The numerous but small nations of the Caribbean Basin face increasingly formidable security threats, many of which emanate with non-state actors. These threats present serious challenges to any small nation working alone, but given their transnational nature, the Caribbean countries must share perceptions, resources, information, and most importantly, a regional strategy, in order to enhance their national and regional security. As a follow-up event to U.S. Southern Command’s (USSOUTHCOM) Caribbean Security Conference (CANSEC) in December 2016, the William J Perry Center for Hemispheric Studies (WJPC) hosted a Caribbean Regional Countering Transregional-Transnational Threats Seminar in Bridgetown, Barbados.

Summary Proceedings¹
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¹These summary proceedings reflect the discussions conducted under Chatham House Rule of the March 21-23, 2017 William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies Caribbean Regional Seminar on Countering Transregional-Transnational Threats Seminar in Bridgetown, Barbados.

Day One of the seminar focused on counterterrorism and perceptions of hemispheric security, with regional perspectives provided by Barbados, the Regional Security System, Trinidad and Tobago, and the Bahamas. The U.S. perspective was provided by USSOUTHCOM. Day Two examined threats from transnational organized crime and external actors from the viewpoint of Antigua and Barbuda, Haiti, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, the Joint Staff, and Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF-S). Day Three addressed cybersecurity, inclusive security, and national/regional security strategies, including discussion of strategies by Barbados, Jamaica, Suriname, Belize, Grenada and Guyana. It concluded with a wide-ranging panel on designing regional strategies, with participation from USSOUTHCOM, CARICOM’s Implementing Agency for Crime and Security (IMPACS), and the RSS.

DAY ONE

I. Barbados and RSS Perspectives on Hemispheric Security

Focusing first on the global environment, cyber security is an emerging concern in the hemisphere, due to a variety of factors. Russia has adopted a more aggressive cyber posture, China extensively employs cyberespionage, especially against U.S. corporations, and Iran uses cyber-attacks to promote its interests. Terrorist organizations make extensive use of the Internet for both recruiting and targeting purposes. Sunni extremism is increasing, and Syrian, Lebanese, and Pakistani communities in the region are vulnerable. ISIS continues to operate outside of its primary zones, and foreign fighters travel to Syria and return with terrorist skills. Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) remain a threat to the world at large, especially due to dual-use biological and chemical technologies. Space is of increasing interest as technological advances fuel innovation and more private investment, with more than 80 countries involved in outer space. Meanwhile, capabilities to counter and jam satellites exist that could affect communications in the region, a significant threat.

Increased demand for drugs in the U.S. impacts the Caribbean as more cocaine from South America passes through the region. Designer drugs and other banned substances challenge both law enforcement and health officials to keep up with the ever-changing medical and legal issues they create. Illicit traffickers of these commodities, as well as human traffickers, engage in corruption to protect their lucrative operations. Climate change is resulting a degraded Arctic and rising sea levels. Instability and crises throughout the world are affecting human security with global displacement, refugees, and migrants, and even the transfer of diseases from animals to humans (i.e., Ebola).

The hemispheric security environment is essentially similar to the global environment, with transnational organized crime, cybercrime, returning terrorist foreign fighters from Syria, the threats posed by Iran and Hezbollah, and the highest homicide rates in the world in the Americas. Transnational, transregional threat networks (T3N) are highly active in the region, with public health threats, terrorism, and organized crime. In the Caribbean, illicit arms trafficking is the source of major security problems, with illegal Russian weapons, possibly from Venezuela, increasingly available and easily introduced into the islands via private boats. The same networks and routes used for trafficking weapons are also used for smuggling many other products, like drugs and people. Cyber criminals are actively stealing money and technology. We also must consider our “Johari Window” blind spot, what we don’t know but may be known to others, and that may include hazardous wastes, maritime pollution and resource exploitation, hacking and cyber attacks, terrorism and foreign fighters, and the spread of infectious diseases.

At the individual island nation level (Barbados, for example), where tourism is the dominant economic activity, the greatest fear is the damage a terrorist attack on a soft target could cause. The degrading of terrorist organizations in the Middle East, including ISIS, is resulting in their loss of territorial space, but not necessarily their defeat or elimination. Instead, they are inspiring “lone wolf attacks,” and issuing global calls to jihad in situ. The ingredients for locally-developed terrorism are readily noticeable, including: radically-inspired Caribbean nationals who have returned home; relative freedom of movement between terrorist locations abroad as well as within the Caribbean; significant numbers of at-risk youth; and, the growing nexus between gangs
and terrorists, including tactics, avenues of movement, and conveyances. In addition, there is a ripple effect of terror attacks in Europe that spreads throughout the Muslim diaspora, some of which are closed communities that are difficult to monitor and penetrate.

Soft tourist infrastructure provides tempting targets in the Caribbean for violent extremists emerging from this toxic mix of ingredients. The impact on the target nation, and more broadly to the region, would deter tourism resulting in lower revenues. It would take time to convince tourists to return after an attack, leaving a vacuum created by fear.

A regional approach to preventing such an attack is required with assistance from international partners. Awareness and vulnerability assessments are also critical prevention elements. The Caribbean needs to develop national strategies that are regionally coordinated and include security partnerships and cooperation. To increase capabilities, these strategies need to be circulated in workshops and seminars and rehearsed in tabletop exercises. The region must identify tactical resources that include training and technical assistance, and improved information and intelligence gathering and sharing. In the past, information sharing has been impeded by a narrow definition of “need to know.” Some of this information should be disseminated as threat-focused messaging to vulnerable communities and at-risk youth. In sum, it is essential to conduct a whole of society campaign to win the hearts and minds of at-risk populations.

The RSS plays an increasingly important role in addressing all types of threats to its member states, although it has serious limitations. While it can assist member states in areas of security and disaster response, it can only advise those governments on how to proceed, not dictate courses of action to them. RSS does have an operational and training capability, but may not be involved in politics and must take guidance from political leaders. Good governance, for example, is a political issue, and the RSS can only provide advice on issues it has been requested to address. Regarding vetting and polygraphing of security personnel, these are capabilities the RSS could provide, but only if national leaders request them. APIS (Advanced Passenger Information System) is a tool that is available to share information about travelers going to/from Syria, but it is only as good as the tracking information that member states input. This system is only used to track aerial movement, leaving a major information gap in maritime arrivals and inter-island maritime travel that needs to be closed. Another information gap exists in the realm of cybersecurity, as we hear about cyber targets in industry and government, but not so much in the banking sector, which is less forthcoming. Cyber threats in the region are numerous, from foreign intelligence services, to organized crime, to individual hackers, to disgruntled former employees. Proceeds from cybercrime have outstripped the illegal drug trade and are growing exponentially. CARICOM is implementing a Cyber Security and Cybercrime Action Plan (CC-SCAP) to counter this growing threat, which is a good start but advancing slowly, and the RSS is establishing
a cyber-crime lab. An interesting possibility for greater operational cooperation among CARICOM members is sharing crewmembers to staff patrol vessels that lack sufficient personnel.

II. The Convergence of Terrorism and Crime

Globalization has empowered illicit networks that consist of terrorists, criminals, proliferators and their facilitators, to find new products, markets and areas of influence around the world. These illicit actors operate in the grey zone between war and peace, disregard sovereignty and the rule of law and threaten the security and prosperity of nation states. We are witnessing a convergence of terrorism and crime that is presenting formidable national and international security challenges to nation states. This convergence is manifested by illicit actors that capitalize on lucrative criminal activities like narcotics, human, arms, and contraband trafficking to fund and support their terrorist agendas. Terrorist groups are engaging in crime while criminal groups are using terrorist tactics to use violence or the threat of violence to control their operating areas, like in the case of the Los Zetas cartel in Mexico.

The Taliban now control more territory in Afghanistan than before 9/11/2001 and are capitalizing on record production amounts of opiates to finance their insurgency and terrorist operations. Afghanistan is also facing major security threats from the Haqqani Network and the ISIS affiliate there. Similarly, the FARC in Colombia has been able to sustain its 50-year insurgency thanks to the dynamic cocaine trade and illegal gold mining. With allegations that the Maduro regime in Venezuela is directly involved in drug trafficking networks and the recent U.S. sanctions against the sitting Vice President, there is debate as to whether Venezuela should be considered a criminalized state.

The best current example of terror-crime convergence is ISIS, the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria that rose to power by committing crimes and terrorist atrocities. ISIS is considered the richest terrorist group in the world engaged in widespread extortion, oil smuggling, human trafficking, bank robbery, and antiquities looting. It controls large swaths of land across Syria and Northern Iraq and is destabilizing the Middle East and beyond with their ISIS direct or inspired attacks in the West. Since 2014, the U.S. has led a coalition to counter ISIS with a three-pronged approach consisting of a military, financial and ideological sphere. At an estimated cost of $12.5 million per day, Operation Inherent Resolve led by U.S. Central Command is targeting the leadership, military assets, financial and economic infrastructure, communications, logistics and other support networks in Iraq and Syria supporting local forces on the ground. The Coalition has tried to starve the financing of ISIS by attacking its oil infrastructure and financial assets. Over the past six months, Iraq forces have moved aggressively to recapture control of Mosul, Iraq’s second largest city and ISIS stronghold.

ISIS is on its heels and no longer to attract the foreign fighter flows it commanded in earlier years; it is reported that some 40,000 foreign fighters have joined ISIS since 2011 from around the world. The return of foreign fighters to their countries of origin presents an emerging terrorist threat. As witnessed in the tragic November 2015 attacks in Paris and in Brussels some months later, ISIS foreign fighters directed by ISIS are waging jihad in their home countries. Moreover, we have seen an increase in ISIS-inspired attacks like in San Bernardino, CA and Orlando, FL, where terrorists are acting in the name of ISIS. To counter the convergence of illicit networks, governments much engage in more interagency and international cooperation at the national, regional and international levels. Countering violent extremism, protecting critical infrastructure, protecting our economic and financial systems, and securing cyberspace will need a whole of society approach that engages the public, private and civic sectors to safeguard our national security.

III. Country Perspectives on Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Bahamas, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago

The Bahamas has a service-based economy that relies on tourism (60% of GDP) and financial services, both of which are soft targets for terrorist networks. Consequently, its counterterrorism effort is focused on critical infrastructure protection, with bilateral cooperation with the U.S., including a State Partnership Program (SPP) with Rhode Island, and regional cooperation including the Tradewinds exercise. There are various financial services sector task forces that assist in monitoring and overseeing that sector, including a Financial Intelligence Unit, the National Financial Task Force, the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force, and support from Interpol.
Jamaica’s threats are much broader, and include the nexus between terrorism and organized crime, disaffected youth who are targets for radical extremists, insufficient intelligence sharing, and chemical stockpiles maintained by small retail companies that are difficult to monitor. Cybersecurity hackers aligned with terrorist groups have been detected. To counter these threats, Jamaica has created a National Cyber Incident Response Team (CIRT), tightened border security and strengthened relationships with regional and international partners. It also participates in the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force, and is more closely monitoring imports and exports of certain chemicals. Going forward, Jamaica looks to strengthen its intelligence security framework and conduct greater intelligence and information sharing with its regional and international partners. It is reviewing current detection capabilities at its airports and seaports and providing more training for port security personnel. Jamaica is also developing a national counterterrorism strategy and a program to de-radicalize vulnerable groups.

Trinidad and Tobago (TTO) faces threats ranging from “thuggery” to religious extremism, including organized criminal activities. Gangs have adopted territorial characteristics. All of these threat groups may have international terrorist linkages. In TTO, moderate mosques provide cover for the activities of more radical elements, with a mix of returning foreign terrorist fighters and homegrown terrorists. Prisons also serve as incubators for Islamic radicals. To counter these threats, TTO has initiated a series of legislative actions and created a response unit that includes counterterrorism and financial intelligence components. The closed communities of Islamic radicals required a counterterrorism strategy that includes specialized assistance to police for de-radicalization programs, addressing the culture of violent extremism, supported by a strategic communications plan, and working with moderate Muslim leaders and Imams.

**DAY TWO**

**I. Transregional-Transnational Threat Networks in the Caribbean**

The strategic environment in the Caribbean is inevitably impacted by the preeminent worldwide terrorist threat represented by ISIS and its affiliates, sympathizers, and collaborators. In the Western Hemisphere, as in other parts of the world, the phenomenon of globalization and its resultant creation of more open borders, deregulated financial systems, and free trade zones has far outpaced the ability of many nations to create effective governance mechanisms to address these new realities. Three types of threat networks need to be addressed: Transnational and Transregional Threat Networks (T3N) and Transregional Criminal Organizations (TCO); Violent Extremist Organizations (VEO); and State-sponsored networks. Each network responds to different motivations and while there may be operational overlap among some, others operate independently of one another. T3N and TCOs operate on the basis of financial gain by trafficking in a variety of lucrative commodities. VEOs are generally motivated by ideology or political power goals. State-sponsored networks such as Hezbollah may be motivated by both profit and ideology.

From the U.S. point of view, these organizations may pose a direct or indirect threat to U.S. national interests at home and abroad: directly, by threatening the U.S. homeland through the exploitation of illicit pathways; and indirectly, by threatening the stability and legitimacy of partner nations. These networks share similar functions, regardless of their goals, including: recruiting personnel; communicating with their network; laundering illicit profits; protecting their operations; and, most importantly, creating the logistics network to move their illicit commodities. All of these functions are conducted without regard to national or regional boundaries, hence the need to illuminate and counteract them globally. The first step in that process is to collect and share cross-functional threat information, without regard to the motivation (profit or ideology) or location. A partnership of nations with the capability to act effectively on timely information will allow us to adapt more rapidly to a changing environment and defeat these threat networks.

The U.S. National Military Strategic Plan to Counter Transregional Terrorist Organizations is designed to defeat ISIS and other priority VEOs. It is strives to ensure a linkage to the U.S. Government objectives and acknowledges that success over the long-term rests largely on the cooperative efforts of the United States and its partners. Key to success is the integration of the operations conducted by multiple geographic combatant command, functional combatant commands, in-
teragency partners, and the partner nations (PN). Critical to this integration is a clear understanding of the interests, capabilities, and capacity of the PNs and a concerted effort to integrate them into an executable combined approach. While the focus is on areas of major concern throughout the Mideast, there is the potential for terrorist organizations to exploit other areas perceived as vulnerable. Regions such as the Caribbean are important to the overall CT3N effort, and have highlighted technological support requirements to cover gaps in their ability to track special interest aliens (SIAs), including fighters traveling back and forth from their home nations. Partner nation input to the development of a Common Operating Picture (COP) is critical for success. Dealing a lasting defeat to threat networks required that we address the underlying conditions feeding radical extremism and violence. This includes taking actions to counter threat financing, disrupting the flow of foreign fighters and SIAs, and undermining the credibility of their narrative.

II. Country Perspectives on Illicit Networks in the Caribbean

Antigua and Barbuda (A&B) is a drug transshipment point, not a producer or major consumer. A consequence of the transshipment activity is increased efforts to corrupt local officials in order to evade detection and prosecution. Private vessels and human couriers are the main modes of transport. Arms and ammunition frequently accompany narcotics shipments, as traffickers are frequently involved in both illicit products. Human trafficking is also a serious problem, with victims recruited from elsewhere in the Caribbean and brought to A&B for forced labor or prostitution. Networks of regional expatriates control the illicit trafficking. Another form of illicit trafficking is money laundering, which occurs in various local enterprises, notably remittance services. To address these problems, A&B is creating a new K-9 unit, revising its Trafficking in Persons Act, seizing illicit proceeds, and enhancing its command, control, communications and intelligence capabilities, adding a national intelligence unit.

Haiti has a major human trafficking problem, which they are addressing through community policing, among other measures. The judicial system is problematic, as laws are not equally applied, in part due to corruption. Haiti lacks strong institutions and good governance, which allows corruption and impunity to flourish. It is vulnerable to natural disasters caused by climate change but lacks the capability to respond effectively. Cybercrime is also an issue, and currently come under breach of trust laws, although new legislation directly addressing cyber is being prepared. Hurricane Matthew created increased internal migration from rural Haiti to Port au Prince, with a high percentage of criminals in that migration. Islamic mosques and schools contribute to the radicalization of Muslim youth in Haiti, and law enforcement has developed a strategy of infiltration, identification, and neutralization of this threat. The government of Haiti recognizes that T3N threats are beyond the capability of a single country to counter; that network threats require a network response, with a global CT3N strategy. Haiti would like to integrate into the RSS and CARICOM/IMPACS (the latter of which is ongoing).

St. Vincent and the Grenadines (SVG) faces many of the same threats as A&B, although it has experienced only a few cases of human trafficking, including migrant smuggling. Drug and arms trafficking also only exists on a small scale, and the country has not detected any terrorist threat. SVG recognizes, however, that its porous borders (around 32 islands), limited resources, difficult topography, the presence of criminal deportees, and the close proximity of other island nations are all significant challenges.

III. U.S. Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime

Globalization has empowered transnational organized crime in terms of scale, velocity, wealth and power, accompanied with unprecedented levels of violence. Latin America and the Caribbean have particularly experienced increased citizen insecurity in large part due to drug, human and arms trafficking throughout the region. Certain countries are no longer to provide their basic missions of security, promoting prosperity, ensuring rule of law and good governance to their people in the face of power transnational criminal organizations. In some instances, we see Central American gangs providing security and employment to the local population as an alternative government. Crime and violence consisting of narcotics, human and arms trafficking and corruption are costing the region 3.5% of GDP according the Inter-American Development report “The Costs of Crime and Violence” published in February 2017.
In 2011, the U.S. issued its first National Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime (CTOC). The strategy recognized transnational organized crime as a threat to national security jeopardizing the prosperity, security and health of U.S. citizens. It described the various manifestations of TOC in terms of illicit trafficking of drugs, people, arms, contraband, and counterfeit goods and activities like money laundering, piracy and cybercrime. It also highlighted the role of facilitators and the terror-crime nexus. To combat TOC, the U.S. is focused on taking responsibility at home to reduce demand for illicit drugs and services. It also seeks to improve intelligence and information sharing for CTOC, enhance interagency and international cooperation and capacity building, dismantle trafficking networks, and protecting economic infrastructure from crime. To implement this strategy, the U.S. is engaged in numerous foreign assistance CTOC programs through Plan now Paz Colombia, the Merida Initiative, the Strategy for Engagement in Central America, Caribbean Basin Security Initiative and several bilateral programs.

Joint Interagency Task Force South under the auspices of U.S. Southern Command is the best example of interagency and international cooperation to implement the CTOC strategy kinetically in Latin America and the Caribbean. The Trump Administration demonstrated its continued commitment to CTOC efforts with the February 9, 2017 Executive Order 13773 on Enforcing Federal Law with Respect to Transnational Criminal Organizations and Preventing International Trafficking. It seeks to enhance cooperation with foreign counterparts against transnational criminal organizations and subsidiary organizations, including, where appropriate and permitted by law, through sharing of intelligence and law enforcement information and through increased security sector assistance to foreign partners.

Q&A Session

The second and third order effects of U.S. actions, such as deportation orders, need to be considered for the security issues they create in partner nations. U.S. banks are in the process of reducing their exposure to possible money laundering (“de-risking”) by severing relations with corresponding banks in the Caribbean, causing serious financial problems for those partner nations. It is not worth the risk for large banks to maintain corresponding relationships with some small banks in island nations due to possible penalties on bank that violate money-laundering norms. Banks in the Caribbean need to establish legal and compliance offices to ensure they are complying with money-laundering norms, to avoid de-risking actions by U.S. banks.

Deportation of illegal migrants is an ongoing process; the receiving country is provided advance notice and should take steps to prepare for the repatriations. While these individuals may be criminalized and difficult to employ, considering them as repatriates rather than deportees can help that situation, as terminology does matter. A whole of society approach to CTOC is preferred, although cultural resistance makes that difficult. It will require a change of mindsets; the USSOUTHCOM Partnering Directorate (SCJ9) and the Joint Inter-Agency Task Force-South (JIATF-S) are two prime examples of how the USG through USSOUTHCOM has addressed that issue.

IV. Interagency and Regional Cooperation to Combat Transnational Threats

USSOUTHCOM’s Partnering Directorate (SCJ9) is one example of how the U.S. is developing innovative solutions to the challenges posed by transnational, trans-regional threat networks. The Partnering Directorate brings together members of the U.S. inter-agency (over 30 liaison personnel from about 12 agencies) who provide their perspective and coordinate with their parent organizations to support the broader effort to counter these threat networks. In most cases, USSOUTHCOM is in a supporting role, as the U.S. military does not have law enforcement authorities. Therefore, law enforcement agencies, including the U.S. Coast Guard, DEA, Treasury Department, FBI, ATF, CBP, and others bring their specialized skills and authorities to benefit from the Defense Department’s planning, communications, intelligence, and logistics capabilities. Working together, the resources of all of these agencies are much greater than the sum of their individual endeavors.

Beyond the U.S. inter-agency, SCJ9 also coordinates with a wide variety of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and private enterprise, incorporating them into joint exercises and operations such as Provide Comfort, which brings medical care by U.S. Navy ship to remote areas of Latin America and the Caribbean. An excellent example of how this whole of government effort functions at the operational level is Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF-S), a subordinate task force to USSOUTHCOM. JIATF-S includes representatives from the U.S. inter-agency as well as a growing number of liaison officers from partner nation military and law
enforcement agencies. The U.S. military role is detection and monitoring of sea and air lanes between South America and the U.S. mainland, including around Central America and the Caribbean. The information obtained from this detection and monitoring mission is shared with U.S. and partner nation law enforcement agencies so they are empowered to conduct the end game against illicit traffickers. With less than 1.5% of the U.S. counter-narcotics budget, JIATF-S accounts for more than 80% of U.S. cocaine disruptions.

V. The Role of External Actors in the Americas

This presentation analyzed the threats to security and defense in the Western Hemisphere posed by external actors, namely the People’s Republic of China, Russia, and to a lesser extent, by the Islamic Republic of Iran and challenges arising from poverty, inequality, and weak governance. The late President Hugo Chavez of Venezuela and former President Ahmadinejad of Iran developed and promoted the ALBA movement in first decade of 21st century characterized by socialist, radical, and populist movements in Latin America and the Middle East to confront the international world order and directly challenge the influence of the U.S. in the Western Hemisphere. While Chinese and Russian interests in the Americas are primarily economic in nature, their military and political influence in on the rise in several countries in the region.

Q&A Session

The idea that the Islamic and Bolivarian revolutions were the pillars of a global anti-systemic movement was challenged. Instead, these revolutions were viewed as responses by populist leaders to the lack of general prosperity that had been expected following the end of the Cold War, but these were not leaders of an anti-systemic movement. On the other hand, democracy does not automatically provide prosperity; it just creates conditions where citizens can work to get ahead. Countries become democracies over a period of time, not from their inception, and they require the rule of law to properly function. Some populist leaders change their constitutions to allow reelection, which defies the rule of law for their own ends.

DAY THREE

I. Cybersecurity and Emerging Technologies

Cybersecurity is a leading concern for all countries at the national, regional and international levels and encompasses an understanding of cyber-based defense and security threats to information and communication systems, internet of things, and critical infrastructure. There are several vulnerabilities and common risk areas that must be identified in cybersecurity and cyber defense areas for strategic and policy analysis, and they require further development of a common understanding of cyber lexicon, best practices, regional initiatives and collaboration efforts for addressing common regional security challenges in cyberspace. The three greatest forces on the planet today are technology, globalization, and climate change. Drones are practical devices that can be used for good (rescue operations), bad (weaponized), and ugly (employed by criminals and terrorists) purposes.

Q&A Session

Questions focused on how this field of cybersecurity is becoming crucial to your privacy, your organization and the future of world politics. It is a domain only well known by “the IT crowd” but touches every major area of public security and private sector concern, but only young and the computer savvy are well engaged in it. In turn, the technical community that understands the workings too often sees the world only through a specific lens and can fail to appreciate the broader picture or nontechnical aspects. Critical issues such as the design of a strategy and policy for the governance and control of the cyber domain must be address by various sectors in a collaborative fashion.

II. Promoting Inclusive Security in the Americas

This path breaking, all female, panel focused on the issue referred to in the U.S. as “Women in Peace and Security (WPS),” and addressed the varying approaches to gender inclusiveness in the Caribbean security forces.

Jamaica has one of the top ten homicide rates in the world. They have calculated that the cost of violence against women is double the overall average, with a significant number committed by other women (as part of Trafficking in Persons). Jamaica supports UNSCR
and views gender equality as strongly linked to development, and has eliminated gender discrimination in its laws. Both the Jamaica Defense Force (JDF) and Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF) are recruiting more female leaders at the operational and strategic level, and the Jamaica Coast Guard is recruiting more females for operational, versus support, roles. Overall, the Jamaican security establishment believes that security requires the elimination of unequal gender relations.

Barbados’ security establishment has traditionally been male-dominated, with only a few token women. One issue that must be addressed in order to change that situation is that data collected on security issues must be disaggregated to take gender into account, to create evidence-based gender policies. Current data collection aggregates males and females which prevents analysis of security issues by gender.

Suriname is beginning to recognize the relationship between development and greater female participation, although they have yet to develop a National Action Plan for WPS. They did establish the National Bureau for Gender Affairs in 1998 that advises the government on women’s rights and equality issues. Gender-based and domestic violence is a serious problem requiring special attention, including national and international partnerships. Suriname is working to increase low participation in politics by encouraging female candidates, organizing a “She Also” campaign in the 2015 elections that organized debates and increased female representation. In the Defense Ministry, a female lieutenant colonel was Deputy Director (she is now Director of the National Security Department). Women are precluded from combat positions in the armed forces.

CARICOM IMPACS is ambivalent towards UNSCR 1325 because the Caribbean is not a region in conflict, but recognizes that understanding gender roles and needs leads to better policy. A gender indicators project to collect data is important, as is more gender sensitivity training. When a gender-training seminar was offered in DC, no men wanted to attend. This attitude limits gender consideration in policy decisions. The high rate of domestic violence in the Caribbean has a cultural context, and is an indicator of societal problems that should be carefully addressed. For example, “gang widows” are losing their homes to violence.

III. National Strategies to Counter Transregional-Transnational Threats

Belize, located at the tip of the Central America Northern Triangle, has more than its share of threats, both traditional and non-traditional. Traditional threats include illicit trafficking, territorial disputes, environmental crimes, corruption, and lack of good governance. Non-traditional threats include cybersecurity, terrorism and narco-terrorism, climate change, and migration. Belize’s National Security and Defense Strategy, 2017-2020 focuses on maintaining sovereignty, reducing
crime, and fostering stability. It takes a four-pronged approach to countering transnational/transregional threats networks, using an interagency organization (JIOC), employing specialized units and institutions, encouraging citizen participation, and promoting international cooperation and diplomacy. The latter is especially important in the case of their territorial issues with Guatemala, where a military mismatch makes a military response not viable. Instead, they are working through international organizations such as the OAS to resolve that situation. So even though Belize is more like the Caribbean, socio-economically, what happens in Central America directly impacts it.

Grenada, in the southeastern Caribbean, is not immune from global threats. It is experiencing rising crime, the presence of special interest aliens (SIAs), and a few cannabis trafficking cases. As a small island state, it makes maximum use of international law enforcement organizations, including Interpol, the RSS, IMPACS, the RIFC, etc. It has developed a Financial Intelligence Unit, and participates in U.S. Customs’ Advanced Passenger Information System (APIS) to assist with border control. An emphasis on intelligence gathering and information sharing has resulted in a greater success rate in drug interdictions.

Guyana is preparing itself for a major transformation, as petroleum discoveries off its coast portend an enormous economic windfall in the next 3-5 years. This income should be used to develop an alternative economy that is greener, raising standards of living, and creating new economic opportunities, since petroleum is not sustainable in the long term. Guyana’s current national security strategy calls for a “secure and green Guyana,” emphasizing its concern for environmental and climate security. Other major security concerns include economic crimes, fraud, narco-trafficking, and corruption. Its National Security Council is chaired by the president, and receives national intelligence estimates from a National Intelligence Center on a wide variety of threats. Guyana defines human security as a combination of freedoms, protections, threats, survival, and dignity. A rising crime rate decreases human security, and is a social problem that should be addressed by teaching security to all citizens, understanding that security is a commodity like education.

IV. Designing Regional Strategies to Counter Transnational-Transregional Threat Networks

There are three dimensions to global security threats. The first dimension is space, which may be defined as the breakdown of borders which leads to transnational threats, compounded by the limitations of governance in many areas. The second dimension is depth, exemplified by non-linear cause and effect with increased complexity combined with second and third-order consequences. Time is the third dimension, which now operates on a 24/7 basis, limiting response and recovery windows.

To overcome these threat dimensions there are five critical elements that contribute to success: strong institutions; the mechanisms inside these institutions that allow them to function properly; adequate resources available to these institutions; performance metrics to measure the institutions’ and mechanisms’ effectiveness; and most importantly, the political will of those who lead the institutions. These are critical elements because the future of power is smart power, which falls on the continuum between hard and soft power. Countering the convergence of illicit networks requires the application of smart power.

U.S. Southern Command plays an important supporting role in developing regional strategies for the benefit of its regional partners. At the strategic level, the Command sponsors an annual conference attended by the chiefs of defense and security, Caribbean Nations Security conference (CANSEC), during which key emerging security challenges are analyzed and solutions offered by the senior leaders. As a follow-up, the Perry Center conducts this seminar to consider methods of implementing the senior leader solutions, at the strategic and operational levels. Other initiatives include assisting regional organizations such as CARICOM and the RSS to develop counterterrorism strategies, for example, which are linked to each participants national security strategy; improving information-sharing through intelligence fusion and dissemination processes, and improved communications architecture; and enhanced security cooperation efforts. This support is an annual process that culminates with the next CANSEC conference (the FY18 iteration is scheduled to be hosted by Guyana).
Both CARICOM’s IMPACS and the Regional Security System (RSS) recognize that the multifaceted threats they face require regional cooperation, and a regional strategy to guide that cooperation. These threats include international terrorism, organized crime, environmental degradation, and public health issues, among others, although a common threat picture needs to be developed. While terminology may differ, the processes required to develop a regional strategy may include a combination of readily identifiable concepts. A common vision and set of core principles is one starting point. A mission statement derived from the multifaceted threats may follow, accompanied by a set of regionally-owned objectives. The strategy itself is a tailored design crafted from stakeholder engagements, shared information and intelligence, which are converted into consensus-derived specified tasks, subject to monitoring and evaluation. The strategic design should include maritime, land, cyber, sustainment and information operations. Implementation is based on mutual cooperation, situational awareness, public support, stakeholder partnerships, and capacity development: a collaborative partnership.

The participants engaged in extended discussion on the challenges the Caribbean region faces in developing and implementing regional strategies. One such challenge is the culture of the security forces which retain a Cold War, reactive mentality, rather than the real-time imperative posed by current threats. More collaboration and coordination is needed; this must be understood by the political leadership, who should be less parochial and change the way they view themselves in relation to the rest of the region. Since CARICOM includes a wider swath of the Caribbean, they developed their regional strategy in coordination with the RSS, UN, and the U.S. The extent of implementation requires a review mechanism to develop metrics, which is pending, but a process is included in the strategy.

On a transregional note, the fact that strategy seems to be segmented by sub-regions (North America, South America, Central America, and the Caribbean) should be addressed, since, for example, narcotics move from South America through the Caribbean to North America and on to Europe. U.S. Southern Command recognizes this shortfall, and is planning to bring together chiefs of defense and security from multiple sub-regions, at a time to be determined. In the meantime, CARICOM/IMPACS, even though not an operational organization, does bring together police chiefs to coordinate activities, working with the Regional Information Fusion Center (RIFC) and the Joint Regional Communications Center (JRCC) on border security operations, while crediting national entities with the activities. Insufficient resources limit the ability of these centers to reach their full potential.

There was substantial discussion on the possibility and desirability of structural changes to the security coordinating mechanisms in order to improve their efficiency. Suggestions included using CARICOM/IMPACS as the strategic-level umbrella organization with the RSS as its operational element, incorporating other supporting elements such as the RIFC and JRCC in one opera-
tions/information fusion center. Indeed, CARICOM is in the process of developing a counterterrorism strategy as one piece of a regional security strategy, with a working paper due to be presented to the CARICOM Counter Terrorism Strategy Conference in June 2017. The threat of terrorism is truly frightful to the Caribbean islands that depend on tourism for about 14% of their GDP, hence the initial strategic focus on counterterrorism. The security leaders recognize that each type of threat requires its own approach; that “one size does not fit all,” as far as strategies to address the various transnational threats. USSOUTHCOM noted that by focusing on the pathways, rather than the product, we could maximize the effectiveness of our efforts, as information on multiple products can be obtained from the same set of sources.

Obtaining buy-in for a regional strategy will be critical to its successful implementation. CARICOM has no method of compulsion, and must work to ensure ownership of the strategy by all of its members. The strategy itself must be developed through multiple engagements so that all members are willing to adopt the final result. Until now, the response to emerging threats has been more reactive than proactive, but the Caribbean states need to anticipate threats, something not part of the culture. In order to get one step ahead of the threats, the culture of “slowness” must be changed. At the national level, if they do not implement security strategies, they will be unsuccessful in anticipating threats. Security practitioners understand this imperative and are trying to change that culture from the bottom up, but it will take time to ramp up their efforts and “get the machinery moving.” They must also carefully balance that effort with the reluctance of political leaders to support cultural change.