"Special Relationship?"
What are the Strategic Choices available to the UK after the US ‘Pivot to Asia’?

By
Group Captain Clive S. Blount BSc(Eng) MA MPhil FRAeS FRIN RAF

A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty
In Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation Requirements
Advisor: Douglas Peifer Ph.D.

14 February 2013

DISCLAIMER
The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the US Government, the Department of Defense or, indeed the Government of the United Kingdom. In accordance with Air Force Instruction 51-303, it is not copyrighted, but is the property of the United States Government.
BIOGRAPHY

Group Captain Clive S. Blount is a Royal Air Force Navigator assigned to the Air War College, Air University, Maxwell AFB. He graduated from Manchester University in 1983 with a Bachelor’s degree in Aeronautical Engineering and has since been awarded a Master of Arts degree in Defence Studies from King’s College, London and a Master of Philosophy in International Relations from the University of Cambridge. He qualified as a navigator in 1985 and has approximately 2,500 flying hours on 11 different types of aircraft; his main type being the Tornado GR1 Fighter/Bomber. He was awarded A1(exceptional instructor) status by the RAF Central Flying School and is a graduate of the Aerosystems Engineering Course at the RAF College. Non-flying appointments include Command of the RAF airbase in Gibraltar and Force Development, planning and doctrine staff jobs. He has completed an operational tour in Kosovo and commanded a Training and Advisory Group in Kabul, Afghanistan.

ABSTRACT

The declaration of a United States ‘pivot’ to Asia poses some compelling challenges, particularly for the United Kingdom which has, increasingly, adopted a position on world affairs almost entirely driven by its close relationship with the United States. The question posed by the ‘traditional’ allies of the United States in Europe, and elsewhere, is just how the new Asian strategy will affect United States’ commitments in the rest of the world as it redeployys finite, and, most likely, reducing, resources to meet new challenges. The dilemma for Britain in particular is how to retain its influence on the United States and thereby maintain its current position as a world power, albeit in the second rank. This paper, therefore, examines the ‘pivot’ from the perspective of the United Kingdom, establishing the importance of the region to the United Kingdom before examining a number of strategic choices available to Britain to complement or support the US strategy. It will argue that, far from being a threat, the new Asian strategy provides a number of opportunities for the United Kingdom to strengthen and deepen the Anglo-American relationship as we move into an increasingly interdependent, global, era.

Note: Throughout this document, for consistency, the British spelling ‘defence’ is used whenever it is referring to a British Government organization or publication. Otherwise, the American ‘defense’ is used.


“Special Relationship?”

What are the Strategic Choices available to the UK after the US ‘Pivot to Asia’?

One of the most important tasks of American statecraft over the next decade will be to lock in a substantially increased investment -- diplomatic, economic, strategic, and otherwise -- in the Asia-Pacific region.

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton

In 2011, the Obama administration announced that the United States needed to make “a strategic pivot” in its foreign policy, in which it would downsize the United States’ presence in the Middle East and Afghanistan over the next decade and switch attention to and, particularly, invest more in the Asia-Pacific region.¹ This decision has since been re-characterized as a ‘rebalancing’ of United States policy in the region.² The decision to pursue such a strategy was mainly driven by perceptions of a growing “triumphalist attitude” in the leadership of a rising China and evidence that Chinese leaders would leverage their new-found power to play a much greater role in influencing events in the Asia-Pacific region. This strategic decision is complicated by the fact that the United States is trying to make this switch at a time when it is beset by a range of domestic challenges – not the least straitened financial times – and foreign policy seemed to be little more than a background issue for most voters in the recent presidential election. The question posed by the ‘traditional’ allies of the United States in Europe, and elsewhere, is just how the new Asian strategy will affect United States’ commitments in the rest of the world as it redeploy finite, and, most likely, reducing, resources to meet new challenges. This paper will examine the ‘pivot’ from the perspective of the United Kingdom, and will argue that the new Asian strategy provides
a number of opportunities for the United Kingdom to strengthen and deepen the Anglo-American relationship as we move into an increasingly interdependent, global, era.

