



March 23, 2017

United States European Command

Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, One Hundred
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Witnesses

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SENATE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

STATEMENT OF GENERAL CURTIS M. SCAPARROTTI

COMMANDER

UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND

March 23, 2017

I. INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of this Committee, I am honored to testify before you in my first year as the Commander of United States European Command (EUCOM). It is a privilege to lead the great Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, Coast Guardsmen, and civilians in this Command. They continue to demonstrate remarkable commitment, dedication, and selfless service both in Europe and across the globe. We all appreciate your continued support.

The European theater remains critical to our national interests. The transatlantic alliance gives us an unmatched advantage over our adversaries - a united, capable, warfighting alliance resolved in its purpose and strengthened by shared values that have been forged in battle. EUCOM's relationship with NATO and the 51 countries within our Area of Responsibility (AOR) provides the United States with a network of willing partners who support global operations and secure the international rules-based order that our nations have defended together since World War II. Our security architecture protects more than 1 billion people and has safeguarded transatlantic trade, which now constitutes almost half of the world's combined GDP.

Nevertheless, today we face the most dynamic European security environment in history. Political volatility and economic uncertainty are compounded by threats to our security system that are trans-regional, multi-domain, and multi-functional. In the East, a resurgent Russia has turned from partner to antagonist. Countries along Russia's periphery, especially Ukraine and Georgia, are under threat from Moscow's malign influence and military aggression. In the Southeast, strategic drivers of instability converge on key allies, especially Turkey, which has to simultaneously manage Russia,

terrorists, and refugee flows. In the South, violent extremists and transnational criminal elements spawn terror and corruption from North Africa to the Middle East, while refugees and migrants fleeing persecution to Europe in search of security and opportunity. In the High North, Russia is reasserting its military prowess and positioning itself for strategic advantage in the Arctic.

EUCOM fully recognizes the dynamic nature of this security environment, and in response, we are regenerating our abilities for deterrence and defense while continuing our security cooperation and engagement mission. This requires that we return to our historical role as a command that is capable of executing the full-spectrum of joint and combined operations in a contested environment. Accordingly, we are adjusting our posture, plans, and readiness to respond to possible future conflicts.

This shift would not be possible without congressional support of the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI). Thanks in large measure to ERI, over the last 12 months EUCOM has made demonstrable progress. U.S. tanks have returned to European soil. U.S. F-15s and F-22s have demonstrated air dominance throughout the theater. U.S. naval forces have sailed throughout European waters. EUCOM has operationalized its Joint Cyber Center. With the approval of former Secretary Carter, EUCOM delivered the first new operational plan for the defense of Europe in over 25 years.

ERI also supports high-end exercises and training, improved infrastructure, and enhanced prepositioning of equipment and supplies, while State Department and DOD funds build partner capacity throughout Europe.

EUCOM has also continued to strengthen our relationship with allies and partners. Our relationship with Turkey endured a coup attempt with minimal disruption

to multiple ongoing operations. EUCOM has strengthened ties with Israel, one of our closest allies. Above all, EUCOM has supported the NATO Alliance, which remains, as Secretary Mattis has said, the “bedrock” of our transatlantic security. Overall EUCOM is growing stronger.

II. THEATER ASSESSMENT – RISKS AND CHALLENGES

Over the past year I have highlighted three signature issues facing us in this dynamic security environment: Russia, radicals or violent extremists, and regional unrest – leading to refugee and migrant flows. At the same time, managing the political, economic, and social challenges posed by refugees and migrants is a consuming concern of our allies and partners.

Russia

Russia’s malign actions are supported by its diplomatic, information, economic, and military initiatives. Moscow intends to reemerge as a global power, and views international norms such as the rule of law, democracy, and human rights as components of a system designed to suppress it. Therefore, Russia seeks to undermine this international system and discredit those in the West who have created it. For example, Russia is taking steps to influence the internal politics of European countries just as it tried to do in the United States in an attempt to create disunity and weakness within Europe and undermine the transatlantic relationship. Furthermore, Russia has repeatedly violated international agreements and treaties that underpin European peace and stability, including the Treaty on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) and the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), and it is

undermining transparency and confidence building regimes such as the Vienna Document and Open Skies, which provides greater transparency of posture and exercises in the region

Russia's political leadership appears to seek a resurgence through modernization of its military. Russia is adjusting its doctrine, modernizing its weapons, reorganizing the disposition of its forces, professionalizing its armed services, and upgrading capabilities in all warfighting domains. Russia desires a military force capable of achieving its strategic objectives and increasing its power.

Russia's aggression in Ukraine, including occupation and attempted annexation of Crimea, and actions in Syria underscore its willingness to use military force to exert its influence in Europe and the Middle East. In Ukraine, Russia's willingness to foment a bloody conflict into its third year through the use of proxy forces in the Donbas, and elsewhere, is deeply troubling to our allies and partners, particularly Russia's closest neighbors. In Syria, Russia's military intervention has changed the dynamics of the conflict, bolstered the Bashar al-Assad regime, targeted moderate opposition elements, and compounded human suffering in Syria, and complicated U.S. and coalition operations against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Russia has used this chaos to establish a permanent presence in the Middle East and eastern Mediterranean.

This past year saw other significant demonstrations of Russia's renewed military capability, including the first ever combat deployment of the KUZNETSOV Task Force, nation-wide strategic exercises, joint air, ground, and maritime operations in Syria using new platforms and precision-guided munitions, and the deployment of nuclear-capable

missiles to Kaliningrad. Russia's deployment in Ukraine and Syria also revealed increased proficiency in expeditionary combat and sustainment operations.

Another key component of Russia's military advancement is its Integrated Air Defense Systems (IADS). For example, in connection with its deployment to support the Assad regime in Syria, Russia fielded advanced Anti-Access / Area Denial (A2/AD) systems that combine command and control and electronic warfare capabilities, and long range coastal defense cruise missiles with advanced air defense platforms. EUCOM assesses that Russia plans to meld existing and future IADS systems into a central command structure to control all air defense forces and weapons.

In the High North, Russia continues to strengthen its military presence through equipment, infrastructure, training, and other activities. Russia is positioning itself to gain strategic advantage if the Northern Sea Route opens and becomes a viable shipping lane between Europe and Asia.

Most concerning, however, is Moscow's substantial inventory of non-strategic nuclear weapons in the EUCOM AOR and its troubling doctrine that calls on the potential use of these weapons to escalate its way out of a failing conflict. Russia's fielding of a conventional/nuclear dual-capable system that is prohibited under the INF Treaty creates a mismatch in escalatory options with the West. In the context of Putin's highly centralized decision-making structure, Moscow's provocative rhetoric and nuclear threats increase the likelihood of misunderstanding and miscalculation.

In addition to recent conventional and nuclear developments, Russia has employed a decades-long strategy of indirect action to coerce, destabilize, and otherwise exercise a malign influence over other nations. In neighboring states, Russia

continues to fuel “protracted conflicts.” In Moldova, for example, Russia has yet to follow through on its 1999 Istanbul summit commitments to withdraw an estimated 1,500 troops -- whose presence has no mandate -- from the Moldovan breakaway region of Transnistria. Russia asserts that it will remove its force once a comprehensive settlement to the Transnistrian conflict has been reached. However, Russia continued to undermine the discussion of a comprehensive settlement to the Transnistrian conflict at the 5+2 negotiations. Moscow continues to play a role in destabilizing the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute by selling arms to both parties -- Armenia and Azerbaijan -- while maintaining troops in Armenia, despite an international pledge to co-chair Minsk Group charged with seeking resolution of the conflict.

Russia fiercely opposes one of our strongest EUCOM partners, Georgia, in its attempts to align with the European and transatlantic communities. Russia’s occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia since its 2008 invasion the Georgian regions of has created lasting instability.

In the Balkans, Russia exploits ethnic tensions to slow progress on European and transatlantic integration. In 2016, Russia overtly interfered in the political processes of both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Montenegro.

Additional Russian activities short of war, range from disinformation to manipulation. Examples include Russia’s outright denial of involvement in the lead up to Russia’s occupation and attempted annexation in Crimea; attempts to influence elections in the United States, France and elsewhere; its aggressive propaganda campaigns targeting ethnic Russian populations among its neighbors; and cyber activities directed against infrastructure in the Baltic nations and Ukraine. In all of these

ways and more, Russia is attempting to exert its influence, expand its power, and discredit the capability and relevance of the West.

Radicals

Violent extremists, most notably ISIS, pose a serious, immediate threat to U.S. personnel, our allies, and our infrastructure in Europe and worldwide. In 2016, there were major terrorist attacks in Berlin, Brussels, Istanbul, Nice, Paris, and elsewhere. ISIS has made its intentions clear: it seeks to overthrow Western civilization and establish a world-wide caliphate.

While its footprint in Iraq and Syria shrunk in 2016, since 2014, ISIS has significantly expanded its operations throughout Europe and now leverages its network to enable and inspire attacks by European-based extremists in their resident countries. Further, ISIS has exploited the migration crisis to infiltrate operatives into Europe. Since Turkey expanded its counter-ISIS role and advocacy for coalition operations in Mosul, it has experienced an increased number of terrorist attacks, and ISIS's leaders have called for more. We do not expect the threat to diminish in the near future.

As a consequence of this threat, European nations have been forced to divert financial resources and military personnel to internal security. The impact of this reallocation is not yet fully appreciated and will likely persist for years. In short, violent extremism poses a dangerous threat to transatlantic nations and to the international order that we value.

Regional Volatility

In EUCOM's AOR, Russia's indirect actions have sought to exploit political unrest and socioeconomic disparities. Russian aggression in Ukraine has led to the deaths of approximately 10,000 people since April 2014. Recently in eastern Ukraine, Russia controls the battle tempo, again ratcheting up the number of daily violations of the cease fire and -- even more concerning -- directing combined Russian-separatist forces to target civilian infrastructure and threaten and intimidate OSCE monitors in order to turn up the pressure on Ukraine. Furthermore, Moscow's support for so-called "separatists" in eastern Ukraine destabilizes Kyiv's political structures, particularly as Ukraine undertakes politically-difficult reforms to combat corruption and comply with IMF requirements.

Ukraine seeks a permanent and verifiable ceasefire, the withdrawal of heavy weapons and Russian forces, full and unfettered access for OSCE monitors, and control over its internationally-recognized border with Russia. Russian-led separatist forces continue to commit the majority of ceasefire violations despite attempts by the OSCE to broker a lasting ceasefire along the Line of Contact.

Turkey has long been and remains an ally of the United States. It now occupies a critical location at the crossroads of multiple strategic challenges. To its west, it implements the Montreux Convention, which governs transit through the Turkish Straits, and is committed to local solutions for Black Sea issues. To its north and east, Turkey maintains a complicated relationship with Russia. Ankara seeks to resume the level of trade with Moscow that it enjoyed prior to Turkey's November 2015 shoot down of a Russian fighter. Turkey has absorbed the largest number of refugees from Syria -- almost 3 million. Despite these challenges, EUCOM continues to work closely with

Turkey to enable critical basing and logistical support to the counter ISIS fight and supports Turkey to counter its terror threat.

Although the flow of refugees to Europe has slowed, the refugee situation remains a significant challenge to our European Allies and partners. The strain on the social systems of European nations, especially along the Mediterranean Sea, diverts resources that could otherwise go toward military and defense spending, and finding solutions has tested political relationships. EU member states struggle to find a common, “shared” approach to admit and settle migrants. Both NATO and the EU, in conjunction with Turkish and Greek authorities, have committed law enforcement and military assets to this issue, including a maritime force in the Aegean Sea to conduct reconnaissance, monitoring, and surveillance.

The Syrian civil war and the risk of spillover into neighboring states, including Israel, continue to threaten stability in Europe and the Levant. Despite assistance from the USG and the international community, the refugee population in Jordan and Lebanon has placed significant burdens on the government and local residents. Additionally, factional fighting in Syria has resulted in occasional cross-border fire into the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights. Israel has avoided being drawn into the conflict in Syria but has taken military action to deny the transfer of advanced weapons to Hezbollah.

The Balkans’ stability since the late 90’s masks political and socio-economic fragility. Russia promotes anti-European views in this region by exploiting corrupt political systems, poor economic performance, and increased ethnic polarization.

Additionally, Islamic radicals seek to take advantage of high unemployment rates, political turmoil, and socioeconomic disparities to recruit violent extremists.

Iran's regional influence in the Levant continues to grow through its ongoing support to radical groups such as Lebanese Hezbollah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and paramilitary groups involved in the Syrian conflict and in counter-ISIS efforts across Iraq. Iran, which Israel views as its greatest existential threat, continues to transfer advanced conventional arms to Hezbollah and is clearly committed to maintaining Syria as the key link of the Iran-Hezbollah axis, which sustains a terrorist network in Syrian-regime controlled territory. Furthermore, Iran has taken advantage of the Syrian crisis to militarily coordinate with Russia in support of Assad.

III. THEATER ASSESSMENT - STRENGTHS AND OPPORTUNITIES

EUCOM will meet these challenges and adapt to the new security environment by capitalizing on our strengths and building new capabilities. We are developing a credible and relevant force structure built for deterrence and defense and leveraging a unified and adaptive NATO Alliance, and transitioning into a command able to address the strategic challenges before us.

Deter Russia

EUCOM activities, facilitated by ERI funding, continue to be the primary demonstration of our deterrent capability.

Increased Rotational Forces. ERI has directly supported an increase in the rotational presence of U.S. forces in Europe, a critical augmentation to EUCOM's assigned forces. For example, ERI funded Fort Stewart's 1st Armored Brigade Combat

Team's deployment to Europe from March to September 2016. Also, ERI funded the deployment of F-22 fighters, B-52 bombers, and additional combat and lift aircraft to Europe as part of the ERI Theater Security Package. Looking ahead, continued congressional support for ERI will sustain these rotations and enable additional anti-submarine warfare capabilities complementing maritime domain awareness assets in Iceland that are included in the FY 2017 ERI request. Additionally, rotational Marine units will operate from Norway and the Black Sea region.

Trained and Equipped Component Commands. EUCOM has also used ERI to fund and field Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS), providing a rapid mobilization capability for additional armored units in Europe. Separately, EUCOM advocated for and received full support for a \$220 million NATO Security Investment Program project (i.e., paid for by NATO common funding) that will build warehousing and maintenance capability for staging APS stocks in Poland. Additionally, ERI funds dozens of projects to upgrade flight-line and munitions-storage infrastructure across eight NATO nations to support not only rotational presence but also training events in Eastern Europe. The Navy is using ERI to fund capability enablers and force rotations to support EUCOM and NATO exercises, including Mine Countermeasure Teams and additional flying hours specifically to enhance EUCOM's deterrence posture.

Persistent Presence. ERI increased funding for U.S. forces in the Baltics, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, and the Mediterranean during 2016. In addition, ERI allowed EUCOM to continue our contribution to NATO's Air Policing mission by funding a continued fighter presence in theater with the 493rd Fighter Squadron at RAF Lakenheath in the UK.

