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Understanding pathways to and away from violent radicalization among resettled Somali refugees

Final Summary Overview

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Purpose

The overall objective of the proposed project was to understand pathways to diverse outcomes among Somali immigrants: why do some embrace greater openness to violent extremism, while others with shared life histories move towards gangs, crime, or resilient outcomes such as civic engagement? To what degree do these outcomes overlap? In this project we empirically examined the principle of multifinality, or pathways leading from a shared refugee experience to multiple outcomes. Understanding these different trajectories, and the factors that shape an individual’s progress towards diverse outcomes, provides critical information to local and state government agencies as they respond to the potential threat of domestic radicalization.

Somalis in North America offer a window into the remarkable potential that can be realized by refugees/immigrants despite experiences of severe adversity as well as the challenges some subgroups encounter when adjusting to life in a new country. Somalia has endured one of the longest and most brutal wars of the past 30 years. Civil war broke out in 1991 and the nation has existed in what has been described as a “perpetual anarchy” to this day (Agbiboa 2014). This enduring conflict has led to millions of Somalis being dispersed as refugees across the globe. As refugees with limited resources, many Somalis in North America are resettled in poor urban neighborhoods where they are visibly different, not only because of race or ethnicity but also because of dress, especially for women who wear a Muslim head covering. Somali refugees have also found themselves inserted into the unfamiliar black and white dichotomy that dominates American racial discourse (Kusow 2006). In this regard, though Somalis came to North America to escape the horrors of war, they often find themselves facing new problems, such as lack of jobs, loss of status, high levels of neighborhood violence, and racial and ethnic
discrimination (Betancourt et al. 2014; Abdi 2015). In addition, the community has been plagued by violence. For example, in Minneapolis, MN, where the greatest number of Somali refugees in the US has settled, the community has faced gang violence and the threat of youth radicalizing simultaneously. In the two-year period between December 2007 and January 2010, eleven Somali American youth were killed in gang violence in the twin cities and twenty left to join Al-Shabaab (Yuen 2010). More recently, nine Somali youth have been arrested and have been sentenced or are awaiting sentences for their attempts to join (Yuen, Ibrahim, and Aslanian 2015; Yuen, Ibrahim, & Xaykaothao, 2016). While the number of Somali American youth joining these groups are small and while the majority of Somali Americans are law-abiding citizens, the terrorist groups’ ability to recruit these youth and to convince some of them to engage in violent acts is concerning not only to policymakers and law enforcement but also to the Somali community which fears losing more youth to violence or having the community’s reputation sullied by being associated with terrorism.

While some of the social and cultural factors affecting Somalis are unique to that ethnic group, they also share experiences common to many immigrants—navigating identity development and duality as they move between home and host cultures, contending with discrimination as religious, racial and ethnic minorities, and striving to achieve their dreams while struggling to gain socioeconomic stability. Thus understanding their developmental trajectories may inform our understanding of other immigrant and refugee groups as well.

**Project Subjects**

Participants for the study were recruited from four communities in North America: Boston, MA, Lewiston/Auburn, ME, Portland, ME, Minneapolis, MN, and Toronto, Canada. Additional participants were also recruited from Lewiston, ME but are not included in the
current set of analyses in order to maintain more consistency around size of resettlement city
(Lewiston, a small city, provided a very different resettlement context). Inclusion criteria was
Somali youth between the ages of 18-30 born outside North America but who have resided in the
US/Canada for at least one year. We successfully recruited a diverse representation of young
Somalis, with a broad range of educational, religious, and acculturative backgrounds (Time 1
n=394 and Time 2 n=355). Table 1 provides demographic information for participants at Time 1.

Table 1. Demographic Information for Quantitative Interviewees (N = 394) at Time 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>M (SD)</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Participant age</td>
<td>21.33 (2.92)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years in U.S./Canada</td>
<td>13.81 (5.76)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Live in Boston, MA</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Live in Portland, ME</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Live in Minneapolis, MN</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Live in Toronto, ON</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>62.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In school</td>
<td>64.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>49.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not in school &amp; don’t have a job</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born in Somalia or Kenya</td>
<td>64.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born in U.S. or Canada</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Currently U.S./Canadian citizen</td>
<td>74.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grew up with mother only</td>
<td>46.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single</td>
<td>92.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Project Design and Methods

Our project was built on a decade-long Community Based Participatory Research (CBPR)
partnership between the PI (Dr. Ellis) and the Somali community; this partnership has led to
unprecedented data collection on sensitive issues, including violent extremism, within a
community that is historically very difficult to engage in research. Building on social control
theory (Hirschi & Stark 1969; Sampson & Laub 1994), and our preliminary data with Somali
youth, we empirically tested a model based on social control theory to understand and describe overlapping and diverging pathways to key outcomes: delinquency, gang involvement, openness to violent extremism, and civic engagement. We pursued this objective through a longitudinal mixed-methods interview design (or more specifically, a concurrent triangulation strategy; Creswell, 2009). First we conducted a series of quantitative interviews to explore the study hypotheses. Constructs of interest assessed through established instruments include: structural adversity (e.g. trauma exposure and discrimination), mental health (anxiety, depression, posttraumatic stress symptoms), social bonds (connection to the resettlement community, connection to the Somali diaspora community, connection to internet community, nationalism, and level of acculturation), criminality, gang involvement, and support for legal and illegal (violent) actions in support of political cause (termed openness to violent extremism). See Appendix A for more detailed about each construct and how it was measured in quantitative interviews.

