March 29, 2017

Health of the Department of Defense Industrial Base and its Role in Providing Readiness to the Warfighter

Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support, Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, One Hundred Fifteenth Congress, First Session

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RECORD VERSION

STATEMENT BY
LTG LARRY WYCHE
DEPUTY COMMANDING GENERAL
UNITED STATES ARMY MATERIEL COMMAND

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS AND MANAGEMENT SUPPORT
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE

FIRST SESSION, 115TH CONGRESS

ON THE HEALTH OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE AND ITS CRITICAL ROLE IN PROVIDING AND SUSTAINING READINESS FOR THE WARFIGHTER

MARCH 29, 2017

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Introduction:

Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Kaine and distinguished members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on the readiness of the Army's Organic Industrial Base. On behalf of our Acting Secretary, the Honorable Robert Speer, and our Chief of Staff, General Mark Milley, thank you for your support and demonstrated commitment to our Soldiers, Army Civilians, Families and Veterans.

Since the War of 1812, our great Nation has reaped the rewards of the unique capabilities resident in our Organic Industrial Base (OIB) to manufacture and repair the equipment and materiel needed to equip and sustain our Armed Forces. Today, 23 ammunition plants, depots and manufacturing arsenals produce combat readiness by manufacturing, repairing and resetting our military's equipment. These depots, plants and arsenals possess specialized core competencies and are operated by a workforce of highly-skilled artisans, some of whom are the 2nd and 3rd generation of a family dedicated to the defense of our nation. These patriots and the facilities in which they work provide a unique set of capabilities that enable readiness and the projection of national power.

The OIB is often referred to as America's National Security Insurance Policy. As with all insurance policies, there must be adequate coverage in advance of a crisis and confidence that the policy will be honored. The OIB represents the very best protection - paying dividends, in the form of readiness now, while providing the capability to regenerate equipment and unit readiness at the outset of the future crises. The OIB directly employs more than 22,000 people in operations that span all 50 states. The annual economic impact of the OIB on local economies is in excess of $3.696 billion. As an example, McAlester, Radford and Iowa Ammunition Plants, as well as the Anniston Army Depot, collectively introduce $205.1 million into their communities each year.

The Army's Organic Industrial Base serves to mitigate risk by providing strategic depth and scalable response during times of crisis. Whenever called upon, the OIB delivers equipment to the tactical point of need that is maintainable and affordable within the tactical commander's available resources (Soldiers, Time and Dollars). From small

arms, ammunition and explosives, to trucks, radars, optics and main battle tanks, our manufacturing base has always delivered state-of-the-art technology and equipment to our globally engaged forces.

Challenges

The two greatest challenges we face today with our OIB are budget caps mandated by the Budget Control Act of 2011 and a lack of consistent and predictable funding as evidenced by repeated continuing resolutions. Sequestration's legacy of imposing cuts without consideration of national security requirements must be brought to an end. Our military's readiness is held hostage to it. Also, continuing resolutions have fostered an era of unpredictable funding that adversely affects the OIB. A year-long continuing resolution will preclude the Army from funding Depot Maintenance at the level needed to rebuild 4 Apache helicopters, 2 Black Hawk helicopters, several Patriot Air Defense systems, as well as upgrades to weapon system required to ensure interoperability on the battlefield.

Additionally, the longer the Army operates under the budget caps and in an unpredictable fiscal environment, the more difficult it is to sustain production at levels that maintain workforce skill sets. Exploiting best business practices in our industrial operations requires consistent levels of funding that facilitate long term planning.

Furthermore, parts of our manufacturing and facilities infrastructure are near the end of their life cycles. We need your continued assistance with modernization and replacement. Since fiscal year 2005, more than $2 billion has been invested in automation and robotics to enhance production and ammunition out-load capabilities, as well as attain energy self-sufficiency. Given the value of the OIB's infrastructure, keeping it in good order offers a good return on investment.

Maintaining Readiness

We recognize and are extremely appreciative of this committee's steadfast support through the past 16 years of war. Without your support, the OIB could not have surged when called upon in support of Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom, to

reset nearly four million items of equipment – a workload three times that of the workload during the Vietnam War. To put this in operational terms, that equates to resetting 105 Brigade Combat Teams.

The capabilities of our adversaries continue to evolve.

General Milley states it most succinctly; “The Army’s number one priority is readiness.” And a foundation of Army readiness is a vibrant and responsive industrial base. We cannot afford to let our warfighting capabilities fall into decay because within the OIB reside one-of-a-kind resources that cannot be easily revived or replicated, and certainly not in time to respond to a national crisis. Now more than ever, we must enhance our readiness through continued investment in our organic capabilities in order to ensure our force can conduct and sustain a combined arms fight in unified operations. In that way we can deter our adversaries and, importantly, win decisively without undue risk to the force.

For example, Nitrocellulose is a key compound used in making explosives. The Radford Army Ammunition Plant is the only known manufacturer of nitrocellulose in North America. McAlester Army Ammunition Plant is so proficient at manufacturing certain munitions that the Navy and the Air Force ask them to produce ordinance to meet both their wartime and training requirements. Watervliet Arsenal is the only manufacturer of large caliber cannon tubes in this hemisphere. Every howitzer at Ft. Sill has a gun tube produced at Watervliet. In fact, in 2013 as the Army was preparing to upgrade the M109A6 self-propelled howitzers to the A7 configuration, corrosion was discovered in the bore evacuators on the cannon barrels. The Army determined that nearly 75 percent of these Paladin howitzers in the inventory were non-mission capable due to bore evacuator corrosion. In nine months’ time, Watervliet repaired 157 of the 171 barrels that were repairable and replaced 73 of the 88 that were not. The skilled and determined workforce, combined with the unique capabilities resident in the arsenal, averted a crisis.

Since 2003, Army equipment reset requirements have generated $29.5 billion in work for the OIB. Orders from the U.S. Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps have generated

another $5.7 billion in revenue. In 2015 alone, the Army's Organic Industrial Base provided $698 million in joint depot work and $504 million in joint parts, demonstrating its impact on not only Army readiness but the readiness of all our Armed Forces. The output of our depots, plants and arsenals not only provides strategic depth but produces direct economic impact on a supply chain of over 11 thousand vendors – many of which are small businesses.