The declaration of a United States ‘pivot’ to Asia poses some compelling challenges, particularly for the United Kingdom which has, increasingly, adopted a position on world affairs almost entirely driven by its close relationship with the United States. The United Kingdom has formally declared that its “…pre-eminent defence and security relationship [is] with the US.” Whether the relationship between the two countries is actually ‘special’, or is just one of many bilateral partnerships between the United States and its allies, the United Kingdom has taken on the job of ‘transatlantic bridge’ between the North American and European members of NATO. It has supported the United States wholeheartedly – even when that support has resulted in significant impacts on international legitimacy and wider support. The effects of a continuing recession, constant pressure to reduce defense spending, and the recovery from the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts, suggest that there is likely to be little money available for new capability or any significant increase in resources. The shift of United States’ focus eastwards therefore poses a significant challenge if the United Kingdom is to retain its influence on the United States and, thereby, maintain its current position as a world power, albeit in the second rank.

Although there is general resignation in Europe to the strategy shift, and despite explicit reassurance to the contrary from the new United States Secretary of State, there is a concern that the shift of focus away from the region may leave gaps in regional defense. However, by its very nature, British foreign and defense policy is global. The United Kingdom has commercial, diplomatic, historical and military links
with the Asia-Pacific region and, increasingly, has indicated that this area will be of
growing importance in the coming decades. This paper will first establish the importance
of the Asia-Pacific region to the United Kingdom, both in terms of history but also from
the perspective of current diplomatic, trade and defense initiatives. It will then examine
the main strategic options open to the United Kingdom if it is to retain influence on the
United States, and will identify and discuss three main possible areas: European
‘burden-sharing’ or ‘back-filling; leverage of current arrangements and influence in the
region, such as basing agreements and alliances; and a re-balancing of British military
force structures to provide more utility for employment in support of American-led
operations in the region. It will then consider the nature of the future world and its
impact on any strategic choices. The paper will suggest that, far from a being a threat,
the United States pivot to Asia will provide Britain with a number of opportunities to
strengthen its relationship with the United States and to develop its longstanding
‘special’ relationship beyond that of just an Atlantic ‘bridge’.

The Far East is an area which has long held a fascination for Britain and, since
the earliest days of the British Empire, has been a source of economic prosperity. It is
also a region that engenders deep emotions, with memories of the Second World War
in the Pacific, and the wars in Korea and Malaya driving both pride and humiliation. The tragedy of the fall of Singapore was possibly one of the worst periods in recent
British history, perhaps in sharp contrast to the contribution by British forces to the anti-
communist campaign in Malaya – often held up to be the model for how to conduct
counter-insurgency operations. More recently, the British have viewed the Far East as
a source of innovation, an area providing vibrant new business opportunities and as a
popular tourist destination. Expanding out from the Asia-Pacific area specifically, Britain has long-standing ties with the wider Indian Ocean and its bordering nations, an area that is likely to play an increasingly vital role in the rise of the East. Middle Eastern oil and gas will remain vital to the developing economies in the Far East, and the Indian Ocean will provide the main trade routes by which it is delivered. The routes will transit vital choke points, such as the Straits of Hormuz, the Malacca Straits and the Horn of Africa, and the security of such trade must play a key part in any Asian strategy. In addition, as China looks to new regions for trade and natural resources, the impact of events as far away as Africa and South America cannot be ignored. Britain has significant influence and interests in all these areas.

