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**HOMELAND SECURITY IN ABSENTIA: POLICING
MIAMI IN THE ERA OF THE NEW U.S.-CUBA
RELATIONSHIP**

by

Manuel A. Morales

March 2017

Thesis Advisor:
Second Reader:

Rodrigo Nieto-Gomez
Carolyn Halladay

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THE NEW U.S.-CUBA RELATIONSHIP**

Manuel A. Morales
Major, City of Miami Police Department, Miami, Florida
B.A., St. Thomas University, 2008

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**NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
March 2017**

Approved by: Rodrigo Nieto-Gomez
Thesis Advisor

Carolyn Halladay
Second Reader

Erik Dahl
Associate Chair for Instruction
Department of National Security Affairs

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ABSTRACT

In 2015, the Obama administration made historic changes to the U.S. and Cuban relationship. The renewal of diplomatic relations marked a departure from the isolation policies of the past half century. While the changes between the United States and Cuba might be of limited importance to the average American, in Miami this news plays out in major headlines. Miami is the adoptive home of the Cuban-American community, with an estimated one million residents of Cuban descent living in the south Florida area. This thesis answers the question: Which modifications should the Miami Police Department make to adapt to the local changes resulting directly from the shift in the diplomatic relationship between the United States and Cuba? The research analyses the short- and long-term impact of the renewed relations on Miami. The case studies described three models of police cooperation across national borders: the China and Taiwan accords, the New York Police Department's International Liaison Program, and the El Paso–Ciudad Juárez sister city agreement. These models can serve as templates for the Miami Police Department to develop a working relationship with the Cuban National Revolutionary Police.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

DHS	Department of Homeland Security
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
HR	human resources
HSE	homeland security enterprise
ILP	International Liaison Program
kg	kilograms
MOU	memorandum of understanding
MPD	Miami Police Department
NRP	National Revolutionary Police
NYPD	New York Police Department
TGF	Cuban Border Guard
TOC	transnational organized crime
USCG	U.S. Coast Guard

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The United States and Cuba are separated by 90 miles across the Florida Straits, but are worlds apart in political ideology. In 2014, President Barack Obama announced his administration's intention to renew diplomatic relations with this nation's island neighbor.¹ The detente marked a stark departure from previous U.S. policy of isolation that has maintained an embargo against Cuba for half a century. The renewed relations have the potential to impact Miami greatly. This thesis explores the modifications the Miami Police Department (MPD) needs to make to prepare the organization for local changes prompted by the changes in U.S. policy. The MPD response to the events of mass celebration and civil disturbances, as a result of Fidel Castro's death in November 2016, demonstrated the MPD is prepared to address effectively the short-term impact of changes in the relationship between the United States and Cuba. However, to prepare Miami for the long-term impact, the department must establish lines of communication with Cuban authorities.

Miami and Cuba are connected by shared family and cultural bonds that make any changes on the island nation manifest in local reaction. The deep connection is a result of various periods of mass migration that saw large groups of Cubans settled in Miami. The bond is contrasted by the artificial separation created by political groups that share a common hatred for the Castro regime in Cuba.

The thesis examined the most notable periods of Cuban mass migration, the golden exiles and the Mariel boatlift, as well as their impact on Miami and its police department's ability to provide public safety services. As an example, the research examines the Mariel boatlift of 1980. The episode of mass migration brought 125,000 Cuban refugees to the United States and impacted the ability of the Miami Police to address public safety effectively in the city. Unbeknown to local officials, the Castro regime had used the migration episode to empty its mental health and detention facilities

¹ "Charting a New Course on Cuba," accessed September 15, 2016, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/foreign-policy/cuba>.

of an estimated 25,000 inmates.² The move is considered by law enforcement professionals as one of the main factors that lead to a historic crime spike in Miami in the 1980s.³

The research identified different models of police cooperation across national borders. The thesis conducted a case study analysis of models of police cooperation by municipal governments with international partners to identify possible working templates for the MPD and the Cuban police. The research looked at three models: the agreements between China and Taiwan, the New York Police Department's (NYPD's) International Liaison Program (ILP), and the sister city agreements between El Paso, Texas and Ciudad Juárez, Mexico.

The first case study involves police relations between authorities in the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China, known as Taiwan. China and Taiwan share a long history of political hostility that extends to federal and local law enforcement.⁴ The two countries shared limited diplomatic contact and had no ability for police cooperation until the 1990s when officials in both nations initiated direct contact to work on several high-profile investigations.⁵ The case offers insight into the potential of informal relations between individuals on both sides of the border. However, the model is heavily dependent on the personal relationships and offers no evidence that the political environment in Miami and Havana would not impact those relationships.

The events of 9/11 brought to the forefront of homeland security experts the undeniable fact that "all terrorism is local" and the NYPD realized the ineffectiveness of their counterterrorism strategies that relied on the federal and state officials as their suppliers of intelligence.⁶ In 2002, the NYPD leadership recognized the need to change

² Alex Larzelere, *Castro's Ploy-America's Dilemma: The 1980 Cuban Boatlift* (Ft. Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, 1988), 225.

³ Michael Palmiotto, *Police Misconduct: A Reader for the 21st Century* (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2001), 120.

⁴ Yungnane Yang and Frédéric Lemieux, *Cross-strait Police Cooperation between Taiwan and China*, ed. F. Lemieux (Portland, OR: Willan, 2010), 202.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 189.

⁶ Erik J. Dahl, "Local Approaches to Counterterrorism: the New York Police Department Model," *Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism* 9, no. 2 (2014): 81.

the role of its municipal policing model in the face of increased international threats and created the ILP. The program offered an opportunity to take their policing efforts abroad and become the “most global of local police forces.”⁷ The model demonstrated an effective way to integrate personnel from two departments in different countries to maximize information sharing. However, the program is expensive and could alienate federal officials that see the local officers abroad as interfering in diplomatic exchanges.

Sister city agreements have been in existence since the early part of the 20th century and have been widely used by neighboring cities along the U.S. and Mexican border. The agreements were intended to “increase international understanding and foster world peace by furthering international communication and exchange at the person to person level through city-to-city affiliations.”⁸ Despite their traditional role, the increase in concerns about national security brought about by the globalization of terrorism and the impact of transnational organized crime has prompted the focus of such agreements to shift towards law enforcement purposes.⁹ Agreements, such as the El Paso and Ciudad Juárez, have demonstrated their ability to address regional security and interoperability concerns effectively with the creation of task forces. Participation in those task forces promotes informal relationships amongst members of law enforcement on both countries that aids in the sharing of intelligence in the fight against trans-border crimes.¹⁰

In January 2017, during the last days of the Obama administration, the two countries signed a bilateral law enforcement memorandum of understanding (MOU). The MOU recognizes the mutual need of both governments to “collaborate in the prevention, interdiction, monitoring, investigation and prosecution” of crimes impacting both nations.¹¹ It also allows for the participation of “all appointed and/or elected officials

⁷ Dahl, “Local Approaches to Counterterrorism: the New York Police Department Model,” 86.

⁸ “Our Mission,” May 2012, www.taoti.com; “What is a Sister City?,” accessed January 8, 2017, www.sister-cities.org/what-sister-city.

⁹ Calvin D. Shanks, “Beyond Sister City Agreements: Exploring the Challenges of Full International Interoperability” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2016).

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ “United States and Cuba to Sign Law Enforcement Memorandum of Understanding,” January 17, 2017, cu.usembassy.gov/united-states-cuba-sign-law-enforcement-memorandum-understanding/.

who exercise police functions or provide police services, and are entitled to make arrests or detentions under the respective jurisdiction” in working groups that will meet bi-annually.¹² The MPD could use its long-standing practice of liaising with federal law enforcement task forces to participate in the U.S.-Cuban working groups.¹³ The involvement in the taskforce will allow the MPD to engage Cuban officials in a formal setting to forge relationships that will lead to informal exchanges of information that benefit both agencies related to local matters outside the MOU’s scope.

The research also revealed that all models examined, despite their formal arrangements, shared a commonality in the fostering of informal relationships. The key to success was related to the ability of individuals in their respective agencies to shift from formal arrangement to informal relationships to affect positive change. The MPD can benefit from the creation of a committee to explore the need for departmental modifications to adjust for a relationship with Cuban authorities. This relationship can aid in the prevention of terrorism, the interdiction of narcotics, the return of fugitives wanted on both sides of the border, and the timely exchange of law enforcement information. Perhaps, the best modification the MPD can make to foster a relationship with their Cuban counterparts on the island is not operational but philosophical.

¹² “United States and Cuba to Sign Law Enforcement Memorandum of Understanding.”

¹³ U.S. Marshall Service, *Memorandum of Understanding District Fugitive Task Force (DFT) South Florida Fugitive Apprehension Strike Team (S/FL-FAST) Florida Regional Fugitive Task Force (RFTF) and the City of Miami Police Department* (Washington, DC: Department of Justice, 2014), egov.ci.miami.fl.us/Legistarweb/Attachments/79026.pdf.

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I. INTRODUCTION

For more than half a century, diplomatic relations between the United States and Cuba were nonexistent following the Cuban Revolution and Fidel Castro's ascent to power as dictator in 1959. By 1961, all economic and diplomatic relations between the two nations were dissolved and not restored until 2015. Cuba is located 90 miles from the Florida coast and represents great significance and opportunity, both politically and geographically.

While the changes between the United States and Cuba might be of limited importance to the average U.S. citizen, this news plays out in major headlines in Miami. Miami is the adoptive home of the Cuban-American community, with an estimated one million residents of Cuban descent living in the south Florida area. Any changes in the relationship between the United States and Cuba have a deep impact on the local political and social climate.¹

A number of mass migrations of Cuban citizens to the United States and Miami, specifically, transpired during the intervening 54 years. By the 21st century, an estimated 1.2 million residents of Cuban descent were living within the Miami metropolitan area, representing 75 to 80 percent of the overall population.² Hence, Cuban roots connect Miami and Cuba, from shared family and cultural ties to politics along with an enduring, mutual desire for an egalitarian society on the Cuban mainland.

Miami Herald reporter Patricia Mazzei illustrates how connections between Miami and Cuba transformed Miami into what she describes as "Havana's old image."³ The first modern wave of Cuban immigrants in the post-revolutionary period, known as

¹ Jonnelle Marte, "Cuban Americans Split over Obama's Trip to Havana," *The Washington Post*, March 20, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/cuban-americans-are-split-on-the-value-of-obamas-trip-to-havana/2016/03/20/6b0eda50-ed59-11e5-bc08-3e03a5b41910_story.html?utm_term=.320e1ff3559a.

² Allison Nichols, "Miami Culture and Cuban Influence," InterExchange, August 20, 2015, <https://www.interexchange.org/articles/abroad/2015/08/20/miami-culture-cuban-influence/>.

³ Patricia Mazzei, "Once Mighty, Miami's Political Guard Left out of Conversation on Cuba," *The Miami Herald*, April 8, 2016, <http://www.miamiherald.com/news/politics-government/article70786987.html>.

the golden exiles,⁴ escaped the Castro regime during the 1960s. Miami seemed the ideal temporary home for transplanted Cubans, one that would allow easy access to their homeland after the expected normalization in Cuba's political climate.⁵ However, as the years passed, and hopes of a quick demise to the Castro regime faded, Miami became what Thomas D. Boswell describes as a "homeland in absentia,"⁶ a new home where Cuban exiles prospered economically and politically by serving their own community bonded by the love of their country and hatred of the Castro regime.⁷

The prosperity of the early exiles—many of whom were educated professionals, businessmen, teachers, physicians, and so forth—set the stage for receiving and accommodating future waves of Cuban immigrants into Miami. This prosperity cemented the city's unique status as the adoptive home of the Cuban community.⁸ Support networks of close families and friends made Miami the epicenter for Cuban culture in the United States while establishing an "umbilical link" for future generations of Cuban Americans.⁹ This connection elevated the influence of the Cuban-American community throughout Miami to a level not witnessed by any other immigrant group within metropolitan areas of the United States.

However, the significance of the relationship between Cuba and Miami extends well beyond geographic proximity. The presence of such a significant Cuban exile community—one that has been solidifying its foundation for more than 50 years and is deeply rooted in tradition—places an important spotlight on Miami as Cuban-American relationships continue to evolve. The interconnectivity between the countries of Cuba and the United States, and the direct impacts of the relatively new relationship between these

⁴ Thomas D. Boswell, *A Demographic Profile of Cuban Americans* (Miami: Cuban American National Council, Inc., 2002), 2, <http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED480201.pdf>.

⁵ Jorge Duany, "Cuban Communities in the United States: Migration Waves, Settlement Patterns and Socioeconomic Diversity," *Pouvoirs dans la Caraïbe, Revue du Centre de Recherche sur les Pouvoirs Locaux dans la Caraïbe*, no. 11 (March 1, 1999): 77, doi: 10.4000/plc.464.

⁶ Thomas D. Boswell, "The Cuban-American Homeland in Miami," *Journal of Cultural Geography* 13, no. 2 (1993): 133, doi: 10.1080/08873639309478394.

⁷ Duany, "Cuban Communities in the United States," 77.

⁸ Kevin E. Mchugh, Ines M. Miyares, and Emily H. Skop, "The Magnetism of Miami: Segmented Paths in Cuban Migration," *Geographical Review* 87, no. 4 (1997): 507, doi: 10.2307/215228.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 506.

nations, affect the Greater Miami area more than any other U.S. city. In spite of the diplomatic exchanges that have occurred over the past 18 months on a national level between Cuba and the United States, little has been advanced in terms of thought leadership addressing concerns by local law enforcement regarding the potential for the homeland security implications posed by the new role Cuba plays.

A. RESEARCH QUESTION

This thesis answers the question: Which modifications should the Miami Police Department (MPD) make to adapt to the local changes resulting directly from the shift in the diplomatic relationship between the United States and Cuba?

To address the research question, the thesis identifies modifications the MPD should make to prepare the organization to respond to the long-term and continuing impact of improved relations with the island nation. The results provide valuable information in determining the programs and policies required to gain the support of essential city and community stakeholders.

B. PROBLEM STATEMENT

Mass Cuban migration over the past decades brought challenges to a city not ready for a population explosion. For example, in the 1980s, a migration phenomenon known as the “Mariel boatlift” brought 125,000 Cuban refugees to the United States in the span of just a few months.¹⁰ The exodus was the result of a policy change by the Castro regime that allowed unrestricted departures for any Cubans who wanted to leave the island. U.S. immigration authorities were unaware that the Castro regime seized the opportunity to empty its jails and mental health institutions to rid the island of thousands of violent individuals. A large portion of the criminally inclined “Marielitos” settled in Miami. The MPD was ill prepared to handle the rapid influx of Spanish-speaking Cuban refugees entering the city. No response plan was in place to ensure the delivery of uninterrupted public safety services. Also, the MPD lacked a contact with Cuban authorities on the island who could assist in exchanging criminally related information.