Complex Exercises with Allies and Partners. ERI expanded the scope of EUCOM's involvement in over 28 joint and multi-national maritime, air, amphibious, and ground exercises across 40 countries. In June 2016, EUCOM participated in the Polish national exercise ANAKONDA, which involved approximately 31,000 Allied troops—including over 14,000 U.S. personnel—and provided a robust demonstration of Allied defensive capabilities, readiness, and interoperability. ERI also supported Navy-led BALTOPS 16, the premier maritime exercise in the Baltic region with over 6,100 troops from participating nations. And utilizing ERI resources, the Air Force took part in over 50 exercises and training deployments across Europe. An Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement concluded with the EU last December enables EUCOM to cooperate better with EU missions in the Balkans and elsewhere.

Russia Strategic Initiative (RSI): EUCOM leads the Department of Defense's Russia Strategic Initiative (RSI), which provides a framework for understanding the Russian threat and a forum for coordinating efforts and requirements. RSI allows us to maximize the deterrent value of our activities while avoiding inadvertent escalation. In just over a year, RSI has created a number of analytic products for combatant commanders that will enable a more efficient application of existing resources and planning efforts.

Deterring Russia requires a whole of government approach, and EUCOM supports the strategy of approaching Russia from a position of strength while seeking appropriate military-to-military communication necessary to fulfill our defense obligations in accordance with the Fiscal Year 2017 National Defense Authorization Act. Going forward, we must bring the information aspects of our national power more fully

to bear on Russia, both to amplify our narrative and to draw attention to Russia's manipulative, coercive, and malign activities. Finally, NATO and U.S. nuclear forces continue to be a vital component of our deterrence. Our modernization efforts are crucial; we must preserve a ready, credible, and safe nuclear capability.

Enable the NATO Alliance

As the United States manages multiple strategic challenges, our enduring strength remains NATO, the most successful alliance in history. NATO's leadership understands that the security environment has radically changed over the past few years. The Alliance has placed renewed emphasis on deterring further Russian aggression, countering transnational threats, such as violent extremist organizations, and projecting stability in the Middle East and North Africa, while fulfilling its commitments in Afghanistan.

The Warsaw Summit last July was a significant demonstration of unity, cooperation, and strategic adaptation. As the member nations declared in NATO's Warsaw Summit Communiqué, "We are united in our commitment to the Washington Treaty, the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations (UN), and the vital transatlantic bond". This unity is NATO's center of gravity, and the United States must continue to support solidarity among the Alliance nations.

Enhanced Forward Presence (eFP). The signature outcome of the 2016 Warsaw Summit was the decision to establish an enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) in the Baltics and Poland to demonstrate NATO's cohesion in defense of the Alliance. Canada, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States have begun deploying multinational battalion task forces to Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and Poland respectively

on a rotational basis. Defense Cooperation Agreements (DCAs) signed in 2017 with Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are facilitating the deployment of U.S forces to the three Baltic states. The United States serves as the framework nation for eFP in Poland and is working closely with the other framework nations and their host nations to ensure NATO's key deterrence and defense measures are capable and integrated.

European Phased Adapted Approach (EPAA). EUCOM continues to implement the EPAA to defend European NATO populations, territory, and infrastructure against ballistic missile threats from threats outside the Euro-Atlantic region. In July 2016, the U.S.-funded Aegis Ashore facility in Romania became operational and transferred to NATO operational control. Work on the Aegis Ashore site in Poland (authorized and appropriated in fiscal year 2016 legislation) is underway and on track for completion by the end of calendar year 2018 and operational under NATO operational control in mid-2019.

Projecting Stability. NATO is a key contributor to ensuring security and projecting stability abroad. It is worth remembering that the first and only time the Alliance invoked the mutual defense provisions of its founding treaty was in response to the 9/11 attacks on the United States. Today, through NATO's Resolute Support Mission, over 12,000 troops (including over 5,000 non-U.S. personnel) provide training and assistance to Afghan security forces and institutions. NATO is committed to ensuring a stable Afghanistan that is not a safe haven for terrorists.

Additionally, it is notable that all 28 NATO nations participate in the Counter-ISIS coalition. NATO committed AWACS surveillance aircraft and actively contributes to

capacity building in Iraq. EUCOM actively supports NATO's goal of expanding its operations against this terrorist threat.

Support to Washington Treaty. EUCOM provides support for key articles of the Washington Treaty, enabling NATO members to meet their collective security commitments. EUCOM conducts activities, such as security cooperation, to help allies meet their Article 3 commitment to "maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist attack." We have been able to reduce allies' dependencies on Russian-sourced, legacy military equipment thanks to ongoing congressional support for critical authorities and funding that provide shared resources. EUCOM also actively assists the Alliance when an ally declares, under Article 4, that its territorial integrity, political independence, or security is threatened. The last time an ally invoked Article 4 was 2015, when Turkey sought consultation following terrorist attacks. Most importantly, EUCOM is the force that backs the United States' commitment to Article 5, which declares that an armed attack on one ally is an attack on all.

NATO Spending Trends. At the Wales Summit in 2014, the allies pledged to reverse the trend of declining defense budgets and invest in the development of highly-capable and deployable forces. Today, in addition to the United States, four allies (Estonia, Greece, Poland, and the United Kingdom) meet the NATO guidelines for 2% of GDP, up from three in 2014. Allies' defense expenditures increased in 2015 for the first time since 2009 and grew at a real rate of 3.8% in 2016, with 22 member nations increasing defense spending. Allies are showing demonstrable progress toward their commitment to contribute 2% of their GDP within a decade (by 2024).

This is a positive trend, but allied nations must meet the 2% mark with 20% allocated to the modernization of equipment and infrastructure. Critical ally and partner capability shortfalls remain, including strategic lift; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); deployable command and control; air to air refueling; and air and missile defense. Further, both EUCOM and NATO are hampered by inadequate infrastructure that affects the ability to maneuver across the continent. The expansion of the Alliance to include former Eastern Bloc countries has exacerbated the lack of common transportation networks between the newer NATO members in the east and the more established allies in the west. EUCOM is working closely with NATO to identify and address infrastructure requirements to improve U.S. and NATO freedom of movement throughout the theater.

Build Partner Capacity

EUCOM has spent several decades working with the Department of State to help allied and partner nations develop and improve their military and other security forces. This partner capacity building has been accomplished with the support of this Committee, which has been generous in providing us the authorization we need to accomplish this critical task. I would highlight two activities in particular.

Defense Institution Building (DIB). DIB helps partner nations build effective, transparent, and accountable defense institutions. For example, EUCOM fully endorses the work of the Defense Reform Advisory Board in Ukraine, which is helping to bring about both political and military reform as the Ministry of Defense, General Staff, and Armed Forces transition from centralized Soviet-style systems and concepts towards a Euro-Atlantic model. We also support defense institutions in Georgia, helping them

improve their strategic logistics, human and material resource management, and institutional aspects of their training management system. Overall, our DIB efforts lay the groundwork for broader security cooperation activities.

Joint Multinational Training Group Ukraine (JMTG-U). Together with forces from Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, the UK, and Canada using State Department-provided Foreign Military Financing and Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative funds, EUCOM trains, advises, and equips Ukraine security forces, helping them build the capacity to defend their sovereignty and territorial integrity. Our team, working through the Multinational Joint Commission, has developed Ukraine's institutional training capability so that Ukraine can create a NATO-interoperable armed force. Our efforts include the training of both conventional and special operations units, as well as advising Ukraine on defense reform priorities.

Assist Israel

EUCOM's mission to assist in the defense of Israel, one of our closest allies, remains a top priority. Success will depend on the continued support of Congress and our strong relationship with the Israel Defense Forces. Many aspects of our bilateral relationship have been guided by the Strategic Cooperation Initiative Program (SCIP) framework, which dates to the Reagan Administration. SCIP enables robust cooperation and coordination on a vast range of security matters. Going forward, we are working to update the SCIP to incorporate an examination of all major exercises to ensure each meets the three major pillars of our security relationship: (1) missile defense, air operations, and counter-terrorism; (2) managing the Weapon Reserve Stockpile for Allies-Israel (WRSA-I); and (3) ensuring Israel's qualitative military edge.

Counter Transnational Threats

Adopting a whole-of-government approach, EUCOM, together with its interagency partners, conducts initiatives to counter transnational threats including countering terrorism and the flow of foreign fighters, countering illicit finance networks, combatting the trafficking of persons and illicit substances; and building allied and partner security, investigative, and judicial capacity. In conjunction with the Departments of State, Justice, Homeland Security, and other federal law enforcement agencies, EUCOM works to monitor and thwart the flow of foreign fighters, support the dismantlement of facilitation networks, and build partner nation capacity to defeat violent extremism.

Through our counter terrorism cell, EUCOM strengthens the global Counter-ISIS efforts in coordination with and support of U.S. Central (CENTCOM), Africa (AFRICOM), and Special Operations (SOCOM) Commands. We have focused on those who facilitate the ISIS brand and network through radicalization, financing, and propaganda.

Also, EUCOM and NATO are working to increase ties with the EU to enhance the capabilities Europe can collectively bring to bear against transnational threats. These three organizational nodes foster a shared understanding of the threats, help match resources accordingly, and can address all elements of national power including diplomatic, informational, military, and economic. In order to realize this networked approach, EUCOM will support NATO efforts to expand the capability and capacity of Allied Joint Forces Command – Naples.

Enable Global Operations

EUCOM personnel actively support operations in AFRICOM and CENTCOM AORs. EUCOM's well-developed and tested infrastructure provides critical capabilities in strategic locations such as Incirlik, Turkey; Sigonella, Italy' and Moron and Rota, Spain. Basing and access in Germany, Greece, Italy, France, Spain, Turkey, and the United Kingdom enable more timely and coordinated trans-regional crisis response.

IV. RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS

Significant U.S. force reductions following the collapse of the Soviet Union were based on the assumption that Russia would be a strategic partner to the West. These reductions now limit U.S. options for addressing challenges in a changing European strategic environment. The strategic rebalance to Asia and the Pacific, combined with budget limitations in the Budget Control Act of 2011, have contributed to substantial posture reductions across our land and air domains. For example, between 2010 and 2013, two fighter squadrons and a two-star numbered air force headquarters were inactivated, along with associated critical enablers and staff personnel. In addition, the last two heavy Brigade Combat Teams (BCT), a two-star division headquarters, and a three-star corps headquarters were removed from Europe, leaving only one Stryker and one airborne brigade. As a result of the BCT losses, without fully-resourced heel-to-toe rotational forces the ground force permanently assigned to EUCOM is inadequate to meet the combatant command's directed mission to deter Russia from further aggression.

Deterrence Posture. Going forward, we will need to continue maintaining capable forces for effective deterrence. EUCOM is coordinating across the DoD to obtain the forces we need in every warfare domain. This may include additional maneuver forces, combat air squadrons, anti-submarine capabilities, a carrier strike group, and maritime amphibious capabilities. We will continue to enhance our plans for pre-positioning equipment across the theater as a flexible deterrent measure and to exercise the joint reception, staging, and onward integration of CONUS-based forces into Europe.

ERI Requirements. EUCOM's continues to require the ability to deter Russian aggression and counter malign influence while assuring allies and partners. We anticipate needing to continue deterrence measures initiated in previous ERI submissions to include: Army and Air Force prepositioning, retention of F-15 presence, improved airfield infrastructure improvements, and to address some new capabilities needed in the theater.

Indications and Warnings (I&W). EUCOM's ability to provide strategic warning is critical to credible deterrence. . A robust intelligence capability enables accurate analysis and rapid response in a changing theater security environment. This capability also supports the design of realistic exercises, posture alignment, and future requirements. Furthermore, when completed, EUCOM's Joint Intelligence Analytic Center at Royal Air Force Croughton will provide a dedicated, purpose-built intelligence facility collocated with NATO and AFRICOM's analytic centers that will enhance capability and capacity in both combatant commands and NATO. Finally, additional

intelligence collection platforms in theater, such as the U-2, the RQ-4, and the RC-135, are required for accurate and timely threat information to support strategic decisions.

Recapitalization Efforts. The European Infrastructure Consolidation effort announced in January 2015 enables EUCOM to divest excess capacity and consolidate missions and footprints at enduring locations. However, with aging infrastructure and little recent investment, recapitalization and consolidation projects are required to support warfighter readiness, command and control requirements, deployments, training, and quality of life. This Committee has been key to these critical efforts. We continue to modernize communications facilities and schools across Europe. Last year, Congress authorized the final increment for the Joint Intelligence Analysis Center, which enables the closure of RAFs Molesworth and Alconbury.

V. CONCLUSION

Let me conclude by again thanking this Committee's Members and staff for their continued support of EUCOM, not only through providing our requested funding, but also by helping us to articulate the challenges that lie before us. Support from other senior leaders and, above all, from the public at home and across Europe is vital to ensuring that we remain ready and relevant. This is a pivotal time for EUCOM as we transition to meet the demands of a dynamic security environment. I remain confident that through the strength of our Alliance and partnerships, and with the professionalism of our service members, we will adapt and ensure that Europe remains whole, free and at peace.

Stenographic Transcript
Before the

COMMITTEE ON
ARMED SERVICES

UNITED STATES SENATE

HEARING TO RECEIVE TESTIMONY ON
UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND

Thursday, March 23, 2017

Washington, D.C.

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HEARING TO RECEIVE TESTIMONY ON
UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND

Thursday, March 23, 2017

U.S. Senate
Committee on Armed Services
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:34 a.m. in Room SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. John McCain, chairman of the committee, presiding.

Committee Members Present: Senators McCain [presiding], Inhofe, Wicker, Fischer, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Cruz, Sasse, Reed, Nelson, McCaskill, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Donnelly, Hirono, Kaine, King, Heinrich, Warren, and Peters.

1 OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN McCAIN, U.S. SENATOR
2 FROM ARIZONA

3 Chairman McCain: Well, good morning.

4 The Senate Armed Services Committee meets this morning
5 to receive testimony on the posture of U.S. European
6 Command. I would like to welcome General Scaparrotti, who
7 is back before the committee. I am sure he has been eagerly
8 awaiting that opportunity. We thank you for your decades of
9 distinguished service and for your leadership of our men and
10 women in uniform.

11 This morning, our thoughts and prayers are with the
12 loved ones of the four innocent people killed and dozens
13 more injured in an attack in the heart of London that police
14 believe was inspired by radical Islamist terrorists. We
15 stands in solidarity with the British people, committed as
16 ever to our special relationship and to the common defense
17 of our security and our values.

18 3 years ago this last week, Russia violated Ukrainian
19 sovereignty and annexed Crimea, a seminal event that
20 revealed what had already been increasingly obvious for
21 years: that the United States and our European allies
22 confront an aggressive, militarily capable Russian
23 Government that is hostile to our interests and our values
24 and willing to use force not as a last resort but as a
25 primary tool to achieve its revisionist objectives. Many

1 believe this challenge had been consigned to the history
2 books. And indeed, the United States operated under that
3 assumption for far too long, drastically reducing our
4 military presence, allowing our intelligence capabilities to
5 wither, and unilaterally disengaging from the information
6 fight.

7 I might add that yesterday we received information that
8 Sergei Magnitsky who was murdered by Vladimir Putin's thugs-
9 - his lawyer was thrown from a fourth floor room. I mean,
10 this kind of stuff you cannot make up. And it is an
11 indication of Vladimir Putin's feeling of impunity that he
12 can go around killing people without any penalty to pay.
13 And I am sure that what Mr. Putin was trying to do is send a
14 message to anybody else in Russia who wants to stand up
15 against him. I digress.