From a military perspective, the United Kingdom has a small permanent footprint in the Asia-Pacific region of merely one thousand or so personnel. This is in contrast to the large force structures maintained in the region until the middle of the last century. Withdrawal from ‘East of Suez’, driven by a fast deteriorating financial position, commenced in the 1960s, with the United Kingdom steadily withdrawing the several thousand troops it had based in the Asia-Pacific region, and, in particular, much reducing its footprint at its naval base in Singapore. The final act of military withdrawal from British-owned bases did not, however, take place until 1997 when Britain handed back the Crown Colony of Hong Kong and the New Territories to China. The largest current concentration of British military personnel is in Brunei. The British garrison in Brunei serves at behest of the Sultan of Brunei, who meets a large proportion of the running costs of the force, to provide security for his country. There has been a British military presence in Brunei since 1962, and, today the garrison consists of some 900
personnel, mainly from the Royal Gurkha Rifles, supported by a small flight of
helicopters. The United Kingdom also maintains its primary jungle warfare school in the
Sultanate. The only other permanent United Kingdom military presence of any note in
the region is in Singapore, where Britain owns a large fuel depot and a number of
berthing wharves in Sembawang dockyard. This facility provides access and fuelling for
three escort-sized vessels and limited spares support. The fuel depot is, allegedly, the
second largest of its type in the Asia-Pacific region, and is therefore an indispensable
asset for the Royal Navy and allied navies.

In addition to these two permanent installations, the UK maintains a network of
defense attachés and advisers in embassies and consulates throughout the region and
a large number of exchange postings, particularly with Australia and New Zealand. Of
particular note with regard to these latter countries is Exercise LONG LOOK, which
enables a large number of United Kingdom, New Zealand and Australian personnel to
work embedded in each other’s services for short term periods (approximately four
months). On 18 January 2013, British Defence Minister Phillip Hammond signed a
treaty with the Australian Defence Minister Stephen Smith to formalize further Anglo-
Australian Defence Co-operation, pledging the two countries to work together in areas
such as cyber security, defense reform, personnel exchange, equipment, and science
and technology. There are also reasonably regular visits by Royal Air Force aircraft,
and Royal Navy vessels, but operational demands in Afghanistan and elsewhere, and
the severely limited budget, have currently curtailed the magnitude and frequency of
these visits. Despite the reduction in permanent, declared physical military presence in
the region, the United Kingdom is committed to a major formal defense agreement in
the region. This is the Five Power Defence Arrangement (FPDA). The United Kingdom, Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand and Singapore devised this loose alliance, in April 1971, in order to share the responsibility for the defense and security of Peninsular Malaysia and Singapore – particularly against the threat of a resurgent Indonesia. This series of bilateral arrangements replaced the Anglo-Malaya Defence Agreement (AMDA) after Britain’s decision to withdraw permanently based forces from the region in 1967.¹¹

The FPDA is a useful grouping and serves the region well. It has not only served as a rationale for the United Kingdom to remain engaged in the region (and has thus proved a useful political lever in times of shrinking defense budgets), but it has also benefited the other nations in the alliance by keeping a leading world player physically engaged. Not only does this keep a permanent member of the UN Security Council tied to issues in the area, but also provides access, both for exercises and if necessary during conflict, to high-end military capabilities such as amphibious maneuver, attack submarines and air-to-air refueling. The cost of maintaining FPDA membership is normally relatively small but provides reassurance to nations that the United Kingdom is still interested in the region. Perhaps most crucially, it provides no legal obligation other than to consult – no nation is committed to military action in support of another as part of this treaty. As the other nations in the FPDA, especially Singapore and Malaysia, have developed their armed forces, a physical security guarantee from the United Kingdom has, therefore, become less important than efforts to build capacity by providing access to expertise and high capability platforms and capabilities, and a
shared voice in the international arena. Thus, the United Kingdom is able, still, to wield significant influence despite straitened financial circumstances.¹²