While we are asking for your support, it is important to note that we are working feverishly to maximize the impact of the resources you have provided. In the past four years, the Army has reduced its inventory of secondary items by 9.2 billion. The OIB has realized $4.5 billion in financial benefits like cost avoidance through continuous process improvement projects since 2011.

As retrograde and reset operations slow, the Army must find innovative ways to reshape itself and leverage its investments with partners from other parts of DOD, government and the private sector when missions, goals, and requirements align. Preserving the workforce, optimizing processes and aligning workload to unit readiness and sustainment needs must be prioritized as we divest obsolete systems and equipment. Simultaneously, we must continue to develop the capabilities required to meet future requirements.

Closing:

This committee, more than anyone else, knows that the world is more dangerous and unpredictable than it has ever been. While our nation's greatest minds work hard to predict the future we are continually surprised by the unpredictable. In every instance of crisis, the OIB has responded by providing solutions to meet unanticipated demands. If the OIB is to continue to deliver when our nation needs it most, we must invest now. Consistent and predictable funding to preserve, maintain and modernize our critical capabilities provides the last line of defense against the unknown, while we continue to produce readiness that guarantees that we will win wherever and whenever our nation calls.

I would like to thank each distinguished member of the Committee for allowing me to offer this testimony today. Your continued steadfast support enables us to maintain and modernize the OIB, and simultaneously preserve and develop the workforce required to provide value to our nation in the form of future readiness and deterrence.

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STATEMENT OF

VICE ADMIRAL PAUL A. GROSKLAGS
COMMANDER, NAVAL AIR SYSTEMS COMMAND

AND

VICE ADMIRAL THOMAS J. MOORE
COMMANDER, NAVAL SEA SYSTEMS COMMAND

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS AND MANAGEMENT SUPPORT

OF THE

SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

ON

DEPOTS, SHIPYARDS, ARSENALS AND AMMO PLANTS

MARCH 29, 2017

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Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Kaine, and distinguished members of the Sub-Committee, we appreciate the opportunity to testify on the current state of Navy readiness and the challenges we face today and in the future.

Before we discuss Navy's readiness challenges and our plans to address them, it is important to understand our present situation. Globally present and modern, our Navy provides timely, agile, and effective options to national leaders as they seek to advance American security and prosperity. Today, however, the ongoing demand for naval forces continues to grow, which will require the Navy to continue to make tough choices. In the classic trade space for any service (readiness, modernization and force structure), readiness has become the bill payer in an increasingly complex and fast-paced security environment. To address these realities, the Navy has identified investments to restore the readiness of the fleet today to shore up what we have. At the same time, we cannot restore the fleet to full health without also updating our platforms and weapons to better address current and future threats, and evaluating the right size of the Navy so that it can sustain the tempo of operations that has become the norm. The Navy is actively working on plans for the future fleet with Secretary Mattis and his team, and we look forward to discussing those plans with you when they are approved.

To characterize where we are today, we would say it's a tale of two navies. As we travel to see our sailors in the United States and overseas, it is clear to me that our deployed units are operationally ready to respond to any challenge. They understand their role in our nation's security and the security of our allies, and they have the training and resources they need to win any fight that might arise. Unfortunately, our visits to units and installations back home in the United States paint a different picture. As our Sailors and Navy civilians, who are just as committed as their colleagues afloat, prepare to ensure our next ships and aircraft squadrons deploy with all that they need, the strain is significant and growing. For a variety of reasons, our shipyards and aviation depots are struggling to get our ships and airplanes through maintenance periods on time. In turn, these delays directly impact the time Sailors have to train and hone their skills prior to deployment. These challenges are further exacerbated by low stocks of critical parts and fleet-wide shortfalls in ordnance, and an aging shore infrastructure. So while our first team on deployment is ready, our bench – the depth of our forces at home – is thin. It has become clear to us that the Navy's overall readiness has reached its lowest level in many years.

There are three main drivers of our readiness problems: 1) persistent, high operational demand for naval forces; 2) funding reductions; and 3) consistent uncertainty about when those reduced budgets will be approved.

The operational demand for our Navy continues to be high, while the fleet has gotten smaller. Between 2001 and 2015, the Navy was able to keep an average of 100 ships at sea each day, despite a 14 percent decrease in the size of the battle force. The Navy is smaller today than it has been in the last 99 years. Maintaining these deployment levels as ships have been retired has taken a significant toll on our Sailors and their families, as well as on our equipment.

The second factor degrading Navy readiness is the result of several years of constrained funding levels for our major readiness accounts, largely due to fiscal pressures imposed by the Budget Control Act of 2011. Although the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 provided temporary relief, in FY 2017 the Navy budget was $5 billion lower than in FY 2016. This major reduction drove very hard choices, including the difficult decision to reduce readiness accounts by over $2 billion this year.

The third primary driver of reduced readiness is the inefficiency imposed by the uncertainty around when budgets will actually be approved. The inability to adjust funding levels as planned, or to commit to longer-term contracts, creates additional work and drives up costs. This results in even less capability for any given dollar we invest, and represents yet another tax on our readiness. We are paying more money and spending more time to maintain a less capable Navy.

We have testified before about the maintenance and training backlogs that result from high operational tempo, and how addressing those backlogs has been further set back by budget cuts and fiscal uncertainty. Our attempts to restore stability and predictability to our deployment cycles have been challenged both by constrained funding levels and by operational demands that remain unabated.

Although we remain committed to return to a seven month deployment cycle as the norm, the need to support the fight against ISIS in 2016 led us to extend the deployments of the *Harry S Truman* and *Theodore Roosevelt* Carrier Strike Groups to eight and eight and a half months, respectively. Similar extensions apply to the Amphibious Ready Groups which support Marine Expeditionary Units. This collective pace of operations has increased wear and tear on ships, aircraft and crews and, adding to the downward readiness spiral, has decreased the time available for maintenance and modernization. Deferred maintenance

has led to equipment failures, and to larger-than-projected work packages for our shipyards and aviation depots. This has forced us to remove ships and aircraft from service for extended periods, which in turn increases the tempo for the rest of the fleet, which causes the fleets to utilize their ships and airframes at higher-than-projected rates, which increases the maintenance work, which adds to the backlogs, and so on.

Reversing this vicious cycle and restoring the short-term readiness of the fleet will require sufficient and predictable funding. This funding would allow our pilots to fly the hours they need to remain proficient, and ensure that we can conduct the required maintenance on our ships. It would also enable the Navy to restore stocks of necessary parts, getting more ships to sea and better preparing them to stay deployed as required.

Naval Shipyards

One of the key components of Navy readiness for our public and private repair shipyards is our ability to effectively plan and execute maintenance on ships and submarines. This is reflected in the Navy's Optimized Fleet Response Plan (OFRP), which places maintenance at the beginning of the OFRP cycle in recognition of the fact that our deployed readiness is dependent on our ability to complete the required maintenance on time and on schedule before ships enter their training and deployment cycle. As the Vice Chief of Naval Operations testified last month, our shipyards are struggling to deliver ships out of availabilities on time and back to the Fleet. When we do not get it right it strains our ability to train and deploy our forces

Naval Sea Systems Command's number one priority is the on-time delivery of ships and submarines to the Fleet. At any given time, about one-third of the Navy's Fleet is undergoing either a major depot maintenance availability in one of our four Naval Shipyards and private sector surface ship repair shipyards or conducting pier side intermediate maintenance. Regardless of where the work is taking place, NAVSEA is working every day to improve maintenance throughput so that our warfighters have the platforms and weapon systems they need to defend our nation.

Our long term success in delivering ships and submarines out of maintenance on time depends on three important elements: determining the full maintenance requirement, aligning the maintenance budget to this requirement so we can match the capacity in our

shipyards to the workload, and improving the overall productivity of our maintenance workforce through improved training, processes, tools and infrastructure.

Long-term continuing resolutions, as we have seen over the past eight years, coupled with a constrained budget environment have exacerbated our ability to effectively plan and execute ship maintenance. Receiving the complete budget mid-way through the year leads to significant inefficiencies, such as delays in material and parts procurement for future availabilities, and results in significant missed opportunities in the year of execution. A stable, predictive funding environment is imperative to support the effective planning and preparations for both current and future maintenance requirements.

The high operational tempo in the post 9/11 era combined with reduced readiness funding and consistent uncertainty about when these reduced budgets will be approved have created a large maintenance mismatch between the capacity in our public shipyards and the required work. This has resulted in a large maintenance backlog which has grown from 4.7 million man-days to 5.3 million man-days between 2011 and 2017. Today, despite hiring 16,500 new workers since 2012, Naval Shipyards are more than 2,000 people short of the capacity required to execute the projected workload, stabilize the growth in the maintenance backlog and eventually eliminate that backlog. This shortfall, coupled with reduced workforce experience levels (about 50 percent of the workforce has less than five years of experience) and shipyard productivity issues have impacted Fleet readiness through the late delivery of ships and submarines. The capacity limitations and the overall priority of work toward our Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSBNs) and Aircraft Carriers (CVN) have resulted in our Attack Submarines (SSNs) absorbing much of the burden, causing several submarine availabilities that were originally scheduled to last between 22 and 25 months to require 45 months or more to complete. These delays not only remove the submarines from the Fleet for extended periods of time, but also have an impact on the crews' training and morale. This situation reached a boiling point this past summer when in order to balance the workload, the Navy decided to defer a scheduled maintenance availability on the USS BOISE (SSN 764) that will effectively take her off line until 2020 or later. Although the Navy has not made a final decision on BOISE, she will likely be contracted to the private sector at additional cost to the Navy in 2019.

The Naval Shipyards have seen a large influx of new hires over the past five years. As of today, half of my public shipyard workers have less than five years' experience. With further growth anticipated in the coming years, we are taking steps to accelerate the training

process. For example, all Naval Shipyards have implemented, and are expanding the use of, Learning Centers with realistic mockups in a “safe-to-learn” environment. New employees are now able to support shipyard-unique work within one to four months of being hired, rather than one to two years under traditional training methods.

In addition to hiring enough people to execute the workload, we must also invest in our Naval Shipyard infrastructure. Many of our Naval Shipyards have buildings and equipment that are degraded or obsolete. With today’s exceptionally complicated ships and systems, we are finding that our infrastructure does not meet the needs of a modern day repair facility. NAVSEA has identified future facility modernization and improvements required to support newer classes of ships, including the VIRGINIA- and COLUMBIA-Class submarines and GERALD R. FORD-Class aircraft carriers. The Naval Shipyards’ outdated Information Technology and Cybersecurity departments are also a critical component of this effort.

The challenges faced by the private sector yards that perform maintenance on our surface ships are very similar to our Naval Shipyards. They, even more than the Naval Shipyards, are impacted by the uncertainty around when budgets will actually be approved. Despite these challenges, we have seen improvements in private sector maintenance. We are driving stability into our processes by working with third-party planners to increase our ability to conduct advanced planning, and the shift to competitively awarded fixed-price contracts has reduced cost and added discipline to the process that has limited growth and improved on-time performance by 40 percent since 2014.

Although we face many challenges, they are not insurmountable. Years of sustained deployments and uncertain funding have created a readiness debt that we must begin to address today. In our Naval Shipyards and private sector, that begins with defining the full maintenance requirement, matching the budget to that requirement, ensuring the capacity to perform work matches the workload, and improving the productivity of our workforce. We can and we must tackle each of these issues today and sustain that focus into the future. Only then will we provide the readiness required of our Navy today and into the future.

Naval Aviation Fleet Readiness Centers

The Navy and Marine Corps are addressing Naval Aviation readiness through seven inter-related Lines of Effort (LOE) – (1) Fleet Readiness Center (FRC) Capability and Capacity, (2) Depot-level In Service Repair of aircraft, (3) FRC Supply and Component

Repair, (4) Aircraft Utilization, (5) Aircraft Material Condition, (6) Flight Line Supply, and (7) Flight Line Maintenance.

Sustained improvement in the readiness of our Naval Aviation forces requires successful execution of multiple ongoing activities across each of these LOEs.

Full and predictable resourcing of these readiness improvement LOEs is essential to re-building Naval Aviation readiness to the level required to support COCOM mission execution objectives.

Specifically, we must maintain a focus on (1) investment in the facilities and workforce at our FRCs, (2) achieving full funding of our "enabler" sustainment accounts (listed at end of this statement), and (3) maximizing funding for supply support.

Naval Aviation's FRCs execute Maintenance, Repair and Overhaul (MRO) activities for a broad range of Aircraft, Engines, Components and Support Equipment (SE) – providing these products directly to our Sailors and Marines in support of mission readiness. The capability and capacity of our FRCs are still recovering from prior years of limited sustainment account funding, and effects of FY13 sequestration driven furloughs and associated hiring freeze. While working to regain previous levels of output on all product lines, meeting production throughput requirements remains challenged by an increased workload demand driven by the degraded material condition of inducted aircraft and components resulting from 16 years of war-time activity combined with the effects of extending aircraft service lives.

To increase production output by reducing turn-around-time, our FRCs are implementing continuous process improvement initiatives, including best commercial practices such as Critical Chain Project Management, across all of our aircraft and component production lines.

In FY17 our FRCs are increasing their workforce size as a continuation of recovery from FY13 reductions and in direct response to increased aircraft and component workload. Approved exemptions to the current hiring freeze for depot artisan and production support personnel is enabling us to continue hiring; however, normal workforce attrition, regional competition with industry, and regional economic conditions combine to challenge our hiring plans in some locations.

Two issues that will continue to negatively impact our ability to meet current and future FRC workload demand are (1) aging facilities and support equipment, and (2) predictability of funding. Accurate planning of FRC workload requirements 12-24 months in advance is

critical to ensuring we have the right people, facilities, and tooling in place when an aircraft or component enters the MRO process. The long term continuing resolutions we have faced in recent years, particularly when already operating in a very constrained funding environment, directly impact our ability to effectively plan, and then efficiently execute, aircraft and component repair schedules.

Creating a path to full resourcing of those accounts which support FRC production and overall aircraft readiness on the flight line is critical. These accounts support activities ranging from procurement of new and repaired spare parts to maintaining the currency of technical and repair manuals used in the FRCs and on the flight line. As we have painfully experienced over the last 5-7 years, being underfunded and "unbalanced" in these accounts has resulted in significantly decreased flight line readiness.

The maintenance, engineering, and logistics professionals working at our FRCs and supporting sustainment efforts across Naval Aviation, including our Sailors and Marines on the flight line, continue to do an amazing job of optimizing readiness within the constraints of aging equipment, increasing demand, and constrained / uncertain resources. We look forward to working with Congress to remove barriers to their success.

Naval Aviation Sustainment Accounts

<u>Flying Hour Program (1A1A/1A2A)</u> – Aviation Depot Level Repairables, consumables, fuel

<u>Air Systems Support (1A4N)</u> – Engineering Investigations, tech pub updates, maintenance planning, Reliability Centered Maintenance, Bill of Material updates, etc

<u>Aircraft Depot Maintenance (1A5A)</u> – Scheduled aircraft, engine, component repairs; In-Service Repairs

<u>Aircraft Depot Operations (1A6A)</u> – Cost Reduction Initiatives, Preservation

<u>Aviation Logistics (1A9A)</u> – Performance Based Logistics / Contractor Logistics Services for F-35, V-22, E-6, KC-130

<u>Technical Data and Engineering Services (1A3A)</u> – Field tech reps, Maintenance Readiness Teams

<u>Equipment Maintenance (1C7C)</u> – Support equipment rework, calibration of test equipment

<u>Aviation Spares (APN-6)</u> – Procurement of interim and outfitting spares

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STATEMENT OF

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MICHAEL G. DANA

DEPUTY COMMANDANT, INSTALLATIONS AND LOGISTICS

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS AND MANAGEMENT SUPPORT

OF THE

SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

ON

DEFENSE WARFIGHTER READINESS

ON

29 MARCH 2017

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Lieutenant General Michael G. Dana
Deputy Commandant, Installations and Logistics

Lieutenant General Dana was promoted to his current rank and assumed his duties as Deputy Commandant for Installations and Logistics in September 2015.

Lieutenant General Dana was commissioned a Second Lieutenant in June of 1982 following graduation from Union College in Schenectady, New York.

From 1983-1986, Lieutenant General Dana was assigned to 2nd Tank Battalion, deploying with Battalion Landing Team 1/8 to the Mediterranean. In 1986 he was assigned as the Combat Cargo Officer aboard USS Duluth (LPD-6), deploying to the Western Pacific with Battalion Landing Team 1/9 embarked.

From 1988-1991, Lieutenant General Dana served as the Logistics Officer for Battalion Landing Team 3/1 and as a company commander and S-3 with 1st Landing Support Battalion from 1992-1994 (Desert Storm/Operation Restore Hope). From 1996- 1999 he served with the Standing Joint Task Force at Camp Lejeune, as an ISAF Plans Officer in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia and as the II MEF G-4 Operations Officer. After a tour with MAWTS-1, Lieutenant General Dana commanded MWSS-371 from 2000-2002.

From 2003-2005 he was assigned to III MEF, serving as the G-7/3D MEB Chief of Staff, III MEF Deputy G-3, and OIC of the MARCENT Coordination Element at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait.

From 2005-2007, Lieutenant General Dana commanded MWSG-37, including a deployment to Iraq from 2006- 2007. From 2010-2012 Lieutenant General Dana served as the Commanding General, 2d Marine Logistics Group, including a deployment to Afghanistan from 2011-2012. He was then assigned as the Assistant Deputy Commandant for Logistics (LP) until October 2012.

Joint assignments include service with EUCOM, NORTHCOM and, most recently, PACOM. Lieutenant General Dana is a graduate of Amphibious Warfare School, Marine Corps Command and Staff College, School of Advanced Warfighting and the Naval War College.

INTRODUCTION

Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Kaine and distinguished members of the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Readiness, thank you for the opportunity to appear today and to report on the readiness of your United States Marine Corps.

I have the privilege to lead an Installations & Logistics (I&L) team that delivers the installations, logistics, and ground equipment readiness that ensures the Marine Corps remains capable of "Making Marines and Winning our Nation's Battles". We are grateful for the continued support of Congress and of this subcommittee for your appreciation of this pivotal role to our nation's defense and in ensuring we remain ready when the nation is least ready.

YOUR MARINE CORPS TODAY

Today, your Marine Corps continues to operate at the same tempo as it has over the past 15 years. With a dynamic and complex operating environment, the Joint Force requires and actively employs our expeditionary capabilities. During the past year, your Marines executed approximately 185 operations, 140 security cooperation events with our partners and allies, and participated in 65 major exercises. Nearly 23,000 Marines remain stationed or deployed west of the International Date Line to maintain regional stability and deterrence in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region. Our Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs) support the joint force by executing counterterrorism (CT) operations in Iraq and North Africa, providing humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) support in Japan and Haiti, and remain forward deployed to respond to crises and emerging threats.

MARINE CORPS RISK

As we operate around the globe today, fiscal constraints and instability have impacted our readiness. As resources have diminished, the Marine Corps has protected the near-term readiness of its deployed and next-to-deploy units in order to meet its operational commitments. Since the conclusion of OIF and OEF, the Marine Corps has not had the benefit of an "inter-war" period to reconstitute and modernize our force. Fifteen years of continuous combat has placed tremendous stress on the force, our Installations, our equipment, and our readiness.

INSTALLATION AND LOGISTICS OVERVIEW

In support of Marine Corps operations, our bases and stations are collectively the "launching pad" that produces and deploys ready, trained forces. Further, our enterprise ground equipment management efforts provide an end-to-end, total life cycle process to account for and maintain-sustain our gear to ensure a high state of readiness.

In terms of total Marine Corps Force serviced on our Installations, there are over 180,000 Marines, 176,000 Dependents, 29,000 Civilians, and 140,000 Retirees. The support ranges from 23,000 housing units, 600 barracks, 56 fitness centers, 43 child development centers, 5,284 miles of road, 146 hangars, 58 runways and close to 15,000 buildings. We are responsible for the management of a $3.8 Billion annual portfolio of programs, systems, and projects in support of Marines and their military equipment and supplies valued at over $30 billion and real property valued at over $70 billion.

INSTALLATION RISK AND CONDITION

The state of facilities is the single most important investment to support training, operations, and quality of life. The Marine Corps has 24 bases and stations valued at over $52 billion. We greatly appreciate the approximately $1.5 billion a year we received from 2007-2014; this investment supported new barracks, new aviation platforms, and improvements to our infrastructure. However, since 2015 our MILCON budget has averaged approximately $570 million per year, well below our requirements. Based on the current fiscal landscape, we foresee $5.4 billion in requirements with only $1.1 billion in available funding over the next 6 years. At the current level of investment, it would take over 204 years to recapitalize our infrastructure.

In addition to MILCON funding, our installations require the requisite amount of Facilities, Sustainment, Restoration, and Modernization (FSRM) money. Due to historic funding challenges, we have seen our FSRM backlog grow to $9 billion. The effect of this shortfall is that of 29,000 facilities in the Marine Corps, 15 percent or 4,300 facilities are in poor or failing condition. Overall Facilities Condition Index (FCI) across the Marine Corps is 82 percent (Fair).

At current funding levels, we are able to complete new construction projects supporting the "Rebalance to the Pacific", the fielding of new aviation platforms such as the F-35 and V-22, and renovating some of our worst barracks; however, without additional investments there will be long term impacts on support to training, operations, logistics, and ultimately readiness. Many projects to replace existing inadequate and obsolete facilities that directly support operational forces are unaffordable. We are deferring critical infrastructure required to support training, operations, and logistics.

To offset these challenges, the Commandant of the Marine Corps signed an Infrastructure Reset Strategy in November 2016 to reverse the ongoing decline in Marine Corps Facilities

condition and close the growing gap between facilities requirements and available resources. The Commandant's vision is to sustain infrastructure and installations as capable, resilient, right-sized platforms to generate force readiness and project combat power.

Although we have a comprehensive strategy, we will continue to prioritize investment of limited resources based on mission and condition. Further, current levels of investment will cause the condition of our facilities to degrade as we defer sustainment and it will lead to more costly repairs and restoration costs. We do appreciate the additional $154 million provided this year for hangars at Miramar. We would appreciate Congress' continued support of our optimization and modernization efforts.

GROUND EQUIPMENT RISK AND CONDITION

The prioritization of current readiness also comes at the expense of equipment modernization, which equates to future readiness. Further, the high op-tempo of the last 15 years of operations has strained our equipment set and has caused accelerated aging. While our equipment has performed well, the dual challenges of equipment age and continued wear-and-tear has led to ground equipment readiness challenges. Adequate maintenance funding is stretched to maintain readiness across the depth of the force.

Due to the tremendous support of Congress, the reset of our equipment is 92 percent complete. While this is a significant accomplishment, the constrained fiscal environment has prevented us from reconstituting and modernizing the force. Our most important ground legacy capabilities continue to age as modernization efforts are not moving quickly enough.

We have extended the service life of older platforms such as the Light Armored Vehicle (LAV) and Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAV) well beyond expected retirement dates; both

platforms remain operational due to the extraordinary sustainment efforts of our Marines and civilians, as well as continued investment in service-life extension programs. Our AAVs are now more than four decades old. Our AAV Survivability Upgrade (SU) Program will sustain and marginally enhance the capability of the legacy AAV, but this does not remove the need to modernize this nearly obsolete platform. Additionally, the average age of LAV's within our inventory is 26 years; the oldest vehicle is 34 years old. As of today, there is no program identified to replace this capable, but outdated platform and we continue to incur increasing costs to extend its life.

Although resourcing of depot and field level maintenance has kept pace with requirements over the last decade with both baseline and OCO funding, sufficient funding is required in the future to maintain ground equipment readiness due to the aging of our equipment . Four critical weapon systems (AAV, LAV, Tank, and M777 Howitzer) account for approximately 70 percent of the Marine Corps' depot maintenance budget and these costs are steadily rising. For instance, the AAV depot sustainment plan cost $49 million in FY11 and now costs $82 million.

Our High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV) is another example of the ground equipment readiness challenges we face today. Thirty years ago, the HMMWV was not developed through the prism of asymmetric warfare and improvised explosive devices (IED). Increased weight on the chassis with the armored variant and a challenging operating environment has led to higher sustainment costs. Continued support for our procurement requests to purchase the Joint Light Tactical Vehicles (JLTV) to replace our HMMWVs is appreciated. Another challenging subset of equipment is high demand/low density (HD/LD)

items, primarily communication assets and specialized tool sets, which support the ability of units to operate in dispersed locations.

Our Depot Production Plants at Albany and Barstow are an essential component to our ground equipment readiness strategy and have been instrumental in maintaining the readiness of our equipment. However, we can only fund our depot maintenance account to 80 percent of the identified requirement which has led to a backlog. To offset this, we are instituting a refined conditions based methodology to better inform future maintenance actions.

Our constrained maintenance funding has made it difficult to keep up with the level of maintenance required. Critical, aging weapons systems, such as tanks, AAVs, and artillery, are increasingly costly to maintain resulting in readiness levels near 70 percent. To maintain readiness levels across our entire equipment set, available readiness funding is stretched. Your support of our readiness funding requests will improve combat equipment availability in support of operations and training. As we look to the future, our enterprise ground equipment management efforts will align USMC material requirements with available resources to ensure the Marine Corps is the most cost effective and cost efficient steward of the US taxpayer dollar.

The Marine Corps has a plan to regain and sustain unit readiness; and with your continued support, we can achieve our organizational readiness requirements leading to a balanced Marine Corps that is healthy and is able to train and operate with needed equipment for all assigned missions.

INNOVATION

While we are focused on readiness for today, we are innovating to achieve readiness in the future. We are implementing unmanned platforms, 3D printing and predictive supply/maintenance capabilities to optimize tactical distribution, modernize the supply chain, and increase equipment readiness. Within our Installations, we are moving towards "smart cities" and advanced transportation technologies to reduce operating costs. Across the Installations and Logistics portfolio, we are leveraging the rapid advancements in technology available today. Most importantly, we are committed to delivering these future capabilities to ensure sustainable readiness.

CONCLUSION

On behalf of all of our Marines, Sailors - many deployed and in harm's way today - and their families and the civilians that support their service, we thank the Congress and this committee for this opportunity to discuss the key challenges your Marine Corps faces. Your support of our funding requests will provide the "ready bench" our Nation requires and the infrastructure the force needs to train and sustain itself. Our future readiness relies upon sufficient procurement and modernization funding. With the support of the 115th Congress, we will move forward with our plan and vision to ensure your Marine Corps is organized, manned, trained and equipped to make Marines and win our Nation's battles.

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

PRESENTATION TO THE SUBCOMMITTEE

ON

READINESS AND MANAGEMENT SUPPORT

UNITED STATES SENATE

SUBJECT: HEALTH OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE AND ITS ROLE IN PROVIDING READINESS TO THE WARFIGHTER

STATEMENT OF: LIEUTENANT GENERAL LEE K. LEVY, II
COMMANDER
AIR FORCE SUSTAINMENT CENTER

MARCH 29, 2017

INTRODUCTION

Chairman Inhofe, Ranking Member Kaine, distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on the readiness of your United States Air Force. On behalf of our Acting Secretary, the Honorable Lisa Disbrow, and our Chief of Staff, General David Goldfein, thank you for your support and demonstrated commitment to our Airmen, Air Force Civilians, Families, and Veterans.

This year the United States Air Force celebrates its 70th birthday. Since established as a separate service in 1947, our Air Force has secured peace through the full spectrum of conflict with a decisive warfighting advantage in, through, and from air, space, and cyberspace. Since Desert Storm in 1991, for the past 26 years, we have been operating in a continuous state of combat and combat support. Essentially, we have been in a steady state of war for the last 37% of the history of our service. Without pause, the United States Air Force has delivered global combat power to deter and defeat our nation's adversaries; we supported joint and coalition forces at the beginning, middle, and end of every operation; and we have secured our homeland through continuous surveillance and air defense. We have done all of this with a force that is shrinking in size, with a fleet that is now an average age of 27 years old, and infrastructure that continues to age and present new challenges. But our Total Force Airmen—Active Duty, National Guard, Air Force Reserve and our dedicated civil servants—are amazing and they will continue to seek new and innovative ways to get the job done. Make no mistake, the United States Air Force is ready to fight tonight, but I am concerned about our ability to sustain our Air Force to fight tomorrow. Threats to this nation and our interests continue to evolve, adapt, and present formidable challenges that threaten our nation and our allies. As we develop advanced

air, space, and cyber capabilities for tomorrow, we must continue to adapt our readiness, sustainment, and logistics enterprise as well.

As the Commander of the Air Force Sustainment Center, I am extremely proud to represent the nearly 43,000 Total Force Airman across 23 locations in 18 states and several overseas locations that are laser focused on providing the best sustainment and logistics capabilities for the available funding to meet the challenges of tomorrow. Literally, we are finding ways to do more with less.

