴⁰ Orehek, 280.

⁴¹ Ibid., 289.

⁴² Edgar Concha, “An Analysis of the Doctrinal Changes that the Peruvian Army Implemented Fighting Counterinsurgency Operations against the Sendero Luminoso Insurgency since 2001” (Master’s thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 2014), ii, iv.

The SL has a good indoctrination system that has allowed them to replenish their leaders for more than 33 years. The SL changed their procedures for recruiting personnel. The recruitment of children and their process of indoctrination through permanent education in communist ideology have given this organization good results. From 1999 to 2008, these children became the present and if not interrupted, will be the future of this organization. They are now in charge of the SL ambushes, attacks, and harassment of military bases and patrols. This process continues and will be permanent.⁴³

The Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission (a group that analyzed the internal violence from 1980 to 2000), stated in chapter 1, volume 2 of its “Final Report,”⁴⁴ that since the SL began its insurgency, even before, the primary indoctrination centers were public universities, not only in Lima, but at central highland region universities.

The *Black Book of SL* is one of the primary sources analyzing SL development from 2001 to 2008. This book studies the first political and military campaign against the Peruvian Army and Government.⁴⁵

The *Black Book of SL* mentions the SL tactics, procedures, and specific aspects of their method of indoctrination. Moreover, they analyze the PSYOPS of the Peruvian Army, arguing that civic actions are useless efforts against their propaganda and indoctrination activities.⁴⁶

⁴³ Concha, 76-77.

⁴⁴ Communication and Public Impact Office, Truth and Reconciliation Commission, “Final Report,” ch. 2, vol. 1, para. 1.1.1.1.3.

⁴⁵ *Sachas on Line Blog*, “El Libro Negro de Sendero Luminoso,” April 2013, accessed November 11, 2016, <http://joreno.blogspot.com/2013/04/el-libro-negro-de-sendero-luminoso.html>.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

Pedro Cotillo, Dean of the San Marcos Major National University (UNMSM), acknowledged in an interview with *Radio Programas del Peru News* on October 30, 2012, that there are undercover terrorist activists inside the university. He also recalled that during the most dangerous period of terrorism, the UNMSM was the main center of SL indoctrination. The dean said that the university authorities are developing measures to avoid terrorism propaganda and similar actions.

The Peruvian journalist, Martin Hidalgo, published an article in *Peru 21 Newspaper* on April 21, 2014, which reported that after intelligence efforts inside some public universities, the Peruvian National Police detained three SL activists associated with MOVADef who have been performing proselytizing activities into the UNMSM. They were also associated with seven terrorist activist groups in other universities in the country.

Review of Support Literature and Consultation

Peruvian Army's PSYOPS

The Peruvian Army plans and executes most of its military operations based on its doctrinal framework. This portion of the research describes current PSYOPS doctrine of the Peruvian Army. This description is an important information for the next stage of the study, which is the analysis phase.

Doctrine

Three manuals provide doctrinal guidance for the Peruvian Army PSYOPS: Peruvian Army ME 40-11, *Psychological Operations Basic Acknowledgements*; Peruvian

Army ME 40-12, *Psychological Operations Techniques*; and Peruvian Army ME 40-13, *Planning and Assessment of Psychological Operations*.

These manuals are the backbone of Peruvian PSYOPS, but the significance of analyzing this material lies in the fact that this doctrine was written in the early 1980s and has only had minor changes since that time. PSYOPS doctrine has not been updated in accordance with SL changes. In the Peruvian Army, doctrinal updates take a long time in many cases. It is a gap that needs to be filled.

Peruvian Army ME 40-11, *Psychological Operations Basic Acknowledgements* states basic concepts to lead the Peruvian Army PSYOPS System at the strategic, operational, and tactical level. This doctrine considers that PSYOPS are composed of two broad and central concepts, which are PW and PA.

ME 40-11 declares the necessity of working psychologically on internal and external adversaries, attracting certain elements to the cause and to weaken and destroy, if possible, the fighting will of the military and elements that are irremediably hostile to the nation. Based on this statement, the Peruvian Army defines PW as the offensive aspect of PSYOPS, driving military operations and actions. It is the planned use of this means that can change enemy behavior, attitudes, feelings, emotions, and opinions (government authorities, armed forces, population, etc.) predisposing favorably to achieving the goals.

In the same way, the Peruvian Army defines PA as the defensive aspect of PSYOPS. It is the planning and implementation of methods, means, and techniques, designed to inform the public in order to influence their behavior, attitude, feelings,

emotions, and opinion favorably. It is conducted during all periods of military operations and actions.

Peruvian Army ME 40-12, *Psychological Operations Techniques* contains modalities and techniques, media, intelligence for PSYOPS, operations for PSYOPS, and support to military operations. Modalities considered are information, propaganda, counter-propaganda (CP), agitation, education, and PR. Each of these modalities uses its techniques. In addition, it recognizes a complementary category named Support Activities for PSYOPS Modalities, which are information to troops, relations with the community, and civic action.

Peruvian Army ME 40-12 also refers to Operations for PSYOPS. In this part, it mentions that for the execution of PSYOPS (planning, implementation, and evaluation) in order to support military actions and operations, the psychological operators (OPERSIC) should participate as specialized staff of the Operational and Special Combatant Command of Land Component, ensuring their participation, successful actions, and dissemination of PSYOPS products.

Finally, Support to Military Operations in Peruvian Army ME 40-12, focuses on PW of strategic PSYOPS, and the support to PSYOPS at the strategic level. Additionally, it mentions support to tactical operations (offensive and defensive), support to consolidation operations, support to the security of the rear zone, support to unconventional warfare, support to counterinsurgency warfare (it remarks that civic actions have a particular interest in this kind of operations to gain population confidence), and support to atypical operations.

Chapter 5 of Peruvian Army ME 40-13, *Planning and Assessment of Psychological Operations*, states that the primary modalities used for PSYOPS purposes are propaganda, education, and agitation. Chapter 6 states that PSYOPS activities are used primarily to transmit information and education to the population. However, it also mentions that PSYOPS should be considered within the type of additional operations, that conveniently employed, contributes to success in the mission fulfilling.

Peruvian Army ME 40-13 addresses the PSYOPS planning process and examines three planning levels: first, strategic level (JCPAF); second, operational level (combatant commands, special commands, land component, corps, division); and third, tactical level (brigades, battalions, and PSYOPS units). The manual mentions some broader unconventional warfare planning considerations as well. Lastly, it suggests techniques, procedures, and considerations for assessing PSYOPS, but only in conventional war.

Peruvian Army Staff Officer Manual ME 101-5, Vol. 1 drives general the responsibilities of all the staff officers. This manual states that PSYOPS should be considered as a system of support activities, and as such should be planned and conducted to achieve changes in the way of thinking and sentiments consistent with the purposes that allow one to reach psychological goals. Moreover, it assigns specific functions to the PSYOPS staff officers. Additionally, it provides guidelines for the planning process. However, these guidelines have not been updated in accordance with the current Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP.)

The *Psychological Operations Handbook* used in the *Escuela Superior de Guerra del Ejército* (equivalent to the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College) is in general terms a summary of ME 40-11, ME 40-12, and ME 40-13. This manual does not

consider any information about PSYOPS in the context of unconventional warfare, counterinsurgency warfare, or atypical war.

Peruvian Army ME 41-7, *Non-Conventional Warfare–Counterinsurgency Manual*, had two editions; 1989 and 2005. The 1989 edition considered two parts. One was the SL organization, structure, tactics, techniques, and procedures used by this terrorist group. The other section examined tactics, techniques, and procedures employed by the Peruvian Army counterinsurgency units. The first version included some PSYOPS considerations for planning and conducting military operations.

The 2005 edition, which is the current version, only mentions tactics, techniques and procedures that should be used by the Peruvian Army counterinsurgency units focusing on the tactical planning process and all kinds of considerations on the employment of kinetic means at the brigade level and below, neglecting the PSYOPS aspect.

Peruvian Army ME 41-8, *Staff Officer Manual for Counterinsurgency Operations* prescribes the particular doctrine of the staff in counterinsurgency operations. It states that PSYOPS should permanently mobilize public opinion in the country in support of the objectives of the State and exalt the faith of the people in the values and moral sentiments of man to prevent psychological transfer that fosters insurgency groups. Moreover, it mentions that planning and conducting PSYOPS should be centralized at the national level.

Peruvian Army ME 41-8 declares that the purpose of PSYOPS is countering insurgency actions and winning the adherence of the population by using certain military and political measures. To comply with these goals, PSYOPS should be aware that the

lack of development, poor economy, and illiteracy, among others features characterized the PSYOPS target area. Finally, this manual again states that PSYOPS must fully exploit the works of civic action.

Modalities

Chapter 2 of Peruvian Army ME 40-12 states two definitions of modalities. The first definition explains that modalities are forms to act to orient or reinforce behaviors, attitudes, feelings, emotions, and opinions [*Conducta, Actitudes, Sentimientos, Emociones, Opiniones* or CASEO]. The intention of modalities is orienting CASEO in the direction desired by the OPERSIC, according to the expected psychological objectives. A second definition states that a modality is a set of techniques that allows appealing, influencing, reinforcing, or reaching the target audience [*Blanco auditorio*] in favorable conditions to the objectives. Chapter 2 of Peruvian Army ME 40-12 also defines six types of modalities: information, propaganda, CP, agitation, education, and PR.

Techniques

Chapter 2 of Peruvian Army ME 40-12 defines a technique as a set of procedures that the OPERSIC uses to make effective the modalities of PSYOPS and according to OPERSIC's expertise can obtain the expected results to reach the psychological objectives. Moreover, this manual states that a technique is a part of any modality and the set of techniques of the same nature conform a psychological modality.

The techniques of the modalities of PSYOPS are:

1. Techniques of the Information Modality: news, press releases, reports, press conferences, newsletters, interviews, etc.
2. Techniques of the Propaganda Modality: testimony or transfer, ordinary man or plain language, the least of evils, inevitable victory (triumphal cart or railroad), expiatory victim (scapegoat or scapegoat), hot potato, simplicity, insinuation, prestige, selection, terror, offense, rumor, etc.
3. Techniques of the CP Modality: direct CP, indirect CP, diversionist CP, silence, deprecation CP, preventive CP, rumor, etc.
4. Techniques of the Agitation Modality: apology, anonymous calls, collection of quotas, armed strike, plagiarism, deception, incitement, etc.
5. Techniques of the Education Modality: discussion in small groups, expositive or master class, practices with feedback, conferences, exhibitions, demonstrations, etc.
6. Techniques of the PR Modality: citizen-patriotic attendance cards, ceremonies and parades, social gatherings and fellowship luncheons, celebration of the day of the Army branches and services, cultural conferences and other important public military demonstrations, contests, etc.