Links with the region are far wider than purely military activity; in the economic arena there are very healthy trade relationships and co-dependence between Europe and the Asia-Pacific region. By far the most useful lens with which to look at this activity is that of the European Union (EU), of which Britain is a member (although not linked to the common currency of the Euro). Notwithstanding the struggle with which the Eurozone has been contending since the start of the global recession, the CIA World Factbook lists the EU as the world’s largest economy, just $30 billion ahead of the United States and $3.6 trillion ahead of China.¹³ Indeed, the close interest that the international community has maintained in the Eurozone crisis and the impact of the crisis on world markets clearly demonstrates the importance of the EU as a global economic player. Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest that, as the US turns its attention to Asia, China has been increasingly turning to Europe. The mutual trade relationship between China and the EU is the biggest economic partnership for each party. China imports more from the EU than from anywhere else in the world and invests 33 percent of its foreign direct investment in Europe – second only to Asia (49 percent) and surprisingly more than the 28 percent it invests in the United States. In early 2012, the United Kingdom was the largest source of direct foreign investment into China from within the EU; the amount of this investment had grown significantly over the previous few years – by 40% in 2010 and by 20% in 2011.¹⁴ To underline this commitment, the British Chancellor of the Exchequer, George Osborne made a trip to China in January 2012. Osborne urged China to invest further in British infrastructure
and, following this trip, China used its sovereign wealth to acquire a stake in a major United Kingdom water utility.\textsuperscript{15} Even more recently, the Bank of England faces increasing pressure to support renminbi trading in London, in order to boost the nascent market in China’s tightly controlled currency. The \textit{Financial Times} quotes a senior Bank of England Spokesman as saying, “The Bank has been and remains fully engaged with the City of London initiative to develop London as a center of renminbi trading and is in regular dialogue with the People’s Bank of China on a range of issues.”\textsuperscript{16} Furthermore, in a recent Fullerton Lecture, British Foreign Secretary William Hague described Asia as “the engine of the world’s growth today”, and committed Britain to be “part of that success story”.\textsuperscript{17} He went on to state that British exports to the Asia Pacific region have increased 20\% year on year, but that much more needed to be done in order to encourage economic growth in an economy that depends “overwhelmingly on expanding trade and investment”. He recognized the immense opportunity that lies in the vast markets of the Asia-Pacific region and described Britain’s ambitious targets to increase, and in some cases to double, bilateral trade between the United Kingdom and China, India, Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia and South Korea within the next five years; the overall drive is to double British exports to £1 trillion a year by 2020.\textsuperscript{18} Most recently, British Foreign Minister Hugo Swire restated a previous commitment to the Anglo-Japanese relationship saying, in a speech prior to a visit to the region, “Whether it is global trade or international peacekeeping our relationship with Japan is fundamental to UK foreign policy, not just in Asia but around the world.”\textsuperscript{19}

Britain has also increased, significantly, its diplomatic activity in Asia since 2010. A series of visits to the region by senior politicians and members of the Royal family has
spearheaded this initiative, but there have also been significant increases in professional diplomatic staff in Embassies and Consulates across the Asia Pacific area. The United Kingdom is one of the few countries in the West that is expanding its diplomatic network at a time of economic crisis. The largest focus of this diplomatic expansion is in Asia with eight new British diplomatic posts in Asia to be established by 2015. Separately, Britain will also deploy around 60 extra staff to China, 30 to India and another 50 across Asian network in Indonesia, Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, Burma, Singapore, Cambodia, Brunei, North and South Korea and Mongolia. As an interesting aside, the Foreign and Commonwealth office has funded an initiative to increase, by 40%, the number of staff who speak Chinese. The British Embassy in Laos, closed in 1985, is to be re-opened so that the United Kingdom will then be represented in each and every Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member state. This is a deliberate move ahead of the planned transformation of ASEAN into a single, highly competitive, market – a clear indication of the economic intentions of the United Kingdom in Asia.

