



May 4, 2017

# United States Special Operations Command

Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, One Hundred  
Fifteenth Congress, First Session

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Stenographic Transcript  
Before the

COMMITTEE ON  
ARMED SERVICES

## **UNITED STATES SENATE**

UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

Thursday, May 4, 2017

Washington, D.C.

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UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

Thursday, May 4, 2017

U.S. Senate  
Committee on Armed Services  
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in Room SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. John McCain, chairman of the committee, presiding.

Present: Senators McCain [presiding], Inhofe, Wicker, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Perdue, Cruz, Reed, Nelson, McCaskill, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Donnelly, Hirono, Kaine, King, Heinrich, Warren, and Peters.

1           OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN MCCAIN, U.S. SENATOR  
2 FROM ARIZONA

3           Chairman McCain: Good morning. The Senate Armed  
4 Services Committee meets this morning to receive testimony  
5 on the posture of the U.S. Special Operations Command, known  
6 as SOCOM.

7           I would like to welcome Ms. Theresa Whelan, who is  
8 representing the Office of the Assistant Secretary of  
9 Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict,  
10 and General Tony Thomas, the Commander of SOCOM. I thank  
11 our witnesses for appearing before the committee and for  
12 their many years of dedicated service to the Nation.

13           The purpose of today's hearing is to hear directly from  
14 the senior civilian and military leaders responsible for  
15 ensuring our special operations forces are trained,  
16 equipped, and ready to confront what is the most complex and  
17 daunting set of national security challenges our Nation has  
18 faced since the Second World War.

19           In response to the increasing threats, our combatant  
20 commanders around the world have developed a seemingly  
21 insatiable demand for the unique capabilities of our special  
22 operators. That is especially true in the fight against  
23 terrorism.

24           For the last 15 years, special operations forces have  
25 been heavily engaged in the fight against global terrorist

1 groups. As a result, SOCOM's budget has emphasized  
2 optimizing and sustaining counterterrorism capabilities.  
3 This is unlikely to change anytime soon. The United States  
4 will remain engaged in global counterterrorism operations of  
5 varying scope and intensity for the foreseeable future, and  
6 special operations forces will continue to play a vital  
7 role.

8 But we must be careful never to equate special  
9 operations with counterterrorism. Special operations forces  
10 must be prepared to perform a variety of other critical  
11 missions beyond counterterrorism, missions that will  
12 continue to grow in scale and importance, and demand more  
13 from our special operations forces.

14 China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea are becoming more  
15 aggressive in challenging U.S. interests and partners  
16 through the use of asymmetric means that often fall below  
17 the threshold of conventional conflict. The ability of our  
18 special operators to conduct low-visibility special warfare  
19 operations in politically sensitive environments make them  
20 uniquely suited to counter the malign activities of our  
21 adversaries in this domain.

22 Put simply, special operations forces have an  
23 indispensable role to play in great power competitions and  
24 global counterproliferation.

25 The challenges posed by militarily advanced great

1 powers will require the development and employment of new  
2 technologies and capabilities. It also warrants a serious  
3 review of the need for additional special operations force  
4 structure.

5       However, posturing a force to effectively operate in  
6 this domain will not be possible until we in Congress step  
7 up and repeal the misguided and disastrous defense spending  
8 caps and forthcoming defense budget cuts required by law in  
9 the Budget Control Act. Persistent budgetary uncertainty  
10 undermines the ability of our military leaders to plan and  
11 forces them to choose between near-term readiness to support  
12 ongoing operations and optimizing the force and its  
13 capabilities to address emerging and future requirements.

14       This is not sustainable, and this is not right.

15       I look to our witnesses to explain how SOCOM is  
16 attempting to balance the need to support ongoing  
17 operational warfighting requirements while also ensuring  
18 that the force is prepared to deal with emerging threats, as  
19 well as describe in detail where budget shortfalls are  
20 forcing you to accept risk.

21       Lastly and most importantly, I expect our witnesses to  
22 provide the committee with an update on the overall health  
23 of the force and what is being done to mitigate the impact  
24 to our operators and their families. Fifteen years of  
25 continuous combat operations in back-to-back deployments

1 have placed enormous strain on the force, challenging  
2 readiness, resilience, and retention.

3 We owe our operators and their families who have given  
4 so much in defense of our Nation the support that they  
5 deserve.

6 Again, I thank our witnesses for being with us today  
7 and look forward to their testimony.

8 Senator Reed?

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1 STATEMENT OF HON. JACK REED, U.S. SENATOR FROM RHODE  
2 ISLAND

3 Senator Reed: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let  
4 me also join you in thanking our witnesses for appearing  
5 today to discuss the United States Special Operations  
6 Command and the readiness of our special operations forces.  
7 You are both ably leading your respective organizations  
8 through a period of both high operational tempo and also  
9 significant transition.

10 The United States Special Operations Command, or SOCOM,  
11 recently celebrated the 30th anniversary of its  
12 establishment by Congress. Those 30 years, and particularly  
13 the last 15, have been characterized by great successes,  
14 including the operation that killed Osama bin Laden.  
15 SOCOM's history also includes tragedies that resulted in the  
16 loss of brave special operators.

17 Fortunately, our special operations forces have learned  
18 from each of these events and have emerged as a stronger and  
19 more capable force.

20 General Thomas, the high quality of men and women you  
21 lead today are a testament to that lineage.

22 SOCOM is unique within the Department of Defense as the  
23 only functional combatant command with service-like  
24 responsibilities for the training, equipping, organization,  
25 and readiness of special operations forces.

1           When Congress created SOCOM, it also established the  
2 position of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special  
3 Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, or ASD/SOLIC, to be  
4 the service secretary-like civilian tasked with day-to-day  
5 advocacy and oversight of special operations forces. For  
6 many reasons, including competing responsibility for other  
7 policy matters, the ASD/SOLIC has not adequately fulfilled  
8 the mandate to date.

9           The National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year  
10 2017 sought to address this issue with a number of reforms  
11 designed to optimize the partnership between the Commander  
12 of SOCOM and the ASD/SOLIC for the benefit of special  
13 operations forces. For that reason, we are pleased to have  
14 Ms. Whelan, the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense SOLIC,  
15 testifying today in the service secretary-like role  
16 envisioned by last year's reforms.

17           We look forward to receiving an update from both of you  
18 as to the progress you have made toward achieving the goals  
19 of last year's bill and what we expect over the next several  
20 years.

21           Our special operations forces remain heavily engaged in  
22 the fight against ISIS, Al Qaeda, and other violent  
23 extremist organizations, sometimes directly, but more often  
24 in support of local partner forces on the ground, as we have  
25 seen most prominently in Iraq and Syria. I hope both of you

1 will give us your assessment of what, if anything, we can do  
2 to accelerate progress in defeating these groups.

3 While the last 15 years of special operations  
4 deployments have been primarily focused on countering  
5 violent extremist groups, there is growing realization that  
6 special operations forces, and the unique skillsets that  
7 they possess, may be called upon for other missions as well.

8 General Thomas, you and many in your community have  
9 sought to characterize this so-called gray zone of  
10 competition short of direct military conflict. We saw such  
11 tactics most notably as part of Russia's eventual illegal  
12 annexation of Crimea, and should expect more such challenges  
13 as adversaries pursue efforts against the United States and  
14 other countries.

15 I hope that you will provide the committee with your  
16 views on the suitability of special operations to direct  
17 gray zone challenges today and what changes in special  
18 operations capabilities and authorities, many of which were  
19 designed to confront the terrorist threat, may be necessary.

20 Given the demand for special operation forces across  
21 these various mission sets, we must always remain mindful of  
22 the already high operational tempo faced by our special  
23 operators and their families. SOCOM has sought to mitigate  
24 the stress of these repeated demanding deployments through  
25 the Preservation of the Force and Family Initiative. I look

1 forward to an update on the lessons learned from this  
2 initiative and SOCOM's plans going forward.

3 General Thomas and Ms. Whelan, I hope you will pass  
4 along the committee's admiration and thanks to our special  
5 operators and their families for the tremendous sacrifices  
6 they make in support of our national security.

7 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

8 Chairman McCain: Ms. Whelan?

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1 STATEMENT OF THERESA M. WHELAN, ACTING ASSISTANT  
2 SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS/LOW-INTENSITY  
3 CONFLICT

4 Ms. Whelan: Thank you, Senator. Chairman McCain,  
5 Senator Reed, and distinguished members of the committee, I  
6 am honored to appear before you today in my capacity as the  
7 Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations  
8 and Low-Intensity Conflict. I am pleased to share the table  
9 with General Tony Thomas, who has served at the forefront of  
10 the special operations forces at all levels of command. Our  
11 entire SOLIC team is proud to partner with him and his  
12 command in forging the future of DOD special operations.

13 I would like to thank you and your predecessors for the  
14 foresight to create SOLIC and USSOCOM 30 years ago, and for  
15 your commitment to maintaining that vision over the last 3  
16 decades. We are grateful for this committee's strong  
17 support for special operations, as evidenced by the  
18 resources, authorities, and depth of understanding you  
19 provide in your oversight. Our military is stronger and  
20 more capable due to your efforts.

21 Today, I will focus on three topics: winning the  
22 current fight and defeating emerging threats, building on  
23 the foundations of Section 922 ASD/SOLIC authorities, and  
24 continuing to hone the edge of SOF personnel and  
25 capabilities.

1           SOF is a vanguard force in countering emerging threats  
2     at the leading edge of the modern security landscape. In  
3     the last 15 years, we encountered a networked enemy, we  
4     flattened our organizations and accelerated our targeting  
5     cycles, and we built a network to defeat them. We now face  
6     advanced transregional threats that demand greater levels of  
7     coordination and collaboration, and we are redoubling our  
8     focus on building relationships and international and  
9     interagency partners.

10           Today, SOLIC provides advocacy for the special  
11     operations budget, which is approximately 1.8 percent of our  
12     defense budget in 2017. And we directly manage over \$2  
13     billion in various budgets that support counterterrorism and  
14     counternarcotics efforts.

15           The 3 decades-long partnership between SOCOM and SOLIC  
16     has generated a force capable of dealing with emerging  
17     threats and a force that is able to translate those gains  
18     across the department. We will win the fight against VEOs  
19     and protect our citizens, vital interests, allies, and  
20     partners.

21           This requires a long-term strategic approach that  
22     combats terrorists, disrupts terrorist networks, discredits  
23     extremist ideologies, and diminishes factors that contribute  
24     to recruitment and radicalization.

25           Sustained funding and flexible legislative authorities

1 have been instrumental to those efforts. I want to thank  
2 the committee for establishing Section 127(e), formerly  
3 known as Section 1208, as a permanent authority. The  
4 maturation of this program has provided our warfighters a  
5 powerful tool to employ to support our allies, attack our  
6 enemies, and protect our force, and it is a great example of  
7 interagency synergy enabled by strong congressional support  
8 and oversight.

9 Congressional support for countering threat finance and  
10 transnational organized crime is also crucial to our  
11 efforts. Terrorists, insurgents, and other threat networks  
12 depend upon illicit revenue streams and criminal  
13 facilitators for logistics support, money laundering, or  
14 obtaining weapons and fraudulent documents.

15 Thank you also for codifying the responsibilities of  
16 ASD/SOLIC's important oversight role, comprised of the  
17 complementary tasks of monitoring and advocacy in the fiscal  
18 year 2017 NDAA.

19 USSOCOM has made dramatic advances during wartime in  
20 response to urgent battlefield demands, gains that require  
21 an institutional foundation to endure. The service  
22 secretary-like authorities in Section 922 serve as a  
23 strategic linchpin ensuring that we lock in these hard-won  
24 gains.

25 These authorities have empowered the Special Operations

1 Policy Oversight Council, which we have used over the past  
2 year to resolve base infrastructure and casualty evacuation  
3 issues among SOCOM and the services. Ultimately, these  
4 gains can be leveraged across the entire force with SOF best  
5 practices in technology and talent management serving as  
6 templates for the department in addressing emerging  
7 challenges.

8 A key part of SOLIC's role is to advance the state-of-  
9 the-art in concepts, technologies, and strategies for both  
10 humans and hardware. Our Combating Terrorism Technical  
11 Support Office leads this effort with SOLIC developing  
12 cutting-edge technologies for SOF, the interagency, and law  
13 enforcement.

14 The SOF Truths state that humans are more important  
15 than hardware. As we continue to provide agile and  
16 innovative capabilities, we must also continue to build and  
17 sustain an elite work force suited to the unique and diverse  
18 demands of 21st century warfare.

19 We will also continue to work closely with Congress to  
20 ensure that we have the right policies, agile authorities,  
21 and necessary resources to employ SOF effectively. I thank  
22 Congress for its continuing support of our men and women in  
23 uniform, and their families, and I look forward to your  
24 questions.

25 [The prepared statement of Ms. Whelan follows:]

1 Chairman McCain: General Thomas?  
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1           STATEMENT OF GENERAL RAYMOND A. THOMAS III, USA,  
2           COMMANDER, UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

3           General Thomas: Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed,  
4           and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for  
5           the opportunity to appear before you today. I am especially  
6           grateful to be here today with Principal Deputy Assistant  
7           Secretary Whelan in a session dedicated exclusively to  
8           special operations as it provides us the opportunity to  
9           discuss in detail the unique requirements, capabilities, and  
10          challenges associated with your United States Special  
11          Operations Command.

12          This body legislated us into existence a little over 30  
13          years ago to act as a unique Department of Defense  
14          organization, a dual-hatted, service-like entity responsible  
15          for the manning, training, and equipping of special  
16          operations forces, as well as a globally focused, functional  
17          combatant command.

18          In fulfilling the first role, which continues to be our  
19          primary function, I believe we have consistently provided  
20          the world's best special operations forces to the geographic  
21          combatant commanders. However, it is in the second role, as  
22          a globally focused combatant command, where SOCOM has  
23          evolved the most.

24          As we carry out both of these roles today, special  
25          operations forces are more relevant than ever to the current

1 and enduring threats facing our Nation. We have been at the  
2 forefront of national security operations for the past 3  
3 decades, to include continuous combat over the past 15.5  
4 years. This is historic period has been the backdrop for  
5 some of our greatest successes, as well as the source of our  
6 greatest challenge, which is the sustained readiness of this  
7 magnificent force.

8 We are thankful for the resources you have provided not  
9 only to operate this force but also to perform the critical  
10 sustainment efforts that underpin our most precious resource  
11 -- our people.

12 Last month was particularly difficult for the United  
13 States Special Operations Command, losing its 407th hero,  
14 Staff Sergeant De Alencar, a father of five, in a firefight  
15 in the Nangarhar Province of Afghanistan while operating  
16 alongside his Afghan partners. Then last week, we lost  
17 Ranger Sergeants Thomas and Rogers, our 408th and 409th  
18 casualties, respectively.

19 This comes on the heels of 16 other combat fatalities  
20 since I assumed command a year ago. It is a stark reminder  
21 that we are a command at war and will remain so for the  
22 foreseeable future.

23 My current priorities for the command fall into three  
24 broad categories. First, we must win the current fight,  
25 which consists of carrying out assigned missions running the

1 gamut from defeating Islamic extremism, both Sunni and Shia,  
2 to countering Russian aggression, to preparing for  
3 contingencies in Korea, as well as various security  
4 operations to defend the homeland. Second, we must continue  
5 to transform our enterprise to remain relevant in the  
6 rapidly changing security environment. Finally, we must  
7 take care of our people and their families as they form the  
8 foundation upon which our force is built.

9 My first year in command has seen us focused on these  
10 priorities as we transform the way the Department of Defense  
11 looks at many of the national military strategy challenges  
12 in our role as the coordinating authority for countering  
13 transregional threats. More recently, we have also poured  
14 significant resources into defining our role as the  
15 department's synchronizer for countering weapons of mass  
16 destruction.

17 Both of these substantive roles are additive to the  
18 current missions, where approximately 8,000 special  
19 operations forces are deployed in over 80 countries, working  
20 with international, interagency, and DOD partners in support  
21 of the geographic combatant commanders' priorities.

22 This focus is also occurring during a period of  
23 unprecedented recapitalization of substantive parts of our  
24 warfighting capability, to include the conversion of our  
25 entire C-130 fleet to J model C-130s, as well as other major

1 platforms. We are extremely thankful to the services for  
2 enabling this transformation of the force, as it sets us on  
3 the path for success for decades to come.

4 We are equally grateful for the support of Congress for  
5 the required resourcing that, in turn, has produced a SOCOM  
6 which is relevant to all the current and enduring threats  
7 facing the Nation. We appreciate your continued oversight  
8 and advocacy for your United States Special Operations  
9 Command, and I look forward to your questions today.

10 Thank you.

11 [The prepared statement of General Thomas follows:]

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1 Chairman McCain: Thank you, General.

2 General, how are the spending caps under the Budget  
3 Control Act impacting the readiness and capabilities of  
4 special operations forces?

5 General Thomas: Chairman, that has been a consistent  
6 challenge over the last couple years as two of the things  
7 that we would endeavor to control in terms of  
8 predictability, and that is the deployment tempo and the  
9 resourcing of our force. Resourcing has not been very  
10 predictable over the last several years, and the potential  
11 for continued cuts undermines both our readiness and our  
12 modernization going forward.

13 Chairman McCain: So what does that do to morale?

14 General Thomas: Chairman, indirectly, I think,  
15 obviously, it affects the morale of our servicemembers who  
16 are concerned about the support of the Nation and this body.

17 Chairman McCain: When it is not predictable as to  
18 where and when they will be required because of budget  
19 constraints. True?

20 General Thomas: Chairman, it is true. Yes, there is a  
21 ripple.

22 Chairman McCain: So how can you plan, in this  
23 budgetary environment, when we lurch from crisis to crisis?

24 I guess I am a little redundant here, but when I look  
25 at this map of where all of your people are, spread all over

1 the world, it seems to me at least we owe them some kind of  
2 predictability.

3 Let me ask, what is your assessment? Do you know when  
4 we will see an updated counter-ISIS strategy from the  
5 administration?

6 General Thomas: Chairman, we are currently working on  
7 updating that strategy.

8 Chairman McCain: What is your assessment of Russia's  
9 malign activities aimed at destabilizing Eastern Europe and  
10 our NATO allies?

11 General Thomas: Chairman, as I think you know, we are  
12 supporting General Scaparrotti's efforts to both discern and  
13 determine the nature of Russian aggression, as well as to  
14 compete short of conflict in the various countries where it  
15 occurs.

16 Chairman McCain: And have you seen the Russia malign  
17 activities increase, decrease, or stay the same?

18 General Thomas: Chairman, I would assess they are a  
19 steady state of aggressive activities.

20 Chairman McCain: And how do you think we deter that?

21 General Thomas: Chairman, I think by, with, and  
22 through our allies is the primary approach. I think we have  
23 great support and great opportunity there, and we are  
24 continuing to enhance that approach.

25 Chairman McCain: Has the European Reassurance

1 Initiative had a positive impact?

2 General Thomas: It has, Chairman.

3 Chairman McCain: Do you think we are in a "stalemate"  
4 in Afghanistan, as General Nicholson testified before this  
5 committee, in light particularly of recent successful, at  
6 least in their view, Taliban attacks, including the killing  
7 of over 100 Afghans at a base?

8 General Thomas: Chairman, I am aware of General  
9 Nicholson's description of the current status of the fight  
10 as a stalemate. I recently returned from visiting  
11 Afghanistan where you know our special operations forces  
12 play a key role with our associated forces.

13 It is, admittedly, a very tough fight, and we are  
14 beginning yet another fighting season. I would offer,  
15 though that, in terms of stalemate, the one objective we had  
16 for why we went there in the first place that we have  
17 accomplished over the last 15.5 years is the avoidance of  
18 another attack from that area. That certainly is an  
19 accomplishment and something that we need to reinforce going  
20 forward.

21 Chairman McCain: But if you have a "stalemate," that  
22 means that it does not end, doesn't it?

23 General Thomas: Chairman, I understood the commander's  
24 assessment of stalemate as an opportunity to change the  
25 strategy.

1 Chairman McCain: But that opportunity, if the present  
2 status quo prevails, then there is no end to it. In other  
3 words, what do you think needs to be done to end a  
4 stalemate?

5 General Thomas: Chairman, I think that General  
6 Nicholson and the Secretary are pursuing new initiatives to  
7 --

8 Chairman McCain: What do you think is needed, General  
9 Thomas?

10 General Thomas: Chairman, we are integral to the  
11 discussion on what is needed going forward. Again, I am  
12 supporting the commander there, and supporting our Secretary  
13 of Defense in terms of the strategy --

14 Chairman McCain: You know, you testified before this  
15 committee that you would give your opinion, if it is  
16 requested by this committee. I will ask you again. What do  
17 you think needs to be done in Afghanistan to end a  
18 stalemate?

19 General Thomas: Chairman, I think the critical factor  
20 is the commitment, the commitment to some enduring state  
21 that has not been described effectively in the past. I  
22 think the new strategy is going to establish that definition  
23 of what --

24 Chairman McCain: Does that mean, in your view,  
25 additional troops commitment?

1           General Thomas:  Chairman, additional troops are being  
2 considered, changes to the ROE --

3           Chairman McCain:  In your opinion, do you think it  
4 requires additional troops?

5           General Thomas:  Chairman, right now, I think we have  
6 an adequate number of my troops, special operations forces,  
7 on the ground.

8           Chairman McCain:  Of your troops, you think you have  
9 enough?

10          General Thomas:  I do.

11          Chairman McCain:  And how often do your average  
12 individuals under your command serve overseas?

13          General Thomas:  Chairman, I believe what you are  
14 getting at is the deployment tempo for folks.

15          Chairman McCain:  Right.

16          General Thomas:  It varies across our force.  In some  
17 cases, various parts of our force, various components are in  
18 a 1-to-1.2 worst-case deployment.

19          Chairman McCain:  Meaning how many months deployed  
20 versus how many months back in the United States?

21          General Thomas:  With that ratio I just described, they  
22 are about a 1-to-1, so 6 months or so deployed, if that is  
23 the rotation, 6 months back.  That is the worst case.  In  
24 the best case, we have been able to establish a balance of  
25 1-to-3, so for every 6 months deployed --

1 Chairman McCain: Isn't it a significant strain to have  
2 half your time deployed? Doesn't that put a lot of strain  
3 on the individuals and their families?

4 General Thomas: Chairman, that worst case is actually  
5 less than the DOD's desired rate, and we are endeavoring to  
6 get that back in balance.

7 Again, that is not our entire formation. That is only  
8 parts of our formation. But it is unsustainable, to your  
9 point.

10 Chairman McCain: I thank you, General.

11 Senator Reed: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

12 To both Ms. Whelan and General Thomas, do you believe  
13 that both SOCOM and SOLIC have an adequate seat at the table  
14 when discussions are made about budget acquisition and other  
15 issues impacting your force, vis-a-vis the other services?

16 Ms. Whelan?

17 Ms. Whelan: Thanks for the question, Senator.

18 Actually, I think that the recent language in the NDAA  
19 in Section 922 has significantly improved the ability of  
20 ASD/SOLIC to gain a seat at the table. And to that point,  
21 specifically, we recently used that language to justify  
22 getting a separate seat for ASD/SOLIC on the Deputy  
23 Secretary's management action group, which previously SOLIC  
24 did not have.

25 We have also gained a separate seat for SOLIC on the

1 Deputy Secretary's SAP Oversight Council. SOCOM has a  
2 number of special access programs that we previously had not  
3 been able to manage independently.

4 Further, within the department, we have established a  
5 tiger team to cross departmentwide in order to determine  
6 other areas in which ASD/SOLIC needs to gain additional  
7 authorities and abilities within the department to represent  
8 SOCOM and have a seat at the table.

9 One other recent accomplishment is I think we will have  
10 a seat for SOCOM in the upcoming defense strategy  
11 development process.

12 Senator Reed: General Thomas, any comments?

13 General Thomas: Senator, I would reinforce Theresa's  
14 points. We very much embrace the recent language that  
15 reinforces ASD/SOLIC's role as a service-like entity. We  
16 are well-represented at all of the appropriate venues.

17 It sometimes takes reminding that we are unique in that  
18 case, because we are seen as either one or the other, and we  
19 sometimes have to remind folks that we are both, a service-  
20 like entity and a combatant command.

21 But you have empowered us to be at the table for all  
22 those venues, and we are adequately represented. Thank you.

23 Senator Reed: Secretary Whelan, are there any  
24 responsibilities you have that you feel might be more  
25 effectively and efficiently carried out by another entity?

1 You have a broad range of responsibilities. Is there  
2 anything that should be repositioned?

3 Ms. Whelan: Within ASD/SOLIC, I think that there is  
4 consistency, actually, across the portfolio in terms of the  
5 types of activities that the Assistant Secretary is  
6 responsible for. In terms of the Assistant Secretary's role  
7 in providing policy oversight, all of the activities that  
8 ASD/SOLIC has purview over are in some way related to either  
9 the employment of SOF forces or the environments in which  
10 SOF forces operate. Whether they be SOF MISO capabilities,  
11 civil affair capabilities, foreign internal defense  
12 capabilities, training capabilities, and, of course,  
13 counterterrorism capabilities, the portfolio is consistent  
14 in that context.

15 Senator Reed: My understanding, and correct me if I am  
16 inaccurate, is that you also have responsibility for  
17 information warfare?

18 Ms. Whelan: Yes, Senator, information warfare does  
19 fall under the purview of ASD/SOLIC.

20 Senator Reed: But you do not have responsibility for  
21 cyber operations. And as we know, cyber operations and  
22 information warfare, on the other side, our adversaries seem  
23 to be one, merged together, with each day.

24 Ms. Whelan: Correct, Senator. It is a seam. There  
25 are a lot of seams, as you all know, within our

1 organizational structure, and it is difficult. If you  
2 eliminate one seam, you will create another. So it is kind  
3 of a difficult balance to strike.

4 One of the things that we have done, though, is SOLIC  
5 recently put out a strategy for operating in the information  
6 environment. This strategy impacts the entire department,  
7 to include the cyber warriors in the department. So we have  
8 an integrated interdepartmental approach to implementing  
9 that strategy.

10 Right now, we are going through a capabilities-based  
11 assessment of that strategy to determine where we have  
12 additional needs and where we have seams that we need to fix  
13 in order to operate effectively.

14 Senator Reed: Thank you.

15 Just a final and very quick question. As the chairman  
16 has noted, we have threats that are not strictly  
17 counterterrorism today with this gray area of operations.  
18 Section 1208, which I think has been very useful, as you  
19 have described it, is focused more on counterterrorism. Is  
20 there anything we have to do to give you that same degree of  
21 authority with respect to these gray areas in unconventional  
22 warfare rather than counterterrorism?

23 General Thomas, your comments?

24 And I have no time.

25 General Thomas: Senator, we are actively pursuing both

1 the authorities and the resources that would enable more  
2 enhanced unconventional warfare operations. Again, we are  
3 very appreciative of what 1208 does for us, and that is  
4 actually -- I mean, it is very -- kind of enthusiastic. Its  
5 similar authority, similar resourcing might be advantageous  
6 for the force and for the Nation for unconventional warfare  
7 purposes, and I look forward to having that continuing  
8 discussion with you and others.

9 Senator Reed: Thank you.

10 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

11 Chairman McCain: Senator Inhofe?

12 Senator Inhofe: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

13 I do want to pursue this a little bit, in terms of your  
14 response to the chairman's question in terms of the adequacy  
15 of the force.

16 But I want to first mention your activity in Africa,  
17 which really surprised me. I can remember when we first  
18 brought AFRICOM along, and we started paying attention to  
19 what is going on over there, the potential threats there,  
20 the terrorism that is infiltrating the countries. So I know  
21 you have been active over there. I have talked to a lot of  
22 the African leaders. Very complimentary on some of the  
23 results that we are getting.

24 And this surprises me, because AFRICOM did not even  
25 come online until the first of 2008, and yet, if you go back

1 to 2006, the deployments to Africa have increased by more  
2 than 1,600 percent. It went from 1 percent to 17 percent in  
3 terms of deployments outside the United States. That is  
4 huge. That is a lot of increase in activity.

5 In addition to combating terrorism and the expanding  
6 network of violent extremism organizations, General Thomas,  
7 what impact, what can you elaborate on, on your activities  
8 in Africa? It is an inordinate increase, in terms of  
9 percentage, when you realize that some 17 percent of all  
10 deployments are actually affecting Africa.

11 General Thomas: Senator, I would actually attribute  
12 that to our adversaries' activities. The migration of ISIS  
13 and Al Qaeda to Africa, to ungoverned spaces over the  
14 preceding decade has been palpable. You know the specific  
15 locations. I probably, in an open session, should not get  
16 into the details of where and what. But we have endeavored  
17 to move where they have tried to establish new provinces,  
18 new areas of influence, in support of General Waldhauser and  
19 AFRICOM.

20 So that transition over time has really been driven by  
21 adversarial action. But I think the good news is that we  
22 have had the ability to move those locations and attempt to  
23 defeat and disrupt them where they try to reside.

24 Senator Inhofe: I do not think anyone anticipated back  
25 in 2008 or even in the years since then that the activity

1 would increase as it has there, so I am interested in  
2 following through with that.

3 On the idea of what you guys are in a position to  
4 handle right now, most of the deployed SOCOM forces, 55  
5 percent, went to the Middle East. Next was Africa, that was  
6 17 percent. Then Europe, 13 percent, and 9 percent.

7 Now, when you look at the optempo that was involved  
8 over there, in your written testimony, you acknowledge that  
9 adversary powers are increasingly turning toward  
10 unconventional warfare to pursue their objectives.

11 But maybe I misunderstood you when you responded to the  
12 question of the chairman, that you are adequately staffed to  
13 carry on these functions. Is that not an accurate  
14 recollection I am having?

15 General Thomas: Senator, we are adequately staffed to  
16 maintain the current tempo, the current distribution of  
17 special operations forces. It is a strain. It is certainly  
18 not an easy burden, but we are adequately resourced.

19 Senator Inhofe: I am looking for the quote that we  
20 had. Yes, this would have been from the House committee  
21 yesterday. I cannot find it right now, but there were  
22 quotes that -- here it is right here. You said most special  
23 operations forces units are employed to their sustainable  
24 limit.

25 Now, to me, that seems a little inconsistent with being

1 adequately staffed. You went on to talk about as or more  
2 challenged as a conventional force by the problem of  
3 suicide, other problems in the ranks that come with what I  
4 consider to be over-deployed.

5 What are some of the problems that you are facing that  
6 give you the indication that maybe you are not adequately  
7 staffed?

8 General Thomas: Senator, again, we can sustain the  
9 current rate of deployment. It is something we scrutinize  
10 every day.

11 You mentioned, the chairman mentioned early on, that  
12 there is a large demand signal from our geographic combatant  
13 commanders to do the things they have to do. As a service,  
14 one of our roles, we aim to meet their requirements. As a  
15 global combatant command, we also attempt to synchronize  
16 special operations activity to the greatest efficacy  
17 possible. I think we are doing that, to the degree we can.

18 There are challenges on the force. You mentioned  
19 certainly some of the more dire symptoms. We address them  
20 directly every day. That is large focal point for us.

21 I would have to thank all of you as well for providing  
22 us the tools that we did not have a decade ago to build in  
23 resiliency for our force in terms of our Preservation of the  
24 Force and Family, and also for our ability to care for our  
25 warriors in the event of mishaps, injuries, et cetera. We

1 did not have that capability. You helped us gain it over  
2 time, and that is a critical part of how we sustain  
3 ourselves.

4 Senator Inhofe: Well, as one member of this committee,  
5 I look at some of the results, some of the problems that you  
6 have, and I have to question as to whether or not it is  
7 adequately staffed.

8 One short question, I know my time has expired, but you  
9 can do this for the record, if you like, Ms. Whelan, there  
10 is some confusion, as I mentioned to you earlier, in the  
11 words that you use when you are talking about adversary  
12 powers increasing, turning toward unconventional warfare.  
13 You said, "exquisite integration across multiple components  
14 of not only the Defense Department, also the United States  
15 Government, as a key challenge to confronting growing  
16 threat."

17 You might, for the record, since my time has expired,  
18 elaborate a little bit on that. Would you do that?

19 Ms. Whelan: Yes, Senator. We would be happy to.

20 Senator Inhofe: Thank you very much.

21 Chairman McCain: Senator Hirono?

22 Senator Hirono: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

23 I want to thank both of our witnesses for your service.  
24 And, in particular, I would like to thank the men and women  
25 that you lead in our armed services, both in the military

1 and in the civilian side, and, of course, particularly the  
2 Special Ops Command in the Pacific arena who provide great  
3 support to the Asia-Pacific region.

4 Secretary Whelan, guidelines for the use of force were  
5 established by President Obama in the 2013 Presidential  
6 Policy Guidance. The rules include the requirement for a  
7 "near certainty" that the terrorist target was present and  
8 that no civilians would be injured or killed.

9 There is no legal requirement that President Obama's  
10 successors adhere to the same rules. President Trump has  
11 recently directed you to advise him on any recommended  
12 changes to the rules of engagement, and there were reports  
13 that there were a large number of civilian casualties after  
14 the raid in Yemen recently.

15 Have the rules of engagement requirement of near  
16 certainty that no civilian casualties will result been  
17 modified for special ops missions?

18 Ms. Whelan: Thanks for the question, Senator.  
19 Absolutely not.

20 Senator Hirono: Are there differences in the steps a  
21 conventional force would take versus special operations to  
22 prevent collateral civilian loss of life during missions?

23 Ms. Whelan: Senator, I will let General Thomas answer  
24 that question.

25 Senator Hirono: General Thomas?

1           General Thomas:  Senator, no is the answer.  We both  
2  adhere to the Law of Armed Conflict.  There are different  
3  techniques in terms of how we develop targets, but the same  
4  absolute standard applies.

5           Senator Hirono:  So these rules of engagement that  
6  require near certainty that your target is there and that  
7  you will minimize collateral damage, that was applied in the  
8  Yemen case?

9           Ms. Whelan:  Yes, the rules of engagement were not  
10  changed for the Yemen case.

11          Senator Hirono:  And although there was a high number,  
12  we were told maybe 200 or so civilian casualties, that did  
13  not result in a review of what happened there?

14          Ms. Whelan:  There have been extensive reviews of what  
15  happened, after-action reports, and lessons learned, but the  
16  casualties were not a result of a change in the rules of  
17  engagement.