¹⁰ Alex Larzelere, *Castro’s Ploy-America’s Dilemma: The 1980 Cuban Boatlift* (Ft. Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, 1988), 236.

The lack of preparation contributed to a 30 percent crime increase in the first three months following the boatlift.¹¹

After the Mariel boatlift, the MPD embarked on a recruiting campaign that increased the organization from 650 sworn officers in 1980 to 1,033 in 1985.¹² This hiring frenzy was aimed at creating a department reflective of the demographic composition of the now heavily Cuban-American dominated community. The political influence of Cubans in Miami became evident by 1985, when they represented the majority of elected members of the Miami City Commission.¹³ This Cuban majority has remained constant with the election of a Cuban-American mayor almost continually since that time.¹⁴ The Cuban influence on the City Commission continues today, along with a Cuban-born mayor who is completing his second term and enjoys tremendous popularity.

Concurrent with the Cuban influence that was altering Miami's political landscape, the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s and early 1990s portended the end of Cuba's strategic value and previous Soviet threat to the United States. New areas of concern were emerging, however, as Cuba served as a springboard for illicit drug trade, human trafficking, and smuggling, replete with terrorism-related implications.¹⁵ This multi-scalar relationship magnifies the political effect of enforcement actions by local officials in Miami.

One such challenge occurred on Thanksgiving of 1999. The U.S. Coast Guard rescued Elian Gonzalez, a six-year-old Cuban migrant, three miles off the Miami coast.¹⁶ Elian's mother, along with several other Cubans, had perished at sea during their

¹¹ Mark S. Hamm, *The Abandoned Ones: The Imprisonment and Uprising of the Mariel Boat People* (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1995), 75.

¹² John Dombrink, "The Touchables: Vice and Police Corruption in the 1980's," *Law and Contemporary Problems* 51, no. 1 (1988): 209, doi: 10.2307/1191720.

¹³ Alex Stepick, Guillermo Grenier, and Max Castro, *This Land Is Our Land: Immigrants and Power in Miami* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 21.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Mark Walsh, "U.S. Telecom Businesses Struggling to Make Connections as Cuba Opens Up," *The Guardian*, March 23, 2016, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/23/us-telecom-businesses-cuba-relations-etecca>.

¹⁶ Stepick, Grenier, and Castro, *This Land Is Our Land: Immigrants and Power in Miami*, 1.

migration. His arrival sparked a national controversy, as the boy's father, still residing in Cuba, demanded his return. However, the boy's family in Miami argued that the boy should remain in the United States because of his mother's ultimate sacrifice to escape Fidel Castro's regime.

In the first months of 2000, the MPD was thrust into the national spotlight when the media blasted the department's actions in response to civil unrest that erupted over Gonzalez's case. The Cuban-American community in Miami staged a number of demonstrations as U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno announced that Elian Gonzalez would be returned to his father.¹⁷ The reaction of the Cuban-American community in Miami, outraged over this announcement, demonstrated the power and influence the group held over the city and—by extension—the nation.

On April 22, 2000, members of the MPD assisted federal agents in an operation to forcibly remove Elian from his "Little Havana" home. The local outcry by the Cuban-American community ultimately led to the firing of the then-police chief and city manager, both non-Latino whites.¹⁸ The Elian riots are indicative of the special relationship between the Cubans on the island and in Miami. They also point to the sensitivity and impact of potential changes on the relationship between Cuba and Miami.

In December 2014, the Obama administration announced somewhat abruptly its intention to normalize diplomatic relations with Cuba.¹⁹ The announcement marks one of the most significant changes in U.S. policy toward Cuba since the Eisenhower administration severed diplomatic relations in 1961.²⁰ The re-opening of the U.S. Embassy in Havana in July 2015 solidified the intent to shift policy from hostility and coercion to coexistence and engagement. In April 2016, President Obama conducted a landmark visit to Cuba. He not only met with President Raul Castro, but used his executive powers to expand "commercial ties and increased the capacity of Americans to

¹⁷ Stepick, Grenier, and Castro, *This Land Is Our Land: Immigrants and Power in Miami*, 2.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 5.

¹⁹ The White House, "Charting a New Course on Cuba," accessed September 15, 2016, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/foreign-policy/cuba>.

²⁰ *Ibid.*

travel and do business in Cuba.”²¹ These modifications are a stark departure from the United States’ previous approach during the Cold War era. The MPD needs to be cognizant of the impact on Miami of such new travel and commerce exchanges between Miami and Cuba.

The timing of the abrupt shift in U.S.-Cuban policy by the Obama administration could be a possible result of a tipping point in the changing variable. This shift, according to William LeoGrande, includes the threat that U.S. foreign policy continues to pose over the United States’ commercial interests, as well as the change in political influence of Cuban-American lobbyists in Washington. Furthermore, the United States continues to suffer a problem with optics from the “attitude of Latin America toward” the former U.S. embargo of the Caribbean nation.²²

Perhaps the biggest factor behind the shift in U.S. policy might be the changes Cuba has enacted under the leadership of President Raul Castro since he assumed power in 2008.²³ It is imperative to understand the variables leading to the recent change in U.S. policy in light of prior impacts directly on Miami from previous changes in diplomatic relations between the United States and Cuba. The city of Miami and the MPD need to be as proactive as possible in anticipating and planning for potential impacts from this most recent shift in U.S.-Cuban relations.

Miami has experienced robust social, economic, and political changes as a result of the influx of Cuban refugees during various periods over the past half-century. Since the December 2014 U.S. announcement triggering a renewal of Cuban-American relations, immigration officials have reported an increase of Cuban refugees.²⁴ This increase is believed to be a result of fears on the part of the Cuban people on the island

²¹ The White House, “Remarks by President Obama to the People of Cuba,” March 22, 2016, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/03/22/remarks-president-obama-people-cuba>.

²² William M. LeoGrande, “Normalizing U.S.-Cuba Relations: Escaping the Shackles of the Past,” *International Affairs* 91, no. 3 (May 12, 2015): 481, doi: 10.1111/1468-2346.12282.

²³ *Ibid.*, 473.

²⁴ Jens Manuel Krogstad, “Cuban Immigration to U.S. Surges as Relations Warm,” *Pew Research Center RSS*, December 10, 2015.

that the new relations will threaten the U.S. immigration (wet foot/dry foot) policy granting Cubans favored status.²⁵

The MPD is prepared to deal with knock-on issues to events emanating from the newly formed U.S.-Cuba relations. A plan developed by the MPD in 2014 (*Response Plan for Changes in Cuba's Government*²⁶) is relatively concise in its focus at just eight pages in length. It does provides an operationally simplistic and one-sided look at the local impact arising from changes in Cuba, primarily those anticipated to occur upon the death of Fidel Castro.

The rapidly evolving diplomatic relations between the United States and Cuba prompts the need for a closer examination of the potential impact to the City of Miami. For example, President Obama's visit to the communist island in April 2016 prompted anti-Castro demonstrations in Miami.²⁷ The MPD was able to initiate the response plan effectively and deploy its personnel to ensure the demonstrations remained peaceful.

On November 25, 2016, the MPD had the opportunity to once again test their response plan as news of the Cuban dictator's death reached the exile community in Miami. The news prompted widespread celebrations in Miami-Dade County, especially in the City of Miami where thousands gathered at pre-dawn to celebrate.²⁸ The MPD personnel were able to respond effectively to the peaceful demonstrations that continued around the clock for weeks. The plan effectively addressed the short-term impact from the standpoint of planning for deployment of police resources as a standalone response to widespread events of mass celebration or incidents of civil unrest.²⁹

²⁵ Janell Ross, "Why the 'Wet-Foot, Dry-Foot' Debate Could Soon Be Coming to a Head," *The Washington Post*, October 16, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2015/10/16/why-the-wet-foot-dry-foot-debate-could-soon-be-coming-to-a-head/?utm_term=.2a0189bc801a.

²⁶ City of Miami Police Department, *Response Plan for Changes in Cuba's Government* (Miami: City of Miami Police Department, 2014). Internal document.

²⁷ Marte, "Cuban Americans Split over Obama's Trip to Havana."

²⁸ David Ovalle et al., "Cuban Exiles Pour onto Miami Streets to Celebrate Fidel Castro's Death," *Miami Herald*, November 26, 2016, <http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/cuba/article117201053.html>.

²⁹ Ibid.

However, the plan's focus fails to consider long-term requirements that the developing relationship between the United States and Cuba will likely demand from the MPD to include developing a working relationship with the Cuban National Revolutionary Police. These contingencies must be recognized and considered in a more comprehensive manner by the MPD.

The local impact of the research can be significant as Miami, with nearly 1,400 sworn officers, is the largest municipal department in Miami-Dade County, which comprises 37 municipal jurisdictions across some 2,400 square miles. It is reasonable to consider that the planning and practices adopted by the city of Miami, as it relates to the renewed Cuban-American policies, can inform law enforcement professionals in the other 36 municipal jurisdictions in the county.

C. LITERATURE REVIEW

When researching the impact the new relationship between the United States and Cuba will have on Miami and the police department, in particular, several abstractions become immediately apparent. First, both positive and negative elements may result from the renewed relations between the two nations that pose a unique challenge for the leadership of the MPD. The research analyzes this impact on Miami and the MPD, in particular, and assesses the department's ability to provide adequate public safety services.

The literature review examines the opposing views on the renewed relationship between the two nations. An abundance of governmental and scholarly, peer-reviewed material is available along with an increasing number of news articles chronicling the ongoing changes and the impact felt, both on the island and in the United States. Much of the literature focuses on the challenges to the local political landscape. The researcher selected the following subcategories best suited to advancing the research for the thesis.

1. Pros and Cons of the New Relationship between the United States and Cuba

In December 2014, President Barack Obama announced the United States' intention to renew diplomatic relations with Cuba.³⁰ This announcement was in sharp contrast to the policies previous administrations had held toward the communist island. The relations between the United States and Cuba have been adversarial for the past five decades following the Kennedy administration enacting the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (Pub. L. No. 87–195) in retaliation for the seizure of U.S. assets on the island, which thus banned all trade with Cuba.³¹

In his December 2014 speech, President Obama acknowledged that the isolation policy against Cuba had failed to provide the desired political changes on the island nation. He added that the embargo served only to deprive the Cuban people of necessary supplies.³² Proponents to improve diplomatic relations toward Cuba and against the current embargo note the primary reasons are economic, political, and humanitarian. The supporters of the embargo argue that the renewed relations bring economic expansion to a ruthless dictatorship with a documented track record of human rights violations.³³

a. Economic

The U.S. Chamber of Commerce estimates the U.S. economy has lost \$1.2 billion in annual income and 6,000 jobs by maintaining the half-century-old embargo.³⁴ The bulk of the economic impact is felt in the agricultural sector, where competition from such countries as Canada and Brazil provide produce to the Cuban market place in lieu of American farmers. A study by the nonprofit group Cuba Policy Foundation found that “If the embargo were lifted, the average American farmer would feel a difference in his or

³⁰ The White House, “Charting a New Course on Cuba.”

³¹ Foreign Relations and Intercourse, Title 22 U.S.C. Ch. 32, Section 620(a).

³² The White House, “Charting a New Course on Cuba.”

³³ Roger R. Betancourt, “Should the U.S. lift the Cuban Embargo? Yes; It Already Has; and It Depends!,” *Cuba in Transition* 23 (2014): 12.

³⁴ “International Agenda: Oppose Unilateral Economic Sanctions,” September 15, 2016, www.uschamber.com.

her life within two to three years,” and estimated that the fiscal impact would likely be much higher than previous estimates, as high as \$4.2 billion annually.³⁵

The critics of the renewed relations and the supporters of the embargo do not argue the fiscal impact of renewed relations, but note that the sole benefactor of the increase is the Cuban government and the military.³⁶ The Cuban economy is 90 percent state-owned and the government’s policy mandates that all foreign companies pay their employees via the state, which takes a hefty tax and converts it to the local devalued currency.³⁷ The currency conversion allows for the Cuban government to maintain economic control, effectively preventing any real economic impact from increased trade with the United States to trickle down to the Cuban people.

b. Political

Since 1991, the United Nations has overwhelmingly condemned the U.S. embargo against Cuba, with Israel being the sole American supporter. Most of the United States’ closest allies represent the bulk of the tourist industry in Cuba, with Canada, Great Britain, and France at the forefront.³⁸ In addition, the embargo was seen by some U.S. lawmakers as a sanction established in response to fears of the potential spread of communism in the Western Hemisphere as a result of the growing relationship between the Cuban and Soviet governments beginning in the 1960s. With the fall of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, the embargo no longer served its intended purpose. In 1998, the U.S. Defense Intelligence noted in *The Cuban Threat to U.S. National Security Report* that Cuba did not pose a significant threat to the region.³⁹

³⁵ “America’s Farmers Bearing Heavy Burden for U.S. Embargo against Cuba: New Report,” January 28, 2002, www.cubafoundation.org.

³⁶ Tony Karon, “Do We Really Need an Embargo Against Cuba?,” *TIME*, April 21, 2010.

³⁷ Richard E. Feinberg, “The New Cuban Economy: What Roles for Foreign Investment,” Brookings, December 9, 2012, <https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-new-cuban-economy-what-roles-for-foreign-investment/>.

³⁸ Peter James Spielmann, “UN General Assembly Votes against U.S. Cuba Embargo,” *Associated Press*, October 29, 2013.

³⁹ “The Cuban Threat to U.S. National Security,” November 18, 1997, <https://fas.org/irp/dia/product/980507-dia-cubarpt.htm>.

Pro-embargo groups insist that the Cuban government has not complied with the conditions outlined in the *Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996*, and consequently, terminating the embargo should not even be considered.⁴⁰ The act calls for free elections, the release of political prisoners, and the respect of human rights as conditions the Cuban government must meet to bring about an end to the U.S. embargo. Some believe that the renewal of diplomatic relations between the two nations—while the Cuban government has refused to meet the imposed conditions of the sanctions—will serve to undermine any future foreign policy the U.S. government might use to bring about changes in other countries.

In addition, the removal of the Cuban government from the U.S. state-sponsored terrorism list would suggest validation of the crimes committed by the Cuban government, including the long-standing support of the guerillas in El Salvador and the Sandinistas in Nicaragua.⁴¹ In addition, Cuba has a long history of harboring U.S. criminals who avoid prosecution by seeking asylum on the communist island, where an estimated 70 wanted criminals hide beyond the reach of U.S. law enforcement agencies.⁴² Joanne Chesimard, a member of the Black Panther Party, and the only woman on the FBI's Most Wanted list, has been in Cuba since 1979; she is sought in connection with the murder of a New Jersey state trooper in 1973.⁴³

c. Humanitarian

The embargo placed a significant strain on the Cuban government's ability to access medicine needed to provide basic healthcare to residents. The renewal of diplomatic relations helps to ensure improved access to necessary medical supplies. The American Association for World Health reported that Cuban doctors have limited access

⁴⁰ *Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996*, 104th Cong. (1996) www.gpo.gov.