Finally, the UK has a large Asian diaspora. People whose origins are in the sub-continent (India/Pakistan/Bangladesh) make up around six percent of the population. This constituency is likely to be hugely influential in forming UK policy in the future, both in developing business ties and cultural exchange but, in the event of a future regional conflict, could have significant influence on British strategic involvement. This is especially significant to this paper, given the importance of the Indian Ocean and its surrounding countries. There is also a large Chinese community comprising of just less than one percent. Links with Hong Kong are still strong even after its return to Chinese
rule in 1997. Cultural ties between Britain and these regions are resilient, and long-established cultural relationships are highly influential. For instance, the British Broadcasting Corporation is the world’s largest international broadcaster and, for several years, the largest audiences for its world service have been in the Middle East and Asia. Transmission stations in the UK, Cyprus, Oman and Thailand, and a wide selection of cable and satellite channels transmit in all the principal languages of the region with the largest audiences being in English, Hindi, Urdu, Tamil and a number of other South Asian languages. There are broadcasts in both Mandarin and Cantonese Chinese. 24 hour television broadcasting in Arabic and Farsi has proved influential in key regions, particularly as a trusted alternative view to Al Jazeera.

It is also essential to remember that the United Kingdom and the United States share remarkably similar views on the importance of international and economic norms and, essentially, a liberal world order. Both countries support open, free markets, legal transparency, popular self-determination and a free press; co-operation and partnership extend far beyond geopolitical affairs. The future interests of the United Kingdom are thus closely entwined with the Asia-Pacific region, and it is difficult to think of a future where the region will not play a strategically significant role. It is clear that the United Kingdom should view American concerns in Asia, and their increasing desire to bring stability to the region, as very much in line with British interests. Britain should, therefore, aim to support the United States’ “Asian Pivot” initiative wherever possible, recognizing resource limitations at home, and, at the very least, see it as an opportunity to strengthen UK/US partnerships. This paper will now examine the main options available to Britain to support this grand strategy.
The first area of consideration as the United Kingdom seeks a strategy against the background of the United States’ shift to Asia is that of developing European defense activity. The EU, if considered as an entity, is, at first glance, the second largest military power in the world. France and the United Kingdom alone spend much the same as China in absolute terms on military expenditures. When the defense budgets of Germany, Italy, Spain, Greece and Poland are added, the EU spends roughly $240 trillion on its armed forces, almost twice as much as China and one third the amount of the United States. However, the conversion of this spending into comparative military power is problematic; manning costs in the west are very much the driver of defense spending, and the co-ordination of the forces of the European nations - all sovereign countries with individual interests and aspirations - to produce unified military power is far from straightforward. However, even as United States’ focus shifts eastwards, there remain a number of key international issues in the Mediterranean, the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, the Western Indian Ocean, and Africa. These issues include building the Libyan economy and society, and creating a Mediterranean economic community that can give North African and some Middle East countries real reason to reform. These issues will still require a considerable investment and it is perhaps here that Britain could use its influence to encourage Europe to ‘take up the slack’, or ‘burden share’, to enable American redeployment. Whilst efforts to develop a common European Security and Defense Policy have been sporadic and, frankly, beset with irreconcilable national interests, bilateral or bespoke multi-lateral arrangements offer more hope of success. In particular, the historic Anglo-French agreement, signed at Lancaster House on 17th February 2012 may prove a model for future European co-
operation and the leadership of European operations. European leadership would be welcomed in the continuation of the efforts to fight pirates off the coast of Somalia; the provision of a rapid deployment capability to prevent eruptions of violence such as those in recent years, in Sierra Leone and the Ivory Coast; in helping to patrol the drug routes along the coast of Western Africa; or even to exercise the rights of all countries to navigate freely in the Strait of Hormuz. Ongoing operations in Mali and the wider Sahel, where France is currently providing the lead (with British ISR and transport support) of what they intend will eventually become a largely African military operation, provide an example of how Europe can, in effect, ‘cover America’s back’ as it concentrates its main effort in the Pacific. It should also be remembered that, diplomatically, Europe holds two out of five of the permanent seats on the UN Security Council and, with the third largest population in the world after India and China (all of those people living under democratic rule), is largely allied with the United States in a zone of peace, democracy, and wealth.