18          Senator Hirono:  What were they the result of?

19          Ms. Whelan:  They were a result of operational  
20  circumstances that the forces on the ground found themselves  
21  in.

22          Senator Hirono:  I see.

23          General Thomas, in your testimony, you identify SOFWERX  
24  as a SOCOM initiative to support agile acquisition with  
25  appropriate venues.  This is an open collaboration facility

1 in Florida that has been in operation for over a year and  
2 has successfully brought hundreds of nontraditional partners  
3 together to work on your most challenging problems. I think  
4 that is a really good idea, although we have a lot of  
5 innovators and idea folks all over the country, also in  
6 Hawaii.

7 How do you search for ideas, collaborators, and  
8 solutions outside of your SOFWERX construct?

9 General Thomas: Senator, you actually teased out the  
10 bigger part of the problem. I have the luxury of commanding  
11 70,000 of the best, most creative problem solvers in the  
12 world. How I marry them up with the absolute innovation  
13 that is everywhere in terms of industrial approaches is the  
14 real challenge.

15 But SOFWERX is one way we are doing that, where we are  
16 compressing the space between academia, innovators,  
17 businessmen, and our operators in the pursuit of very  
18 specific problems. So you might imagine the whole gamut of  
19 issues that we are endeavoring to accomplish there that are  
20 enabling our force. But we are able to do that and go into  
21 rapid fielding and accelerated fielding of capabilities that  
22 enable our force.

23 So a relatively new initiative, SOFWERX, about 1.5  
24 years old, but also already paying some huge dividends for  
25 us.

1           Senator Hirono: So based on your experience so far  
2 with SOFWERX, would you recommend that something like this,  
3 maybe a physical location for PACOM or other commands?

4           General Thomas: Senator, the Defense Department is  
5 actually endeavoring to do this at a number of different  
6 locations. Secretary Carter certainly invested in the  
7 valley. There are other initiatives around the United  
8 States, tapping into the various laboratories and academic  
9 facilities.

10           I cannot speak to where the department is going in  
11 terms of the Pacific and where we might invest out there,  
12 but I am sure we are interested in wherever we can tap into  
13 that kind of innovative capability.

14           Senator Hirono: I hope you all will take a look at  
15 spreading the opportunity around, because there are a lot of  
16 small businesses all over the country who could provide the  
17 kind of innovation that you are seeking.

18           The Pentagon has acknowledged more than 100 U.S.  
19 special operation forces operating with Iraqi units in and  
20 around the Mosul with upwards of 600 more playing a support  
21 role in staging bases farther from the frontlines.

22           This is for General Thomas. Can you comment on the  
23 seemingly ever-increasing use of special operation forces?  
24 Do you think we are relying too heavily on special ops?

25           General Thomas: First and foremost, we are not a

1 panacea. We are not the ultimate solution for every  
2 problem. You will not hear that coming from us. That has  
3 been misconstrued in some media circles. Everything we are  
4 doing is in concert with conventional forces, with our  
5 allies, completely integrated.

6 I just visited Mosul. I was there about 3 weeks ago.  
7 Mosul was my hometown for 15 months, from 2007 to 2008, so I  
8 am very familiar with how daunting that challenge is.

9 In that area, you have a mix of conventional forces. I  
10 met with a brigade commander from the Army who was there.  
11 We had our special operations forces and our forces all  
12 integrated with the Iraqis, who are doing the majority of  
13 the fighting and incurring most of the casualties there. So  
14 it is an absolute blend of all of our forces, and I think  
15 the right mix.

16 Senator Hirono: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

17 Chairman McCain: Senator Wicker?

18 Senator Wicker: Thank you both.

19 Let's talk about collaboration with your international  
20 counterparts. Which one of you would like to discuss the  
21 extent to which we collaborate with our international  
22 allies? General?

23 General Thomas: Senator, in a word, extensively. At  
24 almost every part of our formation, you will see where we  
25 are endeavoring to bring everyone in who has a part of the

1 problem.

2 I am very appreciative that the Director of National  
3 Intelligence has enabled us to crush through pre-existing  
4 prohibitions for information-sharing, probably one of the  
5 most powerful things that we have in this day and age, to be  
6 able to share exquisite information that the United States  
7 has that we may or may not be intent on acting on, but be  
8 able to share that with our allies and enable them to act.

9 But that is at almost every point of our formation,  
10 where that level of collaboration is ongoing right now. So  
11 "exquisite" is the best way I can describe the extent of the  
12 collaboration, and getting better every day.

13 Senator Wicker: Is there anything else you need in the  
14 next NDAA to help you there? Do you have what you need?

15 General Thomas: Senator, I believe we certainly have  
16 no restrictions that I can mention to you nor that I can  
17 specify to right now. So we feel very enabled there.

18 As I mentioned, the intelligence community is finding  
19 ways to enable us more every day, certainly with the  
20 concerns of safeguarding methods and sources and things like  
21 that, but with a lean toward sharing and collaborating more  
22 than we have ever done before.

23 Senator Wicker: I understand you have a particularly  
24 strong relationship with our neighbors to the north in  
25 Canada.

1           General Thomas: A phenomenal relationship, yes,  
2   Senator.

3           Senator Wicker: What can you tell us in this non-  
4   classified setting about Exercise Vital Archer?

5           General Thomas: Senator, hard to go into detail about  
6   that exercise, which we recently completed, as I think you  
7   know. But it is part of a cycle, if you will, to ensure our  
8   interoperability with our neighbors, with one of our  
9   greatest partners, for a very specific mission set that is  
10   of critical interest to both Canada and us.

11          Senator Wicker: Let me shift then to special boats and  
12   say, first of all, that we in Mississippi are thankful and  
13   honored to have Special Boat Team 22 headquartered in our  
14   state.

15          Would you describe the ways in which these special boat  
16   teams contribute to different missions?

17          General Thomas: Senator, I recently had the privilege  
18   of running all over Stennis here about a month ago, and  
19   getting out on the water in some of those capabilities.  
20   They are integral to many of our activities around the  
21   globe. NAVSCIATTS, the institution that you have there as  
22   well, is also a critical enabler for many of our foreign  
23   allies.

24          So, again, two phenomenal aspects of our portfolio that  
25   are important to everything that we are doing.

1           Senator Wicker: So we are continuing to do a lot of  
2 significant work in riverine environments.

3           General Thomas: Where it applies, Senator, we  
4 certainly have that capability, and we continue to improve  
5 it.

6           Senator Wicker: Where does that apply?

7           General Thomas: Senator, on several locations around  
8 the globe that probably would be best to address in a closed  
9 hearing.

10          Senator Wicker: Okay. And let me just say, to follow  
11 up on the chairman's line of questioning about Afghanistan,  
12 I just think it is very important for you to know, and for  
13 everyone listening to know, that we need to move beyond  
14 anything that puts us at a stalemate in Afghanistan.

15          This is an important fight that we need to win, and  
16 there is every reason that we should be able to do that. We  
17 have a populace in Afghanistan who supports our presence  
18 there. The overwhelming majority of the ethnic groups, of  
19 the tribes, appreciate what we stand for and look to the  
20 United States for leadership.

21          So to the extent that either of you, both of you, can  
22 give us correct and helpful information about how to move  
23 past what some people have described as a stalemate, to me,  
24 is very, very helpful.

25          Ms. Whelan?

1 Ms. Whelan: Senator, I think we are actually actively  
2 looking at adjustments to the approach in Afghanistan right  
3 now. I expect that these proposals will go to the President  
4 within the next week, and the intent is to do just that, to  
5 move beyond the stalemate and also to recognize that  
6 Afghanistan is a very important partner for the United  
7 States in a very tricky region. We want to maintain that  
8 partnership with Afghanistan, and we want to ensure that  
9 Afghanistan reaches its potential. So that is the objective  
10 of the strategy, sir.

11 Senator Wicker: That is very good to know. Thank you.

12 Chairman McCain: Senator Heinrich?

13 Senator Heinrich: Thank you, Chairman.

14 Thank you both for being here. And please pass along  
15 our gratitude to everyone who serves in your command. I  
16 think the work they do every day has an enormous amount of  
17 respect from all of our constituents, and we should be very  
18 grateful for that.

19 General Thomas, yesterday, I want to thank you for just  
20 sitting down with me in my office. You and I discussed a  
21 number of things.

22 The high operational tempo was one of the things we  
23 touched on. One of the things you mentioned to me that  
24 really stuck in my head are the numbers. You also indicated  
25 that now somewhere between 28 percent and 30 percent of your

1 funding is now from war supplemental, or OCO funding, versus  
2 7 percent across the other military services.

3 I was hoping you could talk a little bit about what  
4 that means in terms of that budgetary overreliance on OCO  
5 and how that impacts your ability to plan and execute your  
6 mission.

7 General Thomas: Senator, thanks for the question and  
8 thanks for the opportunity to discuss a number of issues  
9 with you in more detail yesterday.

10 I mentioned the two things that I look to that  
11 pressurize us most are unpredictable de tempo, and certainly  
12 there are aspects of that are affecting our force, and  
13 resourcing, the predictability or not of resourcing, which  
14 has been challenging over time.

15 We are monitoring very closely the budget discussions.  
16 We are integral to all those budget discussions.  
17 Truthfully, I am somewhat sanguine that we will get the  
18 resources required to continue to pursue the tempo and the  
19 effects that we are producing right now.

20 You pointed out my one concern is that we have trended  
21 to be much, much more dependent on operational contingency  
22 funds than anybody else in DOD. So the current budget would  
23 push us --

24 Senator Heinrich: If your overall budget were held  
25 flat, would you rather have that in base budget or would you

1 rather see it over in the OCO?

2 General Thomas: Senator, I hope that we will be able  
3 to get consideration to move that into the base over time.  
4 Again, I have talked with Secretary Mattis, so I do not want  
5 to appear inconsistent. The department is not pushing that  
6 as aggressively for the remainder of the other services  
7 because they are only leveraged to OCO to about a 7 percent  
8 degree. We are 30 percent or near 30 percent right now. So  
9 that is some risk that we certainly would like to mitigate  
10 over time.

11 Senator Heinrich: One of the other things we mentioned  
12 and talked a little bit about is the contributions out at  
13 Cannon Air Force Base. Would you take a moment and talk a  
14 little bit about the importance of the RPA contribution that  
15 happens there? And do you have concerns with regard to  
16 operational tempo? We have made huge investments in the  
17 facility over the years because of the growing mission, but,  
18 obviously, the tempo has been incredible.

19 General Thomas: Senator, I think this committee is  
20 very aware that ISR is a significant portion of our  
21 portfolio, to the tune of about one-fifth of our investment  
22 strategy on any given annual basis. It runs the gamut from  
23 tactical ISR all the way to high-end ISR that our Air Force  
24 component produces, which is the best in the world. It is  
25 better than anything on the planet.

1 Cannon plays a critical role in terms of the basing and  
2 training of that ISR capability, both manned and unmanned.  
3 And then the range complex there allows us to work it every  
4 night. So, again, state-of-the-art ISR capability produced  
5 by our Air Force and others that we leverage on a consistent  
6 basis.

7 Senator Heinrich: I also want to commend SOCOM's  
8 interest in pursuing what General Goldfein described as  
9 silent sabotage with regard to directed energy. An airborne  
10 high-energy laser on a C-130 gunship could certainly deliver  
11 a number of capabilities before and during clandestine  
12 ground operations.

13 Do you want to share any thoughts you have on how  
14 directed energy might contribute to your future mission and  
15 how SOCOM's plans for developing that system are coming  
16 along?

17 General Thomas: Senator, as we discussed yesterday, we  
18 see a number of applications for high-energy weapons  
19 capabilities, so we are interested from a number of  
20 approaches. You mentioned that we have offered to base it  
21 on one of our platforms as a test basis. That was  
22 relatively easy for us to offer up and obviously gives us  
23 kind of an immediate developmental capability. So, again,  
24 very interested, not exclusively a SOCOM pursuit --

25 Senator Heinrich: Do you feel good about Air Force's

1 willingness to get in that game as well?

2 General Thomas: I do. We have a phenomenal  
3 relationship with General Goldfein and the Air Force.

4 We have actual annual service talks with all the  
5 services to talk through how we can crush through our  
6 combined equities, and the relationship with our sister  
7 services is phenomenal. I have no concerns.

8 Senator Heinrich: My time has expired here, but I also  
9 want to express a willingness to work with you on the 1208-  
10 like issues with regard to unconventional warfare.

11 So thank you all for being here today.

12 Chairman McCain: Senator Ernst?

13 Senator Ernst: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

14 To Ms. Whelan and General Thomas, thank you so much for  
15 being with us today. As a soldier and a citizen, I want to  
16 thank you very much for your relentless work on the  
17 battlefield. And as the spouse of a former SOF operator, I  
18 want to thank you for SOCOM's dedication to the health and  
19 wellness of those operators and especially the commitment  
20 that you have to those servicemembers' families. So thank  
21 you very much for being here.

22 General Thomas, during your confirmation hearing, we  
23 spoke about SOCOM's Preservation of the Force and Family,  
24 POTFF, initiatives. As you know, I am glad to see that  
25 SOCOM has done a lot in those areas to help our special

1 operations warriors and their family members. The wounded  
2 warriors especially is an interest of mine. I would  
3 encourage everybody on this committee to take a look at  
4 those programs and learn more about them.

5 Can you give us just a brief update on POTFF and  
6 specifically on THOR 3? I had the opportunity to do PT at a  
7 THOR 3 facility with some of your operators. It was an  
8 experience.

9 Can you tell us if SOCOM has the support it needs from  
10 Congress for these types of programs?

11 General Thomas: Senator, thanks for the question.  
12 Thanks more specifically for your personal support for this  
13 critical capability.

14 It is, admittedly, an awkward acronym, POTFF,  
15 Preservation of the Force and Family, but it captures the  
16 essence of what we are trying to enable, focused on both our  
17 force and, arguably, something that we talked about but did  
18 not have the resourcing before, the readiness and the  
19 preservation of our families.

20 It literally builds in or enables us to build in  
21 resilience prior to and in preparation for potential  
22 deployment for both our servicemembers and their family  
23 members across a broad array of approaches -- psychological,  
24 physical, spiritual -- that again has paid huge dividends  
25 for us.

1           You mentioned a specific aspect of that that pertains  
2 mostly to the physical maintenance and the physical recovery  
3 of our force. But over time, this committee and the  
4 Congress has enabled us to put the right infrastructure in  
5 place with the right technicians, therapists, and  
6 psychologists, et cetera, to provide state-of-the-art, as  
7 good as anything on the planet, sustainment capability for  
8 our individual operators, our individual servicemembers, and  
9 their families.

10           Command Sergeant Major Patrick McCauley and I go around  
11 the formation. We get nothing but rave reviews from the  
12 force. In some cases, in fact, the challenge forces in some  
13 of our most distant locations where smaller forces, they are  
14 looking for the same capability, and we are finding ways to  
15 parlay that to them as well, as opposed to just at the  
16 larger special operation installations.

17           Senator Ernst: Outstanding. It is a great program.  
18 Thank you, sir, for being so supportive of that.

19           And it is not surprising that so many of our SOF  
20 warriors, even after injury, are able to get back into that  
21 fight. While I was at THOR 3 with a dear friend of mine  
22 from Iowa, we met another one of his teammates who had also  
23 been injured. He had a near, at the hip amputation and had  
24 a prosthetic. He has been able to return to the fight  
25 because of those facilities. But he has been back to

1 Afghanistan a number of times.

2 But we also have those warriors who are not able to  
3 deploy again. So what is SOCOM doing to utilize their  
4 talents and abilities even after injury if they cannot  
5 deploy? And are there things that we should look at as  
6 Congress to enable those warriors to stay on duty?

7 General Thomas: Senator, you touched on one of the  
8 unique challenges that we have, that most of our  
9 servicemembers, even despite extraordinary wounds,  
10 debilitating wounds for any other human being, desire  
11 greatly to continue serving. So you highlighted one  
12 example. I can highlight dozens where we have been able to  
13 accommodate individuals to stay in the force and to continue  
14 to contribute.

15 You mentioned an amputee. We have amputees that are  
16 operating as operators, frontline operators, special forces,  
17 SEALs, the tip of the spear although way through all of our  
18 supporting functions.

19 And so again, our goal is, if they want to continue  
20 serving, we find a way to enable that. And you have given  
21 us the wherewithal, the committee has given us the  
22 wherewithal to be able to do that through our Warrior Care  
23 program.

24 Senator Ernst: Very good. I appreciate that very  
25 much.

1 I do have a few other questions. We will get to those.  
2 Just a quick yes or no, though.

3 President Trump today is saying that he does support  
4 leaving troops in Iraq in the fight against ISIS. Is that  
5 something that you would support?

6 General Thomas: Senator, I support the strategy, so  
7 whatever the nature of the special operations support is  
8 required to obtain our objectives, I am supportive.

9 Senator Ernst: Ms. Whelan?

10 Ms. Whelan: Yes, actually, we are totally linked, and  
11 the strategy is based on our requirements of the generals on  
12 the ground.

13 Senator Ernst: Thank you very much.

14 Thank you, Mr. Chair.

15 Chairman McCain: Senator Kaine?

16 Senator Kaine: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

17 Thanks to the witnesses. I have a concern and a  
18 question.

19 On the concern side, on the SOCOM Web site, you have a  
20 SOF Truths, five of them. One of them is, most special  
21 operations require non-SOF assistance. That seems pretty  
22 obvious. I have a concern about what I worry is a sort of  
23 growing SOF myth, and that is you can do special forces and  
24 have special forces and nothing else to accomplish your  
25 goals. Even conversations in this body sometimes are, well,

1 we do not want to use ground troops, no boots on the ground,  
2 but it is okay to use special forces.

3 I sometimes think that is a little bit of not really a  
4 military calculation but kind of more of a political one,  
5 that ground troops are a little bit more notable, special  
6 forces tend to be more covert, so we can do things with  
7 special forces and not really have to be accountable for it  
8 to the public.

9 Am I right to worry about that?

10 General Thomas: Senator, I think you are right to  
11 worry about the perception. It is something that we battle  
12 all the time. There have been too many books and movies and  
13 publications that might imply that we go it alone, do it  
14 alone, and that is completely incorrect.

15 So, certainly, I share your concern that that is out  
16 there, but it is something that we push back on all the  
17 time. It is just not the case.

18 Senator Kaine: A question Senator Wicker asked you  
19 about, collaboration with international partners, I want to  
20 focus on a piece of that, the training that you do. I think  
21 one of the best parts of our DOD budget, and it is a very  
22 small part of the budget, is the training work that we do  
23 with other nations, either bringing military leaders of  
24 other nations here or doing training with countries all over  
25 the world.

1           Senator King and I have done some traveling and have  
2    seen U.S. special forces doing training in some tough parts  
3    in the world that are pretty impressive. Without saying  
4    anything in an open setting that you should not, talk a  
5    little bit about the scope of the training activities that  
6    our special forces are involved in with partners all over  
7    the world.

8           General Thomas: Senator, we are consistently trying to  
9    align ourselves with the appropriate partner forces where  
10   our national interests pertain in the interest of building  
11   their capability to the range of missions that they might be  
12   required to do.

13           I think we are pursuing a much more enlightened  
14   training approach, all the way through security force  
15   assistance. Where I think my fellow combatant commanders  
16   would tell you that we are probably not keeping pace is in  
17   terms of the bureaucracy that pertains to foreign military  
18   sales and things of that ilk. I know we are trying to get  
19   those to be as coherent as possible going forward. That  
20   would help us.

21           But I think we are doing a much better job of  
22   identifying partner forces ahead of time that need various  
23   capabilities, and we are pressing to make sure they have  
24   that capability.

25           Senator Kaine: And this training, when you do it, it

1 is not only about just sheer military capacity-building. It  
2 is also about rules of war and human rights and elevating  
3 professional standards in these militaries around the world,  
4 and that is all for the good.

5 General Thomas: Senator, you are nailing what I think  
6 is one of the critical aspects of it. It is literally  
7 imparting our American values to them in the means of a  
8 military-to-military relationship.

9 Too often, in my mind, the first billpayer is that  
10 military-to-military relationship when we have missteps, and  
11 we are the first to address it. If we even get a scent of  
12 extrajudicial killings or inappropriate behavior, we address  
13 that immediately with the respective element. But we are  
14 attempting to bring their understanding of what we believe  
15 is the right way to conduct combat operations along as part  
16 of our training.

17 Senator Kaine: One of the most important things I  
18 think we can do is kind of be the partner of choice as other  
19 nations are looking to build capacity, and I think there is  
20 probably no area more than special forces where we are  
21 really seen as a partner of choice by nations all around the  
22 world. That is a great way to build relationships and  
23 improve capacity, compliance with rule of law.

24 So I commend you on that and look forward to talking  
25 about that more as we get into working on the NDAA together.

1 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

2 Chairman McCain: Senator Sullivan?

3 Senator Sullivan: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

4 Ms. Whelan, General, thanks for your testimony.

5 General, I appreciated the opportunity to meet with you  
6 and your team yesterday. I wanted to follow up on some of  
7 our discussions.

8 Obviously, we focus a lot here on ISIS and Al Qaeda and  
9 some of the other terrorist groups. But certainly, one of  
10 your most important missions is the counter-WMD mission. As  
11 the threat is growing from North Korea, Iran, it is not just  
12 a direct threat. As you know, it is a proliferation threat.  
13 And I think that is going to be an enduring mission for you  
14 and your team and the SOF Command for decades.

15 So in 2016, in the unified campaign plan, it was  
16 amended to transfer responsibility from STRATCOM to SOCOM  
17 for the synchronization of DOD's global counter-WMD  
18 strategy. To the extent you can discuss it in an open  
19 hearing like this, what are the things that we can do to  
20 support that critically important mission in terms of  
21 resources? How is the transfer going? And are there any  
22 other things that this committee should be aware of to help  
23 you most effectively focus and undertake that critical  
24 mission?

25 General Thomas: Senator, thanks for the question, and

1 thanks for the time yesterday as well.

2 As you mentioned, this is an enormous and incredibly  
3 important mission set that we accepted responsibility for in  
4 January. So January of this year was when it was officially  
5 assigned to us from the Department of Defense. We have had  
6 about 4 months to work our enhanced appreciation for all  
7 that entails. Obviously, we had studied ahead of time, but  
8 there is nothing like embracing a mission to really  
9 understand it.

10 We have had a chance to do our first of what is a  
11 semiannual synchronization session with all the interagency  
12 partners that are part of this problem set, all the  
13 geographic combatant commanders, our international partners,  
14 a really, really valuable session that we conduct  
15 semiannually.

16 We are currently now trying to confederate all the  
17 ongoing activities so that we can provide the Secretary an  
18 assessment here. I am aiming for the August timeframe to  
19 give him a comprehensive assessment of where we are in terms  
20 of the United States Government policies and objectives for  
21 countering weapons of mass destruction, where we are from a  
22 DOD approach, and relative to both our interagency and our  
23 international partners.

24 So, again, we are leaning into this mission as  
25 aggressively as we do most everything at SOCOM. But it is

1 obviously much, much bigger than us, and we are honored to  
2 have that coordinating role for the Department of Defense,  
3 and we are endeavoring to provide the best product possible  
4 for the Secretary and the department.

5       Senator Sullivan: As you undertake that analysis and  
6 that transfer of authority over to you, which has already  
7 happened, please make sure that this committee -- I can  
8 almost guarantee you that you would get bipartisan support  
9 for additional responsibilities or resources that you will  
10 need with regard to that critical mission, so please keep us  
11 posted.

12       Let me ask this, it is kind of related to Senator  
13 McCain's and Senator Kaine's question.

14       We seem to have, in some ways, adopted a strategy of  
15 fighting our wars now with a combination of SOCOM forces and  
16 airpower. But in your professional military opinion, what  
17 other capabilities would be beneficial to help our forces  
18 and our country bring success in places like Iraq or Syria  
19 or Afghanistan?

20       I know you are looking at that issue, but there is kind  
21 of this, and I think it is a theme here, you are hearing a  
22 bit of a myth that, hey, once the SOCOM men and women are on  
23 it, everything is good to go. But we know that there are a  
24 lot of other capabilities and other forces that need to  
25 bring to bear.

1           Specifically, what do you see as most important in  
2 terms of other capabilities, supporting or even in the lead?

3           General Thomas: Senator, it is kind of ironic, I am  
4 running through my brain right now 80 different countries,  
5 8,000 special operations forces forward deployed, and I  
6 cannot think of a single circumstance where we are not  
7 dependent on another service, another supporting function  
8 out there -- not one.

9           So if and when it has been described as special  
10 operations forces by themselves, it is a misconception.

11           Now, unfortunately, in some cases, we are too  
12 prominent, too prominent because it is interesting, it is,  
13 again, the stuff of too many books and movies. But we are  
14 not doing anything by ourselves.

15           The good news is, as we go into a problem, as special  
16 operations goes into a problem, I consider the entirety of  
17 the DOD inventory at our disposal, and vice versa. That is,  
18 I think, the benefit of the joint force approach, that we do  
19 not feel constrained that there is nothing available in the  
20 DOD arsenal that we cannot leverage, and they look at us in  
21 the same fashion.

22           So, again, that is happening about anywhere I can  
23 imagine, anywhere I have been lately, without any  
24 shortcomings.

25           Senator Sullivan: So you are integrated, for example,

1 with marines who are doing artillery fire missions with you  
2 in Iraq right now?

3 General Thomas: I think I mentioned to you I will not  
4 get into specifics, but I just visited some marines that  
5 were shooting more 155 ammo than I can supply them right  
6 now, and they are integral to everything we are doing.

7 Senator Sullivan: Great. Thank you.

8 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

9 Chairman McCain: Senator King?

10 Senator King: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

11 Ms. Whelan, I could not help notice your former title  
12 of Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for  
13 Special Operations Low-Intensity Conflict.

14 When I was a junior staff member in this body 40 years  
15 ago, I once called OMB for an administration witness. They  
16 gave me a title. He said I am sending you so and so, the  
17 principal deputy. I said I do not know these titles. What  
18 does that mean? The fellow gave me an answer, which if I  
19 ever write a book about Washington, it will be the title of  
20 my book. The answer was, "He is at the highest level where  
21 they still know anything."

22 [Laughter.]

23 Senator King: I just want you to know that you are at  
24 that level, and I am now above it. So I have never  
25 forgotten that.

1           General Thomas, there has been a lot of talk about  
2 tempo. Let me go back to the left about tempo and talk  
3 about retention, recruitment, and throughput. Do you have  
4 adequate people in the pipeline to maintain the tempo that  
5 you are at today?

6           General Thomas: Senator, again, something that we look  
7 at incredibly closely every day. The answer is we are  
8 having some challenges for portions of the force for  
9 recruitment. I contribute some in terms of Army special  
10 operations forces to the downsizing of the Army, partly for  
11 some internal challenges that I think we have rectified.

12           But in some cases, we have had some challenges. I  
13 think we are trending in the right direction now though  
14 going forward, but we had some temporary challenges over the  
15 last couple years.

16           Senator King: I certainly hope that you will let the  
17 committee know about those issues. And if there are  
18 recruitment and retention issues that our actions here can  
19 help to alleviate, we certainly want to do that.

20           General Thomas: Will do, Senator.

21           Senator King: Ms. Whalen, the command-and-control is  
22 an issue that is of some concern. Do you believe that we  
23 have effective command-and-control of the special operations  
24 forces?

25           I am concerned about interested parties, your command,

1 geographic combatant commanders, service components, all  
2 receive and share information in a quick and efficient  
3 manner. Talk to me about command-and-control.

4 Ms. Whelan: Certainly. I will actually also let  
5 General Thomas comment on this as well.

6 But I think from our perspective, in the SOLIC  
7 oversight role, we actually have excellent command-and-  
8 control. In fact, I think the integration of our forces  
9 between SOCOM and the combatant commands that they support,  
10 the regional combatant commands --

11 Senator King: So if there is an action of special  
12 operation forces in a particular geographic area, the  
13 combatant commands are integrated, they know what is going  
14 on.

15 Ms. Whelan: Actually, Senator, the way it works is  
16 that SOCOM forces, the SOF forces actually fall under the  
17 command of the combatant commander, the geographic combatant  
18 commander. So the GCC is fully in charge of the operations  
19 that take place in their AOR. For example, if you are  
20 looking at the CENTCOM AOR right now, General Votel and his  
21 subordinate commanders, that is the chain of command that  
22 operates all of the forces that are in that AOR right now,  
23 to include special operations forces.

24 Not necessarily for this forum, but there are some  
25 specific elements that operate under a slightly different

1 chain of command, although still under General Votel's  
2 purview but with more direct access to General Votel that  
3 belong to General Thomas.

4 But there is total integration, and nothing happens in  
5 a geographic commander's AOR that he does not know about.

6 Senator King: General Thomas, you are comfortable with  
7 the structure?

8 General Thomas: Senator, absolutely comfortable. I  
9 reemphasize Theresa's point. There are no special  
10 operations in the world right now that are not under the  
11 command-and-control of geographic combatant commander.

12 There are provisions for exceptions in some scenarios.  
13 And truthfully, the exceptions are single digits over the  
14 course of our history where SOCOM could be the supported  
15 commander. But day in, day out, all of our operators right  
16 now are under the control of a geographic combatant  
17 commander.

18 I have combatant command of all special operations  
19 forces, and I apportion them to their respective geographic  
20 combatant --

21 Senator King: There is always coordination with the  
22 combatant command?

23 General Thomas: Always, constant, incessant. Senator,  
24 our role for synchronizing is where these geographic  
25 combatant commanders get to their prescribed limits. So you

1 might imagine, for CENTCOM, for instance, as their borders  
2 literally butt up to other geographic combatant commanders,  
3 Syria to Turkey, Yemen to Somalia, Egypt to Libya, that is  
4 where we play a critical function of synchronizing special  
5 operations activities across those respective geographic  
6 combatant commanders.

7         Again, they fight the forces. We provide a  
8 transregional perspective and role.

9         Senator King: Ms. Whelan, my time is up, but very  
10 quickly, you mentioned information warfare. What does that  
11 consist of?

12         Ms. Whelan: Information warfare is a complex set of  
13 functions that include some of our military information  
14 support teams, as well as some of our communications  
15 specialties. There is a whole list. I know you are short  
16 on time, Senator, if you like --

17         Senator King: Perhaps you could, for the record --

18         Ms. Whelan: Absolutely.

19         Senator King: -- give us a definition of what that is.

20         Ms. Whelan: We will take that for the record and get  
21 you the answer.

22         Senator King: Thank you very much.

23         Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

24         Chairman McCain: Senator Cotton?

25         Senator Cotton: Thank you both for coming today.

1           General Thomas, thank you, in particular, for your  
2 service, and all the men and women underneath your command.

3           Over the last 8 years, there has been some tension  
4 between civilian and uniformed services over the number of  
5 flag officers that we have seen grow in all the services.  
6 The committee made an effort to reduce the number of flag  
7 officers last year.

8           I have heard some generals and admirals, though, say  
9 that when the civilian command authority reserve decision-  
10 making power to the highest levels, decision-making power  
11 that was once delegated to colonels and captains and, heaven  
12 forbid, even lieutenants on the battlefield in Iraq and  
13 Afghanistan in the last decade, then we should expect to see  
14 an increase in the number of flag officers.

15           Have we begun to see in the last 4 months more  
16 delegation of operational decision-making authority back to  
17 where I suggest it belongs, in the hands of commanders who  
18 are on the frontlines?

19           General Thomas: Senator, the short answer is yes.

20           I am a little bit humored by how you described the  
21 situation in that my youngest son, who just gave up company  
22 command of the 82nd recently wrote to me and said since when  
23 did we stop letting company commanders command companies?  
24 My response to him was, Michael, that question has been  
25 asked since time immemorial. Where and how are you

1 restricted right now?

2 But I think, to your overall point, that while certain  
3 authorities had been elevated to very senior levels, I  
4 typically ask our force, are you empowered at the right  
5 level with the right ROE to do your job? And I think it is  
6 turning in that direction.

7 Senator Cotton: As that delegation occurs, do you  
8 think we might see a concomitant decline in the number of  
9 flag officers in the Pentagon who need to make those  
10 decisions for our company and field grade officers in the  
11 field?

12 General Thomas: Senator, I would tell you, truthfully,  
13 flag officers in the Pentagon are not empowered to make  
14 those decisions because they are not in the chain of  
15 command. So I think the right folks in the chain of command  
16 are being empowered to make the decisions that you certainly  
17 experienced from your time in combat. We are going back in  
18 that direction positively.

19 Senator Cotton: On a related note, last month, we  
20 deployed the Massive Ordnance Air Blast in Afghanistan for  
21 the first time. There was some media controversy about  
22 that, about why that bomb was deployed.

23 At what decision would something like that be made?

24 General Thomas: Senator, I think it was described that  
25 that decision was in General Nicholson's authority, so he

1 had the capability, he had the discretion and decision-  
2 making to deploy it.

3 I think you know we used it as an area denial weapon in  
4 an area that we have been having a protracted fight with  
5 ISIS and the Khorasan in Nangarhar Province in Afghanistan.  
6 So I think it was the right deployment of a weapon system  
7 that avoided a more extensive of loss of life.

8 I mentioned Sergeant De Alencar and our two rangers who  
9 died out in the area recently.

10 So, again, that decision-making authority was General  
11 Nicholson --

12 Senator Cotton: The commander in Afghanistan.

13 General Thomas: The commander on --

14 Senator Cotton: Not the chairman, nor the Secretary of  
15 Defense, the National Security Adviser, the President.

16 General Thomas: No.

17 Senator Cotton: And deciding what kind of ordnance to  
18 employ, would you say that is a decision for commanders in  
19 the field to make?

20 General Thomas: I believe it is.

21 Senator Cotton: And they do not need to get approval  
22 from anyone 8,000 miles away in Washington?

23 General Thomas: I think that could actually cause  
24 great risk to the force, if it had to go back that way.

25 Senator Cotton: I hope all the rest of our bombs are

1 overcoming the laws of their mother. Are they?

2 General Thomas: I think they are over their grieving.

3 Senator Cotton: Good.

4 Another question I want to raise is the relationship  
5 between special operations forces and conventional forces.  
6 By definition, special operations forces are special. They  
7 do amazing things, but they are limited in numbers and  
8 focused in mission.

9 Would you agree that you cannot simply flood special  
10 operations forces and expect them to be a substitute for  
11 what our conventional forces or what a broader strategy  
12 would do?

13 General Thomas: Senator, I agree, and, more  
14 pragmatically, we do not have the forces, the special  
15 operations forces, to do that. So it is not a viable  
16 solution.

17 Senator Cotton: So special operations forces are an  
18 important complement to conventional forces in a broader  
19 strategy, but they cannot be a substitute for either?

20 General Thomas: Agreed, Senator.

21 Senator Cotton: A related question, does that mean  
22 that if we expect to increase the number of special  
23 operations forces, or the mission sets that we provide them,  
24 or the operational tempo at which we deploy them, we also  
25 need to see a concomitant increase in the number of

1 conventional forces as well to support those missions?

2 General Thomas: I think that is a good assumption,  
3 Senator.

4 Senator Cotton: All right. Thank you.

5 Chairman McCain: Senator Peters?

6 Senator Peters: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

7 Thank you to our witnesses here today for your  
8 insightful testimony.

9 General Thomas, I would like to go back to something  
10 you brought up in your testimony as well as to a question  
11 earlier from a panelist, and that is the SOFWERX effort that  
12 is undergoing right now to bring together academia and  
13 industry and some high-tech work.

14 As you know as well as anyone, the nature of warfare is  
15 going to change dramatically in the years ahead. Technology  
16 focus will be greater than ever. In the past, the military  
17 has always been a leader in that area and will continue to  
18 do that. But one difference is that what we are seeing now  
19 in the civilian industry is accelerating in terms of new  
20 innovations.

21 We have, in Michigan, TARDEC, which is the Army's tank  
22 and vehicle research lab, which is also working on the model  
23 that you have mentioned. But I was just curious, I know  
24 your effort is only about 1.5 years old now, but what would  
25 you consider the major takeaway of that effort in the last

1 1.5 years? Or perhaps a lesson that you have learned in  
2 that 1.5 years that is going to be instructive for entities  
3 like TARDEC and others to emulate?

4 General Thomas: Senator, I could probably on the  
5 record provide you a list of initiatives that have actually  
6 resulted in fielding capabilities to our forces, so some  
7 very specific dividends that have come out of that  
8 environment.

9 Truthfully, our director of Acquisition Technology and  
10 Logistics is leveraging that platform every day. For  
11 instance, the Counter-Unmanned Aerial System challenge that  
12 cropped up recently in Iraq and Syria, which was relatively  
13 nuanced, we were able to pour some very directed resources  
14 at that, have what he calls a collision of academia,  
15 technicians, operators, come together on that problem, among  
16 others, to really crash on it in a hurry and, more  
17 importantly, leverage off-the-shelf technologies, things  
18 that would otherwise take an inordinate amount of time to  
19 get to the field.

20 So if I can, I would like to provide you a list of  
21 specifics of what we have accomplished and, more  
22 importantly, what we are endeavoring to do going into the  
23 future.

24 Senator Peters: I appreciate that. I would also like  
25 to do a deeper dive, perhaps with some folks there to talk

1 specifically about some of the work that they are doing and  
2 how we can replicate that in other places, because I think  
3 this is critically important in future warfare.

4 As you know, and you have alluded to it in your answer  
5 there, autonomy and robotics will probably have some of the  
6 greatest potential to change how we conduct warfare.

7 In fact, I was struck that, last week, the Marine Corps  
8 conducted an exercise at Camp Pendleton on the future of  
9 amphibious warfare, which included using robots as the first  
10 boots on the ground, resupplying troops with drones, and  
11 even robots providing covering fire for those marines.

12 In general, how do you see autonomy and robotics  
13 changing battlefield tactics in some of your operations? It  
14 appears this is coming a lot quicker than folks may have  
15 anticipated.

16 General Thomas: Senator, I would like to think we are  
17 at the forefront or writing all the initiatives that pertain  
18 to that. As you might imagine, our mission set, especially  
19 our direct-action mission set, entails an element of risk  
20 that we are trying to mitigate for literally the number one  
21 man in a formation that could absolutely be mitigated  
22 through robotics and other kind of sensory improvements over  
23 time.

24 So we are pursuing that actively. I was going to ask,  
25 if your time allows, that maybe we can get you to come visit

1 in Tampa. We have had several visitors come in and actually  
2 provide us other opportunities to connect with academia and  
3 industry to some of the other activities that you mentioned.

4 Senator Peters: I would appreciate that opportunity.

5 What do you consider some of the main benefits and  
6 tradeoffs that we need to consider as this technology moves  
7 forward?

8 General Thomas: Right now, it is a practical challenge  
9 for us, because, as you might imagine, we have tried to push  
10 the application of robotics where just the agility, in terms  
11 of sensory capability, decision-making, and physical  
12 capabilities of robotics just are not there yet. But  
13 nonetheless, we are pushing in that regard. But we see some  
14 great opportunities.

15 Senator Peters: Great. Thank you, General. I  
16 appreciate it.

17 Chairman McCain: Senator Cruz?

18 Senator Cruz: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

19 Good morning. Welcome. Thank you both for your  
20 service to our Nation, particularly at this perilous time.

21 General Thomas, in recent months, special operations  
22 forces from across the services have made the ultimate  
23 sacrifices in conflicts around the world. Most recently, a  
24 number of brave special operators lost their lives fighting  
25 ISIS in northeastern Afghanistan. The reduction in

1 conventional forces in Afghanistan and the closure of a  
2 majority of combat outposts and forward operating bases in  
3 the country has left a considerable gap in U.S. presence in  
4 critical enemy engagement areas.

5         Would special operations forces in Afghanistan be  
6 better supported if there were a greater presence of  
7 conventional soldiers in combat outposts and forward  
8 operating bases throughout the country?

9         General Thomas: Senator, I think General Nicholson and  
10 others are looking at enhancing the capability in terms of  
11 train, advise, assist, so more conventional forces that  
12 would thicken the ability to advise and assist Afghan  
13 forces. That would absolutely be to our benefit.

14         Right now, you mentioned the casualties that we  
15 recently incurred. Those are accompanied operations. That  
16 is where our special operations forces are accompanying  
17 Afghan special operations capabilities.

18         Ultimately, we want to make them capable of doing it on  
19 their own, and we are certainly making some progress there.  
20 But I think parallel efforts to advise and assist the larger  
21 conventional capabilities of the Afghan forces would  
22 absolutely enhance the effort.

23         Senator Cruz: Do the special operations forces have  
24 the dedicated assets and resources that they need to fight  
25 and win, given so many competing areas of conflict around

1 the world? And are you ever put into a position where you  
2 are forced to choose which mission to fully support and what  
3 can be accomplished with less dedicated assets?

4 General Thomas: Senator, to answer your first  
5 question, I do think we have adequate resources to task.

6 The bigger challenge, which was prefaced by the  
7 chairman at the beginning, is that, from a DOD standpoint,  
8 we are a microcosm of the DOD from a global approach, in  
9 that we are trying to provide the necessary special  
10 operations requirements to all the geographic combatant  
11 commanders at the same time with a relative prioritization.

12 The Secretary and the chairman are endeavoring to make  
13 sure that prioritization is as precise as it needs to be for  
14 us as service components so that we can support the effort  
15 and priority, but it is a challenge. We, like the  
16 department, are trying to do a lot of things at the same  
17 time in a challenging world, so that has some inherent  
18 friction to it.

19 Senator Cruz: On a different topic, I understand that  
20 the decision regarding which combatant command would be  
21 responsible for weapons of mass destruction has been  
22 decided, and that, starting in January, it now falls under  
23 your command at the Special Operations Command.

24 This is obviously a critical component of our Nation's  
25 nuclear deterrent and counter-WMD programs that have a major

1 responsibility, including nuclear, chemical, and biological  
2 agents.

3       Could you please comment on how the addition of WMD  
4 responsibility has affected current and future operations?

5       General Thomas: Senator, I mentioned previously that  
6 we absolutely embrace the enormity of this mission. It is  
7 much, much bigger than special operations and SOCOM, so we  
8 are looking to leverage as much of the rest of the  
9 interagency community and our international partners to  
10 accomplish our government's objectives in this regard as we  
11 can.

12       Right now, we have the resourcing required to embrace  
13 this set, and we are in discussion for what we need going  
14 forward. I mentioned earlier that I hope to provide an  
15 assessment to our Secretary of Defense in August in terms of  
16 a comprehensive review of what we are trying to accomplish  
17 from a U.S. Government policy and strategy objective, and  
18 how well we are doing.

19       So, again, we look forward to providing that to the  
20 committee as well, once we brief the Secretary.

21       Senator Cruz: Ms. Whelan, do you have additional  
22 thoughts on the impact of WMD responsibility under SOCOM?

23       Ms. Whelan: Senator, thanks for the question.

24       I think we fully supported the decision to shift the  
25 responsibility to SOCOM. SOCOM has the capabilities on

1 that, we were intended to utilize to address this issue, so  
2 I think, organizationally, it made a tremendous amount of  
3 sense to us to move it from STRATCOM to SOCOM, so we fully  
4 support.

5 Senator Cruz: Thank you very much.

6 Chairman McCain: Senator Warren?

7 Senator Warren: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

8 And thank you for being here. I just want to quickly  
9 ask about the importance of our nonmilitary agencies and  
10 programs to your mission.

11 For much of the past decade, special operations forces  
12 have deployed around the globe 24/7, and we often think of  
13 them as conducting raids and taking out terrorists. But I  
14 understand that a big part of your mission is actually to  
15 advise and assist local forces to build their own capacity.

16 General, how important is our State Department to that  
17 mission?

18 General Thomas: Senator, the relationship to the State  
19 Department is indescribably critical, both at the State  
20 Department level, but I would offer, as I mentioned earlier,  
21 we are in 80 different countries, and we look to have the  
22 most enhanced relationships possible with every one of those  
23 countries through our country team. If that is not the  
24 baseline for our United States Government approach, then we  
25 are flawed from the start.

1           Senator Warren: So at the national level and at the  
2 country level.

3           Would a reduction in funding to the State and USAID  
4 that conduct foreign assistance in diplomacy make your job  
5 easier or make your job harder?

6           General Thomas: Senator, as you are implying, it makes  
7 their job harder, which I think, by extension, would make  
8 our job harder. So I cannot calculate the specific cost,  
9 but I know an already strained State Department would be  
10 more pressed to do their job.

11          Senator Warren: Good. Thank you. That is very  
12 helpful.

13          The administration is seeking a significant reduction  
14 in the State Department and USAID budgets. Diplomacy and  
15 development are critical for alleviating the very conditions  
16 that contribute to the security challenges that SOCOM  
17 confronts every single day.

18          Now, if I can, I would like to return to a question  
19 that Senator Sullivan raised about SOCOM's responsibility as  
20 the lead organization for countering WMDs. I know that this  
21 responsibility was shifted over to you to ensure that we are  
22 paying enough attention to the nuclear proliferation threat  
23 and to ensure that we are synchronizing the WMD work with  
24 the counterterrorism mission so that we can prevent a  
25 terrorist group from ever getting a hold of a nuclear

1     weapon.

2             This mission, as I understand it, includes three lines  
3 of effort: preventing the acquisition of WMDs by foreign  
4 powers, containing and reducing WMD threats, and responding  
5 to a WMD crisis.

6             As I understand it, you seem pretty prepared to tackle  
7 the first of those, given your hard-won experience using  
8 intelligence to track bad actors over the past 15 years.  
9 WMD threats and responding to WMD crises are going to  
10 require some new skills here.

11            General, to the extent that you can in an open session,  
12 can you just say a word about what you see as the biggest  
13 challenges in taking on this new responsibility?

14            General Thomas:   Senator, absolutely.  You mentioned  
15 that we were already pre-established in various aspects of  
16 this mission set.  I think to Secretary Whelan's earlier  
17 comment, I think that is what made it an almost natural fit  
18 for the mission to transition to us, that we have a pre-  
19 existing approach and process, kind of an ethos to dealing  
20 with transregional terrorism.  I think there was a natural  
21 application or kind of a fungible application to the WMD  
22 set.

23            Going forward though, even from a first blush  
24 assessment, the biggest challenge for all of us is seeing  
25 and sensing the nature of the threat in an environment that

1 runs the gamut from dual-use technology, proliferation of  
2 nefarious items in the same stream as things that are for  
3 the good of industry and not of a nefarious use.

4 So I really see the major onus as we go forward is  
5 determining how we, both DOD and the interagency, see and  
6 assess the threat and obviously can enable operations to do  
7 what we need to do, whether it is disruption of activities  
8 or something else. So the most daunting challenge I think  
9 will be of an intelligence variety in terms of assessing the  
10 threat.

11 Senator Warren: Thank you. I appreciate that.

12 I understand that the committee has asked you to  
13 prepare a report on the resources, personnel, and  
14 authorities you are going to need to carry out this mission.  
15 I understand you are working on that. I know it will be  
16 very helpful.

17 General Thomas: Yes, ma'am, we are.

18 Senator Warren: Good. Can I ask you one last quick  
19 question? And that is, Senator Sullivan asked about what  
20 you needed from us to carry out the mission. I just wanted  
21 to see if you could say a word about what you expect to  
22 receive from Strategic Command, who is giving up this  
23 mission, in terms of personnel and funding.

24 General Thomas: Ma'am, we are actually still co-joined  
25 with Strategic Command for this mission set. So as they

1 shifted the set specifically to us, there are still a number  
2 of co-related activities that have kept us co-joined. They  
3 did transfer an entity with the Defense Threat Reduction  
4 Agency that was part and parcel of their approach that came  
5 directly to was and is integral to what we are doing now.  
6 But we are also addressing what we think are the future  
7 requirements to enhance this mission.

8 Senator Warren: Do you expect more transfers to occur?

9 I am going to quit, Mr. Chairman, because I am over my  
10 time.

11 General Thomas: I am hopeful that within the  
12 department, not necessarily from STRATCOM, which is a busy  
13 command with a profound portfolio, but I am hopeful that  
14 within the department, that the resources that we describe  
15 will be resourced.

16 Senator Warren: All right. Thank you. Your job to  
17 stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons is powerfully  
18 important, and we want to make sure you have the resources  
19 you need. Thank you.

20 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

21 Chairman McCain: Senator Rounds?

22 Senator Rounds: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

23 Ms. Whelan and General Thomas, first of all, thank you  
24 for your service to our country.

25 In the 2014 QDR, manpower requirement for Special

1 Operations Command was approximately 72,000. However, this  
2 number was capped at 69,000 due to budget constraints. It  
3 is clear the world is not any safer now than it was in 2014.  
4 I would expect the current demand on your operations has not  
5 been diminished, and, if anything, it has been increased.

6 What is the current manpower requirement for SOCOM to  
7 meet its global requirements? Is additional force structure  
8 required?

9 General Thomas: Senator, I believe our stated  
10 requirement is the requirement. We are working to refine,  
11 if there is any needed growth in the future.

12 I am thankful, as you mentioned, that, in spite of the  
13 fact that we did not receive the growth that was prescribed  
14 and validated, that we have had tremendous support from  
15 across the department in terms of augmentees and additional  
16 units that have enabled us to continue to pursue our jobs.

17 So again, I am thankful that the department has  
18 reapportioned to allow us to do what they have asked us to  
19 do.

20 Senator Rounds: When you were not allowed or not  
21 authorized the amount requested, clearly, then, you have to  
22 take on additional risk in certain areas. Where is that  
23 risk at, at this time? Where did you have to take on  
24 additional risk?

25 General Thomas: Senator, again, I think, without

1 getting into details of specific locations and activities,  
2 there was curtailment in terms of some of our activities.

3 Senator Rounds: Diminished operations.

4 General Thomas: Diminished operations. And then, as I  
5 mentioned, in many cases, we merely went back to the  
6 department and said, while we cannot grow it or maintain it  
7 internally, might we receive additional augmentation? In  
8 almost every case, they have afforded that to us.

9 Senator Rounds: Recent testimony from both the U.S.  
10 Navy and the U.S. Air Force has identified a significant  
11 difficulty in retaining qualified pilots. How is pilot  
12 retention going for special operations aviation?

13 General Thomas: Senator, a great question. Senator  
14 King asked the earlier question about recruitment and  
15 retention. I should have mentioned that we are experiencing  
16 similar retention challenges to the Air Force and others  
17 relative to the enticement of pilots to join industry. So  
18 it is something that is certainly affecting us right now,  
19 and we are trying to come up with creative alternatives or  
20 solutions to rectify that.

21 Senator Rounds: So you are indicating that you do have  
22 the same challenges as everyone else has on it and --

23 General Thomas: To a lesser degree, but, yes, we have  
24 that.

25 Senator Rounds: To a lesser degree.

1           General Thomas: Yes, we do.

2           Senator Rounds: Okay. Does USSOCOM need service-like  
3 acquisition authorities for the purposes of developing,  
4 acquiring, and sustaining special operations technology,  
5 equipment, and services?

6           General Thomas: Senator, we enjoy those authorities  
7 right now. Interestingly, we do not have all the  
8 authorities that the services have. They have some unique  
9 authorities. Usually folks think it is a flip on that, that  
10 special operations have unique authorities that enable us.  
11 There are actually some authorities inherent in the services  
12 that we are looking to gain over time.

13          Senator Rounds: Could you specify?

14          General Thomas: Specifically, I cannot get into the  
15 technical aspects of it.

16          Senator Rounds: For the record, would you provide us  
17 with that?

18          General Thomas: I would be glad to do that. But  
19 again, I would also emphasize that our structure with our  
20 director of AT&L working directly for me with a streamlined  
21 relationship with our program executive officer has enabled  
22 us to do some pretty extraordinary things too. So we are  
23 very well-enabled. We are looking to try to enhance and  
24 have all the tools that the services have.

25          Senator Rounds: Cyber capabilities are critical when

1 it comes to your operations as well. I suspect you would  
2 agree with that. Can you share with us right now your  
3 ability to maintain a cyber superiority with regard to the  
4 operations that your -- let me put it this way. Clearly,  
5 you have to be able to maintain cybersecurity when it comes  
6 to your operations. Can you describe for us the challenges  
7 you have, shortcomings you may have, or needs that you may  
8 have with regard to cybersecurity capabilities?

9 General Thomas: Senator, I would start by expressing  
10 my appreciation to CYBERCOM for the great capabilities that  
11 they have provided us, much like they have to other  
12 combatant commands, to first and foremost protect our  
13 infrastructure. Again, we have some very, very valuable  
14 resources to do that.

15 Similarly, we are working with them closely to enhance  
16 our offensive capabilities, the cyber capabilities that must  
17 be integral to our approach to the full spectrum of combat  
18 operations going forward. Again, I think we have endeavored  
19 to have some pretty nuanced approaches, again thanks to  
20 CYBERCOM and others who have helped enable us.

21 Senator Rounds: My time has expired.

22 Mr. Chairman, thank you.

23 Chairman McCain: Senator McCaskill?

24 Senator McCaskill: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

25 Thank you both for being here and preparing for this

1 hearing today.

2 I wanted to emphasize at the start that, according to  
3 the materials I reviewed, countering Russian aggression is  
4 the number two priority.

5 Is that correct, General Thomas?

6 General Thomas: Senator, right now, that is the number  
7 two priority, although I would tell you it is being  
8 challenged by our preparations for Korea.

9 Senator McCaskill: As I look at the map that we have,  
10 the only place you have more deployed other than EUCOM is,  
11 in fact, CENTCOM, correct? It is the number two deployment?

12 General Thomas: Yes, ma'am. That is accurate.

13 Senator McCaskill: You have 1,400 forces deployed to  
14 protect against Russian aggression right now?

15 General Thomas: Ma'am, working with our partners in  
16 the respective countries, we do.

17 Senator McCaskill: And in addition to that, could you  
18 ballpark how many other American military personnel are we  
19 putting on the frontlines to counter Russian aggression?

20 General Thomas: Senator, I cannot speak specifically  
21 to the other complementary forces that are out there, other  
22 than to say that we are closely linked with them in terms of  
23 --

24 Senator McCaskill: Would it be thousands of American  
25 military in the countries on the western border of Russia?

1           General Thomas:  Senator, I think you would have to  
2 discern between those assigned to Europe and additive  
3 forces.  But I do not have the specific numbers.

4           Senator McCaskill:  Okay.  The point I am trying to  
5 make is, we are putting real resources out there in the  
6 military going after Russian behavior.  We have determined  
7 and you have determined, and the military leadership has  
8 determined, that Russia is a problem.

9           I just want to emphasize that because it is frustrating  
10 to me that they try to break the backbone of democracies all  
11 over the world, and we consider it such a threat that we are  
12 putting the biggest treasure we have, which are the lives of  
13 men and women of our military, on the frontlines of this  
14 aggression, but there does not seem to be a sense of urgency  
15 about Russia.  And I wanted to underline that as I began.

16           The other thing I want to talk to you about today is I  
17 had a chance to review the GAO report that was recently  
18 released.  It is a classified report.  Have you had a chance  
19 to look at that, General Thomas?

20           General Thomas:  Senator, I am not aware of that  
21 specific GAO report.  Regarding what subject, ma'am?

22           Senator McCaskill:  Countering ISIS and its effects?

23           General Thomas:  I have not seen that report, no,  
24 ma'am.

25           Senator McCaskill:  I highly recommend it to you.  I

1 think it would be very helpful to you.

2 Since you are the key DOD element responsible for  
3 global antiterrorism operations, several of the recommended  
4 oversight questions seem really particularly relevant to  
5 your command. For example, the problems that we are having,  
6 we have spent billions trying to train and equip the  
7 military in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Would you agree with  
8 that, General?

9 General Thomas: We have, Senator.

10 Senator McCaskill: And we continue to spend billions  
11 trying to do both of those things, correct?

12 General Thomas: Correct, Senator.

13 Senator McCaskill: And I am not sure that we are  
14 getting adequate information about how much success we have  
15 had. And I think that it would be helpful to know what  
16 steps have been taken to address the challenges to train and  
17 equip regarding the underlying factors that have caused the  
18 personnel shortages in Iraq. We continue to have  
19 insufficient numbers of soldiers even to round out units in  
20 Iraq.

21 I think with the amount of money we are spending, it  
22 would be great, you may not be prepared today, but since you  
23 all are so involved in the train and equip, it would be  
24 helpful for us to get more information about, what is the  
25 problem? And are we adjusting what we are doing? Or are we

1 just pouring in money and still having folks walk away and  
2 still have people who we have trained and equipped show up  
3 on the other side?

4 General Thomas: Senator, I can guarantee that for  
5 every problem that you have identified, we are endeavoring  
6 to try to rectify it. I will work with General Votel, the  
7 CENTCOM Commander, to make sure we get you a response on the  
8 record for the concerns that you have, ma'am.

9 Senator McCaskill: I know that DOD recently revised  
10 the train and equip program in Syria. As you are well-  
11 aware, we had a number of problems, especially the first  
12 attempt at train and equip that was disastrous.

13 Could you tell us what have been the results of the  
14 revisions that occurred in the train and equip mission in  
15 Syria in 2016?

16 General Thomas: Ma'am, there are really two different  
17 programs that I think you are referring to there. One was  
18 the one that was certainly challenged. I think we have made  
19 great strides. I am hesitant to get into details in an open  
20 forum in terms of the very, very capable surrogate forces  
21 that we are now leveraging in Syria and certainly with the  
22 organic forces in Iraq. But we have gone --

23 Senator McCaskill: I learned about some of that when I  
24 was in Jordan.

25 General Thomas: Very good.

1           Senator McCaskill: But what kind of assurances do you  
2 feel like we have now that the individuals associated with  
3 the terrorist organizations of either Syria or Iran are not  
4 benefiting from our train and equip missions?

5           General Thomas: In my particular lane, where our  
6 special operations are supporting CENTCOM activities, I am  
7 very comfortable that we are vetting them to the degree that  
8 we are very certain that we are not contributing to those  
9 particular threat organizations.

10          But, again, I will get you more for the record.

11          Senator McCaskill: That would be terrific.

12          Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

13          Chairman McCain: Senator Tillis?

14          Senator Tillis: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

15          General Thomas, it is good to see you.

16          Ms. Whelan, you as well.

17          I was just back down at Fort Bragg a couple weeks ago.  
18 I get down there frequently, probably they are sick of  
19 seeing me. But it is such an important part of what we do  
20 globally that I want to send the message there.

21          I know that many of my members have asked questions  
22 about the stress on the force and optempo and a number of  
23 those things. What I would like to maybe spend my time on  
24 has more to do with the employment side and my capacity as  
25 Personnel Subcommittee chair.

1 I know that, in your opening testimony, you said we  
2 must continue to place the greatest emphasis on selecting,  
3 retaining, and empowering our people and sustaining them and  
4 their families.

5 With two-thirds of the SOCOM force married, what more  
6 do you think we need to do? And the nature of their mission  
7 is such that even the relative stress level has to be higher  
8 because there is so much that the person back stateside does  
9 not know what is going on.

10 What do you think we need to do to more of to provide  
11 better support for the families of our SOCOM forces?

12 General Thomas: Senator, I mentioned earlier to a  
13 similar question that I am very thankful to the committee  
14 that you have actually given us some tools that have allowed  
15 us to put our money where our intent is.

16 I think, for years, our approach to family readiness  
17 was sort of, be ready, your spouse may or may not deploy.  
18 We did not actually build in specific resilience to that  
19 eventuality, the fact that it is on the training schedule,  
20 that you folks will deploy.

21 We have also been able to leverage, as you might  
22 imagine, you described our operator experience, a lot of  
23 experience, a lot of repetitions downrange. Our spouses  
24 have had the same experience. We have been able to leverage  
25 their experience for how we can be more thorough in our

1 preparation to build in the resilience and to deal with  
2 their problems as they occur over time.

3 So, again, I am thankful that you have given us the  
4 means to get after this, and I think we are doing it much  
5 more comprehensively every day.

6 Senator Tillis: Have you given any thought, as you are  
7 looking at recruiting and retention side of things, are  
8 there any things that have arisen, other things that we  
9 should consider to help you retain our best and brightest?

10 And if you cannot answer that in specifics now, we  
11 would like it for the purposes of the subcommittee so they  
12 can instruct our recommendations for the NDAA.

13 But if you have any off the top of your head, Ms.  
14 Whelan, or you, General Thomas?

15 General Thomas: Senator, I do not have any specific  
16 requirements right now. We are always looking to see, if  
17 and when retention challenges come up, how we can mitigate  
18 those. But at the moment, I do not have any specific  
19 requests.

20 Ms. Whelan: Sir, we do not either. However, one of  
21 the issues that we will be looking at within SOLIC, and as  
22 part of the clarified responsibilities for SOLIC oversight,  
23 is this issue of retention and how we might be able to work  
24 with SOCOM to ensure that we have the resources we need.

25 Senator Tillis: We just want to make sure that we get

1 you the tools that you need, because it costs a lot of money  
2 to get these people to the level that they can be deployed,  
3 and we want to make sure that we focus on retention and  
4 valuing our men and women and their families.

5 In my remaining time, I would like to talk a little bit  
6 about -- I know the demand is outstripping supply in terms  
7 of your ability to fulfill all the demands. One question  
8 that I have is whether you believe, in some instances,  
9 because of the nature of funding and the nature of the  
10 conflicts we are in, if there is some amount of what your  
11 command focuses on that the need would be better satisfied  
12 by the service lines or others.

13 In other words, if we have a legitimate demand for  
14 additional special operations, is there a component of the  
15 demand that you are fulfilling now that could arguably be  
16 fulfilled through some other vehicle outside of SOF?

17 General Thomas: Senator, I field a similar line of  
18 questions from our Secretary of Defense consistently. We  
19 are looking at that very aggressively.

20 Most recently, we completed our annual process to align  
21 forces 2 years out, so where we think special operations  
22 forces are required in priority relative to that of  
23 geographic combatant commanders. So it literally produced a  
24 one through end list of what we are doing in priority and a  
25 plan to discuss that in detail with the Secretary in terms

1 of here is where we could offramp, and here is the risk or  
2 the price to be paid in terms of either cessation of  
3 missions or things of that like.

4 But we are looking at that very closely, on how we can  
5 mitigate the pressure on the force in terms of number of  
6 missions we are doing.

7 Senator Tillis: Thank you.

8 Chairman McCain: Senator Blumenthal has arrived.

9 Senator Blumenthal: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

10 General Thomas, your command now has responsibility for  
11 countering weapons of mass destruction across all of the  
12 combatant commands, correct?

13 General Thomas: Senator, we are the coordinator for  
14 the Department of Defense. That is correct.

15 Senator Blumenthal: Including use of chemical agents.

16 General Thomas: That is correct, all elements of  
17 weapons of mass destruction.

18 Senator Blumenthal: You may be familiar with a new  
19 Human Rights Watch report this week that cites a number of  
20 recent incidents, including the one April 4th that triggered  
21 our missile attack, but others in December 2016 when there  
22 were two and another in March 2017. All involved with the  
23 use of nerve agent weaponry in Syria. Apparently, they  
24 killed at least 159 people, they reported in the New York  
25 Times.

1           And the New York Times reported, in addition, use of  
2 other chemical agents, principally chlorine, since the April  
3 4th attack that led to our missile strike.

4           Are you aware of that report? And do you have  
5 information to corroborate those reports?

6           General Thomas: Senator, I have not seen that specific  
7 report. I am aware of all or most of those incidents. I am  
8 surprised you did not mention use of VX at the Malaysia  
9 International Airport as another egregious use of an  
10 incredibly nefarious weapons system in an open area.

11           Senator Blumenthal: I am sure you have information  
12 about the support or complicity of the Russians in these  
13 attacks, do you not?

14           General Thomas: Senator, I am aware of the nature of  
15 all those attacks and the actors involved. Again, probably  
16 in an open session, I would probably be circumspect to  
17 discuss the specifics of some of the intelligence that  
18 pertains.

19           Senator Blumenthal: Would you be prepared to talk  
20 about Russian involvement in these attacks in a different  
21 setting?

22           General Thomas: Senator, I would be glad to talk about  
23 any actors' involvement in any of these episodes.

24           Senator Blumenthal: I am not sure exactly how to ask  
25 this question, General, and I hope you will bear with me.

1           But is there a reason why the American people should  
2 not know about Russian complicity and involvement in these  
3 war crimes? They are war crimes. If the Russians are  
4 aiding and abetting them, why should the American people be  
5 denied that information?

6           General Thomas: Senator, I think the American public  
7 should know the extent to whoever is employing weapons of  
8 mass destruction and chemical weapons. As much as we  
9 understand who and how, that could and should be divulged to  
10 the American public.

11           Senator Blumenthal: So the rules about your providing  
12 us information in this setting are made by others, not by  
13 yourself, obviously, so I am not meaning any disrespect to  
14 you.

15           But I am absolutely perplexed as to why we should not  
16 make more widely known the involvement of Russians in war  
17 crimes, only one of them so far widely reported, that led us  
18 to launch a missile strike at the base where Russians  
19 currently are stationed. They had to know about the use of  
20 sarin in that attack on Assad's own people.

21           So I hope that we are able to disseminate that  
22 information more widely to the American people. And I  
23 respect your position and the rules that apply to you. But  
24 you do have information about, let's call them other actors  
25 who are aiding and abetting Bashar Assad in these criminal

1 attacks, murderous acts on his own people, is that correct?

2 General Thomas: Senator, we are focused on everyone  
3 who is inclined to use these kinds of weapons.

4 Senator Blumenthal: Is there any sort of defense that  
5 can be provided to the people of Syria by the United States  
6 against these types of weapons?

7 General Thomas: Senator, as you might imagine, the  
8 equipment required for the array of weapons that may or may  
9 not still be in the Syrian arsenal would be extensive, so I  
10 am sure it is a daunting logistics challenge to try to  
11 provide that kind of equipment.

12 Again, I think your first point, disrupting the use or  
13 the employment of the weapons systems is probably the most  
14 effective thing you could do.

15 Senator Blumenthal: General, my time has expired. I  
16 really appreciate both you and Ms. Whelan being here today  
17 and your service to our Nation and the service of every  
18 single man and woman under your command. Thank you very  
19 much.

20 Chairman McCain: I thank the witnesses. This hearing  
21 is adjourned.

22 [Whereupon, at 11:25 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

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STATEMENT OF THERESA WHELAN

PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

BEFORE THE SENATE  
ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE  
115<sup>th</sup> CONGRESS

May 4, 2017

## Introduction

Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, and other distinguished members of the Committee, I am honored to appear before you today in my capacity as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict (SOLIC). I am pleased to share this table with General Tony Thomas, who has served the special operations force (SOF) community at all levels of command. Our entire SOLIC team is proud to partner with his command in forging the future of special operations on behalf of the Department of Defense and the American people.

We are grateful for this committee's strong support of special operations, as evidenced by the resources, authorities, and depth of understanding you provide in your oversight. We pledge to make the best use of these resources to accomplish all special operations mission sets – including defeating the threat networks of terrorists, illicit traffickers, and transnational criminals; denying the acquisition, proliferation and use of weapons of mass destruction; and countering unconventional threats. At the same time, we appreciate your support in advancing SOF warrior care and force resiliency through the Preservation of the Force and Family - which places psychologists, counselors, and exercise physiologists into the daily routines of SOF to perform 'preventative maintenance,' catching and resolving problems before they become chronic - and SOF-for-Life initiatives.

As part of its roles and responsibilities, the OASD(SO/LIC) provides oversight and advocacy for the special operations budget, which is approximately 1.8% of our defense budget in 2017. Additionally, we directly manage over \$2 billion in various budgets that support our counterterrorism and counternarcotics efforts, such as the Counterterrorism Fellowship Program, the Combating Terrorism Technical Support Office, and the counternarcotics budget. We ensure that these investments are leveraged to provide return on investment across the strategic landscape, the interagency, and across the joint force.

I am here to report to you on the current and anticipated strategic environment that our Nation's special operations enterprise will face during this time of transformation. As global events shape our environment, our special operations mission continues finding, fixing, and finishing an innovative enemy while harnessing these trends and technologies for our own advantage. Let me begin by discussing that rapidly evolving environment and its effect on combating terrorists, state-sponsored unconventional warfare, and illicit networks that include, but are not limited to, transnational organized crime. I will then describe three SO/LIC focus areas that will allow us to: 1) win the current fight and defeat emerging threats, 2) build on the foundation of the Section 922 authorities, and 3) hone the edge of SOF personnel and capabilities.