Participants were recruited broadly from each of the four communities, with representation from diverse socioeconomic backgrounds. Snowball sampling, or asking youth who participated to identify and refer other youth who met the research criteria, broadened the sample. Snowball sampling has been shown to be effective with populations where trust is key to engagement (Ellis et al., 2008; Spring et al., 2003). Youth between the ages of 18 and 30 at the time of first interview who had been living in North America for at least one year were eligible to participate.

The research study team was made up of both Somali and non-Somali team members. Somali team members acted as cultural brokers, knowledgeable of both research and Somali cultures. This enabled them to lead recruitment efforts, explain the project to participants and acquire informed consent, and answer questions throughout the interview process. Non-Somali
team members conducted interviews to allow for an interview experience with reduced pressure to provide culturally-expected answers to questions and to address concerns that participants might know Somali team members. Participation in the study was confidential.

**Measurement approaches.**

Measuring illegal or socially undesirable behaviors or attitudes presents many challenges, ranging from ethical to practical. In order to promote truthful reporting, and to minimize risk to participants, sections of the interview that assessed sensitive information (e.g. delinquency, openness to violent extremism) were administered to participants in a way that ensured privacy. Participants were allowed to privately enter their responses to questions on an electronic tablet; at the end of the interview the data was immediately uploaded into an anonymous database. No identifying information was entered in the database. In order to facilitate linking Time 1 and Time 2 data each participant generated a code based on their responses to several personal questions that only they would know the answer to (e.g. what was your first car); these questions were used to re-generate the code and link the Time 1 record to Time 2 at the time of the second interview.

No valid and reliable measurement for risk for violent extremism exists; there is no single profile or set of risk factors that can accurately determine who is most at risk for engaging in violent extremist acts. Our study in no way attempts to determine who is most at risk. Rather, we sought to identify broad attitudes that would indicate a general openness to, or rejection of, the use of violence or illegal actions in support of a political cause. We interpreted an openness to support for the use of violence in the service of political change as a necessary (though not sufficient) aspect of radicalization to violence. We assessed this using the ‘Radicalism intention subscale’ from an adapted version (Ellis, Abdi, Horgan, Miller, Saxe, & Blood, 2014) of the
original Activism and Radicalism Intention Scales (ARIS; Moskalenko & McCauley, 2009). See Appendix A for more detailed description of the adapted version of the ARIS and Appendix B for the instrument itself.

Following the quantitative interviews, a subset of 40 individuals was selected to complete in-depth qualitative interviews that explored changes in the participants’ lives over the past year (since the Time 1 interview). Participants were selected purposively to represent diverse attitudes towards openness to violent extremism (see Table 2 below). The qualitative interview guide, developed by both Somali and non-Somali research team members, was designed to explore participants’ experiences and beliefs thought to be related to, or protective in relation to, radicalization to violence, as well as changes in these experiences and beliefs between time points. Particular attention was paid to experiences of formal (e.g. police) and informal (e.g. community) institutions over the past year. Examples of interview prompts include questions related to social bonds with family and community, and interactions with police. All interviews were audiotaped and subsequently transcribed.

Data Analysis

Quantitative data analysis. An approach called ‘Latent Class Analysis’ was used to test whether participants could be grouped into categories, or classes, based on the way they responded to key variables of interest. An analogy would be looking at what kinds of food a group of participants reported eating; if some people tended to only report eating fruit, grains and vegetables, these participants might be grouped together and labeled ‘vegetarians’. If other people reported eating meat, fruit and vegetables but no grains they might be ‘paleotarians’. A third group might eat everything. By grouping individuals into ‘latent classes’ more meaningful comparisons of other variables across the groups, such as heart disease, could be done than if all
the participants were lumped together and simply scored ‘high’ or ‘low’ on the amount of vegetables or meat eaten.

We applied this method to our data using attitudinal and behavioral variables: delinquency, gang involvement, openness to violent extremism, and civic engagement. Data were analyzed using initially a Latent Class\(^1\) Analysis (LCA; Everitt 1984; Goodman 1979; Mooijaart 1998; Kaplan 2008; Nylund 2007) to verify the optimal latent class structure for Time 1 data. The goal of the latent class model is to deduce a number of subgroups (latent classes) that best represent the observed patterns of responding in the data (Collins and Lanza 2010) against some form of error (unpredictable variance).