Against suggestions many NATO countries apparently had been counting on United States military power in the region to offset their own deep defense reductions, and were thus deeply concerned about the ‘pivot’, British Defence Secretary Phillip Hammond recently said that, instead of worrying about the cutbacks, the allies must recognize that "as a result, European nations, including the UK, will need to do much more of the heavy lifting in the security of their own region," including both Europe itself and the Middle East, Northern Africa, and the Horn of Africa, which he called ‘the near abroad’. . . “This is not the end of Atlanticism, but the beginning of a new, more balanced relationship in the [NATO] alliance.” However, Britain’s relationship with the
EU has never been straightforward, and current discussions have suggested that there may be a future for the United Kingdom outside the Union. The United States has sounded a cautionary note, stating clearly that an Atlanticist Britain is not a direct alternative to a Britain that plays a central role in Europe and that it “believes that the ‘special relationship’ is best served by the UK remaining at the heart of Europe.”

A further strategic possibility for consideration is that of aiding operations by the provision of basing in the region and using United Kingdom influence to ease access to the region. The massive airbase and port at Diego Garcia in the British Indian Ocean Territories and the, previously mentioned, Singapore Fleet Facilities, would be invaluable for power projection both into the region and for operations in the wider Indian Ocean (as they were in playing a large role supporting United States’ operations during recent conflicts in Iraq and the global war on terror). In addition, Britain’s ability to leverage its FPDA allies and its other long-standing diplomatic relationships in the region to support United States initiatives and to facilitate access and over-flight would be likely to prove a significant asset. Finally, Britain’s membership of the P5 group of permanent members of the UN Security Council would not only enable it to support the United States directly in obtaining legitimacy for its actions within the Security Council itself, but could, possibly, provide Britain leverage in its dealings with the smaller nations in the region. Traditional links to Britain, such as Commonwealth membership, provide smaller countries with access to a P5 member who is less partisan or diplomatically ‘charged’ than the United States or China (although this could be said to be arguable), and who may provide support for individual regional concerns in the Council, without
necessarily antagonizing ‘Great Power’ politics. This support may in turn be used to garner support for wider United States initiatives in the region.

From a purely military perspective, in traditional terms of warships, divisions and aircraft, it would appear that the United Kingdom has little to offer the United States. Successive defense reviews have reduced the size of Britain’s armed forces considerably and the war in Afghanistan has depleted both materiel and broader war-fighting experience, as the forces have concentrated on intensive counter-insurgency and stability operations. It will require some time to recover and restock for the full range of capabilities to be restored. However, Britain’s armed forces are respected; Britain remains a leading contributor to NATO, is the world’s third-largest financial contributor to United Nations peace-keeping operations, and is one of the five nuclear weapons states recognized by the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. Britain thus retains some measure of global influence. Moreover, the Strategic Defence and Security Review conducted in 2010 and the subsequent National Security Strategy recognizes the United Kingdom’s reliance on global trade, and stresses that Britain must maintain a power projection capability of highly capable, expeditionary forces in order to deal with emerging problems “at source”, tackling threats before they reach the homeland. Whilst the United States does not lack physical combat power, a capable, connected, deployable, force able to operate easily alongside United States’ forces and within an integrated command structure, is likely to prove an asset in future global operations – and will, again, ‘buy’ influence. Less obviously, Britain’s highly respected intelligence services (particularly signals and communications intelligence), special forces, its contribution to the Global Missile Warning network and some ‘niche’ assets, such as
Airborne Warning and Control and ‘Rivet Joint’ signals intelligence aircraft, provide valuable support to United States’ operations. That said, several senior commentators in the United States have already suggested that any further cuts in defense spending could severely test this relationship, so the British government must remain mindful of the broader effects when considering future defense reviews.29