### **Strategic Environment: The Megatrends of Individual Empowerment, Diffusion of Power, and Demographic Instability**

When John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt wrote their seminal work *Networks and Netwars* in 1991, they introduced the now-ubiquitous phrase: "it takes a network to defeat a network." Their work foresaw changes in the nature of warfare, which shaped how both we and our enemies encounter each other. Previously, Al-Qaeda leveraged the advantage of flat networks to strike

fielded forces and vulnerable targets around the world. In response, we built our own global network to harness these trends and seize the initiative.

Where Al-Qaeda leverages globalization and franchised network structures to threaten our interests, the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) evolves its threat networks further, presenting new analytical and operational challenges by harnessing emerging megatrends. ISIS thrives in the volatile space carved out by these trends. This generation of VEOs adopts the latest technology to communicate on the battlefield and to influence new individuals and groups on behalf of the organization. They also use existing tools in novel ways – the non-state equivalent of the “gig economy” – and adapt so quickly that they overcome most governmental decision cycles. This generation of threats is challenging U.S. national security interests in ways we have not seen before. Social media allows ISIS to connect with individuals who share alienation and grievances. Digital innovation, both in warfighting and communications technologies, is a key to their success. Technologies such as 3D printers, mobile applications, and the dark web help enable illicit trade on an exponentially increasing scale and have contributed to the growth in the number and power of illicit groups. As these groups leverage the darker side of these megatrends, SOF must adapt and innovate in order to disrupt threat networks and deter unconventional adversaries.

### **30 Years of USSOCOM and ASD (SO/LIC): SOF at the Intersection of Global Megatrends**

This year, we celebrate the 30<sup>th</sup> anniversary of both USSOCOM and ASD(SO/LIC). It is appropriate for us to reflect and build upon the past as we look to the future. For the latter half of the past 30 years, war has transformed our nation’s special operations community from a unique, specialized force that occupied a crucial niche in our security posture into a vanguard force that is reshaping our world. In combatting terrorists, special operations forces have built flat networks that bridge interagency divides down to the tactical level. Inherently joint, our special operations warfighters have continued to support global U.S. Government objectives by leveraging critical interagency and international partnerships. These boundary-spanning networks minimize our tactical response time while radically accelerating innovation. They also counter illicit threat networks, such as drug, weapons, and human trafficking, that fuel terrorist organizations and organized criminal enterprises. SOF support in Afghanistan for counter illicit drug trafficking has resulted in increased interdiction of opiates in various forms, reducing this funding resource for the Taliban and other insurgent and criminal groups.

Transregional threats like ISIS and transnational organized crime like drug cartels are demanding greater levels of coordination and collaboration from their – including operational planning, resource requirements, and information sharing. Effectively disrupting ISIS and other threat forces, requires all tools of U.S. national power, including diplomatic, intelligence, military, economic, financial, information, and law enforcement capabilities. The innovations the special operations enterprise has built to defeat adaptive threat networks are informing emerging concepts of unconventional and conventional warfare alike. In this way, SOF leads in Department-wide innovation, fielding, and optimizing emerging technologies and theories of warfighting.

### **Win the Current Fight and Defeat Emerging Threats**

We must win the protracted fight against terrorist organizations and their enabling networks in order to protect our homeland, our citizens, and support our allies and partners. This will require a long-term strategic approach to support the U.S. government and international partnerships. Within this DoD strategy, SOF contributes its unique capabilities to combat terrorists, disrupt adversary networks, discredit extremist ideologies, and diminish those factors that contribute to recruitment and radicalization. Sustained funding and flexible legislative authorities will continue to be instrumental in the defeat of priority terrorist organizations like ISIS and Al-Qaeda.

In light of U.S. conventional dominance, adversary powers are increasingly turning toward unconventional warfare to pursue their objectives. State sponsors of unconventional warfare, such as Russia, China, and Iran, have doctrinally linked conventional, warfare, and cyber warfare, information operations, clandestine, criminal, and other activities to undermine U.S. and allied national security objectives, particularly in ways and places that fall below thresholds conventional U.S. Government or international response. Our special operations forces are exploring the capabilities and authorities required to defeat these challenges to our influence and our interests.

At the same time, I want to thank the committee for establishing Section 127e – formerly known as Section 1208 – as a permanent authority. The maturation of this program has provided our warfighters a powerful tool to employ to support our allies and confront our enemies and is a great example of strong congressional support and oversight.

Congressional support for countering threat finance (CTF) and transnational organized crime is crucial to both of these efforts. Terrorist, insurgents, and other threat networks depend upon illicit revenue streams and criminal facilitators for logistical support, money laundering, or the procurement of weapons and fraudulent documents. These activities often involve both state and non-state actors in spaces between traditional war and peace. As the global synchronizer for DoD counter-threat finance, USSOCOM is uniquely positioned to synchronize efforts across the geographic combatant commands to disrupt the threat finance systems of ISIS, as well as other illicit networks. USSOCOM works alongside the National Guard Bureau and USG components in CTF teams in each GCC. Together, they provide essential support to military operations and to interagency law enforcement partners. The CTF teams analyze financial intelligence, integrate intelligence and operations, and coordinate and execute CTF activities. Countering threat finances disrupts and weakens terrorist and criminal adversaries in ways and places that traditional military weapons typically cannot reach. This capability is valuable across the full spectrum of conflict, including irregular and unconventional warfare. These efforts have enabled action against drug trafficking and other illicit networks, as emerging counter-network doctrine and technologies help unmask dark networks that threaten our national security. CTF efforts have proven to be a cost-effective tool to impact threatening forces and transnational criminal organizations, whether through law enforcement actions, designations, sanctions, or – as in the case of ISIS – through military actions against economic and financial targets.

The unique skills, culture, and capabilities underpinning SOF's success against these dark networks enable the command to serve as synchronizer against complex problem sets. As with CTF, this

expertise underwrites the recent transfer of the counter-WMD mission set, which USSOCOM recently inherited as a result of changes in the Unified Command Plan.

### **Transform the Enterprise: Building on the Foundations of Section 922 Authorities**

We appreciate the committee's support in codifying the responsibilities of the ASD(SO/LIC) to provide oversight and advocacy for SOF. As our force continues to adapt to meet the enduring challenge of global campaigns against global threats, we find ourselves at an institutional crossroads. SOF has made dramatic advances during wartime in response to urgent battlefield demands, gains that require an institutional foundation to endure. SOLIC has completed a preliminary analysis of previous and newly assigned functions and activities to determine where there are gaps and associated risk. Currently SOLIC is reviewing whether these functions are directed by law or directed by Department guidance in order to make recommendations to our senior leaders on the divestiture of non-legally binding responsibilities. In overseeing SOF acquisitions, technology, logistics, personnel, readiness, and talent management functions, SOLIC will be positioned to institutionalize these hard-learned lessons of contemporary conflicts. The 'Service-secretary-like' authorities in Section 922 serve as a strategic linchpin, ensuring that we lock in these hard-won gains.

The FY17 NDAA codified the Special Operations Policy Oversight Council, which we have used over the past year to resolve Department-wide SOF-related issues, such as base infrastructure. We are already serving in a 'Service-secretary-like' role in approving waivers for mission-essential positions under the current civilian hiring freeze. We now sit alongside our colleagues from USSOCOM at budgeting and programming Deputy Management Action Group meetings. Our office is currently implementing the full scope of these far-reaching authorities, even as we benchmark concepts from these initial gains. By leveraging existing Service processes and relationships, we aim to minimize administrative burden and focus on architecture building and strategic awareness. Ultimately, we intend to leverage these gains for implementation across the entire force.

### **Honing the Edge of SOF Personnel and Capabilities**

A key part of ASD(SO/LIC)'s role is to leverage our elite force to advance state of the art concepts, technologies, and strategies for both humans and hardware. For our operators, we strive to improve mental and physical performance on the battlefield and to take care of them and their families at home. For hardware, our investments in technologies and our policy advocacy for special operations capabilities give our SOF the tools they need to get the mission done.

The Countering Terrorism Technical Support Office (CTTSO) develops cutting edge technologies for SOF, the interagency, and law enforcement. For instance, we are exploring deep learning and big data analytics to sharpen strategies for outcompeting our adversaries. We are also investing in better technologies to analyze and present fused information to the warfighter. CTTSO's ability to leverage crowdsourcing pathways has helped field data tools that support operational preparation of the environment in ways we never thought possible. The versatility of these tools allows small tactical units to conduct a broad spectrum of military, special warfare, and cyber operations. Because the CTTSO model is inherently collaborative,

these gains are leveraged across the interagency, as well as with international, state, and local governmental partners.

The first SOF Truth states that “humans are more important than hardware.” Therefore, as we provide agile and innovative capabilities in support of high-priority U.S. national objectives, we must also continue to build and sustain an elite workforce suited to the unique and diverse demands of 21<sup>st</sup> century warfare. SOF has borne the weight of grueling deployments and protracted overseas contingency operations over the course of the last decade, and we have accordingly turned our culture of innovation toward fostering and protecting our people.

## **Conclusion**

As we look back at the last thirty years, we note that SOF has consistently remained at the leading edge of global megatrends. This past year has been no exception. We have diligently leveraged your investment by deriving key concepts for the larger force from that experience. The small portion of the budget that supports our nation’s SOF provides a tremendous return on investment. We are applying your support and oversight to institutionalize a decade and a half of hard-earned warfighting lessons and advances the goal of a joint SOF enterprise. With these authorities, we will continue to evolve how we man, train, and equip our force in order to: win the current fight and defeat emerging threats; transform the special operations enterprise; and hone the edge of SOF. We will continue to work closely with Congress to ensure we have the right policies, agile authorities, and enhanced oversight structure in place to employ SOF effectively.

I thank Congress for its continuing support of our men and women in uniform and their families, and look forward to your questions.

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STATEMENT OF

GENERAL RAYMOND A. THOMAS, III, U.S. ARMY  
COMMANDER  
UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

BEFORE THE

SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

MAY 4, 2017

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## **Opening Remarks**

Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to address you today as the 11<sup>th</sup> Commander of United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). This is my first address on the posture of US Special Operations Forces (SOF). Even in the short span of my first year in command we've seen the world evolve in complexity and the desire for SOF continue to increase. While challenges endure, and new ones emerge our force continues to evolve in the attempt to present options and decision space for our national leadership. During my remarks, I would like to highlight the breadth of missions where SOF is integral to the support of the current National Military Strategy (NMS), as well as how we are adapting to future challenges and transforming our capabilities. It goes without saying that NONE of this is possible without the professionalism, talent, and innovative problem solving capabilities of our most precious asset, our people, the decisive edge, who constitute the greatest Special Operations Force in history.

## **The Formative Evolution of SOF**

Last month we celebrated the 30<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of the creation of USSOCOM as a result of The Goldwater-Nichols Act and the Nunn-Cohen Amendment -- prescient pieces of legislation that created US Special Operations Command from an ad hoc, individual service-based confederation of capability to become both a highly effective Service-like entity and an extraordinarily collaborative and effectively networked global functional Combatant Command. USSOCOM's service-like responsibilities continue to be the command's primary focus providing the world's best SOF to the Geographic Combatant Commanders. We look forward to working closely with the Assistant Secretary of Defense/Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict's (ASD/SOLIC) assigned role in our chain of command in the Title 10 role of manning, training, and equipping the force.

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USSOCOM has evolved enormously since its inception. Rather than a mere “break-glass-in-case-of-war” force, we are now proactively engaged across the “battle space” of the Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs), providing key integrating and enabling capabilities to support their campaigns and operations. We operate and fight in every corner of the world as an integrated joint, combined and interagency force. Today, there are approximately 56,000 active duty, 7,400 reserve, guard, and 6,600 civilian personnel across the SOF enterprise. On a daily basis, we sustain a deployed or forward stationed force of approximately 8,000 across 80-plus countries. They are conducting the entire range of SOF missions in both combat and non-combat situations with a wide variety of Joint, Interagency, International, and Multi-national partners.

We have recently taken on a number of new roles intended to leverage our global perspective on problems, and focus our unique capabilities in support of not only the GCCs, but also the Department of Defense (the Department) as a whole. First, we are the designated coordinating authority for trans-regional terrorist organizations and other threat networks. Acting in support of the Chairman and the Secretary of Defense, our responsibility in this role is to provide a coherent global framework for action and synthesize the perspectives and inputs of the Geographic Combatant Commanders into a single comprehensive military assessment of DoD’s global counter-terrorism efforts. This assists the combatant commands, the Chairman, and the Secretary in understanding and prioritizing efforts to counter violent extremist networks that operate across GCC boundaries in pursuit of a coherent and effective campaign.

To date, our team’s combined quarterly assessments, supported by productive dialogue with our mission partners and the integration of dozens of other assessments conducted by combatant commands, combat support agencies, and specialized task forces, have led to specific

recommendations for the conduct of the Counter-Violent Extremist Organization effort. Specifically, we have identified the necessity to understand and address the underlying infrastructure that terrorist organizations use to generate and sustain their “combat power,” especially their enablers which include foreign fighters, financing and strategic communications. We have galvanized international and interagency focus on the effort in the form of Operation GALLANT PHOENIX, a SOF-led activity, designed to empower, support and integrate the efforts of our international (currently 19 foreign members with several others in the queue), interagency, and Joint Force partners to disrupt trans-regional terrorist networks and their ability to develop and field foreign fighters. Through information sharing, our partners support security and law enforcement actions against these networks, and inform decision makers on border security, identification of legal remedies and tools, and the structuring of counter-messaging campaigns.

Our second new responsibility is the assumption of the Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) synchronization mission for the Department of Defense, recently transferred from USSTRATCOM. In this role, we are responsible for maintaining the DoD CWMD Campaign, establishing intelligence priorities, monitoring global operations and conducting assessments. We are publishing a new Global Campaign Plan to provide a comprehensive, trans-regional approach which integrates ongoing regional and interagency efforts. We have also established a CWMD Coordination Center to design, execute and assess this new trans-regional approach and connect to other USG Departments and Agencies, as well as international partners. The Center leverages the resources and skills of multiple agencies that will result in a multi-layered comprehensive approach to address the CWMD problem set. In coordination with the Geographic Combatant Commands, we will conduct this campaign

attempting to focus more intently on the transregional nature of identified portions of the CWMD challenge and assess effectiveness towards national objectives, while providing resourcing and strategic recommendations to the Chairman and Secretary.

While the Department is addressing our stated requirements, USSOCOM has already implemented temporary manning strategies to mitigate risk as we transfer funding and manpower, hire new personnel, and build a network of partners. We have an established counter-terrorism (CT) network and a committed partner in the Defense Threat Reduction Agency to assist us as we move into this mission space. We are no stranger to adapting and building our network, and we have embraced this mission as we do all others – bringing focus and energy to some of the nation’s most complex challenges.

While we have evolved and now field an unmatched capability to conduct counter-terrorism operations with our partners and execute a select set of niche missions in support of the Joint Force, this expertise is not necessarily tailored to compete with near-peer competitors. We are focused on transformation as rapidly as possible across a broad range of mission capabilities.

**SOF in Today’s Competitions and Conflicts.**

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff identified five current and enduring threats in the new National Military Strategy (NMS): Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs), Russia, Iran, North Korea, and China. Although constituting only 2% of the Department’s budget and about 2% of its manpower, as a Combatant Command with global responsibilities, USSOCOM plays a critical role in the campaigns against each of these. While not a panacea nor a stand-alone solution, SOF produces substantive results at low cost, and with a potentially low profile / signature. However, none of the challenges can be effectively dealt with in isolation as they are

interrelated and cut across GCC boundaries. USSOCOM is striving to be part of our whole of government efforts to face these threats.

*Violent Extremist Organizations.* The threat posed by VEOs remains the highest priority for USSOCOM in both focus and effort. Special Operations Forces are the main effort, or major supporting effort for US VEO-focused operations in Afghanistan, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Somalia, Libya, across the Sahel of Africa, the Philippines, and Central/South America – essentially, everywhere Al Qaeda (AQ) and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) are to be found. Our priorities are disrupting external attack capability, destroying/neutralizing AQ and ISIS, developing a long-term approach to defeat and/or counter VEOs, and building partner capacity – helping our partners stabilize their environment and secure gains. SOF are also engaged in countering aggressive Iranian behavior that not only destabilizes the Middle East, but also, stokes sectarianism. SOF activities are in support of the GCCs’ efforts toward a strengthened deterrence posture, targeted counter-messaging activities, and building partner nations’ capacity.

This methodology is more comprehensive than simple counter-terrorism, and is an important part of an overarching whole-of-government approach to advance broader national security objectives. Organizations such as ISIS and AQ are trans-regional threats that require the Joint Force to work with partners across the US government as well as coalition partners. It requires focused effort to secure and hold our gains by empowering local entities within and among the populations that terrorists exploit. As we move forward in our coordinating authority role within DoD, we are committed to further developing this comprehensive approach to support the US military’s integration across the range of activities that like-minded organizations are pursuing. In this vein, we appreciate the NDAA mandate to expand the role of the State

Department's Global Engagement Center, with whom we work, which provides critical counter messaging against state and non-state actors – a key to ultimately defeating organizations such as ISIS.

*Russia.* Our second priority in terms of resources and impact is supporting United States European Command (USEUCOM) in countering Russian aggression in Europe. As Secretary Mattis pointed out, Russia is seeking control over the economic, diplomatic, and security decisions of its neighbors. Further, Russia has reemerged as a strategic competitor of the US around the globe. This trend is most pronounced in the post-Soviet space, where Russia has shown itself as willing to act aggressively to limit US and Western institutions there. They are particularly adept at leveraging unconventional approaches to advancing their interests and it is clear they are pursuing a wide range of audacious approaches to competition – SOF often present a very natural unconventional response. USEUCOM is responding by using European Reassurance Initiative funding to deter Russia and reassure Allies, including by working with NATO to build more effective defense institutions in partner nations. In support of this, we have had persistent SOF presence for over 2 years in nearly every European country on Russia's western border (Baltics, Poland, Romania, Ukraine, Georgia) – assuring our allies and partners while building host nation and NATO capabilities to compete short of conflict in a hybrid environment. Our current focus consists of assuring our allies through building partner capacity efforts to counter and resist various types of Russian aggression, as well as enhance their resilience. We are working relentlessly with our partners and the Department of State to build potency in eastern and northern Europe to counter Russia's approach to unconventional warfare, including developing mature and sustainable Special Operations capabilities across the region.

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In support of GEN Scaparrotti, we will continue to refine our SOF posture to strengthen these partnerships in order to deter or respond to aggression in the region, as well as reassure our allies and contribute to a broader deterrent effect.

*North Korea.* USSOCOM has recently focused more intently on the emerging threat that is of growing concern to us as well as most of our DoD teammates – the nuclear threat of an increasingly rogue North Korea. Although previously viewed as a regional threat, North Korea's relentless pursuit of nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles, facilitated by a trans-regional network of commercial, military, and political connections, make it a threat with global implications. In response, United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) and United States Forces-Korea (USFK) are focused on sustaining credible combat power in the region, maintaining unrelenting resolve in the face of multiple provocations, and sustaining partnerships with our closest allies. We maintain a persistent and rotational presence on the peninsula, working with our increasingly capable South Korean partners to prepare for future crises. In the meantime, we are actively pursuing a training path to ensure readiness for the entire range of contingency operations in which SOF, to include our exquisite CWMD capabilities, may play a critical role. As previously noted, we are looking comprehensively at our force structure and capabilities on the peninsula and across the region to maximize our support to USPACOM and USFK. This is my warfighting priority for planning and support.

*Iran.* Iran uses both traditional state-based military capabilities and a network of terrorist, sub-state, and non-state partners to conduct operations, actions, and activities that incite violence and threaten US security interests. It relies on militias and a range of partner organizations to expand

its influence and develop access to key areas. SOF activities are in support of CENTCOM's efforts toward a strengthened deterrence posture, targeted counter-messaging activities, and building partner nations' capacity. Our priority remains illuminating this Iranian network in order to understand its capabilities as it seeks to expand its influence. We also support and assure Israel and regional Gulf partners with foreign internal defense and security force assistance, aiding their efforts to counter Iranian threats.

*China.* China is pursuing a long-term, comprehensive military modernization program designed to improve its armed forces' capability to fight short duration, high intensity regional conflicts. China is intent upon expanding its regional and global influence, while developing capabilities to limit our ability to project power in the Pacific. SOF actions support USPACOM's efforts to focus on building military-to-military relations with China, focused on risk reduction. At the same time, we maintain persistent SOF presence in over a dozen countries in the USPACOM AOR – assuring our allies and building partner capabilities to address complex threats. The SOF community has worked to connect experts across the region, and between regions, to share lessons learned that provide opportunities to help our partners grow more effectively.

*Other Challenges.* Although the five NMS threats are the priority challenges for DoD, we remain focused on other parts of the world in terms of presence and engagement. The USSOUTHCOM Commander recently testified that aspects of the NMS-specified threats in the Southern Hemisphere are likely to become security challenges to the US homeland itself. Four out of the five named challenges are active in this region. To help mitigate these challenges, USSOUTHCOM's lines of effort are focused on countering threat networks, preparing for and

responding to disasters and crises, and building relationships to meet global challenges. SOF are actively supporting Interagency efforts that range from counter-threat financing, for which USSOCOM is the DoD lead, to counter-terrorism. We will continue to assure allies and support efforts to counter malign activities in Latin America while working to undermine transnational criminal networks. We have learned that the best way to deal with competition short of conflict is to match the range of tools we have at our disposal to the needs of the Ambassadors and GCCs. We recently hosted a Senior Leader Seminar focused on special interest aliens that involved representatives from USNORTHCOM, USSOUTHCOM, Secretary Kelly from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), other members of the IA, and various South and Central American Country Teams. We enjoy tremendous collaborative efforts as part of the team that provides layered security relative to our southern border and beyond.

### **The SOF Advantage**

USSOCOM provides a focused set of unique capabilities to deal with the challenges facing our Department and Nation today. Maintaining a forward presence in strategically important areas, leveraging established relationships, and identifying and addressing problems before they become full blown crises. Our ability to see, understand, and act across geographic boundaries is what allows SOF to operate globally at the speed of war, provide value to the GCCs, and provide options and decision space to national leadership. Additionally, we have increased the lethality, precision and mobility of our forces over time, which assists us in rapidly repositioning and focusing– providing enhanced options and effects.

Although SOF are effective across the spectrum of conflict, we are most optimally employed “left of bang” – pre-crisis. We believe that specialized application of SOF alongside

partner nations, the Joint Force, and the Interagency conducting activities across the spectrum of conflict allows us to present options that best serve our national interests. In fact, a critical component of our effectiveness in the field is the ability to work with the Services, defense agencies, and interagency partners to support forward deployed forces. We have approximately 30,000 personnel actively engaged in providing support to deployed units in the areas of intelligence collection and analysis; Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) operations; cyber operations; exploitation activities; and communications and logistics support.

### **Transformation: The Next Evolution of SOF**

While we are fully committed to winning the current fight, we are simultaneously working to prepare for the conflicts of tomorrow. We are always searching for improvements and relentlessly pursuing our next advantage. Key to this effort is USSOCOM's approach to requirements validation and acquisition, which allows us to rapidly field resources to those forces actively engaged in the fight. We appreciate Congress' continued resourcing of these efforts – I assure you we will continue to maximize the return on that investment.

Our current budget supports recapitalizing our platforms as well as developing our technological capabilities for dealing with near-peer competitors and competition short of armed conflict. Programmatically, we remain focused on enhancing Service-provided platforms with Major Force Program-11 funds to provide for the unique needs of our force. As always, the effectiveness of our investments is highly dependent upon the investment decisions of the Services.

A good example is seen in the success of our critical AC/MC-130J aircraft re-capitalization efforts, which include Radio Frequency Countermeasures, Terrain Following

Radar, Airborne Mission Networking and Precision Strike Packages. We have taken delivery of 10 new AC-130J Ghostriders and remain on track to declare Initial Operational Capability by the end of 2017. In our legacy Gunship fleet, we fielded eight up-gunned AC-130W Stinger IIs with 105mm large caliber guns and immediately deployed this enhanced capability to the fight in Syria and Iraq.

To improve our intelligence and analysis capabilities, we have distributed acquisition efforts across the air, ground and maritime domains – particularly for those systems and platforms that support operations in remote locations. We are developing and fielding interoperable, networked sensors built to enable common operational and intelligence pictures as well as feed data into all-source analysis tools. This further assists us in leveraging interagency partnerships.

As previously noted, our effectiveness over the last 15 years does not necessarily equate to success against near-peer competitors. We also require urgent investments in capabilities necessary for denied battlefields of the future. This includes submersibles, terrain following / avoidance and all-weather radar, advanced electronic attack capabilities, countermeasures, and precision munitions. We must enhance our effectiveness in partnership with the services. For example, we look forward to continuing work with the Department of the Navy to develop and enhance new options to support undersea operations – a key SOF capability. This is not a one way relationship. Recently the Army leveraged the efforts of our AT&L directorate to determine their future ground mobility vehicle. We continue to refine both our tactics and technological developments to enhance our man hunting and network defeat capabilities.

To integrate the advantages of rapidly evolving technology, we are making investments that will pay dividends for future mission sets. For example, “deep / machine learning” will help

us mitigate thousands of man-hours spent on sorting through vast sums of data. The analysis of publically available information; the processing, exploitation, and dissemination of information, specifically, ISR data; and sensitive site exploitation, are all wide-open areas for the application of this technology. We are pursuing technology which can be applied to open architectures, enabling rapid upgrades and integration of commercial off-the-shelf capability to leverage the latest advancements in data analytics and machine learning.

USSOCOM continues to build networks and venues that support innovation in our research, development, and acquisition programs. These networks include industry, academia, and other government organizations. The command also continues to support agile acquisition with appropriate venues, including SOFWERX – our open collaboration facility that has now been in operation for over a year and has successfully brought hundreds of non-traditional partners together to work on our most challenging problems.

A key part of the unique capabilities that SOF bring to the fight is the ability to fight in contested areas, often leveraging and enhancing the capabilities of indigenous partner forces. Accordingly, we continue to invest in ways that allow SOF to assist our partners better: command and control; ISR; Building Partner Capacity (BPC); and Aviation Foreign Internal Defense. The emphasis for all partner capabilities is on systems and infrastructure which is organically sustainable. An enhanced ability to leverage local relationships will ultimately help us better influence regional outcomes.

We also continue to invest in safeguarding our networks and communication infrastructure. USSOCOM has a unique service-like responsibility to provide all of SOF with networks and communications capability through the SOF Information Environment (SIE). The Global Enterprise Operations Center (GEOC) located at USSOCOM HQ manages network

operations for over 70,000 SOFNET users around the world, to include over 1,200 deployed nodes. The ability to share information across our network – from the unit deployed forward to the USSOCOM Headquarters – provides us with a key advantage in dealing with the information-rich environment we find ourselves in today. Defending the SIE requires sustained investment for cyber defense sensors and tools.

A continuing key area of concern for SOCOM (cited over our last 5 years of testimony) is our reliance on Overseas Contingency Operations funding, or OCO. Since 9/11, we expanded the size of our force by almost 75% in order to take on mission-sets that are likely to endure. OCO underwrites much of that growth, which remains critical to ensuring SOF readiness. OCO represents about 28% of our FY17 budget –triple the rate of OCO reliance among the Services. Approximately 90% of USSOCOM's OCO funds enduring capabilities, which are applicable to the threats beyond the current combat environment. Ultimately, we must reconcile the nature of SOF's work, which requires enduring structure and capabilities, with the relatively temporary funding achieved through OCO. Migrating this funding to the base budget over time will provide SOF a degree of certainty in tomorrow's turbulent security environment that enables us to better program for, train, and equip our joint force.

### **The Sustainment of SOF**

Our people are our single greatest resource. The goal continues to be to recruit, assess, and select the very best, providing them the requisite training and experience, empowering them to exercise their initiative and problem solving abilities, while managing them over a potential career in SOF. This is underpinned by an ethos and process to build in resiliency and provide the best possible care system for service members and their families.

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It is critical that SOF preserves its high state of full-spectrum readiness in order to support enduring, priority tasks while maintaining the ability to surge in support of major contingencies. Healthy dwell rates and Personnel Tempo are essential here. Most SOF units are employed to their sustainable limit, while some are consistently under that goal. Despite growing demand for SOF, we must prioritize the sourcing of these demands as we face a rapidly changing security environment. As we work to support the GCCs in addressing the challenges they face, we are constantly on guard against overcommitting this relatively small force.

Another key aspect of sustainment is our dependence on our Service and interagency partners. The Services provide the foundation upon which we build our force. This includes recruitment, acquisitions, intelligence, mobility, and logistics support – to name just a few. Many of the programs we have are based on Service investments and we often point out that a major shift in Service priorities will require a reassessment of our own. Our purchasing power and our readiness are inextricably linked. We will continue to work with all of the Services as well as Congress to ensure we preserve these foundations. In support of these efforts, we have scheduled annual war fighter talks with all of the Services, as well as key interagency partners (DIA, NSA, NGA, CIA), to integrate our approach to developing and resourcing the force.

Our interoperability with the Services also extends to the operations we conduct. Today we support the Joint Force in countering ISIS in Syria and Iraq, in Afghanistan, and elsewhere around the world. Examples of our interoperability occur every day, most recently in Sirte, Libya, where Special Operators assisted Libyan forces in re-taking the city relying heavily on over 450 airstrikes conducted by our Joint Force partners. Similar relationships are routine throughout all areas of active hostility, such as with the 5<sup>th</sup> Fleet in the CENTCOM AOR and multiple service and IA partners in the Philippines, where our SOF Headquarters ensure we

remain closely nested with theater service components as an integral component of the Joint Force. Today we are more than simply interoperable with the Services...we are truly interdependent.

We are also highly dependent on the capabilities that reside within the defense agencies, such as the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). With improvised threats, we continue to see examples of our adversaries taking commercial off-the-shelf technologies and manipulating and employing them as weapons as well as surveillance systems, such as small Unmanned Aerial Systems (sUAS). The recent integration of Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Organization (JIDO) with DTRA provides us with an expanded ability to counter the improvised threats confronting our force today.

We invest heavily in developing relationships with our interagency partners, as well, such as the Department of State, the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Counter Terrorism Center, and others. In total, we have 36 Special Operations liaison officers working across 16 agencies. This is indicative of the importance we place on whole-of-government solutions to the problems we all share – integrated efforts being the objective.

Operational requirements demand that we recruit, assess and select mentally and physically resilient SOF who can anticipate, respond, and adapt to any operating environment; excel in ambiguous situations; and are skilled at operating in the human domain in order to deal with population-centric conflicts. In addition to rigorous training, SOF require specialized education in areas related to our unique mission sets. SOF-specific education opportunities are an investment in our people and we will continue to augment Service-provided career development programs. A critical component to how we accomplish this is through the efforts of

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our Joint Special Operations University, or JSOU, which shapes the future strategic environment by not only providing specialized joint professional military education through specific undergraduate and graduate curriculum, but also through engagement with partner nations militaries. It is imperative we continue to provide the most highly trained and educated force to support persistent, networked, and distributed GCC operations to advance our nation's interests. Furthermore, it is critical that we continuously develop their talent by providing demanding, realistic training and placing people in the right jobs at the right times to gain valuable experience. In doing so, we empower our people while challenging them to exercise their initiative and make difficult decisions. Maintaining this highly trained and experienced force is the critical objective – it enables everything we do.

Because USSOCOM is significantly engaged in current operations, we continue to incur casualties, along with training injuries and illnesses. Caring for over 6,000 active-duty wounded and ill SOF Service Members, our Warrior Care program – a peer program to the Service Warrior Care programs – remains the gold standard for SOF Service Members and families whose resiliency has been challenged by a life-altering wound, injury, or illness. Recognized by Congress as one of USSOCOM's Service-like responsibilities, the USSOCOM Warrior Care Program (also known as the Care Coalition) executes our mission of returning wounded, ill, and injured SOF personnel to their units, maintaining their experience within the force and capitalizing on the immense investment of time and resources invested in them. The USSOCOM Warrior Care Program conserves its Service Members at rates higher than the conventional Service programs due to our focus on retention.

The Preservation of the Force and Family (POTFF) initiative remains a command priority, and we are deeply grateful for Congress' support for the resources required to execute

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this effort. The POTFF program enables us to build in physical, psychological, spiritual, and social resilience in our service members and their families to cope with the unique challenges of this demanding profession. The unique demands placed on SOF requires specialized attention to reduce injuries, speed recovery, and assure the overall well-being of our force. With your support, we've been able to place professional staff and equipment at our operational units where they have paid huge dividends in sustaining our warriors and their families. In partnership with academia, we are studying how we can continue to enhance the application of the POTFF's holistic approach to improve the effectiveness and sustainment of our force.

Although the command has made progress in reducing suicides, we still have a great deal of work to do. Through our partnerships with the Services and academia, we are analyzing how to better predict and prevent suicidal behaviors. We recently completed an analysis of SOF suicides over the past four years and are using what we learned to inform our suicide prevention strategy going forward. We will improve suicide prevention training for our military members and their families by addressing the underlying cognitive processes that lead to suicides and providing enhanced screening of our military members.

One consequence of our high PERSTEMPO is the challenge it creates for our families (over two-thirds of our force are married). Ensuring our families are cared for is a necessary component of our readiness posture. The Department of Defense as well as the Military Services have provided outstanding resources and support for USSOCOM families. I am also deeply appreciative of Congress's support in allowing the command to tailor family programs that are geared toward meeting the specific needs of our community. This support enabled the command to conduct pre and post-deployment programs, SOF unit orientations, and programs that enrich marital and parental relationships. This year we are using the pilot family program authority to

develop suicide prevention training for families, given we have found that spouses are often the first to notice when their partners are struggling.

## **Conclusion**

In closing, I would like to emphasize my three priorities for SOCOM now and into the future. First, SOCOM is fully committed to winning the current and future fights. Second, we must transform our force to be prepared to deal with all future adversaries. Finally, we must continue to place the greatest emphasis on selecting, retaining, and empowering our people, and sustaining them and their families.

I would like to thank you for your continued support of USSOCOM and our people. As we adapt to new roles and challenges, I look forward to sustaining an open dialogue with Congress on how we can work together to safeguard America's security interests.