Since its creation as part of Air Force Materiel Command's reorganization in 2012, the Air Force Sustainment Center has delivered combat power for America through a globally integrated, agile logistics and sustainment machine spanning from factory to flight line and back, representing and supporting all aspects of Logistics. We directly support every combatant commander, service, and many interagency partners as well as 63 allied countries with depot-level maintenance, supply chain management, and power projection for legacy and 5th generation weapons systems. By achieving the right results the right way through our disciplined "Art of the Possible" leadership and constraints-based management methodology, we continue to yield significant results. Since 2013, we significantly reduced by an average of 70 days each the time it takes to inspect, repair, and return bomber, fighter, mobility, and special mission aircraft to operational units. Across the entire Air Force Sustainment Center, we delivered back to the operational commands 69 more aircraft in fiscal year (FY) 2016 than FY 2012 and we reduced critical parts shortages by 28% from FY12 to FY16. Since 2013, through cost savings or cost avoidance, the Air Force Sustainment Center has returned $2.4 billion to the Air Force to invest in other areas of readiness or modernization. But we cannot continue to rely

on savings within our current budgets to fund our future modernization and sustainment requirements.

The Air Force Sustainment Center is more than the three "depots" in Georgia, Utah, and Oklahoma. Our world-class Air Logistics Complexes at Robins, Tinker, and Hill Air Force Bases are interconnected "engines of readiness" for the Air Force as well as joint partners and allies, and they work as one team to deliver combat effects. The active duty, reserve, guard, civilian, and contractor Airmen that make up the Air Force Sustainment Center deliver combat power to warfighters by adding service life to weapons systems and creating additional capabilities through modernizations and upgrades.

Additionally, the Air Force Sustainment Center is the Air Force global supply chain manager for planning, sourcing, managing, and delivering over $8 billion of parts annually to the combatant commands. As both the wholesale and retail provider of supplies and parts, the supply chain is the shock absorber for Air Force readiness.

The Air Force Sustainment Center is critically involved in, and essential to, sustaining our nation's nuclear enterprise—not just for the United States Air Force but for the United States Navy as well. This mission area is our number one responsibility and our sustainment of components for each leg of the nuclear triad is vital to our nation maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent. We directly enable bombers, inter-continental ballistic missiles, dual capable fighters, air launched cruise missiles, and Navy command and control aircraft that communicate with submerged nuclear assets.

To continue to provide Air, Space, and Cyber supremacy in today's evolving global security environment, our Air Force requires sustained, long-term, and predictable funding. If

Budget Control Act-level funding returns in FY18, it will have severe impacts on our Airmen and readiness. The most important actions this Congress can take to ensure the world's most powerful Air Force will continue to dominate the skies tomorrow will be to repeal the 2011 Budget Control Act and ensure sufficient funding to modernize our weapons systems and infrastructure. We appreciate your support to build the force up to about 321,000 in 2017, yet we will remain stretched to meet national security requirements. We are currently working with the Secretary of Defense to develop the FY18 Presidential Budget to address manning shortfalls in key areas. We must increase our Active Duty, Guard and Reserve manning levels in key skill areas to meet the emerging mission requirements while continuing to support enduring combat operations.

CHALLENGES TO READINESS

The Air Force Sustainment Center—with its organic industrial base—is the nation's readiness and war sustaining insurance policy. We are proud to sustain America's first and most agile response to crisis and conflict, underwriting every joint operation. We provide critical enablers in the air, space, and cyber domains and those demand signals are going to continue to increase over time. But we continue to experience significant readiness challenges in funding, work force hiring, and aging infrastructure and weapon system sustainment.

Recently, the Vice Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force, General Wilson, testified to this committee and stated: "…being 'always there' comes at a cost to our Airmen, equipment, and infrastructure; we are now at a tipping point. Sustained global commitments combined with continuous fiscal turmoil continue to have a lasting impact on readiness, capacity, and capability for a full-spectrum fight against a near-peer adversary." Those costs have unique implications within the Air Force Sustainment Center.

CIVILIAN WORKFORCE HIRING INITIATIVES

The Air Force Sustainment Center depends on a 79% civilian workforce. Our civilian Airmen bleed equally blue as those that wear our uniforms and they serve and sacrifice for our nation as well. As we evolve and adapt our weapons systems and concepts of operations, we must evolve and adapt our workforce. A 5th Generation Air Force requires a 5th Generation work force. Requirements for a Science-Technology-Engineering-Math (STEM) educated workforce and advanced manufacturing and technical skills are ever increasing. We no longer just buy airplanes; we buy highly integrated, sophisticated software packages that come in sophisticated airframes. Each weapon system we procure brings with it an increasing requirement for software development and maintenance to perform almost every function on the aircraft, from controlling flight controls, interfacing with weapons, navigation and communication, recording system health and status, etc. All of this "cyber" capability must be designed so it is resilient to sophisticated cyber warfare. Our requirements for scientists and engineers to sustain these software-intensive weapons systems are increasing dramatically. In addition to developing and sustaining new weapons systems, our engineers must also find ways to sustain our aging legacy systems. From understanding airframe stress, metallurgy, non-destructive inspection techniques, and reverse engineering parts, it takes a talented pool of engineers to help us sustain our legacy Air Force. As we bring new weapons systems on line and continue to sustain our legacy fleet, our civilian engineers are a pivotal component of readiness. As we project a steady increase in the technical workforce needed to support critical warfighting systems, any government actions that make it more difficult to recruit and retain a skilled workforce are detrimental to our readiness.

An antiquated civilian hiring system also constrains our ability to effectively compete with industry for a qualified workforce. The ability to hire engineers to sustain our Air Force is a strategic issue for our nation. We are experiencing a sustained annual growth in our requirements for the number of software engineers by 10-15%. While we aggressively try to hire qualified engineers, we simply cannot get enough qualified applicants to meet our demand. Most recently, to hire 465 new scientists and engineers, we expanded our recruiting efforts across 85 universities in 24 states. This year, our hiring target is 528 new scientists and engineers. To meet this growing demand, we continue to devote significant resources to our recruiting efforts. However, over the past two years, we did not meet our hiring goals, resulting in being short 569 hires at the end of FY17. Without these engineers, our ability to sustain our Air Force today and into tomorrow is in jeopardy. Our nation's Air Force is rapidly transitioning into an information-age fighting force and our ability to sustain and rapidly modify key software in our weapons systems will prove to be a decisive capability in the conflicts of tomorrow.

Two key programs have yielded great benefits in hiring and retaining our scientist and engineer workforce. First, the Defense Acquisition Workforce Development Funds have been a valuable resource supporting our efforts to recruit, hire, retain, train, and develop our scientist and engineer workforce. Second, last year, the Air Force Materiel Command implemented the DoD Civilian Acquisition Workforce Personnel Demonstration Project (AcqDemo) for the acquisition workforce, including scientists and engineers. Although we are just getting started, AcqDemo provides vital flexibilities that enable us to offer competitive salaries and compensate our technical workforce according to performance. The Air Force Sustainment Center appreciates your continued support of these programs.

Manning shortfalls impact our ability to keep pace with our current workloads as well as prepare for future workloads like the KC-46A. Our scientist and engineer hiring efforts presume a healthy supply of graduates with the right degrees. Especially in the area of software developers and cyber experts (electrical engineers, computer engineers, and computer scientists) we must continue to expand this pipeline. As a nation, we must continue the full-court press to attract, excite, and educate the next generation of STEM patriots. Last year, volunteers from the Air Force Sustainment Center donated over 6,000 hours to STEM outreach initiatives. Through funding in the Department of Defense for STEM outreach programs, such as STARBASE, we provided $700,000 in FY16 to support competition teams, sponsor events, and do classroom enhancements. Continued fiscal support for K-12 STEM outreach, scholarships, and internships like the DoD SMART scholarship program, will help expand the supply for STEM graduates that will enable the Air Force Sustainment Center to hire the technical workforce we need in the future.

Our workforce challenges are not just with engineers and scientists. We also rely on a very large labor force of highly skilled technicians and mechanics. The populations of trained mechanics is simply not available in the same quantities as in the past. While we work very closely with vocational training centers around our Air Logistics Complexes, we must still rely heavily on former military technicians that separate or retire from military service and seek a government civilian position. The 180-day waiting period to hire military retirees also reduces our ability to hire required personnel.

OTHER CHALLENGES

In addition to workforce challenges, the unpredictable state of defense appropriations over the past few years significantly impacts our ability to hire personnel and work with industry

partners. Many companies are not eager to invest in advanced technology or sustain existing sustainment capacity when the future of defense funding is volatile and uncertain. Many talented personnel are deterred from working for the government when they hear about furloughs and other uncertainties. Industry partners are disincentivized to bid on contracts when budgets are unpredictable or it is not cost-effective for them to manufacture small quantities of parts. As a result, we receive fewer bids or "no-bids", which translates into less competition, increased costs, and operational impacts to our warfighters. A smaller industrial base is also creating diminishing manufacturing and repair sources for many of our aging weapon systems.

The Air Force Sustainment Center works closely with industry leaders to leverage technology and advanced manufacturing and repair capabilities to help us sustain our Air Force. We must lean on industry partners to develop engine test capabilities for the future. We watch major Maintenance Repair and Overhaul (MRO) and Supply Chain companies adapt and evolve to meet the demands of their customers, and we learn what we can from their experiences, while they continue to learn from us. We must continue to reduce barriers to collective innovation that will benefit commercial business as well as government systems. Currently, there are barriers to collective innovation because of statutes that prevent collaboration with industry and academia to utilize depot resources for collaborative problem solving.

SHAPING FUTURE LOGISTICS CAPABILITIES

The future of warfare is hybrid and multi-domain. Air dominance is not a national birthright. Our adversary's increased capabilities in advanced air defense systems and 5th generation aircraft compel us to find more ways to sustain our Air Force through agility and global integration. Additionally, we currently do not have the ability inside Air Force logistics to deconflict and prioritize competing requirements and then articulate those risks back to the

combatant commanders. This gap presents risk because the responsible combatant commanders must absolutely understand realistic and risk-based options and alternatives to be mission effective. Having multi-domain logistics command and control will help shape operational schemes of maneuver and determine whether or not we have the agility to adapt across multiple domains in multiple geographic locations simultaneously. The necessary processes, decision support tools and visibility are necessary for us to be successful. Our adversaries do not limit their thinking by lines on a map or combatant commander boundaries. Their perspective is hybrid, global, and multi-domain. Our ability to command and control logistics capabilities from opening and sustaining theaters across the globe and resetting the forces will be paramount. Global Logistics agility and the management of scarce assets can only be achieved via a robust global logistics command and control architecture and supporting networks.

The current state of logistics has a theater-centric focus. It is reactive with no common operating picture for logistics, leading to ineffective global asset utilization. The multi-domain logistics command and control is an enterprise-level view of Air Force logistics to optimize warfighter support. By implementing multi-domain logistics command and control, we will no longer think about one combatant command area at a time. It will create complete global asset visibility and decision support tools to best assign and allocate limited global resources to meet immediate theater needs. This new way of operating will allow us to integrate with global and theater planning, articulate risk to the combatant commanders, provide intelligent logistics command and control in anti-access and area denial environments, prioritize and synchronize resources, set and re-set the theaters, and interact with a global distribution network.

We do not currently have a command and control system that allows us to have resilience and mission assurance. This will be essential to the combatant commanders in future warfighting.

CLOSING

The Air Force Sustainment Center continues to deliver combat power to our combatant commanders. We can fight and win tonight. But we must continue to adapt and rely on additional investments and resources to ensure we are ready to deter and defeat potential adversaries tomorrow. As the logistics enterprise evolves and adapts, we must have a multi-domain logistics command and control capability that will be able to utilize limited resources across multiple theaters in multi-domain conflict. High velocity combat support to the warfighter through pre-positioned resources and the ability to swing logistics forces from one point of need to another point of need will be essential. General Eric Shinseki once said, "If you don't like change, you'll like irrelevance even less." We, as the Air Force Sustainment Center, simply cannot afford to be irrelevant because the risks are just too great…the Air Force and the nation rely on us.

Since 1947, the Air Force has relentlessly provided America with credible deterrence and decisive combat power in times of peace, crisis, contingency, and conflict. However, our relative advantage over potential adversaries is shrinking and we must be prepared to win decisively against any adversary. We owe this to our nation, our joint teammates, and our allies. The nation requires full-spectrum ready air, space, and cyber power, now more than ever. America expects it; combatant commanders require it; and with your support, Airmen will deliver it.