16 3 years later, I regret to say the United States still
17 has not adjusted to the scope, scale, and severity of the
18 new strategic reality we face in Europe. We continue to
19 lack coherent policy and strategy to deter conflict and
20 prevent aggression in Europe. Despite important progress
21 made through the European Deterrence Initiative, we still
22 have no long-term vision for U.S. force posture in Europe,
23 one that accounts for Russia's rapid military modernization,
24 evolving nuclear doctrine, violations of the INF Treaty,
25 advanced anti-access/area denial threat concentrated in

1 Kaliningrad, and significant military buildup along its
2 western border.

3 Indeed, as General Scaparrotti points out in his
4 written testimony -- and I quote -- the ground force
5 permanently assigned to EUCOM is inadequate to meet the
6 combatant command's directed mission to deter Russia from
7 further aggression.

8 The new administration has an opportunity to turn the
9 page and design a new policy and strategy in Europe backed
10 by all elements of American power and decisive political
11 will. General Scaparrotti, we hope you can help this
12 committee begin to think through the basic requirements for
13 such a policy and strategy and what resources and authority
14 you need both as European Commander and Supreme Allied
15 Commander, Europe to deter and, if necessary, defeat
16 aggression against the United States and our allies.

17 Some of the features of a new approach in Europe are
18 already clear. For example, the need to enhance the forward
19 presence of U.S. military forces and provide defensive
20 lethal assistance to Ukraine. But we still have a lot of
21 work to do in other areas, particularly in countering
22 Russian disinformation and devising gray zone strategies for
23 competition below the threshold of major conflict.

24 What is also clear is that no U.S. policy or strategy
25 in Europe can be successful without our NATO allies. At the

1 2014 NATO Summit in Wales, the leaders of every NATO ally
2 pledged to reach the goal of spending 2 percent of their GDP
3 on defense by 2024. The good news is that according to NATO
4 Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg, defense budgets across
5 Europe and Canada increased by 3.8 percent last year, or by
6 some \$10 billion.

7 This is important progress, but we must be careful not
8 to reduce the NATO alliance of the notion of burden sharing
9 to simply 2 percent. Our allies do not just need to spend
10 more, they need to spend better. One senior European
11 official recently said that Europe spends roughly 50 percent
12 of the United States on defense, but produces just 15
13 percent of the capability because defense purchases are
14 uncoordinated, duplicative, and inefficient. That is why
15 enhancing European security is not just a job for NATO but
16 also for the European Union, which has an important role to
17 play in encouraging cooperative defense acquisition and
18 operation of modernized defense equipment.

19 Finally, we must never forget that the essential
20 contributions America's allies make to our national security
21 are not measured in dollars alone. After the September 11th
22 attacks killed 2,600 Americans and 135 citizens of NATO
23 countries, for the first time in history, our NATO allies
24 invoked Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. NATO troops
25 went to fight side by side with American troops in

1 Afghanistan, and over 1,000 of them made the ultimate
2 sacrifice.

3 The price our NATO allies paid in blood fighting
4 alongside us should never be diminished. And we must never
5 forget that America is safer and more secure because it has
6 allies that are willing to step up and share the burden of
7 collective security.

8 Senator Reed?

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1 STATEMENT OF HON. JACK REED, U.S. SENATOR FROM RHODE
2 ISLAND

3 Senator Reed: Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman,
4 for holding this timely and important hearing.

5 And I join you in solidarity with our British allies
6 and applaud your comments.

7 Thanks also to General Scaparrotti for your nearly 40
8 years of service in the military, your leadership in
9 Afghanistan, Korea, and now at U.S. European Command. Also,
10 please pass along our sincere gratitude for the outstanding
11 service of all the men and women who serve with you in
12 EUCOM. Thank you, General.

13 The transatlantic relationship is a cornerstone of U.S.
14 national security and the international order established at
15 the end of World War II. Our European allies and partners
16 have stood with us in maintaining the peace, including in
17 coalition operations in Afghanistan and fighting terrorist
18 extremists in Iraq and Syria. The NATO alliance remains
19 strong and is grounded in a shared vision of an integrated
20 and stable Europe rooted in respect for sovereignty and
21 political and economic freedom.

22 I am concerned, however, about the mixed signals that
23 the current administration seems to be sending regarding the
24 U.S. commitment to NATO and the willingness to cut a deal
25 with Russia. Secretary Tillerson's reported decision to

1 skip a NATO foreign ministers meeting next month and take a
2 trip to Moscow prior to a NATO summit in May has raised
3 concerns in some European capitals. I urge Secretary
4 Tillerson to reconsider his attendance at NATO next month
5 and send a strong signal of our unwavering support for the
6 alliance.

7 The broad and growing challenges facing the EUCOM
8 Commander mean that alliance unity is more important than
9 ever. The cohesion of NATO is being directly threatened by
10 Russia. President Putin has repeatedly shown he will use
11 military force to assert a Russian sphere of influence over
12 its neighbors and to undermine their further integration
13 into Europe. Nowhere is this more evident than in Ukraine
14 where Russia has used hybrid warfare tactics to seize Crimea
15 and continues to support militarily and financially Russian-
16 led separatists in eastern Ukraine, in violation of Russia's
17 commitments under the Minsk agreements. As we heard at
18 Tuesday's panel of distinguished former government
19 officials, it is critically important that we assist Ukraine
20 in resisting Russian pressure and instituting democratic
21 reforms. A successful, reformed Ukraine would provide a
22 powerful alternative to Putin's autocratic rule.

23 The United States has taken significant steps in recent
24 years to rebuild its military presence in Europe and
25 reassure our allies and partners threatened by renewed

1 Russian aggression. The European Deterrence Initiative, or
2 EDI, and the NATO enhanced forward presence have increased
3 the rotational presence of forces in Eastern Europe. In
4 addition, while many NATO members to fall short of the 2
5 percent of GDP target for defense spending, defense budgets
6 among NATO nations are increasing and a number of allies are
7 making significant in-kind contributions as well. Questions
8 remain, however, whether we have the appropriate mix of
9 forces in Europe, both quantitatively and qualitatively, and
10 I hope you will address these questions this morning.

11 Russia is deploying the full array of tools in the
12 Kremlin playbook to challenge the West. This includes
13 aggressive actions in the nuclear realm. I agree with the
14 experts on Tuesday's panel regarding the importance of
15 responding strongly to Russia's fielding of a missile system
16 in violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces, or
17 INF, Treaty. In addition, Russia's nuclear doctrine of
18 escalate to deescalate is not only deeply disturbing but
19 potentially catastrophic.

20 Also disconcerting is Russia's increasing boldness in
21 using non-military tools to target Western democracies and
22 advance Putin's strategic aims. Russia is employing an
23 array of covert and overt asymmetric weapons in the gray
24 zone short of military conflict, including cyber hacking,
25 disinformation, propaganda, economic leverage, corruption,

1 and even political assassination. To counter this insidious
2 Russian interference, we must begin by recognizing it as a
3 national security threat. Further, the intelligence
4 community has warned that the kinds of Kremlin-directed
5 malign activities witnessed in last year's U.S. presidential
6 election are likely to re-occur in the future, including
7 during elections in France, Germany, and elsewhere in Europe
8 this year. Responding to this national security threat will
9 require a whole-of-government approach and a comprehensive
10 strategy for pushing back against Russia broadly.

11 EUCOM faces a number of other challenges as well. This
12 includes increasing instability in the Balkans where Russian
13 influence operations are feeding Serbian resentments both in
14 Serbia and among Bosnian Serbs. In addition, in the
15 Balkans, where traditionally a moderate form of Islam has
16 been practiced, there are growing Islamic Salafist
17 influences as a result of a mosque-building campaign funded
18 by Saudi Arabia. On its southeastern border, EUCOM must
19 contend with the instability arising from Syria and the
20 transnational threats emanating from that conflict. And to
21 the south, the migration crisis in the Mediterranean
22 countries continues to strain European resources for
23 security. General, I am interested in hearing how NATO is
24 handling these myriad of problems and how the United States
25 can be helpful.

1 Again, I want to thank General Scaparrotti for his
2 service and I look forward to this morning to his testimony.

3 Chairman McCain: Good morning, General.

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1 STATEMENT OF GENERAL CURTIS M. SCAPARROTTI, USA,
2 COMMANDER, U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND/SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER,
3 EUROPE

4 General Scaparrotti: Chairman McCain, Ranking Member
5 Reed, and distinguished members of the committee, I am
6 honored to testify today as the Commander of the United
7 States European Command. On behalf of over 60,000
8 permanently assigned service members, as well as civilians,
9 contractors, and their families who serve and represent our
10 Nation in Europe, thank you for your support.

11 Before starting, I would like to also express my
12 condolence on behalf of the entire European Command team for
13 the civilians and policemen killed and wounded in
14 yesterday's terrorist attack in the UK. Our thoughts and
15 prayers go out to these victims and their families impacted
16 by this senseless attack. We strongly condemn this attack
17 and will continue to stand shoulder to shoulder with our
18 NATO ally and our partners to defeat terrorism.

19 Chairman, the European theater remains critical to our
20 national interests. The transatlantic alliance gives us a
21 unique advantage over our adversaries, a united, capable
22 warfighting alliance resolved in its purpose and
23 strengthened by shared values that have been forged in
24 battle. EUCOM's relationship with NATO and the 51 countries
25 within our AOR provides the United States with a network of

1 willing partners who support global operations and secure
2 international rules-based order. Our security architecture
3 protects more than 1 billion people and has safeguarded
4 transatlantic trade which now constitutes almost half of the
5 world's GDP.

6 However, this security architecture is being tested,
7 and today we face the most dynamic European strategic
8 environment in recent history. Political volatility and
9 economic uncertainty are compounded by threats to our
10 security system that are trans-regional, multi-domain, and
11 multi-functional. In the east, a resurgent Russia has
12 turned from partner to antagonist as it seeks to reemerge as
13 a global power. Countries along Russia's periphery,
14 including Ukraine and Georgia, struggled against Moscow's
15 malign activities and military actions. In the southeast,
16 strategic drivers of instability converge on key allies,
17 especially Turkey, which has to simultaneously manage
18 Russia, terrorists, and refugee flows. In the south,
19 violent extremists and transnational criminal elements spawn
20 terror and corruption from North Africa to the Middle East,
21 while refugees flee to Europe in search of security and
22 opportunity. And in the high north, Russia is reasserting
23 its military presence and positioning itself for strategic
24 advantage in the Arctic.

25 In response to these challenges, EUCOM has shifted its

1 focus from security cooperation and engagement to deterrence
2 and defense. Accordingly, we are adjusting our posture, our
3 plans, our readiness so that we remain relevant to the
4 threats we face. In short, we are returning to the historic
5 role as a warfighting command focused on deterrence and
6 defense.

7 EUCOM's transition would not be possible without the
8 congressional support of the European Deterrence Initiative.
9 Thanks in large measure to ERI, or EDI, over the last 12
10 months, EUCOM has made clear progress with an enhanced
11 forward presence or force presence, complex exercises and
12 training, infrastructure improvements, increased
13 prepositioning of equipment and supplies, and partner
14 capacity building throughout Europe.

15 But we cannot meet these challenges alone. In response
16 to Russian aggression, EUCOM has continued to strengthen our
17 relationship with strategic allies and partners, including
18 the Baltic nations, Poland, Turkey, and Ukraine. EUCOM has
19 also strengthened ties with Israel, one of our closest
20 allies. Above all, EUCOM has supported the NATO alliance
21 which remains, as Secretary Mattis said, the bedrock of our
22 transatlantic security.

23 Thus, EUCOM posture is growing stronger, and I remain
24 confident in our ability to affect this transition. But
25 there is much work to do. We must not only match but

1 outpace the modernization and advances of our adversaries.
2 We must invest in the tools and capabilities needed to
3 increase effectiveness across the spectrum of conflict. And
4 we must ensure that we have a force that is credible, agile,
5 and relevant to the dynamic demands of this theater.

6 To this end, EUCOM has identified the following focus
7 areas: ISR collection platforms that improve timely threat
8 information and strategic warning; land force capabilities
9 that deter Russia from further aggression; enhanced naval
10 capabilities for antisubmarine warfare, strike warfare, and
11 amphibious operations; prepositioned equipment to increase
12 our responsiveness to crisis and enhance missile defense
13 systems.

14 Let me conclude by again thanking this committee's
15 members and staff for their continued support of EUCOM not
16 only through increased funding but also by helping us to
17 articulate the challenges that lie before us. Support from
18 other senior leaders and, above all, the public at home and
19 across Europe is vital to ensuring that we have a ready and
20 relevant force.

21 This remains a pivotal time for EUCOM as we transition
22 to meet the demands of a dynamic security environment. I
23 remain confident that through the strength of our alliances
24 and partnerships and with the professionalism of our service
25 members, we will adapt and ensure Europe remains whole,

1 free, and at peace.

2 Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.

3 [The prepared statement of General Scaparrotti
4 follows:]

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1 Chairman McCain: Since a quorum is now present, I ask
2 the committee to consider a list of 62 pending military
3 nominations. All of these nominations have been before the
4 committee the required length of time. Is there a motion to
5 favorably report these 62 military nominations?

6 Senator Reed: So moved.

7 Chairman McCain: And is there a second?

8 Senator Nelson: Second.

9 Chairman McCain: All in favor, say aye.

10 [Chorus of ayes.]

11 Chairman McCain: The ayes have it.

12 General, do you have any general comment about the
13 attack yesterday in London and the significance of it?

14 General Scaparrotti: Sir, the attack in London
15 underscores again the dynamic environment in Europe. Europe
16 is challenged by both a flow of terrorists returning to
17 Europe from Syria and other places. They are challenged by
18 an internal threat of those inspired by ISIS or directed by
19 ISIS. And this is an example of the attacks that we have
20 seen in Europe in the past year. It is a difficult
21 challenge. As I said, we remain solid and stand shoulder to
22 shoulder with our allies in NATO to defeat this threat.

23 Chairman McCain: The likelihood of further actions
24 like this, particularly some that are self-indoctrinated, is
25 very hard to stop.

1 General Scaparrotti: It is, sir. And I would just say
2 that the number of threat streams that we have of this type
3 within Europe is probably higher in Europe than any other
4 part of the globe with the exception of the places that we
5 are actually physically fighting in like Syria and
6 Afghanistan and Iraq.

7 Chairman McCain: Is there a connection between that
8 and refugees?

9 General Scaparrotti: The flow of refugees and those
10 who move them, particularly criminal activities that will
11 help move them -- they also are more than willing to move
12 both equipment, personnel, weapons, and people.

13 Chairman McCain: As you know, there was an attempted
14 coup in Montenegro by the Russians. And the Montenegrin
15 membership in NATO is pending, and 26 of the 28 nations I
16 believe have already registered their approval. It is a
17 small country, only 650,000 people. It is very
18 strategically located, as you know. What is your view of
19 the importance of Montenegro especially since they have
20 completed all of the very difficult procedures necessary to
21 become eligible -- what is your view of the importance of
22 their inclusion in NATO?

23 General Scaparrotti: Chairman, it is absolutely
24 critical that they be brought into NATO. They have had this
25 desire. They have met the map. And it underscores NATO's

1 outreach and ability to bring in those who want to determine
2 their own means of government and become a part of NATO. If
3 we were to lose this, it would set back many of the other
4 countries and peoples, particularly in Eastern Europe, who
5 are looking forward to and have their eyes set on the West
6 and becoming a part of NATO.