⁴¹ Nora Torres, "Cuba: How It Was Added to the List of Countries that Sponsor Terrorism," *The Miami Herald*, April 18, 2015, <http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/cuba/article18886467.html>.

⁴² Peter Orsi, "Castro: Obama Is 'Stupid,'" *The Huffington Post*, September 29, 2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/09/29/castro-obama-stupid_n_987134.html?ref=latino-voices&ir=Latino%20Voices.

⁴³ Torres, "Cuba: How It Was Added to the List of Countries That Sponsor Terrorism."

to drugs, with 50 percent of medications available to industrialized nations lacking on the island.⁴⁴

In 2011, Amnesty International reported on the scarcity of antiretroviral drugs, which hampers the proper care of children on the island. Proponents state that Cuban doctors will have greater access to vital medications commercialized under U.S. patents as a result of the new relations between the United States and Cuba.⁴⁵ In 2013, Campion and Morrissey noted in the *New England Journal of Medicine* that Cuban healthcare practices focus on prevention and community health as a result of the limited access to a wide spectrum of modern medicines. They also acknowledge that the limited availability of modern methods and medicines is beginning to stress a system designed to provide patient care with minimum resources.⁴⁶

In contrast, Amnesty International referenced the continued human rights violations taking place inside Cuba in their 2011 report. It confirmed, “All media remained under state control, impeding Cubans’ free access to independent sources of information. Content on and access to the Internet continued to be monitored and, on occasion, blocked.”⁴⁷

In the *World Report 2015: Cuba*, the Human Rights Watch documented the continued use of arbitrary detention and short-term imprisonment for individuals involved in “counter-revolutionary activities.”⁴⁸ The Amnesty International report also noted that the Cuban state police routinely harass and intimidate independent journalists to control the dissemination of reports to foreign media.⁴⁹ Critics of the Obama administration condemn the ongoing violations in Cuba and note that the two nations will

⁴⁴ “Denial of Food and Medicine: The Impact of the U.S. Embargo on the Health and Nutrition in Cuba,” March 1997, www.cubasolidarity.net.

⁴⁵ “Annual Report: Cuba 2011,” May 28, 2011, <http://www.amnestyusa.org/research/reports/annual-report-cuba-2011>.

⁴⁶ Edward W. Campion and Stephen Morrissey, “A Different Model—Medical Care in Cuba,” *New England Journal of Medicine* 368, no. 4 (January 23, 2013): 297–99.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ “World Report 2015: Cuba,” 2015, <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2015/country-chapters/cuba>.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

not see an end to the current embargo until Cuba institutes changes that recognize basic human rights and freedoms. As the dynamics of the renewed relations continue to evolve, the amount of literature is certain to increase, but the argument remains the same.

2. Binational Police Cooperation

The available literature in international police cooperation relates to efforts to address the growing threats from organized groups that operate beyond the borders of any one country. Dr. Bell et al. notes, “[T]he pervasive nature of transnational organized crime (TOC) activity continues to challenge and undermine traditional methods of policing that have attempted to control its spread and influence.”⁵⁰ The research into international relations in law enforcement can best be addressed using a three-tier system of “macro, meso, and micro levels of police cooperation.”⁵¹

At the macro level, the executive decisions are normally made at the national level and address the issues related to “police operational powers across borders (e.g., arrest, surveillance and interrogation), extradition procedures, entry and exit from sovereign states and the role of international treaties and conventions.”⁵² This model of cooperation already exists, in a limited capacity, between the United States and Cuba but it does not involve officials in Miami. The meso models offer the ability to develop the framework for operational policing and allow the “establishment of specialist task forces, face to face contact between officers, linking information systems and coordinating access to shared criminal intelligence databases.”⁵³ The micro model allows for the investigation of specific crimes and it encourages the development of informal relationships that can promote networking.

⁵⁰ Peter Bell, Vy Le, and Mark Lauchs. “Elements of Best Practice in Policing Transnational Organized Crime: Critical Success Factors for International Cooperation,” *International Journal of Management and Administrative Sciences* 2, no. 3 (2013): 23.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 24.

⁵² John Benyon, “Policing the European Union: The Changing Basis of Cooperation on Law Enforcement,” *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)* (1994): 503.

⁵³ Bell, Le, and Lauchs, “Elements of Best Practice in Policing Transnational Organized Crime,” 24.

The main examples of cooperation can also be summed up in three main categories, “direct bilateral contacts, police liaison officers and the development of Joint Investigation Teams.”⁵⁴ However, the literature examines cooperation amongst European law enforcement agencies that share long-standing diplomatic relations with an emphasis on full cooperation.

A review of the literature revealed that it is not the first time that the need for a collaborative agreement has transpired among law enforcement professionals in neighboring countries with an adversarial relationship. One example involves police relations between authorities in the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of China, known as Taiwan. China and Taiwan share a long history of political hostility that extends to federal and local law enforcement.⁵⁵ The two countries shared limited diplomatic contact and had no ability for police cooperation until the 1990s when officials in both nations initiated direct contact to work on several high-profile investigations.⁵⁶

The renewed relations between the United States and Cuba closely mirror the situation between China and Taiwan, where two former foes less than 100 miles apart are in the midst of renewing relations. An examination of the dynamics of police cooperation between China and Taiwan should prove useful in identifying best practices that could be instrumental in developing a relationship between law enforcement officials in Miami and Cuba.

Another model of binational police cooperation is the New York Police Department’s (NYPD’s) International Liaison Program (ILP), which is unique among local police agencies in the United States. Since 2002, the NYPD has partnered and embedded members of its intelligence division in agencies across the globe. The program is highly controversial because “international policing, high policing is generally considered the responsibility of federal law enforcement and intelligence services, largely

⁵⁴ Bell, Le, and Lauchs, “Elements of Best Practice in Policing Transnational Organized Crime,” 24.

⁵⁵ Yungnane Yang and Frédéric Lemieux, *Cross-strait Police Cooperation between Taiwan and China*, ed. F. Lemieux (Portland, OR: Willan, 2010), 202.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 189.

because of its concern with national security.”⁵⁷ However, former Commissioner Kelly explains the purpose of the program is to have officers on the ground to provide information on how it affects their city from a New Yorker’s point of view.⁵⁸

3. City Diplomacy: International Relations of Municipal Governments

Diplomacy has been a matter of national interest but globalization has brought the role of municipal law enforcement agencies into the forefront of international relations. Globalization involving the “dissemination, transmission and dispersal of goods, persons, images and ideas across national boundaries” has impacted many U.S. cities, to include Miami.⁵⁹ The importance of cities as global players has prompted municipal law enforcement agencies to engage in relations with international partners. The move paves the way for what Van der Pluijm calls city diplomacy, “the institution and process by which cities, or local governments in general, engage in relations with actors on an international political stage with the aim of representing themselves and their interests to one another.”⁶⁰ The concept of city diplomacy was prompted by the need of municipal government to deal with emerging global challenges that have local implications to include climate change, immigration, and terrorism.⁶¹

Perhaps, the greatest global player in the United States is New York City. Globalization has impacted this gateway city in an “economic, political, and cultural way.”⁶² Accordingly, the city’s status as a major world player has made it a target of those seeking to attack the American way of life. The events surrounding the 9/11 attacks prompted the NYPD to increase its police involvement in the international arena and it is a prime example of a local jurisdiction having a major global impact.

⁵⁷ Brian Nussbaum, “From Brescia to Bin Laden: The NYPD, International Policing, and “National” Security,” *Journal of Applied Security Research* 7, no. 2 (2012): 179.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 193.

⁵⁹ Rogier Van der Pluijm and Jan Melissen, *City Diplomacy: The Expanding Role of Cities in International Politics* (The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations’ Clingendael’, 2007), 8.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 6.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 8.

⁶² John Rennie Short et al., “From World Cities to Gateway Cities: Extending the Boundaries of Globalization Theory,” *City* 4, no. 3 (2000): 318.

The diplomatic involvement by local jurisdictions is likely a result of a “responsibility to contribute to dialogue and peace, to create a secure environment for their citizens.”⁶³ The literature revealed that six major areas often prompt the involvement in city diplomacy, “security, development, economic cultural, cooperative, and representative.”⁶⁴ The need for security has triggered several local police departments to engage with international police cooperation.

This new phase of city diplomacy has made for the advent of several models of municipal cooperation like the use of sister city agreements and membership in international societies of state.⁶⁵ Sister city agreements have been in existence since the early part of the 20th century and have been widely used by neighboring cities along the U.S. and Mexican border. The agreements “have been a major ploy used to connect people and business,” as they were initially used as a vehicle for cultural and economic collaboration.⁶⁶ Despite their traditional role, the increase in concerns about national security has prompted the focus of such agreements for law enforcement purposes.⁶⁷

D. RESEARCH DESIGN

The thesis explores the need to create a working relationship between two agencies—in Miami and in Cuba—that have deep, shared connections in their Cuban roots. However, an artificial separation for more than 50 years by two political ideologies has led to an adversarial relationship, thus preventing meaningful cooperation. The thesis examines the changes the MPD needs to identify and implement to meet local challenges brought by the renewed diplomatic relations between the United States and Cuba and provides recommendations on best models of cooperation.

⁶³ Arne Musch and Alexandra Sizoo, *City Diplomacy: The Role of Local Governments in Conflict Prevention, Peace-building, Post-conflict Reconstruction* (The Hague: VNG International, 2008), 4.

⁶⁴ Van der Pluijm and Melissen, *City Diplomacy: The Expanding Role of Cities in International Politics*, 19.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 28.

⁶⁶ Short et al., “From World Cities to Gateway Cities: Extending the Boundaries of Globalization Theory,” 323.

⁶⁷ Calvin D. Shanks, “Beyond Sister City Agreements: Exploring the Challenges of Full International Interoperability” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2016).

The research employs a multiple case analysis, or a comparative case study method, that looked at three models of cross-border police cooperation to determine best practices that will benefit Miami.⁶⁸ The method allows for the study of three different models of international police cooperation and the circumstances impacting the local law enforcement capabilities. Robert Yin best defines a case study as “empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident”⁶⁹

The cases study focuses, from a logistics and politically influenced angle, on the challenges facing the MPD as a result of the changing relationship between the United States and Cuba. The research also examined the opportunities this changing relationship provides to the MPD along with an understanding of capabilities based on the MPD’s current response plan.

The cases were selected to allow a qualitative analysis to identify trends that mirror the MPD and its relationship with the Cuban National Revolutionary Police in the past to assist in planning effectively for the future.⁷⁰ The findings should provide a roadmap for identifying mutually beneficial areas to the MPD and the Cuban police despite the vast differences in political and cultural ideology. The research also leverages information as a means by which to foster open communications while embracing a spirit of cooperation.

In addition, the thesis addresses those areas requiring updates in the MPD’s current response plan based on the shift in diplomatic relations between the United States and Cuba, thus allowing for the development of a more cohesive working relationship. Utilizing the case studies to identify best practices can highlight the strengths and minimize the challenges to the implementation of a relationship between the MPD and

⁶⁸ Robert K. Yin, *Case Study Research: Design and Methods* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2013), 18.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Aaron L. Friedberg et al., “The Assessment of Military Power: A Review Essay,” *International Security* 12, no. 3 (Winter 1987–1988): 193.

the Cuban National Revolutionary Police. This identification is instrumental in planning for improved relations between the two agencies and focuses on three main areas:

- Common areas of mutual interest
- Organizational symmetry
- Political trends

Research into the compatibility of the agencies determines the areas of importance for a pathway leading toward cooperation.

II. MIAMI AND CUBA: A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP

Here in Miami, Cuba both lives and is reborn every day, just like the sun,
in its exiled children.

~ Rene Silva, quoted in David Rieff, *The Exile*, 1993

The uniqueness of Miami in the U.S.-Cuban relationship was forged by the tumultuous relations between two countries since the birth of both nations. The history of the United States and Cuba is a complicated one that focuses on domination and geopolitical struggle. Miami's role in this relationship is one of an umbilical link between the two nations; a hub that connects the Cuban people on the island to its exiles on U.S. soil.

Prior to the 1959, "Cuban immigrants clustered in cigar-making centers like Ybor City and Key West in south Florida, and in New York City" and Miami's role in U.S.-Cuban relations was non-existent.⁷¹ Despite the long U.S. involvement in Cuba, the transformation of Miami from a "medium-sized city dominated by tourism into a thriving, throbbing metropolis, the 'Capital of the Caribbean'" did not take place until after the waves of mass migration prompted by the 1959 Cuban revolution.⁷² The migration events served to flood Miami with Cubans fresh from the island that continually renewed the culture of its enclave.⁷³

The complex relationship between the United States and Cuba has served to make Miami the epicenter of the Cuban diaspora. The unique relationship noted on the previous chapter was created by multiple waves of refugees who migrated to Miami in several distinct periods of mass exodus from the island nation and led to the "Cubanization" of

⁷¹ Duany, "Cuban Communities in the United States," 72.

⁷² Mchugh, Miyares, and, Skop, "The Magnetism of Miami: Segmented Paths in Cuban Migration," 504.

⁷³ Lisandro Perez, "Cubans in the United States," *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 487, no. 1 (September 1, 1986): 136, doi: 10.1177/0002716286487001008.

the Magic City.⁷⁴ The mass migration transformed Miami from a sleepy retirement town to one of the most influential cities in America.⁷⁵ The migration to Miami coincided with periods of economic and political distress on the island nation and the immigrants have arrived in the United States from Cuba steadily every year since the 1959 revolution that saw the rise of the Castro regime. The otherness of each of the waves can be identified as they are “characterized by a very different social composition with respect to the immigrants’ social class, race, education, gender and family composition, and values.”⁷⁶

Of the major waves of migration, this chapter analyzes the two that have forged the unique relationship between the City of Miami and the Cuban people, the golden exile and Mariel boatlift.⁷⁷ The periods were selected, as the research demonstrated that they had the greatest impact on the local cultural, economic, and political landscape and on the MPD’s ability to provide effective public safety services. See Figure 1.

⁷⁴ Mchugh, Miyares, and, Skop, “The Magnetism of Miami: Segmented Paths in Cuban Migration,” 504.

⁷⁵ David Rieff, *The Exile: Cuba in the Heart of Miami* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993), 30.

⁷⁶ Silvia Pedraza, “Cuba’s Revolution and Exodus,” *Journal of the International Institute* 5, no. 2 (1998), <http://hdl.handle.net/2027/spo.4750978.0005.204>.

⁷⁷ Leif Jensen and Alejandro Portes, “The Enclave and the Entrants: Patterns of Ethnic Enterprise in Miami before and after Mariel,” *American Sociological Review* 57, no. 3 (1992): 412.

Phase	Dates	Landmark events	Estimated number of immigrants
Golden Exile	January 1959- October 1962	From the triumph of the Revolution to the Missile Crisis	250 000 (22,9 % of the total)
Suspension of regular migration	November 1962- November 1965	From the end of the Missile Crisis to the opening of Camarioca port	74 000 (6,8%)
Freedom Flights	December 1965- April 1973	From the closing of Camarioca to the end of the airbridge	300 000 (27,6%)
Arrivals through other countries	May 1973- March 1980	From the end of the airbridge to the opening of Mariel harbor	38 000 (3,5%)
Mariel exodus	April-September 1980	From the opening to the closing of Mariel	125 000 (11,5%)
Renewal of regular migration	October 1980- December 1991	From the end of Mariel to the reduction of visas	154 000 (14,2%)
Increase in undocumented migration	January 1992- July 1994	From the reduction of visas to the <i>balsero</i> crisis	51 000 (4,7%)
<i>Balsero</i> crisis	August- September 1994	From the lifting of Cuban restrictions to migrate to the U.S.-Cuban agreements	36 000 (3,3%)
Renewal of regular migration	October 1994- December 1996	From the U.S.-Cuban agreements to the present	60 000 (5,5%)

Figure 1. Stages in Cuban Migration to the United States since the Cuban Revolution.⁷⁸

A. THE GOLDEN EXILE 1959–1962

In 1959, the revolutionary forces led by Fidel Castro took power of the Caribbean nation. The revolution forced the first mass exodus from Cuba to the United States and it was comprised of military officials, politicians, and social elites who fled from the revolutionary forces of the Castro regime as they overturned social order. These social elites had access to economic resources that allowed them to escape from Cuba on commercial flights headed to Miami. Alex Larzelere notes the severity of the exodus:

Of 5,000 physicians in Cuba before the Revolution, 1,300 left the country, along with 300 of 1,800 pharmacists. Only 800 of the country's 1,800 certified public accountants remained in Cuba. Some 46 percent of agricultural engineers, 44 percent of civil engineers, and 38 percent of electrical engineers departed the country in the first three years after the Castro Revolution.⁷⁹

The migration induced a brain drain on the island nation that had a serious impact on the government's ability to stabilize the economy.

⁷⁸ Source: Duany, "Cuban Communities in the United States," 71.

⁷⁹ Larzelere, *Castro's Ploy-America's Dilemma: The 1980 Cuban Boatlift*, 54.

Cuba's loss was Miami's gain, as those refugees chose to settle in geographical proximity with hopes of a quick end to the Cuban revolution and with expectations of American intervention in their country. As hopes for a quick return to the island faded, "the early exiles set a course for economic success based on serving their own ethnic community and, by extension, the larger population of Miami and beyond."⁸⁰ It also gave Miami "human skills and hemispheric connections" to allow the new arrivals to succeed.⁸¹

The political influence also skyrocketed, as "the result of an admixture of the entrepreneurial and professional skills of early Cuban emigres, access to capital, hard work, and a positive reception and assistance by the U.S. government" that was motivated by fears of a communist nation 90 miles from its coastline.⁸²

The exiles in Miami were a driving factor in the Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961, as they served as the American launching pad of anti-Castro activity.⁸³ After the dismal failure of the invasion, the exile community grew discontent with American politicians and prompted them to become involved in the local political scene in an effort to aid their desires for a free Cuba. The period marked the end of an era, as exiles realized "the Revolution was here to stay; exile was no longer a transitory status."⁸⁴ Miami was the new permanent home of the Cuban American community.

Wilbur Rich best notes the impact of the early exiles in "one generation three Cuban-American congressmen have been elected, Cuban have won ten Florida state house seats, three Florida state senate seats, the mayorship of Miami, Coral Gables, Hialeah, and other communities in Florida and Northern New Jersey. In metropolitan Miami-Dade County, Latins have consolidated their status as the core electoral

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Wilbur C. Rich, "Cuban-American Political Empowerment," Florida International University, January 29, 1998, <http://www2.fiu.edu/~morenod/scholar/empower.htm>.

⁸² McHugh, Miyares, and Skop, "The Magnetism of Miami: Segmented Paths in Cuban Migration," 505.

⁸³ Duany, "Cuban Communities in the United States," 77.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

constituency.”⁸⁵ Many of the golden exiles are still in influential private and public sector leadership positions that still want to see the United States maintain its Cold War era position of Cuban isolation.

This wave of migration is crucial to the current local political landscape, as it served to promulgate the current anti-Castro political drum line. Lisandro Pérez best describes the primordial role of the golden exiles play in the Cubanization of Miami when he “compared the Cuban diaspora to the peeling of an onion, in which successive layers of migrants draw increasingly on the core of the Cuban population.”⁸⁶ The period came to a close as the relations between the United States and Cuba quickly deteriorated as a result of the Cuban Missile crisis in 1962. The golden exile had minimal impact on the ability of the MPD to provide public safety; however, it was crucial to define the future political landscape that currently impacts Miami and the department’s ability to willingly engage the Cuban police in meaningful talks.

B. THE 1980 MARIEL BOATLIFT

In the spring and summer, I had to deal with a stream of illegal Cuban refugees who began coming to our country. We welcomed the first ones to freedom, but when the stream became a torrent, I explored every legal means to control the badly deteriorating situation. Even so, it was impossible to stop them all.... I sympathized with the plight of the refugees, but they were coming in illegally, and I was sworn to uphold the laws of our land.

~ President Jimmy Carter. *Keeping Faith*, 1982.

In 1979, the Cuban government, under extreme fiscal pressure, allowed 100,000 exiled Cubans from the United States to visit family back on the island. The move was meant to inject a hard currency boost to the failing Cuban economy and spur growth from the increase in visitors. The strategy was initially successful with an estimated \$100

⁸⁵ Dario Moreno, “Cuban Americans in Miami Politics: Understanding the Cuban Model,” in *The Politics of Minority Coalitions: Race, Ethnicity and Shared Uncertainties*, ed. Wilbur Rich (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1996), 145–62.

⁸⁶ Larzelere, *Castro’s Ploy-America’s Dilemma: The 1980 Cuban Boatlift*, 126–137.

million being brought to the island by visitors that year.⁸⁷ The unforeseen circumstance of the move was revealed as the visiting exiles came with tales of prosperity, bringing their relatives clothing, household goods and U.S. currency. The Cuban people already disillusioned with the revolution, because of a high unemployment, housing shortages, and a low standard of living, became further polarized.

In March 1980, a group of Cubans crashed a city bus into the Peruvian Embassy in Havana in search of asylum. The incident unleashed a chain of events that ultimately led to 10,000 Cubans flooding the grounds of the Peruvian embassy. In April 1980, Cuban radio announced that the Port of Mariel, just west of Havana, Cuba would be open for any Cubans wishing to leave the island as long as they had someone to pick them up.⁸⁸

The announcement came at a time when many of the 800,000 Cuban exiles living in the United States were looking for a way to reunite their families and friends ideally outside the oppressive conditions in Cuba. Ronald Copeland wrote, “they witnessed the poverty of their relatives in Cuba and returned here with a sense of remorse and guilt and a resolve to do something to relieve the desperate conditions of their families in Cuba.”⁸⁹ Castro’s announcement, the Cuban-American sentiments, and the Carter administration’s willingness to receive Cuban refugees with “open hearts and open arms” created a flood of would-be Cuban emigrants taking to the ocean in hopes of arriving in the United States. The U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) quickly lost its ability to regulate the Florida straits.⁹⁰ The crush of ships risking the trip to Cuba during the boatlift turned the USCG part-time mission of intercepting undocumented migrants into a full-time mission requiring the assistance of the U.S. Navy.⁹¹ Alejandro Portes and Alex Stepick document

⁸⁷ David Wells Engstrom, *Presidential Decision Making Adrift: The Carter Administration and the Mariel Boatlift* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1997), 47.

⁸⁸ Larzelere, *Castro’s Ploy-America’s Dilemma: The 1980 Cuban Boatlift*, 221.

⁸⁹ Ronald Copeland, “The Cuban Boatlift of 1980: Strategies in Federal Crisis Management,” *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 467, no. 1 (1983): 138–150.

⁹⁰ Larzelere, *Castro’s Ploy-America’s Dilemma: The 1980 Cuban Boatlift*, 181.

⁹¹ Dennis L. Noble, *The U.S. Coast Guard’s War on Human Smuggling* (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2011), 4.

the boatlift in *City on the Edge*, noting, “Mariel was a unique episode in American immigration history. Instead of immigrants coming on their own, they were actually brought into the country, not by government agencies, but in boats chartered by earlier immigrants. Mariel was high drama in the Straits of Florida.”⁹² The flood of people arriving dwarfed all other migration events from Cuba as, “During May 1980 alone, more refugees arrived than in 1962, the previous record year of Cuban immigration.”⁹³

The event was an orchestrated effort by the Castro regime to open an “escape valve” to allow the pressure built up by anti-government dissidents to leave and quell growing tensions in the island. Unbeknownst to the Carter administration, Fidel Castro had hijacked the Mariel boatlift as a way to inject a “virus” into the American mainland. The largely unrestricted admittance of refugees lent itself to be exploited by the Cuban government; Fidel Castro took the opportunity of the Mariel boatlift to empty his jails, and psycho wards. An estimated 25,000 of the refugees had a criminal record, with 1,761 for serious offenses, such as murder and rape.⁹⁴

Andrew J. Carmichael, Acting Associate Commissioner for Examinations for the Immigration and Naturalization Service, noted on the unprepared status of U.S. authorities:

while statistics were gathered daily, the information was taken strictly on their[Cubans] admissions.... We will probably never know the truth about how many criminals arrived....We know now that many of the criminals that arrived with the Boatlift were not detained because they were later arrested for serious crimes. It indicated a failure of the system.⁹⁵

The commissioner’s statements give the reader a glimpse at the chaos facing U.S. immigration officials in the documenting of the arrivals without the cooperation of the Cuban government.

⁹² Alejandro Portes and Alex Stepick, *City on the Edge the Transformation of Miami* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1994).

⁹³ Alejandro Portes and Alex Stepick, “Unwelcome Immigrants: The Labor Market Experiences of 1980 (MARIEL) Cuban and Haitian Refugees in South Florida,” *American Sociological Review* 50, no. 4 (August 1985): 495.

⁹⁴ Larzelere, *Castro’s Ploy-America’s Dilemma: The 1980 Cuban Boatlift*, 225.

⁹⁵ Larzelere, *Castro’s Ploy-America’s Dilemma: The 1980 Cuban Boatlift*, 228.

In addition, an estimated 3,000 refugees were suspected Cuban agents tasked with disrupting the anti-Castro movement in the United States; of those, approximately 400 Cuban agents were sent to smuggle drugs to return the proceeds to the Cuban government.⁹⁶ Fidel said in his 1980 May Day speech, “Those that are leaving from Mariel are the scum of the country-antisocials, homosexuals, drug addicts and gamblers, who are welcome to leave Cuba if any country will have them.”⁹⁷

The impact of the Mariel boatlift on Miami has been the topic of much debate. What is clear is that “the wave of illegal immigrants has pushed up unemployment, taxed social services, irritated social tension and help send the crime rate to staggering heights.”⁹⁸ The issues stemming from the boatlift caused Miami Mayor Maurice Ferrer to comment, “We have become a boiling pot, not a melting pot.”⁹⁹ The episode had a great impact on the ability of the MPD to police Miami.

C. CURRENT U.S. AND CUBA RELATIONS

The Obama administration has acknowledged that the previous U.S. strategy that “rested on three key assumptions that, over time, proved mistaken—that an overwhelming majority of Cubans despised the Castro government, that a well organized opposition had the popular support necessary to displace it, and that a combination of economic pressure and political isolation would catalyze a change of regime” has failed.¹⁰⁰ Obama notes that the failed policy and the resulting embargo have only served to punish the Cuban people. The new policy seeks to renew diplomatic relations, adjust regulations to empower the Cuban people, facilitate travel to Cuba, expand sales of certain goods and services, and ease access by the Cuban people to communication technologies.¹⁰¹

⁹⁶ Ibid., 231.

⁹⁷ Portes and Stepick, *City on the Edge the Transformation of Miami*, 21.

⁹⁸ Darrell M. West, *Brain Gain: Rethinking U.S. Immigration Policy* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2010), 76.

⁹⁹ James Kelly, “South Florida: Trouble in Paradise,” *Time*, November 23, 1981.

¹⁰⁰ Ben Birnbaum et al., *United States-Cuba Relations: Policy Recommendations to Advance Normalization* (Princeton, NJ: Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, 2016), 7.

¹⁰¹ The White House, “Charting a New Course on Cuba.”

Since President Obama's 2014 announcement, the United States has taken several steps to normalize relations with Cuba. In May 2015, the Department of State removed Cuba from the state-sponsored terrorism list, a move that served to clean Cuba's image and pave the way to access funds from American financial institutions.¹⁰² In 2016, the United States has continued on a path to advance the detente with Cuba. Negotiations between both nations reached a fever pitch with a barrage of major announcements.

In March 2016, the Obama administration eased travel restrictions to Cuba, allowing educational and cultural interaction trips, while simultaneously reinstating direct postal service with the island.¹⁰³ The change in restrictions came days before President Obama travelled to Cuba, making him the first sitting U.S. president to visit the island nation since 1928.¹⁰⁴ While on his visit, President Obama addressed the Cuban people in Havana. The President announced his desire to continue fostering open dialogue with the Castro regime. He also noted that changes would continue to include the commencement of commercial flight and cruises direct from U.S. facilities to Cuba.¹⁰⁵

President Obama's speech also highlighted a new plan for educational exchange between the two nations, the 100,000 Strong in the Americas Initiative. The plan "will offer new opportunities for university students to study abroad, more Americans at Cuban schools and more Cubans at U.S. schools."¹⁰⁶ The move will certainly increase the likelihood that the MPD will interact with Cuban students in Miami.

In May 2016, Carnival Cruise Line became the first pleasure vessel to dock in a Cuban port in over 40 years.¹⁰⁷ The airline industry quickly followed suit and in June

¹⁰² Julie Hirschfeld Davis, "U.S. Removes Cuba from State-Sponsored Terrorism List," *The New York Times*, May 30, 2015, <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/30/us/us-removes-cuba-from-state-terrorism-list>.

¹⁰³ "USPS Resumes Mail Service to Cuba," March 16, 2016, https://about.usps.com/news/national-releases/2016/pr16_010.htm.

¹⁰⁴ Dan Roberts, "Obama Lands in Cuba as First U.S. President to Visit in Nearly a Century," *The Guardian*, March 21, 2016, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/20/barack-obama-cuba-visit-us-politics-shift-public-opinion-diplomacy>.

¹⁰⁵ Ramon Espinosa, "Text of President Barack Obama's Speech in Cuba on Monday," *Miami Herald*, March 21, 2016, www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/cuba/article67364722.html.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁷ Alexander Meneghini, "For 1st Time since 1978, U.S. Cruise Docks in Cuba," *CBS News*, May 2, 2016, www.cbsnews.com/news/us-cruise-ship-carnival-adonia-docks-havana-cuba/.

2016, the U.S. Department of Transportation announced that it authorized six major U.S. carriers' direct flights to destinations in Cuba. In October 2016, the Obama administration further eased trade restrictions with Cuba by allowing Cuban rum and cigars to enter the U.S. market. Experts have long regarded those two commodities as the prized jewel of the Cuban economy and the move will impact the cigar producers located in the Little Havana community in Miami.

The interaction between the two nations demonstrates that Cuba has a symbiotic relationship that has been used as an escape valve, via mass migration episodes, to release pressures on their land with significant impact on the American political landscape. Despite their seemingly unwillingness to cooperate, both governments have been able to work together to put measures in place that are mutually beneficial. It is this desire by both nations that must be considered when determining the best course of action in establishing a cooperative model for policing. Their ability to solve a complex issue is a testament to the power of open dialogue and communication.

On January 12, 2017, the relationship between the two nations took another step towards normalization with the announcement of the Obama administration of changes to the current wet-foot/dry-foot policy. The announcement issued by Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Johnson marks the latest move in the final days of the current administration to move forward the detente.¹⁰⁸ The immediate modification of the policy results

are part of the ongoing normalization of relations between the governments of the United States and Cuba, and reflect a commitment to have a broader immigration policy in which we treat people from different countries consistently. To the extent permitted by the current laws of our two countries, the United States will now treat Cuban migrants in a manner consistent with how it treats others; unauthorized migrants can expect to be removed unless they qualify for humanitarian relief under our laws.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁸ *Statement by Secretary Johnson on the Continued Normalization of our Migration Relationship with Cuba,* "Statement by Secretary Johnson on the Continued Normalization of our Migration Relationship with Cuba" (2017), accessed January 17, 2017, <https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/01/12/statement-secretary-johnson-continued-normalization-our-migration-relationship-cuba>.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

With the latest changes the Obama administration sets the stage to impact the latest influx of Cuban arriving that in 2016 that saw a “total of 50,082 Cubans entered the United States in 2016, according to the Office of Field Operations of the Customs and Border Protection Service. Of those, 38,310 arrived illegally, while 11,772 had a visa.”¹¹⁰

The shift in the U.S. immigration policy will eliminate the political pressure valve that the Cuban regime has used to downplay instability on the island. The many scholars see the move as a primer to ignite political consciousness in the island nation with a move towards democracy and limiting the regime’s ability to use mass migration as a weapon.¹¹¹

D. IMPACT OF THE U.S. AND CUBA RELATIONSHIP ON THE MIAMI POLICE DEPARTMENT

The impact of the relationship between the United States and Cuba has been both positive and negative. The golden exile brought some of the most successful and brightest Cubans to Miami. Cuba’s brain drain was Miami’s gain.

However, the Mariel boatlift impacted the ability of the MPD to provide adequate public safety services in the city. The 1980s in Miami was a decade that became synonymous with police corruption on a large scale. In 1985, the Miami River Cops, a group of 19 MPD officers were involved in the theft of drugs, extortion, and murder. The officers were hired in the early 1980s, during a period when Miami sought to double the size of its police force as partly in need to address the mass influx of Cubans.¹¹² Edwin J. Delattre, a leading researcher in the field of ethical police behavior, noted in his book *Character and Cops: Ethics in Policing*, the undeniable link between the widespread corruption of the 1980s in the MPD to the rise in crime and relaxed employment

¹¹⁰ “Hundreds of Cubans Deported since End of U.S. Immigration Status: Cuba,” February 19, 2017, www.jamaicaobserver.com/latestnews/Hundreds-of-Cubans-deported-since-end-of-US-immigration-status-Cuba.

¹¹¹ Kelly M. Greenhill, “Engineered Migration and the Use of Refugees as Political Weapons: A Case Study of the 1994 Cuban Balseiros Crisis,” *International Migration* 40, no. 4 (2002): 68.

¹¹² Mary S. Thompson, “Miami Vice: Police Trafficking in Drugs,” *Washington Post*, February 7, 1988.

standards.¹¹³ The substandard hiring practice allowed a large number of “rotten apples” to secure employment in the MPD.

In the early 1980s, the MPD was also facing a mass exodus of officers in the wake of several riots in the city as a result of deadly encounters between the police and minorities.¹¹⁴ The MPD, overwhelmed and undermanned, was unable to keep the “Magic City” from becoming the deadliest city in America, as the City of Miami was listed on top of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) 10 most crime-ridden cities in the nation in its annual report.¹¹⁵ The cocaine war had turned the city into a battlefield; the local homicide units handled a record 573 murders in 1980. The city and county government was unprepared; the number of murders required the Miami-Dade County Medical Examiner’s office to rent a refrigerated truck to keep the bodies, because they had no more room in their facilities.¹¹⁶ In 1981, the number of murders rose to 621, as the MPD continued to struggle to police the city effectively and deter the drug-related street violence.

Since the MPD was ill prepared to handle the rapid influx of Spanish speaking Cuban refugees that flooded the city streets, the department embarked on a recruiting campaign that saw the organization swell from 650 sworn officers in 1980 to 1,033 in 1985.¹¹⁷ The hiring frenzy came at a cost; the department was unable to attain the number of minority officers needed to service the growing ethnic population. In response, the hiring qualifications were lowered and the screening process was taken away from MPD personnel and assigned to the City of Miami human resources (HR) department. The HR’s focus became hiring those minimally qualified instead of screening out the

¹¹³ Edwin J. Delattre, *Character and Cops: Ethics in Policing* (Washington, DC: AEI Press, 1994), 75.

¹¹⁴ Michael Palmiotto, *Police Misconduct: A Reader for the 21st Century* (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2001), 137.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁶ Francisco Alvarado, “1981: Miami’s Deadliest Summer,” *Miami New Times*, August 10, 2011, <http://www.miaminewtimes.com/news/1981-miamis-deadliest-summer-6565290>.

¹¹⁷ Dombrink, “The Touchables: Vice and Police Corruption in the 1980’s,” 221.

“less desirable.”¹¹⁸ In addition, the starting salary for a MPD officer was \$15,042,¹¹⁹ at a time when it was not uncommon for a street cop to find \$20,000 in cash in the trunk of a car during a routine traffic stop.¹²⁰ The starting salary, accounting for inflation, would be roughly \$34,000; the MPD current minimum salary is \$46,000. The MPD was plagued with widespread corruption, in a department of a 1,000 sworn members, “almost 100 officers were relieved of duty from January 1, 1985 to early 1988.”¹²¹ The number amounted to almost 10 percent of the organization.

In 1985, several drug raids and execution style murders were committed by Miami police officers on vessels along the Miami River. The subsequent investigation and arrest of 19 police officers, became known as the “Miami River Cops” case and marked the largest corruption investigation in the history of the MPD.¹²² The officers involved in the corruption scandal had been hired with minimal qualifications and became the “rotten apples” of the department.¹²³ The “River Cops” case demonstrated that inadequate hiring practices in combination with lax supervision have devastating effects.¹²⁴ The investigation also revealed that the individuals assigned to the night shift had been hired under relaxed standards and had minimal supervision that allowed them to break the law with impunity. Mancini put it best by noting the MPD River Cops turned the MPD “initials and motto from MPD = motivation, pride, and dedication into MPD = murder, piracy, and destruction.”¹²⁵ As departmental morale tumbled, the crime tore Miami apart, as violent crime escalated and murders climbed to a nationwide leading 621.¹²⁶

¹¹⁸ Palmiotto, *Police Misconduct: A Reader for the 21st Century*, 137.

¹¹⁹ “Miami in the 80’s—Mariel Boatlift—Cocaine Cowboys,” YouTube video, 6:15, posted by Billy Corben, November 23, 2007, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gl9OddN29Z4>.

¹²⁰ Dombrink, “The Touchables: Vice and Police Corruption in the 1980’s,” 207.

¹²¹ Dale K. Sechrest and Pamela Burns, “Police Corruption the Miami Case,” *Criminal Justice and Behavior* 19, no. 3 (1992): 296.

¹²² Sechrest and Burns, “Police Corruption the Miami Case,” 296.

¹²³ Palmiotto, *Police Misconduct: A Reader for the 21st Century*, 139.

¹²⁴ Sechrest and Burns, “Police Corruption the Miami Case,” 309.

¹²⁵ Chris Mancini, *Pirates in Blue* (Miami: National Association of Chiefs of Police, 1996), 8.

¹²⁶ Alvarado, “1981: Miami’s Deadliest Summer.”

The Miami River cops' investigation was a result of several internal and external factors, related to the special relationship between Cuba and Miami. The MPD's senior leadership team was late to recognize the magnitude of the impact of the scandal. The department did make widespread hiring reforms but the brand of the MPD had already been tarnished. This special relationship makes collaboration and cooperation necessary, especially as it relates to public safety.

Today, the effects of the relationship continues to be evident in the deployment of departmental resources to monitor and police the many Cuban inspired demonstrations that have impacted the city in the past year. The March 2016 visit of President Obama to Cuba, and the November 2016 death of long-time Cuban Dictator Fidel Castro, prompted large crowds to gather in various spots in Miami, as depicted in Figure 2. Both events impacted the Cuban American community in different ways, yet inspired the same reactions that led to days of demonstrations.



Figure 2. November 2016, Thousands of Cuban Americans Celebrate the Death of Fidel Castro in the Streets of Miami.¹²⁷

¹²⁷ Source: Gustavo Caballero, "Cuban Americans in Miami Celebrate the Death of Fidel Castro," TheBlaze, November 26, 2016, www.theblaze.com/news/2016/11/26/cuban-americans-in-miami-celebrate-the-death-of-fidel-castro/.

The challenges to cooperation with the Cuban authorities can best be illustrated by the statements of Miami Mayor Tomas Regalado, who attended and participated in the mass celebrations that resulted as the news of the passing of Fidel Castro spread throughout the Magic City. Mayor Regalado stated “[A]s a Cuban American I am part of this celebration and the reason I am part of this celebration is because Fidel Castro hurt many generations of Cubans.”¹²⁸ The Mayor went on to illustrate the deep feeling of hatred towards the Castro regime noting that the community was celebrating in unison “[A]nd they have all the reason in the world to celebrate as the world celebrated when Hitler died, today the Cubans celebrate the death of Fidel Castro and it will go on for hours and for days.”¹²⁹ The comparison of the current regime in Cuba to the Nazi party in Germany prior to World War II is indicative of the political climate that could be an insurmountable obstacle to most models of cooperation with officials on the island nation.

Back in January 2016, Mayor Regalado vowed to take legal action if the federal government attempted to place a Cuban consulate in Miami.¹³⁰ Local politicians acknowledged that a consulate in Miami would make perfect sense, because of the large Cuban population and natural connection to the island, however, not under the current conditions. The mayor cited that a consulate would “affect our peace and stability” due to constant protests.¹³¹ The increased risk brought by civil disturbances and demonstrations would tax police resources unnecessarily.

¹²⁸ Regalado on Castro, “What You See Here Are People Who Have Suffered,” *CBS Miami*, November 26, 2016, miami.cbslocal.com/2016/11/26/regalado-on-castro-what-you-see-here-are-people-who-have-suffered/.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*

¹³⁰ Douglas Hanks, “Miami Readies a Fight over Cuban Consulate,” *Miami Herald*, January 18, 2016, www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/miami-dade/article55309110.html.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*

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III. CASE STUDY ANALYSIS

The changes in the relationship between the United States and Cuba have a complex impact on Miami; therefore, identifying case studies examples of police cooperation that fit this rapidly changing framework is difficult. However, the search for best practices that can serve as a template to create a working relationship between the MPD and the Cuban authorities revealed various models of binational police cooperation that can be useful. It is important to recognize that to address security issues in Miami, cooperation with the Cuban police should involve “sharing intelligence, coordinating operations, securing evidence and targeting suspects” that is accomplished by using proven models of international policing.¹³²

The research looked at three models of international cooperation that impact municipal police agencies at a local level: the agreements between China and Taiwan, the NYPD’s ILP, and the sister city agreements between El Paso, Texas and Ciudad Juárez, Mexico. The case study of these models could offer insight into how the MPD and the Cuban authorities can build a knowledgebase of activities occurring outside their respective jurisdictions but impact conditions in their areas of operations.

A. CASE STUDY 1—CHINA AND TAIWAN POLICE COOPERATION

The renewed relations between the United States and Cuba closely mirror the situation between China and Taiwan, where two former foes with a shared ethnic background and less than 100 miles apart are in the midst of renewing relations. China and Taiwan were one nation until the 1949 civil war that saw the Communist defeat of the Nationalist party. The period of hostility began as the nationalists withdrew from Mainland China and instituted a separate political authority in Taiwan.¹³³ Mainland China has, since the split, refused to recognize Taiwan formally as an independent nation and implemented a “political stance of the ‘Three Nos’ (no contact, no compromise, no

¹³² Bell, Le, and Lauchs, “Elements of Best Practice in Policing Transnational Organized Crime,” 24.

¹³³ Ming-Li Hsieh and Francis D. Boateng, “Perceptions of Democracy and Trust in the Criminal Justice System: A Comparison between Mainland China and Taiwan,” *International Criminal Justice Review* 25, no. 2 (2015): 155.

bargaining).”¹³⁴ China’s political stance towards Taiwan is comparable to the U.S. foreign policy towards Cuba prior to the Obama administration.

In May 1986, a Taiwanese national flew a civilian aircraft to China without either government’s authorization. The incident forced formal contact between the two nations and opened the lines of communications between police officials that laid the foundation for future informal contacts.¹³⁵ The event between China and Taiwan was an indicator that binational relations necessitate an increase in police cooperation to address new security issues.¹³⁶

In September 1990, the proliferation of human trafficking and smuggling prompted the formalizing of the Kinmen Agreements. The agreements were mediated by the Red Cross Organization, which allowed the governments to maintain separate political interests. The agreements were very limited and dealt mainly with deportation of criminals as prompted by the need of the Taiwanese and the pressure on the Chinese.¹³⁷ Despite the limited scope of the agreements, it served to segue to formal open lines of communications between high-ranking officials in both nations.

These informal relationships can prove valuable to law enforcement investigations, where formal channels lack the ability to facilitate the open exchange of mutually beneficial information. The efficacy of police relations between agencies can be improved by focusing on “four dimensions related to organizational interactions, including individuals, groups, organizational settings, and environment.”¹³⁸ Rogers offers a way for police agencies to develop and foster police cross-strait cooperation to achieve improvements in organizational interactions by enhancing the potential of incentives to increase the “willingness, ability, and capacity, of cross strait police cooperation.”¹³⁹

¹³⁴ Hsieh and Boateng, “Perceptions of Democracy and Trust in the Criminal Justice System: A Comparison between Mainland China and Taiwan,” 188.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, 189.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, 187.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, 192.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*, 194.

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*, 202.

Several factors continue to force both nations to maintain a working relationship, primarily in diplomatic and national security matters, to address cross-border criminal activity as noted by Yang and Lemieux:

1) the exceptional boom in China's economy during the 1990s, which 187 Cross-strait police cooperation created several illicit lucrative opportunities for both Taiwanese and Chinese people (smuggling and trafficking, white collar crime, etc.); 2) the steady increase of travel between Taiwan and China for cultural, religious, and academic purposes since 1987 and the recent authorization of direct flights between the two countries, both amplifying existing problems related to immigration regulations; and finally 3) the communication technology (for instance, the Internet) used to facilitate trade and financial exchanges is also now making it easier to commit fraud and other forms of cybercrime.¹⁴⁰

The rapid modifications to U.S. policy have brought similar travel and economic changes to Cuba. Those changes will require the City of Miami and its "police organizations shape and implement cooperative initiatives."¹⁴¹

However, implementing change in a politically influenced organization can be complex as North notes:

Cross-strait police cooperation (including both formal and informal constraints on it) is controlled by politics or is under the influence of political institutions. Therefore, political concerns related to national security contribute to the inflexibility of cross-strait police cooperation.¹⁴²

Similarly, the rapidly changing relations between the United States and Cuba has facilitated cooperation between federal authorities, but Miami's anti-Castro political climate presents a daunting and seemingly inflexible obstacle to police cooperation across the Florida Straits.

The political influence does not allow formal political contact; however, law enforcement issues are facilitated via non-governmental entities "to handle technical or business matters, including security issues."¹⁴³ Research has shown that informal

¹⁴⁰ Yang and Lemieux, *Cross-strait Police Cooperation between Taiwan and China*, 187.

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 188.

¹⁴² *Ibid.*

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*

agreements and/or activities play a more important role than formal agreements when measuring police cooperation in particular, it is possible the MPD and Cuban authorities could use a similar model to start a working relationship.¹⁴⁴

Current relations between both nations are continuing to be influenced by the Chinese economic growth after the transition from a “closed-market economy into the world’s second biggest economy.”¹⁴⁵ Despite the economic transformation, China remains “an authoritarian regime with a one-party system,” much like Cuba that since it engaged in renewed relations with the United States is moving towards a limited free market as it maintains political control of the island.¹⁴⁶

The dynamics of the cross-strait relationship between police agencies in China and Taiwan is vastly similar to the political and cultural conditions that impact the relationship between the MPD and the Cuban police. The case offers insight into the potential of informal relations between individuals on both sides of the border. However, the model is heavily dependent on the personal relationships and offers no evidence that the political environment in Miami and Havana would not impact those relationships.

B. CASE STUDY 2—NEW YORK POLICE DEPARTMENT’S INTERNATIONAL LIAISON PROGRAM

This section analyses the circumstances that gave rise to the inception of the NYPD’s ILP. The research also details the operational model, as well as the pros and cons of the program. The events of 9/11 have left a permanent scar of the psyche of all Americans, but nowhere were those scars deeper than in New York City. The events served the members of NYPD’s leadership team as a stark reminder of their systematic failures to protect one of the greatest cities in the world. The events of 9/11 brought to the forefront of homeland security experts the undeniable fact that “all terrorism is local” and the NYPD realized the ineffectiveness of its counterterrorism strategies that relied on the

¹⁴⁴ Yang and Lemieux, *Cross-strait Police Cooperation between Taiwan and China*, 188.

¹⁴⁵ Hsieh and Boateng, “Perceptions of Democracy and Trust in the Criminal Justice System: A Comparison between Mainland China and Taiwan,” 153.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 154.

federal and state officials as its suppliers of intelligence.¹⁴⁷ The lapse in communications that led to intelligence failures of 9/11 cemented in NYPD officials the determination to prove the notion that “homeland security begins with hometown security” by taking a local approach to the city’s defense against terrorism.¹⁴⁸

The realization that its uninterrupted involvement in the intelligence gathering business had a direct impact on its ability to protect its citizens prompted the NYPD to look for a more effective way to gather intelligence. In a post-9/11 New York City, the importance of municipal engagement in the global arena is evident in the economic and technological advancements that have led to increased globalization and international police relations.¹⁴⁹ Nussbaum argues that New York City’s role as a world destination “represent a sort of international critical infrastructure underpinning the global economy,” and therefore, it could “face potentially higher threats because of the high profiles, high number of international travelers and citizens, and target rich environments.”¹⁵⁰ In 2002, the NYPD leadership recognized the need to change the role of its municipal policing model in the face of increased international threats and created the ILP. The program offered an opportunity to take their policing efforts abroad and become the “most global of local police forces.”¹⁵¹ With the controversial move, the NYPD took its counterterrorism and intelligence gathering efforts overseas; locations are listed in Figure 3. It used its status as a global player to create and oversee a law enforcement program unseen in American policing.

¹⁴⁷ Erik J. Dahl, “Local Approaches to Counterterrorism: the New York Police Department Model,” *Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism* 9, no. 2 (2014): 81.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

¹⁴⁹ Brian Nussbaum, “Protecting Global Cities: New York, London and the Internationalization of Municipal Policing for Counter Terrorism,” *Global Crime* (July 2007): 192, <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17440570701507745#.UlvwTxDikck>.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., 214.

¹⁵¹ Dahl, “Local Approaches to Counterterrorism: the New York Police Department Model,” 86.

NYPD Officers have visited or had short postings to the following locations (amongst others):	For the following reason:
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba	Interrogations
Afghanistan	Interrogations
Jordan	JITF Investigation
Bali, Indonesia	JITF Investigation
Germany	JITF Investigation
Kuwait	JITF Investigation
Portugal	JITF Investigation
Malaysia	"Investigations" or "Interrogations"
Pakistan	"Investigations" or "Interrogations"
Singapore	"Investigations" or "Interrogations"
Mumbai, India	Post-Attack Intelligence Gathering (July 2006)
London, UK	Post-Attack Intelligence Gathering (July 2005)
Beslan, Russia	Post-Attack Intelligence Gathering (September 2004)
Madrid, Spain	Post-Attack Intelligence Gathering (March 2004)
Moscow, Russia	Post-Attack Intelligence Gathering (February 2004)
Manila, Philippines	Post-Attack Intelligence Gathering (February 2004)
Istanbul, Turkey	Post-Attack Intelligence Gathering (November 2003)
Israel	Post-Attack Intelligence Gathering (12 + Suicide Bombings)

Figure 3. NYPD Overseas Involvement as of 2007.¹⁵²

The program gave NYPD the ability to create personal relationships with a host of police agencies in major metropolitan areas abroad, “13 locations including London, Paris, Jerusalem, Amman, Madrid, Toronto, and as far away as Sydney,” as of 2016.¹⁵³ The NYPD international expansion was a result of the understanding of the geographical threat locations that have a terrorism nexus to the city and serve a specific investigative purpose.¹⁵⁴ The role of the NYPD personnel overseas is not to engage in active enforcement operations, but to get firsthand intelligence that could be useful to the

¹⁵² Source: Nussbaum, “Protecting Global Cities: New York, London and the Internationalization of Municipal Policing for Counter Terrorism,” 221.

¹⁵³ Jonathan Dienst et al., “I-Team: NYPD Embeds Intelligence Officers in 13 Cities Overseas Since 9/11,” *NBC New York*, November 14, 2016, <http://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local/NYPD-Stationed-Overseas-Increasing-Global-Terror-Threat-401186455.html>.

¹⁵⁴ Nussbaum, “Protecting Global Cities: New York, London and the Internationalization of Municipal Policing for Counter Terrorism,” 228.

department back in New York City. The officers are not armed and must conduct their day-to-day activities in cooperation and with the consent of the host agency.¹⁵⁵

The program operates on two levels. The first allows for NYPD personnel to travel abroad and temporarily liaison with local jurisdictions on a case-by-case investigative basis. This model is not unique to the NYPD; however, its counter terrorism investigations have led it to unlikely places like Afghanistan and Indonesia.¹⁵⁶ The second level is unique to the NYPD and no other U.S. municipal police force has been as proactive in its international policing efforts. The NYPD has officers stationed abroad and embedded with the local jurisdiction in cities considered pivotal in New York City's counterterrorism and investigative efforts. The ILP has proven its effectiveness in securing relevant counter terrorism related intelligence in various occasions. The program serves to enhance the local partnerships with geographically important jurisdictions and serves to limit the reliance on second hand intelligence from federal partners.

The ILP is an incredible asset to the NYPD, but it is not without criticism. The program is expensive, costing nearly four million dollars a year.¹⁵⁷ The NYPD addresses the cost of the program with a unique public and private partnership that allows the department to pay the officer's salary and benefits, while private entities aid in other areas, such as housing and travel. One such case was in 2010, as American Airlines announced that it would support the NYPD's ILP by donating the airfare for all officers deployed in the program.¹⁵⁸ The New York City Police Foundation manages the private funds. The foundation is "an independent, non-profit organization whose purpose is to enhance the services of the NYPD by providing essential resources that are not otherwise

¹⁵⁵ Jia Ma, "The Legal and Political Implications of the NYPD's Counterterrorism Operations Overseas: The International Liaison Program" (master's thesis, Dickinson College, 2016).

¹⁵⁶ Nussbaum, "Protecting Global Cities: New York, London and the Internationalization of Municipal Policing for Counter Terrorism," 222.

¹⁵⁷ "Financial Information," accessed December 12, 2016, <http://www.nycpolicefoundation.org/about-us/financial-information/>.

¹⁵⁸ "American Airlines to Provide Air Travel for Officers Deployed in NYPD's International Liaison Program," December 17, 2012, <http://www1.nyc.gov/assets/fund>.

readily available to the department.”¹⁵⁹ The foundation assumes the financial responsibility of housing and incidentals for the ILP personnel overseas.

The program also faced political pressure and federal opposition. The federal agencies, in particular, the FBI, has been critical of the ILP citing that the NYPD’s presence overseas only serves to confuse foreign governments of who is the legitimate representative of U.S. authorities. The FBI’s criticism intensified in 2010 when retired FBI official Thomas V. Fuentes, “who headed the bureau’s Office of International Operations,” called the program “a complete waste of money.”¹⁶⁰ The NYPD holds that the FBI’s criticism is one of the reasons the local jurisdiction began the program that is seen by some experts as a viable way to circumvent the national security bureaucracy of the FBI.¹⁶¹ Despite federal objections, the NYPD continues the advancement of the program and often cites the events surrounding the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks, when NYPD liaison officers in country where relaying real time information to command personnel in the city, as proof of its success. The information relayed by the detectives in Mumbai was instrumental in a creating a policy shift in the way the NYPD prepared for an attack on its rail system and led to an overall shift in its counterterrorism capabilities.¹⁶²

The NYPD’s ILP model offers a way for local agencies to conduct cop-to-cop interaction with mutually dependent jurisdictions that can result in positive exchanges of time-relevant criminal and intelligence information. Chief Thomas Galati, who helps run the NYPD’s overseas intelligence program, told NBC that the program works for New York City by stating, “learning from other cities firsthand about the plots and threats they face helps the NYPD improve.”¹⁶³ However, the model is costly, conflict prone, and offers little data to prove its effectiveness. The nearly \$4 million yearly price tag might be too costly for smaller jurisdictions like Miami. In addition, the political cost of drawing

¹⁵⁹ Ibid.

¹⁶⁰ Dahl, “Local Approaches to Counterterrorism: the New York Police Department Model,” 87.

¹⁶¹ Nussbaum, “Protecting Global Cities: New York, London and the Internationalization of Municipal Policing for Counter Terrorism,” 221.

¹⁶² Dahl, “Local Approaches to Counterterrorism: the New York Police Department Model,” 87.

¹⁶³ Dienst et al., “I-Team: NYPD Embeds Intelligence Officers in 13 Cities Overseas Since 9/11.”

the ire of federal agencies that provide vital funding for many jurisdictions might be risky for many departments. Lastly, the program's effectiveness is hard to gauge because of the difficulty in documenting thwarted terrorist plots as a result of measures taken from the information gained by detectives abroad.

C. CASE STUDY 3—SISTER CITY AGREEMENTS—EL PASO AND CIUDAD JUÁREZ

The Sister Cities Program is an important resource to the negotiations of governments in letting the people themselves give expression of their common desire for friendship, goodwill and cooperation for a better world for all.”

~ President Dwight D. Eisenhower

The sister city concept was first made popular in North America by President Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1957.¹⁶⁴ According to the Sister Cities International, the agreements were intended to “increase international understanding and foster world peace by furthering international communication and exchange at the person to person level through city-to-city affiliations.”¹⁶⁵ The concept opened the door for local municipalities to engage in international relations in the hopes of cultural and economic advancements. The agreements serve as an option for local governments to be involved in the international scene motivated by these factors:

- Idealistic (such as the desire to promote peace and reconciliation)
- Political (often linked to broader world developments)
- Economic (development of new business and trade opportunities)
- Capacity building (to strengthen governance).¹⁶⁶

¹⁶⁴ Heather Helper, “Sister Cities Program Links Cultures, Businesses,” *The American City & County* 109, no. 10 (September 1994): 22, libproxy.nps.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/195925078?accountid=12702.

¹⁶⁵ “Our Mission” ;“What is a Sister City?.”

¹⁶⁶ Melissa Gibbs et al., *Sister Cities and International Alliances* (Sydney: Australian Centre of Excellence for Local Government, 2015).

Initially, the agreement were geared towards cultural exploration and aimed at boosting tourism and cultural exchanges between the twining entities. Sister city agreements share certain characteristics:

- Signed formal documents, usually by municipally elected officials
- Most agreements are indefinitely and non-expiring
- Not limited by a single project or area of cooperation
- Widespread use of non-paid participants
- Done without the support or involvement of national governments
- Understanding the need for mutual benefit¹⁶⁷

Sister city agreements are not merely ceremonial and serve a specific purpose or connection. Zelinsky claims the process is based on a number of possible criteria “historical connection, shared economic, cultural, recreational and ideological concerns, similar or identical place names and to a certain extent, the friction of distance.”¹⁶⁸ In addition, sister city agreements can serve a more focused purpose aimed at spreading democratic values and enhancing security. One such case of the export of democratic values is the surge of American cities partnering with Nicaraguan communities during the Sandinista crisis of the 1990s, a point that might make a sister city agreement with Havana popular with anti-Castro groups.¹⁶⁹

The popularity of sister city agreements and the diversity of its implementation has led to the metamorphosis of their use. O’Toole notes the several phases of the agreements from what he describes as three distinct but not mutually exclusive phases; associative, reciprocative, and commercial.¹⁷⁰ The associative phase relies on the premise of building international relations in a drive to understand the culture of others. The reciprocative phase is very similar to the first one; however, it goes beyond friendship by

¹⁶⁷ Rolf D. Cremer, Anne De Bruin, and Ann Dupuis, “International Sister Cities: Bridging the Global Local Divide,” *American Journal of Economics and Sociology* 60, no. 1 (2001): 381.

¹⁶⁸ Wilbur Zelinsky, “Sister City Alliances,” *American Demographics* 12, no. 6 (1990): 42.

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 43.

¹⁷⁰ Kevin O’Toole, “Kokusaika and Internationalisation: Australian and Japanese Sister City Type Relationships,” *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 55, no. 3 (2001): 403.

seeking to “develop skills within the two cities.”¹⁷¹ In the commercial phase, local municipalities expanded in an attempt to stimulate their economies. The agreements have taken a more diversified role, as they move towards an economically beneficial position.

Agreements, such as the El Paso and Ciudad Juárez, have added a new phase to the equation, regional security, and interoperability.¹⁷² The case of El Paso, Texas, and Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua, Mexico was born of the need to connect two communities that have a deep cultural bond and economic interdependence, with the realization of a need to work together to address public safety issues. The modern historic connection between the sister cities was marked by the Treaty of Hidalgo, which created the national boundary between the United States and Mexico, that split the city into two towns across the Rio Grande.¹⁷³ The area sits in geographical isolation from other metropolitan areas, which serves to deepen the bond between the two border cities.

The City of El Paso International Bridges Department, which manages the three main vehicular and pedestrian crossings connecting the two communities, estimates that “[I]n 2011, more than 3.6 million passenger vehicles, 4.2 million pedestrians and 300,000 commercial vehicles crossed into Ciudad Juárez through the three bridges.”¹⁷⁴ The constant exchange of cargo and persons has given rise to concerns about safety and security and the ability of local first responders to handle emergency situations adequately that can impact both sides of the border. The concerns have resulted in an interoperability memo of understanding between the local jurisdictions that, aside from the superseding agreements between the United States and Mexico, offer a solution to a pressing concern of local officials. Calvin D. Shanks argues that:

When considering the move toward globalization, and the historical foundations for sister city/border-crossing metro-zones, the need for local governments to collaborate is apparent. With the development of trade

¹⁷¹ Kyle Campbell, “Sister Cities and Diaspora: From Diaspora to Potential Sister City Partnership” (master’s thesis, Malmö University, 2015).

¹⁷² Shanks, “Beyond Sister City Agreements: Exploring the Challenges of Full International Interoperability.”

¹⁷³ John M. Crewdson, “In Sister Cities of El Paso and Juarez, 400 Years of History Erase a Border,” *New York Times*, July 18, 1981.

¹⁷⁴ “International Bridges,” accessed January 17, 2017, www.elpasotexas.gov/international-bridges.

agreements to ensure mutually beneficial growth, it would be a natural progression to develop mutual aid/interoperability compacts. These aid and interoperability agreements build off the foundation of the trade issues, but also are keyed on the level of local interdependence. They are intended to address the potential for a significant event—economic, natural disaster, or other—to impact both international partners negatively. The agreements ready the necessary tools to help protect the economic driver by ensuring that shared impact is mitigated by shared resources.¹⁷⁵

Shanks identifies the value of sister city agreement but recognizes the limitations in cases where the circumstances necessitate emergency cooperation. In this context, a sister city agreement between the City of Miami and Cuba can aid in the furtherance of security for both jurisdictions.

The role of municipalities in foreign relations in the form of sister city agreement has been in existence for several decades.¹⁷⁶ The agreements have been utilized by cities seeking to enhance cultural and economic relations and increase their communication and information sharing. The agreements have also been a vehicle used to connect cities that share a cultural bond but are separated by international borders. One such case is the sister city agreement between the cities of El Paso, Texas and Ciudad Juárez, México. The cities are culturally connected as El Paso has an 81% Latino population of Mexican descent; Miami like El Paso has an almost 80% Latino population although of Cuban descent. The cities are just over the border and much like Miami and Havana, are artificially separated by an international border that offers challenges to public safety.

In 2007, El Paso and Ciudad Juárez established a sister city agreement. The agreement goes beyond the traditional approach to cultural, educational, or economic partnership by recognizing the need for cooperation to address the safety in the region. The agreement fittingly titled, Binational Hazardous Materials Emergency Plan, includes El Paso, Texas and Sunland, New Mexico in the United States and Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua and Ysleta del Sur Pueblo on the Mexican side. The memo of understanding (MOU) “acknowledges the need to develop plans and establish preventive response

¹⁷⁵ Shanks, “Beyond Sister City Agreements: Exploring the Challenges of Full International Interoperability,” 43.

¹⁷⁶ Cremer, Bruin, and Dupuis, “International Sister Cities: Bridging the Global Local Divide,” 378.

mechanism between sister cities.”¹⁷⁷ The MOU identifies that national disaster response begins with local resources. Also, the MOU is the vehicle used to create a Binational Emergency Response Task Force to meet, plan, and conduct exercises to test its efficiency in response.¹⁷⁸ The Region Six Task Force is responsible for the El Paso-Juárez area of operations and has the below listed goals in their two-year plan:

- Reduce air pollution
- Improve access to clean and safe water
- Promote materials and waste management and clean sites
- Enhance joint preparedness for environmental response
- Enhance compliance assurance and environmental stewardship
- Improving environmental and public health through chemical safety¹⁷⁹

Enhancing the joint preparedness for environmental response addresses the sharing and emergency personnel and equipment to address emergencies and sets up the formal channels for communication for other law enforcement information across international lines.

The sister city agreement model offers in its favor the acceptance and encouragement of the federal authorities as highlighted by Shanks quoting the Environmental Protection Agency’s *Semiannual Report on United States-Mexico Border Contingency Planning Activities*:

¹⁷⁷ U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, *Memo of Understanding on Cross Border Communication and Emergency Response Strategies for the Communities of: Municipality of Juarez, Chihuahua, Mexico; The City of El Paso, Texas, United States; The City of Sunland Park, New Mexico, United States; and Ysleta del Sur, United States* (Washington, DC: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2009), 8, www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-01/documents/clean_copy_amended_mou_on_emergency_final_with_signatures_secured_2009_0.pdf.

¹⁷⁸ U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, *Memo of Understanding on Cross Border Communication and Emergency Response Strategies for the Communities of: Municipality of Juarez, Chihuahua, Mexico; The City of El Paso, Texas, United States; The City of Sunland Park, New Mexico, United States; and Ysleta del Sur, United States*, 8.

¹⁷⁹ U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, *REGION 6 2 Year Action Plan Texas—New Mexico—Chihuahua Regional Workgroup (TX/NM/CHIH RWG)* (Washington, DC: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2013), www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2013-09/documents/draft_2yr_action_plan_tx_nm_chih_rwg_september_2013_english_0.pdf.

A critical element of the U.S.-Mexico border cooperation program is the development of sister city partnerships between municipalities and counties in the U.S. and Mexico. Plans call for police, fire, paramedics, and other personnel from both sides of the border to respond quickly to large fires, dangerous chemical spills, or other emergencies.¹⁸⁰

The policy sets the stage for a sanctioned emergency response by municipal entities across international borders. Although the agreement only formally addresses emergency situations, the creation of a task force promotes the informal relationships amongst members of law enforcement on both countries that can aid in the sharing of intelligence in the fight against trans-border crimes.

The sister city agreements saw their role in the 20th century as a diplomatic vehicle to build a relationship between cities with former enemies after World War II.¹⁸¹ *New York Times* reporter John M. Crewdson quoted retired history professor W. Timmons on the relationship between El Paso and Ciudad Juárez, “This boundary, this river, is kind of an artificial thing.”¹⁸² The artificial separation created by the international boundary in El Paso is remarkably similar to the artificial boundaries that exist in Miami and Cuba set by the political mindset of local officials on both sides of the border.

¹⁸⁰ Shanks, “Beyond Sister City Agreements: Exploring the Challenges of Full International Interoperability.”

¹⁸¹ Cremer, Bruin, and Dupuis, “International Sister Cities: Bridging the Global Local Divide,” 380.

¹⁸² Crewdson, “In Sister Cities of El Paso and Juarez, 400 Years of History Erase a Border.”

IV. FINDINGS

Diplomacy and foreign affairs have been the responsibility of governments on a national level with the interest of conducting “peaceful relations; between mutually-recognized sovereign states; and based on expectations of long-term relations.”¹⁸³ These broad goals in diplomacy made it impractical for local governments to engage in productive negotiations with their counterparts abroad. However, advances in technology and current trends in globalization have opened the door for the productive engagement of foreign relations for territorial non-states actors, as it has demonstrated to have a significant impact on local metropolitan zones, like Miami.

Additionally, the internationalization of terrorism has dramatically increased the need to open lines of communications between law enforcement agencies on a local level on both sides of national borders as national defense gives way to national security. Increased patterns of immigration have also prompted the involvement of territorial non-state actors in engaging relations with the origin country of the refugees it harbors. This migration and security need is vividly present in Miami, a city that has been impacted by several periods of mass influx of Cuban refugees.

The case study analysis revealed that the cooperation model between China and Taiwan demonstrates that even limited formal agreements can aid in fostering informal relationship between law enforcement officials, despite the presence of adversarial barriers. These relationships can be used as building blocks to a working relationship between adversaries with a common goal of enhancing national security and police relations, by encouraging the sharing of information and investigative cooperation. However, the model showed the challenge of the impact and influence the political climate of both nations can have on cooperation.

The NYPD’s ILP showed how globalization and the need to streamline the intelligence collection process have turned the big apple into a world player. The model

¹⁸³ Van der Pluijm and Melissen, *City Diplomacy: The Expanding Role of Cities in International Politics*.

demonstrated an effective way to integrate personnel from two departments in different countries to maximize information sharing. Although, the liaison program is expensive, it offered the opportunity to forge a strong partnership with local business leaders in the search to offset the costs. The program could also alienate politicians and federal officials in Miami who disagree with a local police officer stationed in Havana, while the Castro regime remains in power.

Although sister city agreements have traditionally been economically motivated, the El Paso-Ciudad Juárez model shows its applicability to address public safety issues. The research revealed that the use of sister city agreement as an exporter of democratic values could resonate with the anti-Castro groups in Miami. The agreements can also establish the formal lines of communication between police officials that can aid in developing informal relationships. However, any agreement with the Castro regime would be controversial and could jeopardize the 10 sister city agreements the City of Miami already has in effect, some since 1971.¹⁸⁴

When examining models of cooperation, it also must be considered that despite the many changes in the past few years between the United States and Cuba under the Obama administration, a history of cooperation exists between officials in both countries. Prior to the 2015 changes, both nations cooperated on cultural, scientific, and enforcement issues. One applicable example of cooperation before the detente is the USCG's collaboration with the Cuban Border Guard to address maritime drug interdiction and smuggling in the Florida Straits.

Since 2000, the USCG has assigned a drug interdiction specialist to the U.S. mission in Havana, tasked with coordinating enforcement action with Cuban authorities. Both countries "share tactical information related to vessels transiting Cuban territorial waters suspected of trafficking and coordinate responses."¹⁸⁵ Despite the lack of

¹⁸⁴ "Sister Cities Program," accessed February 20, 2017, web.archive.org/web/20071021132113/http://ci.miami.fl.us/mic/pages/SisterCities/default.asp.

¹⁸⁵ Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report*, vol. 1 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 2015), 146.

diplomatic channels, the joint interdiction efforts were hugely successful. The U.S. Department of State notes:

In 2013, during which the Cuban government reported interdicting a total of 1.5 metric tons of illegal narcotics, 98 percent of which washed-up on Cuba's shores. Cuban customs also reported disrupting 43 smaller smuggling operations at airports, seizing a total of 30.45 kilograms (kg) of narcotics. Authorities sanctioned 628 individuals on drug-related charges, 273 of whom received sentences ranging from six to 10 years. Cuban Border Guard (TGF) continues to patrol Cuban waters and TGF notifications of maritime smuggling incidents to the United States are timely and detailed.¹⁸⁶

The maritime operations prove that formal diplomatic channels are not necessary to create an opportunity to work together on mutually beneficial issues.

The USCG cooperation has expanded during the detente and is no longer limited to maritime encounters. In a controversial move, Cuban officials toured the Joint Interagency Task Force South in April 2016.¹⁸⁷ The center located in Key West, Florida is the U.S. command hub for the war on drugs. Four members of the National Revolutionary Police (NRP) toured the facility and “got a briefing on the work of the multi-agency, multi-national organization.”¹⁸⁸ However, the cooperation and multi-national exchanges between the USCG and the Cuban border authorities do not include or involve the MPD.

In addition to the long-standing relationship between the Cuban authorities and the USCG, in January 2017, during the last days of the Obama administration, the two countries signed a bilateral law enforcement MOU. The MOU goes further than any previous arrangement and recognizes the mutual need of both governments to “collaborate in the prevention, interdiction, monitoring, investigation and prosecution of” the following listed offenses:

¹⁸⁶ Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report*, 146.

¹⁸⁷ Carol Rosenberg, “Cuban Security Officials Toured Key West Drug-war Center,” *Miami Herald*, May 4, 2016, www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/cuba/article75619857.html.

¹⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

- Terrorist acts
- Illicit production, manufacturing, trafficking, sale, and distribution of narcotics, psychotropic substances and their precursors, or other chemical substances used for illegal purposes
- Crimes committed through the use of information and communication technologies, and cyber security issues of mutual concern
- Migrant smuggling, as well as forgery of identity and travel papers, and other crimes related to migration fraud
- Trafficking in persons, and the sale of persons, prostitution, use of children and adolescents in pornography, and other forms of sex abuse
- Laundering of assets
- Trafficking in any kind of contraband goods, including firearms, their parts, components, ammunition, explosives, cash money and monetary instruments and other crimes involving cultural heritage, and the illegal trade in wild flora and fauna, and wildlife products, including protected and endangered species
- Other transnational or serious crimes under jurisdiction of the participants¹⁸⁹

The MOU seeks to develop a process for enforcement agencies in both nations to “exchange information; sharing of experiences, good practice and methodologies...and coordinate operations to investigate events related to identified criminal activities.”¹⁹⁰ The newly signed MOU allows for the participation of “all appointed and/or elected officials who exercise police functions or provide police services, and are entitled to make arrests or detentions under the respective jurisdiction” in working groups that will meet bi-annually.¹⁹¹ The MPD could use its long-standing practice of liaising with federal law enforcement task forces, like the Florida/Caribbean Regional Fugitive Task

¹⁸⁹ “United States and Cuba to Sign Law Enforcement Memorandum of Understanding,” January 17, 2017, cu.usembassy.gov/united-states-cuba-sign-law-enforcement-memorandum-understanding/.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid.

¹⁹¹ Ibid.

Force, to participate in the U.S.-Cuban working groups.¹⁹² The involvement in the taskforce would allow the MPD to engage Cuban officials in a formal setting to forge relationships that will lead to informal exchanges of information that would benefit both agencies related to local matters outside the MOU's scope.

The research also revealed that all models examined, despite their formal arrangements, shared a commonality in the fostering of informal relationships. The key to success was related to the ability of individuals in their respective agencies to shift from formal arrangements to informal relationships to affect positive change. These informal relationships highlight the value of selecting the right individuals with the interpersonal skills necessary to see beyond the limitations of the agreement and personal prejudices to realize the value of personal contact.

Lastly, the research also demonstrated the connection between Miami and Cuba was partly a result of a shared Cuban nationality and mirrors the conditions present in Germany prior to the 1989 reunification. In Germany, political instability motivated a civil rights movement that paved the way to the tearing down of the Berlin Wall.¹⁹³ Anti-Castro groups in Miami are hopeful that the renewed U.S. relations promotes a civil rights awakening in Cuba, like in Berlin, that empowers Cubans on the island to act and demand democratic change.¹⁹⁴ A move that Cuban exiles hope unifies two communities kept apart by the totalitarian regime on the island.

In that case, the MPD would benefit from the lessons learned by the Berlin Police in the unification process with their East German counterparts. Glasser notes that in a situation where deep seated mistrust exists, as in the case of two polar policing philosophies coming together, personal contact is pivotal to establishing a pathway

¹⁹² U.S. Marshall Service, *Memorandum of Understanding District Fugitive Task Force (DFT) South Florida Fugitive Apprehension Strike Team (S/FL-FAST) Florida Regional Fugitive Task Force (RFTF) and the City of Miami Police Department* (Washington, DC: Department of Justice, 2014), egov.ci.miami.fl.us/Legistarweb/Attachments/79026.pdf.

¹⁹³ Andreas Glaeser, *Divided in Unity: Identity, Germany, and the Berlin Police* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), 110.

¹⁹⁴ Colin L. Powell, *Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba, Report to the President (May 2004)* (Washington, DC: Secretary of State, 2004), 16.

towards a healthy relationship built on trust.¹⁹⁵ The MPD leadership team must be cognizant of the likelihood of incredible levels of stress that can occur from the need to police a divided community that was physically segregated like Miami and Cuba.¹⁹⁶ The stress is more likely present on the Cuban side due to “occupational insecurities in the light of organizational restructuring and a new policing environment.”¹⁹⁷ The MPD leadership can take proactive measures to protect U.S. personnel by “targeting remedial intervention...aimed at alleviating organizational uncertainties” to minimize personal barriers.

The personal barriers can impact the department but the ideological barriers can politically hinder the cooperation model. To appreciate the logistical barriers to police cooperation, it is critical to understand the differences between the political and social ideologies of the United States and Cuba. Cuba is a country, which has a political system best illustrated by Benigno Aguirre in *Social Control in Cuba* using the description by Turner and Liebeskind:

- One party has the monopoly on political activity.
- The ideology does not admit competing interpretations; it represents the “absolute official truth of the state,” which gives the government total authority.
- The state has a monopoly on the means of coercion and mass persuasion, including formal education.
- The economy is subservient to the state, so that most economic activities and institutions become part of the state and are thus influenced by its reigning ideology.
- Social life tends to be politicized, so that all social behavior becomes subject to political interpretation and state regulation.¹⁹⁸

¹⁹⁵ Glaeser, *Divided in Unity: Identity, Germany, and the Berlin Police*, 254.

¹⁹⁶ Bruce D. Kirkcaldy, Jennifer Brown, and Cary L. Cooper, “Occupational Stress Profiles of Senior Police Managers: Cross Cultural Study of Officers from Berlin and Northern Ireland,” *Stress and Health* 10, no. 2 (1994): 128.

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 130.

¹⁹⁸ John Turner and Claudia Liebeskind, *Fascism and Totalitarianism* (London: Royal Holloway University of London, 1996), 66.

The vast differences between the policing model of the MPD and the NRP go beyond the contrast of political ideologies that govern their respective countries. The Cuban model emphasizes the need to prioritize the collective benefit of the group with little regard for the impact it has on the individual, while the American system holds the value of individual freedom above the greater good.

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V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION—A WAY FORWARD

The diplomatic posture of the Obama administration has achieved that the “Cuban government is more willing than it has ever been to acknowledge U.S. concerns about human rights and liberty. Regionally, the use of soft power in Cuba alone has opened up more opportunities for multilateral dialogue.”¹⁹⁹ It is this willingness to open dialogue that could serve as a roadmap for cooperation between the MPD and the Cuban police.

It remains to be seen the position the Trump administration will take on Cuba. Although, in 2015, President Trump noted, “the concept of opening with Cuba is fine” might indicate that he sees the commercial advantages of the continued U.S. and Cuba relationship.²⁰⁰ In November 2016, just days before the election, in an address to the exile community in Miami at the Bay of Pigs memorial, the President noted that “[T]he agreement President Obama signed is a very weak agreement.”²⁰¹ He also added that in the Obama deal, “[W]e get nothing. The people of Cuba get nothing, and I would do whatever is necessary to get a good agreement.”²⁰² The President’s statements seem to indicate that the Castro regime must show willingness to move towards a more democratic model to continue with the detente.

The MPD response to the events of mass celebration and civil disturbances as a result of Fidel Castro’s death demonstrated the MPD is prepared to address the short-term impact of changes effectively in the relationship between the United States and Cuba. However, to prepare Miami for the long-term impact, the department must establish lines of communication with Cuban authorities.

¹⁹⁹ Gregory Weeks, “Soft Power, Leverage, and the Obama Doctrine in Cuba,” *The Latin Americanist* 60, no. 4 (2016): 535.

²⁰⁰ Jeremy Diamond, “Donald Trump is ‘Fine’ with U.S.-Cuba Diplomatic Relations,” *CNN*, September 8, 2015, www.cnn.com/2015/09/08/politics/donald-trump-cuba-diplomatic-opening/.

²⁰¹ Frances Robles, “Business or Politics? What Trump Means for Cuba,” *The New York Times*, November 15, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/16/world/americas/cuba-donald-trump.html?_r=0.

²⁰² *Ibid.*

The MPD, as most law enforcement agencies, is a paramilitary organization with a rank structure and a clearly defined chain of command. The Chief of Police is tasked with making the final operational decisions on police matters; however, administrative and personnel matters come under the purview of the City Manager.²⁰³ In the case of Miami, the manager is the administrative head and appointed at the discretion of the Mayor, as confirmed by the City Commission as set by the city charter. Therefore, any decision to engage with Cuban authorities requires approval of the elected officials.

The MPD can benefit from the creation of a committee to explore the need for departmental modifications to adjust for a relationship with Cuban authorities. The MPD can apply concepts of emergency management to the assessment and recommendations for the implementation of a program, “[A] program committee that includes senior officials such as the mayor, councilors, or the city manager is arguably of higher quality than one that does not.”²⁰⁴ The committee would allow the influentials in Miami to have an active role in determining the best way to approach a working relationship with the Castro regime and make policy recommendations to the MPD leadership. Once an MPD policy has been drafted, it must be supported by the Chief of Police and presented to the elected officials.

William LeoGrande notes, “Kingdon’s classic study on agenda setting and policy innovation provides an overarching framework for understanding policy change elements, or ‘streams’, that must converge in order for a major policy change to occur.”²⁰⁵ Initially, the policy proposal must make it to the legislative agenda, along with a politically viable solution, to stand any chance to be adopted.²⁰⁶

One way to motivate local activist to support the MPD in a potential move to work with the Cuban authorities is to build a local coalition. In the *Dictator’s Handbook*, Bueno de Mesquita and Smith describe the importance to the success of a plan’s

²⁰³ City of Miami, *Florida, City Charter, Subpart A, Section (16), Powers of the City Manager* (Miami: City of Miami, 2012).

²⁰⁴ Daniel Henstra, “Evaluating Local Government Emergency Management Programs: What Framework Should Public Managers Adopt?” *Public Administration Review* 70, no. 2 (2010): 243.

²⁰⁵ LeoGrande, “Normalizing U.S.–Cuba Relations: Escaping the Shackles of the Past,” 474.

²⁰⁶ *Ibid.*

implementation is getting a buy-in from the group of essentials, or individuals critical to the change process, to form a winning coalition of critical supporters needed to implement change.²⁰⁷ In the search for the members of this winning coalition, the groups affected by the proposal must be identified, to include the interchangeableables, the influentials, and the essentials. First, the general public, to include residents of the City of Miami, but especially the Cuban-American community, and members of the MPD, fall into the category of interchangeableables. This group, although impacted by the modifications and who hold some political influence, does not offer substantial help or obstructions to the implementation. The second group is the influentials, who carry considerable more political clout and can impact the internal changes of the MPD. Members of this group are the Miami City Commission, the President of the Fraternal Order of Police, the senior command staff of the Miami Police, political activists in the City of Miami, and the administrative hierarchy of the City of Miami.

In keeping with the rules for political success outlined in the *Dictator's Handbook*, it is critical to keep the essentials relatively small in number, as they will ultimately decide the future of the proposal and a buy-in will be more difficult in a larger setting.²⁰⁸ The group is composed of the Mayor of the City of Miami, the City Manager, and the police and fire chiefs. This group must be swayed to form a winning coalition to move forward with a plan to develop a partnership with the Cuban authorities on the island.

Political change is bound to come to Cuba, and Miami will continue to feel the impact of those changes. The MPD needs to prepare the organization to handle the impact of this new relationship by setting up formal channels of communication with Cuban authorities on the island that will foster informal relationships with Cuban officials. Miami must apply the lessons learned from the previous Cuban inspired crisis

²⁰⁷ Bruce Bueno De Mesquita and Alastair Smith, *The Dictator's Handbook: Why Bad Behavior Is Almost Always Good Politics* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2011), 5.

²⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 8.

and prepare now to avoid the inevitable finding, it is “ten minutes to midnight” and susceptible to the impact of the psychology of crisis.²⁰⁹

The research has demonstrated the need to establish a professional relationship between the MPD and the Cuban NRP. The model of cooperation, whether it is a sister city agreement, an officer exchange program, or merely a standard operating procedure to exchange information, is not as important as devising a strategy to overcome the anti-Castro sentiments in Miami and the fear of local politicians at the fallout of such a relationship. A key to winning support for a proposed plan is finding allies to join in a coalition. A critical component of maintaining a winning coalition understands the relationship between power and choice. A study published in *Psychological Science* noted, “people are willing to trade one source of control for the other. For example, if people lack power, they clamor for choice, and if they have an abundance of choice they don’t strive as much for power.”²¹⁰ Therefore, the proposal presentation needs to give those who have the most to lose at the inception of a relationship the perception of power or the illusion of choice.

It is also imperative that the planning process includes consulting the critical personnel affected by the potential conditions to the implementation of the working relationship. These consultations have avoided conflict and allowed the formation of a winning coalition by illustrating to the essentials, “Having a strategy suggests an ability to look up from the short term and the trivial to view the long term and the essentials, to address causes rather than symptoms.”²¹¹ In addition, ensure then that their actions are in the best interest of the residents of the City of Miami.

Despite the overwhelming history of political exploitation of the anti-Castro sentiments in Miami, the 2015 changes in the U.S. policy towards Cuba implemented by the Obama administration might help in the transition. A 2016 poll by Florida

²⁰⁹ Bruce Bongar et al., ed., *Psychology of Terrorism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 21.

²¹⁰ Association for Psychological Science, “Power and Choice Are Interchangeable: It’s All about Controlling your Life,” *Science Daily*, 2011.

²¹¹ Sir Lawrence Freedman, *Strategy: A History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), Kindle edition), ix.

International University reveals that 68% of Cuban Americans in Miami favor renewing relations with the island nation.²¹² The reversal of public opinion is the single most important factor in shifting the political mind frame to favor a new policy of cooperation between the two agencies. The future posture of the Trump administration will offer further insight on the ability of the MPD to pursue and maintain a working relationship with Cuban authorities.

The need for cooperation among non-state actors is evident in Miami and although some experts believe that the localized role of state, county, and city police departments is not conducive to the homeland security mission, their role as first responders puts them in a unique position to be an instrumental component of the homeland security enterprise (HSE).²¹³ That responsibility in the HSE is critical in Miami with its relationship with Cuba and its ability to impact the United States.²¹⁴ Cooperation between the MPD and Cuban authorities can aid in the prevention of terrorism, the interdiction of narcotics, the return of fugitives wanted on both sides of the border, and the timely exchange of law enforcement information. Perhaps the best modification the MPD can make to foster a relationship with its Cuban counterparts on the island is not operational but philosophical. Much like the Berlin Police officials did at the events surrounding the integration of East Berlin officers into its department, the MPD personnel needs to set aside prejudicial views of a regime that has impacted its city and culture. The MPD's leadership needs to recognize the value of personal relationships, despite the adversarial views of political ideology to achieve a model that serves the greater good of the community in Miami and Cuba.

²¹² Patricia Mazzei, "FIU Poll: Majority of Miami-Dade Cubans Support Obama Policy," *Miami Herald*, September 14, 2016, www.miamiherald.com/news/politics-government/election/article101749052.html.

²¹³ The Homeland Security Enterprise is described by the Harvard Kennedy School as the intersection of evolving threats and hazards with the traditional governmental and civic responsibilities of civil defense, emergency response, law enforcement, customs, border control, public health, and immigration.

²¹⁴ Marc Rosenblum and Faye Hipsman, "Normalization of Relations with Cuba May Portend Changes to U.S. Immigration Policy," January 13, 2015, Migrationpolicy.org.

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