

**Back to the Future?**  
**Associated Units and ARNG Brigade Combat Teams**

A Monograph

by

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## Abstract

Back to the Future? Associated Units and ARNG Brigade Combat Teams, by MAJ James L. Pope, US Army, 104 pages.

This monograph examined the newly announced Associated Units Pilot Program. Four decades removed from the All-Volunteer Force and Total Force Policy mandate, a significant portion of the US Army's combat power resides in the Army National Guard (ARNG) in terms of brigade combat teams. ARNG brigade combat teams are manned, equipped, and designed to train and deploy as "One Army" with the Active Regular Army for major combat operations. Over the last four decades, numerous opportunities existed for the President, the Department of Defense (DOD), and the US Army to mitigate strategic risk and mobilize ARNG combat brigades for major combat operations, specifically the Persian Gulf War and the Iraq War. To date, numerous challenges prevented their consideration, most notable their inability to meet all peacetime readiness, integration, and responsiveness expectations for major combat operations.

In 2016, the US Army announced the new Associated Units Pilot Program to increase readiness, integration, and responsiveness of the ARNG to train and deploy as "One Army" with the Active Regular Army. This monograph asked whether the Associated Units Pilot Program represented a new operational approach for ARNG brigade combat teams and major combat operations. The historical record revealed that it was not only not new, but an old operational approach that failed. The Congress, the DOD, the US Army, and the ARNG stopped challenging assumptions and asking hard questions. ARNG brigade combat teams are no more ready, integrated, or responsive for major combat operations than they were for the Persian Gulf War twenty-six years ago.

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## Acronyms

ABCT	Armored Brigade Combat Team
AC	Active Component
ADCON	Administrative Control
ADP	Army Doctrinal Publication
ADRP	Army Doctrinal Reference Publication
ANGRA	Army National Guard Readiness Reform Act
ARNG	Army National Guard
AT	Annual Training
ATP	Army Techniques Publication
AVF	All-Volunteer Force
BCT	Brigade Combat Team
BFV	Bradley Fighting Vehicle
BUR	Bottom Up Review
CALFEX	Combined Arms Live Fire Exercise
CCTT	Common Core Task Training
CENTCOM	Central Command
CFLCC	Coalition Forces Land Component Command
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
COIN	Counter-insurgency
CPX	Command Post Exercise
CTC	Combined Arms Training Center
DAIG	Department of the Army Inspector General
DOD	Department of Defense
eSB	Enhanced Separate Brigade

FM	Field Manual
FORSCOM	Forces Command
FTS	Full Time Support
FTX	Field Training Exercise
GAO	Government Accountability Office
HMMWV	High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle
IBCT	Infantry Brigade Combat Team
IDT	Inactive Duty Time
JRTC	Joint Readiness Training Center
LFX	Live Fire Exercise
MATES	Mobilization and training equipment sites
MCTP	Mission Command Training Program
METL	Mission Essential Task List
MOSQ	Military Occupational Specialty Qualified
MTOE	Modified Table of Organization and Equipment
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCO	Noncommissioned Officer
NCFR	National Commission for the Future of the Army
NDAA	National Defense Authorization Act
NGB	National Guard Bureau
NPS	Non-prior service
NTC	National Training Center
OC/T	Observer, Controller, Trainer
OPLAN	Operational Plan (War Plan)
OR	Operational Readiness
ORE	Operational Readiness Evaluation



OSD	Office of the Secretary of the Defense
PME	Professional Military Education
PROVIDE	Project Volunteer in Defense of the Nation Study
PS	Prior-service
RC	Reserve Component (ARNG and/or Army Reserves)
RDT	Rear Detachment Trainers
RFPB	Reserve Force Policy Board
RTB	Regional Training Brigades or Training Support Brigades
SECFOR	Security Force
SBCT	Stryker Brigade Combat Team
TFP	Total Force Policy
TPFDL	Time-Phased Force Deployment List
TRADOC	Training and Doctrine Command
TSB	Training Support Brigade
UCOFT	Unit Conduct of Fire Trainer
VOLAR	Volunteer Army Field Experiment

## Introduction

Every assumption we hold, every claim, every assertion, every single one of them must be challenged.

General Mark A. Milley  
Army Chief of Staff, 2015-2019  
On Future War and Warfare

In December 2016, General Mark A. Milley, the Army Chief of Staff, made the above statement about the radically changing nature of modern warfare. He stated “we find ourselves in a difficult place” given “our readiness to fight a war against a high-end, near-peer adversary has eroded.”<sup>1</sup> He declared “we must be open-minded to change,” because of the evolving phenomena of modern warfare will be “very highly lethal [in the future], unlike anything our Army has experienced.” The modern battlefield of asymmetric technology, sensors, and fast moving smaller forces appears incredibly dynamic. In the future, he believes that this lethality will place “demands on human endurance and equipment” because “if you [Army forces] stay in one place for longer than two or three hours, you will be dead.” General Milley argued “we [the Congress, the Department of Defense (DOD), and the US Army] are facing tough strategic choices, and we are being increasingly challenged with very capable potential adversaries clearly acting in opposition to our interests.” He continued to describe the future of modern warfare as evolving, unpredictable, fluid, asymmetric, and incredibly lethal.<sup>2</sup> General Milley concluded that adaption

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<sup>1</sup> Mark A. Milley, “Change Is Coming: General Mark A. Milley Not Talking About Just Tinkering Around the Edges,” Association of the United States Army, December 13, 2016, accessed December 16, 2016, <https://www.ausa.org/articles/radical-change-coming-gen-mark-milley-not-talking-about-just-tinkering-around-edges>. Army chiefs of staffs serve four year terms. General Milley’s term expires in 2019.

<sup>2</sup> Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Peter Paret and Michael Howard (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 88-89. Clausewitz also described war as a phenomenon that changed like a ‘true chameleon’ with dominant tendencies. He described these dominant tendencies as a remarkable trinity: (1) primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, (2) the play of chance and probability, and (3) its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone. If General Milley believes every assumption needs to be challenged in the US Army, then Congress must also challenge its policy assumptions and expectations. Clausewitz’s secondary trinity comes to mind: the people, the commanders and the army, and the government. Solutions to future war and warfare problems do not reside in the Army alone.

to the radically changing nature of modern warfare “requires significant change in our [Army’s] current methods of thinking, training, and fighting.”<sup>3</sup>

Considering General Milley’s comments, is the Congress, the DOD, and the US Army ready to challenge “every assumption we hold, every claim, every assertion, every single one?”<sup>4</sup> If not, what are the risks, are we willing to accept them, and who pays the immediate price for failure?<sup>5</sup> These are important, but broad questions.

Today, the legacy of the All-Volunteer Force (AVF), the Total Force Policy (TFP) mandate, and the force structure precedents established by them continue to have profound implications on the evolving relationship of the Active Regular Army, the Army National Guard (ARNG), and the Army Reserves.<sup>6</sup> The AVF and TFP legacy continues to constrain the decision-making of the US Congress, the DOD, and the US Army. Hard choices must be made to provide an operationally responsive, ready, and flexible “One Army” for modern warfare that remains largely unpredictable.<sup>7</sup> After a decade of fighting two major conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the

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<sup>3</sup> Milley, “Radical Change Is Coming: General Mark A. Milley Not Talking About Just Tinkering Around the Edges.”

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

<sup>5</sup> Thomas Donnelly and Frederick W. Kagan, *Ground Truth: The Future of Land Power* (Washington, DC: The American Enterprise Institute Press, 2008), 1-142. This book lays out a broad five-question framework for addressing important policy matters, specifically preparation for the future of modern warfare. If warfare is changing, it is important the nation recognize it and prepare for it. If the nation is unwilling, what are the risks?

<sup>6</sup> See the Origins of the All-Volunteer Force (AVF) and Total Force Policy (TFP) section of this monograph, page 16.

<sup>7</sup> Patrick Murphy, “Army Public Affairs Guidance for Associated Units Pilot,” Secretary of the Army Memorandum Enclosure (Washington, DC: dated March 21, 2016), 1-5. Since 1973, the Department of the Army commonly referred to the relationship of the Active Regular Army, the Army National Guard, and the Army Reserves as the “Total Army.” Over the last several decades, the Department of the Army used the terms “Total Army” and “One Army” interchangeably. Patrick Murphy, “Tab I: Associated Units Press Release,” Secretary of the Army Memorandum Enclosure (Washington, DC: dated March 21, 2016), 1. To describe the goals of the Associated Units Operational Approach, Army Secretary Patrick Murphy used both terms. Army Chief of Staff Mark Milley used the term “One Army.” Carter F. Ham and Thomas R. Lamont, *National Commission On the Future of the Army* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2016), 1, 59-79. The Department of the Army specifically used the term “One Army” to recommend multi-component units or associated units in its report to Congress. Thus, where possible, this monograph used the term “One Army” because it is specific to the Associated Units Operational Approach.

US government entered a period of rebalancing national priorities and fiscal austerity with the approval of the Budget Control Act and subsequent legislation in 2011, commonly referred to as sequestration. Sequestration is expected to force the Congress, the DOD, and the US Army to make hard budgetary choices on future force structure, end strength, training, and modernization until at least 2019.<sup>8</sup>

In the Fiscal Year 2015 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), Congress established the National Commission on the Future of the Army (NCFA) to conduct a comprehensive study and provide recommendations on the appropriate future size and force structure of the Active Regular Army, ARNG, and Army Reserves. In January 2016, the NCFA released its findings and identified major problems, seams, and gaps that prevent the full implementation of the TFP in the US Army. Interestingly, the major theme embodied in the study included the continuing struggle for “Developing One Army.” In its report to Congress, the NCFA recommended that the US Army address this problem by establishing peacetime, multi-component unit test pilot programs between the Active Regular Army, the ARNG, and Army Reserves to train together and improve readiness for wartime contingencies.<sup>9</sup>

On March 21, 2016, Army Secretary Patrick Murphy formally announced a new operational approach to “enhance the integration of the Total Army” to achieve the ends of the national military strategy.<sup>10</sup> The new operational approach included the association of units

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<sup>8</sup> Ray Odierno, “CSA's remarks at SASC congressional testimony,” US Army, January 28, 2015, accessed 07 October 2016, [https://www.army.mil/article/141798/Jan\\_28\\_2015\\_CSA\\_s\\_remarks\\_at\\_SASC\\_congressional\\_testimony](https://www.army.mil/article/141798/Jan_28_2015_CSA_s_remarks_at_SASC_congressional_testimony).

<sup>9</sup> Ham and Lamont, 1, 59-79.

<sup>10</sup> Patrick Murphy, “Designation of Associated Units in Support of Army Total Force Policy,” Secretary of the Army Memorandum (Washington, DC: dated March 21, 2016), 1; See Footnote 7; Army Doctrinal Reference Publication (ADRP) 1-02, *Terms and Military Symbols* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2015), 1-67. The term “operational approach” refers to how the US Army will practically translate the “One Army” idea to a concept of operation that can achieve the desired end state of an integrated, responsive, and ready single operating force for war composed of the Active Regular Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserves.

between the Active Regular Army and the Army Reserve Components or multi-component units. General Milley, Lieutenant General Timothy Kaddavy, Director of the Army National Guard, and Lieutenant General Jeffrey Talley, Director of the Army Reserves, all stated in a press release that the new multi-year “Associated Units Pilot Program” would attempt to increase peacetime readiness, integration, and responsiveness of the Active Regular Army, ARNG, and Army Reserve to train and deploy together as “One Army.”<sup>11</sup> Four decades removed from the legacy of the AVF, the TFP mandate, and its structural changes, the US Army decision to pursue an Associated Units Pilot Program or multi-component units leads to many interesting historical, political, and military questions.

Most importantly, what is an appropriate operational approach for integrating the peacetime “One Army” for wartime contingencies? What is an appropriate operational approach for General Milley’s worst case scenario, major combat operations with a near peer, military competitor?<sup>12</sup> Is the Associated Units Pilot Program a *new* operational approach, particularly for combined arms units in major combat operations?<sup>13</sup> What are the historical challenges preventing readiness, integration, and responsiveness of “One Army” combined arms units for major combat operations? For brevity, this monograph attempts to answer these questions by focusing on the

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<sup>11</sup> Murphy, “Designation of Associated Units in Support of Army Total Force Policy.”

<sup>12</sup> Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, *Joint Operations* (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 2011), I-5. Associated combat brigades must be prepared for combined arms maneuver in major operations and campaigns (i.e. extended-duration, large-scale operations that involve combat) as part of the Total Force.

<sup>13</sup> US Army Doctrinal Reference Publication (ADP) 1-02, *Terms and Military Symbols* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2015), 1-18. By US Army doctrine, combined arms involve the synchronization and simultaneous application of arms (infantry, armor, artillery, intelligence, joint capabilities, etc.) to achieve an effect greater than if each arm were used separately or sequentially. Combined arms units conduct combined arms maneuver, a core competency of the US Army. Combined arms maneuver is the application of the elements of combat power in unified action to defeat enemy ground forces; to seize, occupy, and defend land areas; and to achieve physical, temporal, and psychological advantages over the enemy to seize and exploit the initiative. It is combined arms maneuver units that form the core of US Army combat power for major combat operations. Traditionally, combined arms maneuver collective training tasks are the most difficult for large units to achieve a high level of readiness because of limits on time, space, and resources.

ability of ARNG combat brigades or brigade combat teams (BCT) to augment the Active Regular Army for major combat operations.<sup>14</sup>

## Argument

The new “Associated Units” operational approach for ARNG BCTs performing major combat operations with the Active Regular Army is essentially the *old* “Roundout” operational approach that failed to meet peacetime expectations. This monograph argues that the “Associated Units” operational approach for ARNG BCTs is doomed to fail again unless Congress, the DOD, the US Army, and the ARNG address the fundamental readiness generation challenges of previous operational approaches. Congressional limits on peacetime readiness generation prevents ready, integrated, and responsive ARNG BCTs from participating in major combat operations. Politics, policy preferences, and political risks continue to constrain policy-maker and uniformed military advisor recommendations for ARNG BCT participation in major combat operations. Congress, the DOD, the US Army, and the ARNG need to ask hard questions and challenge whether ARNG BCTs are appropriate for the future?<sup>15</sup> The historical record reveals they are unwilling to do so.

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<sup>14</sup> US Army Field Manual (FM) 3-90.6, *Brigade Combat Teams* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2014), 1-1. The Brigade Combat Team (BCT) represents the basic combat power building block of US Army Operational Doctrine in Army Doctrinal Publication (ADP) 3-0 *Unified Land Operations*. The Brigade Combat Team is the smallest combined arms organization that can operate independently, conduct expeditionary deployment, and integrate with higher organizations to provide combat capabilities. This paper therefore investigates the Associated Units Pilot Program by asking whether ARNG combat brigades or brigade combat teams with the Active Regular Army can effectively provide the basic combat power building block for major combat operations. In 2004, the US Army began the modularization all combined arms brigades into BCTs, pushing more capability not less into combat brigades.

<sup>15</sup> Steven Powell. *Army Leader Book: Army 2022* (Washington, DC: G3/5/7 Force Modernization, 2015). In 1994, fifteen ARNG combat brigades existed. In 2017, twenty-six brigade combat teams (BCT) existed in the ARNG (nineteen infantry BCTs, five armored BCTs, and two stryker BCT) compared to thirty BCTs in the Active Regular Army.

## Methodology

To provide context, an examination of the origins of the AVF, TFP, and the structural underpinnings of previous “One Army” operational approaches is required. To understand the Associated Units Pilot Program, it is important to know the previous peacetime and wartime challenges that prevented ready, integrated, and responsive ARNG combat brigades in the past from conducting major combat operations. To understand these challenges, this paper used the historical case study methodology to examine two “One Army” operational approaches and compare them with the newly announced Associated Units Pilot Program.

The first case study examined the ARNG roundout operational approach. It focused on the performance of ARNG roundout combat brigades activated for the Persian Gulf War. Here, ARNG combat brigades mobilized and partially completed certification, but did not deploy to conduct major combat operations. This was the “first involuntary activation of reserve units since the nation adopted the all-volunteer force and the Total Force Policy.”<sup>16</sup> This was the first test of a “One Army” peacetime operational approach for ARNG brigades to respond, integrate, and deploy for major combat operations. The results were controversial as the ARNG brigades did not perform as intended.<sup>17</sup>

An examination of the first case study began by laying out the strategic context, assumptions, and expectations for peace and war that influenced the development of the ARNG Roundout operational approach over two decades. Per US Army doctrine, the establishment of “clear command and support relationships is fundamental to organizing any operation” or operational approach between different organizations. By law, the ARNG and Active Regular

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<sup>16</sup> Stephen M. Duncan, *Citizen Warriors: America's National Guard and Reserve Forces & The Politics of National Security* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1997), 38. Stephen Duncan was the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs from 1987-1993.

<sup>17</sup> Michael D. Doubler, *I am the Guard: A History of the Army National Guard, 1636-2000* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2001), 349-353. The DOD's first comprehensive critique of the post-Cold War era, the “Bottom Up Review” (BUR) led to the elimination of the ARNG Roundout Operational Approach in September 1993.

Army for peacetime operations are two distinct organizations with separate chains of command, but are connected for wartime contingencies.<sup>18</sup> The examination of the first case study therefore focused on Roundout “relationship” expectations during peace and war.<sup>19</sup> The relationship focus was specific to the key variables of readiness, integration, and responsiveness.<sup>20</sup> The first case study examined ARNG roundout brigade mobilization for the Persian Gulf War to identify significant challenges that inhibited the operational approach. None of the roundout brigades deployed; active replacement brigades instead took their place. The first study concluded with significant reactions and the adaptations that eliminated roundout brigades and created the ARNG enhanced Separate Brigade (eSB) operational approach.<sup>21</sup>

The second case study examined the ARNG eSB operational approach and reviewed the peacetime realities of ARNG eSBs prior to the 2003 Iraq War. The second case study then transitioned to the question of ARNG eSB wartime participation in the Iraq War.<sup>22</sup> Inherent in the

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<sup>18</sup> National Guard Bureau Historical Services, “Federalizing the National Guard: Preparedness, Reserve Forces and the National Defense Act of 1916,” *Guard News*, June 2, 2016, accessed February 26, 2017, <http://www.nationalguard.mil/News/Article/789220/federalizing-the-national-guard-preparedness-reserve-forces-and-the-national-de>. The National Defense Act of 1916 codified the dual state and federal mission of the National Guard. In time of a declared federal emergency, the President of the United States could federalize the National Guard for expeditionary wartime service.

<sup>19</sup> Erin McKean, ed., *The New Oxford American Dictionary*, 2nd ed. (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2005), s.v. “relationship.” Throughout this monograph, the word “relationship” refers to the Active Regular Army and the ARNG. A “relationship” implies the commanders and organizations of both the ARNG and Active Regular Army are “connected.” Both share responsibilities and authorities in achieving the stated aims of a “One Army” operational approach.

<sup>20</sup> Army Doctrinal Reference Publication (ADRP) 5-0, *Planning* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2012), 2-15 to 2-18. By US Army doctrine, command relationships outline the “responsibilities and authorities” of commanders and support relationships define the “purpose, scope, and effect desired when one capability supports another.” It is critical to outline the structural command and support relationships of the ARNG and Active Regular Army to examine any breakdowns in the relationship.

<sup>21</sup> National Security and International Affairs Division (NSIAD)-00-114. *Army National Guard: Enhanced Readiness Improved, But Personnel and Workload Are Problems* (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2000), 3-4. The ARNG eSB operational approach included fifteen high priority stand-alone combat brigades consisting of seven light infantry brigades and eight mechanized brigades. Seven of the fifteen ARNG eSBs originally were roundout combat brigades.

<sup>22</sup> Doubler, 349-353. The US Army subsequently created the Enhanced Brigade Operational Approach in 1994.



branding of “One Army” is an overt assumption of parity and interchangeability between ARNG and Active combat brigades to perform as designed for major combat operations. In forty years, DOD policy preferences and political risks prevented this overt assumption from being challenged. Roundout combat brigades did not deploy. In contrast, the ARNG eSBs did complete mobilization, certification, and deploy to the Iraq War, but not for major combat operations. The second case study therefore examined how policy-makers and wartime commanders viewed ARNG eSBs in the Iraq War, both before and after major combat operations. The results again were controversial. Policy makers did not mobilize ARNG eSBs for major combat operations despite eighteen months of planning for an Iraq invasion. Eventually, wartime commanders used ARNG eSBs as complementary forces rather than interchangeable forces in the Iraq War.

Lastly, the Roundout and eSB operational approaches had significant peacetime and wartime challenges. The US Army announced the Associated Units Pilot program as a *new* “One Army” operational approach. A comparison of the Associated Units Pilot Program and the old operational approaches revealed that it is essentially the old Roundout operational approach. The US Army made only three cosmetic changes. It appears the US Army is ready to execute the Roundout operational approach again under a new name two decades later.

In context, the monograph summarizes the residual peacetime and wartime challenges that prevented ready, integrated, and responsive ARNG combat brigades from participating in major combat operations. These challenges will inhibit any future “One Army” operational approach for ARNG BCTs. The monograph concluded by challenging the Congress, the DOD, the US Army, and the ARNG to ask hard questions and consider if ARNG BCTs are appropriate for major combat operations?

## Key Terms, Variables, and Processes

To evaluate, compare, and record the evolution of “One Army” peacetime operational approaches for ARNG combat brigades, it is imperative that several key terms, variables, and processes be defined. The US Army created the Associated Units Pilot Program with the stated aim of increasing readiness, integration, and responsiveness in multi-component units for deploying Active Regular Army, ARNG, and Army Reserves together as “One Army.”<sup>23</sup> Therefore, the key variables of readiness, responsiveness, and integration must be defined. Each of these variables is defined below in relative isolation of one another, but have a strong interdependent relationship in terms of the effectiveness of a “One Army” operational approach. When considered in combination, these variables provide key insights into the evolution and challenges of “One Army” peacetime operational approaches, specifically ARNG combat brigades and major combat operations.

### Readiness Variable

What does it mean for an ARNG BCT to be “ready?” As a verb, the term “ready” implies that an entity is *organized* and *prepared over time* to achieve its *purpose*. As an adjective, the term “ready” implies that an entity is *fully prepared* to achieve its *purpose*.<sup>24</sup> In US Army Regulations, the term “readiness” describes a unit’s ability to deliver the core functions and capabilities for which it was *designed* in its modification table of organization and equipment (MTOE).<sup>25</sup>

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<sup>23</sup> Patrick Murphy, “Army Public Affairs Guidance for Associated Units Pilot,” Secretary of the Army Memorandum Enclosure (Washington, DC: dated March 21, 2016), 1-5.

<sup>24</sup> McKean, s.v. “Ready.” Key readiness attributes and characteristics are in italics for emphasis.

<sup>25</sup> Army Regulations (AR) 220-1, *Field Organizations: Army Unit Status Reporting and Force Registration – Consolidated Policies* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2010), 1-3, 12, 100. The readiness attributes of purpose and design seem synonymous, but there are subtle differences. Design implies a structured plan for using an entity a certain way. Purpose implies there is an intent for using an entity and that it can change. Because of the overt “One Army” parity and interchangeability expectation of ARNG BCTs, this monograph expects the design and purpose to be the same.

These definitions capture the key attributes and characteristics of readiness: *time*, *organization*, *preparation*, *design*, and *purpose*. In this monograph, all five attributes and characteristics are described in the context of ARNG combat brigades. First, this monograph described the *time* assumptions and expectations for ARNG combat brigade to be made “ready” for major combat operations. Since 1902, US law constrains ARNG peacetime pre-mobilization training days to a minimum of thirty-nine days per year compared to approximately 240 days for active units.<sup>26</sup> Each of the operational approaches had different time assumptions and expectations for ARNG combat brigades to be made ready for mobilization, certification, and deployment. The monograph covered the time expectations of each operational approach separately in the individual case studies. Second, this monograph briefly described how the US Army *organizes* [or resources] readiness through the provision and sustainment of resources, personnel, supplies, and equipment in compliance with its MTOE. In theory, a resourced ARNG combat brigade is organized to the extent that it can prepare to achieve its purpose. US Army Sustainment doctrine captures resourcing and the provisioning of readiness as follows:

“The quality of force readiness is measured by sustainment [the provision of resources and services]. Sustainment maintains Army forces by manning it with trained Soldiers and leaders; funding it with required resources; equipping it with the materiel (individual and unit); maintaining Soldier and Family readiness; and sustaining it for decisive action [major combat operations].”<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>26</sup> Jerry Cooper, *The Rise of the National Guard: The Evolution of the American Militia, 1865-1920* (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1997), 153-154. The modern-day requirement of thirty-nine ARNG training days stipulated in Title 32 USC 502(a) (Required drills and field exercises) traces its origins to the 1902 Dick Act and the 1916 National Defense Act (NDA); Thomas Lippiatt, J. Michael Polich, and Ronald E. Sortor, *Post-Mobilization Training of Army Reserve Component Combat Units* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1992), 4-8. ARNG Soldiers must complete a minimum of 24 days Inactive Duty Training (IDT), usually focused on administrative and individual training tasks, and one fifteen-day annual training (AT) period, traditionally focused on collective training tasks. ARNG Soldiers have the option to complete their IDT requirements during forty-eight IDT weekends as an individual, not necessarily as a collective unit. Team practice or readiness generation collectively is confined to AT periods.

<sup>27</sup> Army Doctrinal Reference Publication (ADRP) 4-0, *Sustainment* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2012), 1-1.

Third, this monograph briefly describes the US Army's readiness *preparation or generation* strategy. Resourced units alone do not equal ready units. Units need time and collective training to practice. This generates readiness and makes units fully prepared for major combat operations.

US Army Training doctrine states:

*“The foundation of a unit’s readiness ties directly to the proficiencies of its individual Soldiers... to perform specified tasks related to an assigned duty position and skill level. Training and education prepare individuals to perform assigned tasks to standard, accomplish their mission and duties, and survive on the battlefield.”*

*“Unit collective training occurs... at home station, maneuver combat training centers, and mobilization training centers. Unit collective training develops [generates] and sustains an organization’s readiness by achieving and sustaining proficiency in mission-essential tasks.”*

*“Leaders allot sufficient time and resources... to plan, prepare, execute, and assess training.”<sup>28</sup>*

Training individual Soldiers [to include leaders] sets the foundation. Conducting unit collective training over time increases the likelihood of fully preparing a unit to survive in major combat operations. An ARNG combat brigade has multiple echelons from individual, team/crew, squad, platoon, company, battalion, to brigade that must be trained. Training starts at the individual level and sequentially progresses through multiple training echelons to build and sustain readiness at lower echelons while generating readiness in larger echelons units.<sup>29</sup> The US Army doctrine refers to this as multi-echelon training or the “crawl, walk, run training approach” to generating unit readiness.<sup>30</sup> This monograph discusses briefly how the US Army reports on

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<sup>28</sup> Army Doctrinal Reference Publication (ADRP) 7-0, *Training Units and Developing Leaders* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2012), 1-1 to 1-2, 2-1.

<sup>29</sup> Lippiatt, Polich, and Sortor, 5. Higher echelon units require more complex training in such tasks as coordinating fire, movement, synchronization of activities, and integration with other functions such as artillery, maintenance, engineering, and other support (i.e. combined arms maneuver).

<sup>30</sup> ADRP 7-0, 3-1 to 3-12. The BCT’s mission essential task list (METL) is a list of five to six collective tasks the unit must be able to execute during a wartime mission. Each METL task has supporting individual, collective, and leader tasks for evaluation. Ratings for collective tasks range from trained (T), needs practice (P), or untrained (U). Unit commanders develop annual training plans to achieve higher levels of unit readiness in their mission essential tasks (MET). Unit commanders conduct internal evaluations of their unit’s individual and collective (t-level) training task proficiency for METs. Evaluations focus on the ability of not only the headquarters element to conduct METL collective tasks, but

generating readiness over time in the readiness reporting section of this paper. ARNG combat brigades cannot attain the highest unit readiness levels during peacetime without being activated and mobilized for a wartime contingency. ARNG combat brigades generate unit readiness through post-mobilization training and complete certification for deployment. This monograph briefly discussed this process in detail in the mobilization section of this paper. Fourth, this monograph described the overt “One Army” parity and interchangeability expectation that ARNG combat brigades can be made “ready” and utilized as *designed* comparable to Active Regular Army combat brigades for major combat operations. ARNG combat brigade MTOEs “are manned and equipped to reflect active units” to achieve a *designed* readiness expectation for major combat operations.<sup>31</sup> Most importantly, this monograph discussed the *purpose* for which ARNG combat brigades were and were not made “ready” for major combat operations during peace and war. In both case studies, the policy preferences and political risks of policy makers and uniformed military advisors prevented ARNG combat brigades from achieving their designed purpose, participation in major combat operations.<sup>32</sup>

### Readiness Reporting Process

The US Army is in perpetual state of resourcing and generating unit readiness over time as *designed*. On a regular basis, the US Army measures and assesses unit readiness over time in four MTOE areas: personnel (p-level), equipment and supplies on hand/available (s-level), the readiness and serviceability of equipment (r-level), and unit collective training level proficiency

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a holistic review of all subordinate organizations to conduct their METL collective tasks as well. Internal evaluations are inherently subjective. Therefore, the US Army requires external evaluations for unit collective training assessments at the battalion level and above. Outside organizations conduct external evaluations.

<sup>31</sup> Arthur L. Moxon, “US Reserve Forces: The Achilles’ Heel of the All-Volunteer Force?” in *The Guard and Reserve in the Total Force: The First Decade 1973-1983*, ed. Bennie J. Wilson III (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1985), 97.

<sup>32</sup> Stephen G. Lauer, “The Tao of Doctrine: Contesting an Art of Operations,” *Joint Forces Quarterly*, 3rd Quarter (2016): 120-121.

(t-level). The US Army measures, assesses, and reports on each of these four areas on a scale from 1-5. A rating of “1” is the highest possible rating for any metric and “5” is the lowest. For simplicity, the US Army correlates a unit’s overall readiness level (C-level) as a composite of these four primary readiness areas or metrics. A unit’s C-level denotes its ability to perform the core functions and capabilities for which it was *designed* in its MTOE. For example, if an ARNG combat brigade notionally reported the following readiness metric assessments: P = 2, S = 1, R = 1, and T = 3, the highest readiness level the unit commander could report would be a “C-3” rating. The determination of the unit’s C-level is constrained by its T-3 rating. In this example, the brigade needs more resources, time, and training opportunities to generate higher readiness (t-level).<sup>33</sup>

For deployment certification, combat brigades must traditionally achieve two readiness requirements. First, the combat brigade must receive a “C-1” rating, a “1” rating in each of the four primary readiness metrics discussed above.<sup>34</sup> Second, US Forces Command (FORSCOM) must certify the readiness of combat brigades through an external evaluation.<sup>35</sup> National defense policy for all “One Army” operational approaches is clear that “the training of each National Guard and reserve unit... [must] be held to the same performance standards and readiness criteria as active force units” for wartime deployments.<sup>36</sup> This was the stated intent of Defense Secretary Richard Cheney in January 1990. This monograph examined the intent and practice of this peacetime readiness policy over four decades.

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<sup>33</sup> AR 220-1, 10-17.

<sup>34</sup> Eric Fredland, Curtis Gilroy, and Roger D. Little, *Professionals on the Front Line: Two Decades of the All-Volunteer Force*, ed. W.S Sellman (Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 1996), 154-156.

<sup>35</sup> NSIAD-91-72. *Army Training: Evaluations of Unit’s Proficiency Is Not Always Reliable* (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 1991), 20. FORSCOM external evaluations allow the US Army to control the subjectivity of readiness ratings.

<sup>36</sup> Fredland, Gilroy, and Little, 154-155.

## Integration Variable

What does it mean to “integrate” an ARNG combat brigade into the Active Regular Army for “One Army?” As a verb, the term “integrate” means to bring an entity into *equal participation* or membership in an institution. As a noun, the term “integration” describes how an entity was previously segregated, but undergoes a *process* to combine with another to become a *whole*.<sup>37</sup> The words *process*, *equal participation*, and *whole* relate well with what the DOD wants to achieve with ARNG combat brigades. Effective integration merits a strong mutual peacetime relationship for ARNG combat brigades and the Active Regular Army. The term “process” implies a “series of actions or steps taken in order to achieve a particular end.”<sup>38</sup> Effective integration requires equal participation between multi-component units to bring combat brigades into an equal whole, the “One Army.” Thus, this monograph examined the authorities and responsibilities of the “series of actions or steps taken” by the participants to integrate during peace and war in each operational approach. It examined specifically the process and notion of equal participation.

## Mobilization Process

The integration of the ARNG and Active Regular Army units occurs through distinct phases common to all “One Army” operational approaches. In the US Army, integration is synonymous with mobilization, “the process of assembling, organizing, and bringing the Army to a state of readiness for war.”<sup>39</sup> US Army mobilization phases include: pre-mobilization training, activation and mobilization, post-mobilization training, certification, and deployment in support of major combat operations. For clarity, pre-mobilization training refers to planned weekend

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<sup>37</sup> McKean, s.v. “Integration,” “Integrate.”

<sup>38</sup> Ibid, s.v. “process.”

<sup>39</sup> Army Regulation (AR) 500-5, *Emergency Employment of Army and Other Resources: Army Mobilization* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2015), 1.

inactive duty training (IDT) periods and annual training (AT) periods conducted by ARNG combat brigades to maintain readiness proficiencies. This is routine peacetime training conducted traditionally at home station. Since the 1920s, US law constrains ARNG pre-mobilization training days to a minimum of thirty-nine days per year.<sup>40</sup> Some high priority ARNG units, roundout brigades, did receive additional funding for approximately sixty pre-mobilization training days in 1990.<sup>41</sup> This is not the norm. US law and funding constrains ARNG combat brigade pre-mobilization training and the readiness foundation that can be achieved during peacetime. This affects the starting point and duration of ARNG mission essential task list (METL) collective training during post-mobilization.<sup>42</sup>

In terms of wartime integration, alert or activation occurs when the US Army notifies the ARNG combat brigade of a wartime deployment. ARNG combat brigades conduct mobilization at home station and confirm crew, squad, and platoon qualifications and proficiencies. ARNG combat brigades conduct post-mobilization training at a mobilization center, typically away from home station. During post-mobilization training, the DOD provisions training support to ARNG combat brigades from the Active Regular Army to evaluate and raise the scope and scale of METL collective training proficiencies to the highest possible levels prior to certification (i.e. battalion and brigade).<sup>43</sup> Certification is the process of external verification and validation by the US Army that the ARNG combat brigade can execute its wartime METL prior to deployment. By precedent, certification occurs through a FORSCOM external evaluation.<sup>44</sup>

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<sup>40</sup> Cooper, 153-154.

<sup>41</sup> Robert L. Goldich, *The Army's Roundout Concept After the Persian Gulf War* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 1991), 30.

<sup>42</sup> Keith Vore, *The Training Relationship Between the Army National Guard Brigades and their Active Army Resident Training Detachments – Is this an Effective Relationship?* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, 1999), 6, 15-16.

<sup>43</sup> Lippiatt, Polich, and Sortor, 14, 39.

<sup>44</sup> Fredland, Gilroy, and Little, 149-152. The FORSCOM certification process of external evaluations on RCs to ensure they meet established deployment criteria dates back to the Korean War.



## Responsiveness Variable

What does it mean for an ARNG combat brigade to be “responsive?” As an adjective, the term “responsive” means that an entity can react or respond quickly in a desired or positive way.<sup>45</sup> By this definition, a “responsive” entity must achieve three pre-requisites. First, it is implied that the entity must receive *notification* to react or respond. For a “One Army” operational approach to be responsive; policy-makers must activate ARNG combat brigades for wartime contingencies to integrate with the Active Regular Army for major combat operations. Second, the entity must *act relative to expectation*. For a “One Army” operational approach to be responsive, ARNG combat brigades must complete certification and deployment in the expected time, measured in days. Third, the entity must *perform in a desired or positive way* (i.e. as designed). For a “One Army” operational approach to be responsive, ARNG combat brigades must be able to complete certification, deploy, and conduct major combat operations under the same standards and conditions as the Active Regular Army.

## Origins of the All-Volunteer Force and the Total Force Policy

We have paid, and paid, and paid again in blood and sacrifice for our unpreparedness. I don't want war, but I am appalled at the human cost that we've paid because we wouldn't prepare to fight.

---General Creighton Abrams  
Army Chief of Staff, 1972-1974  
Presumptive Father of the AVF and TFP

Dating back to the early 1900s, historical precedent exists for a relationship between the Active Components (AC) and the Reserve Components (RC) for wartime operations.<sup>46</sup> However,

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<sup>45</sup> McKean, s.v. “Responsive.”

<sup>46</sup> Stephen L. Goff and Ralph E. Kahlan, *The Roundout Program: Is It Still Valid?* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, 2012), 2-6. This reference documents the origins and history of the relationship of Active Regular Army and the Reserve Components, Army Reserves and the ARNG, to the early 1900s. The authors highlight the failure to call up reserves during the Vietnam War, the implementation of the TFP, and the creation of the Roundout Program as a pivotal moment in the relationship. For the first time, Army Reserve Components were now integral to the performance of Army Regular Army units in peacetime for wartime contingencies.

the failure of President Lyndon Johnson, in not calling up reserves to active duty during the Vietnam War, challenged the notion of a future relationship between the Active Regular Army and the Army RCs. General Harold Johnson, the Army Chief of Staff, almost resigned in protest.<sup>47</sup> President Johnson's decision allowed the US Army to relegate the Army RCs to a lower priority. The US Army neglected the RCs and diverted equipment, manpower, and resources to the Active Regular Army on a massive scale. After the war, observers noted that the RCs were in a state of "disrepair and disarray." Many in the Active Regular Army questioned the definitive military value of Army RCs for utilization in future conflicts.<sup>48</sup>

In the context of the Vietnam War, the initial character of a future "relationship" between the Active Regular Army and Army RCs primarily rested on the question of draft reform, which emerged as a major campaign issue in the 1968 presidential election. At the forefront of the issue, Richard Nixon, the Republican presidential candidate, advocated ending the draft. He campaigned in part on a smaller professional, all volunteer military force.<sup>49</sup> Less than a month after his election, President Nixon commissioned an independent study on draft reform. He directed the Gates Commission "to develop a comprehensive plan for eliminating conscription and moving towards an all-volunteer force."<sup>50</sup> President Nixon's policy guidance toward the Gates Commission implied to the Department of Defense (DOD), particularly the US Army, that the end of conscription was essentially a foregone conclusion. The real questions facing the US

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<sup>47</sup> Lewis Sorley, *Thunderbolt: General Creighton Abrams and the Army of His Times* (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1992) 361.

<sup>48</sup> Robert K. Griffith Jr., *The US Army's Transition to the All-Volunteer Force 1968-1974*, ed. Jeffrey J. Clarke (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1997), 263-71.

<sup>49</sup> Beth Bailey, *America's Army: Making the All-Volunteer Force* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), 1-4.

<sup>50</sup> Griffith, 12-13. President Nixon established the "President's Commission on the All-Volunteer Force." Former Secretary of Defense Thomas S. Gates chaired a fifteen-member commission. It is commonly referred to as the Gates Commission.

Army included the timing and ramifications of switching to an AVF. An end to conscription necessitated a change in the relationship between AC and RC forces.

In a post-Vietnam War environment, the US Army understood that the national government would be entering an interwar period. Interwar periods are traditionally characterized by a rebalancing of national priorities and fiscal austerity. The post-Vietnam era was no different. A drawdown of DOD resources challenged US Army decision-making, particularly in the implementation of an AVF. The US Army made tough choices in end strength, equipment, and force structure. The US Army understood that a rebalancing would have serious consequences to the scale and scope of the future relationship. The US Army was not surprised by the policy direction of the Gates Commission nor of the challenges and timing of implementing an AVF. As early as 1968, the US Army launched several studies and experimental tests to include the Butler Study (1968), the Project Volunteer in Defense of the Nation study (PROVIDE) (1969), and the Volunteer Army Field Experiment (VOLAR) (1971).<sup>51</sup> The US Army leadership studied the effects of ending the draft, switching to an AVF, and researched several options for implementation.

From the beginning, the US Army understood that an AVF would be more expensive than conscripts in terms of pay, benefits, and recruiting costs. Many discussions centered around obtaining quality soldiers. Higher paid, quality soldiers would mean a smaller, professional force. Post-Vietnam budgetary constraints would force the US Army to drawdown the Active Regular Army to about “13 divisions and about 825,000 men [possibly smaller] ..., the smallest Army since before the Korean War.”<sup>52</sup> Not surprisingly, as early as 1970, General William Westmoreland, the Army Chief of Staff from 1968-1972, publicly stated that the end of

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<sup>51</sup> Griffith, 17-26, 81-91. The DOD and US Army had to adapt to the policy preferences of President Nixon.

<sup>52</sup> Sorley, 362.

conscription required increased reliance on the Army RCs for “One Army.”<sup>53</sup> A new “One Army” relationship implied a strong future connection.

At midnight on June 30, 1973, the DOD’s induction authority expired, officially ending conscription, and marked the beginning of the professionalization of an AVF.<sup>54</sup> This represented one of the most significant policy shifts in US military history, particularly in the evolution of a peacetime “One Army” from idea to a more formalized and structural operational approach for wartime contingencies. At a minimum, the AVF and budgetary constraints required force structure changes, cooperation, and partnership among all US Army components. In support of the “One Army” operational approach, DOD changes slowly ingrained and operationalized peacetime Army RCs to the extent that “military contingency operations simply could not be executed” for anticipated strategic conflicts in their absence.<sup>55</sup>

On August 22, 1973, Defense Secretary James R. Schlesinger led the transformation in a forceful memorandum announcing the “Total Force Policy” that “Guard and Reserve forces *will* be used as the initial and primary augmentation of active forces.”<sup>56</sup> He mandated that the services take action to integrate all Active, Guard, and Reserve forces “into a homogenous whole” capable of meeting the readiness standards of wartime contingencies.<sup>57</sup> General Creighton Abrams, the Army Chief of Staff from 1972-1974, set about implementing the TFP for the US Army.

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<sup>53</sup> Griffith, 268.

<sup>54</sup> Fredland, Gilroy, and Little, 32.

<sup>55</sup> NSIAD-91-263, *National Guard Peacetime Training Did Not Adequately Prepare Combat Brigades for Gulf War* (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 1991), 8. The Department of Defense reported to the US Congress in 1988 that Guard and Reserves were indispensable to wartime contingency plans, specifically a European, Warsaw-Pact conflict.

<sup>56</sup> Andrew Feickert and Lawrence Kapp, *Army Active Component (AC) / Reserve Component (RC) Force Mix: Considerations and Options for Congress* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2014), 4.

<sup>57</sup> Doubler, 278.

The decision not to mobilize the Army RCs during the Vietnam War buildup left an indelible scar on General Abrams. As the former Vice Chief of Staff from 1964-1967, he personally witnessed the “price in blood and sacrifice the [Active Regular] Army had been forced to pay in lieu of reserve mobilization.”<sup>58</sup> On many occasions, General Abrams stated the nation is “not taking us to war again without calling up the reserves.”<sup>59</sup> General Abrams was not alone in these sentiments. Many senior Army general officers felt President Johnson’s decision to exclude large reserve call ups from the Vietnam War allegedly created many moral, ethical, and civil-military problems.<sup>60</sup> Individual conscripts in lieu of large reserve call ups dispersed the immediate political costs of going to war. Conscripts did not restrict participation in the war to any particular constituency or voting districts. Obtaining popular support and consensus was not an immediate factor for political leaders in deciding to go to war. What little political consensus existed for the Vietnam War deteriorated over time. A divide emerged between the Active Regular Army waging a protracted war in Vietnam and society. Failure to call up the reserves delayed the nation and its political leaders from asking tough questions.<sup>61</sup> General Abrams

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<sup>58</sup> Sorley, 350.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid, 360-366. General Abrams served under Army Chief of Staff General Harold Johnson who almost resigned in protest for failure to mobilize the Army Reserve Components during the Vietnam War.

<sup>60</sup> Harry G. Summers Jr., *On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War* (New York, NY: The Random House Publishing Group, 2006), 11-32. President Johnson’s domestic policy preferences for his “Great Society” initiative and the associated political risks of mobilizing the reserves and National Guard prevented him from widening the war; Stanley Karnow, *Vietnam: A History* (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 1997), 439-441, 562-580. In 1965, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara tells President Johnson that failure to mobilize the reserves and National Guard would mean that the United States “could not meet its global security responsibilities.” For the next three years, the US Army struggled to meet its global security obligations while maintaining combat ready divisions because President Johnson would not mobilize the reserves and National Guard. By 1968, the only combat-ready division in the US Army was the 82nd Airborne Division. After the North Vietnamese Tet Offensive, the US Army stripped one-third of the 82nd Airborne Division’s troops to provide manpower to the Vietnam War. Thus, no US Army combat divisions were combat-ready. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Earle Wheeler repeatedly asked President Johnson to mobilize the reserves and National Guard after the Tet Offensive. Instead, President Johnson ordered a military strategy review to conclude whether sending more troops could achieve the strategic objectives of the United States in Vietnam. This was first military strategy review since the beginning of the war. The results of the military strategy review influenced President Johnson’s decision not seek the nomination of his political party for a second term as President of the United States.

<sup>61</sup> Peter Feaver. *Armed Servants* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), 67.

personally felt that structural reliance on reserves for future conflicts would endow the US Army with the necessary national will and “military flexibility to prosecute a conflict (war) to military victory.”<sup>62</sup> In theory, the nation could not deploy the US Army for wartime contingencies without calling up the Army RCs.<sup>63</sup> With the consent of Secretary Schlesinger and Congress, General Abrams’ proposed a course of action that created the first peacetime structural “One Army” relationship between the Active Regular Army and the RCs. In 1974, this course of action created AC-RC multi-component units as the foundation for the ARNG Roundout Brigade operational approach.<sup>64</sup>

## The ARNG Roundout Brigade Operational Approach

Combat units [roundout brigades] in particular require more time to coalesce and harden into tight, confident fighting teams. While unit building can be accelerated, it must not be done at the peril of soldier’s lives.

---Brigadier General Robert Scales  
Author of the US Army Official Account of the Persian Gulf War

### Strategic Context

In 1973, a major reassessment of US strategic policy, national military strategy, and resource allocations concluded that “American capacity to repel and deter aggression anywhere in the world was limited.” Interwar rebalancing and fiscal austerity forced the United States to prioritize global security and resource commitments. The strategy demanded the US Army focus on fighting a “1½ war” contingency, essentially a full-scale conventional war in Europe and a ½

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<sup>62</sup> Goldich, 5-6.

<sup>63</sup> Fredland, Gilroy, and Little, 104-105.

<sup>64</sup> Ronald R. Rollison, *Are Roundout Brigades a Viable Concept for the Future* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, 1990), 1-25. By traditional US Army doctrine, Active Army Divisions deploy and fight with three combat brigades. In an era of rebalancing national priorities and fiscal austerity following the post-Vietnam War, the US Army created the Roundout Brigade operational approach to retain more Active Army Divisions as a visible deterrent to the Soviet Union. This approach created the notion that Active Army Divisions would deploy and fight with two active combat brigades while waiting on a third ARNG combat brigade to mobilize, deploy, and link up with the division in the theater of war.

small-contingency war in the Middle East.<sup>65</sup> The resource demands for the strategy influenced the creation of the ARNG Roundout Brigade operational approach.

Europe became the United States' "first priority security region" for several reasons. First, the pronounced political, military tensions between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) nations and Soviet Union-backed Warsaw Pact nations increased the risk of a large, scale conventional war in Europe. Treaty obligations bound the United States to the defense of Europe. The Soviet Union posed a real threat. Second, the revitalization of a modern, conventional Soviet Army with increased offensive capabilities worried the US Army. The Soviet Army "had modernized its mechanized and armored forces and [possessed] massive mobile fire support in Europe." In contrast, the US Army emerged from Vietnam as a "broken Army" following a decade specializing in "light infantry combat" and counterinsurgency warfare.<sup>66</sup> Army senior leaders expressed serious concerns. One general told General Abrams, "your Army is on its ass" in terms of discipline, modernization, training, and doctrine.<sup>67</sup> Third, the "gradual deployment of Soviet and Warsaw Pact [combat] units to bases closer to the borders [NATO], implied the adoption of a preemptive, nonnuclear strategy." This influenced the strategic thinking of senior Army leaders. Fourth, the United States believed it would be "fighting outnumbered" in a European conventional war against the Soviet Union.<sup>68</sup>

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<sup>65</sup> Paul H. Herbert, *Leavenworth Papers No. 16: Deciding What Has to Be Done: General William E. DePuy and the 1976 Edition of FM 100-5, Operations* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, 1988), 5-9.

<sup>66</sup> Henry G. Cole, *General William E. DePuy: Preparing the Army for Modern War* (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 2008), 213-235.

<sup>67</sup> Thomas E. Ricks, *The Generals: American Military Command from World War II to Today* (New York, NY: The Penguin Press, 2012), 335-353.

<sup>68</sup> Herbert, 5-9; Kenneth J. Coffey, "Defending Europe Against Conventional Attack: The Increasing Gap Between the Army's Capabilities and NATO Commitments and What to Do About It," in *The Guard and Reserve in the Total Force: The First Decade 1973-1983*, ed. Bennie J. Wilson III (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1985), 203-216.

The Middle East was significant for several reasons. First, instability in the Middle East jeopardized the global free flow of oil. Second, Middle East foreign policy captivated the United States. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the Middle East was a volatile region. Conventional wars flared among the nations of Israel, Egypt, Syria, Iran, and Iraq. The most significant was the 1973 Arab-Israeli War (Yom Kippur War). The impact of this twenty-day war on the strategic thinking of senior US Army generals was profound. Israel was outnumbered two to one against Egypt and Syria. With assistance from the Soviet Union, Egypt and Syria fought “large, highly equipped [conventional] forces with relative proficiency.” From the opening of hostilities, the quickness and lethality with which both sides fought transcended previous wars. The “total tank and artillery losses for both sides together exceeded the entire tank and artillery inventory of the US Army” in Europe. This war convinced General William Depuy, the US Army Training and Doctrine (TRADOC) Commander from 1973-1977, that “future conventional warfare would be significantly different, if not altogether revolutionary, from previous American war experiences.”<sup>69</sup>

This war informed the strategic decision making and risk calculations of senior US Army generals. It forecasted what future Soviet aggression in NATO Europe might look like. General Depuy stated “the next war would be a deadly come-as-you-are affair requiring the United States to win the first battle while fighting outnumbered.”<sup>70</sup> Future conventional wars would be unpredictable, quicker, and more lethal against numerically superior enemy forces. Cooperation and collaboration at the highest levels between Germany and the United States operated on the critical assumption that the “bulk of U.S combat units [combat brigades and divisions] from the continental United States would reinforce NATO in any crisis” to deter the aggression of the

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<sup>69</sup> Herbert, 29-36

<sup>70</sup> Cole, 237; Jon P. Bruinooge, “Mobilization for a European War: The Impact of Habeas Corpus,” in *The Guard and Reserve in the Total Force: The First Decade 1973-1983*, ed. Bennie J. Wilson III (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1985), 223-226.



Soviet Union.<sup>71</sup> The Defense of NATO Europe for the next two decades dominated US Army strategic thinking to include force structure, training, doctrine, and modernization.<sup>72</sup>

In contrast, interwar rebalancing and fiscal austerity dominated the preferences of the US government after Vietnam. The national government informed senior Army generals that the US Army would be getting smaller, possibly too small to some, not bigger. The Soviet Union seemed not only to be getting bigger, but more potent. The 1974 congressionally-budgeted force of thirteen and a third Active Regular Army divisions was insufficient to execute the national military strategy. General Abrams told the US Congress that the budgeted force structure “was sufficient only to provide a marginal chance of succeeding without the use of nuclear weapons.” Per General Depuy, the strategic risk was even greater than what General Abrams had briefed Congress. General Depuy told General Abrams that the US Army had only “enough resources for ten good divisions, not thirteen.” Resources were tight, but General Abrams thought that Active Regular Army divisions symbolized credible deterrence to Soviet aggression. In peacetime, Army Reserve Component units were monetarily cheaper to man, train, and maintain. General Abrams therefore proposed a budgeted force structure of sixteen Active Regular Army divisions, but with subordinate reserve units to “round out” and shore up the difference. During his proposal to Congress, General Abrams stated “we [the US Army] are committed firmly to the essential task of bolstering readiness and responsiveness of the Reserve Components, integrating them fully into the total force.”<sup>73</sup> His proposal gave birth to the first peacetime “One Army” operational approach, the ‘rounding out’ of Active Regular Army Divisions with ARNG combat brigades.

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<sup>71</sup> Herbert, 61-68.

<sup>72</sup> Army Field Manual (FM) 100-5, *Operations* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1977), 1-1 to 1-5. FM 100-5 represented the premiere US Army capstone doctrinal manual. The manual is built around the central premise that the US Army must be prepared to win the first battle, fight outnumbered, and win against enemy forces of the Soviet backed Warsaw Pact in Central Europe. Subsequent US Army capstone doctrinal manuals published in 1982 and 1986 altered the operating concept, but did not alter the central premise to fight outnumbered and win against the Soviet Union.

<sup>73</sup> Sorley, 362-365.

For the first time in history, ARNG combat brigades became an integral fixture in Active Regular Army Division wartime planning, preparation, and execution considerations.

### Peacetime Assumptions and Expectations

Given the strategic context, the national security policy, international commitments, and national military strategy, the DOD and the US Army made three major responsiveness assumptions. First, the US Army assumed US policy-makers would commit ARNG combat brigades to round out and form “an essential part of” their parent active division for wartime contingency operations. Any lapse in decision making by a policy-maker would undoubtedly affect the responsiveness of ARNG combat brigades mobilizing to meet up with their parent division into a wartime “One Army.” Second, the US Army assumed that after federalization, M-Day, all affiliated ARNG combat brigades would complete mobilization, post-mobilization training, certification, and deploy to the theater of war within 120 days “to fight as organic parts of their active divisions.”<sup>74</sup> In the 1970s and 1980s, numerous DOD briefings and budget justifications to Congress repeatedly confirmed this expectation. In a NATO/Warsaw Pact conflict, war plans called for a surge from 660,000 combat-ready troops to 1.525 million within 120 days of the outbreak of hostilities. War planners anticipated ninety five percent of all available ARNG units would be available on M-Day.<sup>75</sup> Third, DOD assumed that all nine ARNG combat brigades would “be ready to mobilize, deploy, and perform wartime missions with the same dispatch and competency as their active duty counterparts.”<sup>76</sup> The NATO deployment schedule called for the first ARNG roundout brigade, the 48th Infantry Brigade, to be in the

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<sup>74</sup> Moxon, 97; Wilfred L. Ebel, “Toward Total-Force Mobilization Readiness,” in *The Guard and Reserve in the Total Force: The First Decade 1973-1983*, ed. Bennie J. Wilson III (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1985), 260.

<sup>75</sup> *Ibid.*, 92-102.

<sup>76</sup> Vincent H. Demma, ed. Susan Carroll, *Department of the Army Historical Summary: FY 1989*. (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1998), 137-138.

European theater by M+29 and all others by M+79.<sup>77</sup> These responsiveness assumptions stipulated that ARNG combat brigades could maintain a high level of readiness, deploy early to a combat theater, integrate with their parent division, and perform as designed for major combat operations. Eager reserve leaders stated the “roundout units were ready to join their active counterparts after only a minimal period of added training, a period that have been anticipated in all contingency plans.”<sup>78</sup> The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs from 1987-1993, Stephen M. Duncan, confirmed these expectations: roundout “brigades were to be part of “early reinforcing forces, i.e. those that would deploy to a crisis area between thirty and ninety days.”<sup>79</sup>

The US Army made a major integration assumption. Peacetime integration processes for ARNG combat brigades are explicitly dependent on all three responsiveness pre-requisites. Any lapse in decision making by a policy-maker undoubtedly disrupted the peacetime integration processes of the US Army to bring ARNG combat brigade into a wartime “One Army.” Wartime deployment schedules and transportation assets were contingent on policy maker decisiveness. This was a major “One Army” integration assumption that all responsiveness pre-requisites would be met. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, however, the US Army never validated the responsiveness assumptions and expectations. Integration was theoretical at best.

To achieve these responsiveness and integration expectations, the US Army, a federal agency, charged the gaining active division commander with the authority and responsibility to generate readiness during peacetime in its affiliated ARNG combat brigade, a state entity. The US Army tasked the gaining active division commander to provide “wartime mission guidance, approve METLs, provide training guidance and priorities for wartime mission planning, review

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<sup>77</sup> Martin Binkin and William W. Kaufman. *US Army Guard & Reserve: Rhetoric, Realities, Risks* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1989), 12-17, 142-143; Ebel, 259-260.

<sup>78</sup> Fredland, Gilroy, and Little, 110.

<sup>79</sup> Duncan, 38.

training programs, review unit status reports, recommend force structure and integration actions, and conduct AT evaluations” for its ARNG combat brigade.<sup>80</sup> The DOD Reserve Forces Policy Board (RFPB) reiterated the readiness responsibilities of the active division commander towards ARNG roundout brigades in their 1988 and 1989 annual reports to the DOD and Congress by stating: “the gaining command becomes involved in training the reserve component [roundout] unit and ensures the training is directed toward the mobilization mission.”<sup>81</sup> This seemed reasonable for planned wartime contingency operations, though in peacetime, ARNG combat brigades were “organic” to their State National Guards and not their affiliated active division.<sup>82</sup> The State National Guard in peacetime had command authority, responsibility, and administrative control (ADCON), which is “the direction or exercise of authority over subordinate organizations [the ARNG brigades] in respect to administration and support, including organization of Service forces, control of resources and equipment, personnel management, unit logistics, individual and unit training, readiness, mobilization, demobilization, discipline, and other matters.”<sup>83</sup>

Given the circumstances, the US Army made two major relationship assumptions. First, the US Army assumed the command authorities were clear and sufficient between organizations for resourcing and generating readiness in ARNG combat brigades. Second, the US Army assumed that the generation of readiness inside ARNG combat brigades during pre-mobilization training was within the gaining active division commander’s span of control. Structurally, the State National Guard and the gaining active division commander shared authorities and

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<sup>80</sup> Goff and Kahlan, 1-2.

<sup>81</sup> John O. Marsh Jr., *Fiscal Year 1989: Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1989), 71-73. Beginning in 1977, the Reserve Force Policy Board provided annual assessment reports, each over a hundred pages in length, to the Secretary of Defense, the President of the United States, and Congress on achieving readiness goals for Reserve Components at comparable levels to Active Components.

<sup>82</sup> Title 32 USC Statute 104 (Units: Location; Organization; Command)

<sup>83</sup> ADRP 5-0, 2-15 to 2-17.

responsibilities for readiness and integration in a unique cross organizational command relationship. The relationship expectation was that the ARNG brigade commanders executed the training plans of the wartime commander and it was assumed that the State National Guard would not work at cross purposes in achieving the intent of those plans. Integration required equal participation.

Tempering readiness expectations, the number of training days per year, mandatory administrative requirements, and geography constrained the peacetime readiness potential of ARNG combat brigades. Several statements in a report to Congress characterized these limitations: (1) “National Guard units train only 39 days each year, of which about one-half may be spent on administrative matters.... available training days include a 2-week period during which units spend at least 7 days in a tactical field environment [for collective training] to approximate wartime conditions.” (2) battalions and brigades rarely conduct collective training as “one unit due to the geographic location of guard units.”<sup>84</sup> The US Army tasked the affiliated active divisions to conduct, evaluate, and generate readiness in ARNG roundout brigade during their AT periods.<sup>85</sup> Per US Army Inspector General reports, this constituted anywhere from “8-9 days” to “no more than 11 days” “of useful collective training [that could be]... accomplished during the 14-day AT period.” Complicating matters, the affiliated active divisions were often geographically separated from the affiliated ARNG brigade’s battalions and companies.<sup>86</sup> On average, ARNG units traveled 150 miles and sometimes upwards of 300 miles to major training

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<sup>84</sup> NSIAD-93-4, *Army Training: Replacement Brigades Were More Proficient Than Guard Roundout Brigades* (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 1994), 28; Goldich, 30. The roundout brigades were high priority ARNG units. The US Army planned roundout brigades for wartime contingencies. In FY1990, the two roundout brigades in the first case study received additional DOD funding for more peacetime pre-mobilization training days. The 48th brigade conducted sixty days of pre-mobilization training. The 155th brigade conducted sixty-four days of pre-mobilization training.

<sup>85</sup> Goff and Kahlan, 1-2.

<sup>86</sup> Binkin and Kaufman, 96-103.

areas for two-day drill weekends.<sup>87</sup> These realities naturally constrained t-level readiness generation strategies for realistic pre-mobilization training above small unit collective training. Realities inhibited command and staff training as well.

Generating t-level readiness for ARNG brigades would be a difficult task for affiliated active divisions during peacetime. Most importantly, the US Army made a major integration assumption, that in this shared command relationship, the affiliated active division commander could give the appropriate wartime training guidance on the scope and scale of ARNG collective training, review ARNG unit readiness status reports with accuracy, and effectively conduct and evaluate the ARNG unit training readiness (t-level) during their AT periods. The US Army assumed that the affiliated active division commander could do it in very brief periods of interaction, ARNG AT periods.<sup>88</sup> The US Army assumed the affiliated active division commander could do all these peacetime integration tasks for the ARNG combat brigade while being geographically separated.<sup>89</sup> The US Army assumed this could be done with the active division's own competing readiness requirements.<sup>90</sup> Most importantly, the US Army made the first major readiness assumption that a t-level readiness foundation could be laid by the active division during pre-mobilization training for the ARNG combat brigade to generate higher t-level training readiness during post-mobilization training.

Given the constraints, the predominate strategy of the DOD and the US Army was provisioning readiness for ARNG combat brigades. Generating readiness could not be the focus. The DOD knew Guard and Reserve units were neglected in the Vietnam War. The DOD and the

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<sup>87</sup> Lippiatt, Polich, and Sortor, 7-8.

<sup>88</sup> Normal Williamson, *Army Readiness and the Reserve Roundouts: A New Perspective* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: The US Army War College, 1993), 16-17. For years, the active Army provisioned mobile training teams (MTTs) to roundout units to conduct requested annual training, effectively undercutting reserve NCOs from preparing and conducting their own training.

<sup>89</sup> Duncan, 43-44.

<sup>90</sup> Goff and Kahlan, 7.

US Army specifically sought to create “a force in being, not in Reserve.” Their aim was to provision the RCs comparable to the AC.<sup>91</sup> This was stated policy reiterated by President Ronald Reagan, the Congress, DOD, and every RFPB report since 1977. President Reagan stated “my administration is determined that these vital Reserve Forces will be manned, equipped, and trained to meet their full responsibility as a combat-ready element of the total force.” In 1982, Defense Secretary Casper Weinberger narrowed this vision stating the “goal of the DOD is to equip all active, Guard, and Reserve units to full wartime requirements... units that fight first shall be equipped first regardless of component.”<sup>92</sup> Based congressional limitations on training days, provisioning readiness was all the DOD could do for ARNG combat brigades.

In the RFPB reports from 1986-1989, resourcing readiness, vice generating readiness, permeated all training and mobilization recommendations. Training resources such as training simulators, facilities, contractors, ammunition, and equipment dominated recommendations, although those for generating readiness through more education and training opportunities received almost no attention at all. The only exception in the 1987 RFPB annual report was a few small paragraphs requesting more funding for increased Guard and Reserve training time. These paragraphs focused on the heart of the problem by stating: “it would be impossible [for most Reserve and Guard units] to maintain the high state of readiness demanded by the Total Force policy, if all selected reservists were limited to that amount of training [thirty-nine days per year].”<sup>93</sup> This was a bold statement, but for unknown reasons, the 1987 RFPB’s recommendation to fund increased training time did not make it into the report’s executive summary. This

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<sup>91</sup> Louis J. Conti, *Fiscal Year 1984: Readiness Assessment of the Reserve Components* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1985).

<sup>92</sup> Bennie J. Wilson III and Wilfred L. Ebel, “Equipping the Total Force: Continuing Dialog” in *The Guard and Reserves in the Total Force: The First Decade 1973-1983*, ed. Bennie J. Wilson III (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1985), 173-184.

<sup>93</sup> Will Tankersley, *Fiscal Year 1987: Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1989), 113.

statement was also absent in the next several annual RFPB reports while provisioning recommendations persisted.

The second major readiness assumption was that the provisioning of personnel (p-level), supplies and equipment (s-level), and maintenance (r-level) readiness for ARNG combat brigades would be sufficient to generate readiness during post-mobilization to meet responsiveness expectations. In the 1970s and 1980s, the US Army set about provisioning p-level readiness to ARNG combat brigades in three significant ways.<sup>94</sup> First, the US Army sought to ensure ARNG combat brigades total personnel strengths were “manned... to reflect or mirror” their active counterparts.<sup>95</sup> Second, the ARNG recruitment strategies focused on obtaining the appropriate mix of prior service (PS) and non-prior service (NPS) soldiers. NPS soldiers were “lower-quality,” “first-time individuals” that required “six to twelve months of full time initial training” prior to joining the ARNG unit.<sup>96</sup> PS soldiers provided the ARNG with “a resource of individuals, trained, and experienced in military skills” that were cost effective given annual training constraints.<sup>97</sup> The US Army actively worked to raise ARNG personnel readiness by targeting and recruiting higher proportions of pretrained PS soldiers to transition to the Guard. The US Army set specific recruitment PS targets for critical military occupational specialties (MOSQ) and

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<sup>94</sup> AR 220-1, 12, 42-45. US Army personnel readiness (p-level) is a composite of three sub-categories: the total percentage available personnel strength, percentage of qualified military occupational specialty (MOSQ) personnel, and the percentage of trained senior grade personnel. The US Army measures total available personnel strength by dividing total available personnel on hand over authorized personnel in accordance with the unit’s MTOE. The US Army measures availability of MOSQ personnel by dividing available MOSQ personnel over authorized MOSQ personnel in accordance with the unit’s MTOE. The US Army measures the availability of trained senior grade personnel across five enlisted (E5-E9) and officer (O1-2, O3, O4, O5, O6) categories in accordance with the unit’s MTOE. By regulation, the US Army counts a senior grade leader trained if he/she completed the required professional military education (PME) course that is commensurate with their grade category and MOSQ. The US Army believes that successful PME graduation is foundational to a unit’s success and enables the leader to be successful in grade.

<sup>95</sup> Moxon, 97.

<sup>96</sup> *Ibid*, 105-109.

<sup>97</sup> Bennie J. Wilson III and James R. Engelage, “Pretrained Individual Manpower: Albatross or Phoenix?” in *The Guard and Reserve in the Total Force: The First Decade 1973-1983*, ed. *Bernie J. Wilson III* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1985), 123-125.



senior grade noncommissioned officers (NCOs) and officers with commensurate professional military education (PME) completion.

In 1977, the US Army recruiting goal was a “35/ 65 mix” of NPS and PS soldiers for the ARNG.<sup>98</sup> This recruitment strategy could only provision ARNG p-level readiness in the short term as “a substitution for [senior] career personnel.”<sup>99</sup> A study found that reliance on PS soldiers contributed to “high compensation costs, grade stagnation, and an aging force” in ARNG reserve units. Grade stagnation specifically occurred because NPS and PS soldiers needed continuing PME over time to fill senior grade and MOSQ personnel readiness requirements for advancement in their ARNG units.<sup>100</sup> Professional units require PME and MOSQ trained soldiers. ARNG units balanced the citizen-soldier’s civilian employment requirements and the need to send soldiers to continuing PME and MOSQ schools for promotion. Course lengths ranged from days, weeks, months, or up to a year.<sup>101</sup> ARNG brigades allowed senior grade categories and MOSQ personnel to serve one level up without PME and MOSQ for grade.<sup>102</sup> This could be problematic for generating readiness during post-mobilization training for ARNG brigades.

Third, the US Army worked to provision personnel (p-level) readiness to ARNG brigades by creating shorter, more flexible, and available PME and MOSQ schools that were conducive to citizen-soldiers.<sup>103</sup> The PME and MOSQ courses were not comparable with their active duty counterparts.<sup>104</sup> Complicating personnel readiness generation was the fact that ARNG personnel

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<sup>98</sup> Moxon, 103-104.

<sup>99</sup> Ibid, 109

<sup>100</sup> Ibid, 103,109.

<sup>101</sup> Duncan, 43.

<sup>102</sup> NSIAD-91-263, *National Guard: Peacetime Training Did Not Adequately Prepare Combat Brigades for Gulf War* (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 1991), 17.

<sup>103</sup> NSIAD-93-4, 14-18.

<sup>104</sup> Thomas C. Stredwick, *Title XI: An Underfunded Initiative* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, 1996), 15. AC and RC units had discrepancies in military education standards.

trained only part-time and had to “retain skills over longer periods with less practice and supervision.”<sup>105</sup> ARNG often had to attend PME and MOSQ training during their AT instead of conducting collective training. This hurt unit peacetime t-level generation. Additionally, ARNG often completed MOSQ training on older equipment only to become unqualified upon being fielded new equipment, a constant problem with the goal of comparable equipment.<sup>106</sup> The major personnel readiness assumption was that these provisioning readiness strategies to raise p-levels would not interfere with the ability of the ARNG brigade to generate t-level readiness during post-mobilization training.

The US Army sought to provision supplies and equipment (s-level) in ARNG combat brigades comparable to their active duty counterparts. In the 1970s, Congress agreed to the DOD’s expansion of three more active divisions that would be rounded out by ARNG brigades, but did not fund the additional supplies and equipment. The DOD resourced the new commands and the ARNG brigades by reorganizing and restructuring existing supplies and equipment.<sup>107</sup> To keep the Guard’s readiness reporting levels high, the US Army designated older equipment as authorized substitutes for more modern equipment.<sup>108</sup> These substitutions were liberal and Guardsman subsequently referred to the TFP as the “Total Farce.”<sup>109</sup> As a result, the US Army provisioned supplies and equipment (s-level) readiness to the ARNG brigades that were not

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<sup>105</sup> Moxon, 107.

<sup>106</sup> Duncan, 43-44; NSIAD-91-263, 13. ARNG soldiers repeatedly needed new equipment training following equipment modernizations. Examples included the modernization of ARNG roundout brigades from M60 Patton Main Battle Tanks to M1A1 Abrams Tanks in the 1980s and from M113 Infantry Personnel Carriers to M2A2 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicles (BFV) in the early 1990s.

<sup>107</sup> Doubler, 280.

<sup>108</sup> NSIAD-92-36. *Operation Desert Storm: Army Guard Combat Brigade War Lessons Reflect Long-Standing Problems* (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 1992), 5-6. As an example, ARNG commanders reported commercial utility cargo trucks (the World War II M170 jeeps) as supply substitutions for high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs) in their readiness reports.

<sup>109</sup> Doubler, 281.

comparable to their active duty counterparts' modern equipment. The DOD de facto policy was to issue first time equipment to active forces first, reserves second; obsolete equipment filled shortages in the reserves.<sup>110</sup> The assumption was that this would not affect the generation of ARNG brigade readiness during post-mobilization training.

Attempting to equip the ARNG combat brigades comparable to their active counterparts created equipment and serviceability (r-level) readiness challenges. No doubt, this was exacerbated with limited annual training days. Equipment operational readiness (OR) rates might deteriorate over time without adequate time to maintain equipment. This could impede the unit's ability to meet readiness generation expectations during post-mobilization training. Thus, the US Army sought to provision r-level readiness for ARNG combat brigades. The US Army created centralized mobilization and training equipment sites (MATES) to provision civilian contractors to maintain ARNG combat brigade equipment. Civilian contractors kept r-level readiness reporting high during peacetime.<sup>111</sup> Contracted civilians largely, not Guardsman, would troubleshoot and perform maintenance on ARNG combat brigade equipment during peacetime. Contracted civilians formed the foundation of the unit's peacetime equipment serviceability, not Guardsman. Again, the assumption was that this would not inhibit the generation of ARNG combat brigade readiness during post-mobilization training.

### Persian Gulf War Mobilization

On August, 2 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait. On August 6, the US Army ordered the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) and 1st Cavalry Division to deploy to the Persian Gulf. On

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<sup>110</sup> Duncan, 43; James Browning II et al. "The US Reserve System: Attitudes, Perceptions, and Realities" in *The Guard and Reserve in the Total Force: The First Decade 1973-1983*, ed. Bernie J. Wilson III (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1985), 76-77. The authors discuss the "modernization bow wave" from AC to RC units. The authors also state the ARNG had equipment that was three to five generations behind current first-line equipment.

<sup>111</sup> NSIAD-91-263, 13-14.

August 10th and September 11th, both active divisions respectively loaded sealift ships. Plans called for the two divisions to be ‘rounded out’ by the ARNG’s 48th Infantry Brigade (Mech) and 155th Armor Brigade respectively. In September 1990, DOD policy makers replaced the deployment of the roundout brigades with active replacement brigades instead, the 197th Infantry Brigade (Mech) and 1st Brigade, 2nd Armored Division.<sup>112</sup> For the Persian Gulf War, the 24<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division and 1<sup>st</sup> Cavalry Divisions would receive and integrate active replacement brigades. Neither had worked with one another during peacetime.

On August 22, President George H.W. Bush signed executive order 12727 ordering a partial mobilization and authorizing the deployment of “those special categories of reservists that are essential to completing our mission.”<sup>113</sup> High on the special categories list were combat support reservists, not the roundout combat brigades.<sup>114</sup> Congressman and the NGB wanted to validate the roundout operational approach. Defense Secretary Richard Cheney and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) General Colin Powell both told Congress that the deployment of roundout combat brigades was impractical because congressional restrictions limited their mobilization to 180 days.<sup>115</sup> This was the narrative. Heated disagreements among senior DOD leaders took place out of the public eye and persisted into October 1990.

Secretary Cheney stated “it was dumb to spend significant resources on reserve units that the military services were reluctant to use simply because it was the politically correct thing to do.”<sup>116</sup> General Powell stated “we can’t permit Congress and the reserve lobbies to make Desert

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<sup>112</sup> Duncan, 36. The US Army never validated the readiness, responsiveness, and integration of roundout brigades for wartime deployment. Both roundout brigades were not ready. The AC assumed strategic risk with integrating AC brigades into AC divisions that had not trained together in peacetime. Fortunately, Operation Desert Storm did not occur until January 15, 1991, and this risk abated over time.

<sup>113</sup> Ibid, 26, 48.

<sup>114</sup> Peter Petre, *General H. Normal Schwarzkopf: The Autobiography: It Doesn’t Take A Hero* (New York, NY: Bantam Books, 1993), 375-376.