7 Chairman McCain: So it is very important.

8 General Scaparrotti: I think it is critical, yes.

9 Chairman McCain: I thank you.

10 Finally, you talked about the military presence
11 necessary for additional forces in Europe, but one of the
12 problems we continue to face -- for example, one of the
13 causes of the attempted coup in Montenegro is the saturation
14 of propaganda emanating from Russia. We all know the
15 controversy here in the United States about our election,
16 but we now see them active in the French election
17 apparently, in the German election. But more importantly,
18 they are inundating the Baltics in particular. What are our
19 ideas other than ask for a strategy? What are our ideas as
20 to how to counter what has emerged as one of the greatest
21 threats to stability in Europe?

22 General Scaparrotti: Chairman, I think, first of all,
23 we have to confront this threat as it is, be sober-minded
24 about it. We have to do it as an alliance and with our
25 partners, and we have to call it out. We have to confront

1 it. There seems to be a reluctance in many of the nations
2 to actually confront it when we see it, publicly take it on.
3 And I think we as partners have to form together and begin
4 to do this. As you said, it is prolific, and I believe we
5 have got to confront it.

6 Chairman McCain: We countered Russian propaganda
7 during the Cold War with Radio Free Europe and Voice of
8 America. And all I have seen so far is disarray in Prague
9 about the role, the funding, the strategies and all that.
10 What do you think we need to do there to have our own
11 effective counter-message to be sent? I know that is not
12 exactly in your area of responsibility, but I think it is a
13 kind of warfare.

14 General Scaparrotti: Sir, it is. The Russians see
15 this as a part of that spectrum of warfare. That is their
16 asymmetric approach.

17 I will start here. You know, we have information
18 operations that are military, and I have those that are
19 countering malign influence in Europe. But what we really
20 need is we need a whole-of-government approach, a whole-of-
21 government information campaign, of which I am a small part
22 of that. We need somebody in the lead of that, and then we
23 need to finance it and form a governmental strategy. As you
24 said, in the Cold War, we had one. There is a start on
25 that. We have what is called the RIG, the Russian

1 Information Group, which is the beginnings of that. But
2 that has to be reinforced. It has to be financed. They
3 have to have the authorities that they need to lead that
4 forward.

5 Chairman McCain: And the lead on that would probably
6 be the State Department. Right?

7 General Scaparrotti: The RIG is co-chaired with EUCOM
8 and the State Department is the lead. Yes, sir.

9 Chairman McCain: So it would not help you any if we
10 slashed the spending for the State Department.

11 General Scaparrotti: No, sir.

12 Chairman McCain: Senator Reed?

13 Senator Reed: Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

14 In fact, you anticipated one of the questions I wanted
15 to raise about the malign influences in elections and
16 institutional capacity that are evident in Europe today.
17 And I think I can safely say that we are really not
18 organized to deal with it at this point. Is that correct?

19 General Scaparrotti: Yes, sir. I agree we can get
20 much better organized to deal with this than we are today.

21 Senator Reed: Let me just go a step further and say
22 that in your estimate, what are the strategic effects that
23 the Russians are trying to achieve by these activities?
24 This is not sort of a random kind of just stir up trouble
25 for the sake of stirring up trouble. What are the strategic

1 objectives?

2 General Scaparrotti: Sir, their overall objective is
3 to undermine the governments that oppose them, to reinforce
4 the political parties in each of those countries that might
5 be aligned with them, to demonstrate the weakness of the
6 West and undermine the U.S. and the West. They want to
7 ensure that they can dominate particularly their periphery.
8 And they are doing that through this asymmetric approach.

9 Senator Reed: Now, you have indicated that
10 particularly with the European Defense Initiative and with
11 the response initiative, we are beginning to reorganize, re-
12 equip, et cetera. Can you give us a sense of your
13 priorities? You had a long list of activities that you feel
14 you have to undertake. But the top three issues that you
15 have to get accomplished in the near future.

16 General Scaparrotti: Sir, the top three that we have
17 to get accomplished -- I think, first of all, is we have to
18 get our posture correct for deterrence, and that is across
19 all the services. It not just -- we tend to focus on the
20 Army part of this, but each of the services play a role in
21 that.

22 Secondly, we have to ensure that our command has made
23 the transition to a command that can command and control in
24 the dynamic environment against an aggressor like Russia.
25 We just recently had our command post exercise we have every

1 2 years. It was a great exercise, but what it laid out is
2 the changes we have yet to make within the component
3 commands in Europe in order to fight a foe like Russia.

4 Senator Reed: And with respect to Ukraine, our expert
5 panel on Tuesday, who did a superb job, suggested that is
6 really the critical arena at the moment. If they are able
7 to subvert Ukraine, then that will send shock waves
8 throughout Europe. Is that in your assessment? And just
9 generally, how are we collectively, both NATO, the United
10 States, EUCOM, and the EU, doing in terms of our efforts in
11 the Ukraine?

12 General Scaparrotti: I think the good news with
13 respect to Ukraine is that we are unified and we are
14 organized. NATO has a defense fund that supports it along
15 very similar lines to the U.S. We are thankful to Congress
16 for its funding of our activities there. In fact, we lead a
17 multinational joint commission, which is actually the
18 vehicle that among our allies and the U.S., assesses and
19 then directs the reform that needs to take place in
20 conjunction with Ukraine. They also do the assessment of
21 the needs in terms of equipment and training and guide that
22 training. So we are actually doing that together with our
23 partners, as well as NATO through that one body. And I
24 think it is very effective.

25 Senator Reed: And in that regard, a great deal -- my

1 impression is -- of the civilian capacity building and the
2 anti-corruption efforts is being done by the European Union.
3 So their efforts are absolutely critical to U.S. success.
4 Is that fair?

5 General Scaparrotti: That is true, sir, and it is
6 critical. Our connection to EU, as well as NATO's, has been
7 in the forefront here for the past year or so for many
8 reasons, and that is one of them.

9 Senator Reed: Thank you very much.

10 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

11 Chairman McCain: Senator Fischer?

12 Senator Fischer: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

13 And welcome, General. It is nice to see you again.

14 As you know, last week General Selva confirmed Russia's
15 deployment of a weapon system that violates the INF Treaty.
16 And he went on to say that, quote, the system itself
17 presents a risk to most of our facilities in Europe, and we
18 believe that the Russians have deliberately deployed it in
19 order to pose a threat to NATO and the facilities within the
20 NATO area of responsibility. End quote.

21 You touched on this in your opening statement on page
22 5, and you said that the system creates a mismatch in
23 escalatory options. Could you please elaborate on what you
24 mean by that and what the implications are of this
25 deployment?

1 General Scaparrotti: Well, this deployment gives them
2 some advantage in terms of reach and precision within their
3 systems. And when we talk about escalation management, if
4 there is a tension or a crisis with Russia, because of their
5 doctrine and their view that they will escalate to dominate
6 or escalate to deescalate, it creates a very tight range of
7 options when we work through escalation management. So an
8 enhancement like that just makes this a very restrictive and
9 difficult management process you through in deterrence. It
10 is that much more pressurized. So it is a critical
11 enhancement. It is one that we need to respond to.

12 Senator Fischer: You say we need to respond, and you
13 just mentioned options, the word "option." Secretary Carter
14 talked about options. He mentioned counter-force,
15 countervailing capabilities, active defenses, but we did not
16 see any real action in order to pursue those. Do you think
17 that we need to?

18 General Scaparrotti: Yes, I think we do.

19 Senator Fischer: And which of these options do you
20 think would be the most effective in dealing with this?

21 General Scaparrotti: If I could, I would like to take
22 that for a response for the record. I need to think about
23 the comparison of those actually and tell you the best
24 response.

25 [The information follows:]

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1 Senator Fischer: Okay. Thank you.

2 General Scaparrotti: Thank you.

3 Senator Fischer: At a recent hearing of the Strategic
4 Forces Subcommittee, which I chair, we discussed the
5 implications of Russia's nuclear strategy, often referred to
6 as the escalate/deescalate. And General Koehler, who is a
7 former Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command, made the
8 point that the Russian approach reinforces the value of NATO
9 remaining a nuclear alliance, as well as the need for the
10 deterrent value provided by U.S. nuclear weapons that are
11 stationed in Europe.

12 In your written statement, you say that NATO and U.S.
13 nuclear forces continue to be a vital component of our
14 deterrence. Our modernization efforts are crucial. We must
15 preserve a ready, credible, and safe nuclear capability.

16 Do you agree that NATO must remain a nuclear alliance
17 and that the U.S. must continue to station those nuclear
18 weapons on the European continent?

19 General Scaparrotti: Yes, Senator, absolutely I do.

20 Senator Fischer: Can you outline to us specific
21 benefits that we receive by having those stationed there?

22 General Scaparrotti: Well, first of all, it provides
23 an immediate response that is within the NATO alliance as
24 opposed to just the U.S. It represents the alliance in a
25 response by 28 nations, a commitment by 28 nations that we

1 will deter and we will deter their nuclear forces. I think
2 that alone is significant.

3 Secondly, it gives us some other options because we
4 have not only the U.S. but other contingents that provide
5 essential capabilities within that nuclear capability. So
6 there is more agility there as well.

7 Senator Fischer: And it recognizes the importance of
8 deterrence. Thank you, General.

9 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

10 Chairman McCain: Senator Shaheen?

11 Senator Shaheen: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

12 And thank you, General Scaparrotti, for being here this
13 morning and for your service to the country.

14 I want to follow up on the line of questioning that
15 Senators McCain and Reed started on the whole information
16 warfare issue. When former General Breedlove was before the
17 committee earlier this week, he pointed out that recently
18 Russia has established an information warfare division
19 within its armed forces. Do you think NATO should be
20 looking at something like that? Are there already efforts
21 underway? You talked about the RIG group, but should we be
22 doing more within NATO to address the propaganda that Russia
23 is putting out throughout Europe and the United States, by
24 the way?

25 General Scaparrotti: Yes, Senator. I think in the

1 United States, we have organization I think to effectively
2 operate. What we need to do is policy and then actions that
3 flow from that within the United States. That is a whole-
4 of-government approach. That is probably not the structure
5 that we have in the way that we need it today. So it is
6 more of a whole-of-government response I would tell you. I
7 think we are pretty agile in the military, rather than
8 establishing some information command, et cetera. We have
9 smaller units that tactically execute these kinds of
10 missions. I have them in EUCOM.

11 Within NATO, NATO has taken this on as well, but it is
12 somewhat nascent at this point. And I think we do have to
13 pursue that. I mean, we have got an adversary here who is
14 using this to very good benefit, and we have to compete
15 short of conflict in this area as well.

16 Senator Shaheen: But as you point out, we do not
17 really have a strategy to do that, and we do not have
18 anybody in charge of that in the United States Government.
19 I mean, we have the Global Engagement Center that is
20 starting up in the State Department. I have spoken, as I am
21 sure others have, with the continuation of the efforts we
22 had during the Soviet Union when we had the Cold War and we
23 had Radio Free Europe, and they did a terrific job in those
24 days. But we do not have a continuation of that that is
25 part of sharing and cooperating with factually presenting

1 what is happening in the West compared to what is going on
2 with Russia's propaganda.

3 So where should that effort be located. Do you have
4 thoughts about who should participate in that and how we
5 better coordinate what we are doing?

6 General Scaparrotti: Yes, Senator, I do. I think
7 actually that the RIG, the Russian Information Group, which
8 I mentioned, is actually a good structure to start with. It
9 has State as the lead, co-chaired with European Command. It
10 has all of the other agencies involved in that. The GEC is
11 a key leader in that, which has been empowered to do the
12 communication piece of the State. But, you know, it is not
13 robustly supported. I do not believe that it has the kind
14 of focus and priority that we need to have. So, therefore,
15 it exists but it needs to really be reinforced, funded. And
16 then as you said, I think we have all the talent and
17 creativity we need in this Nation to do this better than
18 anybody else. We just need to decide to do it.

19 Senator Shaheen: Thank you.

20 There was a report. Actually I agree with you. I just
21 want to make that clear.

22 There was a report earlier this week about Russia
23 training Kurdish fighters. And it was not clear to me to
24 what extent they were doing that. But how is Turkey
25 responding to that report? Are they concerned about what

1 Russia is doing, and how does that affect their sort of
2 growing rapprochement with Russia?

3 General Scaparrotti: Senator, I have not talked to my
4 counterpart, the CHOD in Turkey, since this report came out.
5 So we have not talked directly. I cannot tell you exactly
6 what their response on this would be.

7 But given my association with them and their concern
8 about the PKK and associated groups, Kurd groups, that are
9 aligned with them, I think they would have great concern
10 about it. They want to ensure that the attacks that they
11 have from the PKK are not reinforced in any way -- Turkey
12 does. They also want to ensure that they do not have -- the
13 cantonments in Syria are not connected in Syria so they have
14 Kurdish entity across their entire across their entire
15 southern border. And given those two objectives, I think
16 they are very concerned about it probably.

17 Senator Shaheen: Thank you.

18 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

19 Chairman McCain: Senator Inhofe?

20 Senator Inhofe: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

21 General, last weekend, I was in the Ukraine and was
22 observing their training. The 45th does a great job. In
23 fact, that is the same group that not long ago was providing
24 the same training of training in Afghanistan and Iraq. And
25 so they are going to be there for a year long. You know, I

1 watched that, and there is really an art to that. And they
2 are doing a great job because most people will think that
3 they are there to train the Ukrainians or wherever they are
4 stationed, but they really there to train them to train the
5 others, and there is a big difference. So I wanted you to
6 know that they are really doing a good job.

7 During the parliamentary elections in 2014, I was with
8 Poroshenko and the crowd when, of course, they had that huge
9 success, the first time in 96 years. No Communist is in the
10 parliament there. And so, as you know, it became very
11 controversial after that took place and Putin started
12 killing Ukrainians, and we wanted to provide the lethal
13 defensive assistance. Our committee was pretty much
14 unanimous on that. The administration was not that excited
15 about it. So in both the fiscal year 2016, we authorized
16 \$300,000, in fiscal year 2017, authorized \$350,000 for the
17 security assistance for Ukraine, including lethal assistance
18 such as anti-armor weapons.

19 So General Dunford during his nomination hearing said
20 this. Quote. He said, I think it is reasonable that we
21 provide that lethal support for the Ukrainians. Frankly,
22 without that kind of support, we are not going to be able to
23 protect themselves against the Russia aggression.

24 So I would kind of like to get your idea. Do you agree
25 with him? Do you agree also that we need to provide that

1 assistance? What are we providing now and how much more
2 should we?

3 General Scaparrotti: Senator, thank you. In short,
4 yes, I do agree with him. I have been there twice recently.

5 I would note that I agree. The Guard is doing a very
6 good job there and an important one in their training
7 relationship with the Ukrainians.

8 In terms of lethal support, the Ukrainians are in a
9 very tough fight, which you saw. They are very disciplined
10 soldiers. But they are facing what we say are separatists.
11 They are actually Russian proxies in my mind. They are
12 being provided very lethal equipment. The Russians are
13 providing the separatists that. The Russians are also
14 testing some of their new TTPs there. So we need to
15 reinforce the Ukrainian military as much as we can and
16 provide them the best opportunity to fight what is a very
17 lethal Russian proxy at this point.

18 Senator Inhofe: And I agree with that. I have a
19 question for the record as to what kind of equipment
20 specifically we should do.

21 But I want to mention one thing. Do you happen to
22 know-- his name is Fatmir Mediu. He was the Secretary of
23 Defense in the Albanian defense. They had a meeting, and I
24 happened to be attending that meeting -- it was on January
25 31st -- kind of a roundtable talking about ISIS and the

1 threat in the Balkans. And it was kind of revealing.
2 Apparently a lot of the ISIS recruiting is taking place in
3 the Balkans right now. Do you have any comment to make as
4 to what our activity is there in terms of what the threat is
5 there? Are we working with them as closely as we should?

6 General Scaparrotti: I am very concerned about the
7 stability in the Balkans, and one of the reasons is that
8 what is generally a moderate or a Western-looking Islamic
9 population is increasingly being affected by extremist
10 influence there. And part of that is recruiting for ISIS.
11 And so it is a trend right now. It is one I think we have
12 to pay very close attention to.

13 Senator Inhofe: Okay. That is good. I appreciate it.

14 Now, my time has expired, but for the record, I would
15 like to get as specific information as we could as to what
16 best we could afford to send over there against the
17 aggression that they have. Okay?

18 General Scaparrotti: Yes, sir. Thank you.

19 Senator Inhofe: Thank you.

20 Chairman McCain: Senator Heinrich?

21 Senator Heinrich: Welcome, General.

22 As was mentioned earlier, it is being reported that our
23 Secretary of State will be missing the NATO summit of
24 foreign ministers in a couple weeks. This obviously comes
25 at a time when the administration has criticized the value

1 of NATO. Russia is meddling in European elections, and
2 Russia is threatening our NATO allies in the Baltics.

3 Do you have any opinions on whether this sends the
4 right signal to our NATO allies? And what kind of messages
5 do you think we should be sending to our NATO allies at this
6 time?

7 General Scaparrotti: Senator, I think it is essential
8 that our allies in NATO understand that we are absolutely
9 committed to the alliance and continue to be a key leader
10 within the alliance.

11 I noted this morning that the Secretary-General and the
12 Secretary had met, and they are looking for a date that all
13 of the allies can meet for the foreign ministers conference.
14 And I hope that is, in fact, worked out and that becomes a
15 reality.

16 Senator Heinrich: As do I.

17 General, Russian denial, deception, disinformation were
18 all important parts of the hybrid warfare campaign that we
19 saw during the illegal seizure of Crimea and its Russian
20 support for separatists in eastern Ukraine. As EUCOM
21 Commander, you lead much of the effort to identify and
22 attribute Russian disinformation operations. Can you
23 describe for us how Russia is organized to conduct this kind
24 of information warfare and what techniques you are seeing on
25 display in the Ukraine?

1 General Scaparrotti: Thank you.

2 When you are talking about this, you think about it in
3 a military organization, but frankly, what I think is
4 important is that Russia actually has a very broad set of
5 groups to include their intelligence groups that are doing
6 this. So they actually have a whole-of-government approach
7 on this, which I think makes it one more difficult. It is
8 one of the reasons that we also see what I think is a pretty
9 rapid or agile use of social media, TV --

10 Senator Heinrich: Absolutely.

11 General Scaparrotti: -- cyber, et cetera. So it is a
12 force to be reckoned with at this point. And I think it is
13 that organization that gives them the ability.

14 Senator Heinrich: Do you have recommendations in terms
15 of building our capacity or that of our allies and partners
16 in the region to be able to resist these kinds Russian
17 influence activities?

18 General Scaparrotti: Well, I think, first of all, in
19 EUCOM we have elements that today have missions to counter
20 Russian malign influence, both to identify it, counter it,
21 and then, third, we are building partner capacity. And we
22 are exchanging techniques, et cetera. Estonia has an
23 excellent cyber center of excellence, for instance. That is
24 a key node in NATO. We work very closely with that. So we
25 need to continue those kinds of partnerships and exchange of

1 skill and understanding how they are working. And I think,
2 particularly as an alliance, we can counter this.

3 Senator Heinrich: I think because of their proximity,
4 we actually have a lot to learn from our Balkan partners,
5 and given what we have seen even in our own elections, it is
6 time to learn those lessons.

7 Russia's air defense systems like the S-300 and S-400
8 threaten to block our ability to be able to project power in
9 the event of a conflict in the European region, particularly
10 in the Baltics. This certainly undermines the U.S. and
11 NATO's Article 5 commitment to the defense of these allies
12 and raises concerns about the alliance's ability to deter an
13 increasingly aggressive Russia.

14 How capable are the Russian air defense systems
15 particularly in Kaliningrad?

16 General Scaparrotti: Sir, I would just state in an
17 unclassified venue, they are very capable. The newer
18 systems like the S-400 is a definite enhancement in their
19 capabilities. That is why we are concerned about it. As
20 you stated, their location in Kaliningrad and Crimea and the
21 Mediterranean provides difficulty for our access and
22 mobility. We can counter this. I am confident of that.

23 Senator Heinrich: Do you have opinions in that regard
24 on what types of next generation technologies, for example,
25 we will need to effectively counter the Russian A2/AD

1 capabilities?

2 General Scaparrotti: Up front what I talked about in
3 terms of our advanced aircraft, fifth generation, enhanced
4 munitions, particularly long-range precision munitions,
5 electronic warfare, those things generally is what we need
6 to continue our modernization efforts on. And if you would
7 like, I could give you a more specific in a classified
8 response, obviously.

9 Senator Heinrich: I would appreciate that, General.
10 Thank you, Chairman.

11 Chairman McCain: Senator Rounds?

12 Senator Rounds: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

13 General, thank you for your service. I appreciate the
14 opportunity to visit for just a few minutes today.

15 With regard to Montenegro, the chairman had begun the
16 discussion in terms of the possibilities that they could
17 become a member of NATO. If they were to become a member of
18 NATO, what would you expect the Russian response to be and
19 how would you prepare for it?

20 General Scaparrotti: Senator, I think we have probably
21 seen their response in terms of their activity and their
22 attempt to block that. I think to a certain extent, they
23 know this is going to happen. I trust it will.

24 In a conversation with one of NATO's ministers, one of
25 the countries that has communication with Russian

1 leadership, he shared with me that a Russian leader told him
2 that Putin had said he lost Montenegro, but there will not
3 be another Montenegro. I think that is an indication of how
4 they think and how important it is to them that these other
5 nations that seek to have a democratic government and turn
6 to the West are under threat. It is one of the reasons that
7 I think Russia continues to have frozen conflicts and be
8 present in places like Georgia and Ukraine because it is
9 their means of controlling that.

10 Senator Rounds: You have got extensive background in
11 Europe. You know a number of the European leaders. With
12 the change in administrations, naturally there are going to
13 be some questions in terms of policy changes, decision-
14 making processes, and so forth. What questions are you
15 getting from your European contacts in terms of leaders and
16 what concerns do they have?

17 General Scaparrotti: Well, I think, first of all, as a
18 new administration comes in, they want to ensure that we are
19 committed to the alliance and the security of the
20 transatlantic AOR. For instance, Secretary Mattis at the
21 first NATO meeting at the defense ministers conference made
22 our commitment very clear, as did Vice President Pence, at
23 Munich. And I think that is critical. They look to that.

24 They also now look to what are the policies and are the
25 policies consistent with security in the transatlantic

1 region. Of course, in a new administration, they are
2 looking forward to policies with respect to NATO, policies
3 with respect to Afghanistan and others.

4 Senator Rounds: When it comes to doing your job, you
5 clearly have to have the tools and the tools in proper
6 working order in order to get the job done. If you could
7 give us a list of those areas that you have the most concern
8 with our capabilities today. And I will just give you an
9 example. The fact that right now if we have one task force
10 leaving the Mediterranean coming through and another one
11 going in, in some cases we are actually stopping in the
12 middle of the Mediterranean and trading ammo because we do
13 not have enough ammo to literally maintain operational
14 capabilities in multiple task forces. Those types of things
15 concern us. We have a nuclear submarine sitting at the dock
16 because literally we cannot get the maintenance done on it
17 so that it is certified to die at this stage of the game --
18 a nuclear submarine. The readiness clearly is not there in
19 some cases.

20 Do you have issues right now under your command that
21 you would share with us that you have concerns with?

22 General Scaparrotti: Senator, I would like to get into
23 detail in a classified or closed session. But generally I
24 would say this. The demands of our security strategy today
25 in the dynamic world that we are working in requires us to

1 have more capacity than we have today in our armed forces.
2 You noted the Navy. So in Europe, I do not have the carrier
3 or the submarine capacity that would best enable me to do my
4 job in EUCOM. It is sufficient, but it is not what ideally
5 I would like to have to deter Russia, assure our allies,
6 build their capacity, work with them on the basis that we
7 need to work with them. So that is an example of the areas.

8 Now, you mentioned munitions. I am concerned about
9 that as well because we are using munitions today in those
10 places where we are in conflict. And the adversaries that
11 we face, for instance, Russia or China or North Korea, will
12 be high intensity conflicts. And we have to invest in the
13 stockpiles that we need, and we also have to invest in
14 enhancing those munitions so as we look to the future, we do
15 not find ourselves in a position where our adversaries have
16 outpaced us.

17 Senator Rounds: Thank you, General.

18 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

19 Chairman McCain: Senator Peters?

20 Senator Peters: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

21 And thank you, General Scaparrotti, for being here
22 today. I certainly appreciate your testimony and also
23 wanted to thank you for being very generous with your time
24 at the Munich conference where we had an opportunity to
25 discuss many of these issues at length.

1 General, as you are well aware, we are increasingly
2 relying on space, cyberspace, and fiber optic communications
3 cables in all aspects of our lives. And these systems are
4 also critical for social and economic activity, and their
5 assured access and availability is vital to the U.S.
6 strategic stability. And when you look at Russia's navy
7 operations right now in the EUCOM theater, which includes a
8 significant footprint in the Arctic, which is growing
9 dramatically without necessary response from us, and a \$2.4
10 billion expansion of the Black Sea fleet by 2020, Russia
11 appears committed to bolstering their military
12 infrastructure on EUCOM's flanks. This increased OPSTEMPO
13 includes naval activity that suggests that Russia right now
14 is exploring undersea cable vulnerabilities at much greater
15 depths, depths where the cables are difficult to monitor and
16 breaks are harder to repair.

17 So my question is, in general, what is your assessment
18 as to whether or not we have sufficient redundancy within
19 EUCOM's command and control architecture, to include
20 ballistic missile defense systems, to withstand a
21 coordinated attack on our undersea, terrestrial, and space-
22 based communication systems that you rely on?

23 General Scaparrotti: Sir, what I would like to do is
24 respond to that in a classified venue so I can give you a
25 very accurate answer.

1 Senator Peters: Sure.

2 General Scaparrotti: I am confident of our ability to
3 operate today. As I just said, we just did our command post
4 exercise, and we were looking at that. But we need to
5 modernize what we have today in terms of command and
6 control, as you noted, in order to have the right kind of
7 resilience with the adversary that we face. You need a good
8 deal of redundancy to be sure. And that is one of the
9 areas. If you note in a classified venue, what I have
10 asked of OSD, that is one of the key areas that I think we
11 need to work on is the C-4 structure within Europe.

12 Senator Peters: Well, I would appreciate that and
13 actually following up on Senator Heinrich's questions too as
14 you come back to brief on some of the A2/AD capabilities. I
15 would be interested in learning more about that,
16 particularly when it comes to next generation, what we need
17 to be investing in today to be ready for the years ahead as
18 warfare changes dramatically in the next few years.

19 But based on capabilities, to follow up my last
20 question here related to capabilities, in the fiscal year
21 2016 NDAA budget, I co-led an effort to enhance lethality of
22 the Stryker vehicles with a 30 millimeter cannon. This was
23 in response to an operational needs statement from the 2nd
24 Cavalry Regiment where the Strykers were the heaviest
25 vehicles permanently stationed in Europe at that time. And

1 I understand that the work to add the 30 millimeter cannon
2 to Strykers is going well. The first prototype was
3 successfully delivered last October, and training is
4 beginning on those vehicles.

5 The ERI also provides funds for upgrading the Abrams
6 tanks to be prepositioned in Europe as well.

7 So could you just provide an update on the need for
8 this capability and if we need to continue to be moving
9 forward and that any lapses in that upgrade either of the
10 Abrams or the Stryker is a problem or not for you?

11 General Scaparrotti: Senator, thank you very much.

12 It is not a problem for me, but it is a priority --

13 Senator Peters: Right.

14 General Scaparrotti: -- given the adversary that we
15 have who continues to modernize. Particularly Russia is
16 modernizing their armored force, as well as in each one of
17 their services, they are making advancements. So it is
18 critical that we outpace that, that we provide our soldiers
19 in this case the very best equipment that we can and we
20 continue to upgrade it.

21 Abrams is a fine tank, but as technology changes, we
22 can make upgrades to it and make it better, and we make it
23 better in terms of defense as well. And we owe that to our
24 soldiers.

25 Senator Peters: And the Stryker as well?

1 General Scaparrotti: And the Stryker as well,
2 absolutely.

3 Senator Peters: Great. Thank you, General. I
4 appreciate it.

5 General Scaparrotti: Thank you.

6 Chairman McCain: Senator Sullivan?

7 Senator Sullivan: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

8 And, General, good to see you. Thanks for spending
9 time with a number of us in Munich.

10 Do you agree that one of the most important strategic
11 advantages we have in terms of our national security is that
12 we are an ally-rich nation, our adversaries are ally-poor?

13 General Scaparrotti: Senator, absolutely.

14 Senator Sullivan: And do you also agree that the ally-
15 poor nations like Russia, China, North Korea, Iran -- that
16 they recognize that -- they do not have many allies at all--
17 and that they try to undermine our alliances? Is that not
18 what certainly Vladimir Putin is up to?

19 General Scaparrotti: Yes, sir. I think his intent is
20 actually to fracture NATO, and I think it is because he does
21 fear NATO. He knows the power of that alliance.

22 Senator Sullivan: So given that, are we doing enough
23 diplomatically, militarily right now -- the Trump
24 administration -- to reinforce our alliances, expand our
25 alliances, deepen our alliances? What is your assessment of

1 what we are doing and what we could be doing better whether
2 it is in the military realm or diplomatic realm? How are we
3 doing on that?

4 General Scaparrotti: Sir, I think we absolutely have a
5 focus on building partner capacity, building our
6 relationships with our partners. We are a leader in NATO.
7 From a EUCOM perspective, that is something -- I mean, we
8 work on this every day. I do not think there is any
9 question of that particularly on the military side. It is a
10 very close relationship with our partners. It is day to
11 day. And you know, it works both ways. We learn from our
12 alliance partners as well.

13 Senator Sullivan: Are there things that you recommend
14 that we could do more of or better in that regard? It is
15 really, really an important issue -- or the Senate? We play
16 a big role in terms of our allies, treaties.

17 General Scaparrotti: Well, I think in terms of the
18 alliance itself, here again, I keep coming back to it, but I
19 think it is whole-of-government in the sense that every
20 agency in the government does their part and it is clear to
21 our allies that from every agency in the United States, that
22 the alliance is important and it shows and demonstrates in
23 its actions that the alliance is the bedrock of
24 transatlantic security. So there is no disagreement in what
25 they see in terms of action, not just on the military side

1 but in terms of our diplomacy, our information, our
2 economics, et cetera.

3 Senator Sullivan: I wanted to switch over to an issue
4 that a number of us have been focused on and we have had
5 discussions on it, is what is happening in the Arctic and
6 the increasing importance of that region in terms of
7 strategic resources, transportation, a lot of concerns of
8 our NATO allies like the Norwegians and others about the
9 significant Russian buildup in the Arctic. And as you know,
10 it does not look like a friendly buildup: four new brigade
11 combat teams, a new Arctic military command, very aggressive
12 actions in the high north, including a military exercise
13 that was a SNAP exercise with close to 50,000 troops that
14 EUCOM was barely aware of, which is kind of, in and of
15 itself, not a good sign.

16 A number of us, Senator King, the chairman, were
17 concerned enough that we did not have a strategy on that.
18 So we required the Secretary of Defense to actually put
19 forward a new Arctic strategy. There is a classified and
20 unclassified version. Have you read that?

21 General Scaparrotti: I have not read it, no.

22 Senator Sullivan: So I would highly recommend that you
23 take a look at it because it is the new DOD strategy. It is
24 not perfect, but it is a heck of a lot better than the one
25 that was previously published by DOD, which was pretty much

1 a joke. And so, of course, EUCOM has a lot of important
2 elements to play in that strategy.

3 But one of the things it emphasizes, it does talk about
4 our strategic interests, which the last strategy did not
5 even bother to do. But one of the things it emphasizes is
6 looking at freedom of navigation operations, the ability to
7 actually push back on the Russian buildup, which includes 40
8 icebreakers, 13 more under construction, several new
9 seaports and harbors.

10 But although it emphasizes FONOPS, do you think right
11 now if Russia decided to deny access to vital U.S. or Arctic
12 shipping lanes in the Arctic region, that you as the
13 Commander of EUCOM -- could you provide the President an
14 option of conducting a surface FONOP to challenge that act
15 like we are trying to do in the South China Sea, given our
16 assets right now? Because the strategy emphasizes FONOPS,
17 but it certainly seems like the means that we have right now
18 would not enable you to make such a recommendation to the
19 President. What do you think about that, General?

20 General Scaparrotti: I think it is would depend as
21 well on the circumstances in terms of location and time of
22 year because of the assets that we have as well. As you
23 know, the northern sea route lays in closest proximity to
24 Russia's coastline as well, which complicates that given
25 their military buildup. So we clearly need to invest more

1 in the kind of assets that help us in the Arctic. So that
2 is how I would respond to that, Senator.

3 We can give options. We certainly need to improve our
4 capabilities. And I am concerned as well about our
5 capabilities with respect to the high north and security of
6 the North Atlantic, et cetera.

7 Senator Sullivan: That is just a diagram of what the
8 Russians are doing. It is pretty significant.

9 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

10 Chairman McCain: Senator King?

11 Senator King: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

12 First, General, I want to thank you and your staff for
13 preparing and presenting to the committee this map which I
14 think is extraordinary. I am a great believer that you
15 cannot confront your adversaries unless you understand them,
16 unless you understand how they think. And to me the amazing
17 or very interesting and illuminating part of this map it
18 shows the borders of the Soviet Union in 1989 and today the
19 borders of Russia. And essentially from Putin's point of
20 view, his border retreated about 1,000 miles across a whole
21 front of eastern Europe. And clearly that is part of his
22 world view in terms of Russia's proper place in the world.
23 Would you agree?

24 General Scaparrotti: Yes, sir, I agree. That is why I
25 think the map is illustrative because I think if you are

1 Putin, you are looking out for Moscow and you see what I
2 think he would consider to have been his strategic buffer.
3 It tells you a bit about his mindset, and from what we know
4 about him, he feels as though he has been encroached upon,
5 that he has this sphere of influence that he believes is
6 rightfully his. Of course, these are nations that have a
7 right to determine their own government.

8 Senator King: And part of Russia's history is a kind
9 of paranoia about the West, going back to Frederick the
10 Great and probably Napoleon. They have, in fact, been
11 invaded from the West. And again, that contributes to this
12 mindset. Would you not agree?

13 General Scaparrotti: I agree, sir. Yes, sir.

14 Senator King: And that gets to my real concern -- and
15 I have raised this in other hearings -- both in the South
16 China Sea or in Europe, is the danger of an accidental war,
17 a danger of misunderstanding, confusion, leading to some
18 kind of escalation.

19 What protections do we have from a misunderstanding?
20 For example, we deploy what we consider a defensive rocket
21 battery, missile battery in Poland, and the Russians read
22 that as an aggressive act, and it goes from there. How do
23 we ensure that does not happen? As I view the world today,
24 I think this is our gravest sort of state-to-state danger,
25 is misunderstanding and leading to accidental conflict.

1 General Scaparrotti: Yes, sir. The thing that I worry
2 about the most just day to day is that there is a
3 miscalculation or an issue where we have forces in close
4 proximity. So how do we deal with that?

5 First of all, there are international norms in the air,
6 at sea, et cetera that day to day the Russians adhere to as
7 well. We have seen violations of that on their part. But
8 it enables us --

9 Senator King: Deconfliction.

10 General Scaparrotti: It is deconfliction. That is
11 correct. It is a good word.

12 The second thing is I think it is important that we
13 communicate with them. Today we do that primarily through
14 the media, et cetera. But we have, as you know, connection
15 with the Russians for deconfliction. I think that
16 communication is important because what I try to do in
17 EUCOM --

18 Senator King: Do you have direct lines of
19 communication with your opposite number in Russia, for
20 example?

21 General Scaparrotti: I do not today.

22 Senator King: Do you not think that would be a good
23 idea? You could say, wait a minute, that missile was
24 launched by accident, do not get alarmed. I mean, I think
25 having that kind of communication and at the higher level,

1 at the State Department or at the White House level, there
2 should be the opportunity anyway for this kind of
3 communication.

4 General Scaparrotti: We do have communication for
5 deconfliction within OSD today. It is limited. I agree
6 with you. I think communication is an important component
7 of deterrence, for instance. But I think also given
8 Russia's behavior, there is some limitation to that. We
9 should not reward them for some of their bad behavior as
10 well. So we should do what we need to do to ensure we are
11 safe and we deconflict.

12 Senator King: I am not suggesting warning them. I am
13 just suggesting if something occurs, you could get on the
14 line and say, wait a minute. Do not misinterpret that.
15 That is where the concern comes.

16 General Scaparrotti: That is correct.

17 Senator King: We talked a lot -- and I just want to
18 associate myself with many of the other comments about the
19 information war. To me, the specific answer to our failure
20 to engage successfully in the information war goes back to,
21 I think, 1998 or 1999 when we abolished USIA. There is no
22 single point in the United States Government today that is
23 in charge of information, and I think it is inexcusable that
24 the country that invented Hollywood and Facebook is being
25 defeated on the information battlefield. And clearly, that

1 is part of the war that we are engaged in. Putin is
2 achieving great success in Europe and across the world and
3 one would argue in many areas without firing a shot through
4 effective use of information. I think our friends on the
5 Foreign Relations Committee perhaps can consider that. But
6 USIA was the point and now we do not have it. So I hope we
7 can recover that capacity sooner rather than later.

8 Thank you very much, General.

9 Senator Reed [presiding]: On behalf of Chairman
10 McCain, Senator Cruz please.

11 Senator Cruz: Thank you very much, Senator Reed.

12 General, good morning. Thank you for your service.

13 The European theater continues to be a vital concern, a
14 critical and complex region that will always be near the top
15 of our national security priorities.

16 I want to begin by focusing on the repeated reports we
17 are seeing of Russia's growing support for the Taliban and
18 for ISIS. General Nicholson testified last month that
19 Russia is attempting to legitimize the Taliban and undermine
20 the Afghan Government. Just a few weeks ago, General Votel
21 expressed his concerns regarding the extent to which Russia
22 has managed to prop up the Assad regime. And in the same
23 hearing, General Waldhauser said that Russia is trying to
24 exert influence on the outcome of which entity emerges with
25 control of the government inside Libya. That is a fairly

1 comprehensive list of radical Islamic terrorist hotspots
2 across the globe from Afghanistan to the Middle East to
3 Africa and Russia seeking additional influence with each.

4 How should this inform our future strategic choices
5 with respect to Russia, and what impact would that have on
6 your AOR?

7 General Scaparrotti: Senator, thank you. I think
8 those are all accurate. I agree with all their statements.

9 I think actually that it is a part of Russia's intent
10 to present themselves as a global power. In my view, where
11 they are involved, they are not necessarily so concerned
12 about the outcome, just that they can be a part of it. They
13 can be seen as being a part of that. Whether it is an
14 effective outcome I do not think it is as much of a concern
15 to them.

16 So that is what we need to take from this, more so from
17 our point of view the fact that they are a spoiler often in
18 many of these cases. So we also have to engage them in this
19 manner, and we have to engage globally as well in these
20 places in order to ensure that we have the proper influence.

21 Senator Cruz: And if Russia were to succeed in
22 undermining the Afghan Government, what would the effect of
23 that be on the NATO alliance?

24 General Scaparrotti: It would be significant. I mean,
25 NATO and the United States in my view must win in

1 Afghanistan. And I agree. I have seen the influence of
2 Russia of late, an increased influence in terms of
3 association and perhaps even supply to the Taliban.

4 Senator Cruz: We have also seen over the past few
5 months numerous instances of Russian aggression or hostile
6 behavior such as Russian jets buzzing the U.S. Navy
7 destroyer Porter and numerous intercepts of U.S. aircraft in
8 the Baltic Sea. And some of these incidents have been
9 exceedingly unsafe. Recently Russia also deployed a land-
10 based cruise missile in clear violation of the INF Treaty.
11 And also, a Russian spy auxiliary, gathering intelligence,
12 ship conducted operations off the U.S. coast near our
13 submarine bases.

14 General, in your professional opinion, what should be
15 the U.S.'s responses to these actions? How do we reduce
16 Russia's flouting of international norms?

17 General Scaparrotti: Senator, first of all, we must be
18 strong in all that we do. We should confront them in each
19 of these occasions or each of these incidents. And then we
20 need to sail and fly every place that is within
21 international norms and international airways and maritime.
22 We just need to keep doing that. You know, for instance, in
23 the Baltic or in the Black Sea, these encounters are their
24 means of showing us their displeasure for us being there.
25 We have every right to be there. We have, in fact,

1 increased our presence, and I think that is the right step,
2 increase our presence and insist on the fact that we have
3 every right within international law to operate there and
4 continue to do so.

5 Senator Cruz: Let me shift to a different question.
6 American forces have conducted several deployments in
7 support of Operation Atlantic Resolve to demonstrate our
8 commitment to the stability of Europe. Recently 400
9 soldiers and 24 AH-64 Apache helicopters deployed to Europe
10 from Fort Bliss. However, earlier this month, the Army's
11 Deputy of Chief for Operations, Lieutenant General Joseph
12 Anderson, expressed concerns regarding sustainable readiness
13 for the Army's future rotations. In essence, it sounds like
14 soldiers that are coming home from one deployment will have
15 less time to get ready and train before re-deploying to the
16 European theater. That or the Army will be forced to reduce
17 its global commitments.

18 General, do you share the same concerns as General
19 Anderson regarding this rotation of forces. And what impact
20 do you see in your AOR, and what do you recommend to improve
21 the situation?

22 General Scaparrotti: Senator, first of all, it is
23 crucial that we continue the rotations within Europe for
24 deterrence of Russia and for assurance and support of our
25 allies, the commitments that we have made. But I do agree

1 with General Anderson that, for instance, in the Army, as an
2 Army officer, we are less than a 1-to-2 dwell. We are
3 turning our people very quickly. It is the reason that our
4 Chief has said that we need to grow our force, and we need
5 to focus on readiness, as he is doing, because we are
6 committed today at a very high rate.

7 Senator Cruz: Thank you, General.

8 Senator Reed: Thank you, Senator Cruz.

9 On behalf of the chairman, Senator Donnelly please.

10 Senator Donnelly: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

11 General, thank you very much for being here.

12 We talk a lot about Russia's escalate to deescalate
13 strategy or the idea that Russia has indicated through its
14 words and its exercises that it sees the use of tactical
15 nuclear weapons to supposedly deescalate a conflict as a
16 realistic option.

17 How should NATO respond to this? And does the United
18 States have the capabilities whether through dual-use
19 aircraft or strategic bombers to deter such an escalatory
20 move?

21 General Scaparrotti: Senator, thank you.

22 As I have said, we should be strong in the face of both
23 their rhetoric, their actions, and their modernization. And
24 we do have the capability to deter this. But we must remain
25 strong and we must continue to modernize given the pace of

1 their modernization so that in the future we continue our
2 dominance.

3 Senator Donnelly: I am just wondering personally. Do
4 you think that Vladimir Putin and/or the Russians believe
5 that they could use a nuclear weapon without a similar
6 scaled response?

7 General Scaparrotti: That is a good question. I think
8 that about that a lot.

9 You know, they have said publicly that they see the
10 potential of the use of a nuclear weapon in what we would
11 consider a tactical and conventional means. And that is
12 just alarming.

13 Senator Donnelly: I think it is a clear
14 misunderstanding of who we are as well --

15 General Scaparrotti: Exactly.

16 Senator Donnelly: -- is what I think.

17 I was privileged to be over in Georgia and Ukraine not
18 too long ago. My friend and fellow Hoosier, Senator Lugar,
19 helped create the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction
20 program to combat the spread of weapons of mass destruction.
21 And while we were there, we spent a lot of time working with
22 the Georgian and Ukraine Government in efforts to counter
23 the smuggling of those materials.

24 Russia has destabilized borders in both these
25 countries, and I am concerned about the impact that has had

1 on the ability to smuggle nuclear material through
2 uncontrolled regions like eastern Ukraine. In Georgia, in
3 fact, the special police unit calls those kind of areas the
4 black holes. It is a serious threat given that the
5 smuggling networks in these regions reach to the terrorist
6 networks in the Middle East. That is the pipeline.

7 And I was wondering what EUCOM is doing to counter this
8 effort at the present time.

9 General Scaparrotti: Thank you, Senator. Your
10 pipeline that you described is accurate.

11 We have a transnational threats element within EUCOM.
12 It is whole-of-government. It relies mostly on not just the
13 military piece but mostly on other agencies within our
14 government connection with our partners and allies, with
15 Europol within EU, et cetera. It is a network essentially
16 to help us highlight criminal networks. They are often very
17 closely aligned and working with our terrorist networks. So
18 that is one of the major things that we do. It is an
19 important function, and it is a central part of our counter-
20 transnational threats line of effort, which is one of our
21 five lines of effort.

22 Senator Donnelly: I want to follow on some of the
23 questions my colleague, Senator Fischer, asked earlier about
24 Russia's INF violations and their deployment of nuclear-
25 armed ground-launched cruise missile. They have similar air

1 and sea launch capabilities that do not violate the INF. So
2 why do you think they are deliberately choosing to deploy a
3 seemingly redundant capability on land?

4 General Scaparrotti: Well, I think that it would
5 provide them a capability internal to their country that
6 gives much great reach, simply put.

7 Senator Donnelly: Do you feel that all of the steps
8 being taken in Kaliningrad with the Iskander short-range
9 missiles -- that the goal of all of that is to divide us, to
10 undermine NATO, to try to separate the commitment from one
11 to the other?

12 General Scaparrotti: Senator, I think that is part of
13 it. I think much of what they do is to undermine confidence
14 in NATO, undermine confidence in the West. You know, it is
15 to threaten them with the idea that we can have control over
16 a swath of your country or a number of countries in the
17 region with these systems.

18 Senator Donnelly: I want to thank you. You have a
19 real challenge on your hands at this time, but we want you
20 to know we are 100 percent behind you, that we will do
21 everything we can to provide you with all you need and that
22 you can tell all of our friends and allies over there that
23 we have their back.

24 General Scaparrotti: Thank you, Senator.

25 Senator Donnelly: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

1 Senator Reed: On behalf of Chairman McCain, Senator
2 Ernst please.

3 Senator Ernst: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

4 Thank you, General Scaparrotti, very much.

5 It is good to know that you do support providing lethal
6 aid to our Ukrainian friends. It seems like we all do agree
7 that there should be that lethal assistance out there. And
8 I have made this clear to this administration. I made it
9 clear to the last administration as well. But I do hope
10 that this administration decides to provide the assistance
11 as soon as possible.

12 Recently I have grown increasingly concerned about
13 Russia's use of tactical drones to spot for artillery and
14 advanced technology for communication and GPS jamming. What
15 types of advanced technologies are the Russians using
16 against Ukraine and in other places as well? And is there
17 specific technology that we should be considering when we
18 are providing Ukraine the opportunity to counter that
19 technology?

20 General Scaparrotti: Thank you, Senator.

21 Actually in Ukraine what we see the Russians do is
22 somewhat what they have done in Syria, and that is use the
23 Ukrainian conflict as a place that they can test some of
24 their new technologies or TTPs, and one of them, as you
25 mentioned, is the sensor to shoot our linkages between

1 weapon systems and the use of drones, et cetera. That is a
2 problem that we are working on hard ourselves because we are
3 seeing a proliferation of that not just with the Russians
4 but in some limited ways as well with terrorists. So we are
5 working those technologies. The work with Ukraine provides
6 us an opportunity to test some of the things that we are
7 doing as well. And we simply need to make EW and those
8 kinds of things available to them that can help counter what
9 the Russian proxy forces are bringing to bear there.

10 Senator Ernst: Absolutely. Thank you.

11 And you also mentioned that you were concerned about
12 the stability in the Balkans. And on Tuesday, Ambassador
13 Burns joined us here and highlighted Russia's increasing
14 influence in Serbia. And specifically he did mention the
15 recent coup and assassination attempt in Montenegro that was
16 orchestrated by the Russians in Belgrade. And in light of
17 that effort targeting NATO interest, do you think we should
18 have a more robust presence in Kosovo as a means to deter
19 the Russians in the Balkans?

20 General Scaparrotti: Senator, I do. I have been to
21 the Balkans several times in recent months primarily to
22 learn more myself about the actual situation there, but also
23 to bring focus to it. The Russians are active in
24 undermining our efforts in the Balkans today, and we need to
25 provide additional interagency focus. I think this is a

1 matter of not just the military support with, say, the
2 Kosovo security force, et cetera, which we have troops in.
3 I think it is also a diplomatic and informational effort
4 with us and importantly with our partners because, as you
5 know, NATO and the EU have a large role to play in the
6 Balkans as well today and lead many of these organizational
7 efforts. So we all need to work together. And the military
8 is a part of it. On that point, I would say we should not
9 reduce our force size particularly the Kosovo security force
10 because it is kind of the bedrock of stability right now.
11 But we do need a much more robust diplomatic/informational
12 effort among the alliance there.

13 Senator Ernst: Absolutely. I think everything should
14 be on the table at this point in reassuring and assisting
15 our allies, our friends in the Balkans.

16 And then just very quickly, you have mentioned the
17 cyber center and how great it is, the cyber center that we
18 have in Estonia. And I will be meeting with their
19 ambassador later to discuss their cyber defense center of
20 excellence. So I am really excited about that opportunity.

21 And can you just tell me very briefly how well EUCOM
22 and NATO are prepared to defend against cyber attacks,
23 especially those that are aimed at disrupting the elections
24 that we will see ongoing in Europe?

25 General Scaparrotti: Well, first of all, within EUCOM

1 I think we are postured well to deal with cyber. Cyber
2 Command works very closely with us, and literally it is a
3 dynamic relationship because within the cyber domain, things
4 change so rapidly. So when we just had our exercise here
5 last month, we had an element from Cyber Command that acted
6 as a component per se in EUCOM reporting directly to me. So
7 I think we are modernizing, we are moving forward. We have
8 got good support. We have got a lot of work to do
9 particularly in capacity.

10 Within NATO, NATO recently determined that cyber was a
11 domain at the Warsaw Summit. That was important because
12 what it did is it provided direction to work doctrine and
13 policy in a much fuller way which is the commander within
14 NATO I need, and it gave me authorities to do more within
15 cyber in NATO, which we need to do. So on the defensive
16 side, pretty good. Beyond that, we are at the beginning of
17 this in terms of NATO complete cyber capability.

18 Senator Ernst: And I do hope that is something that we
19 can work on with them.

20 Thank you for your great service, sir. Thank you.

21 Chairman McCain [presiding]: Senator Warren?

22 Senator Warren: Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

23 And thank you for being here, General.

24 I want to quickly ask about the importance of our non-
25 military foreign assistance to your mission. When you

1 appeared before this committee last year for your nomination
2 as EUCOM Commander, you said -- and I am going to quote you
3 here -- I strongly support the collaborative interagency
4 approach. In my experience, it takes a network with all
5 required agencies to defeat a threat network.

6 So, General, do you still agree with that statement?

7 General Scaparrotti: I do, absolutely.

8 Senator Warren: The budget proposal put out by the
9 Trump administration last week calls for a 29 percent cut to
10 the State Department and significant cuts to other agencies
11 with international responsibilities. General, would funding
12 cuts to agencies that conduct diplomacy and development make
13 your job as EUCOM Commander easier or more difficult?

14 General Scaparrotti: It will make the job more
15 difficult. I rely heavily on our relationships with the
16 other agencies in our government. Within my headquarters,
17 my POLAD is essentially one of my deputies, Ambassador
18 Elliott. That gives you an example of the importance we
19 place on it in EUCOM. And many of the things I have talked
20 about this morning, counter-transnational terrorism -- that
21 is predominantly agency personnel from State and Treasury.
22 It is not uniformed personnel that do those actions for
23 EUCOM in the United States and Europe.

24 Senator Warren: Thank you, General. I agree strongly
25 on this.

1 You know, Russia is actively working to destabilize
2 countries along its border and undermine unity within the
3 European Union and NATO. And they are doing this through a
4 lot of indirect tactics like enabling separatist forces and
5 disseminating propaganda and fake news. They even launched
6 a cyber attack to influence the results of our election
7 recently.

8 But Russia is also investing in other kinds of
9 asymmetric capabilities like disrupting communications
10 through electronic warfare or working to evade U.S. and NATO
11 surveillance and investing in space and cyber tools.
12 According to press reports and arms control analysis, they
13 violated the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty by
14 deploying ground-launched cruise missiles.

15 The European Reassurance Initiative, ERI, has helped to
16 counter some of these destabilizing activities. The United
17 States has deployed equipment and rotated forces into
18 Central and Eastern Europe, but I am wondering if this
19 standard display of force is the best way to deter Russia
20 now that Putin seems to rely more on indirect tactics.

21 So what I want to ask, General, is let us set aside
22 conventional forces and prepositioned equipment for just a
23 second, that it is there. What more can we do through ERI
24 to address Putin's indirect and asymmetric tactics?

25 General Scaparrotti: Through ERI, we are actually

1 using these funds in some of the areas for the asymmetric
2 activities to counter those malign influences. We have
3 special operations forces that are supported by this that do
4 military information support operations and activities in
5 support of U.S. Government, particularly the embassy and the
6 ambassadors in each of the countries. It supports us as
7 well in cyber in operations. In other ways, there are means
8 that perhaps -- for instance, support in naval forces are
9 seen as a ship, et cetera, but they are actually supporting
10 those capabilities and those ships support us in other ways
11 in terms of asymmetric means. So I agree with you, and we
12 do have a focus on that.

13 I would last say that part of this is we are learning
14 too. I mean, part of that effort through ERI is to make
15 sure we understand how they operate in this gray zone or
16 hybrid activity. And that is supported here as well.

17 Senator Warren: Thank you very much, General. I think
18 we need to be smart about responding to and deterring
19 Russia's asymmetric aggression. It seems to me that we
20 cannot think solely about deploying more troops and
21 conventional military assets in Europe in order to counter
22 Russia. We have got to have a very wide perspective on
23 this. Thank you.

24 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

25 Chairman McCain: Senator Wicker?

1 Senator Wicker: General, you mentioned on page 8 of
2 your testimony the ceasefire violations in Ukraine, that the
3 majority of them are being committed by Russian-led forces.
4 Senator Warren mentioned fake news. How helpful are the
5 OSCE monitors in giving us the correct picture there? And
6 then I have a couple of other questions about OSCE.

7 General Scaparrotti: Senator, thank you.

8 OSCE is very important to this. One of the issues is
9 that their job is to monitor activities and compliance with
10 the agreement on both sides of the line of contact. In
11 fact, Russia -- it is well known that they intimidate and
12 restrict the mission monitors in their job, which is one of
13 the things that we need to encourage and insist that Russia
14 stop doing and begin to allow the OSCE to do its job
15 properly.

16 Senator Wicker: What can we do in that respect?

17 General Scaparrotti: Well, I think in that respect,
18 sir, we need to bring the international community together
19 with respect to Russia and their lack of movement on the
20 Minsk. They say publicly they are in support of the Minsk
21 agreement, but personally I think if you watch their
22 actions, there does not seem to be steps taken on their part
23 to do just that.

24 Senator Wicker: They are doing a lot of exercises
25 there and in all of Europe. One of the techniques they use

1 to try to get around their commitments is the SNAP exercise
2 designation. Can you tell us about that?

3 General Scaparrotti: These exercises reflect Putin's
4 focus on his modernization. It reflects his intent to make
5 their forces more responsive to improve their mobilization,
6 but it also is a part of intimidation I would say.

7 The SNAP exercises themselves are typically broadcast
8 as much smaller than they end up being. Some of them are
9 not announced at all in contravention to the Vienna document
10 and the treaties that we have there. So that is very
11 disturbing, and it is a way that you can have
12 miscalculation. And we know in the past, at least with
13 Crimea, they have used an exercise to shield what was a
14 violation of the sovereignty of Ukraine.

15 Senator Wicker: But they also continue to do exercises
16 in Crimea. What is the significance of the most recent
17 Russian exercise in Crimea?

18 General Scaparrotti: To me the significance is that --
19 well, there are several of them. One is that they do both
20 defensive and offensive operations as a part of that SNAP
21 exercise. They rehearsed attacks on the eastern border,
22 actually flew toward it, those kinds of activities which are
23 very disturbing and create a lot of angst along the eastern
24 border and within EUCOM being able to watch this and
25 understand what is their real intent. So it is the way they

1 run the operations and without transparency that creates the
2 problem.

3 They have the right to do military exercises. They
4 need to do them in a way that is constructive and aligned
5 with our agreements.

6 Senator Wicker: But they do not have a right to do the
7 no-notice exercises under their agreements.

8 General Scaparrotti: Under the agreement, it has to be
9 announced if it is over 9,000 troops, and it has to be
10 observed if it is 13,000 or more. There has to be an
11 allowance for observers if we choose to do so. And their
12 SNAP exercises are much, much larger than that, almost
13 100,000 if you take them in all the different exercises that
14 happen simultaneously.

15 Senator Wicker: Should we be concerned about trends in
16 Russian activity in the North Atlantic?

17 General Scaparrotti: Yes, we should. They are more
18 aggressive. They are reestablishing bases in the Arctic and
19 North Atlantic. We have to go back to establishing the same
20 deterrence that we practiced during the Cold War in my view.

21 Senator Wicker: Is there a forum where we are engaging
22 with them diplomatically about that?

23 General Scaparrotti: I do not know the forum
24 personally. I know that we have engaged with them
25 diplomatically, but I could not tell you the forum, sir.

1 Senator Wicker: Thank you very much.

2 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

3 Chairman McCain: Senator Hirono?

4 Senator Hirono: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

5 General, you have mentioned several times the
6 importance of the whole-of-government approach particularly
7 to reassure our NATO allies and your concern that the
8 contemplated cuts to the State Department, for example, and
9 the Treasury Department by this administration would raise
10 major concerns for you, also shared by Secretary Mattis. Is
11 that concern that you express shared by our other combatant
12 commanders?

13 General Scaparrotti: Senator, I would say that you
14 would have to ask them directly for their own personal
15 opinion, but I will answer it this way. We operate with our
16 interagency, and most of what we do today, even in the more
17 direct actions that we have taken in, say, Afghanistan or
18 Iraq have relied upon an interagency approach, a whole-of-
19 government approach. That is the way we traditionally
20 operate.

21 Senator Hirono: It sounds as though that your concern
22 or your commitment to the importance of a whole-of-
23 government approach is one that is shared by our other
24 commanders.

25 You mentioned that there is a possibility, of course,

1 of Russia's use of nuclear weapons, and there is always that
2 possibility. But on the other hand, Russia has cyber
3 capability that can be very effective, and one wonders why
4 they should resort to conventional warfare if they can use
5 cyber to do all kinds of damage. So, for example, Russia is
6 currently conducting cyber operations in various countries,
7 such as the Ukraine, Montenegro, by attacking military
8 communications and secure databases, as well as power grids.
9 In addition, they are using fake news and information
10 operations to impact elections across the globe. And this
11 has magnified a wave of populist nationalism in Europe and
12 impacted the recent U.S. elections.

13 And I think that you mentioned or you described that
14 you are working with our allies to create a defensive
15 approach to the cyber operations that Russia has deployed.

16 I am wondering, though, has the question of what the
17 U.S. would do if Russia's activities in affecting and
18 disrupting the elections of our NATO allies, whether the
19 question has come up where at some point we would say that
20 these kinds of cyber attacks rise to the level of an act of
21 war that would trigger reaction from us to support our NATO
22 allies.

23 General Scaparrotti: Senator, that is a matter of
24 policy, but I think we are a member of NATO. NATO has said
25 that Article 5 could be triggered by a cyber event. We are

1 a member of that. So I think there is the occasion that
2 that could occur. But, again, what we would do and what
3 level that would be that would create a response is a policy
4 decision.

5 Senator Hirono: Something that we need to definitely
6 discuss at the policy level.

7 I think you mentioned in response to another question
8 regarding our mil-to-mil communications with Russia that we
9 do not necessarily want to reward their bad behavior. And I
10 am wondering, based on your communication with the
11 administration, do you know what the administration's
12 position is on the current Russian sanctions? And would
13 rescinding these sanctions affect stability in Europe in
14 your view?

15 General Scaparrotti: I have not had the discussion
16 with my leadership on the sanctions, Senator. You know, I
17 think that we must retain the sanctions. We put them in
18 place as a result of their annexation of Crimea. It is
19 another way that we, both the United States and the alliance
20 in Europe, strongly show that that is unacceptable and we
21 will maintain strength in the face of Russia's activities.

22 Senator Hirono: So would any kind of cutting back on
23 those sanctions not signal some kind of a retreat or
24 weakness on the part of our U.S. commitment to NATO, for
25 example?

1 General Scaparrotti: Well, I think personally that if
2 we were to relieve or cut back on those, Putin would see
3 that as a very good thing, and it would reward him standing
4 fast long enough to perhaps survive the sanctions
5 themselves.

6 Senator Hirono: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

7 Senator McCaskill [presiding]: I am the acting
8 chairman right now, and I have the pleasure of calling on
9 myself.

10 You know, I am going to say for the record what needs
11 to be said here, and that is that if we want to send the
12 right signal to Russia, all of the work that we are doing,
13 that you and your command are doing, which is so important,
14 is an integral piece of that. All of the work we do with
15 our allies in Europe is an integral piece of that. But a
16 big piece of it is having a commander-in-chief that will say
17 that right things to Russia. And we do not have a
18 commander-in-chief right now who is willing to say out loud
19 what everyone knows about Putin and what he is doing in
20 Europe and what he tried to do in the United States. And
21 until we have a commander-in-chief that is willing to speak
22 out against this thug and his behavior, I do not know that
23 all the great work that you and your command can do is ever
24 going to move the needle enough.

25 And I have said it, and I feel better. You do not have

1 to say a word, not your place to say a word. I understand
2 the role of the commander-in-chief in your life. But I
3 wanted to say it and put it on the record.

4 I was in Estonia. I would like to talk a little bit
5 about what is going on in other places in nontraditional
6 warfare. I was in Estonia last summer, and I was shocked
7 how many Estonians told me -- you know, we went to a coffee
8 shop and we were talking to those who spoke English. And
9 they were saying how they really wanted to be part of NATO,
10 but they were worried about the NATO soldiers being able to
11 rape the citizens of Estonia and not be held legally
12 accountable. And I, of course, went, what?

13 And as it turns out, this is the other thing Russia is
14 doing, that Russia is pushing propaganda through Estonia
15 that NATO is somehow going to damage their sovereignty in
16 terms of the enforcement of rule of law.

17 Could you speak to that, General, that method that they
18 use to try to undermine the support of NATO in the countries
19 that they have designs on?

20 General Scaparrotti: You stated it clearly. In fact,
21 we are now in NATO -- the first forces are going into the
22 four nations, Estonia being one of them. And we have
23 already had a couple of incidents of just complete untruth--
24 the incident never occurred -- within days of the troops
25 arriving. We prepared for this. We expected it. We were

1 able to respond to those truthfully and quickly and debunk
2 the false story. But it is something that I expect will
3 continue.

4 And as you said, it obviously has -- their
5 disinformation obviously has some influence. If there is a
6 consistent message from Russia in the east, it is to
7 undercut the credibility of the United States and NATO at
8 large, consistently.

9 Senator McCaskill: And do we have a robust enough
10 response to this kind of disinformation campaign? Are we
11 focusing enough on this part of the warfare?

12 General Scaparrotti: I think we are focused on it. I
13 do not think we have a robust enough response at this point.
14 I think we have to, both as the U.S. and also as allies,
15 come together and take a more aggressive confrontation of
16 Russia particularly in this gray area.

17 Senator McCaskill: Yes. I would certainly hope that
18 would be on NATO's agenda as to strategies moving forward to
19 combat this kind of insidious disinformation that really
20 does strengthen the efforts of Russia to use military might
21 to intimidate and eventually move into countries that have
22 no desire to be occupied.

23 I also want to take a brief moment to talk about
24 something I am like a broken record on and that is OCO. The
25 Congressional Research Service recently published an

1 extensive report on OCO funding, and it states the obvious
2 that those of us who are on this committee are painfully
3 aware of, that this began truly for a contingency after 9/11
4 and has now morphed into something very ugly off the books
5 in that we now have the European Reassurance Initiative in
6 the OCO budget. We now even have base budgeting in the OCO
7 budget.

8 Talk, if you will, from your perspective, as you are
9 asked to draw up your financial needs for your command, how
10 you all are making a decision inside the Pentagon what you
11 put in OCO and what you put in the base budget.

12 General Scaparrotti: Well, ma'am, for instance, I will
13 start with EUCOM. We have the outline of the use of ERI,
14 what it is intended to do based on Congress' direction. I
15 have a process where my component commands, the other
16 services, make recommendations for funding in ERI. And I
17 have a board that eventually comes to me for a decision
18 that, first of all, asks the question, is that in support of
19 the intent of ERI, and if not, why is it in here. We will
20 push it off to the base budget. Or even those areas where I
21 think, you know what, that is a broader activity we are
22 funding. It really ought to be in the base, not in ERI. So
23 I have that system myself within EUCOM, and we draw that
24 line hard because we appreciate ERI. We want to maintain
25 the credibility of it and how we use it. It is fundamental

1 to doing our job in EUCOM.

2 Within OSD, there is a very deliberate process run by
3 the DepSecDef and the Vice Chairman that all of us as
4 combatant commands take part in. And it is very detailed in
5 terms of a look at each command and what we propose for a
6 budget, what we intend to put in, and it looks at a cross
7 section, as well, a comparison of each other. So it is a
8 deliberate process.

9 I would just say that I am in favor of moving funds
10 into the base. We need predictable funding --

11 Senator McCaskill: Right.

12 General Scaparrotti: -- so that we can actually make
13 longer-term decisions and have more continuity. And that
14 would be better I think for the force as a whole as well.

15 Senator McCaskill: This would be a good time for us to
16 have the discipline, as the President has presented a budget
17 that is -- frankly, it is not a huge increase in the
18 military. I think he is trying to make everybody believe it
19 is a big increase to the military. I think it is only 3
20 percent higher than what President Obama recommended in his
21 budget. But nonetheless, it is an increase. When
22 everything else is getting cut, I think this would be a good
23 time for us to bite the bullet -- pardon the use of that
24 particular analogy, but I think it would be time for us to
25 be honest with the American people and put all of these

1 items into the base budget so the American people understand
2 what we are spending on the military as it compares to other
3 parts of our budget.

4 I thank you for your service. I thank all of the men
5 and women who serve under your command. I think you have
6 got a really important job now. I understand the importance
7 of what you do now has been exacerbated by what Russia has
8 done over the last 12 months and what they continue to do in
9 democracies across the world. And we are depending on you
10 to be our front line eyes and ears to their aggression. And
11 I thank you very much.

12 Chairman McCain [presiding]: Senator Blumenthal?

13 Senator Blumenthal: Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

14 I want to join in thanking you and the men and women
15 under your command for their service in a critical area of
16 the world for us and our national security.

17 I understand you have just come back from a trip to
18 Israel, and I would like to ask you what security concerns
19 the Israelis raised with you, focusing specifically on the
20 Iranian development, continuing development, of their
21 ballistic missiles.

22 General Scaparrotti: Yes, sir. Well, first of all,
23 Israel is an extremely close ally of ours, a special ally.
24 We in EUCOM have an excellent relationship with them. It is
25 nearly daily contact. One of my missions is support of

1 Israel and their defense.

2 And so as I visited, their CHOD and I and their senior
3 leaders obviously talked about their concerns about Iranian
4 malign influence, as well as their missile capabilities. We
5 work closely with them to support and complement their
6 missile defense, for instance. And in fact, one day of that
7 trip, I met their air missile defense commander and went to
8 look at some of their sites to ensure that we in EUCOM were
9 supporting that fully.

10 Beyond that, we discussed, for instance, their concern
11 about Hezbollah and fighters gaining experience in Syria and
12 other places and returning and what that might mean in the
13 future, a concern about, obviously, Syria and the tri-border
14 region as the conflict in Syria continues. So they live in
15 a very tough neighborhood, and you can look in nearly every
16 direction and have a threat.

17 Senator Blumenthal: Is there more that we can and
18 should be doing to strengthen their defenses against that
19 kind of missile threat?

20 General Scaparrotti: Senator, we are doing all that we
21 can. I mean, we work with this closely to ensure that we
22 do, in fact, reinforce their defense. In fact, there are
23 more things we can do with their missile defense. We have
24 people there this week working on that as well. I mean, it
25 is a matter of modernization, change in environment. But we

1 are doing that. To maintain their military edge is very,
2 very important and also to maintain the war stocks that we
3 have committed to them for use.

4 Senator Blumenthal: But there is more that we can do
5 and we are doing it.

6 General Scaparrotti: We are, and we are focused on
7 support of Israel.

8 Senator Blumenthal: I take it, speaking of ballistic
9 missiles, that you would agree with General Selva who
10 testified earlier this week during the House Armed Services
11 Committee that Russia is violating the INF Treaty.

12 General Scaparrotti: Yes, I agree.

13 Senator Blumenthal: And I think in your testimony you
14 used the word "concerning." This is an extraordinarily
15 important area. Is it not?

16 General Scaparrotti: Yes, sir, it is. And it is an
17 enhancement in capability that has a direct impact
18 throughout the theater from my perspective.

19 Senator Blumenthal: And that is because, as you put it
20 well in your testimony, it increases Putin's asymmetric
21 options as this missile capability is built. The whole
22 reason that the treaty exists is to stop this kind of
23 development because it threatens to destabilize the whole
24 confrontation -- not confrontation, but the array of forces
25 in that part of the world. Correct?

1 General Scaparrotti: That is correct.

2 Senator Blumenthal: Have you made recommendations as
3 to what we should be doing about it?

4 General Scaparrotti: I have made recommendations in
5 the sense that we need to respond to this. We need to be
6 strong in the face of it. And I think the actions that we
7 have recommended in EUCOM, in terms of posture, force
8 structure, et cetera, are all a part of this, a part of the
9 response that we need to have for Russia at large.

10 Senator Blumenthal: Is there consideration, to the
11 extent you may know of it, about additional diplomatic or
12 military action that the administration may be taking to
13 counter this threat to our security?

14 General Scaparrotti: At this time, I have not had that
15 discussion yet with that specific topic in terms of policy
16 actions or actions that might be taken.

17 Senator Blumenthal: Have you any expectation that that
18 discussion will occur?

19 General Scaparrotti: Yes, I do.

20 Senator Blumenthal: Can you give us a general time
21 frame?

22 General Scaparrotti: No, I cannot, but I would expect
23 we will have it. Yes, sir.

24 Senator Blumenthal: Well, I would urge that it be done
25 sooner rather than later. With all due respect, I am not

1 nearly as well informed as you, but I am extremely alarmed
2 by this violation of the INF Treaty and what it represents
3 strategically in that part of the world and what it reflects
4 in the way of Russian intentions around the world. Thank
5 you, General.

6 General Scaparrotti: Thank you, sir.

7 Senator Blumenthal: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

8 Chairman McCain: Apparently Senator King has not had
9 enough.

10 Senator King: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Fortunately,
11 your microphone was off for the editorial comment.

12 General, a couple of quick questions. Do you consider
13 RT, Russia Television, an agent of the Russian Government?

14 General Scaparrotti: Yes, I do, sir.

15 Senator King: And it is my understanding that not only
16 are they using RT in Europe, but they are also sniffing
17 around or, in fact, looking into acquisitions of commercial
18 television and radio capacity in Europe.

19 General Scaparrotti: That is correct. I have been
20 told in a number of countries that they are using fronts,
21 but essentially buying local TV, and in one case recently, a
22 social media network that is influential particularly with
23 the young in the Baltics.

24 Senator King: So when you say buying local TV, you are
25 talking about TV stations, not airtime.

1 General Scaparrotti: That is right. They are buying
2 TV stations and a social network company that does work on
3 social media.

4 Senator King: This is one more area of their what I
5 consider very effective playing of a weak hand. They are
6 aggressing upon us at a low dollar cost, but aggression
7 nonetheless.

8 General Scaparrotti: Yes, sir. I agree.

9 Senator King: Different subject. Iceland. I was in
10 Iceland recently, and it struck me as an incredible
11 strategic location. Keflavik air base was dismantled -- or
12 not dismantled. It is still there, but it was deactivated
13 around 2004 or 2005. It strikes me that this is such a
14 strategic location. Do you believe that we should at least
15 consider, subject to the approval of the people of Iceland,
16 some reconstitution of our capacity there? I know we have
17 rotational forces there but something more than that.

18 General Scaparrotti: Senator, we do have rotational
19 forces through there, but I think we should consider it.
20 Again, it comes back to my concern about the high north,
21 North Atlantic, and the increasing Russian threat from the
22 North Atlantic fleet there. So that area is important to us
23 to increase our activities with our allies to ensure that we
24 deter Russia and we are very knowledgeable of their
25 activities as well.

1 Senator King: It struck me as a large, unsinkable
2 aircraft carrier in the midst of the most strategic spot in
3 the North Atlantic.

4 General Scaparrotti: Yes, sir.

5 Senator King: Thank you.

6 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

7 Chairman McCain: And, you know, Senator King, I met
8 with the President of Iceland, and I know that General
9 Scaparrotti has too. We have a PR challenge there as well
10 with the people of Iceland. Is that not true, General?

11 General Scaparrotti: Yes, I believe we do. I think
12 NATO could do more work there as well in terms of
13 perspective or receptiveness, Senator.

14 Chairman McCain: They would be more receptive if it
15 were a NATO kind of commitment rather than just the United
16 States.

17 General Scaparrotti: Well, in discussions, that is
18 what has been discussed with me as the SACEUR.

19 Chairman McCain: Well, I thank you, General, and I
20 appreciate, obviously, the important information you have
21 provided the committee.

22 I would just like to mention again what Senator King
23 brought up, and that is this whole issue of this information
24 warfare that is going on right now is something that crosses
25 a lot of boundaries between State and Defense and

1 intelligence and other agencies of government. And yet,
2 every time I turn around and talk particularly to one of the
3 smaller countries, that is one of their biggest issues is
4 this propaganda that the Russians -- and fake news, et
5 cetera, ranging from what their obvious attempts at changing
6 the outcome of the French election to the pressure on Latvia
7 to alienate their Russian speaking population. So I hope we
8 will move that issue up on our priority list. It seems to
9 me it is kind of like the weather. We talk about it but we
10 really do not do anything about it.

11 And there is a precedent for it. It was called the
12 Cold War. How many people do we know that after The Wall
13 came down who said I listened to Radio Free Europe? I
14 listened to the Voice of America. It kept hope alive. Why
15 can we not reconstitute something along those lines to get
16 the message out? I do not think it would be hard to counter
17 Russian propaganda given the kind of lifestyle they have in
18 Russia.

19 So I hope you will think about it, and we will continue
20 to think about it. But whenever you get one of these issues
21 that involves more than one agency of government, as you
22 know, we have much more difficulty, whether it be cyber, or
23 whether it be this information challenge that we are facing
24 now.

25 So we thank you, General, for visiting with us again

1 and thanks for the great work. Senator King will come to
2 Brussels and spend time with you as well. Thank you.

3 General Scaparrotti: Thank you, Chairman. My
4 privilege.

5 [Whereupon, at 11:35 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

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