We then attempted to replicate the classes at Time 2 and found the results were very similar, suggesting that these groupings were meaningful across time despite changes to number of participants, in relation to civic engagement. This analysis involved testing for measurement invariance (Millsap & Kwok 2004), that is, the equivalence of the latent class structures between Time 1 and Time 2 data. This analysis involved comparing two nested models, one in which latent class probabilities were free to estimate at both time points and a comparison one in which the latent class probabilities at Time 2 were constrained to be equivalent to those at Time 1. Model comparison was again guided using information criteria as recommended in the literature (Collins & Lanza 2010). Results indicated that the constrained model (in which Time 1 and Time 2 data fit the same structure) provided a better fit to the data as both the AIC\(^2\) and BIC\(^3\) were

\[^1\] Collins and Lanza (2010) term the latent classes ‘latent statuses’ to reflect the fact that those classes are temporary due to time in that individuals move from one condition (state) to another.

\[^2\] The Akaike information criterion (AIC) is a measure of “goodness of fit” of a model or in other words, the relative quality of statistical models for a given set of data.

\[^3\] The Bayesian information criterion (BIC) is a model selection tool, offering a criterion (lower is better) for selecting a model from a limited set of models.
lower compared to the unconstrained model in which classification probabilities were left free to vary at both time points (AIC$_{\text{Invariant}}$=6084.790, AIC$_{\text{Free}}$=6143.810, BIC$_{\text{Invariant}}$=6266.215, BIC$_{\text{Free}}$=6395.013). This result supported the equivalence of the latent class solution between Time 1 and Time 2.

We then ran Latent Transition analyses (LTA; Collins 2001; Collins & Wugalter 1992; Langheine 1988; 1994) to see how likely it was that participants stayed in the same group from Time 1 to Time 2. Continuing with our previous analogy of looking at what kinds of food a group of participants reported eating, we wanted to see how likely it was that different types of people would change their eating habits over time. For example, how likely was it that someone who had previously been classified as a ‘vegetarian’ would stay vegetarian, vs. adding meat to their diet and becoming an omnivore?

Finally, we conducted additional analyses to profile groups along a series of demographic and other characteristics, such as length of time in the U.S. or experiences of discrimination, and to test whether certain demographics or experiences were significantly different between groups. We also examined how these demographics or experiences related to the likelihood that someone would transition between groups from Time 1 to Time 2.

Qualitative data analysis. As noted, 40 participants agreed to participate in a qualitative interview following their Time 2 quantitative interview. Demographic information for the subset of participants who participated in the qualitative interviews is provided in Table 2.
Table 2. Demographic Information for Qualitative Interviewees (N=40) at Time 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>M (SD)</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Participant age</td>
<td>22.14 (2.80)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years in U.S./Canada</td>
<td>16.29 (5.66)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Live in Boston, MA</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Live in Minneapolis, MN</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Live in Toronto, ON</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>70.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In school</td>
<td>55.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>62.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither in school nor employed</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born in Somalia or Kenya</td>
<td>55.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born in U.S. or Canada</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Currently U.S./Canadian citizens</td>
<td>77.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grew up with mother only</td>
<td>42.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single</td>
<td>90.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All 40 interviews were audiotaped (with permission from the participant) and subsequently transcribed. Six members of the research team, including two Somali team members, developed the coding and analyses process. First, through multiple iterative steps, codes were developed through the preliminary analyses of four transcripts. These codes were then applied by multiple coders to an additional four transcripts, and discussed until consensus was achieved. Codes were then modified and new codes were added to capture any new subjects or topics that had not emerged in the first set of transcripts. Finally, and in order to assess the reliability of coding, one member of the research team coded all forty transcripts, with a second member of the team coding every tenth transcript. Coding by the secondary coder was cross-checked with the transcripts coded by the primary coder.
Table 3. Examples of Codes Developed from In-depth Qualitative Interviews.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code; Name</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Future; Vision of the future</td>
<td>Any discussion of one’s personal future, including goals, aspirations, hopes, and fears</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police_inter; Police Interaction</td>
<td>Any discussion of interaction with law enforcement (FBI, police, etc.) including positive and negative interaction and trust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radical; Radicalism/Extremism</td>
<td>Any discussion of radical or extremist beliefs or actions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respect; Respect</td>
<td>Any discussion of respect, including self-respect and respect for others</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Analyses of coded transcripts were supported with NVivo (2012) and included examination by multiple team members for emerging themes (Charmaz, 2006). Qualitative analysis and quantitative analysis for this manuscript were conducted concurrently.

Findings

Latent Classes. Our findings indicate that participants fall into five distinct groups: 1) Delinquent, 2) Civically Engaged, 3) Civically Unengaged, 4) Radical Beliefs/Civically Unengaged, and 5) Radical Beliefs/Civically Engaged (See Figure 1).
Overall, the majority of participants in our sample fell into groups (classes) that were neither engaged in violence nor open to violent extremism. The largest proportion of participants was in a group that was civically engaged; the second largest group was not civically engaged, and did not support or engage in the use of violence. Participants of the remaining three groups expressed greater openness to violent extremism, but differed in important ways. Members of one of these groups (Delinquent) were also likely to be engaged in delinquent acts and/or gangs; members of another group (Radical Beliefs/Civically Engaged) were likely to be civically engaged; members of the third group (Radical Beliefs/Civically Unengaged) did not show high levels of delinquency or civic engagement.
Two groups (Civically Engaged and Radical Beliefs/Civically Engaged) were strikingly similar on all variables, with the exception of attitudes towards violent extremism: participants who fell in these groups were low on gang involvement, high on civic engagement and political engagement, but differed on levels of openness to violent extremism: Civically Engaged participants scored low on openness to violent extremism, while those in the Radical Beliefs/Civically Engaged group scored high.

*Stability of Latent Classes.* Figure 2 (below) depicts membership in latent classes at Time 1 and Figure 3 (below) depicts membership in latent classes at Time 2.

Figure 2. Latent Class Membership at Time 1.
Results with regard to the stability of latent class membership from Time 1 to Time 2 are shown in Table 4.

Table 4. *Five Class Latent Transition (LTA) Model for the Identification of Subgroups with Different Patterns of Gang Attitude, Political and Civic Engagement, and Openness to Violent Extremism.* *(N=242; subset of 394 that had full data available).*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Delinquent (N = 17†)</th>
<th>Civically Engaged (N = 102†)</th>
<th>Civically Unengaged (N = 50†)</th>
<th>Radical Beliefs/ Civically Unengaged (N = 24†)</th>
<th>Radical Beliefs/ Civically Engaged (N = 49†)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Latent Class Prevalence</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time 1</td>
<td>.070</td>
<td>.421</td>
<td>.207</td>
<td>.099</td>
<td>.202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time 2</td>
<td>.058</td>
<td>.500</td>
<td>.149</td>
<td>.070</td>
<td>.223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Transitional Probabilities</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delinquent</td>
<td><strong>.404</strong></td>
<td>.168</td>
<td>.082</td>
<td>.105</td>
<td>.241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civically Engaged</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td><strong>.843</strong></td>
<td>.036</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.121</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Civically Unengaged</th>
<th>.013</th>
<th>.318</th>
<th>.566</th>
<th>.044</th>
<th>.058</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Radical Beliefs/Civically Unengaged</td>
<td>.106</td>
<td>.189</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.572</td>
<td>.133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civically Engaged</td>
<td>.106</td>
<td>.320</td>
<td>.023</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.572</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** Row percentages add to 100% with some rounding error. Transitional probabilities shown in bold (in the diagonal to facilitate interpretation) demonstrate stability between Time 1 and Time 2 measurements for the same class. For example, 84.3% of the individuals who were classified in the “civically engaged” latent class at Time 1 remained in the same latent class at Time 2; however, 3.6% of them moved to the civically unengaged class and 12.1% to the radical beliefs, civically engaged class. Thus, the probability of remaining in the same class was 84.3%.

†Sample sizes in the parentheses represent Time 1 prevalence estimates.

Figure 4 (below) depicts the latent class transition data with more specificity. The circles in the left column represent membership in each of the classes at Time 1, i.e. 102 people were classified as Civically Engaged at Time 1. The pie charts in the right column depict where the individuals in that specific class transitioned to at Time 2. For example, the most stable group appeared to be the Civically Engaged group; 84% of participants who were classified in this group at Time 1 remained in this group at Time 2. The remainder of those who were classified as

![Figure 4, Latent Class Transition from Time 1 to Time 2.](image)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legend</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civically Engaged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civically Unengaged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civically Engaged / Radical Beliefs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delinquent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civically Unengaged / Radical Beliefs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
to the Civically Engaged/Radical Beliefs group (12%) and the Civically Unengaged group (4%).
The two groups that scored highest on openness to violent extremism (Radical Beliefs/Civically Engaged and Radical Beliefs/Civically Unengaged) had equal probability of being in the same group across time with stability rates of 57%. Most of the participants classified in the Radical Beliefs/Civically Engaged group at Time 1 that changed classification at Time 2 transitioned to the Civically Engaged group (31%); none transitioned to the Radical Beliefs/Civically Unengaged group. The least stable group was the Delinquent group with only 40% of those classified as Delinquent at Time 1 remaining in that group at Time 2. Twenty-four, or 1%, of those participants transitioned to the Radical Beliefs/Civically Engaged group and 17% transitioned to the Civically Engaged group. Overall the ‘Delinquent’ participants had great variability in their developmental trajectories.

Covariates and Stability Rates. Preliminary analyses suggest that when other variables were taken into account, such as the occurrence of discrimination or higher levels of depression/anxiety, etc., stability rates lowered; thus, the presence of any ‘negative event’ was associated with a greater likelihood that participants would move from one class to another between Time 1 and Time 2. Without taking into account adverse experiences, individuals moved from the Radical Beliefs/Civically Engaged group to the Civically Engaged group at a rate of 32% but, interestingly, preliminary data indicate that this rate became remarkably lower in the presence of negative events such as trauma or poor interaction with police (for both covariates rates went down to 14.5% from 32%; Ellis et al. 2015). This suggests that the presence of personal/societal obstacles such as those represented by covariates slowed down the transition from the Radical Beliefs/Civically Engaged group to the Civically Engaged group at Time 2.
**Civically Engaged and Radical Beliefs/Civically Engaged Groups.** The Civically Engaged and Radical Beliefs/Civically Engaged groups differed across a number of demographic and psychosocial variables (Ellis et al., 2015). Figure 5 presents a profile of the Civically Engaged and Radical Beliefs/Civically Engaged groups across a number of these variables.

**Figure 5.** Relationship between the Civically Engaged Group and Radical Beliefs/Civically Engaged Group Across Covariates. * Denotes statistically significant differences.

The estimates in Figure 5 represent percentages of individuals within two groups (Civically Engaged and Radical Beliefs/Civically Engaged) who endorsed certain experiences. The last four variables of Figure 5 (high trauma, high marginalization, high separation and lack of assimilation) were all significantly higher for those in the Radical Beliefs/Civically Engaged
group compared to those in the Civically Engaged group. None of the remaining variables were significantly different between those two groups.

Qualitative Results.

Four key themes emerged from our qualitative data analysis in relation to the question ‘How do Somali youth experience and perceive interactions with police’. These include: 1) experiences of unfair treatment, 2) experiences with ethnic Somali policing, 3) positive experiences of policing, and 4) consequences of unfair treatment by the police. Each of these themes represents salient and significant perceptions of treatment by the police of the respondents in our sample.

Many participants described feeling unfairly targeted or accused by police. This was the most common theme in the audio-recorded data from our respondents. They attributed this treatment to multiple statuses and aspects of identity including: being Somali, being black, and being Muslim. They also identified important negative outcomes of these processes. Often our participants described feeling targeted due to the “threat” they present by being Somali. Some participants specifically connected their unfair targeting to their Muslim religion, and the fact that terrorism investigations were being operated in their community.

Several Somali police officers were employed in communities where participants lived. In Minneapolis, a specific Somali community policing program had recently been launched. Participant opinions on the value of having Somali officers on staff varied widely. Some youth noted that this was a positive development and helped to bridge cultural and language barriers; others, however, felt that tribalism or policing based on cultural (rather than legal) norms lead to unfair treatment of Somalis by Somali police officers.
When positive experiences of police interaction were described they often were in relation to police involvement at community events, or when police played a more educational role with newer immigrants helping them to understand the law (as opposed to enforcing consequences).

Implications for Criminal Justice Policy and Practice in the United States

This study provides empirical validation for the notion that there is no single pathway to openness to violent extremism, nor is there a single type of individual most vulnerable to being open to violent extremism. Furthermore, within this sample of Somali refugees the vast majority neither participated in, nor expressed support for, the use of violence. The fact that individuals who showed openness to violent extremism varied in their other behaviors and attitudes is of significance for prevention and intervention efforts. Building on existing gang prevention/intervention programs may reach some youth who might be vulnerable to being open to violent extremism—but not all. Other youth might benefit from opportunities for constructive civic engagement that offers credible opportunity for making change or voicing opinions, while still others are disengaged from these activities and may be difficult to reach. Thus any efforts to prevent violent extremism will need to consider the various routes to reaching diverse youth, and recognize that the drivers of radicalization for different youth may be different.

Life experiences may play a role in determining group membership. Overall, a strong sense of attachment to one’s country of resettlement (in this case, the U.S. or Canada) was associated with less openness to violent extremism. In addition, an analysis of latent classes at Time 1 suggests that moderate levels of trauma and/or discrimination tended to be associated with groups that were in some way in support of making change; being in the Civically Engaged,
Civically Engaged/Radical Beliefs or Civically Unengaged/Radical Beliefs groups were all associated with moderate discrimination and trauma (Ellis et al. 2015). One possible interpretation is that exposure to moderate adversity may catalyze a desire for change; whether this change is sought through legal or illegal/violent means may be driven to some extent by the degree to which youth feel a sense of belonging and attachment to their country. Further longitudinal work may help to clarify to what degree adverse experiences such as trauma and marginalization create a context of greater risk for vulnerability to violent extremism, and how broader public health prevention efforts could be drawn on to broadly reduce potential vulnerabilities.

Our study also suggests that there is significant movement between groups, even over the period of one year. The Civically Engaged group, a group that appears resilient to violence, was the most stable: 84% of these participants remained in the Civically Engaged group at Time 2. However, 12% moved into the Civically Engaged/Radical beliefs group at Time 2. This subgroup will be important to understand; did they have unique experiences, relative to others, that might explain this movement towards radical beliefs? Such questions will be the focus of future analyses.

The Civically Unengaged and Radical Beliefs/Civically Engaged groups each showed a 57% stability rate, meaning 57% of participants classified in a group at Time 1 remained in the same group at Time 2. Within the Civically Unengaged group, almost all of those that transitioned moved into the ‘Engaged’ group; thus they moved from one non-violent group to another, more civically-engaged non-violent group. Within the Civically Engaged/Radical Beliefs group, the majority of those transitioning went to the Civically Engaged (again, non-violent) group. Thus overall, participants from the three largest groups tended to either remain in
groups that rejected violent extremism, or transitioned from groups that endorsed violent attitudes to those that did not. This is a promising trend, suggesting that radical beliefs may be relatively transient within this population.

The two smallest groups, however, showed more variability in their developmental trajectories. The Radical Beliefs/Civically Unengaged group showed a 57% stability rate (similar to the groups described above). Although 19% moved to the Civically Engaged group, the remaining 23% moved to groups that scored high on openness to violent extremism; Delinquent or Radical Beliefs/Civically Engaged. Thus this may be a group that is particularly important for practitioners and service providers to reach; the fact that they are not high on civic engagement, however, may also make this group less likely to be reached through community outreach programs or other civic programs. Further work is needed to better understand who is in this group, and what type of prevention efforts could best reach them.

Members of the Delinquent group were the least likely to stay in the same group; only 40% were in that group at both Time 1 and 2. They also were highly variable in which group they transitioned into; while the largest number transitioned to the Radical Beliefs/Civically Engaged group (24%), others transitioned into each of the other groups. Overall, roughly a quarter of the Time 1 ‘Delinquent’ participants transitioned into a non-violent group. Given the fact that members of this group seem primed to adopt new ways and/or relinquish old, prevention efforts that target this group may be particularly effective. Gang prevention efforts or criminal justice diversion programming may be particularly likely to reach these youth, and could impact developmental trajectories at a time when youth are particularly open to redirection.

For each of these two ‘violent’ groups (Radical Beliefs/Civically Engaged and Delinquent) the majority of those participants remained open to violent extremism at Time 2.
Despite this, it is important to note that a substantial subset of each of these groups appeared capable of moving in more positive directions. Future analyses understanding what might contribute to these more resilient trajectories will be important.

Preliminary findings also suggest that adverse experiences such as trauma and poor interaction with police may decrease the likelihood that an individual transitions from the Radical Beliefs/Civically Engaged group to the Civically Engaged group at Time 2; efforts to protect youth and young adults from these negative experiences may enhance movement towards non-violence and constructive civic engagement. Here again, public health models that more generally address health promotion and reduction of risk factors broadly in a community may also contribute to reduction of risk for violent extremism (Weine et al., 2015).

A further examination of experiences of interactions with police provides a more in-depth analysis of how formal institutions promote or hinder a sense of belonging and connection to one’s country of resettlement. Participants described experiences of unfair treatment at the hands of police, and understood this injustice to be the result of a variety of reasons related to their identity, including race, immigrant status, and Muslim religion. The type of unfair treatment youth reported ranged from stereotyping to acts of outright physical abuse. In addition, some youth described instances where they sought help but were turned away; taken together, these actions have the potential to greatly undermine police-community relations and to create an adversarial relationship between Somali immigrants/refugees and law enforcement.

The implications of such widespread negative interactions (or perceptions thereof) are manifold. Negative experiences of interactions with police may be undermining efforts to build immigrant-police partnerships at a time when they are especially critical. During the White House Summit on Countering Violent Extremism (2015), community-police partnerships were
identified as central to efforts to build community resilience and reduce the risk that youth would be drawn towards violent extremism. Poor police interactions undermine this effort in two ways. First, law enforcement depends on community members to share information if a youth exhibits concerning behavior that may indicate a movement towards radicalization. A willingness to share information with police requires established, trusting relations between law enforcement and community members; perceptions that Somalis are treated unfairly, are profiled or receive harsh punishment rather than support and assistance, will reduce the likelihood that community members will turn to police for help with vulnerable youth. Second, this research suggests that a strong sense of belonging and attachment to one’s country is protective in relation to openness to violent extremist views; policing practices that alienate Somali community members and contribute to the perception that they are ‘other’, and ‘less than’ American citizens work against this kind of attachment, and may in fact contribute to less resilient communities in relation to the threat of violent extremism.