<sup>115</sup> Duncan, 50-52. These are first-hand accounts from the Assistant Secretary of Reserve Affairs.

<sup>116</sup> Ibid, 80-81.

Shield a test of the types of reserve forces that would be needed in the future.” He felt roundouts were outdated.<sup>117</sup> General Carl Vuono, the Army Chief of Staff, affirmed the deployment of the roundout brigades was vital and “at the heart of the Total Army concept.”<sup>118</sup> He pressed Secretary Cheney for the deployment of roundout brigades. He believed the 48th Infantry Brigade would be ready in sixty days. General Vuono considered it the best trained roundout in the US Army after completing a National Training Center (NTC) rotation in July 1990.<sup>119</sup>

The US Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander, General Norman Schwarzkopf, firmly disagreed and stated “I understand your political problem, but goddammit, we’re fighting a war.”<sup>120</sup> He privately “had never supported the roundout concept” and from experience, questioned the 48th brigade’s readiness.<sup>121</sup> He stated “I knew precisely what we needed: truck drivers, stevedores, ammunition handlers, telephone installers, mechanics – workers to take on the nitty-gritty tasks of supporting a deployment in a combat zone.”<sup>122</sup> He believed roundout combat brigades were unprepared and “might better be suited to a longer war.”<sup>123</sup> The US FORSCOM Commander, General Ed Burba, concurred and spoke against utilizing the roundout brigades and acknowledged the risk of sending “men to war unprepared.”<sup>124</sup>

From the beginning, DOD policy-makers and wartime commanders had private policy preferences for not to mobilizing ARNG roundout combat brigades for their designed purpose,

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<sup>117</sup> Duncan, 80-81.

<sup>118</sup> See Footnote 7 of this monograph.

<sup>119</sup> Ibid, 63-64.

<sup>120</sup> Petre, 376.

<sup>121</sup> Duncan, 36-37. General Schwarzkopf served as the former affiliated active division commander for the 48th Infantry Brigade roundout from 1983-1985.

<sup>122</sup> Petre, 375.

<sup>123</sup> Ibid, 376.

<sup>124</sup> Ibid, 376. This quote is directly from General Schwarzkopf’s autobiography.

major combat operations. They all assumed risk if unproven and untrained ARNG roundout brigades failed in the Persian Gulf War. They did not want to widen the war if active replacement brigades were trained and ready.<sup>125</sup> DOD policy-makers and wartime commanders professed policy preferences that had low political risks. To counter the DOD public narrative on the non-mobilization of roundout combat brigades, Congress authorized changes in the provisions of Section 673b restricting their mobilizations to 180 days.<sup>126</sup>

On November 30, 1990, after intense political pressure, the DOD activated the 48th and 155th roundout brigades to begin post-mobilization training, a full 112 days after affiliated active divisions deployed. The operational approach failed the first pre-requisite of a responsive roundout brigade that of notification and thus, by default, all integration assumptions and expectations for wartime plans failed. On February 28, 1991, FORSCOM trainers prematurely certified the 48th Infantry Brigade at the NTC after ninety-one days of post-mobilization training.<sup>127</sup> The 155th Armored Brigade never completed certification and began demobilization

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<sup>125</sup> Williamson, 8-14, 27. Mobilization is an act of political will that sends strong signals to domestic constituencies, allies, and foes. Compared to combat support and combat service support units, the mobilization of ARNG combat brigades represents a strong political symbol for imminent major combat operations. Political risks for miscalculation are high for both DOD policy-makers and wartime commanders. In the Persian Gulf War, both DOD policy-makers and wartime commanders did not recommend ARNG combat brigades for mobilization in support of major combat operations. In the future, hypothetically, DOD policy-makers could delay ARNG combat brigade mobilization for participation in major combat operations for political reasons counter to the recommendations of wartime commanders and planners. This could increase the pressure on wartime commanders to take bold action in the absence of favorable force ratios against an adversary and assume more strategic risk in major combat operations.

<sup>126</sup> Duncan, 66-92.

<sup>127</sup> Lippiatt, Polich, and Sortor, 21-22. FORSCOM certified the 48th Infantry Brigade without platoons completing the Advanced Gunnery Tables X-XIIs or companies completing combined arms live fire exercises (CALFEX). The US Army structures twelve gunnery tables for crews to develop and test proficiency in a progressive manner. Tables I-IV (Basic Gunnery) requires individual crews to engage stationary targets. Tables V-VIII (Intermediate Gunnery) requires individual crews to demonstrate proficiency against single, multiple, and simultaneous targets while the crews are stationary and moving. Tables IX-XII (Advanced Gunnery) requires vehicle sections and the platoon to engage multiple and simultaneous stationary and moving targets. Tables IX-XII simulates actual wartime offensive and defensive missions at the platoon level. A company CALFEX trains companies to integrate, coordinate, and synchronize combined arms maneuver competencies (infantry, armor, engineer, indirect fire, and aviation assets) for major combat operations. The Department of the Army Inspector General (DAIG) estimates that it would require another seventeen days to complete these requirements, maybe more. It may or may not be coincidental that FORSCOM certified the 48th Infantry Brigade on the day of the Persian Gulf War cease-

after 105 days of post-mobilization training.<sup>128</sup> The operational approach failed the second responsiveness pre-requisite that of the war plan expectations and estimates of availability in unit status reports. Roundout war plan expectations for post-mobilization, certification, and deployment to theater were M+29 and M+79 for the 48th and 155th brigades respectively.<sup>129</sup> The month prior to activation, the 48th and 155th brigades reported overall unit readiness ratings of C-2 and C-3 respectively. Each requested twenty-eight and forty days of post-mobilization training respectively to generate a C-1 overall unit readiness rating and complete certification. Upon activation, both immediately revised their overall readiness ratings downward to C-3 and C-5 respectively. Accordingly, both revised their training plans and post-mobilization training day estimates for certification down to ninety-one and 135 days respectively.<sup>130</sup> The operational approach failed the third responsiveness pre-requisite of performing in a positive way. War plans called for the 48th Infantry Brigade to be the first roundout to be ready as it was the best trained of the roundouts having completed a peacetime NTC rotation five months prior. The best ARNG roundout brigade, however, did not meet war plan expectations. The other roundout brigade never certified. This was not positive.

Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the DOD repeatedly provisioned p-level, s-level, and r-level readiness to ARNG roundout brigades. The US Army tasked the affiliated active division commanders to review the accuracy of roundout brigade unit readiness reports monthly and to conduct external evaluations during their AT periods. The affiliated division commander had the responsibility to ensure a t-level readiness foundation was laid in the roundout brigade to generate

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fire; NSIAD-95-91, *Army National Guard: Combat Brigades' Ability To Be Ready For War In 90 Days Is Uncertain* (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 1995), 2, 50. The GAO estimated another twenty-four days would be required to recover, prepare, and load the 48th Infantry Brigade to meet original responsiveness expectations in theater. FORSCOM prematurely certified the 48th Infantry Brigade.

<sup>128</sup> Goldich, 1, 12-14.

<sup>129</sup> Binkin and Kaufman, 12-17, 142-143.

<sup>130</sup> NSIAD-91-263, 24.

higher t-level readiness during post-mobilization training. To this end, the US Army provisioned an “extraordinary commitment of active Army personnel and resources” to generate the individual, collective, and leader proficiencies of the roundout brigades during post-mobilization training.<sup>131</sup> ARNG brigade and battalion commanders “were unstinting in their praise of active Army assistance [during post-mobilization integration] to achieve standards.”<sup>132</sup> The US Army committed 4,370 active trainers to assist and certify the 48th brigade at the NTC for two months. This commitment canceled a planned rotation of a brigade from the 4th Infantry Division. Instead, the US Army committed 1,800 active trainers from the 4th Infantry Division to assist and certify the 155th brigade at Fort Hood, TX for four months.<sup>133</sup> In context, the peacetime command relationships for pre-mobilization training and the active resources applied to post-mobilization integration were inadequate to generate the required t-level readiness to meet war plan responsiveness expectations.

The question was, could the US Army in the future provision more p-level, s-level, r-level, and t-level resources during pre-mobilization and post-mobilization to generate readiness quicker? Department of the Army Inspector General (DAIG) reports, congressional investigations, after action reviews, special reports, and the official US Army account of the Persian Gulf War all revealed wishful thinking on the part of the DOD and US Army that provisioning more resources, besides more peacetime collective training time, could generate readiness and responsiveness expectations faster.

The official US Army account of the Persian Gulf War revealed that the p-level readiness foundation was not sufficient: “the post-mobilization plan [for roundout brigades] called for crew and small-unit training to begin immediately after call-up, but collective training had to be

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<sup>131</sup> NSIAD-91-263, 25-27.

<sup>132</sup> Goldich, 23.

<sup>133</sup> NSIAD-91-263, 25-27.



delayed until individual soldiers' skills were brought up to standard."<sup>134</sup> The total available p-level strengths of the 48th and 155th brigades was eighty-four and eighty-two percent respectively. This was thirteen percent lower than the active replacement brigades that deployed to the Persian Gulf War. Because of soldier non-deployables, the roundout brigades made it worse by cross-leveling "personnel and equipment to balance resources available among the units" at the mobilization stations. This broke up small units that had trained together during peacetime, effectively bringing the unit training readiness rating to a "T-4."<sup>135</sup> P-level readiness deficiencies wreaked havoc on post-mobilization t-level training. The roundout brigades were short critical combat arms specialties in infantry, armor, and artillery. This resulted in "10-15 percent of the M1 tank crews and 25-50 percent of the infantry squads not fully manned" for post-mobilization collective training.<sup>136</sup> The total available strength alone was not the sole p-level factor that inhibited t-level readiness generation.<sup>137</sup>

The MOSQ and PME qualifications of roundout soldiers "never matched the levels attained by the replacement brigades" or came close at any time during post-mobilization.<sup>138</sup> Though total available strength hovered around approximately eighty three percent at mobilization, roundout brigade effective strengths for post-mobilization training averaged between sixty-five and seventy percent. Many soldiers from the 48th and 155th brigades, 834 and 673 soldiers respectively, did not complete MOS qualifications during peacetime.<sup>139</sup> General

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<sup>134</sup> Robert H. Scales, *Certain Victory: The US Army in the Gulf War* (Washington, DC: Brassey's, 1993), 53.

<sup>135</sup> NSIAD-91-263, 10. Higher than normal medical non-deployable soldiers also contributed to the cross-leveling of personnel in subordinate organizations.

<sup>136</sup> NSIAD-93-4, 19-20.

<sup>137</sup> Roundout brigades had large numbers of non-deployment soldiers for medical and dental readiness. For brevity, this monograph does not discuss this at length.

<sup>138</sup> NSIAD-91-263, 12.

<sup>139</sup> NSIAD-93-4, 19-20.

Vuono vowed “no [reserve] soldier would deploy who was not trained and ready for combat.”<sup>140</sup> During post-mobilization training, approximately 600 roundout non-MOSQ soldiers left their brigades to complete formal p-level MOSQ schooling for forty-two specialties, which meant missed collective training opportunities. This further prevented t-level readiness generation. The other non-MOSQ soldiers completed collective training, but received waivers in lieu of the MOSQ requirement.<sup>141</sup> Thus, the standard was lowered.

ARNG units did not get officers and NCOs to PME courses in peacetime. This complicated post-mobilization readiness generation. Post-mobilization leadership deficiencies occurred despite US Army initiatives to accommodate ARNG units for more non-resident, shorter PME courses. These PME courses were not equivalent to their active counterparts.<sup>142</sup> The standards were lowered. This became transparent during post-mobilization training; ARNG “NCOs were generally one rank behind the active Army in completing [PME] required courses.”<sup>143</sup> The NGB exacerbated the problem by instituting a policy authorizing “immediate promotions upon mobilization for soldiers occupying a position graded higher than their current rank.”<sup>144</sup> Like dominos, brigades promoted NCOs in all grades. Roundout brigade NCO PME completion rates averaged thirty percent for sergeants, forty five percent for staff sergeants, sixty five percent for sergeants first class, and ten percent for first sergeants. In contrast, the active replacement brigades that deployed early, averaged eighty five percent or higher for all NCO PME grade categories. US Army observer controller-trainers (OC/T) noted that a solid p-level

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<sup>140</sup> Scales, 52.

<sup>141</sup> NSIAD-91-263, 25-26.

<sup>142</sup> Goldich, 30-32.

<sup>143</sup> NSIAD-93-4, 16.

<sup>144</sup> NSIAD-91-263, 17.

foundation in roundout brigades was absent.<sup>145</sup> US Army OC/Ts stated: “lacking technical and tactical skills, many [roundout] NCOs could not make routine operations happen.”<sup>146</sup> The trend was consistent for ARNG officers as well. Roundout brigade officer PME completion rates averaged seventy percent for lieutenants, fifty percent for captains, and sixty percent for majors. Trained company and field grade officers are critical to t-level readiness generation. In contrast, the active replacement brigades averaged ninety-three percent or higher for all officer PME grade categories. US Army OC/Ts noted that the “Officers on the brigade and battalion staffs displayed insufficient knowledge of the difficult tasks of coordinating combined arms operations.”<sup>147</sup> NCO and officer p-level readiness deficiencies occurred despite a peacetime ARNG “35 NPS / 65 PS mix” recruitment strategy to provision PME/MOSQ p-level readiness. NCO and officer grade stagnation did occur at substantial levels in the roundout brigades during peacetime.<sup>148</sup> There are no shortcuts to p-level readiness generation. Provisioning it alone proved unsatisfactory.

There were, however, readiness provisioning bright spots. In a congressional report, investigators revealed that resourcing s-level readiness was more positive over past mobilizations. Investigators noted “investments in modern equipment for the Guard, especially the roundout brigades, did not have to take place after mobilization...unprecedented when compared to past reserve call-ups.”<sup>149</sup> Prior to 1973, past mobilizations of brigades required approximately 189-231 days for certification prior to deployment.<sup>150</sup> Past mobilizations required “more supply [s-level]

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<sup>145</sup> Lippiatt, Polich, and Sortor, 8. ARNG schooling requirements are typically conducted during AT periods. School attendance during annual training periods detracts from tactical vehicle crew integrity and affects gunnery qualifications.

<sup>146</sup> NSIAD-93-4, 18.

<sup>147</sup> Doubler, 315.

<sup>148</sup> Moxon, 103-104; Goldich, 13.

<sup>149</sup> Goldich, 24.

<sup>150</sup> Williamson, 9-10.

stocks to bring the units to acceptable readiness levels.”<sup>151</sup> In this case only, s-level resource problems were comparable between the roundout brigades and the active replacement brigades.<sup>152</sup> This is not surprising. Roundout brigades received high priority for peacetime equipment modernization because of their expected direct wartime integration into the nation’s operational plans and missions.<sup>153</sup> The 1980s reports of a “Total Farce” appear exaggerated for equipment in the roundout brigades in 1991.<sup>154</sup> Major s-level readiness deficiencies did occur with new personnel and supply system equipment, but p-level MOSQ and PME deficiencies in understanding Active Army processes and procedures magnified this problem. For these systems, the US Army awaited funding for planned equipment fieldings.<sup>155</sup> These s-level issues are to be expected with any large combat unit.

The official US Army account of the Persian Gulf War reveals that the r-level readiness foundation was not sufficient: “the brigade had difficulty with maintenance of equipment due to a general lack of operator knowledge, mechanic diagnostic skills, and knowledge of the Army maintenance system.”<sup>156</sup> Post-mobilization observers noted that both the 48th and 155th brigades frequently had more vehicles disabled in their support areas due to mechanical problems than in use against opposing forces in simulated brigade battles. US Army OC/Ts reported that ARNG brigades experienced vehicle operational readiness (OR) rates in the range of fifty percent while comparable active units traditionally had eighty-five to ninety percent equipment OR rates during similar training exercises.<sup>157</sup> This was extremely problematic given the roundout brigades had

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<sup>151</sup> Williamson, 14.

<sup>152</sup> NSIAD-93-4, 3, 32-37.

<sup>153</sup> Duncan, 152.

<sup>154</sup> Rollison, 19.

<sup>155</sup> Goldich, 24, 32.

<sup>156</sup> Scales, 53.

<sup>157</sup> NSIAD-93-4, 13-14.

more critical low-density personnel specialties in comparison to their replacement brigades in medical, maintenance, supply, communications, and chemical operations. Unfortunately, the critical maintenance specialties were largely untrained MOSQ personnel. Peacetime contracted civilian contractors did prevent trained ARNG mechanics from “fully learning their jobs and ... their maintenance responsibilities.”<sup>158</sup> Once again, there could be no shortcuts to r-level readiness generation. Provisioning it alone proved unsatisfactory.

A t-level readiness generation foundation did not get laid during pre-mobilization for the 48th and 155th roundout brigades despite increased peacetime training days, sixty and sixty-four days respectively.<sup>159</sup> Both failed to generate t-level readiness during post-mobilization training to meet expectations. The ARNG blamed the failures on the Active Regular Army for not “understanding each Brigade’s post activation training proficiency level,” active micromanagement of post-mobilization training, and unclear certification standards. This criticism, however, is inaccurate for the assumptions and expectations of the operational approach.<sup>160</sup> Roundout brigade training plans lacked focus for attainable pre-mobilization goals.<sup>161</sup> The basic crew qualifications and low echelon collective training lanes established by the roundout brigades during the mobilization phase provide the evidence. For example, the 48th brigade scheduled ten days at home station for tank and Bradley fighting vehicle (BFV) Gunnery Qualification Tables IV-VIII (Basic and Intermediate). This was prior to the integration of active Army OC/Ts to assist with post-mobilization training. The 48th brigade could only qualify forty-three percent of its Tank and thirteen percent of its BFV crews.<sup>162</sup> Crew qualifications continued

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<sup>158</sup> NSIAD-93-4, 13

<sup>159</sup> Goldich, 30.

<sup>160</sup> Donald Burdick, *ARNG After Action Report (02 August 1990 – 28 February 1991): Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm* (Washington, DC: National Guard Bureau, June 28, 1991), 34-35.

<sup>161</sup> Vore, 17.

<sup>162</sup> Lippiatt, Polich, and Sortor, 21-22, 39.

at NTC during post-mobilization training. Active trainers assisted. ARNG crew qualification failures during mobilization meant crews attempted to qualify during unit collective training opportunities at NTC. It is not collective if *all* do not attend the training. Most importantly, the 48th brigade did not attempt the advanced gunnery tables expected of the Active Regular Army, Tables XI-XII.<sup>163</sup>

The 155th brigade had similar challenges, spending an “excessive” amount of time conducting gunnery qualifications. The DAIG found that “many [155th] Guard crews [tanks and BFVs] required as many as eight attempts to qualify, while active Army crews normally qualify in one or two attempts.” This was four times an active brigade’s annual standard allocation for ammunition. The 155<sup>th</sup> battalions took between seventeen and twenty-four days to complete crew qualifications; active units usually completed this task in a week.<sup>164</sup> The DAIG found that roundout crews rarely used their tank and BFV Unit Conduct of Fire Trainer (UCOFT) simulators during pre-mobilization training. The ARNG had mobile UCOFTs to use once per quarter. At NTC, active trainers offered UCOFT training opportunities to the 48th brigade during post-mobilization training. The unit “only partially exercised this opportunity.”<sup>165</sup> Pre-mobilization training plans failed to set a crew qualification t-level generation foundation. DAIG reports revealed that ARNG crew qualification training practices in pre-mobilization were unrealistic. The ARNG “did not hold crews accountable for meeting Army firing-time standards, used

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<sup>163</sup> Lippiatt, Polich, and Sortor, 21. Tables XI-XII prepare platoons for simulated offensive and defensive missions in major combat operations. The 48th Infantry Brigade completed only intermediate gunnery for individual crews (Tables V-VIII).

<sup>164</sup> NSIAD-93-4, 29-30.

<sup>165</sup> Ibid, 8; Lippiatt, Polich, and Sortor, 5-8. A COFT is a Tank and BFV crew simulator with realistic controls and display screens that simulate the view of opposing vehicles, terrain, and elaborate sets of targets and situations representing varying levels of difficulty. Most active divisions require four to six hours of UCOFT time per month for new crews. Reserve companies have access to mobile COFTs once a quarter.

outdated firing ranges, and allowed unit master gunners to boresight all tank, rather than requiring tank crews to learn procedures.”<sup>166</sup>

The infantry squad and platoon t-level generation foundation was no better. The 155th brigade set aside eight days for squad and platoon situational training exercises on attack and defend METL collective tasks at their home station mobilization center. Forty three percent of the 155th brigade’s platoons received unsatisfactory external evaluations after multiple attempts. Retraining days did not get scheduled.<sup>167</sup> Despite not training lower echelons to standard, the 155th brigade continued to train to the next echelon: company team attack and defend situational training exercise (STX) lanes. Forty one percent of all companies in the 155<sup>th</sup> brigade received unsatisfactory ratings after multiple attempts.<sup>168</sup> The US Army continued to progress the ARNG combat brigades to the battalion and brigade echelon training levels with a substantial number of untrained crews, platoons, and companies.

The US Army naturally faced a conflict between training ARNG combat brigades to standard and executing the post-mobilization training plan to meet responsiveness expectations. War expediency in the post-mobilization training plan required that readiness be generated at each echelon quickly. National defense readiness policy also required that “the training of each National Guard and reserve unit...[must] be held to the same performance standards and readiness criteria as active force units” for wartime deployments.<sup>169</sup> US Army training management standards, practices, and regulations required that each ARNG brigade echelon receive satisfactory evaluations in lower METL collective tasks prior to conducting training at the

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<sup>166</sup> NSIAD-91-263, 14-16.

<sup>167</sup> James T. Brady II, *Ready to Serve? The 48th, 155th, and 256th Brigades and the Roundout Concept during operations in Desert Shield and Desert Storm* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Command and General Staff College, 2007), 96-97.

<sup>168</sup> Lippiatt, Polich, and Sortor, 21-22, 40.

<sup>169</sup> Fredland, Gilroy, and Little, 154-155. See the Readiness section of this paper, pages 9-10.

next higher echelon.<sup>170</sup> Training standards are not arbitrary requirements. Training standards mitigate risks associated with anticipated enemy and friendly hazards that occur frequently in major combat operations. In major combat operations, the probability and severity of enemy and friendly hazards to include fratricide are extremely high.<sup>171</sup> The US Army built the post-mobilization training plans of ARNG combat brigades based on Active Regular Army standards, but ARNG combat units took longer than anticipated. A DAIG report concluded that the post-mobilization training “was often inconsistent with Army standards because of the inadequate leadership and weak technical skills” of ARNG combat brigades.<sup>172</sup> Faced with an ethical dilemma, the US Army balanced training standards and what was possible for ARNG combat brigades. War expediency in post-mobilization plans tempted different standards. Expediency pushed the US Army to generate t-level readiness ratings for ARNG combat brigades quickly, but artificially in comparison to US Army standards. This was not simple, but gross negligence on the part of the US Army to underwrite such risks for major combat operations.<sup>173</sup>

On February 28, 1991, the US Army prematurely certified the 48th brigade with numerous untrained lower echelons, without advanced gunnery tables, and without company CALFEXs. The 155th brigade attempted advanced gunnery tables and company CALFEXs, but

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<sup>170</sup> Army Field Manual (FM) 7-0. *Train To Win In A Complex World* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2016), 1-1 to 1-18, 3-1 to 3-5. Multi-Echelon Training: An effective logic trail clearly nests from one echelon to the next and effectively crosswalks the tasks up the echelons and down the echelons. Retraining: Units never depart a training event with tasks not trained to standard and training objectives not met. Army Regulations (AR) 683-35. *Range Safety*. (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2003), 161-164. This section covers Exercise Planning.

<sup>171</sup> Army Techniques Publications (ATP) 5-19. *Risk Management* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2014), 1-1 to 1-7.

<sup>172</sup> NSIAD-93-4, 16.

<sup>173</sup> Army Regulations (AR) 735-5. *Property Accountability* (Washington, DC: US Printing Office, 2016), 93-34. Gross negligence is an extreme departure from due care resulting from an act or omission of a person accountable or responsible that falls far short of that degree of care that a reasonably prudent person would have taken under similar circumstances. It is reckless, deliberate, or wanton disregard for foreseeable loss or damage.



never completed certification. It began demobilization after 105 post-mobilization training days. Recriminations abounded in the Active Regular Army, the ARNG, the DOD, and Congress, but the bottom line was that the Roundout Brigade operational approach did not live up to all readiness, integration, and responsive assumptions and expectations. It failed to generate t-level readiness in post-mobilization training. It failed despite DOD peacetime attempts to provision p-level, r-level, and s-level readiness to the ARNG combat brigades.

Congress immediately wanted answers to post-mobilization training failures. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) told Congress that a major disparity existed between Active and ARNG combat brigade preparations for war. The GAO stated “the active replacement brigades’ post-deployment training took on a “honing skills” character, while roundout brigades focused on “developing skills” for the first time.”<sup>174</sup> The GAO poignantly identified that almost all ARNG echelons were developing too many skills for the first time. Thus, AC-RC integration relationship for post-mobilization training took on a decided different character for preparing ARNG combat brigades for major combat operations than active combat brigades. Post-mobilization had to be an unequal, AC-driven integration process because ARNG combat brigade pre-mobilization training constraints did not set a p-level, r-level, and t-level training foundation for t-level generation during post-mobilization training. It fostered an “us and them” relationship that already existed in the shared ADCON relationship.<sup>175</sup>

Many studies, reports, and investigations concurred with this assessment. A DAIG investigation revealed that ARNG pre-mobilization training plans lacked focus. Another GAO investigation revealed that ARNG readiness evaluations were “not fully reviewed by higher commands” due to lack of time.<sup>176</sup> If the peacetime command relationship was to be taken

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<sup>174</sup> NSIAD-93-4, 8.

<sup>175</sup> NSIAD-95-91, 3-5.

<sup>176</sup> NSIAD-91-72, 33.

literally, the active division commander failed. The command relationship dictated that it was his responsibility to provide that focus, despite shared authorities. The active division commander failed to set attainable pre-mobilization training goals for roundout brigades, despite shared authorities. The DAIG investigation reported that the ARNG pre-mobilization training plans were unrealistic and did not “focus the limited amount of training available for reservists during peacetime on the fundamental building blocks [echelons] of Army training.”<sup>177</sup> The active division commander failed to review ARNG readiness reports for accuracy. Lacking experience, ARNG brigade commanders also failed to construct reasonable pre-mobilization training plans. ARNG brigade commanders trained like their active brigade counterparts and thought too optimistically about the validity of their readiness reports.

In 1990, the roundout brigades conducted higher pre-mobilization training days than normal, between sixty and sixty-four days in comparison to the normal thirty-nine. The roundout brigades conducted multi-echelon training in an unprogressive, unsequential manner during pre-mobilization training. Instead of training lower echelons to standard, the roundout brigades moved to train higher echelons. More training days did not yield a sufficient peacetime readiness foundation for post-mobilization. In 1990, on average, the roundout brigades conducted thirteen field training exercises (FTXs), six command post exercises (CPX) for staff, and twenty-one live fire exercises (LFX) during pre-mobilization training. Roundout brigade pre-mobilization training echelons ranged from crews, squads, platoons, companies, and/or battalions to an NTC rotation for the 48th brigade.<sup>178</sup> A failure to set realistic, attainable goals for pre-mobilization training inhibited effective and efficient post-mobilization readiness generation.

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<sup>177</sup> NSIAD-93-4, 7.

<sup>178</sup> NSIAD-91-263, 24-26; NSIAD-93-4, 28-29.

## Reactions

On March 31, 1991, it was clear to the DOD that the ARNG Roundout Brigade operational approach had failed all readiness, responsiveness, and integration expectations. In direct language to a reporter, Defense Secretary Cheney stated clearly that “the concept of mixing a brigade of combat reserves with active-duty combat forces (multi-component units) is not a good one.” He was adamant that “in the future, the Army’s rapid-deployment divisions should be composed entirely of active-duty forces.” He concluded that guard combat units should not be aligned against wartime contingency plans because guard combat brigades were better suited for “second and third echelon” forces.<sup>179</sup>

In 1992, the DOD and the US Army commissioned an extensive study to review the roundout brigade operational approach, determine the appropriate training tasks and timelines for the pre-mobilization and post-mobilization phases, and recommend future certification options to generate readiness in an effective and efficient manner. The study’s goal was to establish realistic, attainable goals that roundout brigades could accomplish in pre-mobilization that would lay a foundation for post-mobilization readiness generations. It concluded that roundout brigades needed approximately 128 days of post-mobilization training to complete certification and deploy for major combat operations.<sup>180</sup> The study made thirteen major mobilization assumptions. The 48th and 155th brigades did not achieve seven of these assumptions. The study made an analytical best guess on training tasks, timelines, and training days based on a partial mobilization

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<sup>179</sup> Melissa Healy, “Cheney Would Reduce Reserve Combat Role” (Los Angeles Times, March 1, 1991), accessed December 8, 2016, [http://articles.latimes.com/1991-03-14/news/mn-149\\_1\\_u-s-central-command](http://articles.latimes.com/1991-03-14/news/mn-149_1_u-s-central-command). Defense Secretary Cheney also told the reporter that in the future “planning [for guard combat brigades] would take into account not that they deploy the first day of the war but rather that they get 90 days to 120 days of work-up before you send them.” It was obvious to Defense Secretary Cheney that the Roundout Brigade operational approach failed all readiness, responsiveness, and integration expectations.

<sup>180</sup> Fredland, Gilroy, and Little, 157; Lippiatt, Polich, and Sortor, ix-43. The RAND study makes thirteen major assumptions for how pre-mobilization and post-mobilization tasks should occur in a partial mobilization to achieve this estimate. The roundout brigades did not achieve seven of these assumptions. The other six assumptions may not be applicable in a full mobilization. An estimate of 128 days may be overly optimistic.

like the Persian Gulf War. The study's other six assumptions related to full mobilizations. The last full mobilization in US history was World War II. The other six also assumed that roundout brigades would receive the same amount of active resources during a full mobilization as had been received during the Persian Gulf War partial mobilization. The analytical best guess of approximately 128 days for the certification of roundout combat brigades was optimistic at best.

The US Army official account of the Persian Gulf War also concluded that “combat units [roundout brigades] in particular require more time to coalesce and harden into tight, confident fighting teams” and that “while unit building can be accelerated, it must not be done at the peril of soldier's lives.”<sup>181</sup> This was a significant lesson learned. In 1992, the US Army removed all ARNG roundout brigades from wartime contingency plans, organic parts of the active divisions, and assigned them as ‘roundup’ brigades.<sup>182</sup> This relegated ARNG combat brigades to second and third echelon reinforcement forces. Recriminations ensued. State Adjutant Generals complained, we need “more routine AC sponsor support in the form of mobile training teams (MTT), equipment, and participation in major training exercises that would enhance training opportunities and the training effectiveness of their roundout units.”<sup>183</sup> AC commanders voiced their frustrations with the NGB and State Adjutant Generals, “We [the AC divisions] don't own you

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<sup>181</sup> Scales, 380.

<sup>182</sup> Stredwick, 14. Congress mandated in the 1992 Army National Guard Readiness Reform Act that the DOD associate each ARNG combat unit considered *essential* to the national military strategy. Congress mandated that AC commanders at brigade or higher: (1) approve the RC unit training program; (2) review readiness reports; (3) assess manpower, equipment, and training resource requirement; and (4) validate, at least annually, compatibility of the RC unit with AC forces they are assigned to support. This was the original AC-RC command relationship that failed with the roundout operational approach. Congress authorized the determination of *essential* to the Secretary of the Army. In 1994, the Secretary of the Army exercised this authority to remove roundout brigades; Fredland, Gilroy, and Little, 305. A roundup brigade augments and provides a fourth brigade to an active division that during peacetime already has its normal complement of three active combat brigades; NSIAD-92-36, 1-3. On May 5, 1992, the GAO briefed Congress that US Army expectations for ARNG combat brigades were completely unrealistic given that “the synchronization of combined arms maneuver is the most difficult doctrinal and leadership task in the Army.”

<sup>183</sup> Goff and Kahlan, 7.

[roundout brigades], so we'll only do the minimum to ensure you're well trained."<sup>184</sup> Ultimately, in 1994, DOD eliminated ARNG brigades as roundup forces or attachments to active divisions after numerous readiness and integration reforms initiatives were underway. The DOD created stand-alone eSBs. The eSB operational approach reaffirmed the ARNG as the “principle combat reserve of the Army.” ARNG eSBs were not contingency, but strategic reserve forces.<sup>185</sup>

## Peacetime Adaptions

The failure of the Roundout Brigade operational approach had a profound effect. It spawned studies, reform initiatives, and much legislation. Holding constant ARNG peacetime pre-mobilization days for readiness generation, Congress, the DOD, the US Army, and the ARNG overwhelmingly adopted more provisioning readiness strategies. These mandates continued to shift the burden of AC-RC peacetime integration to an unequal AC driven process.<sup>186</sup> In 1991, Congress began legislation for a “pilot program” to provide “AC advisors to RC combat units.”<sup>187</sup> From 1992-1996, Congress enacted the legislative foundations of that “pilot program.” Congressional authorizations from 1992-1996 under Title XI of the US Code and the Army National Guard Readiness Reform Act (ANGRA) forced the DOD to delegate sweeping authorities and resources to FORSCOM, specifically 1st Army as the executive agent for providing readiness and training support to the Army National Guard.<sup>188</sup> Through Title XI,

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<sup>184</sup> Stredwick, 22.

<sup>185</sup> Doubler, 350-352.

<sup>186</sup> Vore, 13-15.

<sup>187</sup> Ibid, 14, 45; Pilot Program for Active Component Support of the Reserves, Public Law 102-190, US Code, 102d Congress, 1st Session, vol. 1, sec. 414 (1991).

<sup>188</sup> Stredwick, 8-17; Pub. L 102-484, div. A, Title XI, October, 23, 1992, 206 Statute 2536, Sections 1111-1136 cover the provisions and mandates of the ANGCRA. Congress amended it four times from 1992-1996.

Congress mandated and the DOD implemented nineteen new provisions, requirements, and authorizations to provide advisors to prepare ARNG combat units for major combat operations.<sup>189</sup>

In terms of p-level readiness, Congress mandated more ARNG provisions. Congress provisioned a fourteen percent increase in ARNG full time support (FTS) personnel authorizations from 1989 to increase readiness.<sup>190</sup> Throughout the 1990s, the ARNG continued to ask for more FTS personnel and Congress kept provisioning more. ARNG FTS authorizations rose from 25,327 in 1987 to 71,928 in 2003.<sup>191</sup> For p-level PME and MOSQ readiness, Congress initially attempted to increase the PS / NPS mix. Congress mandated sixty percent of all officers and fifty percent of all enlisted in the ARNG have two years of active PS experience. Congress authorized enlisted and officer strategies to obtain these goals.<sup>192</sup> Congress authorized a PS enlistment bonus system to provision more p-level PME and MOSQ readiness. Congress authorized DOD to allow service academy and distinguished ROTC graduates to complete their obligations in the Selected Reserve after two years of active duty service.<sup>193</sup> Ultimately, Congress and the DOD compromised on the original PS / NPS mandate. It was infeasible.<sup>194</sup>

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<sup>189</sup> Stredwick, 11. Vore, 14-15. Congress did not specify what exactly the Active Army advisors would do. Congress made provisions and DOD delegated to the Active Regular Army. The Active Regular Army under Title 10 made advisory programs for RC units that unfortunately had no authority in peacetime for Title 32 RC units.

<sup>190</sup> Public Law 103-337, div. A, title XVI, §1661(a)(3)(B), Oct. 5, 1994, 108 Stat. 2980; Rapp, William, *2015-2016 How the Army Runs Senior Leader Handbook* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: The US Army War College, 2015), 6-9. FTS personnel consist of Active Guard and Reserve (AGR) soldiers on active duty, military technicians, DA civilians, and AC Soldiers assigned to RC units. FTS personnel may and may not fill MTOE authorizations.

<sup>191</sup> Binkin and Kaufman, 71; *The United States Army 2004 Posture Statement* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2004), 15. Reserve FTS personnel plans called for continued growth to 85,840 by FY 2012.

<sup>192</sup> Stredwick, 14.

<sup>193</sup> *Ibid*, 14-15.

<sup>194</sup> Public Law 103-139, 107 Statute 1441.

To ensure AC oversight of RC officer PME, Congress mandated that the Senior Army Advisor, an active duty officer, review all promotions for the grades of first lieutenant and higher and if necessary, recommend promotions to each State's Adjutant General for vacant positions. The intent was to ensure ARNG officers meet p-level PME qualifications prior to promotion. The DOD implemented this recommendation.<sup>195</sup> For NCO PME, Congress mandated to the DOD "non-waiverability" of a one military education standard for all AC and RC enlisted and NCO promotions.<sup>196</sup> Theoretically, this mandate would prevent the automatic ARNG enlisted or NCO promotions upon activation that occurred in roundout brigades at the expense of p-level PME readiness. Unfortunately, the authorization allowed the Secretary of the Army to waive this requirement if necessary "to preserve unit leadership continuity under combat conditions."<sup>197</sup> Congress essentially allowed the Secretary to waive soldier and NCO PME requirements under same circumstances that occurred in the Persian Gulf War mobilization.

To increase p-level available personnel strength readiness, Congress mandated the creation of special initial entry training and non-deployable personnel accounts to enable the DOD to have greater p-level visibility for ARNG units.<sup>198</sup> In the Persian Gulf War, a high number of roundout combat brigade soldiers were non-deployable.<sup>199</sup> In addition, Congress mandated that DOD conduct annual dental and medical screenings and examinations to reduce nondeployable soldiers from ARNG combat units.<sup>200</sup> Congress increased ARNG administrative

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<sup>195</sup> Stredwick, 15.

<sup>196</sup> Ibid, 12.

<sup>197</sup> Public Law 102-484, div. A, Title XI, October, 23, 1992, 206 Statute 2536, Section 1114.

<sup>198</sup> Stredwick, 12.

<sup>199</sup> NSIAD-91-263, 18-22; NSIAD-94-3, 4, 24-25.

<sup>200</sup> Stredwick, 13.

requirements without increasing ARNG training days. In 1996, though, DOD protests led Congress to repeal the ARNG dental and medical readiness mandates.<sup>201</sup>

In terms of additional t-level resources, Congress mandated that the DOD provision more combat simulators and simulations training opportunities to RC units. In response, the DOD provided more Weaponeer, GUARDFIST I/II, and Simulator Networking/Close Combat Tactical Trainer (SIMNET/CCTT) simulators.<sup>202</sup> The DOD provided more mobile UCFTs for all ARNG tank and BFV units. Congress and DOD acknowledged that ARNG combat units needed a better t-level readiness foundation for individuals and lower echelons during pre-mobilization training. For simulations training opportunities, the DOD created Operations Group C of the Battle Command and Battle Staff Training (BCBST) Program at Fort Leavenworth, KS to train ARNG eSB brigade and battalions staffs on an annual basis.<sup>203</sup>

In terms of t-level generation, Congress mandated the DOD increase multi-component unit authorities, organization, personnel, and responsibilities to supervise, provision, train, assess, and inspect ARNG combat units during pre-mobilization and post-mobilization. Congressional intent was to provision more AC supervision to RC units, particularly ARNG combat brigades. DOD delegated this authority to 1st Army, the FORSCOM executive agent for providing AC to

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<sup>201</sup> Public Law 104-106, div. A, Title VII, 702(b), February 10, 1996, 110 Statute 372.

<sup>202</sup> Stredwick, 15-16, 19. The Weaponeer is an indoors training simulator to train soldiers on basic rifle marksmanship without rifles, ammunition, or going to a rifle range. The GUARDFIST I is an indoors training simulator designed to increase tank crew proficiency up to Table VIII. The GUARDFIST II is an indoors training simulator to train indirect fire forward observers using a map, protractor, compass, and binoculars to call in fire missions to a Fire Direction Center and observe a simulator screen to make indirect fire adjustments. The GUARDFIST II simulator also trained forward observers to complete close air support missions. The SIMNET/CCTT simulator provided infantry, armor, mechanized, and cavalry units from squad through battalion and squadron level, including battle staffs, collective training opportunities in a virtual training environment.

<sup>203</sup> Ibid, 15-16, 19. Today, the BCBST program is the Mission Command Training Program (MCTP).



RC training support, mobilizations, and providing federal oversight to State ARNG forces.<sup>204</sup> Congress mandated that the DOD create an Operational Readiness Evaluation (ORE) Program. Under this program, DOD tasked FORSCOM, and ultimately 1st Army, an AC-RC multi-component unit, to determine whether ARNG combat units were meeting AC readiness (p-level, s-level, r-level, and t-level) standards and requirements.<sup>205</sup> Congress mandated that the DOD provision 5,000 AC soldiers to serve as advisors to high priority RC units. Congress mandated that the DOD assign 2,000 AC soldier-*advisors* to RC units as Resident Detachment Trainers (RDT). The DOD would assign 700 RDTs to eight ARNG eSB.<sup>206</sup> In addition, Congress mandated that the DOD provision 3,500 AC soldiers to train high priority RC units. DOD assigned the 3,500 AC Soldiers to 1st Army to provide unit maneuver training lanes to RC combat units.<sup>207</sup>

Immediately after the roundout operational approach failed, the Active Regular Army and the ARNG entered a period of self-reflection, reform, and adaption searching for improved ARNG combat brigade readiness generation strategies.<sup>208</sup> General Gordon Sullivan, the Army Chief of Staff, led US Army reform efforts. In 1991, he announced the Bold Shift program, a new

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<sup>204</sup> Jason Joose. “Briefing to SAMS: First Army Mission and Authorities” (Fort Leavenworth, KS: The School for Advanced Military Studies, September 12, 2016), slide 3 and 4. Originally, both Fifth and First Army had this authority. Fifth Army transferred this authority solely to First Army in 2004.

<sup>205</sup> Williamson, 18-19. The intent of the ORE program was to ensure no AC-RC readiness double standard.

<sup>206</sup> Vore, 17-28. RDTs could only advise and assist, not evaluate or train ARNG combat brigades. Active RDTs had no command relationship with ARNG combat units. Active RDTs provided recommendations and RC units could follow or ignore. The roundout brigade command relationship had the same problems when Title 10 and Title 32 priorities conflicted.

<sup>207</sup> Stredwick, 17-18; 10 USC 12001; Pub. L. 108–375, div. A, title V, §515(a), Oct. 28, 2004, 118 Stat. 1883 increased from 3,000 AC soldiers for AT periods to 3,500 AC soldiers. Vore, 16. General Sullivan, the Army Chief of Staff, instructed 1st Army to plan, prepare, resource, and provide a “turn key” operation for RC combat units.

<sup>208</sup> Williamson, 15-20. This source documents the origins of the Bold Shift program.

integrated readiness generation training strategy for high priority ARNG combat units.<sup>209</sup> It emphasized the need to set realistic, attainable peacetime training goals during pre-mobilization. The intent was to set a peacetime t-level readiness foundation that would allow for the effective and efficient t-level readiness generation of ARNG combat units during post-mobilization. Though extensive feasibility studies were underway, General Sullivan's stated goal for ARNG combat brigade responsiveness for wartime contingencies was ninety days or less.<sup>210</sup> To achieve General Sullivan's goal, 1st Army implemented in 1992 the AC driven Bold Shift program: (1) All ARNG soldiers would be fully trained and proficient on assigned weapons systems annually. (2) All tank and BFV crews would be fully trained and proficient up to gunnery table VIII (Immediate) annually. (3) All ARNG eSB brigade and battalion level headquarters would conduct one CPX simulation annually. (4) All ARNG combat units would receive a 'trained rating' in three platoon METL tasks: attack, defend, and movement to contact. Units would conduct platoon echelon METL training lanes twice annually, once in IDT and once during the annual training period.<sup>211</sup>

Armed with new authorities and personnel, DOD established eighteen Regional Training Brigades (RTB) under 1st Army to implement the Bold Shift program.<sup>212</sup> Throughout the 1990s, the RTB mission evolved to ensure "the eSBs' ability to deploy and fight a major combat operation, ninety days after mobilization."<sup>213</sup>

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<sup>209</sup> Vore, 13. This source discussed General Sullivan's Bold Shift program intent.

<sup>210</sup> Richard E. Arnold, *Active Component Support to Reserve Component Training Changes to Training Support XXI* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, 2003), 3. GAO/NSIAD-95-91, 40-48; Vore, 13, 15-17.

<sup>211</sup> Stredwick, 19; Vore, 16-19; Williamson, 16-20.

<sup>212</sup> Global Security, "Training Support Brigades History," accessed December 13, 2016, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/brigade-tsb.htm>.

<sup>213</sup> Richard G. Greene, *Assessing the Army National Guard's Enhanced Separate Brigade Concept: Searching for Readiness and Relevance* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Command and General Staff College, 2003), 43; Williamson, 16. The US Army refers to RTBs as Training Support Brigades (TSB) today.

In 1991, the ARNG announced its own program, Project Standard Bearer, to provision and “enhance the capability and readiness” of ARNG combat brigades to maintain its wartime contingency missions. ARNG eSBs would “receive resources, training, and validation as "standard bearers" for the entire ARNG.” The goal was to attain and maintain at least a ninety-five percent MOSQ p-level in combat brigades.<sup>214</sup> In 1993, the ARNG failed to achieve this goal. The primary cause for non-deployable soldiers in these brigades was incomplete PME and MOSQ training. Secondary causes included soldier legal, medical, and disciplinary issues. Undeterred, the DOD and the ARNG provisioned a 125 percent personnel MTOE authorization for eSBs.<sup>215</sup> This gave ARNG eSBs a thirty percent buffer for failure in the event of a mobilization. The ARNG refused to let ARNG eSBs fail, funding expensive recruiting and retention bonuses from their own budgets in an attempt fill higher authorizations.<sup>216</sup>

## The ARNG Enhanced Separate Brigade Operational Approach

Beware the twelve-division strategy for a ten-division Army

---General Eric Shinseki  
Army Chief of Staff, 1999-2003  
Controversial Retirement Speech

### Peacetime Realities for ARNG Major Combat Operations

From 1992-1996, the provisions, mandates, authorities, and adaptations of Congress and DOD created the 1st Army support structure that enabled the creation of a new peacetime “One Army” operational approach, stand-alone ARNG eSBs.<sup>217</sup> ARNG eSBs represented a new

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<sup>214</sup> Dwight D. Oland and Daniel W. Hogan Jr., *The Department of the Army Historical Summary FY1992* (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 2001), 64-65.

<sup>215</sup> NSIAD-00-114, 10.

<sup>216</sup> NSIAD-95-91, 22-28.

<sup>217</sup> NSIAD-00-114, 3-4. The ARNG eSB operational approach included fifteen high priority stand-alone combat brigades consisting of seven light infantry brigades and eight mechanized brigades. Seven of the fifteen ARNG eSBs were originally roundout brigades.

operational approach for preparing ARNG combat brigades for major combat operations in peacetime.

In 1995, Congress was curious about the returns on investment and the feasibility of ARNG eSBs to prepare for major combat operations. It tasked the GAO to investigate and answer three questions: (1) Is the Bold Shift training strategy enabling ARNG eSBs to meet peacetime training goals? (2) Are RDTs assigned to ARNG eSBs working effectively to improve training readiness? (3) What are the prospects of having ARNG eSBs ready for major combat operations within ninety days?<sup>218</sup>

For the first question, from 1992-1994 the GAO concluded that none of the ARNG eSBs “came close to achieving the training proficiencies sought by the Bold Shift training strategy” to prepare them for major combat operations in peacetime.<sup>219</sup> This included p-level soldier and leader MOSQ, PME, and total available strength goals. This also included t-level crew gunnery qualification goals, the three platoon METL collective training goals, and brigade and battalion staff training goals, of which none were met. The reports most damning p-level readiness challenge was that soldier and leader MOSQ, PME, and total available strength goals could not be achieved even with a thirty percent buffer when twenty-three percent of the eSB soldiers turned over annually.<sup>220</sup> The report found that only three battalions out of all fifteen eSBs came close to achieving gunnery qualification goals, only fourteen percent of all platoons received trained ratings in the three METL tasks, and p-level schooling requirements prevented effective staff training during the annual training period.<sup>221</sup> The GAO told Congress that the more measured Bold Shift strategy appeared reasonable and improved, but “it may take another 5 to 10

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<sup>218</sup> NSIAD-95-91, 2, 13-14.

<sup>219</sup> Ibid, 3.

<sup>220</sup> Ibid, 3, 22-28.

<sup>221</sup> Ibid, 3, 15-22.

years before the impact of the strategy is clearly known.” The DOD concurred with these findings.<sup>222</sup>

For the second question, the GAO concluded that “the role of active Army advisers [RDTs] in the state-run brigade operations has not been clearly defined by the Army” because “advisors have no formal authority.”<sup>223</sup> GAO characterized the Title 10 and Title 32 authority relationship as an “us and them” relationship. RDTs could only advise and assist, not evaluate or train ARNG eSBs. Active RDTs had no command relationship with ARNG eSBs. Active RDTs provided recommendations and ARNG eSBs could follow or ignore. The previous roundout brigade ADCON command relationship had the same problem. The DOD concurred with these findings.<sup>224</sup>

For the third question, the GAO concluded “it is highly uncertain whether the National Guard combat brigades can be ready to deploy 90 days after mobilization” to perform major combat operations. It even noted that General Sullivan in 1992 questioned whether ARNG combat brigades could ever “deploy with less than 60 to 90 days of post-mobilization preparation time.” General Sullivan acknowledged in a Congressional briefing the real problem of the brigade’s “difficulty in reaching high enough levels of peacetime training proficiency, in only 39 days of [pre-mobilization] training [per year].” Ultimately, the GAO recommended to Congress that more time be given to see if Bold Shift could work for ARNG eSBs. The DOD concurred with these findings, but it needed more time to examine other mobilization strategies.

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<sup>222</sup> NSIAD-95-91, 13, 29, 53-55.

<sup>223</sup> Ibid, 3, 13, 30-37. Title 10 of the US legal code gives the Department of Defense, a federal agency, clear legal authorities and administrative control (ADCON) over the Armed Forces to include the Active Regular Army during peace and war. Title 32 of the US legal code subordinates the National Guard under the authority and administrative control (ADCON) of each State during peacetime. The GAO characterized it as an “us and them” relationship because legally the National Guard and Active Regular Army are separate entities during peacetime.

<sup>224</sup> NSIAD-95-91, 55-57; Vore, 17-28. The NGB stated RDTs were ‘counter-productive.’ Today, RDTs do not exist.

Early on, the Active Regular Army recognized the infeasibility of some Bold Shift goals. To reach attainable goals, the Active Regular Army modified and lowered goals, essentially making the “shift” not so “bold.” In 1992, the Active Regular Army cut the original Bold Shift goal of 100 percent qualification on Table VIII for all ARNG tank and BFV crews to seventy five percent for tank crews and sixty percent for BFV crews annually. In 1995, the Active Regular Army cut the ARNG platoon METL collective training proficiency goal by two thirds. ARNG eSBs would train their platoons on *one* of the three METL collective tasks annually and train all three over a three-year period.<sup>225</sup>

In 2000, after five years, Congress again tasked the GAO to investigate its returns on investment for the eSB operational approach. Congress wanted answers to three questions: (1) Are eSBs meeting current training and personnel readiness goals? (2) What are the key reasons for any continuing difficulties in eSBs meeting these goals? (3) Does the Army have an effective system for assessing eSB readiness and the time required for brigades to be ready for major combat operations?<sup>226</sup>

For the first question, the GAO concluded that “only one brigade” met p-level readiness goals for a ninety percent total available strength and eighty-five percent of all soldiers and leaders PME and MOSQ qualified.<sup>227</sup> This occurred despite increased personnel MTOE authorization buffers. For t-level readiness, the GAO noted a slight improvement for the reduced Bold Shift goals, but ultimately concluded that “only forty-two percent of twenty-four mechanized battalions met gunnery standards [Table VIII]” and “only three of fifteen brigades reported their platoons met training goals” for the *one* annual METL task.<sup>228</sup> After almost a

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<sup>225</sup> NSIAD-95-91, 19-20.

<sup>226</sup> NSIAD-00-114, 4, 20-21.

<sup>227</sup> *Ibid*, 5, 8-10, 14. The GAO found that on average only sixty-seven percent of personnel attended ARNG combat brigade collective training during the annual training periods 1998.

<sup>228</sup> *Ibid*, 5-7.

decade of provisioning readiness strategies, ARNG combat brigade readiness only marginally improved. The DOD concurred, but disturbingly acknowledged that the original Congressional mandate for “one military education standard for all AC and RC enlisted and NCO promotions” would not be the same in the future.<sup>229</sup> DOD stated it was launching the “ARNG Distance Learning Initiative,” essentially creating a separate military education system and standards for ARNG soldier and leader p-level readiness.<sup>230</sup> Once again, the DOD lowered the standard.

For the second question, the GAO gave ARNG brigade officials fifteen potential problems to rank order. ARNG brigade officials surprised GAO investigators with another major problem not listed. ARNG brigade officials frequently reported to the GAO that “the problem of too much to do in the time available” was a major, longstanding peacetime problem for ARNG combat brigades and major combat operations.<sup>231</sup> The DOD concurred and emphasized that the ARNG must do more to “concentrate their limited training time on the most critical wartime planning requirements” and that Army staff will continue “conducting missioning study groups.”<sup>232</sup> The Army staff continued to focus all efforts on making the impossible, possible in ninety days by playing with the assumptions of theoretical post-mobilization training modules.

For the two part third question, the GAO reported that “the Army does not have an effective system for assessing [eSB] brigade readiness and deployment times” because ARNG peacetime “training readiness assessments are subjective and unrealistic.”<sup>233</sup> This answered the

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<sup>229</sup> Stredwick, 12.

<sup>230</sup> NSIAD-00-114, 31.

<sup>231</sup> Ibid, 5, 10-14.

<sup>232</sup> NSIAD-95-91, 40-50; NSIAD-00-114, 29. The DOD and US Army conducted numerous modeling exercises attempting to determine the optimal post-mobilization training plan to prepare ARNG combat brigades for major combat operations in the shortest amount of time possible. Repeated modeling studies continued to prove that it was nearly an impossible task to prepare ARNG combat brigades for major combat operations in less than ninety days.

<sup>233</sup> NSIAD-00-114, 6, 14-17.

first part of the third question, assessing readiness, but caused problems with the question's second part, preparing ARNG combat brigades for major combat operations. Thus, the GAO essentially told Congress that the Army needed to "clarify the goal concerning the amount of time the brigades have to be ready for war" because peacetime readiness reports were unreliable.<sup>234</sup> The GAO could not reconcile the second part of the third question with unreliable ARNG eSB readiness reports juxtaposed against their *designed purpose*, major combat operations. The GAO rather requested the Army should redefine their *purpose* by "linking requirements to time frames established in the war plans" or realistic missions counter to their *designed purpose*, major combat operations.<sup>235</sup> Basically, the GAO ignored the intent of Congress' question and deferred to the DOD. The DOD happily ignored the big question of whether ARNG eSBs could deploy or not in ninety days for major combat operations.<sup>236</sup>

After three decades of provisioning peacetime readiness strategies, both peacetime "One Army" operational approaches for preparing ready, integrated, and responsive ARNG combat brigades for major combat operations failed. The Iraq War would temporarily change the debate on "One Army" operational approaches for ARNG combat brigades.

### Iraq War Strategic Context

In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, the US worldview appeared anew. Non-state actors, Al Qaeda, committed acts of terrorism against the United States from Afghanistan. The enmity and solidarity of the American people demanded reprisals. President George W. Bush authorized a Global War on Terrorism. US military special operations forces and paramilitary forces quickly invaded Afghanistan, built local coalitions, and toppled a primitive Taliban regime

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<sup>234</sup> NSIAD-00-114, 18-19.

<sup>235</sup> Ibid, 19.

<sup>236</sup> Ibid, 29-30.



in November 2001. Three Active Regular Army divisions soon followed, occupied Afghanistan, and began conducting counter-terrorism operations against Al Qaeda and its affiliates.<sup>237</sup> Shortly thereafter, DOD policy-makers, in accordance with their preferences, announced a revolution in military affairs, a desire to harness US military special operations forces and paramilitary forces in future wars. Considering the circumstances, President Bush made a simple political decision that incurred few, if any, political risks. The decision to invade Afghanistan put terrorist groups and the nation-states that harbored them on notice.<sup>238</sup> The American public expected a quick reprisal.

Unfortunately, future political decisions by President Bush would not be so easy, particularly what to do about old adversaries such as Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. Old paradigms and preferences shaped DOD policy-maker recommendations inside the Bush administration. These would guide Iraq war planning for major combat operations and post-war occupation activities.<sup>239</sup> The “target sets” between Iraq and Afghanistan were completely different. Afghanistan was a primitive regime.<sup>240</sup> Iraq was not a near-peer military competitor, but in comparison to Afghanistan, a formidable enemy none the less. Iraq war plans would require

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<sup>237</sup> Gregory Fontenot, E.J. Degen, and David Tohn, *On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2005), 24-25. In Afghanistan, counter-terrorism (CT) operations were the priority, not nation-building. Army conventional forces initially included the 10th Mountain Division, 101st Airborne Division, and the 82nd Airborne Division in 2003 and 2004. The United States also had elements of the 101st Airborne Division committed to Kosovo during the same time.

<sup>238</sup> Ibid, 22-23. President Bush articulated to a joint session of Congress the Bush Doctrine on 20 September 2001.

<sup>239</sup> Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *COBRA II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq* (New York, NY: Pantheon Books, 2006), 363. CENTCOM to Coalition Forces Land Command Component (CFLCC) Iraq war planning began in September 2001, OPERATION VIGILANT GUARDIAN; Fontenot, Degen, and Tohn, 44-45. CLFCC to V Corps formal Iraq war planning began in November 2001; Ricks, 32-34. President Bush and DOD policy-maker oversight began in November 2001.

<sup>240</sup> Thomas E. Ricks, *Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq* (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 2006), 117. The US-led ground invasion force consisted of approximately 145,000 troops. It faced an Iraqi Army consisting of approximately 400,000 Iraqi troops, approximately 4,000 tanks and other armored vehicles, and tens of thousands of irregular fighters. Unconventional, special operations forces and paramilitary options alone would be insufficient.

increased force levels and conventional approaches.<sup>241</sup> To military planners, the mobilization of ARNG combat brigades for an Iraq War seemed both appropriate and logical.<sup>242</sup> Such an act, however, would defy policy-maker preferences and the existing political environment. Absent clear evidence that Iraq posed an existential threat, policy-makers would incur substantial political risks for the mobilization of ARNG combat brigades.<sup>243</sup> At the time, the search and justification for weapons of mass destruction intelligence was highly politicized and controversial.<sup>244</sup>

Iraqi President Saddam Hussein frustrated US policy-makers and pundits throughout the 1990s.<sup>245</sup> CENTCOM commanders and military planners conducted years of in-depth analysis and war planning for Iraq war contingencies. By 1998, CENTCOM completed operational plan (OPLAN) 1003-98, an Iraq war plan for major combat operations and post-war occupation activities. Its estimates for major combat operations called for an invasion force of three heavy armored corps and approximately 400,000 troops. Its estimates for post-war occupation called for 500,000 troops to conduct security operations and nation building activities.<sup>246</sup> Interagency wargames pointed to an occupation that would last up to ten years.<sup>247</sup> Per the national military

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<sup>241</sup> Ricks, 100-101.

<sup>242</sup> Ibid, 4-8, 26-27. CENTCOM OPLAN 1003-98 contained different force packages for various scenarios. Force level estimates ranged from 380,000 troops to 500,000 troops. In 2001, the entire Active Regular Army consisted of 476,000 soldiers. Fontenot, Degen, and Tohn, xix, 176.

<sup>243</sup> Ibid, 96-100. After fifteen months of planning, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld was reluctant to mobilize RC combat support and combat service support units prior to Christmas, December 25, 2002. This was almost three months prior to the Iraq invasion. The political risks of mobilizing RC combat support and combat service support units was too high; Fontenot, Degen, and Tohn, 73-74.

<sup>244</sup> Ibid, 3-111. On September 8, 2002, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice tells the New York Times “we do not want the smoking gun [WMD] to be a mushroom cloud,” 58.

<sup>245</sup> Ibid, 3-28. This source discusses US Iraq Containment Policies.

<sup>246</sup> Gordon and Trainor, 4.

<sup>247</sup> Ibid, 26.

strategy, OPLAN 1003-98 would require the mobilization of ARNG combat brigades as its implementation would quickly outstrip the combined arms maneuver capabilities of the Active Regular Army, ten active divisions.<sup>248</sup> Regardless, the mobilization of significant ARNG combat power by policy makers was never a planning consideration.<sup>249</sup>

In November 2001, President Bush publicly remained focused on Afghanistan, but secretly began engaging the DOD on formal Iraq War planning. The invasion would not begin for another sixteen months. Regrettably, the Bush administration would need all sixteen months to present its case to the American people and the world for the Iraq War. On January 29, 2002, President Bush started presenting his case. At the annual ‘State of the Union’ address, he formally announced what many deemed a “declaration of war.”<sup>250</sup> He referred to Iraq, Iran, and North Korea as an ‘Axis of Evil.’ He openly stated “the United States will not permit the world’s most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world’s most destructive weapons.” He continued presenting his case throughout 2002 and 2003 in six major speeches.<sup>251</sup> On January 28, 2003, he vocally changed policy for Iraq, Iran, and North Korea from containment to regime change.<sup>252</sup>

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<sup>248</sup> NSIAD-99-47, *Force Structure: Opportunities for the Army to Reduce Risk in Executing the Military Strategy* (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 1999), 1-39. “The Army did not assess risks in its 1998 force structure review.” “Requirements increased as force structure decreased.” The study concluded future risk mitigation might require the mobilization of two Army National Guard Divisions.

<sup>249</sup> Gordon and Trainor, 4. In November 2001, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld received his first Joint Staff briefing on OPLAN 1003-98 for 500,000 troops. Without military justification, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld stated “in exasperation that he did not see why more than 125,000 troops would be required and even that was probably too many” for the current policy preferences of the Bush administration. The political risks of an Iraq War at the time were high. The bar for considering ARNG combat brigades for mobilization was too high. At the time, the Bush administration had not presented a case to the American people or the world for an Iraq War.

<sup>250</sup> Ricks, 35-38.

<sup>251</sup> *Selected Speeches of President George W. Bush 2001-2008*. The six speeches were the West Point Commencement Speech (June 1, 2002), Middle East Peace Process Speech (June 24, 2002), Address to the United Nations General Assembly Speech (September 12, 2002), State of the Union Address to the 108th Congress (January 28, 2003), Remarks on the Future of Iraq Speech (February 26, 2003), Address to the Nation on Military Operations in Iraq Speech (March 19, 2003), 103-114, 125-133, 139-164, 167-177.

<sup>252</sup> *Selected Speeches of President George W. Bush 2001-2008*. “State of the Union Address to the 108th Congress” (January 28, 2003), 149-165.

Iraq would be the initial target as it had defiantly challenged and agitated US policies throughout the 1990s.

On February, 2003, President Bush needed Secretary of State Colin Powell, a private skeptic, to go before the United Nations Security Council, layout the intelligence, cement a coalition, and secure authorization for an Iraq War.<sup>253</sup> Politics, policy preferences, and political risks prevented DOD policy-makers from mobilizing significant ARNG combat power despite mounting Active Regular Army commitments. Only a handful of ARNG light infantry battalions mobilized and deployed prior to the Iraq invasion. By necessity, many battalions were broken up and did not participate in major combat operations. War planners stated “all [ARNG light infantry battalions] were intended to secure sensitive sites, including Patriot units, theater support units, and air and seaports.”<sup>254</sup> Active Regular Army global commitments mounted, but DOD policy-makers did not authorize ARNG combat brigades to mobilize.

By March 2003, DOD policy-makers authorized the commitment of four Active Regular Army divisions plus two armored cavalry regiments for an Iraq invasion.<sup>255</sup> Elsewhere, global commitments included one active division each for Afghanistan and South Korea.<sup>256</sup> Pending authorization, the Active Regular Army hastily prepared the other four active divisions for major combat operations. The Active Regular Army also prepared one active combat brigade for

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<sup>253</sup> Ricks, 31, 48, 52, 71, 90-94. The day before his address to the United Nations, Secretary of State Powell needed confirmation from the intelligence community that the intelligence was accurate. His private and public narratives were different.

<sup>254</sup> Fontenot, Degen, and Tohn, 176-177. ARNG combat units were called ‘orphan’ units.

<sup>255</sup> Ibid, 86-87. V Corps combat maneuver forces in Iraq included the 3rd Infantry Division, the 101st Airborne Division, the 82nd Airborne Division, the 4th Infantry Division, the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment, the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment, and the 173rd Airborne Brigade. This was four and half active divisions out of ten.

<sup>256</sup> The Active Regular Army also had the 10th Mountain Division and the 2nd Infantry Division in Afghanistan and South Korea respectively. Six and half Active Regular Army divisions were committed. The other three and half Active Regular Army divisions actively generated peacetime readiness for potential commitment to major combat operations.

Kosovo.<sup>257</sup> Despite mounting Active Regular Army commitments, DOD policy-makers did not act prudently. DOD policy-makers assumed strategic risk and did not authorize the mobilization of ARNG eSBs. DOD policy-makers eventually did mobilize ARNG eSBs, five months after major combat operations were over.<sup>258</sup>

### Politics, Policy Preferences, Political Risks, and Military Mobilization

The military policy preferences of President Bush, Vice President Richard Cheney, and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld are well documented. On September 23, 1999, in a major national security speech at the Citadel, Republican Presidential Candidate Bush announced complete disdain for the difficult and lengthy peacekeeping operations of the Clinton administration. He believed this was not the role of the military. He pledged to “develop lighter, more mobile, and more lethal [military] forces.” He vowed to appoint a strong Secretary of Defense that would develop a new military structure.<sup>259</sup> On October 11, 2000, Republican Presidential Nominee Bush espoused a strong policy preference for intervention, but not nation-building. He stated: “I believe the role the military is to fight and win war... I think our troops ought to be used to help overthrow a dictator... when it’s in our best interests.”<sup>260</sup> On the campaign trail, the Republican Vice Presidential Nominee, Richard Cheney, repeated similar sentiments and recommended, Donald Rumsfeld, an old mentor, to be the next Secretary of Defense. He felt he needed a strong ally that shared his views in upcoming policy debates within the administration.<sup>261</sup>

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<sup>257</sup> Ricks, 118-123. Senior DOD military officials worry about the lack of “combat depth” and debated how fast two other active divisions, the 1st Armored Division and the 1st Cavalry Division, could be made ready to deploy to Iraq. DOD policy-makers were unconcerned.

<sup>258</sup> Ibid, 145-146. President Bush announced on May 1, 2003 that “Major Combat Operations in Iraq have ended.”

<sup>259</sup> Gordon and Trainor, 5.

<sup>260</sup> Ricks, 24-25.

<sup>261</sup> Ibid, 25.

From the beginning, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld vowed to reform DOD bureaucratic processes, provide strong civilian oversight, and overrule an uncooperative military.<sup>262</sup> At his confirmation, he proclaimed an intention to transform the military and begin a revolution in military affairs. To him, a large Active Regular Army represented “legacy thinking” and everything that was wrong with the military. Per Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, new war and transformation emphasized technology, information, speed, mobility, and lethality. He held strong DOD policy preferences against the Powell-Weinberger doctrine and the buildup of “a large ground force,” termed the principle of mass by military professionals.<sup>263</sup> In August 2001, intense DOD debates occurred between Defense Secretary Rumsfeld and the Army about the possibility of reducing active divisions from ten to eight.<sup>264</sup> His strong policy preferences would eventually prevent RC deployment authorizations for the Iraq War, to include the mobilization of ARNG combat brigades.<sup>265</sup>

Paranoid and overbearing, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld built a team of political loyalists over the course of eighteen months of Iraq war planning.<sup>266</sup> He frequently bypassed the Joint Staff and expressed disdain for its “rival source of power.”<sup>267</sup> To ensure military planning consensus

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<sup>262</sup> Donald Rumsfeld, “Bureaucracy to Battlefield” speech, September 10, 2001. <http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2001/S20010910-secdef.html>. On September 10, 2001, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld announced at a Pentagon town hall meeting that he faced “an adversary that poses a threat to the security of the United States.” He named it the “Pentagon Bureaucracy.”

<sup>263</sup> Gordon and Trainor, 3-9.

<sup>264</sup> Ricks, 69.

<sup>265</sup> Gordon and Trainor, 99-117.

<sup>266</sup> Ricks, 4-111.

<sup>267</sup> Gordon and Trainor, 7-8, 46. Defense Secretary Rumsfeld accused CJCS Hugh Shelton of disloyalty. CJCS Shelton almost resigned. Secretary Rumsfeld then recommended General Richard B. Myers and General Peter Pace for Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff not for their “best military advice,” but because they were team players. Congress later questioned their independence; Ricks, 66-67. Later, the Joint Staff was put on notice not to question Iraq War intelligence and Lieutenant General Greg Newbold, Deputy Chief of Operations for the Joint Staff, quietly retired.

for smaller Iraq force packages, in an unprecedented move, he appointed two Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) civilians to the CENTCOM planning staff.<sup>268</sup> General Tommy Franks, the CENTCOM Commander, repeatedly adjusted Iraq war planning assumptions not for tactical or operational reasons, but for the policy preferences and the political risks of the administration, particularly those of Defense Secretary Rumsfeld.<sup>269</sup>

The Bush administration continued to make its case in a mid-term election year for the use of force in Iraq. Over eighteen months, General Franks and the CENTCOM planners repeatedly manipulated assumptions and revised force packages downward for an invasion over five major plans. An initial estimate included 500,000 soldiers (OPLAN 1003-98), then 380,000 soldiers (revised OPLAN 1003-98), then 145,000-275,000 soldiers (OPLAN BLUE: A Generated Start), then 18,000-250,000 soldiers (OPLAN IMMEDIATE BADGER: A Running Start), and then 20,000-130,000 soldiers (OPLAN HYBRID).<sup>270</sup> After the “Use of Military Force Against Iraq” became domestically palatable, only then did Defense Secretary Rumsfeld approve OPLAN COBRA II, which comprised 103,000-145,000-275,000 soldiers.<sup>271</sup> Even then, he vowed to be

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<sup>268</sup> Ricks, 32-54. CENTCOM planners were unhappy. OSD planners kept feeding Defense Secretary Rumsfeld planning information on force packages that were contrary to his policy preferences.

<sup>269</sup> Ibid, 4-163.

<sup>270</sup> Gordon and Trainor, 26-29, 47-48, 52-54, 67-70, 86-89, 563. The first number of soldiers represented the number planners recommended to start the invasion. The second number of soldiers represented the number planners needed from the TFPDL to continue to flow after the start of the invasion; Ricks, 120. The third number of soldiers for the COBRA II plan represented the entire post-war TFPDL force package that wartime commanders and planners anticipated might be needed for Iraq war post-war activities. In an unprecedented move, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld retained the authority of approving each unit and controlling their notification for a wartime deployment to Iraq.

<sup>271</sup> *Selected Speeches of President George W. Bush 2001-2008* (Address to the United Nations General Assembly, September 12, 2002). President Bush’s speech exclusively focused on Iraq regime change. The speech focused on domestic and international audiences; Ricks, 58-64. In October 2002, the US Congress voted, 77 of 100 senators and 296 of 435 representatives, for the ‘Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq.’ In November 2002, the Republicans owned both the House and Senate after the mid-term elections. Gordon and Trainor, 91-94. President Bush approved before the election the Hybrid plan (small force package). Defense Secretary Rumsfeld approved COBRA II on December 12, 2002. Defense Secretary Rumsfeld tells General Franks that he did not think it was necessary to get President Bush’s approval again on the war plan.

“the arbiter” of force packages moving into theater by approving every unit authorization, not the entire time phased force deployment list (TPFDL) package traditionally submitted by wartime commanders and approved by the Defense Secretary as a whole.<sup>272</sup> Politics, strong policy preferences, and political risk prevented even the slightest consideration for the mobilization of ARNG eSBs. Politics, not the enemy, drove war planning and force packages.<sup>273</sup>

Interestingly, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld would censure, fire, and force many DOD military professionals and planners to resign or retire if they expressed even the slightest of public or private sentiments counter to OSD policy preferences for smaller force packages.<sup>274</sup> One of many notable examples, included the Army Chief of Staff, General Eric Shinseki, a transformation ally.<sup>275</sup> He testified before the Senate Arms Services Committee on February 25, 2002 and responded to a question from Senator Carl Levin, “Could you give us some idea as to the magnitude of the Army’s requirements for an occupation of Iraq following the successful completion of the war?” General Shinseki answered that “something on the order of several hundred thousand soldiers... would be required.” He only repeated Joint Staff planning estimates, but unfortunately spoke against OSD policy preferences. The Defense Secretary’s preferences

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<sup>272</sup> Gordon, 94-102; Ricks, 121-122, 157, 221. In April 2003, wartime commanders began asking for the entire COBRA II TPFDL force package of 275,000 soldiers. Defense Secretary Rumsfeld attempted to “off-ramp” the 1st Armored and 1st Cavalry Divisions from the TPFDL. The Joint Staff begged Defense Secretary Rumsfeld not to do so. Defense Secretary Rumsfeld compromised and put both divisions in a “holding pattern.”

<sup>273</sup> Ricks, 117.

<sup>274</sup> Ibid, 121-122, 157, 221. In July 2003, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld continued to force his original policy preference for a forced withdrawal and a drawdown to approximately 34,000 soldiers by late summer. Wartime commanders became extremely frustrated.

<sup>275</sup> Army Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2001), foreword, 1-2 to 1-17. This Army operating concept or capstone manual, approved by General Shinseki, revolutionized the way the US Army viewed the spectrum of conflict beyond major combat operations. Combined arms maneuver units must be prepared not only for major combat operations, but military operations other than war (MOOTW; smaller-scale contingencies, peacetime military engagements). General Shinseki put in motion transformation from a division based force structure to one based on the brigade combat teams.



were much lower, approximately thirty-four thousand soldiers. Publicly, the OSD narrative was that the Congress had pressured General Shinseki's answer. A month later, to the disdain of OSD, General Shinseki reaffirmed his post-war estimates to Congress.<sup>276</sup> Despite being an OSD transformation ally, General Shinseki's "best military advice" went against OSD policy preferences.

In an unusual announcement, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld subsequently nominated General Shinseki's replacement, a full year in advance of his four-year term. Instead of nominating within the active ranks, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld pulled General Peter Schoomaker from retirement. He acknowledged he wanted to steer the Army in a new direction. Most importantly, he preferred that the Army do more in the future with less force structure.<sup>277</sup> General Shinseki eventually opted for early retirement.<sup>278</sup> On June 11, 2003, General Shinseki openly discussed at his farewell the tensions between OSD and the Army. He mentioned the friction between "best military advice" and the principle of civilian control of the military. He

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<sup>276</sup> Gordon and Trainor, 101-104; Ricks, 96-100.

<sup>277</sup> Ricks, 157; Daniel Bolger, *Why We Lost: A General's Inside Account of the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars* (New York, NY: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2014), 206-207. In 2004, General Schoomaker realized the Army needed more land combat power and full spectrum capabilities at the tactical level in Iraq and Afghanistan. He realized that the active divisions needed a fourth combat brigade for force generation. The Active Regular Army had a lot of force structure tied up in the augmentation of divisions and corps for major combat operations. He knew that expanding Active Regular Army force structure was not politically palatable to the administration or Defense Secretary Rumsfeld. He decided to create more combat brigades from existing force structure by reorganizing division and corps augmentation units to create modularized brigade combat teams. Modularized brigade combat teams (BCT) had more combined arms assets and more full spectrum capabilities comparative to the force structure of older combat brigades with an additional third maneuver battalion, a field artillery battalion, a cavalry squadron, a brigade engineer battalion, a military intelligence company, and a signal company. Each division now had a fourth BCT. The transformation added ten more BCTs to the Active Regular Army, increasing the force generation capabilities of the Active Regular Army for Iraq, Afghanistan, global commitments, and potential wartime contingencies. In May 2005, ARNG combat brigades (eSBs) began the process of converting to the more complex brigade combat team MTOE.

<sup>278</sup> "Rumsfeld Fired Army Secretary Thomas White," *USA Today*, April 25, 2003, accessed December 30, 2016, [http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/2003-04-25-white-resigns\\_x.htm](http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/2003-04-25-white-resigns_x.htm). In April 2003, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld asked for the resignation of Army Secretary Thomas White. He nominated his replacement not from the Army, but the Air Force. He wanted to move the Army in a new direction.

characterized the existing policy friction as Vietnam-like. He openly stated the Army needed to be big enough for the missions it was assigned. He advised his successors to “beware the twelve-division strategy for a ten-division Army.”<sup>279</sup> Essentially, he was pointing out that the DOD committed six and half active divisions and only had three and half active divisions generating readiness to replace them. Still, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld did not relent to mobilizing ARNG combat brigades.

In retrospect, many journalists point to General Shinseki’s retirement speech as the moment when the security situation in Iraq started to unravel. In context, General Shinseki privately knew the intelligence and the peacetime readiness pipeline of current active combat brigades and divisions in FORSCOM. He had to see the early signs of a flawed post-war Iraq strategy on the horizon. With low soldier force ratios comparative to the large Iraq population, conditions in Iraq began to deteriorate rapidly. In May 2003, early indicators of an Iraq insurgency emerged.<sup>280</sup> At the time, wartime commanders requested the entire COBRA II TPFDL force package from Defense Secretary Rumsfeld. As the Army Chief of Staff, General Shinseki knew that the Active Regular Army needed to expand or authorize RC mobilizations, or both, to fulfill their TPFDL requests.<sup>281</sup> Regrettably, none of these options matched the policy preferences of the administration and OSD. At the time, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld was “off ramping” active divisions from the COBRA II TPFDL force package.

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<sup>279</sup> Ricks, 156-157. Defense Secretary Rumsfeld elected not to attend General Shinseki’s retirement.

<sup>280</sup> Donald P. Wright and Timothy R. Reese, *On Point II: Transition to the New Campaign* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 2008), 92-129. On May 16, 2003, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) announced the de-Bathification of 300,000 Iraqi soldiers, 12,000 police, and up to two million public servants. From May 2003, insurgent attacks increase by fifty percent every month for the next six months. In July 2003, General John Abizaid, the CENTCOM commander, openly stated coalition forces are witnessing the beginning of a “classic guerilla type campaign.”

<sup>281</sup> Gordon and Trainor, 101-105.

Initially, politics, policy preferences, and political risks prevented the mobilization of ARNG eSBs for their designed purpose, major combat operations. Initially, DOD policy-makers also did not mobilize ARNG eSBs to mitigate the possibility of failure. Only when it became obvious that the Active Regular Army might fail or break long term did Defense Secretary Rumsfeld even consider ARNG eSB mobilizations.<sup>282</sup> Hypothetically, if the Active Regular Army did fail on the battlefield, the big question would be how long it would take the US Army to mobilize ARNG eSBs. This is a fair question given the Active Regular Army was overextended.

### ARNG Enhanced Separate Brigade Mobilizations

On July 23, 2003, DOD policy-makers authorized the notification of two ARNG armored or heavy eSBs to participate in Operation Iraqi Freedom. They would begin mobilization in October 2003. DOD policy-makers notified them that they would deploy not as designed armored brigades but instead as motorized brigades. The ARNG eSBs would deploy with up-armored vehicles, not their organic tanks and BFVs.<sup>283</sup> The DOD announced that the ARNG eSBs would likely deploy sometime between January and May 2004. Ultimately, the DOD and 1st Army did not know how long it would take to certify the ARNG eSBs. It had never been done before. The original responsiveness expectation of the “One Army” eSB operational approach was ninety days. DOD policy-makers needed ARNG eSBs to replace Active Regular Army combat brigades in Iraq as interchangeable entities or battlespace owners. The Active Regular Army was stretched thin.<sup>284</sup> Unfortunately, as Operation Iraqi Freedom progressed, DOD policy-makers opted to use

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<sup>282</sup> Wright and Reese, 87-129.

<sup>283</sup> GAO-05-21, *Reserve Forces: Actions Needed To Better Prepare The National Guard For Future Overseas and Domestic Missions* (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, November 2004), 12.

<sup>284</sup> James Conachy, “Pentagon Calls Up 10,000 National Guard for Combat Duty in Iraq” (World Socialist Website: October 4, 2003), accessed December 30, 2016, [https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2003/10/ng-o04.html?view=article\\_mobile](https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2003/10/ng-o04.html?view=article_mobile).

ARNG eSBs not as interchangeable forces with the Active Regular Army, but as complementary forces. This occurred predominately after General Schoomaker created an additional ten Active Regular Army BCTs from existing active force structure. DOD policy-makers and wartime commanders, counter to the “One Army” moniker, selected mission purposes for ARNG eSBs different from the Active Regular Army combat brigades.

In October 1, 2003, at three active duty installations, 1st Army supervised the mobilization and federalization of the 30th ARNG eSB, the first eSB notified for deployment. 1st Army trained the 30<sup>th</sup> ARNG eSB under existing post-mobilization training modules for major combat operations.<sup>285</sup> In January 2004, the reorganized 30th ARNG eSB (motorized) deployed to the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) to complete certification. The “One Army” eSB operational approach, however, did not meet the ninety-day mobilization expectation. On March 9, 2004, the 30th ARNG eSB conducted its first combat patrol in Iraq. It replaced an Active Regular Army combat brigade in Iraq.<sup>286</sup> This was a little over six months after it mobilized and eight months after it received its first alert. 1st Army and the 30th ARNG eSB did not meet any wartime readiness, integration, or responsive mobilization expectations for the “One Army” eSB operational approach.

On October 12, 2003, 1st Army supervised the mobilization and federalization of the 39th ARNG eSB, the second eSB notified for deployment. 1st Army trained the 39th ARNG eSB

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<sup>285</sup> Thomas F. Lippiatt, James C. Crowley, Patrick K. Day, and Jerry M. Sollinger, *Post-Mobilization Training Requirements: Army National Guard Heavy Enhanced Brigades* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1996), 1-196; Honore, Russell and Daniel L. Zajac, “Theater Immersion: Post-mobilization Training in the First Army.” *Military Review* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Vol. 85, No. 1, January/February 2005). The 30<sup>th</sup> ARNG eSB mobilized at Fort Bragg, NC, Fort Stewart, GA, and Fort Drum, NY.

<sup>286</sup> Michael D. Doubler, *The National Guard and the War on Terror: Operation Iraqi Freedom* (Washington, DC: National Guard Bureau, 2008), 55-60; “39th Infantry Brigade: The Arkansas Brigade Heritage,” February 02, 2012, accessed December 30, 2016, [http://www.first-team.us/legacies/cmdunits/39th\\_bde](http://www.first-team.us/legacies/cmdunits/39th_bde); “30<sup>th</sup> Brigade Combat Team to Deploy to Iraq,” October 30, 2007, accessed December 30, 2016, <http://www.wral.com/news/local/story/1985801>; Wright and Reese, 605.

under existing post-mobilization training modules for major combat operations.<sup>287</sup> In February 2004, the reorganized 39th ARNG eSB (motorized) deployed to the JRTC to complete certification. The “One Army” eSB operational approach did not meet the ninety-day expectation. In March/April 2004, the 39th ARNG eSB arrived in Iraq approximately six months after mobilization and eight months after it was first notified, replacing an Active Regular Army combat brigade in Iraq.<sup>288</sup> 1st Army and the 39th ARNG eSB did not meet any wartime readiness, integration, or responsive mobilization expectations for the “One Army” eSB operational approach.

In 2005, General Russell Honore, the 1st Army Commanding General, commented on the challenges and lessons learned for the mobilizations of the 30th and 39th ARNG eSBs. He revealed that many of the expected assumptions noted in the DOD-sponsored ARNG eSB post-mobilization study, *Post-Mobilization Training of Army Reserve Component Combat Units*, proved false. Most importantly, he confirmed the impossibility of mobilizing, certifying, and deploying ARNG eSBs as a post-mobilization training goal after ninety days. General Honore alluded to many obstacles. First, he specifically discussed the open competition and friction between AC units and ARNG eSBs for limited installation resources. AC units were preparing for wartime deployments as well. ARNG eSBs were mobilizing at multiple AC installations. His solution was to move all ARNG eSB mobilization and post-mobilization training to Camp Shelby, MS. He predicted that even with centralization, ARNG eSBs would still require ninety days of initial post-mobilization training before they were ready for the FORSCOM certification exercise, another thirty days. Second, General Honore discussed the challenge of scheduling Active Regular Army and ARNG combat brigades for limited FORSCOM CTC facilities. He

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<sup>287</sup> Lippiatt, Crowley, Day, and Sollinger, 1-196; Honore and Zajac. The 39th ARNG eSB completed post-mobilization training at Fort Hood, TX.

<sup>288</sup> Doubler, *The National Guard and the War on Terror: Operation Iraqi Freedom*, 42-43; Wright and Reese, 605.

forecasted that ARNG eSBs would be staggered and sequenced with Active Regular Army combat brigades for FORSCOM certifications in the future.<sup>289</sup>

General Honore's estimates accurately acknowledged the impossibility of making ARNG eSBs ready, integrated, and responsive after ninety days of post-mobilization training, certification, and deployment. He challenged the possibility of "One Army" operational approaches for ARNG eSBs and major combat operations, their designed purposes. He reported that the post-mobilization training of ARNG eSBs would be dictated not by their designed MTOE purposes, major combat operations, but by theater mission requirements to include availability of ARNG eSBs for deployment to relieve units and training for missions other than major combat operations.<sup>290</sup> Instead of making ARNG eSBs ready, integrated, and responsive for major combat operations, General Honore concluded that 1st Army in the future had to lower ARNG eSB post-mobilization collective training requirements to meet theater mission requirements. General Honore essentially alluded that it took 1st Army too long, approximately six months of post-mobilization training to prepare ARNG eSBs for major combat operations. The DOD mobilized ARNG eSBs for eighteen months to complete mobilization training, deployment, and demobilization.<sup>291</sup> Training ARNG eSBs comparable to Active Regular Army standards took too long and minimized their deployment availability. This partially confirms why from 2004-2011 ARNG eSBs were used as complementary forces in Iraq, rather than interchangeable forces comparable to Active Regular Army combat brigades.<sup>292</sup> This challenged the overt "One Army" parity assumption.

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<sup>289</sup> Honore and Zajac.

<sup>290</sup> Ibid.

<sup>291</sup> Ibid.

<sup>292</sup> Raphael S. Cohen, *Demystifying the Citizen Soldier* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2015), 24-25. The other reason ARNG eSBs were used as complementary rather than interchangeable forces from 2004-2011 includes the fact that the DOD began converting ARNG eSBs from combat brigades to brigade combat teams in 2005. The new brigade combat team MTOE possessed more full-spectrum capabilities than previous legacy combat brigade MTOEs. ARNG BCTs required more peacetime

## ARNG Enhanced Separate Brigade Wartime Missions

A recent RAND corporation study noted that forty-seven ARNG combat brigades deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan between 2004 and 2013, concluding that ARNG and Active Regular Army combat brigades comparatively performed different roles and missions. Clearly, DOD policy-makers and wartime commanders treated ARNG combat brigades not as the interchangeable forces, the overt implication of the “One Army” moniker, but as complementary forces to the Active Regular Army. ARNG combat brigades were initially treated as interchangeable, but over time received the “less tactically complex missions.”<sup>293</sup> Interestingly, the study only counted the number of ARNG combat brigade unit identification codes (UICs) that deployed. The study did not include the ARNG combat brigade’s subordinate units that deployed separate from their assigned brigades as ‘orphan units,’ i.e. separate companies and battalions.<sup>294</sup> This happened frequently, particularly in the beginning of the war. The statistics discussed below are lower for ARNG combat units conducting COIN missions and higher for SECFOR and TF PHOENIX missions comparative to Active Regular Army combat units.<sup>295</sup>

From 2004-2013, ARNG combat brigades deployed and conducted three types of missions: Security Force (SECFOR), Task Force Phoenix, or Counterinsurgency (COIN) missions. Twenty-three ARNG combat brigades, or forty-nine percent, completed SECFOR missions. SECFOR missions included “less tactically complex, but still dangerous missions” like

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pre-mobilization training to be interchangeable with the full spectrum capabilities of the Active Regular Army BCTs.

<sup>293</sup> Sydney Freedberg Jr., “National Guard Commanders Rise In Revolt Against Active Army; MG Rossi Questions Guard Combat Role” (Breaking Defense, March 11, 2014), accessed December 30, 2016, <http://breakingdefense.com/2014/03/national-guard-commanders-rise-in-revolt-against-against-active-army-mg-ross-questions-guard-combat-role>.

<sup>294</sup> Fontenot, Degen, and Tohn, 176-177.

<sup>295</sup> Freedburg.

convoy security operations and fixed site security-guard type operations.<sup>296</sup> Seven ARNG combat brigades, fifteen percent, completed TF PHOENIX missions.<sup>297</sup> TF PHOENIX missions included training host nation security forces such as national guard, army, and/or police personnel and units.<sup>298</sup> Only seventeen ARNG combat brigades, or thirty-six percent, completed COIN missions. COIN missions included the “most tactically complex missions,” full-spectrum operations. COIN units predominately owned an area of operations. COIN units possessed the authority and responsibility to gather intelligence, disrupt and destroy enemy forces, secure key terrain, and provide security to the local population within their assigned area of operations. In contrast, Active Regular Army combat brigades overwhelming received COIN missions from 2004-2013. From 2004-2006, when the Active Regular Army was stretched thin, ARNG combat brigades received the most COIN missions, nine of the seventeen.<sup>299</sup>

From 2006-2013, several factors limited ARNG combat brigade missions. The Active Regular Army added ten more brigade combat teams and expanded its end strength to surge in Iraq from 2007-2008 and Afghanistan from 2009-2010. From 2005-2015, the ARNG transformed from older legacy combat brigades to the more complex brigade combat team MTOE. Thus, from 2006-2013, ARNG combat brigades and BCTs received more SECFOR and TF PHOENIX missions. It received less COIN missions comparative to the Active Regular Army.<sup>300</sup> DOD

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<sup>296</sup> Freedburg. SECFOR units predominately were not assigned areas of operations. SECFOR units were treated predominately as force multipliers or enablers to the battlespace owner, another combat brigade or division.

<sup>297</sup> Cohen, 24-25.

<sup>298</sup> Wright and Reese, 437; Freedburg. TF PHOENIX units predominately were not assigned areas of operations. TF PHOENIX units were treated mostly as force multipliers or enablers to the battlespace owner, another combat brigade or division.

<sup>299</sup> Doubler, *The National Guard and the War on Terror: Operation Iraqi Freedom*, 35-43, 46-48. The Active Regular Army was stretched thin, faced a “classical guerrilla-type campaign,” and needed to buy time by deploying ARNG combat brigades for the expansion of more combat brigades and the creation of brigade combat team force structure.

<sup>300</sup> Cohen, 24-25.



policy-makers and wartime commanders treated ARNG combat brigades not as interchangeable forces as the overt “One Army” moniker would imply, but as complementary forces. The eSB operational approach failed for major combat operations, but more importantly highlighted policy-maker and wartime preferences against using ARNG BCTs.

## The Proposed Associated Units Operational Approach

The pilot will test a new model for sustaining readiness in the Reserve Component through increased training days and frequency of CTC rotations...Associated Units concepts have been explored, but not using the associate units authorities in the Army National Guard Combat Readiness Reform Act of 1992.

---Patrick Murphy  
Army Secretary, 2017

On March 21, 2016, the Secretary of the Army, Patrick Murphy, issued a formal memorandum authorizing the designation of twenty-seven AC and RC units for association.<sup>301</sup> Plans called for a *new* three-year Associated Units Pilot Program. The DOD pretext for a *new* operational approach included continued projections for lower operating budgets, high global demands on reduced active force structure, and sustained operational tempos.<sup>302</sup> Secretary Murphy stated the purpose of the pilot was “to test a One Army concept for *generating* Reserve Force combat power” and “to provide commanders the ability to fully integrate for training and ensure the readiness of their formations.”<sup>303</sup> Of the formal associations announced, the Department of the Army listed four Active and ARNG BCTs. The 3rd BCT, 10th Mountain

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<sup>301</sup> Murphy, “Army Public Affairs Guidance for Associated Units Pilot,” 4. Army Secretary Murphy referred to Section 1131 of the ANGCRA. Congress authorized the Army Secretary to designate ARNG and Army Reserve units for association that he deemed as essential for the execution of the national military strategy. By designating these ARNG BCTs, under Section 1131, Secretary Murphy believed that the execution of the war plans now rested on the readiness, integration, and responsiveness of ARNG BCTs. If ARNG BCTs are essential, the associated units operational approach needs to address the fundamental challenges that affected its previous failures.

<sup>302</sup> Ibid, 1.

<sup>303</sup> Murphy, “Designated Associated Units in Support of Army Total Force Policy,” 2.

Division, stationed at Fort Polk, LA, will be associated with the 36th Infantry Division, Texas Army National Guard. The 86th Infantry BCT, Vermont ARNG, will be associated with the 10th Mountain Division, stationed in Fort Drum, New York. The 81st Armored BCT, Washington ARNG, will be associated with the 7th Infantry Division stationed at Joint-Base Lewis McChord, WA. The 48th Infantry BCT, Georgia ARNG, will be associated with the 3rd Infantry Division at Fort Stewart, GA.<sup>304</sup>

It remains a pilot program, yet there are many similarities between the Roundout Brigade Operational Approach and the Associated Units Pilot Program. The parallels are uncanny. Associated Units appear to be refurbished roundout or roundup units. Minimal parallels exist in the eSB operational approach, though, it is unclear how associated units will interface with 1st Army and regional Training Support Brigades (TSB) under Title XI authorities.<sup>305</sup>

In terms of the AC-RC relationship, Secretary Murphy announced that “associated” means AC and RC commanders will “exercise shared ADCON of their designated “associated units,” but only as it pertains to the four training and readiness authorities and responsibilities” which are: (1) Approving the Training Program of the associated units, (2), Reviewing the readiness reports of the associated units, (3) Assessing manpower, equipment, and training resource requirements of the associated unit, and (4) Validating, not less than annually the compatibility of the associated units with AC forces.<sup>306</sup>

Based on available information, there are four major similarities between the old roundout brigade operational approach that remains relevant to the Associated Units Pilot Program today. First, the core premise of creating wartime multi-component units is evident.

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<sup>304</sup> Murphy, “Army Public Affairs Guidance for Associated Units Pilot,” 3.

<sup>305</sup> First Army Regional Training Brigades (RTB) are now called Training Support Brigades (TSBs) today.

<sup>306</sup> Murphy, “Designated Associated Units in Support of Army Total Force Policy,” 1-2.

Secretary Murphy stated “associated units support the One Army concept of establishing formal relationships between operational AC and RC units prior to deployment.”<sup>307</sup> He stopped short of affirming an assigned wartime mission, but implied a core premise of the roundout operational approach. Though, the pilot program is essentially designed to test associated units as “roundout” or “roundup” units for wartime missions and major combat operations. Likewise, General Milley is on record favoring ARNG “roundout” and multi-component units for the future.<sup>308</sup> It is obvious the continued global demands of the national military strategy juxtaposed against sequestration, limited active force structure, and continued operational tempos forced the US Army to reconsider ARNG combat brigades for wartime contingencies. ARNG BCTs might be tied to wartime contingencies in the future like the old failed roundout brigade operational approach.

Second, the command relationships are almost identical between “affiliated” roundout units and “associated units.” In less words, the four training and readiness authorities of associated commanders listed above mirror the authorities and responsibilities of the active affiliated division commander under the Roundout operational approach.<sup>309</sup> Secretary Murphy acknowledged the “...shared ADCON of associated units between two controlling headquarters of the AC and the ARNG.”<sup>310</sup> Shared ADCON and multiple controlling higher headquarters creates unity of effort challenges. Roundout brigades did experience readiness and unity of effort fratricide. Secretary Murphy’s detailed guidance memorandum for associated units provides four scenarios for when ADCON may or may not be shared for IDT, AT, integrated training exercises, and non-integrated training exercises.<sup>311</sup> A cursory look at conflicting authorities and

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<sup>307</sup> Murphy, “Designated Associated Units in Support of Army Total Force Policy,” 2.

<sup>308</sup> Mark A. Milley, “CSA's National Guard Association of the United States Speech” (US Army Website, September 11, 2015), accessed December 14, 2016, <https://www.army.mil/article/155581>

<sup>309</sup> See monograph page 26 for a comparison.

<sup>310</sup> Murphy, “Designation of Associated Units in Support of Army Total Force Policy,” 2.

<sup>311</sup> Murphy, “Detailed Definitions and Guidance Regarding Designation of Associated Units,” 2-3.

responsibilities by location helps to see the potential for authority fratricide. For example, the 3<sup>rd</sup> BCT, 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain associated unit has three controlling headquarters: the 36<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division ARNG headquarters in Texas (for the four training and readiness authorities and responsibilities mentioned above), the 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division parent headquarters in Fort Drum, NY (for all other FORSCOM authorities and responsibilities), and the Installation headquarters in Fort Polk, LA (for all installation command authorities and responsibilities).<sup>312</sup> Likewise, three of the associated ARNG BCTs above have two controlling higher headquarters at a minimum, maybe three.<sup>313</sup> Congress created Title XI training and readiness authorities and responsibilities after the roundout operational approach failed. The DOD created 1st Army and regional TSBs to execute Title XI authorities and responsibilities. Based on current information, the command relationships between 1st Army entities and associated ARNG BCTs remains unclear. The command relationships of the Roundout Operational Approach and the Associated Units Pilot Program are remarkably similar.

Third, the friction of geographically-separated units and controlling headquarters [for training and readiness] existed in both approaches. “Associated units” and their controlling headquarters for training and readiness are geographically separated like the “affiliated units.” Geographic separation did complicate command relationships, specifically the 155th brigade located in Mississippi and its affiliated division headquarters located in Fort Hood, Texas.<sup>314</sup> Two of the four associated ARNG BCTs are geographically-separated from their training and readiness controlling headquarters. Multiple command relationships and geographic separation presents unity of effort challenges in pre-mobilization training execution. During the Persian Gulf

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<sup>312</sup> Murphy, “Army Public Affairs Guidance for Associated Units Pilot,” 3-4.

<sup>313</sup> The 10th Mountain Division at Fort Drum, NY, is also geographically-separated from the 81st Infantry BCT located in Vermont.

<sup>314</sup> NSIAD-91-263, 9; Duncan, 83.

War, this was a contributing factor in the inaccurate readiness reports of the 48th and 155th brigades prior to their mobilization and it is relevant to the Associated Units Pilot Program.

Fourth, both operational approaches exclaimed that ARNG BCTs are high priority units, emphasizing that ARNG BCTs need more RC training days than normal, frequent rotations to combat training centers, and more integrated training with AC units.<sup>315</sup> LTG Kadavy asserts “...[associated] BCT readiness is being prioritized because this is an area where the Army has an immediate requirement” and “...require(s) greater time to develop [generate] and sustain proficiency.”<sup>316</sup> He said “a hundred days spent at the mobilization station will not cut it,” implying ARNG BCTs can no longer wait to conduct large scale unit training once mobilized for deployment.<sup>317</sup> He believes “Soldiers are the core of the Army” and “they must be available and prepared for collective training to improve unit’s proficiency,” implying that war now requires professional soldiers. He further implied professional guard units are needed by saying: “Guard Soldiers have typically trained one weekend a month, and two weeks in the summer for a total of 39 days each year. That training model, in place since the passage of the Dick Act of 1902, doesn’t match current operational tempos and needs.”<sup>318</sup> LTG Kadavy remains focused on keeping armored and Stryker BCTs in the ARNG and in “a rotation to Fort Irwin every four years.” He wants one of the ARNG armored or Stryker BCTs available to support a deployment “every two to three years.”<sup>319</sup> The rhetoric for keeping high priority, associated ARNG BCTs responsive for

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<sup>315</sup> Murphy, “Army Public Affairs Guidance for Associated Units,” 1-2.