Support Activities to PSYOPS Modalities

Chapter 2 of Peruvian Army ME 40-12 defines three type of support activities, and considers a classification named Other Complementary Techniques:

1. Troop Information Support Activity: upon enrollment in service, during service, and prior to licensing.

2. Community Relations Support Activity: support of transportation, agricultural activities, food distribution, support in communications, construction repair and improvement of communication routes, support activities for health and health campaigns, support to the education sector, aid to charities, works of patriotic character, etc.
3. Civic Action Support Activity: support with food, medical-dental care, delivery of construction materials, support with mobility and transportation, hygiene and sanitation, social assistance, and essential public services support.
4. Other Complementary Techniques: nostalgia, music, symbols, slogans.

Means of Communications

Chapter 3 of Peruvian Army ME 40-12 defines the means of communication as those physical elements used in PSYOPS to carry messages to the target audience. This manual classifies means of communications in the following manner.

1. According to the speed of communication: Fast means which includes radio, television, loudspeakers, flyers, newspapers, posters, computer through the Internet information network, etc.; Slow means, which includes periodicals, books, exhibitions, films, theatrical productions, etc.
2. According to which sense (sight, hearing, etc.) through which the communication is received: Audible means, which is communication through the sense of hearing (radio, loudspeakers, recordings, etc.); Visual means, where messages are received by sight, including printed materials such as flyers, posters, newspapers, periodicals, books, brochures, exhibitions, exhibitions, the computer through the Internet, computer, multimedia, etc.;

Audiovisual means, where they make simultaneous use of sight and hearing to receive a communication that includes cinematographic films, television, theater, public meetings, computer, Internet, multimedia, e-mail, etc.

Types of Communications

Chapter 3 of Peruvian Army ME 40-12 states two types of communications. Direct communication, which in its simplest form is the encounter of two individuals (face to face) for an ordinary conversation with a particular purpose and it only uses the voice to appeal to the target audience. Indirect communication, where the message is transmitted through a physical media (television, radio, loudspeakers, personal computer, paper, etc., previously selected in an appropriate way that is relevant to the mass media opportunity.

SL Informational Campaign

SL is an insurgent organization whose goal is the seizure of power to implement communism in Peru. To this end, it uses revolutionary violence (terrorism, sabotage and guerrilla warfare).⁴⁷ This section of the study about the SL considers doctrine, modalities, support activities to SL informational campaigns, means, and types of communications.

Doctrine

For the SL and many other insurgent groups, doctrine addresses their activities. Since most doctrine is not easily known, the researcher must make inferences about it.

⁴⁷ Gustavo Gorriti, *The Shining Path: A History of the Millenarian War in Peru* (Lima, Peru: Editorial Apoyo, 1990), 107-108.

Doctrine provides guidelines to the SL and insurgent groups in the appropriate and ideal way to conduct actions to achieve objectives.

The 1989 version of Peruvian Army ME 41-7, *Non-Conventional Warfare–Counterinsurgency Manual* was the unique Peruvian Army official military source that detailed the SL ideology, doctrine, organization, structure, tactics, techniques, and procedures used by this terrorist group. However, the SL has changed, and the Peruvian Army does not release current official information.

Nevertheless, the 1989 version of ME 41-7 mentioned that the SL performs informational campaigns using agitation and propaganda, developing mass agitation; distribution of brochures and flyers; and mobilizing rallies and marches using existing broadcasting media (newspapers, radio stations, television, and others).

The *Black Book of SL* is one of the primary sources to analyze the SL development from 2001 to 2008. This book mentions the SL tactics, procedures, and specific aspects of their method of indoctrination. Forms of struggle are ambushes, assaults, selective annihilations, and revolutionary propaganda and agitation.

The *Black Book of SL* explains indoctrination methods applied mainly to the insurgents at the VRAEM. The *Black Book of SL* indicates the way the SL should recruit experts to its group, which audiences to attack both in rural and urban areas, how to develop informational campaigns, and address different forms to support the rural population to neutralize Peruvian Army PSYOPS. The following citation extracted from the *Black Book of SL* reflects its doctrine and ideas:

To run these revolutionary actions the Party and comrades, commanders and fighters of the People’s Revolutionary Army do not wear hoods and balaclavas. They do not cover their faces neither perform draws. They do not hoist red flags

with the hammer and sickle; they leave no signs over the dead. They do not send letters asking for financial support and other items. They send letters exposing their readiness for dialogue and political understanding to various states and governments, Peruvian and foreign bourgeoisie, and all sectors and classes of our country. It is not the SL policy kidnapping and arrest; do not make kidnapping to ask in exchange for his freedom sums of money. The selective annihilation is the military personnel and proven civil and military “intelligence” infiltrators and traitors capitulators agents according to prejudice the interests of the people and the Peruvian revolution.⁴⁸

Moreover, insurgents analyze the PSYOPS of the Peruvian Army, arguing that civic actions are useless efforts against their propaganda and indoctrination activities.

Valentina Cocco mentioned that the SL “began a massive operation of indoctrination and recruitment of *senderistas* within the universities; it was directed to students who were usually from the lower classes.”⁴⁹ Cocco also stated, “During the years of Sendero’s indoctrination, its recruitment was targeted to the middle class and the rural population.”⁵⁰

James Rochlin states, “There exists a considerable literature regarding the root causes of rebellion in Latin America and other third world countries, some unique to particular cases and others applicable in a more general fashion.”⁵¹ For that reason, most of the insurgent groups have common aspects such as in recruitment sources.

⁴⁸ *Sachas on Line Blog*.

⁴⁹ Valentina Cocco, “Marxist Insurgencies and Indigenous Rights; the Cases of Guatemala and Peru” (Master’s thesis, The City College of New York, 2011), accessed November 12, 2016, http://academicworks.cuny.edu/cc_etds_theses/43, 64.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 69.

⁵¹ James F. Rochlin, *Vanguard Revolutionaries in Latin America* (London, UK: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), 2.

Michael Radu and Vladimir Tismaneanu wrote the book *Latin American Revolutionaries*, an in-depth overview of the major insurgent or terrorist movements in Latin America since the Cuban Revolution.⁵² Their book considers insurgent and terrorist groups from the early 1960s to the late 1990s.

In their book, Radu and Tismaneanu describe some key aspects of the Latin America insurgent groups such as location, origins, front organizations, memberships, leadership, ideology, propaganda, view on violence, military structure, performance, training, logistic and equipment, recruitment and popular support, and finally relations with other groups.

Bolivia was not exempt from insurgent groups. The *Ejército de Liberación Nacional* (ELN or National Liberation Army) “was active in the remote areas of southeastern Bolivia, with a minimal logistical presence in La Paz . . . In 1972, the *Partido Revolucionario de Trabajadores Bolivianos* (PRTB or Bolivian Workers’ Revolutionary Party) was set up as a political front for the ELN.”⁵³

The *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia* [FARC or Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia] was established early in 1966 as the armed branch of the Colombian Communist Party (PCC). In March 1985, the FARC announced the formation of its political branch, the FARC-UP (Popular Unity), and declared that it would

⁵² Michael Radu and Vladimir Tismaneanu, *Latin American Revolutionaries: Groups, Goals, Methods* (New York: Pergamon-Brassey’s International Defense Publishers, 1990), 85.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 109.

participate in the elections. FARC's propaganda seeks to radicalize Colombian peasants.⁵⁴

Guatemala has also had several insurgent groups such as the *Partido Guatemalteco de Trabajo* [PGT or Guatemalan Party of Labor], whose propaganda was directed at university students, unionized workers, and some wage laborers in the countryside. The PGT published its own newspaper. The *Organización Revolucionaria del Pueblo en Armas* [ORPA or Revolutionary Organization of the People in Arms] was another insurgent organization. ORPA's ideology was a combination of Marxism, Leninism, Maoism, and the nativist and racist-romantic ideas of Frantz Fanon and Jose Carlos Mariategui.

In the case of Peru, the SL does not publicize any current insurgent doctrine, but their public actions and declarations allow the researcher to infer that they look to gain the respect and support of the population. Michael Burgoyne mentioned the change the SL is using in strategy:

Following its collapse in the 1990s, SL conducted a 5-year study of its failure and codified its findings in a 45-page summary that became Sendero's new strategy. Within the document, SL renounces many of its former practices, including extrajudicial killings, kidnappings, blackmail, and occupying homes. Shining Path concluded that violence against the population was the critical failure of the rebellion. It is now reportedly providing potable water, building sports fields, and painting schools to garner popular support.⁵⁵

⁵⁴ Radu and Tismaneanu, 149-155.

⁵⁵ Michael Burgoyne, "The Allure of Quick Victory. Lessons from Peru's Fight against Sendero Luminoso," *Military Review* 90, no. 5 (September/October 2010): 70, accessed November 11, 2016, http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20101031_art011.pdf.

Ismael Iglesias mentioned that the SL has two fronts of struggle. The first one is clandestine, dedicated to the military line and charged for attacking the security forces, and terrorist attacks on state infrastructure based on their main force, known as the Revolutionary Army People. This first front could be acting independently of the SL leadership in prison.

The second front consists of political activists and former prisoners of terrorism who act openly, looking for infiltrating different organizations of society, especially in the trade union movements to press for a political solution and amnesty for their imprisoned leaders, most lifers in maximum-security prisons.⁵⁶ The two fronts of struggle Iglesias mentioned overlapped in its SL hierarchy.

Tarazona-Sevillano explains, “Much like other military organizations, SL is structured hierarchically in five basic levels.”⁵⁷ These levels are sympathizers, activist, militant, commanders, and the National Central Committee members known as the cupola. Concerning sympathizers, James Rochlin states, “Sendero sympathizers were generally divided into two groups: SL supporters who had pragmatic motivations but who lacked loyalty to the rebels, and a sizable population for whom Sendero was able to provide a strong sense of identity.”⁵⁸

⁵⁶ Ismael Iglesias, “*Sendero Luminoso y el Narcotráfico en el VRAEM*,” *Air and Space Power Journal* 24, no. 4 (2012): 61, accessed September 14, 2016, http://www.au.af.mil/au/afri/aspj/apjinternational/apj-s/2012/2012-4/2012_4_07_iglesias_s.pdf.

⁵⁷ Tarazona-Sevillano, 67.

⁵⁸ Rochlin, 42.

Part of this study mainly focuses on the two first levels that the SL organizes sympathizers and activists. The military component or militant level in the structural pyramid of the organization is at the third layer and above.

In this sense, Tarazona-Sevillano argues, “The large foundation of the SL pyramid is composed of a nationwide body of sympathizers.”⁵⁹ That is the reason why SL looks for increasing its sympathizer cadres.

During the 1980s and 1990s, SL information operation speeches focused on the rhetorical ideas of Marxism, Leninism, Maoism, and other domestic themes such as social inequity, poverty, abuse, popular discontent, lack of state presence, and so on.

Rochlin provides a broader list; he mentions:

In the economic realm, such factors include poverty and profound economic inequity, unemployment and underemployment, the failure of a country to adapt to dominant economic trends, and the onset of general economic crisis. Common political themes include a lack of adequate representation, rising expectations, exclusion, and the failure of the state to act in tune with dominant international factors.⁶⁰

Moreover, Rochlin states, “Central to the group’s strategy was the theory of terror and extraordinary use of violence. SL relied on classic terrorism to achieve power by instilling intense fear among the population through the awesome use of force.”⁶¹

Ted Gurr mentions, “Experimental studies indicate that discontented people tend to give selective attention to aggressive messages, which suggests that even aggressive

⁵⁹ Tarazona-Sevillano, 67.

⁶⁰ Rochlin, 2.

⁶¹ Ibid., 57.

content communication albeit small it can reach its potential audience.”⁶² On the one hand, Eric Selbin argues that when performing IO, insurgent groups appeal to:

The rare capacity to consider existing realities as transformed possibilities and to inspire a collective imagination of a better future. Prior to the political victory, it is necessary to draw attention to popular grievances and discontent with the status quo and its maintenance. Then and more important, the leaders propose a vision of the future in which these grievances and discontent are rectified. The transformation of the society requires daring, commitment, creativity, adaptability, and vision.⁶³

On the other hand, since 2010 when the SL established its political branch (MOVADef), they have used this branch to deliver several speeches and new ideas to persuade enrollment in their movement. In this sense, Max Manwaring argues that the SL is going to reevaluate “their ideas of tolerance, cooperation, equality, and compromise as they try to build a political coalition that could threaten to topple an incumbent government by employing democratic means.”⁶⁴ Manwaring also notes that the SL “organizes a campaign of information gathering and then develops public support for a new, people-oriented Shining Path agenda based on this information.”⁶⁵

The new SL platform claims: (1) new constitution that contemplates the fundamental rights of the people; (2) restitution of freedoms, rights, benefits, and achievements; (3) economic freedom for the people, natural resources, national

⁶² Ted Robert Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970), 224.

⁶³ Eric Selbin, *Modern Latin American Revolutions* (Boulder: CO: Westview Press, 1993), 79.

⁶⁴ Max G. Manwaring, *The Complexity of Modern Asymmetric Warfare* (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2012), 41.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

production; (4) land for the one who works it, against the spoil; (5) political freedom and criminalization of popular struggles; (6) defend the nation, sovereignty and integrity; (7) political solution, general amnesty, and national reconciliation; and (8) respect for the rights of the working people.⁶⁶ “These are some of the strategic-level analytical commonalities that have proved, over the years and throughout the world, to generate the political conflict environment.”⁶⁷

The SL looks for engaging people and group incentives for collective action, to achieve the SL political ends. Ted Gurr and Monty Marshall mentioned, “The greater the disadvantage imposed on a people and the greater their sense of injustice, the easier it is for group leaders to convince them that they have something to gain from collective action.”⁶⁸ In other words, the SL manipulates poor people to take advantage of their needs for political recognition.

As part of that manipulation, the SL appeals to people’s sentiments so that the people feel sure of the truth of the SL’s speech. Gurr and Marshall note, “The greater a people sense of common identity, the greater their potential for join action. Identity alone is not sufficient; it needs organizational expression.”⁶⁹

⁶⁶ Movement for Amnesty and Fundamental Rights, “Program Guidelines,” accessed January 25, 2017, <http://www.movadef.net/lineamientos-programaticos/lineamientos-programaticos>.

⁶⁷ Manwaring, 41.

⁶⁸ Ted Robert Gurr and Monty G. Marshall, “Assessing Risks of Future Ethnic Wars,” in *People versus States: Minorities at Risk in the New Century*, ed. Ted R. Gurr (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2000), 229.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 230.

The SL is eager for collective action in domestic opportunities when they are performing informational campaigns: “Group leaders make strategic decisions about when to initiate, escalate, and terminate collective action. They do so in the context of changing political environments that shape the chances of successful political action.”⁷⁰

The SL’s leaders realized that they lack conventional power to directly influence the national government or any Peruvian neighbor’s government. Consequently, the revolutionary leadership figured out that irregular, asymmetric warfare is the only logical means of how to enforce a vigorous political organism to do one’s wish.⁷¹

Since the SL has members who embrace different humanistic training in law, economics, or liberal arts of some form, they understand that informational campaigns are appropriate means to affect population’s perception. Manwaring argues, “This kind of irregular war—based on the notion that the human terrain is the main contemporary center of gravity—relies primarily on words, images, perceptions, and ideas.”⁷²

The SL uses a variety of characteristic symbols such as the classic “sickle and the hammer” to instill its messages. They know the powerful impact that images have. Gurr argues, “Aggressive political symbols are verbal or graphic representations of violence against political targets, including descriptions of actual violence, past or present, and assertions about the desirability or lack of desirability of violence against such targets.”⁷³

⁷⁰ Gurr and Marshall, 231.

⁷¹ Manwaring, 43.

⁷² *Ibid.*, 41

⁷³ Gurr, 225.

The SL has to adapt and innovate the way they convince and recruit people. In that sense Daniel Castro mentioned that, the guerrillas or insurgent groups “Lost its battles against time because most of them lacked the necessary ability to adapt rapidly, not only to the terrain, but also to the daily life, language, and customs of the peasants; process which normally takes years.”⁷⁴ In effect, the SL declared its armed struggle against the Peruvian State in May 1980, regardless of the fact they were militarily defeated by late 1990 and early 2000. The SL continues its political war and its labor in the ideological field.

In this context, the SL has a well-structured information operation campaign. Pedro Yaranga, who is a Peruvian consultant and analyst on issues of drug trafficking and strategic security mentioned that the FUDEPP is part of the second stage of the *Plan Amanecer* (SL Sunrise Plan) which would have been written in handwriting by Guzmán Reynoso (founder of SL, currently imprisoned). He explained that the first step was by MOVAREF, who executed “a propaganda war,” and the front, which is the new face of SL, seeks political participation.⁷⁵

Journalistic research of the Lampadia blog reports that since its creation in 2009, the MOVAREF activities have increased. The establishment of seventy-five MOVAREF political cells nationwide demonstrates this argument. The MOVAREF settled its organic

⁷⁴ Daniel Castro, *Revolution and Revolutionaries: Guerrilla Movements in Latin America* (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1999), 126.

⁷⁵ Yaranga.

structure in Lima, and from there the MOVADef moves its pieces with total freedom in the provinces.⁷⁶

It is evident that the SL turned to a new strategy, primarily using soft instead of hard means. Many other terrorist groups worldwide have used soft means as part of their informational campaigns to attract people. Laurie Fenstermacher, Larry Kuznar, Tom Rieger, and Anne Speckhard explained the modalities used as part of informational campaigns:

Terrorists use three forms of communication: discursive (language), visual (images), and symbolic acts (behaviors that send a message) often with the goal to change public opinion and political will or to recruit, fundraise or—rally the troops. Common discursive communication mechanisms used to persuade include rhetoric, argument, and narrative frames. To fully understand the language, cultural references need to be understood. Visual images are powerful due to the non-linear fashion in which they are absorbed. They have a visceral, powerfully emotional impact and, when in the news, are commonly regarded as objective truth. Symbolic acts are akin to terrorism— theater, sending messages to multiple audiences simultaneously. New media and communications editing technology are contemporary—game changers regarding enabling more sophisticated influence messaging.⁷⁷

David Ronfeldt, John Arquilla, Graham Fuller, and Melissa Fuller, in reference to the *Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional* [EZLN, Zapatista National Liberation Army] of Mexico explained, “The information revolution is leading to the rise of

⁷⁶ Lampadia Antocha Informativa, “MOVADef has 75 Post Nationwide,” November 7, 2012, accessed January 26, 2017, <http://www.lampadia.com/analisis/politica/movadef-tiene-75-bases-en-todo-el-pais/>.

⁷⁷ Laurie Fenstermacher, Larry Kuznar, Tom Rieger, and Anne Speckhard, “Protecting the Homeland from International and Domestic Terrorism Threats: Current Multi-Disciplinary Perspectives on Root Causes, the Role of Ideology, and Programs for Counter-radicalization and Disengagement,” National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, January 2010, accessed November 11, 2016, http://www.start.umd.edu/sites/default/files/files/publications/U_Counter_Terrorism_White_Paper_Final_January_2010.pdf, 17.

networks forms of organization, whereby small, previously isolated groups can communicate, link up, and conduct coordinated joint actions as never before.”⁷⁸

Therefore, the Zapatista movement constituted a new mode of conflict called netwar. The term netwar is an emergent way of conflict and crime at societal levels, including measures short of traditional war, in which the protagonists depend on using network forms of organization, doctrine, strategy, and technology.⁷⁹

It is proven that the information revolution (IR) during the last decade has altered the nature of conflicts for two main reasons: first, the IR is favoring and strengthening network forms of organizations, while simultaneously making life difficult for old hierarchical forms. Second, as the IR deepens, conflicts increasingly depend on information and communication matters.⁸⁰

Transformation in the character of war reflected changes in war strategies, and the EZLN realized that. Ronfeld et al., noted that the *subcomandante* of the EZLN—nicknamed Marcos, clarified, “a new model of social conflict and transformation was emerging. He had long been interested in the power of the word.”⁸¹

That proclamation was the commencement for EZLN leaders and activists to switch in active IO where they strove to dominate the information space such as media, via faxes, and on the internet in ways to compensate the inability to hold much physical

⁷⁸ David Ronfeldt, John Arquilla, Graham Fuller, and Melissa Fuller, *The Zapatista Social Netwar in Mexico* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1998), 1.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 2, 9.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 7.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 63-64.

territory or to project power. Nonviolent, media-oriented strategies figure strongly in that emerging doctrine.⁸²

Zapatista IO were directed at the Mexican Government and public, and at foreign governments and populations. Moreover, information and communication technologies have helped not only sympathizers and activists, but also nongovernmental organizations exporting a conflict to foreign venues and engaging influential audiences there.

In tracing transformation and development of its IO, EZLN leaders changed lectures they delivered before, where the mobilization of civil society instead of the expansion of the insurgent group became the key strategic element:

EZLN leaders claimed to eschew Leninist, Maoist, and Fidelist models in which an army or party must seize power as the vanguard of the socialist revolution. Instead, the EZLN's agenda (e.g., political democracy, local autonomy) began to sound more reformist than revolutionary denying that the EZLN wanted to conquer the state and they proclaimed a key role for civil-society actors in the EZLN's vision of the conflict. The EZLN claimed: "We do not want state power, it is civil society that must transform Mexico, we are only a small part of that civil society, the armed part, our role is to be guarantors of the political space that civil society needs."⁸³

Modalities

This study considers the same modalities for the SL. Modalities are information, propaganda, CP, agitation, education, and public relation. Historical data reports that most of the insurgent groups returned to propaganda as the primary modality. It is a common modality with the SL.

⁸² Ronfeldt et al., 65.

⁸³ Ibid., 64.

The *Partido Comunista Revolucionario* [PCR or Revolutionary Communist Party] created on January 6, 1968, was located in urban areas, including Buenos Aires, Cordova, Santa Fe, and Argentina. Concerning propaganda, Radu and Tismaneanu mentioned:

The ultra-radical propaganda of the PCR is primarily addressed to working-class youth and university students who are attracted to the calls for revolutionary struggle. Their slogans proclaim socialist revolution, conceived in Marxist-Maoist terms, to be the solution for Argentina's problems. *Nueva Hora* is the organization of the PCR.⁸⁴

Concerning propaganda of the *Movimiento Peronista Montonero* [MPM or Montonero Peronista Movement], Radu and Tismaneanu explained:

At its zenith, the movement directed its attention to trade unions, universities, and the secondary school. Unlike the ERP, the MPM found considerable support from the corporate entities of the urban society of the east. The Montoneros developed a revolutionary-nationalist rhetoric requiring repudiation of the "oligarchical-military dictatorship," and by the 1983 elections began to invoke democratic slogans. The Montoneros resorted to such propaganda means as mimeographed communiques, interviews, and articles printed in foreign leftist magazines. They also practiced direct propaganda in the universities and secondary schools.⁸⁵

The *Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo* [ERP or People's Revolutionary Army] "existed in the cities of Buenos Aires, Cordova, Mendoza, and rural areas in the province of Tucuman; also in Paraguay, Chile, Uruguay and Nicaragua."⁸⁶ Radu and Tismaneanu reported that ERP propaganda:

Calls for revolutionary warfare were directed at students, intellectuals, and the urban middle class. Such manifestos and proclamations cried out for violent opposition to the established order. The Cuban and Nicaraguan press published

⁸⁴ Radu and Tismaneanu, 92.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 96.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 101.

interviews and statements by ERP, while manifestos, leaflets, and oral propaganda publicized the movement's platform.⁸⁷

In late 1960s, the *Acao Libertadora Nacional* [ALN or National Liberation Action] emerged in Brazil and was mainly active in the city of Sao Paulo. Concerning propaganda issues, Radu and Tismaneanu quoted:

The ALN addressed the potential mass power base for urban guerrillas, attracting militants of the orthodox Communist party (especially communist youth), intellectuals, and working-class militants Communicate statements were broadcast from Havana and from Brazil (captured radio stations). The ALN publicized its views through books and journals and developed an influential sector dealing with oral propaganda.⁸⁸

The *Movimento Revolucionario de Outubro 8* [MR-8 or October 8 Revolutionary Movement] of Brazil was considered to be a small but very active group. "The MR-8 developed patterns of active propaganda, particularly in the cities. Its efforts aimed at intellectuals, students, and working-class elements. The MR-8 issued statements and manifestos advocating the necessity of revolutionary struggle and developed oral propaganda (agitation) among students."⁸⁹

The *Vanguardia Popular Revolucionario* [VPR or Revolutionary People's Vanguard] was another Brazilian insurgent group. "The VPR propaganda was addressed primarily to middle-class intellectuals and the military. The group issued manifestos and interviews to convey their ideas. The VPR organized agitation among universities students and developed oral propaganda among the military."⁹⁰

⁸⁷ Radu and Tismaneanu, 103.

⁸⁸ Ibid., 117.

⁸⁹ Ibid., 121.

⁹⁰ Ibid., 128.

The VPR is an interesting case because as Radu and Tismaneanu cited, one of the VPR audiences were former military: “The group found some local support among the peasants. It also recruited among social groups such as students, former army officers and soldiers, middle-class intellectuals, and peasants.”⁹¹

The *Partido Comunista de Chile* [PCCh or Communist Party of Chile] propaganda aimed mainly at working-class people, but also peasants and intellectuals. The PCCh’s ideology represented the basic themes of Communist propaganda.

The *Ejército de Liberación Nacional* [ELN or National Liberation Army] operated in vast regions of northeastern Colombia. The ELN’s propaganda was addressed primarily to the peasants who were a high percentage of its members. Nevertheless, workers, students, professionals, and priests played an important role in the group. During their urban activities, the *Ejército de Liberación Nacional* [ELN, National Liberation Army] ELN guerrillas developed oral propaganda campaigns.⁹²

The *Ejército Popular de Liberación* [EPL or People’s Liberation Army] which operated in Colombia was composed of peasants, workers, and students. The EPL addressed propaganda mainly to peasants, but insisted on the fundamental role of the working class in the revolutionary struggle.

What SL looks for is propaganda in different ways. David Palmer argues, “For SL the struggle for power is fundamentally political, not military. Actions are usually taken

⁹¹ Radu and Tismaneanu, 129.

⁹² Ibid., 156-159.

more for their political impact (that is, how they affect the state of people's perceptions) rather than for their military effect."⁹³

In general terms, regardless some military actions of the SL at the VRAEM, it has not developed significant actions against the Peruvian Government. They are in a non-violent time.

Fenstermacher, et al. used a case study of Hizbut Tahrir, an Indonesia terrorist organization and "their use of strategic communications for recruiting, training, and to reinforce and solidify membership."⁹⁴ The case study also mentioned:

HT is currently non-violent, but does not rule out their use of violence in the future. HT is adept at strategic communications, utilizing halaqa (small study groups) as a key method for recruitment and training with specialized indoctrination materials that can be downloaded. The group employs a variety of communication media/mechanisms, including websites, translated books, magazines, cell phones, international conferences, music, demonstrations, and television.⁹⁵

The spread of SL propaganda has been facilitated using radio broadcasts, graffiti and pamphlet campaigns, and supportive publications and websites. It means that the SL changed its communication strategy and IO campaigns. Palmer mentioned of the SL adaptive mindset:

Shining Path has much greater difficulty establishing itself in areas where a strong network of national or regional political or social organizations already exists, especially reformist parties or the church, which have been able over time to respond to some of the needs of the residents, peasants, or workers. By adapting

⁹³ David Scott Palmer, *The Shining Path of Peru* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), 243.

⁹⁴ Fenstermacher et al., 18.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

its strategy to be more responsive to local concerns and to be less violent, SL can make some progress.⁹⁶

Scott Englund and Michael Stohl compared the SL and the Islamic State and mentioned, “SL used violence to force non-participants to essentially choose sides, to intimidate Peruvians to join in their struggle.”⁹⁷ They also defined three similarities:

First, both organizations claimed localized objectives as well as universal ideological goals. Secondly, violence is an essential element of both of these organizations’ operations; violence was both instrumental and symbolic. Finally, both groups viewed themselves as ideologically pure and belonging to the only “real” manifestation of their belief system.⁹⁸

Manwaring mentions a number of factors that allow the resurgence of SL insurgency continual evolving:

The relative popular dissatisfaction stems from deep-rooted socioeconomic inequalities, distrust, and lack of confidence in the police, the legislature, and the political parties. There are also rising popular expectations along with growing popular consciousness of nonexistent rights. Peruvians are particularly disgruntled demonstrating the greatest dissatisfaction.⁹⁹

Manwaring explains what Jorge Verstryngue names the “revalidation of guerrilla warfare.”¹⁰⁰ Manwaring emphasizes the term revalidation because currently it drives the insurgency phenomenon and mentions insurgent groups:

⁹⁶ Palmer, 245.

⁹⁷ Scott Englund and Michael Stohl, “Violent Political Movements: Comparing the Shining Path to the Islamic State,” *Perspectives on Terrorism* 10, no. 4 (2016): 23, accessed November 12, 2016, <http://www.terrorismanalysisists.com/t/index.php/pot/article/view/524>.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 20.

⁹⁹ Manwaring, 30.

¹⁰⁰ Jorge Verstryngue Rojas, *La guerra periférica y el Islam revolucionario* (Madrid, Spain: El Viejo Topo, 2005), 39-51, in *The Complexity of Modern Asymmetric*

Must move from Che Guevara's violent military-oriented approach to compel rapid radical change, and revert to Lenin's Mao Tse Tung's (or Mao Zedong's), and now Verstrynge's softer and more subtle use of multidimensional combinations of propaganda corruption, subversion, coercion, and time to achieve indirectly the kind of power that creates its own legitimacy and generates radical political changes.¹⁰¹

"After a few years of remaining relatively quiet, Sendero began to reemerge."¹⁰²

In years past, the SL tried to gain entrance into political system through MOVADDEF and FUDDEP. Manwaring also argues, "The evidence demonstrate that SL is promulgating a more benign ideology (Verstrynge's multidimensional 'revalidation of guerrilla war') closely aligned with Lenin's political-psychological-agitation concepts and Mao's notion of protracted war."¹⁰³

Manwaring argues, "Sendero Luminoso appears to be in a rebuilding process" and they have turned into stage 1 of SL's original revolutionary plan where "The revolutionary leadership must again concentrate on doctrine and leadership development, expand the organization's relationship with other regional and global political movements, and create a receptive political-psychological environment."¹⁰⁴

Support Activities to SL Informational Campaigns

These activities are to enable the insurgent group to obtain different sources for personnel and logistics. Concerning recruitment and popular support of the PCR, Radu and Tismaneanu reported, "The Federation of Leftist University Groups had hundreds of

Warfare, ed. Max G. Manwaring (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2012), 30.

¹⁰¹ Manwaring, 31.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, 37-38.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, 38.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 39.

active members and thousands of supporters. The party exerted influence among university students in Buenos Aires.”¹⁰⁵

The MPM was located primarily in urban areas of Argentina. After its defeat at home, the MPM became active abroad. They were founded in the early 1970s.¹⁰⁶ Concerning recruitment and popular support, the *Montoneros* “were particularly influential within the Peronist Youth and the National University Confederation, although less so with the Peronist Workers Youth. The group exerted influence among university students in Buenos Aires, Mendoza, and Cordova.”¹⁰⁷

Concerning recruitment and popular support, the ERP:

was particularly influential in the universities of Buenos Aires, but also received isolated support from young working-class elements. In relation to recruitment and popular support, the ELN recruited among middle-class intellectuals, university student leaders, the working class (unemployed mine workers, taxi drivers) and especially young people.¹⁰⁸

Another example is the *Partido Comunista Brasileiro Revolucionario* [Revolutionary Brazilian Communist Party]. This insurgent group developed cells in large cities such as Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo.

In Chile, the PCCh was active across the entire country at different times. Its main strength was in the major cities of Santiago, Concepcion, and Valparaiso.

The *Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria* [MIR or Movement of the Revolutionary Left] was part of the Chilean Socialist Party. The University of

¹⁰⁵ Radu and Tismaneanu, 93.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., 94.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., 99.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., 105-112.

Concepcion provided the initial leadership nucleus. MIR activities were concentrated in urban areas (Santiago, Concepcion, and Valparaiso). It was particularly active among university students and controlled some universities organizations. The MIR included middle-class individuals with a humanistic training in law, economics, or liberal arts of some form. Therefore MIR addressed primarily students, workers, and peasants.¹⁰⁹

Most of the ERP cadre were of middle-class workers background, peasants, university dropouts, and professionals.¹¹⁰ Cynthia McClintock mentions:

As in almost all Latin American revolutionary experiences, in both El Salvador and Peru the university was the key place where the guerrilla leadership formed. Accordingly, the socioeconomic backgrounds of most of the original leaders were middle class or upper middle class, and teachers were an important constituency. However, the universities at which the movements emerged were very different.¹¹¹

Means of Communications

Means of communications play an important role during insurgent warfare because they are an important tool that insurgents use to spread their claims and ideology. Historical data reports that insurgent groups are mainly focused using fast means like radio stations. The ELN “used exhortations of mass struggle against the established order and revolutionary slogans . . . the ELN used the PRTB clandestine paper *El Proletario* and engaged in oral propaganda.”¹¹²

¹⁰⁹ Radu and Tismaneanu, 141-145.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., 205-215.

¹¹¹ Cynthia McClintock, *Revolutionary Movements in Latin America: El Salvador's FMLN and Peru's Shining Path* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1998), 250-251.

¹¹² Radu and Tismaneanu, 110-111.

The ERP was established in the northeastern corner of El Salvador. In terms of scope and technical sophistication, ERP's propaganda network was the most accomplished of all Salvadoran guerrilla groups. The ERP's main instrument of propaganda was Radio *Venceremos*, which broadcast on the meter band, three hours a day, seven days a week, AM and FM. Its location was difficult to determine because it appeared that the main station of Radio *Venceremos* was located in Nicaragua, with some mobile stations in El Salvador.¹¹³

Gurr notes, "Communication media thus can facilitate specific outbreaks of violence. In the absence of other media, wandering preachers and propagandists can serve as communication agents."¹¹⁴ (That is the role of activists and sympathizers.) They are people who have begun to develop an interest in the ideology of the movement and have agreed to take part in demonstrations and provide support in the form of money, medicine, clothes, arms, explosives, and certain services. While these sympathizers rarely participate in armed initiatives themselves, they may harbor arms or deliver messages for those who do.¹¹⁵

Activists constitute the next level of the organization. Members of this tier are mainly students, workers, and members of the urban and rural underclasses. Nevertheless much more actively committed than sympathizers, most activists have not yet committed themselves irreversibly to the organization. Activists are responsible for setting up

¹¹³ Radu and Tismaneanu, 205-215.

¹¹⁴ Gurr, 224.

¹¹⁵ Tarazona-Sevillano, 182.

popular education programs, distributing leaflets and flyers, mobilizing the masses for demonstrations, and maintaining a spirit of civil unrest.¹¹⁶

The SL takes advantage of technologic advances and communication systems.

Rochlin mentioned that:

Prior to the revolution in communication technology and surveillance devices, the state and large media corporations were largely able to manufacture unchallenged political truth. Bolstering this was the political space of the nation-state and the related power of patriotism. However, with devices such as the Internet, the state has had a much more difficult time cornering the market on political truth. Information dissemination from such nonstate sources as Internet discussion and new groups as well as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) means that there is a proliferation of political information that does not have to pass through the confining ideological filters of the state and elite media. Political truth can now be shaped by new actors with new information, sometimes in a fashion that is subversive to state interest.¹¹⁷

The SL is conscious that the more they deliver its IO the better people know about them.

Gurr explains the characteristics of communication systems in these terms:

Communication systems that most directly affect the dispersion of aggressive political symbols in a collectivity are the number of channels or media, the density of information flow over them, and the proportion of the population reached by the media. The greater the number of media, the more likely that means can be found for articulating aggressive symbols.¹¹⁸

The MOVADEF, the political branch of the SL is using technology to deliver its messages through an Internet channel. For this reason, the SL is able to catch massive audiences; Gurr says, “The greater the density of aggressive symbols communicated through these media, the more likely people are to attend to and be affected by them.”¹¹⁹

¹¹⁶ Tarazona-Sevillano, 182.

¹¹⁷ Rochlin, 17.

¹¹⁸ Gurr, 224.

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

He added, “The greater the audience of communication media, the greater the proportion of discontented who are likely to receive such messages.”¹²⁰ These new procedures are similar to what Fenstermacher et al. explained:

The Internet is used as a—soft power vehicle for propaganda, indoctrination, publicity, and teaching, in part due to persecution and the difficulty in disseminating messages, and in part to promote global transnational solidarity. It is the best means for consolidating a spectrum of doctrines, new interpretations, and conveying the image of a large volume of activity. The priority of militant websites is to target youth to indoctrinate them and build a collective identity. In this vein, the Internet is effectively a global madrassa, or open university for militants.¹²¹

Since 2009, the SL has broadcast several media resources, domestics and international web pages and directions could be found on the net.¹²² All of those previous links are samples of the emphasis how they are using media and technology to legitimize their actions. Ackerman et al. expressed some similarities of the international terrorist groups:

For groups seeking legitimacy and “respect” in today’s technologically advanced world, the sophistication of a group’s attacks can be of utmost importance. Such a distinction is important both for public reactions—where a more technological attack may result in greater impact—and in the ability of the terrorist group to gain the attention of the world press necessary to transmit their propaganda to a broad audience.¹²³

¹²⁰ Gurr, 224.

¹²¹ Fenstermacher et al., 18.

¹²² Several websites are active on the internet such as <https://www.youtube.com/user/afavid/featured>; <https://www.youtube.com/user/MOVADEF>; <https://www.youtube.com/user/afavid/videos>; <https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCm8Cc9ahb3k9bbdybM2-vfw>; <https://www.facebook.com/Movadef-LaRadio-on-Line-1503748576580075/>; <http://fudepperu.blogspot.com/>; <https://www.facebook.com/apoyamosal.fudepp/>; <https://www.facebook.com/movadef.chile/>.

¹²³ Gary Ackerman, Praveen Abhayaratne, Jeffrey Bale, Anjali Bhattacharjee, Charles Blair, Lydia Hansell, Andrew Jayne, Margaret Kosal, Sean Lucas, Kevin Moran, Linda Seroki, and Sundara Vadlamudi, *Assessing Terrorist Motivations for Attacking Critical Infrastructure* (Monterey, CA: Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey

Types of Communications

Types of communications refers to how the SL makes contact with their target audience. Direct communication involves all kinds of close contact, mostly face-to-face. The SL returns to indirect communication using some sort of technology that they have on hand such as internet, radio, television, etc.

Radu and Tismaneanu suggested, “The PCBR issued political statements and other documents addressed primarily to the working class. PCBR documents were broadcast by radio and they stressed the necessity to mobilize the working class through oral propaganda and other methods of political agitation.”¹²⁴ In this example, it is possible to recognize that again, “Its principal support came from radical intellectuals and university students.”¹²⁵

Radio Moscow (Spanish) and other East European stations broadcast speeches and statements about the PCCh. In addition, the PCCh published irregular clandestine papers and newspapers abroad.¹²⁶ Another example is the EPL that occupied several radio stations and issued various manifestos and communiques.¹²⁷

Institute of International Studies, January 4, 2007), accessed November 12, 2016, <https://e-reports-ext.llnl.gov/pdf/341566.pdf>, 35.

¹²⁴ Radu and Tismaneanu, 125.

¹²⁵ Ibid., 126.

¹²⁶ Ibid., 133-134.

¹²⁷ Ibid., 162-165.

Finally, on one hand, this chapter compiles a background of research and the main body of the Peruvian PSYOPS. On the other hand, it shows relevant information about the SL and other insurgent groups. All of this information is used in the analysis chapter.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Introduction

In general terms, this chapter depicts the general design of this study. The general concept of design here: “an underlying scheme that governs functioning, developing, or unfolding” and “the arrangement of elements or details in a product or work of art.” A good design, one in which the components work harmoniously together, promotes efficient and successful functioning; a flawed design leads to poor operation or failure. Qualitative research are flexible rather than fixed, and inductive rather than following a strict sequence or derived from an initial decision. In a qualitative study, “research design should be a reflexive process operating through every stage of a project.” The activity of collecting data, developing and modifying theory, elaborating or focusing the research question, and identifying and addressing validity threats are usually all going on more or less simultaneously, each influencing all the others.

— Joseph A. Maxwell, *Qualitative Research Design: An Interactive Approach*

Research Approach

This research approach for this investigation allowed, “Focusing on the particular phenomena being studied, which may differ between individuals or setting and requires individually tailored methods.”¹²⁸ This research was a qualitative study that “presents a statement about reality and social life that has to be continually argued and reaffirmed.”¹²⁹ The qualitative process foundation was based methodologically on inductive activities, because it was necessary to know the collateral aspects of the presented situation more in-depth. The work done, far from manipulating or controlling variables, was oriented to the definition of concepts and arguments based on the

¹²⁸ Maxwell, 88.

¹²⁹ Adrian Holliday, *Qualitative Research: Doing and Writing*, 3rd ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2016), 1.

credibility of the literature in consultation allowing a reflexive interpretive framework (hermeneutic).

According to Adrian Holliday, strategies of research are also named methodologies and involve large entities in the research approach. Holliday mentions, “A very important point to make about these strategies is that they do not represent tight categories; and researchers do not have to choose between them”¹³⁰ because these are by no means mutually exclusive.

The present research took the shape of a case study because the social phenomena studied was better suited to this methodology. Moreover, Holliday notes that a case study can be ethnographic or not, and ethnography is often associated with participant observation since the researcher is a member of the Peruvian Army. In different forms, the methodologies or strategies involved and interacted with each other. Figure 2 shows the interplay of different strategies applied in this study.

¹³⁰ Holliday, 15.




Figure 2. Relationship between Strategies of Investigation

Source: Adrian Holliday, *Qualitative Research: Doing and Writing*, 3rd ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 2016), 15.

To provide a structure to each research variable, they have been divided into dimensions and sub dimensions. Splitting both research variables facilitated the job to the researcher during the analysis process. Moreover, it allowed organizing variables thematically.

Table 1. Description of Research Variables

Variables	Dimension	Sub dimension
Psychological Operations of Peruvian Army Informational campaign of Sendero Luminoso	Doctrine	Manuals, handbooks, and publications
	Modalities	Information
		Propaganda
		Counterpropaganda
		Agitation
		Education
		Public Relations
	Techniques	Techniques for Information
		Techniques for Propaganda
		Techniques for Counterpropaganda
		Techniques for Agitation
		Techniques for Education
		Techniques for Public Relations
	Support activities	Information to the troops
		Populace relations
		Civic action
	Means of communication	Fast means
		Slow means
		Audible means
		Visual means
		Audiovisual means
	Types of communication	Direct communication
		Indirect communication

Source: Created by author.

The investigation was an in-depth examination of the changes that the Peruvian Army PSYOPS has made struggling against the SL insurgency since 2000. The specific research question was: what are the PSYOPS changes that the Peruvian Army should implement during counterinsurgency operations against the informational campaigns of the SL political branch since 2000? The secondary research questions were: (1) what are the doctrine, modalities, support activities, means and types of communication that the SL insurgent organization has used since 2000? and (2) have Peruvian Army PSYOPS doctrine, modalities, techniques, support activities, means and types of communication been effective against informational campaigns of the SL political branch since 2000?

Research Relationship

It is the interaction and intervention scale the researcher uses with the object and sample he was studying in, “where the presence of the researcher is recognized as part of the setting, he can also become part of the data through his interaction with his participants.”¹³¹ For the present research, the researcher had an indirect participation relationship, it was an organizational-centeredness study, in this case, the Peruvian Army and the SL worked as organizations.

Site and Participant Selection

What is commonly named sampling or sampling frame are decisions about where to conduct a study and whom to involve in it. Concerning the term sampling, Joseph Maxwell mentions, “it is problematic for qualitative research, because it connotes a purpose of representing the population sampled, the usual goal of sampling in quantitative research.”¹³²

Instead of using probability samples, present research assumed the nonprobability sampling strategy called purposeful selection or purposive sampling. “In this strategy, particular settings, persons, or activities are selected deliberately to provide information that is particularly relevant to your questions and goals, and that can’t be gotten as well form other choices.”¹³³ This study described the application of PSYOPS from the perspective of the Peruvian Army as well as the SL at the VRAEM and Lima.

¹³¹ Holliday, 70.

¹³² Maxwell, 96.

¹³³ Ibid., 97.

Methods of Data Collection

Data collection focused mainly on two types of sources. First was research obtained from open sources such as books, magazines, journals, and web pages, which gave a comprehensive view of what occurred with the SL insurgency and the Peruvian Military counterterrorism operations in Peru since 2000. Second was research obtained from Peruvian internal sources that contained information on specific events like ambushes, attacks, and kidnappings. Internal sources included the Peruvian Army counterterrorism handbooks, the PSYOPS handbook, and booklets that provide information on specific military operations against the SL insurgency. Because of the qualitative nature of this study, the researcher made use of diverse kinds of data. Table 1 portrays the data being utilized.

Data Analysis

The data analysis was an iterative and dialectic process that involved permanent assessment of the information collected. One main concept that was necessary to understand was that from the beginning to the end of the research, it was a nonlinear process and each stage or phase influences all the others.

Reading and taking notes immediately once the information has been compiled developed data analysis process. Then the researcher noted broad ideas and arguments, which finally become conclusions of the study. Figure 3 depicts the data analysis process and is by no means strictly a linear process. Data analysis involved four ample stages: (1) corpus of raw data; (2) data analysis; (3) creation of themes; and (4) text of data discussion.

Corpus of raw data was the first stage. The data was “what the researcher sees or hears which is collected or recorded,”¹³⁴ and its role “in the process of writing is very different,”¹³⁵ because data “normally appears in the data discussion chapter which is the place where the outcome of data analysis is articulated and discussed.”¹³⁶ The corpus of data was “all the data that is used in the research. The data at this stage was still raw and largely unworked by the researcher.”¹³⁷ In this study, the corpus of raw data involves and is present in chapters 1 and 2.

The next stage was data analysis, which was “the process of making sense of the data and discovering what it has to say.”¹³⁸ During this stage, data was “analyzed and subsequently organized.”¹³⁹

Following this stage was the creation of themes stage. In this stage, the researcher took data “from all parts of the corpus and arranges it under thematic headings.”¹⁴⁰ Finally, the thematic headings “then become the basis for the data discussion section, under which the arguments, extracts, and discursive commentary are organized in the written study.”¹⁴¹ This last stage was text of data discussion.

¹³⁴ Holliday, 98.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, 100.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*




Figure 3. From Data to Writing: The Data Analysis Process

Source: Adrian Holliday, *Qualitative Research: Doing and Writing*, 3rd ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 2016), 99.

Table 2. Types of Data

Type	Bodies of experiences	How to collect
Description of behavior	What people are seen or heard doing or saying	Observation notes, research diary, etc.
Description of event	Piece of behavior, either defined by the people in the setting (e.g. wedding, meeting) or by the researcher (e.g. bus journey, argument)	Ditto
Description of institution	The way the setting or people operate in terms of regulations, tacit rules, rituals	Ditto
Description of appearance	What the setting or people in it look like (e.g. space, buildings, clothing, arrangement of people or objects, artefacts)	Ditto, drawings, diagram
Description of research event	What people say or do in interview, focus group, etc.	Observation notes, research diary, etc.
Personal narrative	Reconstruction of the researcher's experience that aids understanding	Narrative, research diary, etc.
Creative nonfiction	Reconstruction from a range of different types of data that has been previously collected	Whole range of visual, observational, oral, and documentary data
Statements	What people say or write to the researcher—actual words	Interview, audio recording, questionnaire, participant's diary, transcription, verbatim notes
Talk	What people are heard or seen saying—actual words – including internet sites (e.g. chat sites, social media)	Audio recording, transcriptions, verbatim notes, internet download
Interaction	What people are heard or seen saying to each other, including with the researcher in interviews, focus groups and internet sites (e.g. chat sites, social media)	Ditto
Visual record	What is actually seen	Film, video recording, internet download
Document	Piece of writing belonging or pertaining to the setting	Photocopy, scan

Source: Adrian Holliday, *Qualitative Research: Doing and Writing*, 3rd ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 2016), 67-69.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Peruvian Army PSYOPS

Doctrine

Concerning the Peruvian Army PSYOPS, doctrine is the basis for most of the military operations that the Peruvian Army performs. After an in-depth analysis of each one of the six dimension for the research variables which are doctrine, modalities, techniques, support activities, means of communications, and types of communications, it is possible to argue there exists several doctrinal gaps that address some inappropriate performance in the tier of PSYOPS. There is lack of coherence among the different manuals, handbooks, and publications that the Peruvian Army utilizes.

The Peruvian Army defines PA as the defensive aspect of PSYOPS. It is the planning and implementation of methods, means, and techniques, designed to inform to the public opinion in order to influence their behavior, attitude, feelings, emotions, and opinion favorably. It is conducted in all periods of military operations and actions.

The first gap identified was that at the operational and tactical level, it is necessary for a joint publication that addresses PSYOPS at those levels. At the tactical level, one should consider operations with the Peruvian National Police.

Peruvian Army ME 40-12, *Psychological Operations Techniques* defines modalities and techniques, media, intelligence for PSYOPS, operations for PSYOPS, and support to military operations. This manual also refers to Operations for PSYOPS and mentions that for realization of the PSYOPS (planning, implementation, and evaluation) to support military actions and operations, the psychological operator should participate

in the staff of the Operational and Special Combatant Command of Land Component, as specialized personnel, ensuring their participation success actions and dissemination of PSYOPS products.

Another gap identified was that ME 40-12 considers its functions directly at the operational level, skipping the tactical level. In addition, even dissemination of PSYOPS is performed at tactical level without coordination, but it considers the activities at the operational level.

Finally, ME 40-12 discusses Support to Military Operations. This chapter of the manual focuses on the PW in the strategic PSYOPS and the support to PSYOPS at the strategic level. Additionally, it mentions support to tactical operations (offensive and defensive), support to consolidation operations, support to the security of the rear zone, support to unconventional warfare, support to counterinsurgency warfare (it remarks that civic actions have special interest in this kind of operations to gain population confidence), and support to atypical operations.

After analysis of ME 40-12, it was identified that even though PA and PW are two sides of the same coin, this manual does not include PA in the Support to Military Operations chapter. It only considers PW. This chapter does not discuss operational level support. It mentions consolidation operations (in the Peruvian Army doctrine, consolidation is a phase of the offensive) instead of stability operations. This manual does not define unconventional warfare, counter subversion, or atypical operations.

ME 40-12 remarks that civic actions have a special interest in support of unconventional warfare and counterinsurgency warfare to gain the confidence of the

population. Gaining the confidence of the population is necessary and important, but it is much better to change their ideas through education and information.

Experiences have demonstrated that instead of changing their mindset, people return to the Peruvian Army during civic actions mainly to satisfy some sort of need such as support with food and groceries, medicine, physicians, medical-dental care, support with mobility and transportation, lawyers and legal support, or social assistance among others. If there are other organizations that provide the same support as the Peruvian Army, the population's loyalty would change for convenience.

Chapter 5 of Peruvian Army ME 40-13, *Planning and Assessment of Psychological Operations* references that the modalities primarily used for PSYOPS purposes are propaganda, education, and agitation. Chapter 6 states that PSYOPS activities are primarily used to transmit information and education to the population. However, it also mentions that PSYOPS should be considered a type of additional operation, that conveniently employed, contributes to success in fulfilling the mission. It is evident that there is a contradiction in those statements that confuses the sense of PSYOPS.

Peruvian Army ME 40-13, *Planning and Assessment of Psychological Operations* addresses the PSYOPS planning process and considers three planning levels: first, the strategic level (JCPAF); second, the operational level (combatant commands, special commands, land component, EO, and DE, which are similar to corps and division); and third, the tactical level (brigades, battalions, and PSYOPS units).

The manual mentions some broad unconventional warfare planning considerations as well. Lastly, it mentions techniques, procedures, and considerations for assessing PSYOPS, but only in conventional warfare.

According to current doctrine, a land component, an EO and DE, are at the tactical not the operational level. There is serious confusion in the levels of planning. Tactical PSYOPS depends on a higher echelon plan. However, ME 40-12 does not consider the operational level. Moreover, PSYOPS planning does not follow the current Peruvian Army MDMP.

The *Psychological Operations Handbook* used in the *Escuela Superior de Guerra del Ejército* is in general terms an extract of ME 40-11, ME 40-12, and ME 40-13. This handbook does not consider any information about PSYOPS in the context of unconventional warfare, counterinsurgency warfare, or atypical warfare. There are no national directives for PSYOPS.

Peruvian Army ME 41-8, *Staff Officer Manual for Counterinsurgency Operations* again highlights that PSYOPS must fully exploit the works of civic action. ME 41-8 considers gaining the confidence of the population is the same as influencing the population's ideas. Civic actions do not ensure true confidence from the people. Peruvian doctrine has paid special attention to civic action while neglecting the other modalities.

In accordance with the Peruvian Army PSYOPS doctrine, it is oriented primarily toward geographic areas that have a lack of development, poverty, illiteracy, and other disadvantages. However, it does not recognize that the SL has changed its strategy and currently they are attracting experts, not only in rural areas, but also in urban areas where the Peruvian Army has an insignificant presence in terms of PSYOPS.

Modalities

The modalities of PSYOPS are information, propaganda, CP, agitation, education, and PR. During the last decade, the Peruvian Army has focused primarily in developing information and PR.

The techniques of PSYOPS involves:

1. Techniques of the Information Modality: news, press releases, reports, press conferences, newsletters, interviews, etc.
2. Techniques of the Propaganda Modality: testimony or transfer, ordinary man or plain language, the least of evils, inevitable victory (triumphal cart or railroad), expiatory victim (scapegoat or scapegoat), hot potato, simplicity, insinuation, prestige, selection, terror, offense, rumor, etc.
3. Techniques of the CP Modality: direct CP, indirect CP, diversionist CP, silence, deprecation CP, preventive CP, rumor, etc.
4. Techniques of the Agitation Modality: apology, anonymous calls, collection of quotas, armed strike, plagiarism, deception, incitement, etc.
5. Techniques of the Education Modality: discussion in small groups, expositive or master class, practices with feedback, conferences, exhibitions, demonstrations, etc.
6. Techniques of the PR Modality: citizen-patriotic attendance cards, ceremonies and parades, social gatherings and fellowship luncheons, celebration of the day of the Army branches and services, cultural conferences and other important public military demonstrations, contests, etc.

After the present analysis, it is possible to argue that although the Peruvian Army is able to apply a vast number of techniques, they mainly concentrate on information and PR modalities while neglecting others such as techniques of education.

Support Activities

Support activities to PSYOPS are performed in three different ways. Chapter 2 of Peruvian Army ME 40-12 defines support activities as:

1. Troop Information Support Activities: upon enrollment in service, during service, and prior to licensing.
2. Community Relations Support Activities: support of transportation, agricultural activities, food distribution, support in communications, construction repair and improvement of communication routes, support activities for health and health campaigns, support to the education sector, aid to charities, etc.
3. Civic Action Support Activities: support with food, medical-dental care, delivery of construction materials, support with mobility and transportation, hygiene and sanitation, social assistance, essential public services support.

Means of Communications

Analyzing the available evidence concerning means of communications, it is possible to argue that the Peruvian Army mostly focuses on fast means like radio stations but only in the VRAEM, and on a smaller scale by using flyers, newspapers, and posters.

The Internet is used for broadcasting an online program on YouTube¹⁴² and Facebook pages. However, this program does not contain messages against SL ideologies or support other institutional counterterrorism psychological objective.

Types of Communications

Chapter 3 of Peruvian Army ME 40-12 provides information regarding types of communications. Analysis of these types of communication report that direct communication is sparingly used during civic actions mostly through speeches appealing to a specific theme. Indirect communication is the type of communication used most by the Peruvian Army. However, this is sometimes irrelevant for a target audience.

SL's Informational Campaign

The SL is an insurgent organization whose goal is the seizure of power to implement communism in Peru. To this end, it uses revolutionary violence (terrorism, sabotage and guerrilla warfare).¹⁴³ This section of the study about SL considers doctrine, modalities, support activities to SL informational campaigns, means, and types of communications.

Doctrine

In terms of doctrine, regardless of the fact that the 1989 version of ME 41-7, *Non-Conventional Warfare–Counterinsurgency* manual has been superseded, it is possible to argue that SL doctrine remains the same in terms of ideology because the SL maintains

¹⁴² YouTube, “Official Peruvian Army Channel,” accessed March 10, 2017, <https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCTGY4eLU52F9C3gUpuwRidA>.

¹⁴³ Gorriti, 107-108.

the Marxism, Leninism, Maoism, and Gonzalo's thought. However, the SL changed in terms of organization, structure, tactics, techniques, and procedures.

In terms of PSYOPS, the SL keeps its doctrine while they perform informational campaigns using agitation and propaganda, developing mass agitation, distribution of brochures and flyers, mobilizing rallies and marches using existing broadcasting media (newspapers, radio stations, television, and others).

The contrast of the SL actions during the past ten years with what they declare in the *Black Book of SL*, allows one to infer that the SL changed in terms of organization, structure, tactics, techniques, and procedures. After analyzing the *Black Book of SL* statements concerning doctrine, it is possible to argue that the SL became more selective with their target audience for informational campaigns and military actions. In terms of informational campaigns, these have become oriented to undergraduate university students in towns and major cities.

In the PSYOPS realm, SL insurgents analyzed the PSYOPS of the Peruvian Army and defined that civic actions are useless efforts against the propaganda and indoctrination activities. For this reason, the SL changed their doctrine and procedures. This fact is interesting because it shows how adaptive the SL is, that they have paid attention to lessons learned from after action reviews, and improved their actions.

Some of these changes contradicted Rochlin when he stated, "Central to the group's strategy was the theory of terror and extraordinary use of violence. SL relied on classic terrorism to achieve power by instilling intense fear among the population through

the awesome use of force.”¹⁴⁴ In the present day, the SL avoids attacking the population and seeks popular support.

These actions were reinforced when Cocco mentioned that the SL “began a massive operation of indoctrination and recruitment of *senderistas* within the universities directed to students who were usually from the lower classes.”¹⁴⁵ However, this doctrinal change dismissed Cocco’s ideas related to recruitment of the rural population.¹⁴⁶ Today, the SL mostly directs rural population recruitment at the VRAEM.

Regarding military actions, the SL’s attacks (these include ambushes, assaults, and annihilations) focus specifically against armed forces personnel instead of government officials, businesspersons, journalists, peasants, or other civilians. The selectiveness of the SL reinforces what Burgoyne mentioned about the SL strategy changes:

SL conducted a 5-year study of its failure and codified its findings in a 45-page summary that became Sendero’s new strategy where SL renounced many of its former practices, including extrajudicial killings, kidnappings, blackmail, and occupying homes. SL concluded that violence against the population was the critical failure of the rebellion. It is now reportedly providing potable water, building sports fields, and painting schools to garner popular support.¹⁴⁷

Modalities

This section considers the same modalities used for the Peruvian Army and the SL. Modalities are information, propaganda, CP, agitation, education, and PR. Historical

¹⁴⁴ Rochlin, 57.

¹⁴⁵ Cocco, 64.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid., 69.

¹⁴⁷ Burgoyne, 70.

data reports that most of the insurgent groups returned to propaganda as their primary modality. It is a common and primary modality of the SL. However, the SL also often returns to agitation, education, and PR. The SL seldom uses CP.

To have a broad idea of how insurgent groups used different modalities, this section analyzed the most symbolic Latin America cases. Insurgent groups considered were the PCR, the MPM, and the ERP from Argentina; the ALN, the MR-8, and the VPR from Brazil; the PCCh; and the ELN and the EPL from Colombia.

After analyzing these groups and the Peruvian case, and then contrasting this with current SL activities, it is possible to argue that in terms of modalities, the SL has made no major changes and differs with the other groups in that regard. As Radu and Tismaneanu mentioned, most of the propaganda of these groups is primarily addressed to “working-class militants, intellectuals, urban lower class, and university students.”¹⁴⁸

There are some cases where SL propaganda “develops a revolutionary-nationalist rhetoric” requiring repudiation of the established order and rule of law. Usually the SL manifestos advocate, “The necessity of revolutionary struggle and develops oral propaganda (agitation) among students,”¹⁴⁹ especially inside public universities.

During the last decade, the SL dismissed orienting propaganda among the peasants, the illiterate, and non-Spanish-speaking Indians. This propaganda is consistent with Palmer’s analysis when he states, “For SL the struggle for power is fundamentally political, not military. Actions are usually taken more for their political impact (that is,

¹⁴⁸ Radu and Tismaneanu, 92.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., 96, 21.

how they affect the state of people's perceptions) rather than for their military effect."¹⁵⁰

It indicates that the SL has not developed significant actions against the Peruvian Government. The SL is in a non-violent time.

The spread of SL propaganda has been facilitated using radio broadcasts, graffiti and pamphlet campaigns, and supportive publications and websites. It means that the SL changed its communication strategy and information operation campaigns.

One significant feature of the SL is its flexibility. What the SL states in the *Black Book of SL*, is consistent with Palmer's analysis when he mentioned the adaptiveness of the SL mindset because they realized their weaknesses as consequence of the increased establishment of the Peruvian State agencies and officials:

Shining Path has much greater difficulty establishing itself in areas where strong network of national or regional political or social organizations already exists, especially reformist parties or the church, which have been able over time to respond to some of the needs of the residents, peasants, or workers. By adapting its strategy to be more responsive to local concerns and to be less violent, SL can make some progress.¹⁵¹

Utilization of propaganda shows that the SL is in a reinvigorating phase. This stage began early in 2000 when the SL lost important ringleaders and most of his sympathizers, activists, and militants abandoned their organization. However, as Manwaring mentions concerning the resurgence of SL insurgency, it is in a continual evolution.

Manwaring also argues:

The evidence demonstrate that SL is promulgating a more benign ideology (Verstrynge's multidimensional 'revalidation of guerrilla war') closely aligned

¹⁵⁰ Palmer, 243.

¹⁵¹ Ibid., 245.

with Lenin's political-psychological-agitation concepts and Mao's notion of protracted war. Sendero Luminoso appears to be in a rebuilding process and they have turned into stage 1 of SL's original revolutionary plan where "The revolutionary leadership must again concentrate on doctrine and leadership development, expand the organization's relationship with other regional and global political movements, and create a receptive political-psychological environment."¹⁵²

SL propaganda seems like it is being performed well because in the past, the SL tried to insert into the Peruvian political system through MOVAREF and FUDDEP, which are façade elements of the SL. The importance of the establishment of these façade organizations rests in the fact that according to the Peruvian Law for Political parties, to be able to register into the political system, the SL required no less than 165,000 supporters be registered in their files and that at least sixty-five political cells be established across the country.

Analysis of this fact permits one to recognize that the SL is performing a silent, consistent, and permanent propaganda campaign to attract sympathizers. It is accompanied by information, education, PR, and modalities of PSYOPS.

Support Activities to SL Informational Campaigns

The SL performs these activities to obtain different resources for personnel and logistics. The most important activity is recruitment. This activity is being well developed in public universities and poor urban neighborhoods. The target audience continues to be university students, working-class elements, unemployed workers, and especially young people. As with most of the Latin American groups, recruitment involves lower and

¹⁵² Manwaring, 38, 39.

middle-class individuals with humanistic training in law, economics, or liberal arts of some form.

The SL shifted its recruitment target. At the beginning of its insurgency, the SL focused mainly on peasants. Today, the SL orients its recruitment effort towards the lower and middle-class population. Concerning popular support, the SL has lost open support from the population. Most of the resources the SL receives to sustain its organization come from drug trafficking and money laundering.

Means of Communications

Means of communications play an important role during an insurgent warfare because they are useful tools that insurgents use to spread their claims and ideology. Historical data reports that insurgent groups mainly focus on using fast means like radio stations. However, in the Peruvian case, during the last decade, the SL prefers clandestine exhortations of armed struggle against the established order and mostly is engaged in oral propaganda. Since the radio stations are easily identified, the SL takes advantage of technology and has developed an online network as its main propaganda instrument.

As other insurgent groups, the SL evolves and exploits the technology on hand. Comparing what Fenstermacher, et al. mentioned, “HT is currently non-violent, but does not rule out their use of violence in the future.”¹⁵³ Regarding the SL, it is possible to argue that the SL became adept at strategic communications, utilizing small study groups as a key method for recruitment and training with specialized indoctrination materials. This material can be downloaded, employing a variety of communication

¹⁵³ Fenstermacher et al., 18.

media/mechanisms, including websites, translated books, magazines, cell phones, international conferences, music, demonstrations, and television.¹⁵⁴

The SL is conscious that the more they deliver their IO, the better people know about them. The SL understood some aspects that Gurr explained about the characteristics of communication systems:

Communication systems that most directly affect the dispersion of aggressive political symbols in a collectivity are the number of channels or media, the density of information flow over them, and the proportion of the population reached by the media. The greater the number of media, the more likely that means can be found for articulating aggressive symbols.¹⁵⁵

The MOVADEF and FUDEPP, the political branches of the SL are using technology to deliver its messages through an Internet channel. For this reason, the SL is able to capture massive audiences. As stated earlier, these new procedures are similar to what Fenstermacher et al. explained:

The Internet is used as a—soft power vehicle for propaganda, indoctrination, publicity, and teaching, in part due to persecution and the difficulty in disseminating messages, and in part to promote global transnational solidarity. It is the best means for consolidating a spectrum of doctrines, new interpretations, and conveying the image of a large volume of activity. The priority of militant websites is to target youth to indoctrinate them and build a collective identity. In this vein, the Internet is effectively a global madrassa, or open university for militants.¹⁵⁶

Types of Communications

Regarding this aspect, the SL uses direct and indirect communication according to the target audience to spread its claims. In this sense, the SL has not had major changes.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵⁵ Gurr, 224.

¹⁵⁶ Fenstermacher et al., 18.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions

After analyzing the SL informational campaigns, it is possible to conclude that this terrorist group has changed its doctrinal framework in terms of PSYOPS for the following reasons:

1. SL doctrine remains the same in terms of ideology considering the Marxism, Leninism, Maoism, and Gonzalo's thought. However, what they try to project to society is that the SL is taking on an ideology based on democratic ideals. SL became more selective with its target audience for informational campaigns and military actions. In terms of informational campaigns, these have become oriented to undergraduate university students in towns and major cities instead of the rural population. The SL avoids attacking populations and seeks popular support. Its doctrine addresses how adaptive this terrorist group should be, what lessons learned to grasp, and what to do to improve its actions.
2. Propaganda, education, and PR are the SL modalities that have taken preeminence during the last decade. The fact that the SL collected about 400,000 signatures as support to register MOVADERF or FUDEPP as a political party demonstrates that the SL poses a well-structured and in a sustainable way informational campaigns system. It also reflects that the SL continues having long-term objectives in accordance with its strategic guidance.

3. Recruitment is the main activity within SL support activities. The SL shifted its recruitment target from peasants to orient its recruitment effort towards lower and middle-class populations. However, concerning popular support, the SL has lost open support from the population. Most of the resources the SL receives to sustain its organization come from drug trafficking and money laundering.
4. Since 2000, the SL has made a significant improvement in the management of means of communication. The SL is eager to take advantage of modern technology like the Internet by delivering its messages through cyberspace using social media such as Facebook, YouTube, different blogs, and several collaboration sites. For this reason, the SL is able to capture or attract massive audiences such as students and middle and lower class workers among others. The SL uses the Internet as a soft power vehicle for propaganda, indoctrination, publicity, teaching, for disseminating messages, and for consolidating a spectrum of doctrines, new interpretations, and conveying the image of a large volume of activities.
5. The SL balances the different types of communication using direct and indirect communication to spread its claims according to the target audience. In this sense, the SL has not had major changes.

Regarding the second specific research question, it is possible to conclude that the Peruvian Army PSYOPS doctrine, modalities, techniques, support activities, means and types of communication have been ineffective against the informational campaigns performed by the SL political branch since 2000.

1. Most of the Peruvian Army doctrine largely focuses on military actions based on kinetic means. It is a fact that in the military realm, the Peruvian Army defeated the SL but not in the ideological realm. However, there is little attention on PSYOPS. Doctrine neglects the importance of influencing the thinking and changing the overall mindset of an opponent during counterinsurgency periods. Manuals mostly focus on PW on conventional warfare, and sparingly mention PSYOPS on PA and against insurgent groups. The EO and DE manuals do not consider any aspect of PSYOPS planning. There are no links between the doctrine itself.
2. The Peruvian Army has focused primarily on developing information and PR modalities.
3. Although the Peruvian Army is able to apply a vast number of techniques, it mainly releases news, press releases, reports, press conferences, newsletters, and interviews, which are techniques of the modality of information. Furthermore, ceremonies and parades, social gatherings, celebration of the day of the Army branches and services, cultural conferences, public military demonstrations, and contests, which are techniques of the modality of PR, while neglecting important techniques of education.
4. The Peruvian Army has a strong preference in executing civil actions support activities. These mostly consist of support with food, medical-dental care, delivery of construction materials, support with mobility and transportation, hygiene and sanitation, social assistance, and essential public services support. Nevertheless, these activities are rarely assessed in terms of changing

population mindset. Eventually, when natural disasters occur, Community Relations support activities such as transportation support, agricultural activities, food distribution, communications support, construction repair and improvement of communication routes, support activities for health and health campaigns, support to the education sector, and aid to charities, among others.

5. The Peruvian Army mostly focuses on rapid communications like radio stations but only in the VRAEM, and on a lower scale by using flyers, newspapers, and posters. From Lima, the Peruvian Army uses the Internet information network to broadcast an online television program. However, this program does not contain messages against SL ideologies or support other institutional counterterrorism psychological objective.
6. Direct communication is sparingly used during civic actions, mostly through speeches appealing to a specific theme. Indirect communication is the most common type of communication used by the Peruvian Army. However, this is sometimes irrelevant for a target audience.

As a final product of this study, it is possible to argue as a global conclusion that the Peruvian Army should implement an entire set of modifications in PSYOPS doctrine, modalities, techniques, means, and types of communications. This update process must consider adjustments in terms of DOTMLP-F to determine a more effective way to encounter the informational campaigns of the SL political branch since 2000.

Recommendations

At this point, one new question emerges. Peruvian Army doctrine considers that PSYOPS are a set of support activities executed into the domestic domain to mitigate,

neutralize, or break up terrorist group efforts when a terrorist organization is performing military actions against the Armed Forces. Then this concept assumes that counterinsurgency is primarily a military issue, which is not true. Insurgency is born in the ideological realm. For this reason, the researcher asks whether it is pertinent to continue considering PSYOPS as a support activity, when at any given moment, what is necessary is to encourage the ideological fight. Therefore, as important as direct military actions against insurgent groups are, during counterinsurgency operations, PSYOPS should be the main effort instead of considering support activities. It is imperative to rethink and reorient the framework and employment of PSYOPS, not only as support activities, but also as the main effort in accordance with the nature of the mission and situations.

The *Comando de Educacion y Doctrina del Ejército* (equivalent to the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command) should organize staff working groups to update most of the Peruvian Army PSYOPS publications according to the current doctrine. For example, within a land component, an EO and DE echelons are at the tactical not the operational level. There is serious confusion in the levels of planning. Tactical PSYOPS depends on a higher echelon's plan. However, ME 40-12 does not consider operational levels which link up the tactical level with the strategic level. Moreover, PSYOP planning—especially what is taught in the Psychological Operations School, does not follow the current Peruvian Army MDMP. It is advisable that during the modifications of PSYOPS doctrine, implementing strategic communications be considered as well.

In the same sense, it is necessary to modify Peruvian Army ME 41-8, *Staff Officer Manual for Counterinsurgency Operations* because it again highlights that PSYOPS must

fully exploit the works of civic action. ME 41-8 considers that confidence from the population confidence is the same as influencing the population's ideas. Civic actions alone do not ensure true confidence from the people. Peruvian doctrine pays special attention on civic actions while neglecting other modalities.

In Peruvian Army Intermediate Level Education, the *Psychological Operations Handbook* used in the *Escuela Superior de Guerra del Ejército* is in general terms an extract of ME 40-11, ME 40-12, and ME 40-13. Consequently, this handbook does not consider any information about PSYOPS in the context of unconventional warfare, counterinsurgency warfare, or atypical warfare. This is a failure in education because field grade officers do not have a solid knowledge of PSYOPS. The *Escuela Superior de Guerra del Ejército* should generate modern PSYOPS doctrine in accordance with current military requirements.

The Peruvian Army Training and Doctrine Division and the Information Division should promote through the JCPAF, a set of viable and sustainable national directives for PSYOPS. The Peruvian Army Information Division should generate permanent informational campaigns that capitalize on competencies and known knowledge that Peruvian officers own. The SL political branch performs educational activities within public universities. The Peruvian Executive Order No. 1129, Article No. 17 stipulates that education in matters of security and national defense is mandatory at all levels and modalities of the national education system. It is necessary to encourage the Peruvian Army to assign officers as professors to be able to apply a vast number of techniques, through joint ventures with public universities, thus making the further development of education and information techniques possible.

The Peruvian Army Information Division should develop an entire set of measures of performance and measures of effectiveness to permanently assess the outcomes of each PSYOPS activity, making pertinent adjustments and implementing adequate control mechanisms.

In summary, at the end of this research, it is necessary to recognize that all the elements involved in any kind of conflicts or disagreements are subject to be influenced through a systematic and methodological employment of the PSYOPS. The best victory is one that is won without guns and fighting inside the mind of the soldiers or people. The Peruvian Army should evolve in its points of view regarding PSYOPS to obtain better outcomes. The SL is a latent threat for the Peruvian State. For that reason, the Peruvian Army must contribute to the stability of the government by improving its performance. This study is only one initial approach for studying PSYOPS in the Peruvian context. It also serves as a basis for future research that could fill some gaps in this study.

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