**Conclusion**

Overall, Somali immigrants and refugees engage constructively in the civic and political life of their countries of resettlement (here, the U.S. and Canada) and are far more likely to reject violent ideas and actions that to endorse them. There is also a great deal of diversity within the Somali community, and no single set of beliefs or behaviors describes those who are most open to violent extremism. Over the course of one year there appears to be ample change in attitudes and behaviors related to civic action and attitudes towards violent extremism; appropriately formulated prevention efforts should, theoretically, be able to play a role in promoting more positive changes. Public health approaches that reduce adverse experiences in resettlement, such as discrimination and/or trauma exposure, may play a key role in reducing risk for vulnerability.
to violent extremism. Community oriented policing programs that have the potential to improve trust and relations with the Somali community may also play a critical role, as this study suggests the current state of police/Somali relations are largely marked by perceptions of unfair treatment. Finally, efforts to reduce vulnerability to violent extremism should take into account the diversity among youth, and strive to reduce negative psychosocial experiences.
References


NVivo qualitative data analysis Software; QSR International Pty Ltd. Version 10, 2012.


This resource was prepared by the author(s) using Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Appendix A. Description of How Each Construct Was Measured

**Structural Adversity**

1. **Trauma Exposure**
   To inquire about potentially traumatic experiences, the Somali adaptation of the War Trauma Screening Scale (WTSS; Layne, Stuvland, Saltzman, Djapo, & Pynoos, 1999) was used. The Somali adaptation of the WTSS is an 18-item self-report checklist of violence and adversity experienced in the context of war exposure (Ellis et al., 2008). Items inquired into a participant’s experiences such as a lack of adequate food, water, or clothing; forced separation from family members; rape; having a friend or family member killed; having an acquaintance killed; missing or losing a family member; having to flee suddenly; loss of property or belongings; having a house or shelter burned down; an acquaintance being injured; being physically separated from a loved one; being forced to leave home; witnessing the destruction of property like the burning down of a house among others. Participants were asked whether they had experienced each event (“yes” or “no”) and also asked to indicate how many times they had experienced each event if endorsed.

2. **Discrimination**
   To assess participant’s on-going, routine, and minor cases of perceived injustice/discrimination, we enlisted the nine item Every Day Discrimination Scale (EDD; Williams, Yu, Jackson, & Anderson, 1997). As an example of inquiry, participants were asked, “In your day-to-day life (now in the United States/Canada), how often are you threatened or harassed?” They were then asked to indicate “never,” “once every few years,” “a few times a year,” “a few times a month,” “at least once a week,” or “every day.” Other sample items include being treated with less respect than others and being called names or insulted.

**Social Bonds**

1. **Connection to the Somali Diaspora and Resettlement Community:**
   The Psychological Sense of Community Membership scale (PSCM; McGuire & Gamble, 2006) was used to assess connection to the both the resettlement and Somali diaspora community. The PSCM is an 18-item self-report measure of the sense of belonging an individual experiences towards his/her community. In collaboration with our Somali community advisory board, we adapted the measure to reference the Somali community separately from the non-Somali resettlement community, as it was expected that youth experience them in uniquely different ways. Therefore, we administered the instrument twice, first asking the participant to reference how they felt about their Somali immigrant community in resettlement and then asking them to reference how they felt about the host (non-Somali or American/Canadian) community. Sample items include, “Most of my community leaders are interested in me” and “There’s at least one person in this community I can talk to if I have a problem.” Participants rated whether each statement is true on a 5-point Likert scale from "not at all" to "completely."

2. **Connection to Internet Community**
To understand about connection to communities on the Internet, participants were asked to indicate how important their online community-as defined by the participant- is to them on a Likert scale from 1 (not at all important) to 7 (extremely important).

3. Nationalism
To assess nationalism or attachment to the United States/Canada the 8-item attachment subscale from The Measure of Identification with the National Group (Roccas, Klar, & Liviatan, 2006) was used. Participants were asked to indicate how much they agree on a scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) with statements such as “Being American (Canadian) is an important part of my identity” and “It is important to me to contribute to America (Canada).”

4. Level of Acculturation
Level of acculturation, more specifically feelings of marginalization was measured with the East Asian Acculturation Measure, developed by Barry (EAAM; 2001) and modified by Jorden, Matheson, & Anisman (2009) for use with Somali immigrants. Four different patterns of acculturation are provided by the EAAM: assimilation, separation, integration, and marginalization. The subscale of marginalization was utilized in this study. The marginalization subscale consists of 9 items which ask participants to indicate their level of agreement to statements on a scale from 1 (completely disagree) to 7 (completely agree). A sample statement is “Sometimes I feel that Somalis and Americans do not accept me”.

Criminality
To determine criminality, 17 items of the original 47-item Self-Reported Delinquency scale (SRD; Elliott, Huizinga, & Ageton, 1985; adapted version by Esbensen, Winfree, He & Taylor, 2001) were inquired about. The 17 items assessing specific delinquent behaviors (yes or no) and the frequency of those behaviors in the past year from the SRD that was most applicable for our population were used. Several subscales were created by combining items that conceptually grouped together: minor offenses (4 items), property offenses (6 items), and crimes against persons (5 items). Each subscale was dichotomized 0 = no delinquent behavior and 1 = presence of delinquent behavior.

Gang Involvement
To understand gang involvement, participants were asked about their attitudes toward or perception of gangs. Using five items adapted from Kent and Felkenes (1998), participants were asked to indicate how much they agreed on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) with statements such as “most kids in gangs are really okay” and “gang members seem to have a lot of fun.”

Mental Health
Participants were assessed for symptoms of anxiety and depression using the subscales of the Hopkins Symptom Checklist-25 (HSCL-25; Parloff, Kelman, & Frank, 1954). Participants were
asked symptoms of anxiety (10 items, e.g., “Have you felt faintness, dizziness, or weakness?”) and depression (15 items, e.g., “Have you been feeling hopeless about the future?”) that may have occurred in the past 4 weeks. Participants were asked to rank these symptoms on a 4-point scale from 1 “not at all” to 4 “extremely.” They were also assessed for PTSD using the 16 items from the Harvard Trauma Questionnaire (HTQ; Mollica et al., 1992). Participants were asked about how much they had been bothered by symptoms of post-traumatic stress in the past four weeks. For example, one question is, “In the past week have you had recurrent thoughts or memories of the most hurtful or terrifying events?” with answer responses ranging from 1 (not at all) to 4 (extremely).

Support for Legal and Illegal (Violent Actions) In Support of Political Cause

To inquire about openness to violent extremism, participants were asked items from the adapted version of the Activism and Radicalism Intention Scales (ARIS; Ellis, Abdi, Horgan, Miller, Saxe, & Blood, 2015). The original ARIS (Moskalenko & McCauley, 2009) was designed to assess readiness to participate in legal non-violent or illegal and violent political action, and to be used as an indicator of radical intent among groups potentially vulnerable to terrorist recruitment. The original ARIS starts by asking participants to rate the importance (from “1” = not at all important to “7” = extremely important) of five different groups: country, family, ethnic group, religious group, and college. Participants are then asked to think of “the group you feel closest to”, of those listed or any other group that is important and to write the name of that group down in the space provided. They are then instructed to answer the following questions in regards to the group they just named. The following nine items of the ARIS includes two subscales: Activism, four items assessing readiness to participate in legal political action and Radicalism, five items assessing readiness to participate in illegal and violent political action. Respondents rated items on a scale ranging from 1 (disagree completely) to 7 (agree completely). A score of 5 or greater has previously been interpreted as being ‘high’ on the radicalism scale.

The adapted ARIS was developed by Ellis and colleagues (2015) for use with Somali refugees after receiving detailed feedback from Somali community leaders. Based on community feedback, and in order to increase acceptability of the ARIS within the Somali community, we made several adaptations. First a list of groups that may be important to Somalis (e.g., tribe/clan, United States, etc.) was generated. The adaptation included rephrasing items to assess attitudes towards legal non-violent and illegal and violent activism, vs. personal intentions to engage in these types of activism. For example, in the adapted version an item assessing openness to illegal and violent activism was changed from “I would…” to say “I can understand someone who would…”. For example, I can understand someone who would participate in a public protest against oppression of his people even if he thought the protest might turn violent.” The phrasing ‘understand’ has been used in previous research assessing attitudes towards political violence, and found to be predictive of endorsing violent intentions (e.g. Doosje); thus while understanding someone who uses violence is conceptually distinct from being prepared to use violence one’s self, we use it as an indicator of attitudes towards types of activism. See Appendix B for the adapted version of the ARIS.
Appendix B. Adapted Activism and Radicalism Intention Scales (ARIS; Ellis, Abdi, Horgan, Miller, Saxe, & Blood, 2015)

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Disagree Completely Neutral Agree Completely

6. I can understand someone who would join/belong to an organization that fights for his people

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |

7. I can understand someone who would donate money to an organization that fights for his people

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |

8. I can understand someone who would volunteer his time working (i.e. write petitions,

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
distribute flyers, recruit people, etc.) for an organization that fights for his people

9. I can understand someone who would travel for one hour to join in a public rally, protest, or demonstration in support of his people

10. I can understand someone who would continue to support an organization that fights for his people even if the organization sometimes breaks the law

11. I can understand someone who would continue to support an organization that fights for his people even if the organization sometimes resorts to violence

12. I can understand someone who would participate in a public
13. I can understand someone who would attack police or security forces if he saw the police beating members of his people.

14. I don’t think someone has to be 100% certain who attacked him before he retaliates.