<sup>316</sup> Jon Soucy, “Army Guard Soldiers to See Increase in Training Days” (National Guard Bureau, October 5, 2016), accessed December 14, 2016, <http://www.nationalguard.mil/News/Article/965325/army-guard-soldiers-to-see-increase-in-training-days>.

<sup>317</sup> Ibid.

<sup>318</sup> Ibid.

<sup>319</sup> John Goheen, “More Training Days for the Guard” (National Guard Bureau Association, October 11, 2016), accessed December 14, 2016, <http://ngaus.org/newsroom/news/more-training-days-guard-soldiers#sthash.tqKMbjC.dpuf>.

future wartime contingency operations is exactly the same rhetoric for the old roundout brigade operational approach.

Current plans for the Associated Unit Pilot Program include increased training days of ARNG BCTs. LTG Kadavy announced that over a four-year training model, “[ARNG] Soldiers in those [associated] units can expect to see yearly training days range from 39 days in year one to 60 days in year three, with the fourth year seeing Soldiers train 51 days.”<sup>320</sup> The plans for ARNG brigades allegedly remain focused on the Bold Shift program, but gradually move to higher multi-echelon training levels over the four year training plan.<sup>321</sup> The Associated Units Pilot acknowledges the importance of lower echelon training in pre-mobilization. Secretary Murphy concurs: “the goal... is not to achieve the same readiness as an AC unit, but rather to sustain higher readiness [for RC units] to reduce post-mobilization training requirements when activated.”<sup>322</sup> Interestingly, in 1990, the 48th and 155th roundout brigades were high priority units as well. They received sixty and sixty-four pre-mobilization training days above the law and conducted integrated higher multi-echelon level training with their AC units. Five months prior to mobilization, the 48th brigade completed a CTC rotation. The major differences between affiliated roundout units and associated units appear purely cosmetic at best.

The Associated Units Pilot Program plans to overcome the complications of the roundout operational approach in three new ways. First, officer evaluations, the associated unit commander will receive an officer evaluation from the associated controlling headquarters either as a rater, intermediate rater, or senior rater. The parent unit will still be in the officer rating chain. Second,

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<sup>320</sup> Soucy. The Bold Shift program remains in effect today as “Operation Bold Shift.” Its original goals were more realistic. ARNG combat brigade peacetime readiness generation goals are now spread over four years despite high personnel turnover percentages. In three out of the four years, units will train up to the company level. In the model, combat brigades will conduct battalion and brigade operations at a CTC rotation. The law of attraction and positive thinking is unfolding again. ARNG BCTs will feel pressured to report higher C-level readiness in peacetime that is unrealistic.

<sup>321</sup> Ibid.

<sup>322</sup> Murphy, “Army Public Affairs Guidance for Associated Units Pilot,” 2.

AC-RC personnel exchanges, both the associated unit and controlling headquarters will exchange one to two personnel to coordinate readiness and training opportunities. Third, unit patches, the associated unit will wear the unit patch of the associated controlling headquarters as a visible symbol of the “One Army” concept in peacetime.<sup>323</sup> Given the fundamental peacetime challenges over the last forty years, these are nothing more than cosmetic refurbishments.

## Conclusion

Reframing includes revisiting early hypotheses, conclusions, and the operational approach that underpins the current plan. In reframing, the commander and staff revise understanding of the operational environment and problem. If required, they develop a new operational approach to overcome challenges or opportunities that precipitated the need to reframe.

Army Design Methodology Doctrine  
---Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 5-0.1

### Peacetime Challenges

Four major peacetime challenges prevented the readiness, integration, and responsiveness of the ARNG combat brigade participation in major combat operations during the Persian Gulf War and for consideration in the Iraq War. These four challenges still endure today for any “One Army” operational approach.

The first major challenge includes the recognition that the phenomena of modern warfare has substantially changed. In 1965, Gordon Moore, a semiconductor pioneer, posited that the “number of transistors in a dense integrated circuit would double every two years.”<sup>324</sup> Many refer to the landmark invention of the first microprocessor in 1971 as the beginning of the Information Age and Digital Revolution. Moore theorized about it much earlier.<sup>325</sup> The Congress and DOD

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<sup>323</sup> Secretary of the Army Memorandum Enclosure, “Army Public Affairs Guidance for Associated Units Pilot” (Washington, DC: dated 21 March 2016), 4.

<sup>324</sup> Bret Swanson, *Moore’s Law at 50: The Performance and Prospects of the Exponential Economy* (American Enterprise Institute, 2015), 1-4.

<sup>325</sup> Gordon Sullivan and Anthony M. Coralles, “The Army in the Information Age” (Carlisle Barracks, PA: The US Army War College, March 1995), accessed December 13, 2016, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/summary.cfm?q=268>

created the AVF and TFP in 1973. These policies bounded peacetime “One Army” operational approaches. Significant modernization occurred in the 1970s and 1980s as “the Guard and Reserves were receiving quantities of ... [equipment], new advances in technology were pushing much of that “new” equipment to the borderline of obsolescence.”<sup>326</sup> Moore’s Law modernizations pressed the boundaries of “One Army” operational approaches. Rapid and continuous advances in technology prior to the Persian Gulf War “were far more complex and demanding than just a decade before; Long Range tank and TOW gunnery, rapid maneuver, and complex electronic equipment all require[d] skills that take a great deal of time to learn and maintain.”<sup>327</sup> The phenomena of modern warfare was changing to account for Moore’s Law. In 2015, technology continues to modernize at the rate of Moore’s Law.<sup>328</sup> The evolving nature of technology, information, and digital systems continued to grow at alarming rates for the US and adversaries. During brigade transformation beginning in 2004, the phenomena of modern warfare pushed more capabilities down into brigade combat team MTOEs. Technology made wars more asymmetric.<sup>329</sup> Soldiers are now professional technicians. The evolving nature of technology, modernization, and the phenomena of modern warfare will affect any future operational approach. Congressional limitations and precedents continue to bound “One Army” operational approaches. Peacetime changes to “One Army” operational approaches are now purely cosmetic.

The second major challenge includes the recognition that the phenomena of modern warfare requires the professionalization of ARNG soldiers, NCOs, and officers in peacetime. The US Army now requires a p-level readiness foundation (PME and MOSQ) comparable to the

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<sup>326</sup> W.D. McGlasson, “Combat Readiness Suffers,” in *The Guard and Reserve in the Total Force: The First Decade 1973-1983*, ed. Bennie J. Wilson III (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1985), 152.

<sup>327</sup> Scales, 380.

<sup>328</sup> Swanson, 17.

<sup>329</sup> Max Boot and Jean K. Kirkpatrick, “The Paradox of Military Technology” (Council on Foreign Relations: The New Atlantis, Fall 2016), accessed December 13, 2016, <http://www.cfr.org/information-warfare/paradox-military-technology/p11666>



professionals of the Active Regular Army. Guardsman need p-level technical skills in peacetime that can generate effective t-level readiness in post-mobilization. The US Army provisioning of PME and MOSQ through PS recruitment strategies was not enough. The after-action review of the Persian Gulf War notes this challenge: “With no comparable civilian skills, Guardsman had to learn the [modern] complexities of fire and maneuver in close combat during their meager 39 days of training per year.”<sup>330</sup> The new phenomena of modern warfare required the development of tactical and technical skills “over many years of schooling, daily training, and practical experience.”<sup>331</sup> Unfortunately, under the AVF, the peacetime p-level readiness gap widened over four decades between the ARNG and the Active Regular Army. The AVF paved the way for the Active Regular Army and higher quality soldiers to adapt to the phenomena of modern warfare. During the same period, limited training time forced the ARNG to make hard choices between collective training, civilian employment, and individual soldier PME and MOSQ qualifications and schooling requirements. The DOD chose to create a separate military education system standard for ARNG soldiers. The evolving phenomena of modern warfare and its peacetime p-level readiness generation requirements will challenge any future operational approach.

The third major challenge includes the recognition that the phenomena of modern warfare requires an examination of readiness provisioning strategies. US law constrained the number of annual training days for operational approaches. The DOD and US Army focused over the last four decades almost exclusively on provisioning p-level, s-level, and r-level readiness resources during peacetime. There were diminishing returns without increased training time. Fortunately, the 48th and 155th roundout brigades received higher annual training days, sixty and sixty-four days respectively. It still was not enough. The Congress, the DOD, and the US Army continued to focus on resourcing ARNG combat brigades in almost all instances. The predominate strategy

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<sup>330</sup> Scales, 380.

<sup>331</sup> Ibid, 380.

was more funding, trainers, simulators, contractors, and equipment.<sup>332</sup> The Law of Diminishing Returns is applicable: “in all productive processes [readiness generation], adding more of one factor of production [readiness resources], while holding all others constant [readiness training time], will at some point yield lower incremental per-unit returns.”<sup>333</sup> At some point, providing more readiness resources for limited returns on investment, ARNG BCT readiness generation, becomes wasteful or lost opportunity costs for resources that could be used elsewhere to deal with the evolving phenomena of modern warfare. A detailed cost-benefit analysis is beyond the scope of this study, but a cursory review of the ARNG BCT economies of scale begs for extensive research and hard choices. The law of diminishing returns for provisioning readiness resources will challenge any future operational approach for ARNG BCTs because collective training time has a limit. That limit appears to be somewhere between thirty-nine and sixty days annually. There is a threshold whereby citizen-soldiers will not answer the call to serve.<sup>334</sup> This limit constrains the peacetime p-level and t-level readiness generation of ARNG BCTs.

The fourth major challenge includes the recognition that the phenomena of modern warfare requires an examination of readiness generation strategies. Again, US law constrains the number of annual training days for any operational approach. The DOD and US Army resourced ARNG combat brigades at similar p-level, s-level, and r-levels. The DOD and US Army instituted a command relationship that was supposed to generate a peacetime t-level readiness

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<sup>332</sup> See Sections 1111-1136 of the 1992 ANGCRA.

<sup>333</sup> Paul A. Samuelson and Nordhaus, William D., *Microeconomics* (McGraw-Hill, 2001), 110; Fredland, Gilroy, and Little, 148. Time is the critical factor to prepare forces for combat. It is the one factor that has been held almost constant for ARNG unit collective training since 1902.

<sup>334</sup> Scott Maucione, “National Guard Reaches Out To Families, Companies As Training Days Increase” (Federal News, October 14, 2016), accessed March 11, 2017, <http://federalnewsradio.com/defense/2016/10/national-guard-reaches-familiescompanies-training-days-increase/>. The Guard reached out to soldiers and industry to reconcile the fact that soldiers who previously spent at least thirty-nine days a year in active-duty training would be spending up to sixty days per year. There is a limit on collective training for ARNG BCTs. Sixty days is not enough to generate sufficient readiness.

foundation for ARNG combat brigades. ARNG combat brigades were manned and equipped the same as their active counterparts. Active and ARNG brigade commanders briefed their training plans to the active division commander. ARNG roundout brigade pre-mobilization training plans included training events across all echelons from crew to the brigade level like their active brigade counterparts. ARNG combat brigades completed higher multi-echelon training plans like their active counterparts and reported higher C-level readiness levels. The Law of Attraction, the belief that “like attracts like,” was applicable. ARNG combat brigades attempted to mirror their active counterparts in training plans.<sup>335</sup> ARNG combat brigades and active division commanders did not set realistic, attainable goals for pre-mobilization training plans. The Law of Positive Thinking, the idea “you are what you think,” was also applicable. ARNG roundout brigades reported high readiness rates that were inaccurate, yet like their active counterparts.<sup>336</sup> ARNG roundout brigades reported higher C-level readiness levels and active division commanders accepted it at face value. Everyone thought positive, but the peacetime t-level readiness foundation proved insufficient for t-level generation in post-mobilization training. Today, the AVF and TFP still creates attraction and positive thinking between the Active Regular Army, the ARNG, the DOD, and Congress. The AVF and TFP still frames narratives and the debate between Congress, the DOD, the US Army, and the ARNG on strategic threats, force structure, and readiness.<sup>337</sup> Limits on annual training days, peacetime readiness generation strategies, and

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<sup>335</sup> Guy Redden, "Magic Happens: A New Age Metaphysical Mystery Tour," *Journal of Australian Studies*, 101.

<sup>336</sup> Brandon Olivares, “The Law of Attraction: How Positive Thinking Can Be Dangerous” (Co-Creation Coaching, August 26, 2006), accessed December 13, 2016, <http://cocreationcoaching.org/law-of-attraction-positive-thinking-can-dangerous>.

<sup>337</sup> Freedburg. The debate includes three narratives different narratives from the Active Regular Army, the NGB, and Congress. The Active Regular Army narrative acknowledges that AC-RC should work hand in hand and side by side, but is adamant that AC-RC are not “interchangeable.” The NGB counters the Active Regular Army’s narrative by stating the AC remarks are “disparaging, disrespectful, and simply not true.” The NGB contends the AC remarks “disrespect the over 700 Guardsman and women killed in the line of duty since 2001.” The Congressional narrative remains: “It’s a false choice” between AC and RC force structure; the nation needs both AC-RC units.

politics challenge the realism and feasibility of any operational approach. This is true for the Associated Units Pilot Program, because essentially it is the old Roundout Brigade operational approach.

### Wartime Challenge

One major wartime challenge prevented the readiness, integration, and responsiveness of ARNG combat brigades participating in major combat operations in both the Persian Gulf War and the Iraq War. The unknown variable of “politics” remains the principal barrier for employing ARNG combat brigades in major combat operations as interchangeable forces with the Active Regular Army, the overt stated purpose of “One Army.” The designed purpose of ARNG combat brigades is major combat operations. Yet, the political symbolism of mobilizing ARNG combat brigades for major combat operations is profound, both to domestic and international audiences. The political symbolism threshold for mobilizing ARNG combat support and combat service support units was not high in either case study. Policy-makers and wartime commanders have real political risks recommending unproven ARNG BCTs for major combat operations. The policy preferences may vary, but the political risks are real.

Policy-makers prefer Active Regular Army combat brigades for major combat operations and smaller force packages. Wartime commanders always recommend a higher force ratio for wartime contingencies, but are unwilling to assume the strategic risk of unprepared and unproven ARNG combat brigades failing in major combat operations. Mobilization of ARNG combat brigades goes against DOD policy-maker preferences. Thus, roundout or associated combat units get replaced with Active Regular Army BCTs for wartime contingencies. This nullifies the purpose for which ARNG combat brigades were designed. A substantial amount of the US Army’s land combat power now resides in ARNG combat brigades. The policy preferences of wartime commanders nullify their purpose when Active Regular Army BCTs take the hardest missions and ARNG combat brigades do complementary missions. The political variable more

than any other prevents ready, integrated, and responsive ARNG combat brigades from participating in major combat operations. It will inhibit the Associated Units operational approach.

### Appropriate for the Future?

This monograph argued that the new “Associated Units” peacetime operational approach for ARNG BCTs performing major combat operations with the Active Regular Army is essentially the old “Roundout” peacetime operational approach that failed to meet peacetime expectations. The DOD created the “One Army” concept to generate national will, maintain flexibility, and project deterrence with more active divisions. The DOD justified more active divisions to Congress on the assumption that ARNG combat brigades were more cost-effective. These four justifications remain suspect at best. Recent studies prove all four justifications are inaccurate.<sup>338</sup>

National will is a long-term consideration, usually irrelevant unless an election is in the near term.<sup>339</sup> Policy preference and political risks shape national decision-making.<sup>340</sup> In the Persian Gulf War, civilian policy-makers, uniformed military advisors, and wartime commanders had clear policy preferences against ARNG combat brigades. For major combat operations, the political risks for unprepared ARNG roundout combat brigades were extremely high. Civilian policy-makers therefore replaced ARNG roundout combat brigades with active replacement brigades in the Persian Gulf War.

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<sup>338</sup> Cohen, 1-39.

<sup>339</sup> Elections are a demonstration of national will, not force structure. Domestic elections drove policy-maker preferences in both case studies. Likewise, international institutions and coalition formation also drove policy-maker preferences in both case studies.

<sup>340</sup> Fredland, Gilroy, and Little, 148. ARNG mobilization is first a political decision.

In the Iraq War, civilian policy makers and uniformed military advisors had different policy preferences. Civilian policy-makers wanted a smaller combat force. The Active Regular Army force structure was almost half what it was from the Persian Gulf War. Uniformed military advisors and commanders analyzed the strategic problem set and believed a larger combat force was necessary to include ARNG eSBs. In the Iraq War, mobilizing ARNG eSBs constrained civilian policy makers politically. Originally, DOD policy-makers never planned to mobilize ARNG eSBs for major combat operations or subsequent post-war occupation activities. The Active Regular Army was expected to assume the risk. Only when the Active Regular Army was stretched thin, the war was unraveling, and failure became a real possibility did DOD policy-makers reconsider the mobilization of ARNG eSBs.<sup>341</sup> Iraq was not a near peer military competitor. In a near peer military competitor scenario, time may not be an ally of the United States, particularly an overstretched Active Regular Army like the one in the Iraq War. Historically, in both case studies, it took between five to six months to get ARNG combat brigades ready, integrated, and responsive to the theater of war. ARNG BCTs may take longer.

ARNG BCTs flexibility continues to be a matter of perspective.<sup>342</sup> Deterrence is only credible if ARNG BCTs are ready and can respond, integrate, and perform as designed comparable to Active Regular Army BCTs. To date, credible deterrence for ARNG BCTs and major combat operations remains unproven and is highly suspect.<sup>343</sup> ARNG BCTs have yet to

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<sup>341</sup> Doubler, *The National Guard and the War on Terror: Operation Iraqi Freedom*, 46-48.

<sup>342</sup> State governors need ARNG personnel and equipment for natural disasters. Other force structure alternatives need to be considered. ARNG brigade combat teams are complex, expensive, and present difficult peacetime challenges for both the ARNG and Active Regular Army to maintain even minimum levels of readiness.

<sup>343</sup> Todd Heussner, *Deterrence as a Means of Maintaining American Pre-Eminence* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, 2010), 1. “Deterrence must have credibility as an underlying foundation. A threat that is not credible is no threat at all. Enemies of America must know, in no uncertain terms, that actions deemed unacceptable by the United States government will be met with a swift and effective response.” Duncan, 41. “The importance of reserve readiness to the credible deterrence of war, and to winning of war if deterrence fails, has never been greater.”

perform major combat operations since the TFP mandate. In the Iraq War, the DOD did not treat ARNG and Active Regular Army BCTs as equal.

ARNG BCT cost-effectiveness remains questionable. Even the NGB admits that the original “One Army” justification of monetary cost effectiveness remains suspect.<sup>344</sup> Yet, Congress and the DOD continue to provision substantial readiness resources to ARNG BCTs as the exclusive strategy for the failures of “One Army” operational approaches. Congress and the DOD continue to ignore the historical readiness generation challenges of “One Army” operational approaches for political reasons.

The “Associated Units” peacetime operational approach for ARNG BCTs is doomed to fail again unless the Congress, the DOD, the US Army, and the ARNG address the fundamental readiness generation challenges of previous operational approaches. Congressional limits on peacetime readiness generation prevents ready, integrated, and responsive ARNG BCTs from performing major combat operations with the Active Regular Army. The Congress, the DOD, the US Army, and the ARNG stopped challenging assumptions and asking hard questions. Critical thinking about the past remains irrelevant to designing future “One Army” operational approaches.<sup>345</sup> ARNG BCTs are no more ready, integrated, or responsive for major combat operations than they were for the Persian Gulf War twenty-six years ago.

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<sup>344</sup> Stephanie Kostro, *Citizen-Soldiers in a Time of Transition: The Future of the US Army National Guard* (New York, NY: Rowan & Littlefield, 2014), 44.

<sup>345</sup> Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 5-0.1, *Army Design Methodology* (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2015), 1-3 to 1-9. Critical Thinking involves questioning information, assumptions, conclusions, and points of view to interpret data and information, evaluate evidence, and clarify goals. Creative thinking examines problems from a fresh perspective to develop innovative solutions. Collaboration and dialogue help develop shared understanding. Interestingly, the Congress, the DOD, the US Army, and the ARNG no longer critically think, collaborate, or discuss the hypotheses, challenges, and conclusions of previous “One Army” operational approaches for ARNG BCTs. Thus, creative thinking or fresh perspectives for “One Army” operational approaches and ARNG BCTs remain old ideas. Our doctrine states a reframing of the operational approach is required. Yet, the associated units pilot program represents an old operational approach.

Unless the Congress, the DOD, the US Army, and the ARNG truly challenge “every assumption we hold, every claim, every assertion, every single one” to include those in the Dick Act of 1902, those in the National Defense Act of 1916, those in the AVF, and question the TFP, then all future “One Army” operational approaches for ARNG BCTs will continue to fail.<sup>346</sup> Under current law, the political risks for employing unprepared ARNG BCTs in major combat operations and failing are extremely high. ARNG BCTs cannot generate sufficient readiness in peacetime to lower the political risks.<sup>347</sup> Therefore, policy makers and wartime commanders will continue to rely on the Active Regular Army and have policy preferences against employing ARNG BCTs for major combat operations unless failure appears certain. The strategic problem is evident. It takes approximately five to six months to prepare ARNG BCTs for major combat operations. This may be too late and catastrophic against a near peer military competitor.

General Abrams was appalled “at the human cost” the United States paid in the Vietnam War because it would not prepare for war. He created the first “One Army” operational approach. Its success for RC combat support and combat service support units is well documented.<sup>348</sup> Its peacetime and wartime failures for ARNG combat brigades is likewise well documented. The Congress, the DOD, the US Army, and the ARNG know the peacetime and wartime challenges that prevent ready, integrated, and responsive ARNG BCTs, yet they continue to pursue old operational approaches destined to fail.

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<sup>346</sup> Milley, “Radical Change Is Coming: General Mark A. Milley Not Talking About Just Tinkering Around the Edges.” General Milley stated “we [Congress, the US Army, and the ARNG] to challenge every assumption we hold, every claim, every assertion, every single one” for the future of war and warfare.

<sup>347</sup> Sandra Erwin, “Army Chief: Part-Time Soldiers Cannot Replace Full-Time Soldiers” (National Defense Magazine, January 7, 2014), accessed December 19, 2016, <http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/blog/lists/posts/post.aspx?ID=1369>. These comments from the Chief of Staff the Army and the National Guard Bureau Chief reflect the ongoing debate about ARNG and Active combat brigades.

<sup>348</sup> In comparison to ARNG BCTs, RC combat support and combat service support units have fewer and less complex METL tasks, fewer training echelons, and can generate a peacetime readiness foundation to support major combat operations.



General Milley predicts future confrontations with near peer military competitors, possibly major combat operations, in an unprecedented and lethal modern war. As a professional, he believes the US Army needs to challenge everything. The historical record of ARNG roundout brigades and eSBs is a good place to start. The Associated Units operational approach is already outdated by the historical record.<sup>349</sup> Creative thinking is not occurring.<sup>350</sup> When it comes to the readiness, responsiveness, and integration of brigade combat teams, there are “Two Armies” not “One Army” between the Active Regular Army and the ARNG. The bottom line is the US Army needs to propose a real “One Army” operational approach that can address the fundamental peacetime and wartime challenges of making ready, responsive, and integrated ARNG BCTs for major combat operations. If this is not possible, the US Army needs to tell the Congress and the DOD that existing laws and policies are outdated for waging war against near peer military competitors today. The US Army needs to tell the Congress and the DOD that given the status quo, a smaller, less lethal Active Regular Army focused on two fronts, home and abroad, will pay the blood price in the future because the nation would not prepare ARNG BCTs for war.<sup>351</sup>

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<sup>349</sup> Ellen M. Pint, Matthew W. Lewis, and Thomas F. Lippatt, *Active Component Responsibility in Reserve Component Pre- and Post-Mobilization Training* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2015), i-xv, 1-102. Conclusions and Recommendations: “The Title XI requirement for RC units to be associated with similar AC units has become outdated; AC-led multi-component units, such as 1st Army, now fulfill the roles and responsibilities of AC associated units,” xvi.

<sup>350</sup> ATP 5-0.1, 1-6.

<sup>351</sup> Making ARNG BCTs ready, responsive, and integrated for major combat operations is now an unequal, AC driven process. The Active Regular Army fought a formidable enemy in the Iraq War, but did not face a near-peer competitor. The Iraq War almost broke the Active Regular Army. A near-peer competitor could break the Active Regular Army. The Congress, the DOD, the US Army, and the ARNG need to reframe their hypotheses, assumptions, and operational approaches for a near-peer competitor.

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