Thus far, this paper has taken a rather traditional world view, looking at issues against the background of the traditional state system and international affairs as currently constituted. However, states in the future world are likely to become increasingly interdependent and interconnected, and it is likely that the traditional national boundaries will become more porous. An increasing amount of business and diplomatic affairs will take on an international character with unrestricted access to the so-called ‘global commons’ of the sea, air, space and cyberspace becoming increasingly vital.30 Therefore, it becomes increasingly obvious that any future world power would be ill-advised to limit its strategy purely in terms of geography or regions of interest. The effects of the Chinese anti-satellite tests in January 2007 and January 2010 (and early reporting suggests 2013), which caused significant debris fields in busy orbits, are a harbinger of the extensive disruption that irresponsible behavior, or intentional attacks, could have on global operations across all areas of human activity.31 The widespread repercussions of aggressive actions in cyberspace, as exemplified by the attacks on the Estonian banking system,32 or the STUXNET virus in the Middle East, further demonstrate that a global outlook is required when enumerating national interest; it is no longer sufficient to designate regional areas of concern, or, indeed,
divide up the world into ‘regions of influence’. Again, the Anglo-American emphasis on norms of international behavior comes to the fore.

This paper has examined the challenges and opportunities faced by the United Kingdom as a result of the much-vaunted United States strategic rebalancing towards the Pacific. Britain considers its partnership with the United States as vital to its security and economic well-being and seeks to maximize its influence on United States’ policy-making. Many in Europe have seen the United States’ shift to Asia as threatening as a result of a ‘zero-sum’ philosophy; reality is a lot more nuanced. A number of options are available to Britain in the wake of the pivot, to maintain, or possibly develop, its influence on the United States. Britain has a long history in the Asia Pacific region and has a number of well-developed diplomatic and military relationships in the region on which it can draw. It also has a significant trade relationship with the region, particularly with China and Japan, and as a member of the EU. As a leading member of NATO and the EU, Britain should continue in its attempts to influence European nations to take more of a share in the provision of security in Europe and the ‘near abroad’, releasing the pressure on American forces to be redeployed to the Asia-Pacific region. Britain can also encourage burden-sharing and take a leading role in facilitating international co-operation in the provision of global ‘goods’ such as the prevention of piracy and in counter-terrorism. The United Kingdom is an influential P5 member of the United Nations Security Council and still possesses credible, deployable armed forces that are interoperable with those of the United States. In addition, it can enable unique access to the region and has certain niche areas of expertise and capability that would provide significant support to United States operations. United Kingdom policy-makers should,
therefore, see the United States strategic rebalancing to Asia as an opportunity rather than a threat, providing, as it does, security in an area of global economic importance, but also opening broader opportunities to support the United States, further develop influence and to build upon the ‘special relationship’. To conclude, the United Kingdom’s economic recovery and continuing prosperity, as with those of most developed countries, depends on global stability and growth. The country has always been a trading nation and will not prosper without a sustained economy, continued access to new markets and new sources of inward investment, and a global commons that is secure to all. The United States ‘pivot’ to Asia must, therefore, be seen not as a ‘distraction’ from Europe and the Middle East but as an attempt to support stability and security worldwide and therefore as opening new opportunities for prosperity and peace.


4 US Secretary of State-designate John Kerry, “The United States’ strategic pivot to Asia ‘should not and will not come at the expense of relationships in Europe, the Middle East or elsewhere,” Senate confirmation hearing, 24 Jan 13.


7 A spokesman at the Bureau of Asian Research in Washington DC suggested that 90% of Middle Eastern Oil will go to China by 2030 – Air War College Grand Strategy Program briefing 12 Dec 12.


14 Speech by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Rt Hon George Osborne MP, to the Asian Financial Forum, Hong Kong, 16 January 2012, at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/speech_chx_160112.thm Last accessed 7 Feb 12.


18 For information about UK trading relationships with Asia see http://www.businessinasia.co.uk/asiapacific/market-information


28 The Strategic Defence Review, 19.


Bibliography

Published Books:

Official Publications: