



April 4, 2017

# Use of Confidential Informants at ATF and DEA

Committee on the Oversight and Government Reform, United States  
House of Representatives, One Hundred Fifteenth Congress, First Session

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Office of the Inspector General  
United States Department of Justice

Statement of Michael E. Horowitz  
Inspector General, U.S. Department of Justice

*before the*

U.S. House of Representatives  
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform

*concerning*

"Use of Confidential Informants at ATF and DEA"

April 4, 2017

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Cummings, and Members of the Committee:

Thank you for inviting me to testify about the Department of Justice (Department) Office of the Inspector General's (OIG) oversight of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives' (ATF) Confidential Informant Program and the Drug Enforcement Administration's (DEA) Confidential Source Program. We appreciate the Committee's continued interest in the Department's confidential informant programs. Confidential informants are an important part of the Department's law enforcement operations, with both ATF and DEA relying heavily on confidential informants to provide information related to unlawful activity and services that further federal criminal investigations.

Department officials have acknowledged that there are risks involved with using informants because these individuals often have criminal backgrounds, and they often provide assistance or cooperation in exchange for cash or the prospect of a reduced criminal sentence rather than a desire to help law enforcement. The appropriate use of informants requires assessing the usefulness and credibility of the information and services they provide, and therefore requires significant oversight, attentive program management, and thorough guidance.

To address these risks, the Attorney General's Guidelines Regarding the Use of Confidential Informants (AG Guidelines) provides Department-wide guidance on various confidential informant matters, including determining the suitability of individual informants and providing enhanced oversight of high-risk informants. Compliance with the AG Guidelines helps ensure consistent and appropriate informant management among all Department law enforcement agencies and helps to mitigate the risks involved with using confidential informants in federal investigations. However, despite this guidance, our 2012 review of ATF's Operation Fast and Furious found that, until 2011, ATF had not updated its policies on confidential informants to account for the requirements of the AG Guidelines and our July 2015 review of DEA's confidential source policies found that they differed in several significant respects from the AG Guidelines' requirements.

In November 2016, I testified before this Committee and described the results of our July 2015 and September 2016 audits of DEA's Confidential Source Program. Two weeks ago, we released a public summary of a classified addendum to our September 2016 report that identifies specific findings related to the use of and payments to confidential sources by the DEA's Intelligence and Special Operations Divisions. Last week, we issued a report detailing our findings regarding ATF's Confidential Informant Program.

### **ATF's Management and Oversight of Its Confidential Informant Program**

ATF managed over 1,800 active informants as of January 2016, spending approximately \$4.3 million annually on its Confidential Informant Program in fiscal years (FY) 2012 through 2015. Although ATF's Confidential Informant Program is not as large as others in the Department, the overall risks of using informants remain the same. Last week's audit found that ATF's oversight of its Confidential

Informant Program required significant improvement, especially pertaining to ATF's management of relevant confidential informant information, tracking of payments to confidential informants, and oversight of higher-risk confidential informants.

While we determined that ATF's confidential informant policies were generally aligned with the AG Guidelines, our audit also determined that ATF has not properly implemented practices that accomplish what is written in its policy, and ATF's informant policies and procedures did not provide for adequate management of the program. The deficiencies I will describe in more detail below did not allow for ATF to meet the oversight requirements established in the AG Guidelines, and did not allow ATF to employ the level of oversight or management that would have most effectively mitigated the risks involved in using confidential informants.

Of particular concern, we found that information critical to the management of ATF's Confidential Informant Program was compartmentalized in three different locations: (1) the informant file, which is a hard-copy file that includes basic background information about the informant and administrative documents related to the informant; (2) one or more investigative files, which are hard-copy files that include details of the informant's case-related activities, as well as documentation of payments provided to the informant; and (3) an electronic database that contained only identifying information about every informant. Maintaining information in this way made it difficult for us, and could make it difficult for ATF officials, to assess whether an informant was providing information that assisted ATF investigations, particularly those informants who were involved in multiple cases. Further, the automated system that ATF used during our audit to manage its informant information was unsophisticated and unreliable, and it did not retain historical information.

Moreover, the compartmentalized nature of ATF's informant information had particularly significant effects on ATF's ability to track payments to individual informants. The AG Guidelines require that all payments to individual informants be accounted for. However, during our audit we found that ATF could not efficiently identify and track total payments made to individual informants with sufficient accuracy or reliability because doing so required locating and reviewing numerous hard-copy documents in multiple, separate files and systems. Recognizing the importance of this matter, we alerted ATF management of our concerns in June 2016 - which was prior to the conclusion of our audit - that ATF's information environment did not provide sufficient safeguards to ensure that complete and accurate information was consistently available, including when such information was required to be made available to prosecutors for use during criminal proceedings. In response to our concerns, ATF concluded that it also could not completely reconcile some confidential informant payment records. Although we did not examine whether ATF provided incorrect informant payment information during any criminal proceedings, and we are not aware of any such instances, we consider this deficiency in ATF's information environment to be a significant concern.

We also have concerns with ATF's management and oversight for certain categories of higher-risk confidential informants, because we found that ATF did not always categorize, track, and review the use of these informants. For one particular category of higher-risk informants, foreign nationals, we found that while ATF can sponsor foreign national informants for temporary legal status when ATF believes the informant will provide valuable information and assistance to its investigation, ATF officials did not completely and accurately track information related to these foreign national informants. As a result, we were unable to determine the total number of ATF-sponsored foreign national informants. The inability to efficiently identify these informants is especially problematic because these informants, as with many informants, can have criminal histories or may be involved with criminal organizations, and therefore the risks associated with these informants remaining in the United States without legal authorization are higher than normal. This lack of reliable information prohibited ATF headquarters from properly managing the informants and from ensuring appropriate coordination with the Department of Homeland Security.

We were similarly unable to obtain from ATF an accurate and complete picture of informants who are also Federal Firearms Licensees. While we found that ATF's policy provides guidance related to this informant category, we are concerned that ATF did not have a reliable method of querying its records to identify informants who may be a licensee. In our 2012 report on ATF's Operation Fast and Furious and Related Matters, the OIG found that ATF was receiving information and cooperation from a licensee regarding firearms sales to individuals who were engaged in firearms trafficking and illegal firearms purchases. That report revealed that ATF did not have controls in place to ensure that there was no conflict between its use of the individual in an investigative manner and its oversight of the same individual as an approved license holder. Although ATF officials told us that ATF does not currently have any licensees who are also informants, we continue to believe that this informant category requires increased oversight and therefore ATF should strengthen its recordkeeping in this area.

In addition, we reviewed ATF's efforts to manage certain categories of higher-risk informants that are identified within the AG Guidelines. For example, the AG Guidelines require law enforcement agencies to establish a Confidential Informant Review Committee comprised of component and Department officials to approve the continued use of long-term informants, which is defined as six consecutive years as a confidential informant. While ATF policy states that field divisions are responsible for determining which, if any, confidential informants have been active for six consecutive years and therefore must be submitted to the ATF Committee for review, we found that ATF headquarters officials did not have a sufficient method to verify that all such informants were submitted for Committee review. We could not determine, and ATF could not affirm, if ATF's Committee had reviewed all long-term informants, as ATF did not have adequate records about these informants and allowed the field divisions to manage long-term informant information. We are concerned that this decentralized process did not provide an adequate level of assurance that all long-term informants requiring this enhanced review were identified.

Moreover, the Committee had not always met as scheduled, had not always reviewed and opined on all of the informant files provided by ATF for review, and had postponed decisions to a later date on numerous occasions. As a result, we believe that ATF's review process for these informants had not provided the enhanced oversight required by the AG Guidelines.

We provided ATF with five recommendations to address the deficiencies in its informant program and to improve its ability to sufficiently identify, assess, and mitigate the risks involved with using informants. In responding to our audit, ATF agreed with all of the recommendations and expressed a commitment to implement program enhancements. We will monitor ATF's efforts to address our recommendations, including its implementation of the new informant database. Our report can be found on the OIG's website at the following link: <https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2017/a1717.pdf>.

Shortly after our entrance conference in October 2015, ATF informed us that it was in discussions to enhance its existing CI database and, in June 2016, ATF awarded the contract for its new database. Last fall, after our fieldwork was completed, ATF developed its new automated system that it believes will address many of the findings in our report. Because ATF has not yet fully implemented the system and integrated its use into ATF policy and guidance, we have not audited it. Based on a demonstration provided to us, we believe the system is an improvement over its unsophisticated legacy system and enhances ATF's information environment. However, the system is still in its infancy and several advancements are necessary to address the relevant findings in our report.

### **DEA's Management and Oversight of Its Confidential Source Program**

In July 2015, the OIG issued a report that determined the DEA's confidential source policies were not in full compliance with the AG Guidelines and lacked sufficient oversight and consistency with the rules governing other DOJ law enforcement components. We made seven recommendations to the DEA, all of which are now closed as a result of DEA's issuance of new policies governing its Confidential Source Program and DEA's implementation of more comprehensive procedures and coordination with the Department. That report can be found on the OIG's website at the following link: <https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2015/a1528.pdf>.

In September 2016, we issued our next audit report that found that the DEA's management of its Confidential Source Program did not provide sufficient oversight and controls related to the DEA's establishment, use, and payment of confidential sources, in particular Limited Use and DEA intelligence-related sources. We made seven recommendations to help the DEA address deficiencies and improve various aspects of its Confidential Source Program. The DEA continues to evaluate and assess necessary actions needed to address our recommendations and remedy the deficiencies we found during our audit. As such, all of our recommendations remain

open. That report can be found on the OIG's website at the following link: <https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2016/a1633.pdf>.

In March 2017, we provided the Department and Congress with a classified Addendum to our September 2016 report, and also issued an unclassified public summary, that provides additional details about the OIG's findings concerning DEA's establishment, use, and payment of confidential sources used in a DEA Intelligence Division program and by the DEA Special Operations Division for overseas operations. As we discuss in our public summary, we found that the DEA had not fully accounted for the national security, foreign relations, and civil liberties risks associated with using and paying certain confidential sources. We provided the DEA with several recommendations for the improvement of its efforts related to the use of these confidential sources. The DEA concurred with all of the recommendations and stated that it is taking necessary steps to implement the recommendations, which we plan to review and assess through our resolution and follow up process. Our unclassified public summary of that Addendum can be found on the OIG's website at the following link: <https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2017/a1633a.pdf>.

Informant programs are unquestionably important to law enforcement, but they also come with significant risks. My office will continue to be vigilant in helping to ensure that they are appropriately overseen within the Department of Justice. This concludes my prepared statement, and I will be pleased to answer any questions that the Committee may have.

# Meet the Inspector General



Michael E. Horowitz was confirmed as Inspector General for the Department of Justice (DOJ) by the U.S. Senate on March 29, 2012. He was sworn in as the fourth confirmed Inspector General on April 16, 2012.

As Inspector General, Mr. Horowitz oversees a nationwide workforce of more than 400 special agents, auditors, inspectors, attorneys, and support staff whose mission is to detect and deter waste, fraud, abuse, and misconduct in DOJ programs and personnel, and to promote economy and efficiency in Department operations.

Mr. Horowitz most recently worked as a partner at Cadwalader, Wickersham, & Taft LLP, where he focused his practice on white collar defense, internal investigations, and regulatory compliance. He also was a board member of the Ethics Resource Center and the Society for Corporate Compliance and Ethics. From 2003 to 2009, Mr. Horowitz served as a Presidentially appointed and Senate confirmed Commissioner on the U.S. Sentencing Commission. As

Commissioner, he was instrumental in rewriting the guidelines for corporate compliance programs, and for fraud, antitrust, intellectual property, and money laundering offenses.

Mr. Horowitz previously worked for DOJ in the Criminal Division at Main Justice from 1999 to 2002, first as Deputy Assistant Attorney General and then as Chief of Staff. Prior to joining the Criminal Division, he was an Assistant U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York from 1991 to 1999. From 1997 to 1999, Mr. Horowitz was the Chief of the Public Corruption Unit, and from 1995 to 1997, he was a Deputy Chief of the Criminal Division. In 1995, he was awarded the Attorney General's Award for Distinguished Service for his work on a complex police corruption investigation.

Before joining the DOJ, Mr. Horowitz was an associate at Debevoise & Plimpton and clerked for Judge John G. Davies of the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California.

Mr. Horowitz earned his Juris Doctor, *magna cum laude*, from Harvard Law School and his Bachelor of Arts, *summa cum laude*, from Brandeis University.

Updated: October 2016



# Department of Justice

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**STATEMENT OF**

**ROBERT W. PATTERSON  
PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR  
DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION**

**BEFORE THE**

**COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM  
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES**

**FOR A HEARING ENTITLED**

**“USE OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS AT ATF AND DEA”**

**PRESENTED**

**APRIL 4, 2017**

**Statement of  
Robert W. Patterson  
Principal Deputy Administrator  
Drug Enforcement Administration**

**Before the  
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform  
U. S. House of Representatives**

**At a Hearing Entitled  
“Use of Confidential Informants at ATF and DEA”**

**April 4, 2017**

Chairman Chaffetz, Ranking Member Cummings, and distinguished Members of the Committee: on behalf of the approximately 9,000 employees of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), thank you for the opportunity to be here today to update you on DEA’s confidential source program and the enhancements we have made to our policies since our November 30, 2016 hearing resulting from several reviews and reports by the Office of the Inspector General (OIG).

Our mission is to identify, investigate, disrupt, and dismantle the world’s most significant drug trafficking organizations responsible for the production and distribution of illegal drugs. To that end, we work closely with our local, state, federal, and international counterparts by following the evidence wherever it leads.

Central to this mission is a world-wide confidential source (CS) network, one which uniquely positions DEA to act quickly, effectively, and proactively to reach beyond our borders to identify, investigate, and indict those that threaten the safety and interests of our country’s citizens at home and abroad. This informant network is vital to our operations. However, DEA recognizes that the nature of using these sources has inherent risk, something that must be carefully and regularly balanced against the benefits of utilizing these individuals in furthering investigations. Strict oversight and adherence to sound policy and procedures are paramount to ensuring both the safety of our employees and the integrity of operations.

As we discussed during the November hearing, we have updated our CS policy to fully comply with the Attorney General’s Guidelines, and in some cases even exceed the guidelines. The changes to our policy address the recommendations in OIG’s July 2015 report, as well as a similar report released by Government Accountability Office (GAO) in September 2015. Those reports have been fully closed out based on DEA’s implementation of all recommendations.

On September 29, 2016, the OIG issued a second report concerning the DEA’s CS program, with a classified addendum released on March 22, 2017. This second report contained seven recommendations for DEA, primarily regarding increased oversight of the CS program from a Headquarters level to balance the Field responsibility, CS payments, and use of “Limited

Use” sources (often referred to as “tipsters,” or sources who make information available independently without direction from DEA). DEA agreed with all seven recommendations and we have provided OIG our way forward for addressing each of the recommendations. Based on these plans and subsequent actions, OIG considers all of the recommendations resolved. Once DEA has been able to fully implement actions for the recommendations and provide documentation to the effect, OIG may close out the report.

Although DEA’s next response to OIG is not due until May 2017, I would like to take the opportunity to update you on several of the improvements we have implemented to address the recommendations.

Regarding increased oversight of the CS program, we have implemented additional review and approvals to provide increased oversight for the establishment and use of CSs. In the field, we are in the process of implementing formal policy requiring a second line supervisory (at a Senior GS-15 level) review and approval for all CSs, including Limited Use CSs, where previously only a first-line (GS-14 level) approval was necessary. Although DEA policy has not yet been updated to reflect this requirement, procedurally this change is in place. DEA’s IT system for tracking CSs must be modified to allow for this second line supervisory requirement before we can update the policy to coincide with the change. We are also enhancing staffing in the Headquarters CS Unit to provide increased review on submissions from the field to ensure complete submissions with all necessary reviews and approvals conducted, and that CSs have been properly and consistently classified.

Further adding to oversight of the program, DEA has implemented increased reviews of the CS program by DEA’s Office of Inspections (IN). Increased emphasis is being placed on the CS program as part of the yearly Division Inspection Program conducted by each division, the on-site division inspections conducted by IN, as well as an annual special review audit of the CS program conducted by IN. Through this increased scrutiny, we will identify issues early on, correct them, and assess areas that require reinforced guidance, training, or procedural modifications.

The increased oversight over the CS program will also help ensure payments made to CSs are appropriate for the quality and amount of assistance being provided to the case. While approvals for smaller, more routine payments remain in the field, DEA has revised its procedures for significant payments to CSs through the CS Award Program. The CS Award Program allows for higher payments to CSs for information and assistance in the development of an investigation and/or for information or assistance leading to a civil or criminal forfeiture. DEA has established a Headquarters CS Award Review Board comprised of Senior Executive level Special Agents, who will review all CS award submissions and assess the impact of the CS’s contribution on the investigation. The Board will review each submission and determine the award amounts based on the established criteria, comparable cases, and prior awards. Thus, awards should be consistent based on similar contributions.

In addition to implementing changes to DEA's CS policy and procedures in the past year, DEA has actively messaged the importance of these modifications and compliance with new policy and procedures. This has been done at the leadership level to DEA's executive staff both in the field and Headquarters, as well as through training for personnel at the working level. Since OIG's issuance of the second report, all CS Coordinators have been trained on the revised CS policy.

### **Conclusion**

Notwithstanding DEA's own dedicated and committed workforce, our CS program is among the most valuable assets our agency has in infiltrating, disrupting, and dismantling violent drug trafficking organizations responsible for perpetuating the deadly opioid epidemic and violent crime in our neighborhoods, as well as transnational organized crime around the world. We recognize that along with such value, this program also comes with risks and we share your concerns that the program be managed in a way that mitigates those risks as much as possible. We appreciate OIG's reviews of the program and have embraced their recommendations in an effort to improve it. We have made significant changes in the last year as a result, and we will continue our efforts to implement the remaining recommendations, as well as seek additional ways to better the program.



**Robert W. Patterson**  
**Principal Deputy Administrator**  
**Drug Enforcement Administration**  
**U.S. Department of Justice**



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Robert W. Patterson was appointed as DEA's Principal Deputy Administrator in November 2016. In that role, he is DEA's Chief Operating Officer, overseeing all of DEA's enforcement, intelligence, administrative, and regulatory activities worldwide. He is the highest ranking career Special Agent at DEA.

Mr. Patterson came to this position after serving as DEA's Chief Inspector beginning in November 2015. As the Chief Inspector, he had oversight of the Office of Inspections, the Office of Security Programs, and the Office of Professional Responsibility. Collectively, these offices comprise DEA's internal affairs, compliance, and security programs and provide guidance and support to DEA Headquarters and Field Offices.

Prior to his appointment as the Chief Inspector, Mr. Patterson served in a variety other positions within DEA, including Assistant Special Agent in Charge (ASAC), and later Acting Special Agent in Charge, of the Special Operations Division (SOD), where he oversaw classified programs, and communication exploitation tools, in support of field operations.

Prior to his assignment at SOD, Mr. Patterson was a Group Supervisor in the Miami Division, where he led the operations of the Orlando District Office Task Force, and later served as acting ASAC.

Mr. Patterson began his career with DEA in 1988 in the New York Division, where he worked numerous RICO investigations. Mr. Patterson was also part of a special program established to combat the growing opioid epidemic and associated violence in the greater New York area.

Mr. Patterson is a native of New Jersey, and received a Bachelor of Science degree in Criminal Justice from Northeastern University, where he graduated with honors. Over his nearly 30 years with DEA, Mr. Patterson has gained a reputation as an expert on transnational criminal networks, narcotics trafficking and trends, as well as governing policy and agency oversight matters.



# Department of Justice

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**STATEMENT OF**  
**RONALD B. TURK**  
**ASSOCIATE DEPUTY DIRECTOR**  
**BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS, AND EXPLOSIVES**  
**U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE**

**BEFORE THE**  
**COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM**  
**U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES**

**FOR A HEARING CONCERNING**  
**USE OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS AT ATF AND DEA**

**PRESENTED**

**APRIL 4, 2017**

Chairman Chaffetz, Ranking Member Cummings, and Members of the Committee, thank you for inviting me to appear before the Committee today. I welcome the opportunity to discuss the Department of Justice (DOJ) Office of Inspector General's (OIG) report "ATF's Management and Oversight of Confidential Informants" (the OIG Audit Report).

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, ATF Special Agents, Investigators, and professional staff are dedicated to removing the most violent offenders from America's streets and making our communities safer. These violent offenders are often associated with gangs and other criminal organizations. To successfully investigate these cases, ATF must periodically enlist the cooperation and assistance of confidential informants. Cooperating informants often can obtain evidence about the activities of violent offenders, particularly those associated with gangs and other criminal organizations, that is not otherwise available to ATF and its law enforcement partners. Consequently, ATF's confidential informant program is an important tool in the fight against violent crime, and ATF is grateful that the Inspector General conducted a thorough assessment of this program.

ATF has carefully reviewed the OIG audit report, and concurs with all of the report's recommendations. I am pleased to have the opportunity today to provide some additional background to the Committee about ATF's confidential informant

program, and to describe the steps we have already taken to implement the OIG recommendations.

As the OIG report indicates, before the audit was completed, ATF recognized and had begun addressing many of the issues raised in the report's recommendations. In fact, many of the report's findings do not reflect the current status of ATF's confidential informant program.

ATF's administration of this program has evolved over the years. Prior to 2012, we primarily relied on a decentralized, paper-based system, with each ATF field division maintaining those paper files in the field. In 2012, recognizing the need to modernize and centralize this process, ATF developed an interim, headquarters-based electronic database to track basic information regarding all confidential informants. This database was designed to be temporary, acting as a bridge while ATF developed a robust, national computerized system. As early as 2013, ATF began evaluating system requirements and exploring cost-effective means of developing and implementing a new national system.

While the OIG accurately notes that ATF did not enter a final contract with the system vendor until June 2016, development of that contract was the result of a multi-year effort. In October 2016, that multi-year effort came to fruition, and ATF deployed our national confidential informant management system. ATF's new system is robust and adaptable, and its functionality immediately addresses many of

the concerns the OIG raises in its recommendations. We will continue to work with the OIG to ensure that our new confidential informant management system adapts to meet any continuing concerns, and to implement updated policies and procedures for the system's use by agents and managers.

I also want to emphasize that the report reflects the results of an audit of ATF's administrative oversight of its confidential informant program; the report does not identify any deficiencies regarding the manner in which ATF manages the use of confidential informants in its investigations. ATF strictly adheres to Department of Justice guidelines governing the use of confidential informants, and, since 2012, we have continually strengthened our internal orders applicable to the usage of confidential informants to provide safeguards that exceed baseline Department guidelines.

Finally, let me assure the Committee that ATF also takes very seriously the OIG's conclusion that its paper files and legacy database did not provide sufficient safeguards to assure that accurate and complete confidential informant payment information was consistently available to prosecutors. ATF is acutely aware of its obligation to provide accurate and complete information to prosecutors in the criminal discovery process, is fully committed to meeting that obligation in all cases, and is confident that our new system provides the consistency needed to ensure we continue to meet that obligation.

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I am proud to be here today representing the men and women of ATF; they work conscientiously every day to make America's streets safer. I assure you that ATF's executive staff will continue to identify areas where we can further strengthen our effectiveness; we owe no less to our dedicated employees and our communities. Thank you for this opportunity.

Ronald B. Turk  
Associate Deputy Director  
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF)  
U.S. Department of Justice

Ronald B. Turk was appointed the 2<sup>nd</sup> highest official of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives in April 2015. As the Associate Deputy Director, Mr. Turk is responsible for leading an agency of men and women charged with enforcing laws and regulations related to firearms, explosives, arson, and alcohol and tobacco trafficking.

Prior to his appointment, he served as the Assistant Director, Field Operations beginning in March 2012, where he was responsible for executing ATF's mission to fight violent crime and regulate the firearms and explosives industries throughout the United States. This included executive oversight of all 25 ATF Field Divisions and over 3,800 special agents, investigators, and support staff. He also oversaw several Bureau Headquarters programs including the Special Operations Division; and the Firearms, Explosives, Arson, and Tobacco program areas.



Mr. Turk has also served as Deputy Assistant Director, Field Operations, supervising enforcement operations in the central region of the country, and as Special Agent in Charge of ATF's New York Field Division, where he was responsible for all operations in the State of New York. His prior duty assignments include 5 years as an Assistant Special Agent in Charge in Nashville, Tennessee; more than 4 years as a Resident Agent in Charge in Bowling Green, Kentucky; and as a project officer in the asset forfeiture program in ATF's Headquarters. His ATF career began in Trenton, New Jersey, where he spent 8 years as a street agent. Mr. Turk was also assigned to the Northeast Special Response Team as a forward observer for more than 5 years.

Mr. Turk is also a Brigadier General in the Air National Guard, assigned as the Chief of Staff, Maryland Air National Guard where he directs the assigned Air Staff at Joint Force Headquarters and ensures higher headquarters support to over 1,500 personnel. He first enlisted to active duty as an E-1, and has approximately 30 years of combined active duty and guard status service in the Security Forces career field. He has over 15 years of command experience. Mr. Turk's most recent deployment was to Iraq where he was awarded the Bronze Star.

Mr. Turk received his Masters in Justice Administration from the University of Louisville and a Bachelor of Sciences Degree in Criminal Justice from Sam Houston State University. He has also completed programs in the Air Force War College and the Air Force Command and Staff College, and is both a qualified Level II Joint Officer and a trained/experienced Joint Task Force Commander.